Hiwa Michaeli

Goethe’s *Faust* and the *Divan* of Ḥāfīẓ

Body and Soul in Pursuit of Knowledge and Beauty
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Goethe (1749–1832) received Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall’s complete translation of the *Divan* of Ḥāfīẓ (ca. 1315–1390) in May,¹ 1814.² Five years later, Goethe published his poetic work *West-östlicher Divan*, a text clearly influenced by Ḥāfīẓ’s *Divan*. Many studies have explored this literary encounter from numerous perspectives. Yet the majority of these comparative literary investigations, focusing solely on issues of influence and resemblance, are restricted in scope. They are limited to comparisons between Goethe’s *West-östlicher Divan* and Ḥāfīẓ’s *Divan*,³ often against the background of Goethe’s study of the cultural space of the Orient as he explains in *Noten und Abhandlungen zu besserem Verständnis des West-östlichen Divans*. Muḥammad Iqbāl’s productive reception of *West-östlicher Divan* in his 1923 collection of poems *Payām-i mašriqi* offers a different approach to understanding the literary encounter of 1814. In his poem *Ǧalāl and Goethe*, Iqbāl expands the intercultural literary dialogue beyond Ḥāfīẓ and Goethe by widening the textual field of observation beyond the two *Divans*. Set in paradise, the poem depicts a meeting between Maulānā Ġalāl ud-Dīn Balḥi-yi Rūmī (Rumi) and Goethe, in which Goethe reads one of his works aloud to Rūmī. Remarkably, the work in question is not *West-östlicher Divan* – rather, it is *Faust*. Goethe’s reading of *Faust* to the Persian Sufi-poet kindles an

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¹ In this work, the rules of transliteration as established by the ‘Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft’ (DMG) are followed. This means, Arabic words and phrases are rendered according to these rules for Arabic. Persian words, even if of Arabic origin, are rendered following the rules for Persian. Arabic names in Persian are rendered according to Arabic rules. Oriental words common in English are rendered according to English rules. Transliterations in older publications are kept throughout in their original form. The names of authors who have published in Western journals and publications are rendered in their original orthography throughout. I have followed the rules of DMG for differentiation between classical Persian and modern Persian, this is also applied to the names of authors. The word *Divan* in this work is seen as an English word, unless it is a part of a longer Persian phrase. Goethe’s orthography of the word *Divan* is identical with ours and is rendered as the original title of his work. Compare to: Carl Brockelmann et al., ‘Die Transliteration der arabischen Schrift in ihrer Anwendung auf die Hauptlautursprachen der islamischen Welt’, in *19. internationalen Orientalistenkongreß in Rom* (Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GMBH, 1969), p. 10; 12; 17. In difficult instances, e.g. *Mazdayasnā*, I followed Mu’in: Muḥammad Mu’in, *Farhang-e Mu’in*, 6 vols., Selsele-ye farhanghā-ye Mu’in (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1342–1352/1963–1973). I have also consulted Dehḥodā’s *Loğatnāme*: ‘Aliakbar Dehḥodā, *Loğatnāme* (Tehran, 1325/1946–1352/1973).


³ Henceforth, when I refer to the *Divan* without mentioning its author, I have in mind the *Divan* of Ḥāfīẓ.

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intellectual exchange between the two. *Faust* (and not *West-östlicher Divan*) reveals to Iqbal’s Rumi the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Du, der Wortes Geist erfaßt,} \\
\text{Die Engel jagst und Gott als Beute hast} \\
\text{Dein Denken sich im Herz verborgen hält,} \\
\text{Erschafft aufs Neue dann die Alte Welt!}
\end{align*}
\]

Considering the author’s vast knowledge of both Islamic and Western philosophy, Iqbal’s poetic work lends credibility to the project of expanding our textual scope of investigation beyond *West-östlicher Divan*. As Iqbal shows us, the dialogue between the two cultural horizons in question is not limited to *West-östlicher Divan*. Whatever the intentions of the historical Goethe may have been, Iqbal’s Goethe correctly locates this dialogue in *Faust* as well.

Several articles and short essays comparing Ḥāfīz’s *Divan* and Goethe’s *Faust* provide the background for the project described above. In an article published in 1966, for example, in the context of a more general comparison between the two authors, Şadiq Rezazzade draws attention to similarities between the respective mystical outlooks articulated in the *Divan* of Ḥāfīz and Goethe’s *Faust*.²

Bahā’ ud-Din Ḥorrāmsāhi, known for his commentary on Ḥāfīz’s *Divan* and his translation of the *Qurʾān* into Persian, is another scholar who contributes to an expanded comparative study of Goethe and Ḥāfīz. Ḥorrāmsāhi likewise compares Ḥāfīz’s *Divan* and Goethe’s *Faust* (as well as *West-östlicher Divan*) in an article from 1999 that more generally compares the two authors in terms of their social and political situations, their learnedness within their respective societies, and their world-views. Ḥorrāmsāhi’s comparison between *Faust* and the *Divan* of Ḥāfīz operates on multiple levels.³ On one level, reflecting the general framework of the article, Ḥorrāmsāhi focuses on the two authors themselves, arguing that the character Faust represents Goethe and the character ‘Inspired Libertine’⁴ (*rind*) represents Ḥāfīz. The analysis then moves toward the textual level. Ḥorrāmsāhi draws attention to the hypertextual aspect of the character of

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Faust – half historical charlatan and trickster, half multifaceted hero – and argues for the similarity between this characteristic of Faust and the character of rind in Ḥāfiz’s Divan. Rind, too, is a character with an ambivalent identity. Interpreted literally and in accordance with social historic meaning, he appears to be a base villain. Yet he also exhibits an antinomian heroic character with semiotic roots in Sufi literature.⁸

Finally, on yet another level, Ḥorramšāhī observes a remarkable similarity between the structures of the two works. Ḥorramšāhī offers a short explanation of the style of the Divan that is based on his previous studies. He defines the style of Ḥāfizian ḡazal as scattered (pāšān) – the verses of a given ḡazal do not merely illustrate a linear development of a single theme. This style, according to Ḥorramšāhī, is Ḥāfiz’s own innovation in ḡazal and the result of the poet’s studies of the Qur’an. Ḥorramšāhī then points out that Goethe’s Faust also deviates from classical unities; the thematic development of the scenes in Faust does not follow a logical, linear structure. Notably, however, Ḥorramšāhī provides no support for this claim. Furthermore, Ḥorramšāhī observes that both texts are filled with mythological, cultural, religious, and literary allusions. Yet Ḥorramšāhī admits that the comparison between the two texts requires further, in-depth investigation.⁹ His preliminary observations, particularly as they pertain to the German texts, lack sufficient textual support. Yet they suggest intriguing hypotheses and starting-points for further inquiry, such as the present study. Though not fully developed, Ḥorramšāhī’s observation regarding the similar ‘pāšān styles’ of the Divan and Faust was an original insight – and one to which we will return.

After Ḥorramšāhī, who dedicated a small part of the aforementioned article to opening the way for a comparison between Faust and Ḥāfiz’s Divan, Moṯtabāʾī, in the article Ḥāfiz in Goethe’s Faust, sets out to put the comparison between Faust and Ḥāfiz’s poems in the center of focus. The author’s aim is to trace possible reflections of Ḥāfiz’s poetry in Faust and thematic resemblances between the two works.¹⁰ He also aims to identify other Oriental, Iranian and Islamic lines of influence.¹¹ It is the first article exclusively dedicated to a comparison between Ḥāfiz’s Divan and Faust, and it makes a remarkable contribution to the field of comparative literary studies. Yet the elements of Faust that the author selects to compare to the Divan (and its cultural and intellectual background) are treated

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⁸ Ḥorramšāhī, ‘Ḥamdelī az hamzabānī behtar ast,’ p. 133.
⁹ Ibid., pp. 132–133.
¹¹ Ibid., p. 9.
without sufficient consideration of Faust’s own cultural, literary and intellectual background. The author points out similarities between the two works but neglects to reference studies carried out on the subject by German and international scholars. His repeated identification of Mephisto with Satan,\(^\text{12}\) for example, disregards Goethe’s explicit rejection of such an interpretation of the (much more complex) character of Mephisto.\(^\text{13}\) Consequently, the author identifies Mephisto with Satan without considering the drama’s historical context and Goethe’s own views on the possibility of representing evil in literature. In Faust I, the author assumes, Faust fights the temptations of Satan, and in Faust II, it is Satan who is overcome by Faust and is at his service.\(^\text{14}\) Moṭṭabā’i’s moral judgment of Faust’s actions in Faust I leads him to make general, ahistorical statements. And Moṭṭabā’i misguidedly praises Faust’s project in the fifth act of Faust II as one in which Faust seeks to improve the well-being and prosperity of his people.\(^\text{15}\) But this interpretation decontextualizes the drama from its historical context and neglects to pay due attention to the scholarship on the subject and the theatrical context itself – the blind Faust’s monologue is clearly meant to be ironic. Since the main objective of Moṭṭabā’i’s article is to search for and highlight possible similarities between the two texts, the author does not follow any specific and clear thematic approach. Thus, verses from Faust are picked out of context and juxtaposed to verses from Ḥāfīz’s Divan in a way that decontextualizes both works.

Despite their shortcomings, the comparative investigations described above pave the way for future investigation and advance hypotheses that can be examined and critically evaluated in more comprehensive studies. These early studies shed light on the similarities between Ḥāfīz’s Divan and Goethe’s Faust, and they identify Ḥāfīz’s engagement with the intellectual and ethical substance of Sufism – an essential part of Ḥāfīz’s historical, cultural and intellectual world – as an important source of these similarities.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 6.
\(^{13}\) Eggensperger describes Mephisto’s character in Goethe’s Faust as the ‘sicherlich schillerndste’ of dramatic and narrative representations of Mephisto: Klaus Eggensperger, ‘Den Bösen sind sie los. Überlegungen zu Mephistopheles und zum Bösen in Goethes Faust’, Pandaemonium germanicum, no. 8 (2004), p. 190. Huber further elaborates on various aspects of Goethe’s Mephisto by drawing attention to several of his ‘masks.’ He describes Mephisto as ‘the representation of a “schwankende Gestalt”’ to clarify his multifaceted identity. Peter Huber, ‘Mephisto is the devil – or is he?’, in Goethe’s Faust, ed. Hans Schulte, John Noyes, and Pia Kleber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 41. In §II.1.3.3 (‘Differentiating between Mephisto’s Intentions and Deeds’), I will explore Mephisto’s character.
\(^{14}\) Moṭṭabā’i, Ḥāfīz dar Faust-e Goethe, p. 10.
\(^{15}\) Ibid., pp. 21–22.
Though written in different historical and cultural contexts, Goethe’s *Faust* and Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan* were both composed during historical periods in which the relation between body and soul was being reevaluated. Philosophical and theological speculations, new intellectual approaches, and debates concerning the definition of ‘truth’ as immanent (rather than radically transcendent in relation to the world and the seeker of truth) informed the authors’ respective historical periods. Despite the historical and cultural distance between the two texts, the present study concentrates on this resemblance. The main question this study sets out to investigate is the following:

Is the change from a world-view based on transcendent truth to one based on immanent truth reflected in the two works in question?

Several sub-questions follow from this guiding question:

Are there traces of the pursuit of transcendent truth in the two texts?

If so, how does the pursuit of transcendent truth reflect itself in the two works in question? For instance, does it reflect in the manner in which the seekers of knowledge evaluate their own bodies and souls?

Are there textual instances in the literary works that illustrate the experience of the seeker of truth replacing a radically transcendent world-view with an immanent one?

Are there literary articulations of an immanent world-view in the two texts?

If so, what are the specific structural elements that form the immanent world-view in each work?

As the radically transcendent world-view becomes an immanent one, does the method or object of pursuit change as well?

The present study contains three chapters. Each chapter is divided into two sub-chapters in which I separately explore different aspects of the questions posed above relative to the specific intellectual, cultural and historical contexts to which each text belongs. At the end of each chapter I will provide a close comparison between the two texts based on the detailed findings of that chapter. Thus, we are able to pay close attention to the specific historical and cultural contexts of each work, while illuminating the phenomenological resemblances between the two texts so as to show possible underlying structural similarities pertaining to the thematic focus of a given chapter.

Following the questions posed above, I remain focused on the intellectual aspect of the views reflected in both texts. With regard to the Sufi views that manifest in the *Divan*, my concentration will remain on the ethical, cosmological and epistemological aspects of their intellectual content in relation to

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16 It is of seminal importance to note that, in both contexts, truth is seen as identical with the *divine*: see p. 19; 28; 40 below.
questions of this study. A comparative analysis of both works with a focus on theological perspectives – for instance, the influence of specific traditions of exegesis of the Old and New Testament or the Qurʾān – lies outside the scope of this study. Rather, the concern of this study is to trace the influence of the intellectual views regarding the relation between the intelligible content of the corporeal world (the soul) and the bodily realm upon the manner of evaluation of the body and the soul in one’s life. To that end, I will follow the dramatization of the life of the character Faust and the poetic descriptions of philosophical views concerning forms of life in the Divan. But discussions of life after death in the Divan, as well as the final scenes of Faust (Grablegung, Bergschluchten) that illustrate the journey of Faust’s immortal soul after death, will not be the subject of this study. They should be treated in a separate comparative study with a focus on Christian and Islamic theological traditions and conceptualizations of life after death. Furthermore, I only discuss those scenes of Faust pertaining to a horizon of human episteme that is comparable to the intellectual horizon of Ḥāfiz’s Divan. The fourth and the fifth acts of Faust II, therefore, which relate to modernism and Faust’s colonial projects, will not be included in this treatment. In other words, I follow Faust only in his pursuit of knowledge and love; Faust’s third reincarnation as the developer and colonizer remains outside of the scope of this study.

In the first chapter, I examine literary articulations of an ascending direct approach to the acquisition of knowledge and truth and I trace the influence of this epistemic view on the representation of body and soul in Faust and the Divan. To that end, I am guided by Platonic and Neoplatonic theories of transcendent truth; the relation between truth and the world; the manner of pursuit of truth; and the relation between body and soul. In addition to discussing these Neoplatonic views, in the context of Ḥāfiz’s Divan, I discuss the intellectual and ethical teachings of early Sufis (who were, in fact, influenced by Neoplatonism) in relation to the subject of the first chapter (i.e., the transcendent truth). First, I dedicate a section to clarifying the mode of knowledge present in the two texts, relative to their respective cultural and historical backgrounds. I explain the relevance of Neoplatonic views in this context. In both texts, I trace the influence of a world-view based on the radical transcendence of truth from the natural and sublunary realm. I show that the pursuit of knowledge within this world-view entails a Platonic exclusion of the material, bodily and natural realms in which the purified seeker of knowledge directly ascends to the extramundane truth. I demonstrate that this view manifests in metaphors of light and representations of the sun and the moon. In both texts, I locate textual instances in which the sun represents, metaphorically, the transcendent object of pursuit. Seekers of such knowledge, I argue, wish to fly directly toward this object, leaving the natural and the bodily spheres behind. Regarding
expressions of striving directly toward the extramundane source of knowledge, I locate in both texts indications of the impossibility of a radically negative and direct pursuit of the transcendent – an approach that is destructive to life itself and that causes pain and alienation from the world. I argue that the *Faust* drama exhibits a cycle of pain, escape into fantasy, and experience of disillusionment. This cycle contributes to the text’s dramatic development, including Faust’s attempt at suicide. The experiences of pain of the ascending seeker of knowledge are interwoven with a growing awareness of the necessity of rethinking the natural and bodily spheres as well as the relation between divine truth and the world. Assessing the critiques of the method of the pursuit of truth in both texts is the subject of the second chapter.

In the second chapter, I investigate the literary illustration of the shift from the pursuit of the transcendent truth to the pursuit of immanent truth in Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan* and Goethe’s *Faust*. To highlight the literary articulations of this process, I first probe the texts for descriptions of the world constructed in accordance with the view of truth as radically transcendent. Then, with a clear view of the characteristics of this initial state – i.e., the state that will undergo the shift I’ve described above – I focus on the process itself. I show how Faust’s academic title (‘Doktor’) and his study (Studierzimmer) represent a world characterized by an exclusive world-view as well as the practice of negation and purification of the natural and the bodily spheres. I analyze Faust’s expressions of discontent with the world that surrounds him. In this context, I point out the ways in which Neoplatonic views are modified in both texts; in case of the *Divan*, I also address Ḥāfiẓ’s polemics against elements of ascetic Sufism based on the radical transcendence of the divine truth. In this chapter, I trace Faust’s shifting views regarding truth – namely, whether his pursuit of truth requires mediation or not. I also explain the metaphorical role of colors in *Faust* and argue that verse 1120 describes the emerging turn toward life and a mediated approach to the object of pursuit in an immanent world-view. Furthermore, in this chapter, I differentiate between Mephisto’s actions and the intentions that he voices in Faust’s absence. Based on this differentiation, I advance an interpretation of Mephisto as a mediating figure who, through his actions, guides Faust through his own process of change. In both texts, the mediating figures help the respective character’s transition from an exclusive world-view to an inclusive one. I argue that this function is vividly present in Ḥāfiẓ’s mediating figure, Pir-i Muğān. Furthermore, I show that the mediating figures in *Faust* and the *Divan* both make use of the potentialities of paradox to overcome the binary view that anchors the practice of exclusion and negative ascension. Detecting the immanence of the divine in the natural and colorful beauty of spring, I identify spring’s beauty and its aesthetic appreciation as a component of the rejection
of a radically transcendent world-view. The importance of beauty and love, a central theme of the third chapter, is denoted in the title of this study. I argue in the third chapter that the increasing importance of beauty does not mean that the pursuit of knowledge loses its significance. The attempts to justify the pursuit of beauty and its appreciation in love reflect that they are corollaries of an intellectual turn toward a principally immanent world-view.

The third chapter explores the immanent world-views poetically articulated in the two texts. Goethe’s studies of Spinoza’s *Ethics* that were influenced by Herder inform my reading of *Faust* in this chapter. I show that, instead of directly pursuing the transcendent truth, Faust pursues beauty and love in the drama by comprehending natural and human beings as reflections of the One, the immanent divine, in the world. My analysis of *Faust* in this chapter also refers to Goethe’s dramatic fragment *Pandora*, his lyrical works in *West-östlicher Divan*, and other poems dedicated to the poetic articulation of his world-views. As for Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan*, I investigate the relevance of the Sufi views regarding immanence of the divine in the world. I refer to instances in the early history of Sufism in which Sufi adherents, worshipping beauty, integrate the adoration of human beauty into their process of self-development and pursuit of knowledge of the divine. Later, Sufism turned to reject an understanding of divine truth as absolutely transcendent and began conceptualizing it as immanent in relation to the realm of the multiplicity and nature. In the third chapter, I identify intertextual links between the poetry of Ḥāfiẓ, and two important Sufi treatises on love written by Aḥmad Ġazzālī, and Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿĪrāqī. I trace this intertextual link based on the terms that the *Divan* shares with the works of these two Sufi masters. Furthermore, I describe the relation between the pursuit of beauty and a mediated immanence of the One, the being that is referred to as the Beloved in this context. In *Faust* and Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan*, I show that, in place of the quest of ascension and separation of the body from the soul, the pursuit of beauty involves the mediated immanence of the One in the form of its reflected images. In this chapter, I show that the light metaphors function differently. In both texts, I observe instances of hyperbole that denigrate the sun in the face of physical, human beauty. In addition to pointing out the differences between the two texts, I show the underlying structural similarities between their respective representations of immanence. I show that the immanent world-view in both texts is based on a monistic view that explains the relation between the One and the many. This monistic view conceives the One as the ontological ground of the many; in turn, the many are recognized to be mediated reflections and images of the One. The underlying structure of this world-view, I argue, encompasses three sets of relation: the One and the world; the One and humans; and humans and the world.
The following study, however, does not investigate influences of Ḫāfīz’s Oriental cultural space on Goethe’s Faust. The study at hand is a purely phenomenological literary study; it sets out to explore the two texts in their own contexts and to find literary articulations relevant to the relation between body and soul with regards to the acquisition of knowledge.

Before turning to the two texts, I briefly discuss the issue of genre in Goethe’s dramatic work (written almost entirely in verse) and Ḫāfīz’s lyrical Divan. Ḡorramšāhi’s study of the structural similarities between Faust and Ḫāfīz’s Divan is the first treatment of the difference of genre of these two texts. In the following section, I further explore the problem of genre in Goethe’s Faust and Ḫāfīz’s Divan. I elucidate the structural features of these texts that enable my cross-genre reading and comparison.

On the Structure of Goethe’s Faust and Ḫāfīz’s Divan and the Problem of Genre

The earliest readers of Latin translations of Ḫāfīzian ġazals, around the turn of the eighteenth century, had difficulty understanding the connection between individual couplets and the poems they comprised. It is well known that conventional notions of literary analysis such as unity of theme and linear development of a single subject do not apply to the Divan. William Jones’s hasty critical description of Ḫāfīz’s poems as ‘simple lay’ and ‘[l]ike orient pearls at random strung’ stems from his unfamiliarity with the style of Ḫāfīz’s ġazals. The historical record suggests that the poet deliberately innovated with his style of ġazal by abandoning the genre’s previous conventions of linear structure and development of a single theme. In fact, the poet’s innovation was appreciated even in his own time and, to this day, his works are considered to be the peak of Persian classical ġazal. In Fifty Poems of Ḫāfīz, Arberry makes a significant contribution to our understanding of what he describes as Ḫāfīz’s ‘revolutionary’ innovation in ġazal. According to Arberry, Ḫāfīz discovers ‘that a ghazal may treat of two or more themes and yet retain

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its unity.\textsuperscript{19} The peak of Ḥāfīz’s development of this style, according to Arberry, occurred when he discovered that ‘it was not necessary to develop a theme to its logical conclusion at all; fragments of themes could be worked into the composition without damage to the resulting unity.’\textsuperscript{20} Arberry notes that formation of this style was facilitated by the fact that ‘the convention had produced a regular repertory of themes’ the slightest allusion to which would be recognized by the audience.\textsuperscript{21}

Responding to Arberry’s findings and reflecting that Ḥāfīz was an expert in the Qur‘ān and knew it by heart, Ḥorramshāhi draws our attention to the fact that, in many cases, the Surahs of the Qur‘ān do not adhere to unity of theme.\textsuperscript{22} For instance, following the story of a given prophet or group of people in the Qur‘ān requires that the reader jump around from verse to verse and Surah to Surah. (The story of Joseph in the 12th Surah is an exception to this rule.)\textsuperscript{23} According to Ḥorramshāhi, the poet’s pāšān style in the Divan mimics that of the Qur‘ān. In both texts, independent verse-units act as contributing parts to the whole. To grasp the way different themes are treated in one poem and repeatedly revisited in other ḡazals in meaningful variations, Ḥorramshāhi argues, requires reading the Divan more than one or two times. To go beyond enjoying single verses or groups of verses in each ḡazal and to appreciate and then analyze the ‘multidimensional’\textsuperscript{24} treatment of various themes across the Divan, one needs to consider the whole Divan in relation to each theme. Achieving this level of acquaintance with the Divan requires repeated readings.\textsuperscript{25}

Considering (a) Arberry’s remark on the relevance of presence of the repertory of themes in the literary convention, and (b-1) Ḥorramshāhi’s comparison of the Qur‘ān’s manner of non-linear thematic development with the pāšān style of the Divan, and (b-2) Ḥorramshāhi’s mention of richness of literary, and textual references in the Divan,\textsuperscript{26} it becomes clear that intertextuality plays a more significant role in the Divan than Arberry recognizes. Belonging to a textual network of hypotexts is essential for the pāšān form of narration. The Qur‘ān succeeds in its pāšān form of narration only because it is in constant reference to

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., pp. 30–31.
\textsuperscript{22} Ḥorramshāhi first developed this view in the following work: Ḥorramshāhi, ‘Oslūb-e honari-ye Ḥāfīz va Qur‘ān’.
\textsuperscript{23} ———, ‘Hamdele az hamzabānī behtar ast,’ pp. 132–133.
\textsuperscript{24} ———, ‘Oslūb-e honari-ye Ḥāfīz va Qur‘ān’, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{26} Ḥorramshāhi, ‘Hamdele az hamzabānī behtar ast,’ p. 132.
the Old and New Testament. The Divan can treat multiple topoi in fewer than ten verses, and enjoys its celebrated status in the Persianate world, because it is a hypertext in constant reference to five hundred years of Persian literature. Arberry describes this intertextual quality as ‘that “plagiarism” which all Persian (and Arab) poets have practiced from the beginning, and none more constantly or discriminately than Ḥāfīz.’

This quality of the text necessitates a specific manner of reading: for example, investigating the significance of spring in the Divan (as I do in the second chapter) requires considering each separate occurrence of the term ‘spring’. Furthermore, it is essential to consider the context of the texts to which Ḥāfīz alludes and from which he borrows terms and figures of speech. In describing spring, for instance, he borrows a phrase from Rūdaki, a tenth-century poet, whose non-Sufi poems fit in the genre of seasonal bacchanalian poems. By borrowing from Rūdaki, therefore, Ḥāfīz connects his own work to that poetic tradition and its manner of appreciating nature. The same is true regarding the topoi of piety, libertinism, asceticism, antinomianism, love and wine. Ḥāfīz’s innovation occurred at a historical moment in which he may have assumed that his readers had committed many verses from famous poets to memory – the minds of his learned readers were archives of lyrical poetry and themes. The poet himself (as the Divan proves beyond doubt) committed an immense number of verses to memory in addition to the Qurʾān. In allusion to these texts and topoi, Ḥāfīz produced poems that can be described as texts produced by texts.

In the poems of the Divan, Ḥāfīz abandons the principle of unity of theme. By revisiting limited themes from different angles and in climactic, novel settings, Ḥāfīz creates, in his well-polished verses, independent fragments contributing to the development of larger themes within the Divan as a whole. Thus, to readers who are able to have the whole Divan present in their minds and who are learned in Persian classical literature, the Divan becomes a tale of various familiar characters and settings – often presented in conflict with one another. Specific world-views and spiritual and religious philosophies are brought into

27 Arberry, Classical Persian Literature, p. 325.
28 See §II.2.4.1 (‘The Repentance-Shattering Spring’).
29 Compare to: Lewisohn, Hafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry, pp. 11–12.
30 On multiple occasions, Ḫorramšāhi refers to Ḥāfīz (whose name literally means the protector, the safe keeper, and the one who has memorized something) as our (i.e., the Persianate) collective memory and collective unconscious. Ḫorramšāhi, ‘Hamdeli az hamzabānī behtar ast,’ pp. 122–123; ———, ‘Ḥāfīz dar farhang-e mā va farhang-e mā dar Ḥāfīz’, in Ḥāfīz ḥafeze-ye mā-st (Tehran: Naṣr-e Qaṭre, 1385/2006).
dialogue with each other through characters familiar to the readers: for instance, the Shaikh (šayḫ), Pīr-i Muğān, the judge (qāżī), the lover, the morality police (muḥtaṣīb), the drunkard and the vintner, the zealot ascetic (zāhid), the libertine (rind), faqih, and Ḥāfiz himself. Terms pertaining to followers of specific ways of life, religious affiliations, and intellectual perspectives; local settings such as the mosque, the pleasure-house (ḥarābāt), the oratory, the temple of the Magi, the hermitage, the bazaar (bāzār), the madrasa, and the wine-house; and objects such as the Sufi garment, the goblet, the prayer-rug, prayer-beads, the lyre, and the lute all contribute to Ḥāfiz’s non-linear and polyphonic epic tale. This makes Ḥāfiz’s Divan an infinitely suggestive tale, which doesn’t have a single beginning, but which invites the reader to enter through each couplet and each ġazal.

The following verses from the poem Unbegrenzt from West-östlicher Divan shows that Goethe regards the quality of absence of beginning and endings as a characteristic of Ḥāfiz’s poetic style; it also reflects that Goethe has noted the essential role of repetition in the Divan of Ḥāfiz:

Daß du nicht enden kannst das macht dich groß,
Und daß du nie beginnst das ist dein Loos.
Dein Lied ist drehend wie das Sterngewölb e,
Anfang und Ende immerfort dasselbe,
Und was die Mitte bringt ist offenbar,
Das was zu Ende bleibt und Anfangs war.32

Staiger admits he cannot believe Goethe would read ‘solche Verse ohne Anfang und Folge und Schluß mit größtem Entzücken’.33 He further remarks that the poem Unbegrenzt elevates, as the Persian poet’s greatest accomplishment, those very characteristics of Ḥāfizian ġazal that ridicule classical form – ‘die aller klassischen Ordnung spotten’.34

The unconventional structure of Faust – namely, its quality of being formed out of numerous literary genres and theatrical traditions – is a characteristic of Goethe’s life-work. It is evident on the first reading of the text, which takes the reader through the lyrical Zueignung, the Vorspiel auf dem Theater (the fragment that treats the institution of theater),35 the Prolog im

34 Ibid.
35 J. W. Goethe, Faust Texte und Kommentare, ed. Albrecht Schöne, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 2005). [Henceforth citations from ‘Faust’ will be from the first volume of this
Himmel (a scene that invokes mystery plays) and, finally, the scene Nacht and Faust’s first soliloquy.\textsuperscript{36} It seems that Faust provides a case-study of the mixture of genres that Goethe discusses in Drei Natur Formen der Dichtung (his notes to West-östlicher Divan). In this text, Goethe describes the three genres of poetry – lyrical, epic and dramatic – in terms of three forms of poetic production (‘drey Dichtweisen’): The first is enthusiastic, the second narrates in a clear fashion, and the third illustrates people in action.\textsuperscript{37} More importantly, Goethe asserts that ‘[i]n dem kleinsten Gedicht findet man sie oft beyzammen, und sie bringen eben durch diese Vereinigung im engsten Raume das herrlichste Gebild hervor’.\textsuperscript{38} They differ in their mode of articulation, and they contribute to the formation of the whole work.\textsuperscript{39} Throughout Faust, we observe Goethe interweave the dramatic structure with poetic segments of high lyrical quality – ‘lyrische Einlagen’, as Schöne describes them.\textsuperscript{40} These include the Zueignung, the song of the Archangels, the soliloquies in the scene Nacht, the Easter song, the monologues in Osterspaziergang, the song of the spirits at the end of Studierzimmer [I], Gretchen’s songs, and Faust’s soliloquy of gratitude in Wald und Höhle. This mode of articulation permeates the drama from the beginning to the end – the last verse of the song of Chorus Mysticus. Although these poetic segments are a fundamental part of the drama, they also assume individual identities that transcend the work as a whole. Composers such as Zelter, Schubert, Schumann, Wagner, Berlioz, and Mahler, to name just a few, have put these poetic segments to music.\textsuperscript{41} Faust’s monologue praising spring and the sun in the scene Osterspaziergang has become a part of German culture. In 2017, I personally witnessed an Easter family gathering in which verses 903–940 were recited to a rapt audience; as another example, the slogan of the ‘dm’ drugstore chain plays on verse 940. The relation between these lyrical pieces and the drama as a whole can be described as the relation between the text and its semiotic units that form a hermeneutical circle. These semiotic units, which may be appreciated independently of the larger edition in case of reference to other verses outside the body of the drama it will be signified as FT and the second volume is referred to as FK] FK, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{36} See: FK, pp. 18–19.
\textsuperscript{37} FA I, 3/1: p. 206.
\textsuperscript{38} FA I, 3/1: p. 206 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{39} To support his point, Goethe divides French tragedy and the performances of his contemporary improvisators in public markets into three parts – the beginning, the middle and the end – and shows how each stage of the formation of the work makes use of a quality that is present in one of the three natural forms of poetry. FA I, 3/1: p. 207.
\textsuperscript{40} FK, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{41} See: FK, pp. 19–20.
context, nonetheless accompany the reader of the whole text and enrich the reading experience. *Faust* contains many monologues and soliloquies that are lyrical articulations of condensed and universal human experiences. Such monologues and soliloquies are given not only to Faust, but also to Mephisto, Helena, Lynceus, Gretchen, and even minor characters such as Erichto. These universal lyrical poems are part of the *Faust* drama, but they also speak to the reader on an individual hermeneutical level. For instance, we find one of the most vivid articulations of Helena’s beauty in Lynceus’s lyrical monologue. Yet the monologue also has a narrative function: it justifies Faust’s pursuit of Helena. As I explain below, the role of lyrical poetry in *Faust* is one of the drama’s structural characteristics.

As Schöne notes, Goethe and Schiller were in correspondence in 1797 on the topic of dramatic and epic poetry. This correspondence may have informed Goethe’s decision to structure the drama in the way that he did – a composition of fragments that are graceful and intellectually engaging, independent entities, yet which contribute to the formation of the whole. In his account of his conversation with Goethe on February 13, 1831, Eckermann recounts Goethe reflecting on the structure of act four of *Faust* as follows: ‘Dieser Akt bekommt wieder einen ganz eigenen Charakter, so daß er, wie eine für sich bestehende kleine Welt, das Übrige nicht berührt, und nur durch einen leisen Bezug zu dem Vorhergehenden und Folgenden sich dem Ganzen anschließt.’ Here, the author casts light on two important characteristics of his work: (a) the independence of the parts; and (b) the allusive references that link them to the whole work. Goethe suggests that these qualities apply to the whole drama – not only to act four. Eckermann makes this point explicitly:

Er wird also, sagte ich, völlig im Charakter des Übrigen sein; denn im Grunde sind doch der Auerbachsche Keller, die Hexenküche, der Blocksberg, der Reichstag, die Maskerade, das Papiergeld, das Laboratorium, die klassische Walpurgisnacht, die Helena, lauter für sich bestehende kleine Weltenkreise, die, in sich abgeschlossen, wohl auf einander wirken, aber doch einander wenig angehen. Dem Dichter liegt daran, eine mannigfaltige

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42 When discussing the presence of independent fragments in Goethe’s *Faust*, we should note that different versions and sections of *Faust* was made available to readers at different times: *Faust Ein Fragment* appeared in 1790; *Faust I* in 1808; Helena Act in 1827; and the first act of *Faust II* in 1828. See FK, pp. 66–67, 386–387.

43 FK, pp. 389–390. Citing Schiller’s letter to Goethe from April 21, 1797, Schöne brings to light that this is a case in which Goethe’s intellectual and theoretical exchange with Schiller informed the structure of his drama in a mixture with the genre of epic literature in which the independence of the parts is characterized by the two authors as a main characteristic of the genre.

44 FA II, 12: p. 433 (my emphasis).
Welt auszusprechen, und er benutzt die Fabel eines berühmten Helden bloß als eine Art von durchgehender Schnur, um darauf aneinander zu reihen was er Lust hat.  

In addition to supplying examples from parts I and II of *Faust*, Eckermann also underscores the two qualities discussed above: the independent nature of the separate parts and their integration into the whole through allusive references. His further elucidation of the structure of the drama clearly assigns epical characteristics (based on Goethe and Schiller’s theoretical collaboration) to the drama. The tale of the ‘famous hero’ here functions as the string that unites the scenes and settings of the drama and makes up the unity of the whole work. Goethe agrees with Eckermann’s assessment of the structure of *Faust*:

> Sie haben vollkommen Recht, sagte Goethe; auch kommt es bei einer solchen Komposition bloß darauf an, daß die einzelnen Massen bedeutend und klar seien, während es als ein Ganzes immer inkommensurabel bleibt, aber eben deswegen, gleich einem unaufgelösten Problem, die Menschen zu wiederholter Betrachtung immer wieder anlockt.

A work composed in such a style must be read several times, Goethe continues. What he does not discuss is *Faust*’s relation to its hypotexts – a relation that Eckermann alludes to when he describes ‘die Fabel eines berühmten Helden’ as the string that runs through the drama.

For texts written in such a style, intertextual relations are crucial to understanding fragments individually and in relation to the whole. Referring to Koselleck’s discussions of the subject, Schöne argues that Goethe’s view of history informed the non-linear structure of *Faust* – a structure more present in *Faust II*, he claims, than in *Faust I*.  

> Goethe, Koselleck explains, believed that the structure of world-history (though not, of course, its specific events) was circular, ‘so daß alles darauf ankommt, das Altbekannte im Neuen wiederzuentdecken und zu formulieren.’  

Here, Koselleck leaves no doubt that the ‘Altbekannte’ also includes human textual literary heritage and that the two acts of recognition and formulation can be read as acts of reception and literary production. Schöne finds traces of this view in the reoccurring stories of *Faust* that, in new constellations and disguises, repeatedly unveil themselves.

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45 FA II, 12: p. 433.
46 FA II, 12: p. 433 (my emphasis).
47 FK, p. 388.
to the reader. Based on Goethe’s view of history and deep knowledge of cultural and textual literary traditions, Koselleck remarks:

Dreitausend Jahre der Kulturen, ihre Mythen und Sagen hatte er gespeichert, um sie hermeneutisch, metaphorisch, ironisch, sarkastisch oder spöttisch, didaktisch, mutig oder übermütig, zornig oder sanft und duldsam abzurufen: jedenfalls umzugießen in seine Werke.

In *Faust*, the epic genre and lyrical poetry are all dressed in the garment of a verse drama that is, on many levels, deeply interwoven with its hypotexts and embedded in its historical, intellectual, cultural background.

These qualities of *Faust* invite comparison to Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan*, another unconventional work of lyrical poetry. In the *Divan*, each *gazal* contains multiple threads of fragments that repeatedly allude to settings familiar to its Persianate readers. Taken together, the *gazals*, featuring well-known characters, suggest a tale of epic qualities. These fragments are in constant reference to the body of Persian literature and the textual intellectual heritage from the earliest works of Persian lyrical and epic poetry to Ḥāfiẓ’s own contemporaries. Each fragment acts as a monologue or a soliloquy from the point of view of one of the characters in the *Divan*. In some cases, well-known characters are placed in dialogue, a literary technique that further embeds them in the setting of the poem. Rooted in the historical, intellectual and spiritual context of his time, Ḥāfiẓ redefines and rearticulates these well-known themes, characters and settings. He thereby creates a story that conveys the poet’s critical views of the content of the cultural and literary material that he engages with. These critical views are based on his life experiences and his close observation of contemporary institutions and figures that were also historical extensions of his past. This story of the *Divan* invites comparison to *Faust*.

50 FK, p. 388.
I Direct Pursuit of Knowledge of the Transcendent Truth

I.1 Definitions and Contextualizations

In this chapter, I explore the textual articulations pertaining to a direct pursuit of knowledge of the transcendent truth in both our texts. The first step will be to inquire into the presence of knowledge and its pursuit in both texts. Then I define the form of knowledge in question. Furthermore, I define the boundaries of knowledge and the quest for knowledge within which Goethe’s nineteenth-century drama can be compared to the fourteenth-century Divan of Šams ud-Dīn Muhammad Ḥāfīz of Shiraz (Ṣīrāz). In this chapter, based on definitions discussed below, I explore the significance of the pursuit of knowledge in regard to the way the seeker of knowledge values and treats the body and soul. In the chapters that follow, I explore possible modifications of the approach, object of pursuit, and significance of the body and soul in Goethe’s Faust and Ḥāfīz’s Divan.

I.1.1 The Representation of Knowledge in the Beginning of Faust I

The reader starts to construct an image of Faust’s character from the following verses in the Prolog im Himmel:

DER HERR
Kennst du den Faust?
MEPHISTOPHELES
Den Doktor?
DER HERR
Meinen Knecht!1

The Lord is the first one to mention Faust’s name; Mephistopheles immediately recognizes him as ‘the doctor’.2 The co-presence of the Lord and Mephistopheles in this scene highlights two aspects of Faust: as an individual, he is ‘der Doktor’; but Faust is also ‘der Knecht’, a description that alludes to the Biblical story of Job: ‘Der Herr sprach zu dem Satan: Hast du nicht acht auf meinen Knecht Hiob

1 V. 299.
2 This manner of introducing Faust is an allusion to the biblical story of Job. (Job 1: 6–12) See: FK, pp. 170–171.

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While most of the drama depicts Faust as an individual free from a predetermined destiny (‘der Doktor’),\(^\text{4}\) in the scene *Bergschluchten*, the other aspect of Faust (‘der Knecht’) comes to the fore. It is, however, undeniable that the mention of Faust’s name in the *Prolog im Himmel* – a scene in which all the archangels as well as Mephistopheles are gathered in a heavenly assembly – opens the way for the reader to form interpretations that are of a transhistorical and archetypical nature.\(^\text{5}\) Yet this does not justify a reading that approaches the text as an account of a predetermined fate written in heaven. Rather, the drama goes through its chain of events in accordance with the logic that the work itself constructs as it unfolds.

Mephistopheles describes Faust as an individual full of longing and restlessness: ‘Und alle Näh und alle Ferne | Befriedigt nicht die tiefbewegte Brust.’\(^\text{6}\) Yet the cause of his discontent is unknown. The curious reader who carries this question with him to the scene *Nacht* finds Faust no less restless and lost than he was (as Mephistopheles describes him) in the *Prolog im Himmel*, but at least in the scene *Nacht* the reasons for Faust’s agonies are explained. In his opening soliloquy, Faust makes it known that he is a polymath, ever longing for more knowledge. Four branches of knowledge are mentioned. The first is philosophy and the last, named with explicit irony, is theology – or as Faust says, ‘leider auch Theologie!’ It is clear why the drama is considered a ‘Gelehrtentragödie’.\(^\text{7}\) While introducing *Faust I* as oriented around two main themes,\(^\text{8}\) Trunz rightly points out that what Faust expects to achieve is ‘durch

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4 Compare to FK, p. 164.
6 V. 306–307
8 Trunz suggests that *Faust I* is constituted of two main thematic lines, which are ‘Gretchentragödie’ and ‘Gelehrtentragödie’. HA, vol. 3: p. 470.
Erkenntnis über sich hinauszugelangen’. Here, we approach and analyze Goethe’s Faust in respect to one thematic aspect – the longing to go beyond the existing definitions of self through self-knowledge and knowledge of the world. Yet first we must define the form of knowledge in question.

I.1.2 Knowledge and Self-knowledge in Faust

To explain the relation between knowledge and self-knowledge in Goethe’s Faust, it is first necessary to understand the author’s view of knowledge in relation to the human being.

The most important feature of Goethe’s theory of knowledge is that it views truth, the object of pursuit, as identical with the divine. The relation between the divine source of intelligible content in the world, on the one hand, and the world itself and the seeker of knowledge, on the other hand, must be considered in this light. This does not mean that Goethe considers the natural world to be devoid of intelligible divine content. On the contrary, as the following quote from his Versuch einer Witterungslehre explains – and as I will further demonstrate in the course of this study –, the One and the many are intimately related. The former is perceivable in the latter in an indirect manner:

\[\text{Das Wahre mit dem Göttlichen identisch, lässt sich niemals von uns direkt erkennen, wir schauen es nur im Abglanz, im Beispiel, Symbol, in einzelnen und verwandten Erscheinungen; wir werden es gewahr als unbegreifliches Leben und können dem Wunsch nicht entsagen, es dennoch zu begreifen.}\]

Bearing this fact in mind, we now turn to Goethe’s pursuit of knowledge of nature.

After controversial debates in the late nineteenth century regarding the significance of Goethe’s contribution to science, contemporary scholarship sees the writer of Faust as a researcher of natural sciences as well as a poet with a horizon of knowledge encompassing meteorology, physics, geology, morphology of plants and comparative osteology.

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Philological facts reflect the difficulties that Goethe faced in his pursuit of the natural sciences. He struggled to earn the recognition he expected for contributions such as his Farbenlehre and his findings in the field of comparative osteology. As Dane demonstrates, on multiple occasions Goethe expressed his discontent '[d]aß seine naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungen in der zeitgenössischen Öffentlichkeit nicht die Wertschätzung erfuhren, die Goethe sich gewünscht hatte, wußte er und bedauerte es außerordentlich'. Considering the circumstances in which Goethe persistently carried out his research in the natural sciences, we ask ourselves ‘warum hat Goethe sich nicht auf die so genannte schöne Literatur beschränkt?’ The answer is simple: Goethe did not believe, as modern science does, in clearly delineated borders between different fields of knowledge. More importantly, he did not recognize natural science as fundamentally distinct from culture and humanities. As macrocosm and microcosm, natural science and humanities are intimately related, Goethe thought. In his letter to Zelter on January 29, 1831, Goethe writes, ‘Hätt ich mich mit den Naturwissenschaften nicht abgegeben, so hätt ich die Menschen nie kennen lernen.’ As Dane explains, ‘Der Wunsch nach Menschenkenntnis, Wissen über den Menschen – darin liegt eine Motivation für seine Naturerforschung.’ As he makes clear in his letter to Zelter, Goethe viewed knowledge of the natural world as a prerequisite for anthropological knowledge. Dane emphasizes that this view was one of the main motivations for Goethe’s pursuit of knowledge of nature.

For Goethe, humanities, natural science and literary work were deeply related. In his speech Zum Shakespears [sic] Tag (1771), Goethe explains how he finds in the works of the English poet a sort of knowledge of nature that had been neglected by many great philosophers. This knowledge of nature, Goethe argues, manifests in the plots and characters of Shakespeare’s dramas.

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13 Schiller remarked that, if Goethe had published his research under a pseudonym, he would have had more success reaching his readers. See Schiller’s Letter to Goethe 23 Nov. 1795 explained and cited in: ibid., p. 12 & 14.
14 Ibid., p. 15.
15 Ibid., p. 12.
16 Ibid., p. 17.
17 FA II, 2; p. 363.
18 Dane, ‘Unerhörte Begebenheiten. Was lesen wir, wenn wir Goethe lesen?’, p. 16.
19 FA I, 18: pp. 11–12.
*Farbenlehre*, Goethe opines that the scientist should abandon an essentialist approach toward light and colors; he supports this methodological claim with an example taken from the realm of anthropology – a field that he viewed as inseparable from the literary field of narratology, let us recall.

Denn eigentlich unternehmen wir umsonst, das Wesen eines Dinges auszudrücken. Wirkungen werden wir gewahr, und eine vollständige Geschichte dieser Wirkungen umfaßte wohl allenfalls das Wesen jenes Dinges. Vergebens bemühen wir uns, den Charakter eines Menschen zu schildern; man stelle dagegen seine Handlungen, seine Taten zusammen, und ein Bild des Charakters wird uns entgegentreten.

Die Farben sind Taten des Lichtes, Taten und Leiden.20

Here, we observe that the relation between literature and knowledge of nature is reciprocal in Goethe’s view.21 In the speech *Zum Shakespears Tag* and in the passage above, Goethe shows anthropology and poetics to cast light on scientific horizons. Now we can inquire about the relation between knowledge and self-knowledge. In *Bedeutende Fördernis durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort*, Goethe reflects on the famous injunction to know thyself:

Hiebei bekenn ich, daß mir von jeher die große und so bedeutend klingende Aufgabe: *erkennen dich selbst*, immer verdächtig vorkam, als eine List geheim verbündeter Priester, die den Menschen durch unerreichbare Forderungen verwirren und von der Tätigkeit gegen die Außenwelt zu einer inneren falschen Beschaulichkeit verleiten wollten. Der Mensch kennt nur sich selbst, insofern er die Welt kennt, die er nur in sich und sich nur in ihr gewahr wird. Jeder neue Gegenstand, wohl beschaut, schließt ein neues Organ in uns auf.22

This quote articulates the view that self-knowledge and knowledge of the world are interconnected. Pursuing knowledge of the world, Goethe argues, has an additional purpose: it creates a space within which self-knowledge can unfold and grow.

The author’s view of the interrelation of knowledge of the world and self-knowledge can be traced to verses 354–357 of Faust’s opening monologue in the scene *Nacht*. In these verses, Faust expresses discontent with knowledge that is abstracted from the real world and its intersubjective, social and communicative aspects. His own knowledge, he admits, though vast by some measures, is bereft of worldly intelligence. Here, Faust gestures toward the inner

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20 FA I, 23/1: p. 12.
21 See also: Dane, ‘Literatur zwischen Natur- und Kunstlehre: Goethes Erzählung *Der Mann von fünfzig Jahren*’. Here, Dane expounds on the presence of the reciprocal relation between natural science and literary work in Goethe’s *Der Mann von fünfzig [sic] Jahren*.
22 FA I, 24: p. 595–596.
relation between knowledge of the world and self-knowledge that we know to be such an essential part of Goethe’s own world-view.²³

Bilde mir nicht ein was rechts zu wissen,
Bilde mir nicht ein ich könnte was lehren
Die Menschen zu bessern und zu bekehren.²⁴

Throughout this study, we will return again and again to how a character’s understanding of knowledge informs his or her ethical personality and how characters change their conceptions of knowledge in the course of the drama. There is a noticeable difference between an abstract conception of knowledge that is irrelevant to the ethical aspect of a person’s life and the ethically embedded kind of knowledge which Faust strives for and which he introduces in his opening monologue.

In Faust, knowledge (in its different fields) is present as a literary element in the drama. In other words, the work ‘never propagandizes but instead reflects the intricate mystery of nature and the complexity of the human relation with the material realm’.²⁵ Furthermore, the drama contains references to the scientific scene of Goethe’s time and problematizes various assumptions and theories. The debates between Anaxagoras and Thales are a good example of this aspect of the literary work.²⁶

Though alchemy is not among the four branches of knowledge in the opening of the scene Nacht, multiple allusions to alchemy can be found in the text. As the eighth book of the second part of Dichtung und Wahrheit informs us, the young Goethe invested a certain amount of time in reading sources of alchemy and conducting experiments.²⁷ Dorothea Kuhn situates Goethe’s interest in alchemy within his larger world-view:

Die Magia naturalis entsprach in ihrer Einheit, die sich bis ins Theologische erstreckte, einer Einheit suchenden Grundveranlagung Goethes, und so sind in seine Naturanschauung unauslöslich Elemente dieses merkwürdigen Kosmos eingegangen.²⁸

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²³ See also Gaier’s comments on the first scene of Faust I and the historical relevance of knowledge and anthropology here: Ulrich Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-Dichtungen, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999), vol. 2: p. 83.
²⁴ V. 371–374.
²⁶ See Schöne’s comments in FK, pp. 506–507; p. 768.
Studies have explored Goethe’s acquaintance with alchemy in great depth, and Goethe’s knowledge of the subject appears in many of his works – not least of all, Faust. The young Goethe aspired to study alchemy in Frankfurt in 1768 and 1769 influenced by his friendship with Susanne Katharina von Klettenberg. Alchemy, in its own way, paints a picture of the cosmos in which the human being and nature – the microcosm and the macrocosm – are deeply interrelated and in which boundaries between disciplines of knowledge are softened.

In the case of alchemy, Faust explicitly articulates his views in conversation with Wagner in the scene Osterspaziergang. In the context of discussing his father, who helped the people during an outbreak of the plague, Faust portrays alchemy as an illegitimate manner of pursuit of knowledge of the natural world.

Mein Vater war ein dunkler Ehrenmann,
Der über die Natur und ihre heil’gen Kreise,
In Redlichkeit, jedoch auf seine Weise,
Mit grillenhafter Mühe sann.
Der, in Gesellschaft von Adepten,
Sich in die schwarze Küche schloß,
Und, nach unendlichen Rezepten
Das Widrige zusammengoß.

In verse 1034, Faust expresses his disagreement with his father’s approach through his ironic tone: ‘auf seine Weise’. Faust denigrates his father’s work as unoriginal and describes his father’s dabbling in alchemical experiments as nothing more than reproduction of recipes of the past, carried out ‘nach unendlichen Rezepten’. Furthermore, as Schöne explains, referring to Johann Heinrich Campe’s Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache, the word ‘grillenhaft’, found in verse 1037, expresses ‘thoughts and impressions that lack any support but bring about unrest’ and may be translated into English as ‘capricious’ as opposed to ‘systematic’.

Astrology also comes under criticism in Faust. In Faust II, we learn the true source of an astrologist’s insights. In the ironic scene Kaiserliche Pfalz Saal des
Thrones, the astrologist, seemingly hypnotized by Mephisto, inanely echoes whatever Mephisto whispers in his ear. A passage from Goethe’s Versuch einer Witterungslehre comes to mind:

[W]ir wagten den Mond, die Mitplaneten und ihre Monde, zuletzt die gegeneinander unbeweglichen Gestirne als mitwirkend zu betrachten, und der Mensch, der alles notwendig auf sich bezieht, unterläßt nicht, sich mit dem Wahne zu schmeicheln, daß wirklich das All, dessen Teil er freilich ausmacht, auch einen besonders merklichen Einfluß auf ihn ausübte

In each of the instances mentioned thus far, we find critiques of certain kinds of knowledge with respect to the human realm. In particular, as we see in the quote above, Goethe criticizes astrology as a faulty manner of understanding the relation between the human and cosmic realms – one in which the human being, acting irrationally, follows his disposition to reconstruct everything in relation to himself, as though the cosmos exerted a special influence on him.

In his comments on Faust, Schöne writes, ‘Die Möglichkeit einer umgreifenden “Weltformel” freilich hat Goethe lebenslang beschäftigt.’ Faust shares his author’s ambition and likewise views universal knowledge as encompassing the realms of cosmology and anthropology. For Goethe and Faust alike, the relation between self-knowledge (‘know thyself’) and knowledge of the world is not confined to a specific field of knowledge – the unity of knowledge erases the modern scientist’s arbitrary boundaries.

This broad and philosophical view of knowledge is as old as the ancient Greek philosophers. But it also has a place in literary texts – not only philosophical treatises. As I demonstrated earlier, knowledge in Faust extends itself to the life of the seeker and other human agents; crucially, moreover, as I argue later, the manner of pursuit of knowledge informs how the seeker of knowledge conceives the relation between body and soul. Assessing Goethe’s view of knowledge, however, is only the first step toward exploring possible ways in which Faust poetically discusses the pursuit of knowledge as an indispensable part of human life and, specifically for the purposes of this study, informs our understanding of the relationship between the body and soul.

In comparing Faust with Ḥāfiz’s Divan from the fourteenth century, a question arises: to what extent are the natural sciences, based on experiment in the modern sense, present in Faust? As I demonstrated in this section, Goethe did

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32 V. 4955–4970.
34 FK, p. 214.
not view knowledge as modern science does. And if any doubt about that point remains, consider that Goethe disparaged the instruments of contemporary science as ‘das größte Unheil der neuer Physik’.\textsuperscript{35}

Turning now toward the \textit{Faust} text itself, we find that ‘knowledge’ in the modern experimental sense does not appear. Wagner’s invention of a machine that would make sexual intercourse superfluous for reproduction is the closest we come to a modern experimental view of knowledge. Yet the motivation for this enterprise has to do with Wagner’s evaluation of natural reproduction, a view that reflects his own idiosyncratic anthropological standpoint and that appears far removed from the modern consensus. Mayer correctly describes Wagner as follows:

\begin{quote}
Ein gütiger, dankbarer, nicht sehr vitaler Mensch. In der Menge fühlt er kaum sich wohl, die Natur betrachtet er ohne Geduld, der Zeugungsvorgang ist ihm tierisch, so daß sich die Wissenschaft die Aufgabe stellen muß, Fortpflanzung zu humanisieren.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Furthermore, the method that Wagner practices is not what the modern science would consider ‘scientific experiment,’ despite its appearance as such – ‘äußere Anschein trägt’.\textsuperscript{37} Mayer explains:

\begin{quote}
Wagner verhält sich durchaus nicht fragend und in wissenschaftlicher Neugier experimentierend. Er besitzt Gewißheiten. Die verdankt er den überlieferten Rezepten. Auch hier stellt er seine Quellen nicht kritisch in Frage. Da er alles gelesen hat, weiß er jetzt, auf welche Mischungen es bei Menschenschöpfung ankommen muß.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

As I demonstrated above, the form of knowledge whose pursuit is dramatized in Goethe’s \textit{Faust} is a unified knowledge that is intrinsically connected to self-knowledge and that hearkens back to ancient Greek philosophy. Defined in this way, the pursuit of knowledge and self-knowledge in Goethe’s \textit{Faust} invites comparison to the \textit{Divan} of Ḥāfiẓ.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 192.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. See also in: Smith, ‘Was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält: Scientific Themes in Goethe’s Faust’, p. 198.
I.1.3 Knowledge in the Divan of Ḥāfīz

I.1.3.1 Terms that Represent Knowledge in the Divan
In the Divan of Ḥāfīz, we find several terms that all translate, roughly, as ‘knowledge,’ but with important semantic differences. The Persian word dāniš and the Arabic word ḫilm both translate to ‘knowledge’ in a general sense. Since Arabic was the language of scholarly writing and teaching of the time, Ḥāfīz’s poetry uses terms with Arabic roots to differentiate various aspects of knowledge in a more specialized context. Ḥikmat (‘wisdom’) and ḥakim (‘a wise person’) are used frequently in the Divan.39 In addition, the word ṣārīf (‘gnostic’ – a seeker of knowledge learned in Sufism, but not necessarily a follower of any particular school) appears thirteen times in the Divan.40 Sufism as a form of attaining knowledge of the divine and its relation to the world, permeates the Divan and forms the cultural backdrop to the text’s representation of the pursuit of knowledge – the word ‘Sufi’ appears thirty-five times in the Divan.41 For further elucidation concerning the multiplicity of terms related to ‘knowledge’ that were used in Ḥāfīz’s time, we turn to an encyclopedia written in Shiraz by one of Ḥāfīz’s contemporaries, the renowned polymath Šams ud-Din Āmuli.

I.1.3.2 Ḥikmat and Sufism in Šams ud-Din Āmuli’s Encyclopedia
Šams ud-Din Āmuli (d. in Shiraz 753 H/1352 CE) was the writer of the encyclopedia Nafā’īs ul-funūn fi ṣarā’īs al-‘uyūn. After years of teaching in the Sulṭāniya Madrasa, he immigrated to Shiraz due to increasing instabilities in Il-ḫānis’ rule over Āzarbāyḡān. He lived, taught, and finished Nafā’īs ul-funūn in Shiraz during the short period of the relatively peaceful reign of Šāh Ṣayḥ Abū Isḥāq (ruled ca. 1342–1353) of the Īlynḡ dynasty (ca. 1325–1353),42 who was in fact the royal patron of Ḥāfīz.43 In Āmuli’s definition, ḥikmat consists of:

40 Šeddiqīyān and Mīr’ābedinī, Farhang-e vāženāme-ye Ḥāfīz, p. 801.
41 Ibid., p. 777.
1. Practical ḥikmat (ḥikmat-i ʿamāli), which in turn consists of ethics, politics and household management (oikouμia).

2. Theoretical ḥikmat (ḥikmat-i naẓāri):
   a. Logic: Ḥisāḡūǧ (Isagoge of Porphyry), QāṭīGNUyās (Aristotle’s Categories), Bārückmūs (Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias), Sūligmūs (Syllogism), Anūlūṭqā (Analytica) on art of argumentation, Ṭūbīqā (Aristotle’s Topics) on disputation, Sūfasṭqā (Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations) on fallacies, Abūṭqā [Aristotle’s Poetics] on poetics.
   b. First Philosophy (falsafa-yi ʿūlā): Metaphysics
   c. Theology: including knowledge of the Necessary Existent; knowledge of praise of its magnificence; knowledge of the manner of emanation of its influences and care; and knowledge of intellects and their influence in the realm of soul and matter. This, according to Āmulī, can be pursued in nature and the divine realm based on the seeker’s perspective.
   d. Knowledge of natural objects: the realm of generation, decay and minerals.

3. Mathematics: including geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music – in this exact order.

4. Secondary nature: a. medicine, diagnosis and pharmacy; b. alchemy, the occult knowledge and knowledge of talisman.44

As we see, ḥikmat covers a wide range of knowledge, and one who masters it all rightly deserves to be called a polymath (ḥakīm). It is clear that the definitions of knowledge above were influenced by ancient Greek philosophy and science. In other words, ḥikmat covers the full spectrum of knowledge encompassed by philosophy in the ancient Greek sense of the term. More importantly, for our present purposes, ḥikmat denotes the unity of the branches of knowledge listed above by Āmulī.

Āmulī’s writings also provide valuable information regarding the level of education expected of a man of letters. Such a person was expected to be proficient in rhetoric, astronomy, music, chess and backgammon, and would have been able to converse knowledgeably about each of these subjects.45 The learned person should practice poetry, but not too much. It was a temptation to be resisted, given the adoration that elites and masses alike accorded to poets. Āmulī warns, lest he be remembered merely as a poet, and not as a ḥakīm. Āmulī offers Nāṣir Ḫusrua, Anvari and Sarāḡ ud-Din Qumrī as cautionary examples: ‘each one [of these men] was one of a kind in sciences, accomplishments, and author of unique books, but as they have devoted much time to poetry, they were categorized as poets and not men of other sciences.’46

46 Ibid., pp. 138–139 (my translation).
Ámulí’s definition of the path of the wayfarer in Sufism, too, bears a close resemblance to Platonic views concerning the abstraction of the bodily and natural realms from the sublime, extramundane truth that is identical with the divine. The path of a Sufi, according to Ámulí, is one of self-mortification and self-purification pursued with the aim of ascending to the transcendent truth (ḥaqq ta’ālā). To this end, fasting, sleep deprivation and meditation in solitude and darkness are prescribed as a way to weaken the outward senses and open the inward ones. At the core of Sufism, Ámulí explains, lies knowledge of the truth (ʿilm-i haqiqat), defined as re-cognizing the simple known (maʿlūm-i muğmal) in the multiplicity (ṣuvar-i tafaqsil). To explain the meaning of the lower-soul (nafs), the soul, and the hierarchy that links them – all part of knowledge of the truth –, Ámulí constantly appeals to Neoplatonic views of emanation.

The influence of Platonic and Alexandrian philosophy, particularly as they explain the relation between the transcendent divine truth and the natural, human realms, is constantly present in Sufi works from the twelfth century. Later in this chapter, I briefly discuss how Greek philosophy was introduced to the Islamic world and I point out how Platonic views on love found their way into hagiographic Sufi books.

Ḥāfiẓ’s intellectual and poetic dialogue with Sufi views will be an important part of our work in the following chapters. In the next sub-section, I give a brief account of the presence of various branches of ḥikmat in the Divan in order to cast light on the poet’s vast erudition.

I.1.3.3 Branches of ḥikmat in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ
In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ mentions several branches of ḥikmat that Ámulí defines in Nafāʾis ul-funūn. In one poem of the Divan, the poet flaunts his knowledge of logical terminology: ‘O wine-boy, how long the delay in circulating the cup? | When the round falls to lovers it must be uninterrupted.’ In Arabic-Persian

48 Ibid., vol. 1: p. 18.
49 Ibid., vol. 2: p. 43.
50 Ibid., vol. 2: pp. 45–51.
51 See pp. 36–38 below.
53 The Collected Lyrics of Ḥāfiẓ of Shirāz, trans. Peter Avery (London: Archetype, 2007), [Henceforth cited as Avery, gazal, couplet, page number], CCLXXI, 7, p. 340 (my emphasis). Since Avery follows Ḥānlar’s edition of the Divan, the number of the gazal and the couplet are identical between the two: Ḥāfiẓ Šams ud-Din Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ, Divān-e Ḥāfiẓ gazaliyāt, qaṣāʾed, maṣnaviyāt, qaṭaʾāt va robāʾiyāt, ed. Parviz Nātel Ḥānlar, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Tehran:
logic terminology, the logical concept of a ‘vicious circle’ translates literally as ‘uninterrupted circulation’ (‘daur-i tasalsul’). In the poem above, Ḥāfīẓ decontextualizes this term as though he were addressing fellow scholars. He invites them to experience the term in the context of bacchanalian lyrical poetry.54

The poems of the Divan also reflect that the poet was an expert minstrel with vast knowledge of Iranian modal music (mūsiqī-yi dastgāhī).55 One of the branches of ḥikmat, music appears in the Divan through the poet’s naming of different guša (melodic types) and dastgāhs (organized yet modifiable musical compositions made of coherent gušas).56 Knowledge of Persian music is indeed a prerequisite for appreciating the many verses in the Divan in which the emotional mode of the musical motif or composition is referred to. And another level of meaning becomes accessible if one reads the names of these musical units literally. Bearing in mind the poet’s expertise as a minstrel, consider the following verses from the Divan: ‘Love’s murmur, into Ḥejāz and Ḵār, casteth | The melody of the strain of ghazals of Ḥāfīẓ of Shīrāz.’57 Here, Ḥiḡāz and ʿIrāq are musical terms denoting the melodic peak (auḡ) of a given musical composition, but if we take the terms literally, they also convey the metaphorical ‘peaks’ that the poet’s fame reached during his lifetime.58

Pythagoras’s conviction that the movement of the heavenly bodies creates a cosmic music is also reflected in Ḥāfīẓ’s poetry. In the following cases of

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55 See also: ibid., pp. 93–94.
58 Note that Hiḡāz also refers to an area including Mecca and Medina, which are far from Shīrāz and ʿIrāq (Here ʿIrāq-i ʿAḡām or Persian Iraq is meant – an area that included Ǐsfāhān, Ray, Hamadān.)
hyperbole, the Pythagorean view is turned upside down. Marveling at the poet’s mastery of the form of gazal and art of minstrelsy, the heavenly bodies themselves begin to dance:

The song is sung and the pearl is strung;  
Come hither, oh Hafiz, and sing again!  
And the listening Heaven above thee hung  
Shall loose o’er thy verse Pleiades’ chain.59

In another instance, we read the following: ‘On the sky, –what if, of Ḥāfīz’s utterances | Zuhra’s [Venus] singing should bring to dancing the Masīḥā (Christ).’60

Joachim Wohlleben offers a helpful commentary on the above verse: ‘Nach muslimischer Lehre ist Jesus nicht gestorben, sondern als besonders reiner Mensch in den Himmel erhoben worden, und zwar in die vierte Himmelssphäre, in der auch Sohre weilt.’61 Wohlleben’s comment is correct in so far as it describes the ascent of Christ; however, Venus is not in the fourth heavenly sphere, but rather in the third. The fourth sphere houses the sun, associated with Christ. Later in this study I address the relation between the sun and Christ in greater detail62; for the time being, it suffices to note the poet’s knowledge of the Ptolemaic astronomical arrangement of the heavenly spheres and the intimate connection, made apparent in music, between the realm of anthropology and the heavenly spheres.

The Divan also displays the poet’s knowledge of astrology and astronomy. In several poems, we find verses in which different constellations, conjunctions and planets act as metaphors corresponding to their respective astrological significance. When describing the beauty of his beloved’s eyebrow, the poet cannot help but recall the bow of Jupiter; and he describes her gaze as dominating

60 Clarke, 9, 9, p. 45. Dar āsimān na-aḡāb gar ba gufta-yi Ḥāfīz | Surūd-i Zuhra ba raqṣ āvarad Masiḥā rā. Transcription according to Qazvīnī & Ġānī, 4, 8.  
61 See Wohlleben’s footnote on p. 52.  
62 See this work p. 78.
the lion of the sun (the astrological term for the sun when it enters the constellation of Leo and reaches the peak of its power).63

Describing auspicious events, Ḥāfiẓ uses astrological conjunctions that signify luck and happiness (such as the moon and Jupiter) as a literary instrument. The comparison underscores the rarity of the event and thus conveys how precious the moment is for the poet: ‘I asked: “When will the master be going to the bridal chamber?” | He answered: “The time when Jupiter and the moon are in conjunction.”’64

Despite his use of astrological terms as a poetic device, the poet was critical of astrology outside of the poetic sphere. Viewing astrology as superstition, he strongly disputed that the planets and their movements influence human life, and its fortunes and misfortunes: ‘Catch hold of the curl of the moon-cheeked one and do not repeat the fable. | That good luck and ill are from the effect of Venus and Saturn’.65 Ġanī demonstrates that superstitions were strongly present not only among the masses, but also among the elites; political astronomy played a major role in the lives of educated kings, such as Šāh Šayh.66 After his great defeat at the hands of Amīr Mubāriz ud-Dīn, he openly admitted that his dependence on astrology compromised his decisions on important matters and blinded him to the facts.67

Medicine is another branch of ḥikmat that appears in the Divan.68 In one poem, the poet displays his erudition by mentioning the names of Ibn Sinā’s two major books: Qānūn (The Canon of Medicine) and Šifāʾ (The Book of Healing on philosophy, logic, and natural sciences). Yet the poet plays on words, inviting us to read the titles literally (qānūn: canon, law; and šifāʾ: cure, healing):

64 Avery, CXCIII, 8, p. 253. The Persian couplet is the following: Guftam ki ḥẖāğa kiy ba sar-i ḥẖīla miravad | Guft ān zamān ki muştari u mah qarān kunand
65 Avery, XLVI, 6, p. 79. The Persian couplet is the following: Bigīr ṭurra-yi mah čihra-i u qīṣṣa mahān | Ki sa’d u nabs zi ta’ṣīr-i Zuhra u Zuhal ast
66 The ruler of Shiraz of Īynū dynasty 1342–1354 and Ḥāfiẓ’s patron.
67 Ġanī, Bahš dar āşār va aḵār va aẖvāl-e Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 182–183.
68 As an example of medicine in Divan see in the following article Mahdī Moḥaqqiq’s elaboration on the first couplet of the ʿazal 422, in Mahdī Muḥaqqiq, ‘Gozāreš-e yeki az ta’bīrāt-e pezēški dar še’r-e Ḥāfiẓ’, in Soḥān-e aḥl-e del: Maḵmū ‘e-ye maqālāt (Tehran: UNESCO-Iran, 1371/1992), pp. 709–712.
Yesterday out of concern when he saw me, the physician said, | “Alas, your sickness is beyond the canon of healing.”

In another instance, the poet refers to a standard medical procedure of the time – daily examination of the color of an unhealthy person’s urine. He juxtaposes the function of the ‘urine glass’ used for this purpose to that of the wine glass in joyous times of drinking. ‘He who has conferred the never-ending glass on me for the sake of keeping me alive, | Why does he keep taking my specimen glass to the doctor?’ In the Divan, terms of medicine are employed to convey poetic thoughts and emotions. Furthermore, they contribute phonetically to the musical flow of the work. The transliteration of the seventh couplet of the ḡazal 375 illustrates the phonetic function of the word ‘glass’ (šīša): ‘Ānki mudām šīša-am az pay-i ‘aiš dāda ast / Šīša-am az ċi mībarad piš-i ṭabīb harzamān’. The letter šīn, ringing three times in each line, evokes the sound of glasses of wine in bygone times of joy.

The terms of ḥikmat (discussed above) and Sufism (to which I turn in the following chapters) form a necessary backdrop for appreciating Ḥāfizian verses. For example, in the verses where the poet refers to two important and world-renowned works of Ibn Sinā, only the reader who is familiar with these works is able to access a layer of meaning of the poem in which it critiques a system of thought. That said, these terms are used in such a way that, even when the reader is unaware of their significance, the text still stands, and influences the reader with other poetic elements such as rhythm and onomatopoeic effect.

I.1.3.4 Neoplatonism in the Cultural Horizon of Ḥāfiz

As we have seen, ḥikmat and the different branches of knowledge in the cultural space of the Divan were deeply influenced by Greek philosophy. In this section, I briefly discuss the presence of the Greek philosophy and Neoplatonic views in this cultural space.

When Justinian closed the Academy in Athens in 529 CE, the Neoplatonists sought refuge in Ctesiphon, the capital city of the Sassanid Empire. There, under the rule of Ḥusrau I (Ḥusrau Anūširavān), the environment was ripe for

69 Avery, LXXXII, 8, p. 122. See also: Mu‘in, Ḥāfiz-e širinsohan, p. 90. The Persian couplet is the following: Dī guft ṭabīb az-sar-i ḥasrat ču ma-rā did | Hiyhāt ki ranq-i tu zi qāmān-i šifāʾ raft.
70 Avery, CCCLXXV, 7, p. 458. See also this couplet in Wohlleben’s translation: ‘Derjenige, der mir ständig eine Flasche zur Erfrischung gebracht hat, | wieso trägt er (jetzt) immer wieder meine Flasche zum Arzt?’ In: Wohlleben, 375, 7, p. 482.
71 Located 32 kilometers southeast of the modern city of Baghdad
dialogue between the Zoroastrian theologians and their Neoplatonist guests.\textsuperscript{72} The use of Persian Zoroastrian terms in Greek philosophy, however, predates Plotinus’s time; as early as the second century, Platonists such as Plutarch (ca. 45-120 CE) and his contemporary Atticus would make reference to the disorderedly motion in the ‘Indefinite Dyad’ as ‘Ahriman’ and described the Good as ‘Ahūrā Mazdā.’ Their use of these terms speaks to a longstanding tradition of intellectual exchange between Persia and Greece.\textsuperscript{73}

Soon after the advent of Islam and capture of Mecca in 630 CE at the hands of Muslim armies, the era of Arab conquest began.\textsuperscript{74} In the years 632–650 CE, Muslims expanded their originally small territory to an empire. Yet their rulers lacked the knowledge and experience necessary for this sudden change. The challenges of ruling peoples of so many cultures and world-views became apparent with the uprisings during the time of the second Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Ḥaṭṭāb; these problems ‘were too complicated to be solved within the political and social framework of the existing system.’\textsuperscript{75} Uprisings and conflicts continued as the Umayyad dynasty expanded the empire further. The system collapsed when a revolution engineered in Kūfa, a city near the former capital of Ctesiphon, expanded to Marw and Ḫurāsān in the Northeast of today’s Iran and, in 750 CE, finally put an end to the Umayyads’ rule. This was the revolution that brought the ‘Abbāsids to power.

The ‘Abbāsids inherited a vast empire and all of the problems that came with it. They were aware of their need to educate themselves about how to govern such a vast empire. To attain the expertise they sought, the ‘Abbāsids gave key positions and considerable power to Iranians. The most renowned Iranian families in the royal court were the Naubaḥtīs and the Barmakīs (Barmakids).

In response to social and political pressures caused by the empire’s territorial expansions, al-Manṣūr’s rule (752-774 CE) saw a remarkable increase in patronage for translation and scholarship.\textsuperscript{76} Books of astronomy, medicine and other sciences were eagerly collected from all around the empire to be translated


into Arabic. As a way to provide a methodological basis for theological debates, al-Mahdī, al-Manṣūr’s successor, commissioned the translation of Aristoteles’s *Topics* from the Syriac translation of the work. In addition, Hārūn ar-Raṣīd (r. 786-809), continuing his grandfather’s legacy, added to the collection of works of Greek philosophy, and supported the translation of these sources. Al-Masʿūdī, a renowned historian of the tenth century, recounts the events in the time of Hārūn ar-Raṣīd in his book *The Meadows of Gold*. He dedicates a special part to the intellectual activities of Yahyā ibn al-Ḥālīd al-Barmakī, the vizier of Hārūn ar-Raṣīd. Here he describes how leaders of different schools of thought would gather in the vizier’s own house:

Yahya [Yahyā ibn al-Ḥālīd al-Barmakī], the son of Khalid ibn Barmak, an enlightened man, learned and fond of discussion and philosophical inquiry, gathered at his house for symposiums a number of famous controversialists chosen from among Muslim theologians, free-thinkers and divines of various sects.

In one of these gatherings, the vizier suggested ‘love’ as the topic of the day’s discussion. Masʿūdi recounts the various views on the subject – the origin of love and its effect on lovers – advanced by the eminent guests in attendance. Remarkably, despite that these guests represented opposing schools of thought, they shared the view that likeness is the source of love. At the end of his

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77 See also: ibid. In the first part, Gutas addresses the social and political backgrounds of the translation movement.

78 Compare to: ibid., p. 69.


82 The diversity of views in this gathering was so important that the gathering had an expert (muǧ) Magian to speak for their views as the thirteenth speaker. See: Masʿūdī, *The Meadows of Gold: The Abbasids*, p. 111.
account of the gathering, Masʿūdī gives voice to the philosophical views of Galen and Plato:

According to Galen, sympathy is born between two intelligent beings because of the very similarity of their intelligences, but it cannot exist between two stupid people with limited minds, because of the stupidity which they share. ‘Indeed,’ he said, ‘intelligence follows a regular path and it is possible for two beings following the same path to meet, while stupidity moves in a completely unpredictable way, which renders all encounters impossible.’

Masʿūdī also quotes Plato: ‘I do not know what love is. I only know that it is a divine madness, a passion which is neither to be praised, nor is worthy of blame.’

The importance accorded to translations during this time was based on the view that knowledge is one and divine, regardless of the language in which it is produced: languages and cultures must be bridged in order to attain knowledge. In his tenth-century work al-Fihrist, Ibn an-Nadīm elaborates on the process of acquisition and assimilation of this wide spectrum of human knowledge. He begins the seventh chapter of al-Fihrist, dedicated exclusively to philosophy and philosophers, by recounting a myth that illustrates the universality and divine nature of knowledge. According to the myth, people were once
governed by a council of seven wise men. When a prophet appeared among them, however, they refused to follow the wisdom of the seven wise ones. The seven wise ones went their separate ways, teaching wisdom to people in different lands across the world:

Among them [the seven] there was a wise man named Hermes. He was the most thoroughly intelligent, the most strikingly wise, and the most refined in discernment among them. He went to the land of Egypt, where he ruled over the inhabitants, making the land prosperous, improving the conditions of the people, and manifesting his wisdom among them.91

Later in the book, the writer of al-Fihrist suggests that the Caliph al-Ma’mūn’s interest in Greek philosophy was not merely an interest in something foreign; rather, Aristotle, portrayed as the successor of Hermes, comes to al-Ma’mūn in a dream and awakens his interest. Ibn an-Nadīm describes one reason why books of philosophy and ancient sciences were available in large numbers in Baghdad:

al-Ma’mūn saw in a dream the likeness of a man white in color, with a ruddy complexion broad forehead, joined eyebrows, bald head, bloodshot eyes, and good qualities sitting on his bed. Al-Ma’mūn related, ‘It was as though I was in front of him, filled with fear of him. Then I said “Who are you?” He replied, “I am Aristotle.” Then I was delighted with him and said, “Oh sage, may I ask you a question?” He said “Ask it.” Then I asked, “What is good?” He replied, “What is good in the mind.” I said again, “Then what is next?” He answered “What is good in the law.” I said, “Then what next?” He replied “What is good with public.” I said, “Then what more?” He then answered, “More? There is no more.”’92

Against this backdrop, Ibn an-Nadīm recounts al-Ma’mūn’s correspondence with the Byzantine emperor:

[al-Ma’mūn] sent forth a group of men, among whom were al-Ḥajjāj ibn Maṭar; ibn al-Baṭrīq; Salmān, the director of the Bayt al-Ḥikmah; and others besides them. They brought the books from what they had found. Upon bringing them to him, he ordered them to translate [the manuscripts], so that they made the translation.93

Al-Fihrist provides a list of books by Plato, Euclid, Ptolemy, Hippocrates, Porphyry and Aristotle available in Bagdad at the time, as well as names of

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92 Ibid., p. 583.
93 Ibid., p. 584.
over fifty translators. Furthermore, Ibn an-Nadīm provides a detailed list of dialogues of Plato available in translation and the names of their translators and commentators.

The Abbasid Caliph sought a rational mode of argumentation that would help Islamic theologians answer questions posed by a wide spectrum of theologies and philosophies. Islamic philosophy flourished in this abundance of textual sources. At the heart of the philosophic enterprise, Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus were given special attention.

Fārābī (870–950 CE) was one of the earliest influential Islamic Neoplatonists – his epithet was The Second Teacher. He followed Plotinus’s emanative system. His choices of terminology illustrate the central place of metaphysics in his thought. He describes the One as ‘the First Existent,’ an attribute that Plotinus also identified as the central characteristic of the One.

A group called Iḥwān aš-Šafā (The Brethren of Purity) developed an ‘ethico-spiritual’ community for the élites that engaged deeply in philosophy, science and epistemological theory. Yet its ultimate purpose was not merely to acquire knowledge, but rather to build ‘a refuge from the struggle that was raging among religious congregations’ for those who believed in unity and brotherhood in the name of knowledge and philosophy. It is indisputable that the brotherhood’s philosophy and cosmogony were systematically influenced by Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and the Stoics.

Ibn Sinā (980–1037 CE) carried Fārābī’s philosophy further by attributing to the One the predicate of ‘Necessary Existent.’ Ibn Sinā was the first philosopher in the Islamic tradition to reconcile philosophy with Sufism. In his treatises Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān and Salāmān and Absāl, elements and terms from his and Fārābī’s cosmological metaphysics appear in the Sufi context.

94 Ibid., pp. 586–590.
97 The First Teacher, of course, was Aristotle.
99 See in ibid., pp. 294–298.
Šahāb ud-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhravardī (548–569/1154–1191 CE) also followed Neoplatonic cosmogony and its hierarchy of existence. Furthermore, he offered a specific reading of the history of philosophy in which wisdom is seen as the path to truth, rather than mere ‘rational systematization’. In his view, similar to that articulated in al-Fihrist by Ibn an-Nadīm, philosophy begins with Hermes and Agathodaimon and then goes in two directions: a Greek path tread by Asclepius, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Neoplatonists and Žūn-un-Nūn Miṣrī; and an Iranian path that starts with Gayūmarṣ, the first human being in the Zoroastrian mythology, and continues through Firiydūn, the king of the Pišdādī era, Kay Ḫusrau, and great Sufi masters such as Ḥallāḡ, Bāyazid of Bastām and Abū Ḥasan Ḩarqānī. Suhravardi articulated a philosophy that combined Neoplatonism, Mazdaism and Sufism to form the school of the ‘Ḥikmat ul-išrāq’ – Philosophy of Illumination.

The fundamental concepts of Plotinus’s philosophy – emanation, the individual soul’s pursuit of reunion with the One, Plato’s unity of the Good, the Just and the Beautiful – influenced all of these philosophers, Sufi and non-Sufi alike.

I.1.3.5 Historical Controversies Concerning Ḥikmat and Ḥāfiẓ’s Position in the Divan

To grasp the significance of Ḥāfiẓ’s position regarding Ḥikmat and Ḥakīm in the Divan, we must consider the historical backdrop against which his work was produced. Firdausī (940–1019/1025 CE), the author of Šāhnāma, describes Aristotle as a Ḥakīm when Aristotle mourns over the coffin of Alexander, his former student.

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102 See p. 36 above.
103 Behramgore Tehmuras Anklesaria, ‘Zand-ākāsi: Iranian or greater Bundahišn / transliteration and translation in Engl. by Behramgore Tehmuras Anklesaria,’ (Bombay 1956), Chapter: I, a, 12. & 13. pp. 25–26. The scholarship categorizes the Pišdādī kings as mythological and the Kings of the Kayāni era as historical. It should also be mentioned that Zoroastrian believers consider the Pišdādī kings to be also historical. In Zoroastrian texts, extraordinary attributes have been assigned to Kayāni Kings such as Kay Ḫusrau.
105 Also known as The Book of Kings, this book of Persian history told in verse traverses three eras – mythological, prehistoric and pre-Islamic history of Persia up to the invasion of Persia by the second Caliph ‘Umar ibn Ḫaṭṭāb.
that pursuing dominance and power is unwise, given the transience of the world. In the eleventh century, following the historical confrontation between orthodox Islam and the rationalism of the Muʿtazilids, the religious orthodoxy tried to purge Islamic thinking from non-Islamic influences; Greek philosophy was disparaged as a foreign element. The Zahirids, the school of theology that opposed the Muʿtazilids, held that the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth (sayings of the prophet) are the only sources of knowledge. They viewed the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth as native to Islam; hikmat and philosophy, on the other hand, were seen as foreign elements and thus non-Islamic. These views were reflected in the literary representation of hikmat and philosophy in the centuries that followed. In one of his qaṣāʾıd (odes), for instance, the first great Sufi-poet, Sanāʾī (d. 1131 CE), writes the following:

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Till when, out of negligence in prayer you bad tempered ḥakīm,
Will have the beliefs of the Greeks like the lowly?
Abandoning the truthfulness of Būbakr, and adeptness of Ḥaydar;
Then falling for Pharaoh and Hāmān!
Reason is not reading philosophy in hope for accomplishment.
What is reason? To have a Qurʾān willing and Qurʾān reading soul.
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108 Qaṣāʾıd is the plural of qaṣida, a verse form consisting of 15 to 70 couplets in which the first verse of the first couplet rhymes with the second verse of all the couplets of the poem.

Among these poets Rūmī’s works differentiate between philosophy as true pursuit of knowledge and purposeless fallacies, which he believed some practiced in the name of philosophy. Rūmī expresses his utter respect for Plato and Galenus, while distancing himself from partaking in endless abstract discussions. Manūchehr Mortazavi, Maktab-e Ḥāfīz: Moqaddame bar Ḥāfīẓenās (Tehran: Ibn Sinā, 1344/1965), Introduction, p. 69.
110 The first Caliph after Muḥammad, famous for his honesty – hence his epithet śiddiq (truthful).
111 Ḥaydar (lion) is the epithet of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālīb, cousin of the prophet Mohammed and the fourth Caliph after the prophet; he is also the first Imām according to the Shia Muslims.
112 Pharaoh’s vizier according to Qurʾān (28: 8)

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Tākiy az kāhīl-namāzī iy ḥakīm-i zīst ḥū | Hamcū dūnān i tiqād-i ahl-i Yūnān dāštān
Ṣidq-i Būbakri-yu ḥizq-i Ḥaydarī kardan rāhā | Pas dil andar zumra-yi Firʿaun u Hāmān
dāštān
ʿAqīl nāvyd falsafa hīʾāndan zi bahr-i kāmīlī | ʿAqīl cībvd gān nuby hīʾ ah u nuby hīʾān dāštān
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This rejection of ḥikmat and philosophy as foreign elements corrupting Islamic orthodoxy can be seen in Sanāʾī’s direct mention of the Greek philosophical roots of ḥikmat. Sanāʾī names Greek philosophy alongside a series of elements signifying the otherness of the subject as Pharaoh and Hāmān. ‘Aṭṭār of the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries advanced the same view of ḥikmat and philosophy. In his Muṣḥbatnāma, he writes:

Become the man of religion and confidant of the secrets
Loathe the philosophers’ fantasy
Farther from the Sharia of the prophet of Hāšimīs (the prophet Muḥammad’s tribe),
Other than the philosopher no one can be.114

It must be mentioned that not all attacks made by Sufī poets against philosophy and ḥikmat were motivated by enmity against the teachings of Greek and Alexandrian philosophers; in fact, as I discuss later, the views of Neoplatonists make up the core of Sufi theosophical teachings regarding emanation. In many cases, Sufi opposition to philosophy was directed against radical rationalistic thinkers who held human reason to be sufficient to understand nature, metaphysics and even the essence of the divine. Since Sufis thought that intuition was the only way to understand the divine, they rejected the role ascribed to reason by rationalist philosophers.115 Furthermore, despite the hostility of early Sufi poets against ḥikmat and philosophy, some of the most important philosophers of the Islamic Peripatetic and Neoplatonic traditions considered Sufism to be a part of philosophy. Moreover, the growing trend on the part of Sufis and Sufi philosophers toward speculation and discursive representation obscured the boundaries that separated Sufism, theology, philosophy, and metaphysics.

Throughout the Divan, Ḥāfiz never claims to be a polymath (ḥakīm) on par with Ibn Sīnā, Ḥrāḡa Naṣīr ud-Dīn Ṭūsī and Āmulī. Yet the presence of different aspects of ḥikmat in the Divan proves that the poet was a seeker of such knowledge. The following couplet gestures toward the poet’s view of ḥikmat and, more importantly, of the relationship between philosophy and life: ‘Ḥāfiz! From

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Mard-i din šau, mahram-i asrār gard | Az ḥayāl-i falsafi bızār gard | Nist az šar’i nabi-yi Hāšimi | Dūrtar az falsafi iak ādamī

115 Compare to: Naḡm ud-Dīn Rāżi, Risāla-yi ‘iṣq va ‘aql (Mi’yār ul-ṣidq fi miṣdāq ul-‘iṣq), ed. Taqī Tafaqḍūlī (Tehran: Bongāh-e Tarḡome va Naṣr-e Ketāb, 1345/1966), pp. 45–48. Naḡm ud-Dīn Rāżi is knowledgeable about the views of the Peripatetic Philosophers – see p. 69. However, his true debt to Alexandrian and Platonic views concerns his explanations of emanation of the divine and the hierarchic levels of benefiting from divine emanation, which is constantly present in his interpretative Qur’ān citations. See for instance p. 56; 58.
the fountain of Philosophy, bring to hand a cup (of wisdom) | It may be that
from the heart
's tablet, the picture of ignorance goeth.

In this couplet, the poet clearly acknowledges his respect for ḥikmat as a remedy for ignorance. Translated by Clarke as 'philosophy' and by Wohlleben and Hammer-Purgstall as 'Weisheit', ḥikmat refers to that aspect of the knowledge that overcomes ignorance and extends into life itself. In this respect, ḥikmat and Sufi teachings overlap.

Ignoring the wide range of meaning and practical orientation of ḥikmat, Clarke incorrectly translated ḥakīm – a person who is accomplished in ḥikmat – as 'physician' in the following couplet. In the following poem, we find expressed the Platonic view regarding the equivalence of the Truth, the Right and the Good (ṣavāb and ḥayr). Here are Wohlleben’s and Clarke’s translations:

Der Rat des Weisen ist genau das Richtige und schlechthin Gute;
glücklich, wer ihn hört und akzeptiert.
The essence of good and essentially good, is the physician’s counsel:
Happy that one’s fortune, who, with the ear of resignation, ---
heard

The poet views ḥikmat (at least in its practical aspect) as a source of clarity – a spring, as he describes it in the first quote above, from which to quench the thirst for knowledge and clear away the ignorance that clouds the faculty of judgment.

Yet, as the following verses show, ḥikmat does not quench the poet’s thirst entirely.

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116 Translation from: Clarke, 244, 7, p. 440. The Persian couplet is the following: Ḥāfiẓ az čišma-yi ḥikmat ba kaf āvar ġāmī | Bū ki az lauḥ-i dilat naqš-i ġihālat biravad. In: Qazvīnī & Ģānī, 222, 7.
118 Wohlleben, 238, 11, pp. 323.
119 Clarke, 215, 11, p. 397. The original Persian couplet is the following:


It is important to note that what Clarke translates as ‘resignation,’ the Arabic word raẓā, literally means ‘contentment’ and ‘satisfaction.’ If we insist on reading it in Sufi context then it would mean inner and spiritual contentment. It is does not, however, denote surrender or resignation (taslīm) or predestination (ḡabr). I should clarify that in the whole Divan there is not one instance of usage of the term ḡabr as a doctrine. For submission (taslīm) in the Divan see: Ibid, 59, 6, p. 146; Ibid, 169, 8, p. 324.
120 For another instance see in: Clarke, 524, 13, p. 858.
Brave tales of singers and wine relate,
The key to the Hidden 'twere vain to seek;
No wisdom of ours has unlocked that gate,
And locked to our wisdom it shall be.121

It is in verses such as the above that we grasp that in the Divan ḥikmat is subject to problematization. In other words, ḥikmat itself has its limits. In the couplet that follows, the poet addresses ḥikmat, represented by Plato. ‘Save Plato, jarsitter with wine, | To us, the mystery of philosophy, who uttereth –again?’122 The philosopher who chose his house to be a vat (pithos) was Diogenes of Sinope of the fourth century BC. By alluding to this attribute of Diogenes and specifying that the jar in question is jar of wine, the poet seamlessly embeds Plato, who represents ḥikmat, into Ḥāfiẓian bacchanalian ġazal and the poet’s quest for knowledge. This is evident in the poet’s mention of wine and Plato together in a single line. By suggesting that Plato’s house is a jar of wine, Ḥāfiẓ implies that Plato is the wine itself, and vice versa, thereby elevating Plato to the sole source of acquisition of knowledge (ḥikmat) for Ḥāfiẓ. Moreover, by linking wine and Plato, Ḥāfiẓ also shows that the reception of Platonic philosophy is interwoven with Sufi wine metaphors – one example of the inner-connection between ḥikmat and Sufi views in the Divan.

1.1.4 Neoplatonic Views as the Starting Point for the Study of the Relation Between Body and Soul in Goethe’s Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ

The most reliable sources on Ḥāfiẓ’s views regarding the body, the soul and the pursuit of truth are the Divan itself as well as writings of Ḥāfiẓ’s contemporaries. As we saw earlier, Āmulī viewed proficiency in multiple branches of knowledge as a prerequisite for all poets; Ḥāfiẓ would never have achieved his rank as a poet without the wide range of knowledge he possessed and to which the Divan testifies. We know from the Divan itself and from Gulanām, who assembled its poems, that Ḥāfiẓ had been a lecturer of theological texts and Qur’ān interpretations. In particular, he held lectures on Kaššāf, a comprehensive

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121 Ḥāfiẓ, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, 5, p. 91. Transcription of the original Persian couplet:

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\text{Hadīṣ az muṭrīb u māi gū u rāz-i dahr kamtār gū / Ki kas nagšūd u nagšāyad ba ḥikmat in muʿammā rā.}\text{ In: Ḥānlarī 3, 5.}
\]

122 Clarke, 306, 3, p. 530. See also in Wohlleben, 256, 5, p. 345. The Persian couplet: \text{Ǧuz Falāṭūn-i ḥum-nišīn-i ẓarāb / Sirri ḥikmat ba mā ki ġūyad bāz}
commentary on the Qurʾān written in the twelfth century by the theologian (ahl-i kalām) Zamaḥšari, who belonged to the school of Muʿtazilids, which was deeply rooted in the rational tradition that flourished as Greek philosophy was becoming accessible through translation to Islamic world. As Dādbeh asserts, lecturing on Kaššāf requires knowledge of philosophy and kalām. Ḥāfīz’s personal acquaintance with the founder of the philosophical school of Shiraz, ʿAṣud ud-Dīn Īǧī, and his knowledge of his work Mawāqif (The Stations) further testifies to the poet’s knowledge of philosophy.

The term ḥikmat and most of its branches are present in Ḥāfīz’s Divan. As I showed above, Ḥāfīz follows Āmulī’s understanding of the term as philosophy in the broadest sense. Furthermore, as I showed and as I will further demonstrate throughout this study, knowledge of the truth, self-knowledge and self-development were pursued through ḥikmat and Sufism alike, both of which were influenced by Neoplatonism. Since, during Ḥāfīz’s time, questions concerning the pursuit of knowledge and the relation between body and soul were viewed through a Neoplatonic lens, answers to these questions advanced in the Divan must likewise be understood in light of Neoplatonic views.

As far as Goethe is concerned, we benefit from textual documentation of Goethe’s study of Platonic and Neoplatonic texts. This documentation allows us to more easily approach Faust as an instance of the problematization of Neoplatonic views in the context of the relation between the body and the soul in the pursuit of knowledge.

The sixth book of the second part of Dichtung und Wahrheit provides useful information regarding Goethe’s familiarity with Platonism and Neoplatonism. Here, Goethe notes that, as a young man, he considered that ‘eine abgesonderte Philosophie sei nicht nötig, indem sie schon in der Religion und Poesie vollkommen enthalten sei.’ He read Johann Jakob Brucker’s history of philosophy with this view of philosophy in mind. Regarding the earliest philosophers, Goethe writes: ‘An den ältesten Männern und Schulen gefiel mir am besten, daß Poesie,
Religion und Philosophie ganz in Eins zusammenfielen'.

Koch clarifies that Neoplatonic thinkers caught young Goethe’s interest during the early stage of his studies of philosophy. Furthermore, Koch explains that Goethe studied the texts in Latin and that one of his sources may have been Marsilio Ficino’s (1433–1499 CE) translation of the *Enneads* of 1486. In his *Ephemerides*, Goethe responds to a passage in *Bibliographia antiquaria* by Johann Albrecht Fabricius in which Fabricius condemns Spinoza’s cosmology and that of Zeno, Aristotle and Plotinus; the author then expresses his support for the position that views God and Nature as separate. Goethe critiques these passages of *Bibliographia* through an ontological perspective; he expresses his strong disagreement with the separation of God and Nature, asserting that ‘the whole’ is in the state of unity based on the one true being that is God, which is the ontological ground of the multiplicity. Furthermore, he clarifies that this view has its roots in antiquity and goes back to Plotinus.

The *Ephemerides* also proves that Goethe studied Moses Mendelssohn’s *Phädon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* in the period between September, 1768 and March, 1770. He read this text in comparison with Plato’s *Phaedo* and attempted to identify differences between them. As the title indicates, this work of Mendelssohn’s focuses on providing philosophical arguments for the immortality of the soul. The line of argument in Plato’s *Phaedo* and Mendelssohn’s modifying translation of it, as Goethe also notes, has the ontological and epistemological elements as basic components contributing to their philosophical system. These spheres then determine the ethical aspect of the dialogue.

Goethe saw in *Phädon* the interwoven threads of multiple critiques of the method of the acquisition of knowledge – i.e. the epistemological, ethical and ontological aspects of the work. Goethe’s first note highlights the ethical aspect

129 Ibid.
of the dialogue: ‘Ein Weiser stirbt gerne.’135 The next note in the Ephemerids that is of importance for this study concerns the ontological realm. Mendelssohn, like Plato, believed that there existed a gap between the states of being and non-being and that the realm of natural perpetual change cannot escape or step outside of this gap. In other words, in the realm of nature, as Mendelssohn and Plato understand it, there is no coming to be and ceasing to be in an ontological sense. Rather, there is only perpetual change, as the following passage in Phädon makes clear:

So lassen sich auch, im Ganzen betrachtet, die Tage der Woche nicht unterscheiden; denn das Stetige und Aneinanderhängende läßt sich nur in der Einbildung, und nach den Vorspiegelungen der Sinne, in bestimmte und abgesonderte Theile zertrennen; der Verstand aber siehtet gar wohl, daß man da nicht stehen bleiben muß, wo keine wirkliche Abtheilung ist.136

It is in this context that Goethe quotes the following passage from Mendelssohn’s Phädon: ‘Zwischen seyn und nicht seyn ist eine entsetzliche Kluft, die von der almählig wirkenden Natur der Dinge nicht übersprungen werden kann.’137 According to this line of argument, the influence of the transcendent realm on the realm of nature and perpetual change can be explained through an ontological perspective. After this ontological remark, Mendelssohn describes the soul’s journey toward knowledge and wisdom. It is only in the radical independence of the soul from the body that the soul can be recognized as eternal. This view, as Goethe notes, extends to an epistemology of independence from the body, according to which philosophy is the practice of abstraction of the body from the soul: ‘Kann die Seele ohne Sinne empfinden. Sie wird die erhabne, heilige, geistische Gefühle von Schönheit, Ordnung und also von Gott haben.’138 In addition, Goethe’s letter to Herder from 1772 speaks to Goethe’s study of Greek philosophy and literature, specifically Plato and Xenophon.139 Werner Keller points out that Goethe’s studies of Plotinus took

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135 Ibid., p. 437.
138 Der Junge Goethe, p. 438. See also in ———, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele’, pp. 53–54. (Goethe must have taken this note from Cebes’s mention of Philolaus’s view within Socrates’s arguments.)
an important turn in the summer of 1805, when Goethe spent his fifty-sixth birthday in Lauchstädt. During this short period of seclusion, he dedicated some time to reading Plotinus’s *Enneads*. During this time, Goethe was in frequent correspondence with Friedrich August Wolf, a philologist friend known for his expertise in Greek texts. Goethe’s letter on August 30, 1805 to F. A. Wolf reveals that, during this time, Goethe tried to study the Greek texts. The most celebrated fruit of these studies are the four verses cited below. Keller dedicated an article to these verses in which he tried to read them in connection with Plotinus’s views regarding the emanation of the transcendent in the world and the unity of the knower with the known. As Keller states, the chronological order of appearance of the verses is as follows: ‘im Notizheft und als Widmungsblatt vom 1. September 1805, als zentrales Bekenntnis in der Einleitung “zum didaktischen Teil” der *Farbenlehre* (1810) und als “Zahmes Xenion” in der Ausgabe von 1827.’ In *Farbenlehre*, these verses appear in the context of a series of discursive arguments regarding the relation between the perceiving organ (the eye) and the light. Considering Goethe’s knowledge of the philosophical origin of these verses, there is no doubt that they were influenced by Neoplatonic views that, in turn, were inspired by Empedocles (ca. 495–435 BCE).

Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Wie könnten wir das Licht erblicken?
Lebt’ nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie könnt’ uns Göttliches entzücken?

These verses, as Keller notes, are a loose translation of Plotinus’s *Ennead* I. 6. 9. In *Farbenlehre*, Goethe credits the source of these verses: die ‘Worte eines alten Mystikers, die wir in deutschen Reimen folgendermaßen ausdrücken möchten’.

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140 FA II, 6: Goethe’s letter: An Herzog Carl August 28.8.1805
141 FA II, 6: p. 27.
143 Goethe specifically mentions the view of knowing the like by the like ‘nur von Gleichem werde Gleiches erkannt’, which reminds Goethe of ‘der alten ionischen Schule’. FA I, 23/1: p. 24. On Empedocles and the idea of likeness in cognition and perception in a critical context of Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’s introductions and interpretations of Empedocles’s view, see the following article: Rachana Kamtekar, ‘Knowing by Likeness in Empedocles’, *Phronesis*, 54, no. 3 (2009), pp. 215–238.
144 FA I, 23/1: p. 24.
145 Ibid.
The interwoven cosmological and epistemological aspects of these verses lead to an articulation of the view of immanence in the world in Goethe’s poetic adaptation of the above *Ennead*; they also motivate the metaphor of the sun in a context in which the sun and the human being stand in a cosmological and epistemological relation. We should also note that these words testify to an inner connection between mysticism and philosophy, a view expressed by Goethe at various points throughout his study of philosophy.

Goethe was constantly in dialogue with Platonism and Neoplatonism. Furthermore, Goethe’s problematization of Neoplatonic views was inseparable from his conception of light and the sun; his exploration of questions regarding the human being’s ontological and epistemological dimensions; and his interest in the way the human being lives and pursues knowledge. This context is suitable for exploring *Faust* within the outlines of the problematization of the pursuit of knowledge and its reflection on the body and soul relationship.

In this chapter, I have demonstrated the relevance of Platonic and Neoplatonic views to understanding Hafiz’s *Divan* and Goethe’s *Faust*. We are now in a position to understand the intellectual and historical adaptations that these basic views undergo in the respective cultural spaces reflected in our two texts.

I.1.4.1 Becoming Sun-like or Being Sun-like

‘Were not the eye sun-like, how could we behold the light?’146 This poem is Goethe’s modification and translation of a sentence in the *Ennead* I. 6. 9.147 But

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146 FA I, 23/1: p. 24 (my translation). ‘Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, | Wie könnten wir das Licht erblicken?’

147 On likeness of the eye and the sun, as well as the inner relation between the eye and the sun in the *Republic*, we read the following:

- Neither sight nor the organ in which it resides, which we call the eye, is the sun?
- No.
- Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?
- By far the most like.
- And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?
- Exactly.
- Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight?
- True, he said.

what is it that Goethe modifies here? The answer to this question shows us where, according to Goethe, the Neoplatonic view needed to be corrected.

The *Ennead* I. 6. 9 expounds on a process of gaining the ability to see with an eye other than the sensory one. This is apparent in the last sentence of the *Ennead* I. 6. 8: ‘Shut your eyes, and change to and wake another way of seeing, which everyone has but few use.’  

Plotinus is referring to a kind of sight that can be awakened – one that is not, like sensory perception, already active. Opening this inner eye requires going through a process of purification: ‘But if anyone comes to the sight blear-eyed with wickedness, and unpurified, or weak and by his cowardice unable to look at what is very bright, he sees nothing, even if someone shows him what is there and possible to see.’  

The question in Plotinus’s *Ennead* I. 6. 9 concerns becoming and not being sun-like: ‘No eye ever saw the sun without becoming sun-like, nor can a soul see beauty without becoming beautiful.’  

The process that one has to undergo to open the inner eye, according to Plotinus, concerns only the soul. Furthermore, it is a process of ascent: ‘First the soul will come in its ascent to intellect and there will know the Forms, all beautiful.’  

Unlike in the *Ennead* I. 6. 9, however, Goethe views the inner eye as already active. He describes it as an ontological characteristic of the human being. The eye and the sun are already similar, Goethe thought. Furthermore, Plotinus’s process of purification or ascent is absent from Goethe’s version of the theory. Goethe’s critical interpretation of the above *Ennead* problematizes one of the most cardinal aspects of Neoplatonic metaphysics – namely, the transcendent nature of the truth and the ascending method of pursuit of the truth. In Goethe’s poem, the sun stands in an immediate relation to ‘Gottes eigne Kraft’. It is an active principle in human beings that does not need to be ‘awoken’.

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149 Ibid. I. 6. 9, p. 261.

150 Ibid., (my emphasis).

151 Ibid. Compare to the same sentence modified in Goethe’s poem in Harder’s German translation of the *Ennead* I. 6. 9: ‘Man muß nämlich das Sehende dem Gesehenen verwandt und ähnlich machen, wenn man sich auf die Schau richtet; kein Auge könnte je die Sonne sehen, wäre es nicht sonnenhaft; so sieht auch keine Seele das Schöne, welche nicht schön geworden ist.’

I.1.4.2 A Brief Note on the Presence of the Sun and Its Light in Plotinus’s Theory of Emanation

The Neoplatonic theory of emanation claims that the cosmos emanates from a simple, unchanging and incorporeal principle named the One. As the highest principle in Plotinus’s system, the One inherits the qualities that Plato, Plotinus’s predecessor, thought the highest principle must have: the One is the Good, the True, the Beautiful, the Real and the Just all at once. Whenever any of these aspects of the One is addressed, all the others are immediately and necessarily implied. The emanation itself can be described, in short, as a process in which the One bestows existence upon the multiplicity of the phenomena. Yet it is of utmost importance to note that, by definition, the One is immutable. Therefore, the two related concepts of time and movement are irrelevant to the One and its emanation; the stages of the emanation occur in an eternal continuum.152

Emanation, as Plotinus understands it, goes through the following stages: Intellect emanates from the One; the Soul of the World emanates from Intellect; and, finally, the Soul of the World imparts the intelligible, never-changing forms to heavenly bodies. The body appears for the first time at the level of heavenly bodies; prior to this stage, emanation is conceived to be a purely spiritual process. By Plotinus’s definition, the body is the meeting place of the spiritual and the material.153 The aversion of Plotinus’s system toward matter becomes apparent from the fact that heavenly bodies are held to be made of ether and are untouched by change and decay.154

Bearing in mind these qualities of the One, we may now address the place of the sun in Plotinus’s system. Plotinus argues that the One must emanate the universe without itself being moved and changed. In the Ennead V. I. 6 (On the Three Primary Hypostases), Plotinus reasons that, if the One were moved, then anything that came from it would be two steps removed (rather than one) from the origin of the movement – yet the origin of moment, as per definition, is the One. How can something create movement without itself being moved? Here is


153 Ennead III. 4. 1. Thus, the intelligible has no other origin than the intellect, which in turn has no origin and existence other than that of the One. In short, there are no qualities or quantities which have any origin other than the One, via Intellect and the World Soul. Therefore, the intelligible is the continuum of the One in accord with the capability of the body.

154 On the hierarchic levels of the emanation see: Ennead II. 3. 17 and V. I. 6.
where Plotinus appeals to the metaphor of the sun. Its rays of light represent a
form of begetting that (a) does not require any movement from its originating
cause and (b) illustrates emanation as the necessary essence of the One: ‘It
must be a radiation from it while it remains unchanged, like the bright light of
the sun which, so to speak, runs round it, springing from it continually while it
remains unchanged.’ The sun represents the One and the rays of light repre-
sent the Intellect, the first emanation. In other words, the sun stands for the
necessity of emanation that is presupposed by the essence of the One. Thus,
the One emanates freely, yet at the same time necessarily and inexhaustibly,
and it remains unchanged in the process.

These are the cosmological principles that Plotinus aspires to illustrate via
the sun metaphor. As I pointed out above, one of the clearest instances of the
cosmological implementation of the analogy of the sun is the Ennead V. 1. 6.
Though not as illustrative as the metaphor of the sun and its rays, Plotinus also
saw the transmission of scent as a metaphor for emanation theory. Scent as a
metaphor for Intellect and perfume as a metaphor for the One can be seen, for
instance, in the Ennead V. 1. 2. These metaphors will also play a role in the
analysis of our two texts.

Each stage of the emanation, Plotinus thought, is in love with the stage
above it. This love is explained as the love of the child for its parents; the lower
stage directs its quest toward the Beautiful and the Good in the stage above. This
view is rooted in Plato’s Symposium and the teachings of Diotima, who defined
love as poverty and the recognition of need. ‘Every thing longs for its parent and
loves it, especially when parent and offspring are alone; but when the parent is
the highest good, the offspring is necessarily with him and separate from him
only in otherness.’ Yet Plotinus modifies this view and extends it to the One
itself. Armstrong clarifies that, according to Plotinus, the One is not only ‘self-

155 Ennead V. 1. 6.
156 Arthur Hilary Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of
Plotinus: an Analytical and Historical Study, Cambridge classical studies (Amsterdam: Hakkert,
157 See in Republic the sun juxtaposed to the source of the forms, expressed by the following
simile:
‘You would say, would you not that the sun is not only the author of visible in all visible
things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generated?
Certainly.
In like manner you must say that the good not only infuses the power of being known into
all things known, but also bestows upon them their being and existence, and yet the good is not
158 Ennead V. 1. 6.
sufficient’ and ‘self-directed’. It also has a unique characteristic: ‘the One does not only think itself, it wills and loves itself.’ Plotinus explains the process of reunion in terms of the One’s self-willing and self-loving, and he claims that the human soul contains a spark of the One itself; I will explore this view in greater depth later, when I turn to the analysis of the body and soul relation in *Faust*.

### I.2 The Sun, Heavenly Bodies and the Call for Ascent in *Faust*

The *Prolog im Himmel* commences with the sun. Following Pythagorean theory, Raphael’s ode celebrates the rotation of the sun as the source of a tune that the angels perceive and enjoy.

Die Sonne tönt nach alter Weise  
In Brudersphären Wettgesang,  
Und ihre vorgeschrieb’ne Reise  
Vollendet sie mit Donnergang.  
Ihr Anblick gibt den Engeln Stärke,  
Wenn keiner sie ergründen mag;  
Die unbegreiflich hohen Werke  
Sind herrlich wie am ersten Tag.  

The sight of the sun gives the angels strength and nourishment. It reminds us of the Stoic conception of the sun as the source of energy and nourishment in the cosmos – a source of ‘undiminished giving.’ The archangels’ inability (by self-admission) to comprehend the sun recalls the Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor of the sun as the source of emanation of all that is intelligible and which stands beyond the Intellect. The philosophical representation of the sun in the *Prolog im Himmel* highlights the significance of the sun to the drama as a whole.

In his first monologue, Faust characterizes the object of the knowledge he wishes to attain in several ways. It is the ‘indwelling entity’ that holds the world together; the seed from which the world springs; and the force that influences the world:

160 V. 243–250.
Daß ich erkenne was die Welt
Im Innersten zusammenhält,
Schau' alle Wirkenskraft und Samen,
Und tu' nicht mehr in Worten kramen.\textsuperscript{162}

In these verses,\textsuperscript{163} there is no mention of an upward path that might lead to a source of knowledge and being. Furthermore, there is no mention of a ‘hierarchy of being’ as a characteristic of the transcendent source of truth. Rather, Faust describes a triad – forces, seeds and the world – that creates a whole. This can be understood either as a modification of the Platonic emanation theory or as an articulation of Spinoza’s substance/attribute/mode triad of monistic Nature.\textsuperscript{164} (Recall that these lines were written after Goethe’s study of Spinoza and his speech \textit{Zum Shakespears Tag}.) This controversial issue, however, is not the subject of this study. For the purposes of tracing the problematization of Platonic views in \textit{Faust}, it suffices to note that Faust appears to view the acquisition of knowledge in terms of a world that is principally immanent.

\subsection*{I.2.1 Direct Approach to the Transcendent: Pain, Escape and Fall}

In the following verses, Faust fixes his gaze on the moon and recalls many nights in which the moon and its gloomy light were his only friends:

O sähst du, voller Mondenschein,
Zum letzenmal auf meine Pein,
Den ich so manche Mitternacht
An diesem Pult herangewacht:
Dann, über Büchern und Papier,
Trübsel’ger Freund, erschienst du mir!\textsuperscript{165}

Remarkably, Faust’s summoning the presence of the moon coincides with an expression of pain and alarm. Yet the pain turns into a delirious ecstatic fantasy of bathing in the moon’s dew – a mystical urge for direct ascent and union that is described in sensual language:

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{162} V. 382–385.
\bibitem{163} These verses were part of the drama since the \textit{Faust frühe Fassung}, which, as Schöne informs us, can be traced back to the years 1776 and 1777. See in: FK, p. 81.
\bibitem{165} V. 386–391.
\end{thebibliography}
Ach! könnt' ich doch auf Berges-Höh'n
In deinem lieben Lichte gehn,
Um Bergeshöhle mit Geistern schweben,
Auf Wiesen in deinem Dämmer weben,
Von allem Wissensqualm entladen
In deinem Tau gesund mich baden! \(166\)

Faust's escape into his fantasy of reaching directly for the moon is followed by a fall back to reality – the ‘Kerker’, as Faust describes it. Verses 398-409 depict the state of Faust's life in a world that he inherited from his forefathers, practitioners of alchemy and magic. Faust had restrained himself from these activities up until this point:

Weh! steck' ich in dem Kerker noch?
Verfluchtes dumpfes Mauerloch,
Wo selbst das liebe Himmelslicht
Trüb' durch gemalte Scheiben bricht! \(167\)

This world contained within these walls is the location where Faust suffers this pain. Initially, Faust conceptualizes his pain as a call that conveys his longing for the truth, a concept that is articulated poetically via light metaphors – these metaphors are consistent with 'the ascending tradition' that we discussed earlier. The scene's gothic room is constructed in such a way that light only penetrates its stained-glass windows.

In the scene *Nacht* Faust expresses another wish for escape – an urge to get out immediately and flee to faraway lands: 'Flieh! Auf! Hinaus in's weite Land!' \(168\) Evidently, this urge for escape takes the form of an urge for ascent, thereby paving the way for Faust's first speculative fantasy in pursuit of ascent – the path to which, according to Faust, is described in the book of Nostradamus.

### I.2.1.1 Escape in Speculative Fantasy

Faust’s inclination toward a world-view built around a principally immanent system emerges as he reads the macrocosm sign. Faust immediately integrates the microcosm into the macrocosm (‘Bin ich ein Gott?’) as he forms an understanding of the macrocosm. \(169\) His senses are the first to experience the speculative vision:

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\(166\) V. 392–397.
\(167\) V. 398–401.
\(168\) V. 419.
\(169\) V. 434–439.
Hal welche Wonne fließt in diesem Blick
Auf einmal mir durch alle meine Sinnen!
Ich fühle junges heil’ges Lebensglück
Neuglühend mir durch Nerv’ und Adern rinnen\(^{170}\)

Following the moon, which appeared at the beginning of the \textit{Nacht} scene, the sun – likewise a heavenly body – now appears in Faust’s reading of the macrocosm sign. The sun is represented by the metaphor of golden buckets, a metaphor that is taken from everyday life and that, therefore, brings the scene closer to its audience. Here, an emanative system is described in a manner that resembles the Platonic and Neoplatonic similes of light and scent. In accordance with the Platonic tradition, the emanation proceeds from above; rays of light emanate from heaven and resonate through existence, as though ‘passing’ golden buckets from one person in line to the next. However, even at this early point in the drama, we discern a clear difference between Faust’s speculative vision and Platonic and Neoplatonic views – namely, there is no sign of any resistance toward the flow of this heavenly Goodness in Faust’s account. In this moment of envisioned speculation, as if under the magical influence of the macrocosm sign, the above difference allows Faust’s body – his ‘Nerv’ und Adern,’ and not merely his intellect – to be influenced as well. Body and the soul both participate in the appreciation of the moment. This speculative vision includes ‘Blick’, ‘schauen’ and ‘erkennen’ of what ‘die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält’ in Faust’s vision\(^{171}\):

\begin{verbatim}
Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt,
Eins in dem andern wirkt und lebt!
Wie Himmelskräfte auf und nieder steigen
Und sich die goldnen Eimer reichen!
Mit segenduftenden Schwingen
Vom Himmel durch die Erde dringen,
Harmonisch all’ das All durchklingen!\(^{172}\)
\end{verbatim}

The only hindrance here is on the receiving end – namely, the human’s incapable ‘sense’ and dead ‘heart’:

\begin{verbatim}
Jetzt erst erkenn’ ich was der Weise spricht:
‘Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen;
Dein Sinn ist zu, dein Herz ist tot!
\end{verbatim}

\(^{170}\) V. 430–433.  
\(^{171}\) V. 430; 440; 442; 382–385. Also compare to: Hans Arens, \textit{Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I} (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1982), p. 86.  
\(^{172}\) V. 447–453.
Auf, bade, Schüler, unverdrossen
Die ird’sche Brust im Morgenrot!173

In the words of the ‘Wise One,’ ascension and purification are necessary for us to make the ‘earthly bosom’ capable of appreciating this light.174 Yet we face a discrepancy: although the immanence of the One is homogenous and uninterrupted, its appreciation by ‘Sinn’ and ‘Herz’, as Faust says, is neither unconditional nor universal. At first glance, it may appear that there is no way to describe how the senses and the earthly bosom open to ‘die Geisterwelt’; nonetheless, it is suggested that the ‘Schüler’ bathes the earthly bosom in the red light of dawn, thereby imagining the sensual (‘Sinn’) and spiritual (‘Herz’) experience of revolving around the sun. The rhetoric of negative and purifying ascent to transcendent truth is clearly present in the description of this bathing. These four verses are clearly different from the one written in 1805 in Lauchstädt. In verses 443–446 even in the midst of this joyous moment, the eye and the senses are depicted as ‘closed’ and the heart as ‘dead’. This description highlights the necessity of purification. The exhortation to profound purification was also at the core of the Ennead I. 6. 9, yet Goethe’s poetic reconstruction of the Ennead (in all of its variations since 1805) ignored this point.

For Faust, who zealously yearns for a sensual experience of immanent Nature, all these visions are deemed to be one magnificent spectacle – and nothing more. Bathing in the ‘Morgenrot’ only leads to another painful fall:

Welch Schauspiel! aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!
Wo fass’ ich dich, unendliche Natur?
Euch Brüste, wo? Ihr Quellen alles Lebens,
An denen Himmel und Erde hängt,

173 V. 442–446.
As we saw, Faust longs to appreciate the immanent presence of the transcendent as boundless nature; yet he does not know how to grasp nature in such a sensual unity. Faust's self-criticism doesn’t do him any more good than opening yet another page of the book of Nostradamus. Now the ‘Erdgeist’ is in front of him: ‘Du, Geist der Erde, bist mir näher’. Faust deems this soul to be at a lesser level of transcendence and therefore closer to him:

In Lebensfluten, im Tatensturm
Wall’ ich auf und ab,
Wehe hin und her!
Geburt und Grab,
Ein ewiges Meer,
Ein wechselnd Weben,
Ein glühend Leben,
So schaff’ ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,
Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.

The ‘Erdgeist’ introduces itself as an active and organic unity that contains multiple polarities: ‘auf und ab’, ‘hin und her’, ‘Geburt und Grab’. In this scene, Nature can be best understood in the context of Goethe’s Zum Shakespears Tag:

[D]as was wir das böse nennen, ist nur die andre Seite vom Guten die so notwendig zu seiner Existenz und in das Ganze gehört, als zona torrida brennen und Lapland einfrieren muß daß es einen gemäßigten Himmelsstrich gebe.

In this part of the speech, Goethe first describes Good and Evil as two poles or sides of a unique whole. He then expands his view by stressing the necessary polar coexistence of countless binary extremes in ‘das Ganze’. It must be noted that the ‘Erdgeist’ has the qualities attributed to the All.

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175 V. 454–459 (my emphasis).
176 V. 461.
177 V. 501–509.
178 Seen in the context of the text, it becomes clear that Goethe immediately distances himself even from recognizing anything as Good and Evil. Consider the way he refers to these two poles: ‘Das was wir […] nennen.’
I.2.2 The Problematization of a Method

The cosmic order of nature that Faust envisioned in his reading of the macro-cosm sign appears before him as the incarnate ‘Erdgeist’. Yet the immanence and the unity of the dichotomies contradict Faust’s wish to be recognized as ‘göttergleich’. At this stage, the discrepancy between Faust’s separation from the world (as an observer) and his vision of immanence that integrates the human being into nature becomes problematic. This, however, cannot be understood as unnatural – Goethe’s dramatic plot seems to share a characteristic that he praises in Shakespeare’s works:

[S]eine Stücke drehen sich alle um den geheimen Punkt (den noch kein Philosoph gesehen und bestimmt hat) in dem das Eigentümliche unseres Ichs, die prätendierte Freiheit unseres Wollens mit dem notwendigen Gang des Ganzen zusammenstoßt.

The willing subject strives for unity with the All, but knows that it is impossible to achieve: Goethe sees this conflict in Shakespeare’s characters and explains it as a conflict between the pretended freedom of will in the face of the necessary flow of the whole. Being human in this paradoxical state does not diminish the dramatic construct of the work. In fact, as a philosophical principle about nature it accounts for Goethe’s remark concerning Shakespeare: ‘Und ich rufe, Natur, Natur! nichts so Natur als Shakespeares Menschen.’

In the scene Nacht, we observe a seeker in his loneliness with a book opened before him. He is talking to the moon, speculating and dreaming. Isolated from all that is natural, he wishes to experience an immanence in which the all and the All are in unity – or as he says, ‘Harmonisch all’ das All durchklingen. In this setting, Faust forces the ‘Erdgeist’ to appear in his dark ‘Kerker’: ‘Du mußt! du mußt! und kostet es mein Leben!’ As soon as Faust is free of Wagner’s questions, he criticizes himself for having forced nature:


182 Ibid., p. 11 (my emphasis).

183 Ibid.

184 V. 453.

185 V. 481. See also the words of the ‘Erdgeist’ as it mocks Faust for being awed in its sight: v. 483–485.
Läßt sich Natur des Schleiers nicht berauben,
Und was sie deinem Geist nicht offenbaren mag,
Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit Schrauben.\textsuperscript{186}

This aggressive method of acquisition of knowledge is treated by Goethe in his 
\textit{Farbenlehre}.\textsuperscript{187} Goethe criticizes the stage that Newton sets up for his experi-
ment.\textsuperscript{188} Faust’s dark room, which Mephisto later describes as a ‘Marterort’
(v. 1835), does not seem to be any different from the ‘Marterkammer’ and ‘die
dunkle Kammer’\textsuperscript{189} that Schöne addresses in \textit{Goethes Farbentheologie}. For in-
stance, we read in the \textit{Zahme Xenien} VI of 1827:

Freunde flieht die dunkle Kammer
Wo man euch das Licht verzwickt,
Und mit kümmerlichstem Jammer
Sich verschroben Bilden bückt.
Abergläubische Verehrer
Gab’s die Jahre her genug,
In den Köpfen eurer Lehrer
Laßt Gespenst und Wahn und Trug.

Wenn der Blick an heitern Tagen
Sich zur Himmelsbläue lenkt,
Beim Siroc der Sonnenwagen
Purpurrot sich niedersenkt,
Da gebt der Natur die Ehre,
Froh, an Aug’ und Herz gesund,
Und erkennt der Farbenlehre
Allgemeinen ewigen Grund.\textsuperscript{190}

The words of the first stanza are the same as those used to describe Faust’s
‘Marterort’.\textsuperscript{191} And the second part of the verses above follows the first in a man-
ner that reminds us of the words of the Wise One in the scene \textit{Nacht}. Yet this
poem reflects Goethe’s re-interpretation of the \textit{Ennead} I. 6. 9; accordingly, there

\textsuperscript{186} V. 673–675.
\textsuperscript{187} On the relevance of Goethe’s criticism of scientific methods to this scene in \textit{Faust}, also see
Schöne’s comments on these verses in FK, p. 225.
\textsuperscript{188} See poems and fragments from 1806, 1823 and 1827 that orbit around Goethe’s critique of
method of acquisition of knowledge and torturing of the phenomenon in: Albrecht Schöne,
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 64.
\textsuperscript{190} FA I, 2: pp. 677–678.
\textsuperscript{191} Compare to: Schöne, \textit{Goethes Farbentheologie}, p. 64. These verses can also be found in
is no purification required to acquire knowledge. It suffices to observe nature with the naked eye. In this context, Faust’s self-criticism in verses 673–675 can be understood as his critique of a method of pursuit of knowledge that manufactures a vision of the All that cannot include the seeker of knowledge.

I.2.3 Suicide as a Way of Transcending the Body

After reflecting on his failed experience with the ‘Erdgeist’, Faust comes to a conclusion regarding his suffering: he credits it to the opposing directions toward which the soul and the body strive. Faust blames the corporeal realm for thwarting his efforts whenever he attempts to ascend toward the absolute.

Dem Herrlichsten, was auch der Geist empfangen,
Drängt immer fremd und fremder Stoff sich an;
Wenn wir zum Guten dieser Welt gelangen,
Dann heißt das Bess’re Trug und Wahn.
Die uns das Leben gaben, herrliche Gefühle,
Erstarren in dem irdischen Gewühle.

The complaints of Socrates in Phaedo come to mind. In the Ephemerides, Goethe mentions the Platonic notion of the separation of body and soul as a condition for acquiring the truth. Faust appears to share this Platonic view: ‘Für den Leib sorgt der Weise nicht. Denn er ist ihm vielmehr beschwerlich. Die Seele kann sich schwer [sic] zur betrachtung [sic] der geistigen Wesen erheben.’

The seeker of knowledge, Plato’s Socrates says, should ‘rid as far as he can, of eyes and ears, and so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they associate with the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge’. The body disparages the higher aspirations of the soul as ‘Trug und Wahn’ and the soul, after many failures, learns to be content with the meager space of the body. ‘Sorge’ is introduced as the body’s way of attaching itself to the soul.

Die Sorge nistet gleich im tiefen Herzen,
Dort wirkt sie geheime Schmerzen.

192 Compare to: FK, p. 224.
193 V. 634–639.
194 Der Junge Goethe, p. 437.
Unruhig wiegt sie sich und störet Lust und Ruh;
Sie deckt sich stets mit neuen Masken zu,
Sie mag als Haus und Hof, als Weib und Kind erscheinen,
Als Feuer, Wasser, Dolch und Gift.\textsuperscript{196}

In other words, the body is actively involved in leading the soul astray and obstructing its ascending quest. As we read in verses 647–651 of \textit{Faust}, an active will engineers these fears and masks them with the mundane to keep the soul concerned and attached to the body. ‘Du bebst vor allem was nicht trifft, | Und was du nie verlierst das mußt du stets beweinen.’\textsuperscript{197}

Matter is to blame for all of these misdeeds. Fire is the element used to forge iron into daggers, Faust reflects; and water is the essence of poison, a symbol of treason and deception. Socrates, too, identifies the body with seduction, want and distractions of ‘Haus, und Hof’ and ‘Weib und Kind’. In \textit{Phaedo}, we read the following:

For the body is a source of countless \textit{distractions} by reason of the mere \textit{requirement of food}, and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the pursuit of truth: it fills us full of \textit{loves}, and \textit{lusts}, and \textit{fears}, and fancies of all kind [...] Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? All wars are occasioned by the love of the money, and money has to be acquired for the sake of the body and in slavish ministration to it\textsuperscript{198}

Schiller read the \textit{Faust} drama against the background of the seeker of knowledge and the relationship between body and soul.\textsuperscript{199} In his doctoral dissertation, which provided a brief history of various conceptions of the body and soul relation, he addressed a commonly held view of his time – namely, that the body is a ‘distraction’ for the thinker because it has needs and desires. He invites the reader to understand these ‘interruptions’ as a call from Mother Earth that awakens the dreamer and reminds him of his attachment to the earth. These complaints are

\textsuperscript{196} V. 644–649 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{197} V. 650–651.
\textsuperscript{198} Plato, ‘Phaedo’, p. 417, 66 b & c (my emphasis).
strikingly similar to those found in *Faust* and *Phaedo*. Schiller’s words may be read as the body’s answer to Faust’s complaint in verses 634–651:


The heavenly bodies and their light are associated with the wish to fly and transcend earthly boundaries. As Faust fixes his gaze on the poison, a fantasy of moonlight in the forest kindles his desire for lightness and flight. The poison promises release from failure and suffering:

> Doch warum heftet sich mein Blick auf jene Stelle?  
> Ist jenes Fläschchen dort den Augen ein Magnet?  
> Warum wird mir auf einmal lieblich helle,  
> Als wenn im nächt’gen Wald uns Mondenglanz umweht?

Suicide as a means of ascent to the heavenly realm is a subject of *Phaedo*. In fact, Goethe’s notes on *Phädon* begins with precisely this issue: ‘Ein Weiser stirbt gern. So beginnt das Gespräch. Eine kleine Abhandlung über den Selbstmord.’ In the short section to which Goethe refers in this note, both Plato and Mendelssohn advance arguments against suicide. They argue that suicide is an unacceptable way to bridge transcendent truth with life in the body, a state that both authors view as equivalent to ignorance. ‘Ein Weiser, fängt er an, lernt seine ganze Lebzeit durch sterben. Der Tod setzt er voraus sey eine Trennung des Leibes und der Seele.’ These notes refer to the most controversial passage of Plato’s *Phaedo*, represented with caution in Mendelssohn’s work: ‘In fact the true

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201 V. 686–689.

202 *Der Junge Goethe*, p. 437.

203 Ibid.
philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying. If philosophy is the practice of separating the soul from the body, then it follows that philosophy is a lifelong practice of preparing for death. Yet there is an important distinction between advocating for suicide (Plato most certainly doesn’t) and articulating a way of life that emphasizes the abstraction of the soul from the body and that outlines the ascending pursuit of truth. This manner of pursuit of truth finds its metaphorical articulation in the parable of the cave in the *Republic*. As Smith points out, Porphyry offers a Neoplatonic explanation of this method of life and pursuit of knowledge. Porphyry describes the spiritual death of the true seeker as one ‘in which the soul may, in a positive sense, distance and thus separate itself from the distractions of the body.’ Logically intertwined with the ethic of ascent in the Platonic tradition, this epistemology is a way of life. Yet, considering *Phaedo*’s portrayal of Socrates as welcoming of death and the fact that the dialogue has difficulty refuting arguments in favor of suicide, we cannot deny the strong association between the negative pursuit of truth and death.

Faust’s attempts at ascension repeatedly fail. In desperation, he now resolves to leave the earthly realm behind and to flee the cycle that traps him – the cycle of pain, escape into fantasy and falling back to reality. Each time he sees or thinks of heaven and heavenly bodies – made of ether, according to the Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophies –, Faust’s urge burns again. Thus, Faust’s only wish is for upward movement – ‘Auf neuer Bahn den Äther zu durchdringen’. Yet unlike that of the biblical Elijah, Faust’s ascent is horrific: ‘Nach jenem Durchgang hinzustreben, | Um dessen engen Mund die ganze Hölle flammt’. Before he reaches for the poison, Faust thinks of the sun. He regretfully encourages himself to turn his back to the earth’s precious sun in the hope of reaching the incorporeal realm of ether: ‘Ja, kehre nur der holden

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204 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, p. 418. 67, e. See also ibid. p. 435. 80, e.
207 V. 704–705.
208 Schöne points out the biblical allusion that Goethe utilizes here as he refers to the Elijah’s ascent to heaven. FK, p. 226.
209 V. 716–717.
210 It is worth mentioning that, for Plato in *Republic*, the sun is the most precious thing in the visible world: ‘And this, you must understand, is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind’ in: Plato, ‘Republic’, pp. 370–371. Book VI. 507d–508c.
Erdensonne | Entschlossen deinen Rücken zu!211 Once again, Faust prepares to force himself beyond his human limits: ‘Vermesse dich die Pforten aufzureißen, | Vor denen jeder gern vorüber schleicht.’212 Earlier in the scene Nachtk, Faust resorted to force to summon the ‘Erdgeist’, and thereby risked his own life: ‘Du mußt! du mußt! und kostet es mein Leben!’213 Now he is willing to risk his life again: ‘Zu diesem Schritt sich heiter zu entschließn | Und wär’ es mit Gefahr, in’s Nichts dahin zu fließen.’214

Earth and heaven are juxtaposed as the ascent toward the heavens meets with heavenly songs. This unfolds in three stages: first, Faust complains about his failure to conceive of himself as immanent and God-like. His complaint highlights his feelings of rejection as he, metaphorically speaking, knocks on the doors of the immanent divine nature215: ‘Was sucht ihr, mächtig und gelind, | Ihr Himmelstöne, mich am Staube?’216 This complaint then leads to an admission: ‘Zu jenen Sphären wag’ ich nicht zu streben, | Woher die holde Nachricht tönt’.217 Finally, Faust’s skepticism is overwhelmed by emotions caused by memories of childhood: ‘Und doch, an diesen Klang von Jugend auf gewöhnt, | Ruft er auch jetzt zurück mich in das Leben.’218

Again, heaven and earth are mentioned together as Faust returns to earth. In the following verses, the circularity of Faust’s actions is remarkable. In longing for ascent, Faust strives downwards toward what he recognizes as hell219; yet from above, heavenly songs awaken his childhood memories and return him to earth.

Erinnerung hält mich nun, mit kindlichem Gefühl,
Vom letzten, ernsten Schritt zurück.
O tönet fort ihr süßen Himmelslieder!
Die Träne quillt, die Erde hat mich wieder!220

211 V. 708–709 (my emphasis).
212 V. 710–711.
213 V. 481.
214 V. 718–719.
215 Faust’s endeavor to grasp the limits of his individuality continues to be present in the Pact Scene: ‘Ich habe mich zu hoch gebläht; | In deinen Rang gehör’ ich nur. | Der große Geist hat mich verschmäht, | Vor mir verschließt sich die Natur.’ (V. 1744–1747). This quest for the place of the ‘Ich’ will be explored further in this study.
216 V. 762–764.
217 V. 767–768.
218 V. 769–770 (my emphasis).
219 See v. 717.
220 V. 781–784.
Though overwhelmed, Faust is able to critically evaluate his emotions: he describes them as childish feelings rooted in childhood experiences. It is no wonder therefore, that the series of curses Faust casts in the so-called Pact Scene begins with cursing these feelings (v. 1585–1589). In the poem *Prometheus*, there is a remarkable passage in which the sun joins with the wish for ascent and childish hopes and thereby introduces part of Goethe’s poetic critique of religion:

Da ich ein *Kind* war,
Nicht wußte wo aus noch ein,
Kehrt’ ich mein verirrtes Auge
Zur *Sonne*, als wenn drüber wär’
Ein Ohr zu hören meine Klage,
Ein Herz wie mein’s,
Sich des Bedrängten zu erbarmen.221

In this instance, the sun and the wish for ascent are in direct connection. In these rebellious verses, moreover, Prometheus admits that, as a child, he too had hoped for sympathy from the heavens. The awakened Titan depicts this sentiment as childish folly.

### I.2.4 Flying toward the Setting Sun

After his suicide attempt, Faust exits his dark cell for the first time in the drama and walks in nature. On this stroll, he experiences the outside world introspectively. Two well-known poetic monologues from this scene focus on the sun. In this section, I address the second monologue. (I explore the first monologue in the chapter *Toward Life*.)

Near the end of the scene *Vor dem Tor* (v. 1069–1099), the sight of the setting sun offers Faust respite from his grief concerning his lack of knowledge. The sight of the sun kindles in him the wish for ascent; he yearns for wings with which to fly toward the sun: ‘O daß kein *Flügel* mich von *Boden hebt*, | *Ihr* nach und immer nach zu streben!’222 Faust dreams with his eyes open and fixed on this natural spectacle. In his fantasy, he flies toward the sun. The fantasy continues until the sun vanishes from the horizon. Suddenly, the old wound – the urge to ascend – reopens. Once again employing a light metaphor, Faust articulates this tendency as the desire to drink from the eternal light of the sun

222 V. 1074–1075 (my emphasis).
while floating between the darkness of matter and the spiritual light (night and day, and the waves and the heaven).

Doch scheint die Göttin endlich wegzusinken;
Allein der neue Trieb erwacht,
Ich eile fort ihr ew’ges Licht zu trinken,
Vor mir den Tag, und hinter mir die Nacht,
Den Himmel über mir und unter mir die Wellen.223

The direction of Faust’s ascent here is the same as the ascent in Plato’s allegory of the cave. If the macrocosm vision was a spectacle – ‘ein Schauspiel nur’ –, in this scene, Faust interprets his experience as a dream: ‘Ein schöner Traum, in dessen sie entweicht.’224 Since the soul’s wings are like fantasy’s ‘kühnem Flug’ (v. 640–641) and are again sabotaged by the ‘körperlicher Flügel’, Faust directs his complaints to the body once again. This time, the complaint commences with an expression of great loss and pain: ‘Ach! zu des Geistes Flügeln wird so leicht | Kein körperlicher Flügel sich gesellen.’225

Faust turns toward justifying the longing in his soul that ‘hinauf und vorwärts dringt’.226 He explains the origin of these urges in a manner suggestive of the anamnesis. There is an innate yearning, he asserts, that stirs in human beings whenever their gaze falls on phenomena that remind them of their transcendent nature. Illustrating this point, Faust provides three examples that draw attention to the heavens: the resonating song of a lark flying in the empty sky; the depths below an eagle’s widely-spread wings; and finally, the image of striving back home227:

Doch ist es jedem eingeboren,
Daß sein Gefühl hinauf und vorwärts dringt,
Wenn über uns, im blauen Raum verloren,
Ihr schmetternd Lied die Lerche singt;
Wenn über schroffen Fichtenhöhen
Der Adler ausgebreitet schwebt,
Und über Flächen, über Seen,
Der Kranich nach der Heimat strebt.228

223 V. 1084–1088.
224 V. 1089.
225 V. 1090–1091.
226 V. 1093.
228 V. 1092–1099 (my emphasis).
Faust’s words connect the dots between noticing the heaven; ascending as high as possible; and then striving to return back home. In the *Ennead* I. 6. 8, the process of ascent culminates in reunion. This reunion is articulated as a call to fly back to ‘our homeland’ and ‘our Father’.²²⁹ In his comments on this passage, Armstrong points out that Plotinus’s description of the path of ascent refers to *The Iliad* 2. 140, when Agamemnon tries to convince his comrades to sail back to their homeland. This is a call for the reunion of the undescended part of our souls – as Plotinus describes it in the *Ennead* V. 1. 10–12 and which Inge names the ‘divine nucleus’²³⁰ – with the One. ‘Our country from which we come is there, our Father is there. How shall we travel to it, where is our way to escape?’²³¹

In the following verses, the first line of which is interrupted by an outburst of grief, the dichotomy between body and soul finds its clearest articulation:

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\text{Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,} \\
\text{Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;} \\
\text{Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust,} \\
\text{Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen;} \\
\text{Die andere hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust} \\
\text{Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.}²³²
\]

Faust acknowledges the existence of two souls residing in his chest: one devoted to the material body and its needs; the other striving for ascent. More importantly, Faust also asserts that one of these two souls is determined to separate itself from the other. The verses that follow allow us to identify which of the two souls seeks to separate itself. Faust describes the modes of activity characteristic of each soul. Inclusion is the essential characteristic of the first soul: it grabs hold of – ‘hält’ – and clings with its ‘klammernden Organen’ to the world. Separation is the essential characteristic of the second soul: it wants to ascend forcefully – ‘hebt gewaltsam sich’²³³ – and exclude and separate itself from the constellation of which it is a part.

These verses describe the body as an active willing soul whose forces are directed downwards. The divine soul, on the other hand, is directed ‘Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.’ The activity of the body’s will is resistance; it clings to life’s promises and pleasures. The will of the other soul reflects a movement directed upwards

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²³¹ *Ennead* I. 6. 8 (my emphasis).
²³² V. 1112–1117.
²³³ V. 1116.
and beyond this world. The resisting force here acts as an impediment to the process of reunification and purification. As the Ennead I. 8 mentions, matter in its incorporeal form (prime matter or hyle) stands against the One’s first emanation, the Intellect. The resistance of prime matter against the One is called the prime evil in the Ennead I. 8.234 The resistance the divine nucleus faces on its path of ascent is the secondary evil.235 Near the end of the Osterspaziergang, Faust acts as ‘der Weise’ of the Ephemerides is expected to. Faust sees his being as an arena of constant struggle of the soul trying to separate itself from the corporeal and the force whose attention is devoted to the bodily. In the Platonic tradition that Plotinus follows, the body is the meeting place of the soul and matter. All the faculties of the soul are embedded in the body except for the direct presence of the One in the human soul. As the Ennead V. 1. 10–12 explains, this direct presence makes possible the recognition of beauty and goodness and stands in connection with the lower stages of the human soul.236 This connection between the divine nucleus and the other faculties of the soul weakens as the other stages turn their attention to the bodily realm instead of practicing purification and going through the process of abstraction:

First of all, this kind of soul is not outside matter or by itself. So it is mixed with unmeasuredness and without a share in the form which brings order and reduces to measure, since it is fused with a body which has matter. And then its reasoning part, if that is damaged, is hindered in its seeing by the passions and by being darkened by matter, and inclined to matter, and altogether by looking towards becoming, not being; and the principle of becoming is the nature of matter, which is so evil that it infects with its own evil that which is not in it but only directs its gaze to it. For since it is altogether without any share in good and is a privation of good and a pure lack of it, it makes everything which comes into contact with it in any way like itself.237

Faust, like Plotinus, recognizes in the body a will (soul) that inclines toward matter, clings to distractions and prefers stagnation to ascension. This soul’s corruption is due to its excessive attachment to the corporeal realm.

235 Ennead I. 8. 4.
236 In the human soul as microcosm the divine nucleus represents the One. For all other stages of emanation, there is a corresponding stage in the intellectual faculty. Therefore, the Intellect and the reproductive and nourishing aspects have their likeness to the Soul of the World and the demiurgic aspect of the emanation. See the microcosm argument in Ennead V. 1. 10.
237 Ennead I. 8. 4 (my emphasis).
As I discussed above, we find multiple instances early in the drama in which Faust attempts to ascend beyond his earthly boundaries. On each such occasion, the sight of heavenly bodies – either the sun or the moon – provides the impetus for Faust to ascend. And in each case the body and its worldly attachments are seen as active impediments. In the form of houses, land, children and wives, these worldly attachments hinder the fulfillment of Faust’s wish to reach the sun – ‘ihr ew’ ges Licht zu trinken’.  

In each stage of the process analyzed thus far, we noticed that the transcendental truth, represented to Faust as the macrocosm sign, must have a homogenous immanence in the cosmos. Yet, compared to the Platonic view of the transcendence of truth, this view of homogenous immanence does not appear to have deep roots in Faust. This dominance of transcendence becomes clear when Faust faults his bodily and human condition for his failure to grasp the ‘Erdgeist’ – the personification of the immanence of the transcendent in nature. Faust’s contempt for the body reappears in the scene Vor dem Tor. The view of transcendence of the intelligible content of the world from the bodily realm seems to be deeply seated in Faust’s mind. Therefore, up to this point, we find no clear instance of a conception of the world in which those two spheres – to which his two souls, respectively, are attracted – were seen as parts of that one infinite harmony. In other words, Faust does not see himself as already part of the whole. Thus, he cannot grasp the place of the individual, the ‘Ich’, in his pursuit of knowledge.

The paradoxical state between Plotinus’s call for purification and Goethe’s view of immanence in his reinterpretation of the Ennead I. 6. 9 sets the stage for the beginning of Faust’s journey. In this paradoxical state, we begin to see the problematization of the Platonic view of the ascending pursuit of knowledge; the valorization of the body and soul relation; and the dramatization of ‘Es irrt der Mensch so lang’ er strebt.’

I.3 Direct Approach to Knowledge of the Transcendent Truth in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ

One important characteristic of the Divan is that Ḥāfiẓ edited each poem’s form and content, again and again, over the course of his life. Therefore, although some historical characters are recognizable in his works, these characters

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238 V. 1086.
239 V. 1112.
240 V. 317.
cannot be used to reliably construct the development of the poet's intellectual life. Scholars have not yet succeeded in categorizing the poet's works into distinct periods or stages. At best, historical facts within a given poem suggest when the ǧazal was first written; in a few cases, moreover, a poem's mood along with the king or patron named in the poem points to circumstances behind its initial composition. Yet Ḥāfīẓ is almost certain to have edited the poem at a later time. The problematization of different views and approaches takes the form of dialogues between opposing views. As we will see in the course of this study, Ḥāfīẓ often practices self-criticism – the poet's multiple standpoints have a polyphonic effect. This characteristic of the Divan invites comparison to Faust, which, as we saw in Faust's reading of the macrocosm sign and summoning the 'Erdgeist', also contains constant coexisting paradoxical views – sometimes even in one character and in a single moment.

Ḥāfīẓ considered himself a seeker of a form of knowledge relevant to the ethical dimension of life. The ascending negative approach to the acquisition of knowledge is an important part of the world-views that were handed down to him. As I explained earlier, Platonic views were one of the main sources of this approach. Intertwined with ḥikmat and Sufi theoretical discourse, Platonic views influenced interpretations of the Qur'ān and the ḥadīth.

In the Divan, there are several poems that reflect the dominance of the abstract and ascending direct approach toward the transcendent truth. This approach includes self-denial and striving for the separation between body and soul – a condition for seeking and appreciating the truth. The small number of these poems and their discernible poetic style of linear form brings Arberry to conceive of an early phase in the poet's career.²⁴² Falakī dedicates a section of his dissertation to exploring this putative early phase in the poet's life – a phase in which Ḥāfīẓ's ǧazals show traces of Sufi views.²⁴³ As far as poetic style is concerned, the comparison between linear and pāšān form does suggest that these poems were written when the poet was young. Yet if this argument leads to the conclusion that the young poet was a follower of a Sufi order, we should be skeptical – there is no evidence for Ḥāfīẓ's belonging to any Sufi order. Even the great Sufi poet Ġāmī (1414–1449 CE) admits in his Nafḥāt ʿl-uns that Ḥāfīẓ's interest in Sufi terms did not reflect membership in a specific Sufi order.²⁴⁴ In fact, there

is substantial textual evidence in the Divan suggesting that the poet disapproved of such membership. But as Ġāmi correctly explains, Sufi terminology and the theoretical and ethical aspects of ḥikmat that are shared with Sufi theory are present in poetic form in Ḥāfiz’s Divan.

I.3.1 Escaping the Cage of the Body

The body as an impediment to the soul’s path to ascension and reunion – a topic discussed in Platonic and Neoplatonic sources – appears in the verses that follow:

[1] The dust of my body is becoming the veil in front of the face of the soul. Oh happy the moment when from off that face I cast the veil aside!
[2] A cage like this is unworthy of a sweet singer like me. I will go to the rose bed of Paradise, because I am the bird of that Garden.
[3] It is not clear why I came, where I was; Pain and woe, that of my beginning and end I am unaware.
[4] How can I make my circuit in the space of the World of Holiness, When, in the enclosed world of contrivance, I am tied to the plank of my body?
[5] If from the blood of my hear the scent of yearning comes, Do not be surprised: I am the musk pod of the fellow sufferer of Khotan.
[6] Have no regard for my candle-like gold-laced tunic of Taráz, Because hidden under my shirt the burning are.
[7] Come and from him snatch away Ḥāfiz’s being: With your being, nobody will hear from me, ‘I am.’

The ġazal begins by defining the body in relation to the soul: the body is accused of being confusing, distracting and distorting, like dust that is kicked up from the earth as a person walks quickly or as a caravan leaves the gates of a city, depriving the lover of the sight of his or her beloved. The dust hides the face of the soul, and Ḥāfiz impatiently waits for the joyous moment at which he may cast this veil aside. In the next couplet, the body is illustrated as a cage in which the nightingale of the soul feels imprisoned, longing for escape and ascent. The imprisoned soul then expresses its regrets for having forgotten its

245 Ennead 1. 6. 8.
246 Clarke’s translation – the mixed abode – is closer to the word Ḥāfiz employs in this verse. Sarācā-yi tarkib means the abode of mixture that in contrast with fažā-yi ālam-i quds (the space of the World of Purity) denotes the realm of mixture of body and the material. See: Clarke, 385, 4, p. 661; and Ḫanlari, 334, 4.
247 According to the literary tradition, Ḫutan is known as the habitat of the musk-deer.
248 Avery, CCCXXXIV, p. 413.
home and its purpose in the narrow cage. There is an unexplainable wish to leave this worldly sphere behind and ascend to higher levels. Only the body impedes the wings of longing, for the soul now is in the abode of mixture. The term 'abode of mixture', sarāca-yi tarkīb, directly refers to the bodily realm, a mixture of four opposing elements, and the soul.

In the fifth couplet, Ḥāfiẓ turns to a form of argumentation strongly reminiscent of the anamnesis doctrine, which is articulated in elements and metaphors native to his cultural space. The argument employs the metaphor of the musk-pod and its fragrance. This metaphor requires a brief elucidation. The musk-pods that one found in the bazaars during Ḥāfiẓ’s time were severed musk glands of the musk-deer. In the couplet above, the scent of this severed organ represents the memory of its far away home. Furthermore, its desirable and unique scent was believed to derive from droplets of blood that the heart-broken deer poured into this severed gland. The poet finds in his own bleeding heart the scent of musk as well; like the musk-pod, the poet’s heart has been taken far away from its home, and this scent is a constant reminder that he is not from this sphere of mixture. As an incorporeal presence in the epistemic horizon of the poet, the scent activates the anamnestic process – an urge to elevate the segregated, individuated human and separate the body from the soul.

The sixth couplet reveals a noteworthy aspect of Ḥāfiẓ’s self-image as a human with all his longings: the body, the object under consideration, is not exhausted or famished by abstinence and self-denial. Rather, it is so graceful that the poet feels the need to explain that an ‘inner burning passion’ consumes his heart – even though he appears to be ‘an ornamented candle’ from the outside. Having started with metaphysical concepts of body and soul, the poem arrives at the metaphorical imagery of the candle. The candle burns throughout the night and gives to the beloved the light that she had kindled at the beginning of the night; as it burns, the candle waits for the moment at which it is extinguished by the beloved at sun-rise. In this moment, the candle can see its beloved one last time before it is annihilated. In the last couplet, the poet abandons his desire to forcibly remove the beloved’s veil. He waits for her to come, expecting that her presence will resolve his individuality. In the end, the desire to see her face dominates the poem, but not as a personal wish for ascent; the poet depicts himself as a candle at midnight that awaits dawn.

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249 We must consider here the significance of scent and light in the Platonic context.
250 On anamnesis in the Divan see the following verses: Avery, XXXVII, 4–5, p. 68; Wohlleben, 335, 5–6, p. 437; Avery, CCCXXXV, 5–6, p. 414.
251 The metaphor of candle has many aspects, one of which I explained above. But we should note that this element of this literary tradition, like many others, goes through Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic
The following *gazal* illustrates the relation between body and soul on an ascending path to truth:

[1] You without the news, strive to be its possessor.
So long as you are not a wayfarer, how can you be a guide?
[2] In the school of the Truths, before one versed in love,
Hey son, make an effort to become one day a father.
[3] Like the valiant of the Path, *cleanse your hands of existence’s copper*,
To discover love’s alchemy and turn it into gold.
[4] Sleeping and eating have distanced you from your proper rank.
You will come into your own when you get above sleeping and eating.
[5] Were the light of God’s love to fall upon your heart and soul,
By God, you would be finer than the sun in heaven!
[6] Be drowned in the ocean of God a moment. Do not suppose
That by so much as a hair you will be wet from the waters of the Seven Seas:
[7] From head to foot all the light of God will be yours,
Once, headless and footless, you are on the path of the Lord of Glory.
[8] If the countenance of God should become the object of your sight,
From then on no doubt will remain that you are the master of insight.
[9] When the foundations of your being are turned topsy-turvy,
In the heart do not suppose that you will ever again be on top.
[10] If, O Háfiz, you have a mind for union,
At the door of the virtuous you must become dust.252

In the verses above, a goal is defined and a process is outlined for reaching it. Following the tradition of Plato’s *Symposium* and Ibn Sinā’s *Treatise on Love*,253 love is the teacher who guides lovers on their journey. Yet love requires that lovers first recognize the lack of their goodness – i.e., they must admit that they are ‘without the news’ so that their appreciation for higher-level goodness puts in motion the process of ascent.

In the third couplet, Háfiz invites the reader to undergo a process of transformation through which the reader relinquishes the ‘copper’ of his existence. The metaphor of ‘existence’s copper’ refers to the individuated soul within the productive process in which multiple allusions are combined in one instance. For further instances of the candle as a metaphor see: Avery, CCCXVII, 1, p. 394.; Clarke, 378, 1, p. 652.; Wohlleben, 317, 1, p. 415; and Avery CCCXX, 2, p. 397.; Clarke, 386, 2, p. 662.; Wohlleben, 320, 2, p. 418.; and Avery, CCLXXXIX, p. 360.; Clarke, 347, pp. 594–595.; Wohlleben, 289, p. 376.

252 Avery, CCCCLXXVIII, p. 579 (my emphasis).
253 Huseyn ibn ’Abdullah Sinā, ‘Resāle-ye ’Iśq’, in *Rasā‘el-e Ibn Sinā*. Translated by Diyyā’ ud-Dīn Dorri, ed. Diyyā’ ud-Dīn Dorri (Tehran: Markazi, 1360/1981), p. 123. Ibn Sinā sees love as an existential and intellectual matter that stands in relation to the Goodness that is the Necessary Existent. All beings pursue it since they are attracted to the perfection in the Good in relation to their relative poverty of it.
boundaries of the body. This process of ascent and purification is described as analogous to the process of turning worthless copper to gold through alchemy. The current state of ignorance and forgetfulness in which Ḥāfiẓ sees himself has its roots in what the Enneads describe as ‘the secondary evil’. In the fourth couplet, sleep and eating keep us away from original purity; only by abandoning them our self will realize itself in the Self.

As the most precious objects in the visible world, the sun and its light are the destination for the process of ascent. If the light of God permeates his existence, the seeker may ascend beyond the goodness of the sun. The fifth and seventh couplets describe a light that is beyond what is aesthetically perceivable – the light of God as the Lord of Glory. Lord of Glory or Žūl-ġalāl refers to an aspect of the divine that is absolutely transcendent. Ġalāl describes the awe and fear that strikes the person who comes close to perceiving the divine. In contrast to the fear-inspiring divine majesty that is dominant in this ġazal, the divine beauty (ġamāl) inspires bliss.

In the eighth couplet, the seeker relinquishes his ability to see the visible world but gains the ability to look directly toward the transcendent. By focusing exclusively on the radically transcendent divine, it is possible to become šāhib naẓar – master of insight. We should note the importance of the term šāhib naẓar. The poet uses this combination of šāhib (lord, possessor) and naẓar (view, vision, theory) when speaking within the horizon of exclusion and negative ascent to the truth. As the poem shows, this term belongs in the context of transcendence and majesty, rather than immanence and beauty. We can now go back to the Ennead I. 6. 9 and observe how the eye becomes like the sun and how, after the soul’s purification, truth is perceived in an excluding manner that transcends the particulars. There is a deep resemblance between these views and the intellectual content of the two ġazals analyzed above.

These two ġazals are characterized by their seriousness and absence of irony. In the Divan, however, Ḥāfiẓ frequently employs sarcasm to criticize religious puritanism and Sufi zealot asceticism – it is one of the Divan’s defining features. The term ‘master of insight’ fits with the general ascetic Sufi tone of this poem. As the two ġazals above prove, the poet was proficient in the theory

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255 Ennead I. 8. 4. See also the explanations of this point in the analysis of Faust p. 67 above.
of negative, direct ascent and the Sufi views that correspond to it. Considering
the ubiquity of light metaphors and specifically the sun in the analysis that fol-
lows, I briefly discuss the significance of the sun for Islamic Neoplatonists. I
then discuss the presence of the sun in the *Divan* as a metaphor for extramun-
dane divine truth.

### I.3.2 The Presence of the Sun in Islamic Neoplatonism

According to Ptolemy, there are nine spheres that revolve around the earth.
This view influenced Fārābī’s theory of emanation, according to which ten
levels of Intellect emanate from the First Existent.258 In Fārābī’s emanative
system, the sun analogy explains the ‘Active Intellect’,259 a level of hierarchy
of intellect comparable to that of Plotinus’s Soul of the World. Active Intellect
emanates the intelligibility of the cosmos and the power of apprehending it;
the sun and the eye are the best analogies for the Active Intellect, Fārābī
suggests.

The significance of the sun as the source of life for the Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafā sug-
gests that they were influenced by the Stoic and Pythagorean views. *Al-Nafs al-
kulliyah* (the World Soul) is a simple essence emanated from the Intellect. The
power emanated in the World Soul ‘manifests’ in the sun and then animates
sublunary, material beings.260 Furthermore, the Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafā hold that the
sun has a direct role to play in the formation of the human soul in the last stage
before its natural birth. Farrukh explains the stages that a soul passes through,
from its descent from the One to its human birth:

> When a soul falls, it enters the ovum which happens to be impregnated at the time of its
> fall. This soul in the ovum comes soon under the regimen of the planets. All planets, be-
> ginning with the farthest one, Saturn, influence the incubation of the soul turn by turn
> for a whole lunar month. After the completion of the third month the fetus comes under
> the influence of the sun, the king of the planets, and life is breathed into it.261

In this manner, they conceive the bond between human beings and the sun to
be existential.

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259 Fārābī takes this name and the modified material of the levels of intellect from Aristotle’s
*De Anima* III. See: Majid Fakhry, *Al-Fārābī, founder of Islamic neoplatonism*, Great Islamic


261 Ibid., p. 298.
In Metaphysica, Ibn Sinā mentions the sun in the context of an analogy for the process of emanation. He concisely explains his reasons for using this analogy:

It has become evident, therefore, that there is a primary entity (awwalī) in the world which is not in the world (ʿalam nīst) though the being of the world comes from It. Its existence, which is necessary, is due to itself. In reality It is absolute being (hast-i mahḍ) and absolute existence (wujūd-i mahḍ). All things exist due to It in the same manner as the light of the sun (āftāb) is due to itself, whereas the illumination all other things receive from the sun is accidental.262

In this section, I discussed the significance of the sun for the philosophers of the Islamic tradition. I also briefly explained the intellectual and ontological aspects of what the sun represents. I expand on these topics in the analysis of Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan that follows.

I.3.3 The Mote and the Sun

Just as we saw in the early scenes of Faust, the sight of the sun in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan kindles a longing for ascent and unity with the source of illumination. But unlike the two ġazals that we analyzed above,263 the verses that follow are polyphonic; they include multiple voices and paradoxes. These verses thereby resist any single interpretation. This quality is evident in the following ġazal, in which the poet alludes to wine and juxtaposes the Arabs with the Persians:

[1] Happy that day when I go from this ruined stopping place.
I seek the soul’s repose and I’m going in pursuit of the darling.
[2] Although aware that the stranger might not get anywhere,
I am proceeding by the perfume of that disheveled tress.
[3] With ailing feet and a powerless heart, like the breeze
I move in longing for that swaying cypress.
Let me pack my bags and go to the realm of Solomon.
[5] In his way, if going must be like a pen with the tip of my head,
With wound-enduring heart and weeping eye will I go.

263 The perfection of style and majority of these ġazals in the Divan strengthens the scholarly speculations that suggest the two ġazals in question belong to the early stages of the poet’s career.
I vowed, should I one day emerge from this grief,
I would go to the wine temple in glee and singing a song;
In desiring him, like a dancing mote
To the lip of the source of the dazzling sun I would go.
The Arabs have no sorrow for the grief of the heavy laden;
O Persians, some help that I may go happily and with ease,
And if like Ḥāfiz I do not follow the route out of the desert,
I will go in the companionship of the party of the Āsaf of the Ages.

An urge for escape permeates this ḡazal. The poet wishes to leave the world that he perceives as a ruined abode in which the soul (ḡān) feels encaged. The expression of this overwhelming discontent finds explicit articulation in the radīf of this ḡazal ‘biravam’ repeating the wish for escape. This soul seeks a path to the beloved (ḡānān). In the second couplet, the seeker expresses that he feels like a stranger, yet he recognizes clues that he hopes will lead him to his homeland. In describing these clues, Ḥāfiz uses the Persian word bū, which denotes both ‘perfume’ and ‘hope’. The scent metaphors, like the light metaphors, represent the continual presence of the transcendent in the timeless act of emanation. The imagery of a disheveled tress from which this perfume permeates the world illustrates the seeker’s attraction toward the object of pursuit. This attraction is intellectual insofar as it is based on the ability to appreciate higher goodness. In the fifth couplet, Ḥāfiz illustrates the difficulties that the seeker encounters on his path. It is important to note that, although this intelligible trace of the incorporeal realm is perceivable in the natural world, it cannot be fully enjoyed there. The interruption of immanence of the transcendent in the world makes the world resemble a prison for the soul – the Prison of Alexander (zindān-i Sikandar), as Ḥāfiz describes it. The poet wishes to flee to the kingdom of Salomon (mulk-i Sulaīmān) – a metaphor either for poet’s literal place of origin (Shiraz) or his extramundane homeland.

264 Avery, CCCLI, p. 431.
265 Making use of a complete word as radīf (rhyming word) shows the poet’s readiness to sacrifice aesthetic perfection for direct communication of emotion.
267 On scent metaphors in Neoplatonic tradition see p. 50 above.
268 Interpreters who take historical approaches read these two metaphors as a reference to the two cities of Yazd (Alexander’s Prison) and Shiraz (Kingdom of Solomon) See: Ḥusain ‘Alī Heravi, Šarh-e ḡazalhā-ye Ḥāfiz, 4 vols. (Tehran: Naṣr-e Nau, 1367/1988), pp. 1479–1489. And, Muʿīn, Ḥāfiz-e Sūrīsūshan, pp. 119–124. However, the fact remains that these assumptions lack sufficient historical support, as Esteʿlāmī shows in his comment on this ḡazal: Esteʿlāmī, Dars-e Ḥāfiz, vol. 2: p. 921. Furthermore, it should be noted that, even if this poem had been written only to encourage a patron to help the poet move from Yazd back to Shiraz, it is the rhetoric of
In the eighth couplet, Ḥāfīẓ uses a play on words to change the tone of the poem. The two words ṭāzyān (‘the riders’ or ‘the Arabs’) and pārsāyān (‘the virtuous’ or ‘the Persians’) are juxtaposed to each other. Whereas the poet expects to receive no sympathy from the first group, he anticipates assistance from the second. The mention of a wine-house (translated above as ‘wine temple’) in the sixth couplet colors the word pārsāyān. This couplet brings remarkable variation to the ġazal by suggesting that the path to the transcendent can be enjoyed.269

After the sixth and eighth couplets change the tone of the poem, the form of the journey is modified as well. In the seventh couplet, Ḥāfīẓ employs the motif of the mote, an object that strives for the sun. The desire to reach the sun is expressed in the metaphorical imagery of the sun as a fountain toward which the mote strives and from which it wishes to drink.270 The intoxicating influence of wine transforms the upward movement into a joyous dance.

In another ġazal in the Divan, the imagery of the mote and the sun appears again. In accordance with its intellectual context, love is described as motivating the act of elevation: ‘You are not less than a mote. Do not be degraded. Practise love, | So that whirling now this side up, now that, to the private chamber of the sun you might arrive.’271 In the couplet above, wine, love and the natural beauty are present, whereas pain is absent. Even the sun is connected to love through the choice of the verb. The compound verb that Ḥāfīẓ uses here is ‘mihr varzīdan.’ In Persian, one of the words that signifies the sun is mihr. Yet mihr also means ‘love’, and ‘mihr varzīdan’ means ‘making love’. In his choice of words, the poet articulates how natural it is that practicing love and ascending to the sun are one and the same.

As we have seen thus far, it is only in the first two ġazals that the element of pleasure is absent in the poems.272 In the ascending process of abstraction,

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269 In the second and third chapters of this study we examine this aspect of the Divan.

270 In Faust v. 1086, we saw Goethe’s illustration of the desire to reach the sun and the sensual experience of drinking its light. In the Divan, this transcultural ancient image appears to illustrate the same intense longing.

271 Avery, CCCLXXX, 4, p. 463.
on the other hand, stress was placed on the painful experience of being in a world in which the transcendent truth is absent.

I.3.4 Masihā (Christ) and the Sun

To discuss the significance of Masihā – Christ – in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, we need to consider Christ’s significance in the poet’s cultural horizon. Earlier, I mentioned that Ḥāfiẓ associates Christ with the sun.273 As Wohlleben points out, the poet sees Christ as ‘besonders reiner Mensch’274 on account of his immaculate conception with the emanation (fayażān)275 of the Holy Spirit (Rūḥ ul-Qudus), which is the ‘grace and power’276 of the Holy Ghost that makes Christ Rūḥullāh or the ‘Soul of God’ in Islamic theology.277 In this context, Christ is the second human being after Adam who was born directly from God’s soul. The Quranic verses relevant to this subject can be found in the Surah al-Nisā’ (Women).278

It is noteworthy that, in the Qurʾān, the titles Word of God and Soul of God are reserved only for Christ.279 This exclusive characteristic of Christ in the Qurʾān reflects itself in the views of Aḥmad ibn Ḥayāt, an Islamic rationalist theologian of the Muʿtazili school of the ninth century CE, who ‘held that there are two deities: one, the creator and eternal deity, and the other, the created one which is Jesus Christ, the son of Mary. He regarded Messiah as the Son of God. On account of this belief he was considered to have renounced Islam’.280 These extraordinary characteristics of Christ reflect themselves in the conviction that, Jesus ascended to the house of the sun.281

273 See the citation and explanations on p. 30.
274 See footnote to Wohlleben p. 52.
275 See in: Clarke, 123, 9, p. 259. Here, Clarke translates fiyż as ‘bounty’. Ḥāfiẓ sees the power in Christ in the contribution of emanative grace of the Holy Ghost: Fiyż-i Rūḥ ul-Qudus
279 Other prophets have titles in the Qurʾān which depict them in a relation to God and not as an extension and will of God as soul and word. For instance, Abraham has the title of God’s friend: Ḥalil ullāh. And Moses’s title is ‘the one who converses with God’: Kalim ullāh
In the poet’s view, whenever we think of miracles and the final ascent of Christ, we must consider that the humanity of Christ is dissolved in the grace of God. This privileged state is reserved for him and whomever else God may choose. Ḥāfiẓ recognizes the magnificence of those who, like Christ, have dissolved the boundaries of their individuality. He believes that they may experience a divine existence—by grace of the Holy Spirit rather than by their own efforts. Yet it is vitally important to note that Ḥāfiẓ does not in any way personally identify with the Masihā; he considers himself a simple human being.

In two different ġazals in the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ treats the difference between Masihā and others regarding their respective desires for transcending to the sphere of the sun. Since the term that Ḥāfiẓ uses in the following ġazal is difficult to capture in translation, I make use of German and English translations alongside the transliteration of the original Persian:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Masihā-yi mu\text{"g}arrad rā barāzad} \\
\text{Ki bā ḡuršīd sāzad ham-visāqī}^{284} \\
\text{Mit Sonnen ein Bündnis zu schließen, geziemet} \\
\text{Dem Herrn Jesus nur allein}^{285} \\
\text{The lonely (un-married) Masihā, it suiteth} \\
\text{That, fellowship with the sun, he should make}^{286}
\end{align*}
\]

\textit{Mu\text{"g}arrad} is the word that Ḥāfiẓ uses to describe Christ (Masihā). This word is originally Arabic, but it is commonly used in Persian to mean ‘single’ or ‘unmarried.’ It also signifies being lonely, and literally it means ‘naked’ and ‘pure.’ But in the context of Sufism and especially hikmat, the term is best translated as ‘abstract’—i.e., being purified in the process of negation of all that is attributive, corruptible and ʿāriżī or being stripped to the essence (zāt). In Kašf ul-maḥğūb, a canonical Sufi text written by Ḥuğvīri in the tenth century, we learn two major points: first, the writers of the Sufi tradition use the term \textit{mu\text{"g}arrad} exclusively for Christ; and, second, in this context, \textit{mu\text{"g}arrad} does
not mean unmarried or lonely. Huḡvīrī quotes Ġunayd, a prominent Sufi of the ninth century:

Sufism is founded on eight qualities exemplified in eight Apostles: the generosity of Abraham, who sacrificed his son; the acquiescence of Ismael, who submitted to the command of God and gave up his dear life; the patience of Job, who patiently endured the affliction of worms and the jealousy of the Merciful; the symbolism of Zacharias, to whom God said, ‘Thou shalt not speak unto men for three days save by signs’ (Kor. iii. 36), and again to the same effect, ‘When he called upon his Lord with a secret invocation’ (Kor. xix, 2); the strangerhood of John, who was a stranger in his own country and an alien to his own kin amongst whom he lived; the pilgrimhood of Jesus, who was so detached therein from worldly things that he kept only a cup and a comb – the cup he threw away when he saw a man drinking water in the palms of his hands, and the comb likewise when he saw another man using his fingers.288

In the original Persian, Huḡvīrī writes: ‘va ba siyāḥat ba ʿĪsā ki andar siyāḥat-i ḫud čūnān muḡārrad būd ki [...]’289 We see clearly that the attribute muḡārrad is applied to Christ three hundred years before Ḥāfīz and refers to his ability to negatively purify himself – or as Nicholson translated it, to detach himself from whatever is unnecessary and other than God.

It is evident that these terminological details were not considered in the above translations of Ḥāfīz’s couplet. Therefore, taḡrīd (‘abstraction’) is not recognized as a term and the translations lack an important semantic aspect. In light of the terminological context, we may infer that in the Divan the quest for the fellowship of the sun – the quest to become its housemate or roommate, as the word ham-vaṣāqi suggests – is only suitable for Christ. Moreover, the process of profound abstraction and purification from the material realm is reserved for those whom God chooses. Purification cannot be achieved through extreme asceticism or rejection of the mundane and bodily concerns, as early Sufis such as Huḡvīrī believed.

Now that we have the necessary understanding of the term taḡrīd and its relation to Christ in the Divan, we may turn to the gazal from which it was cited. The poem describes the state of separation: ‘From not seeing the beloved, blood became my heart; | Now evil befall the days of separation!’290 Earlier, we saw that this state was compared to a prison cell. Now, in addition to the state of separation, the text provides us with further contextual

290 Clarke, 534, 3, p. 875.
information through which to understand the poem – namely, the poet’s age and his view of the world: ‘Back to my recollection, youthfulness bring— | The sound of the harp and the hand-waving of the Sāḳī.’ The speaker is old but not blind to the pleasures of life. He even advises himself to be moderate in drinking wine: ‘O daughter of the vine! the pleasant bride, thou art; | But, sometimes, worthy of divorce, thou art.’ Here again, Ḥāfiẓ expresses the view that pleasure is possible even in the state of separation from the beloved: ‘O minstrel, sweet singer, sweet speaker! prepare | An 'Irāḳ note in Persian verse.’ At this point, we may turn to the next ġazal in the Divan in which the sun and Christ are present.

In this next ġazal, the poet’s gaze is fixed on the night sky as he introspectively reflects on the different meanings that the sky and the heavenly bodies have for him. The first couplet describes the state of feeling the proximity of death as the poet looks at the slender crescent of the new moon resembling a sickle’s blade; the shape of this heavenly body reminds the poet of judgment day (the season of harvest): ‘I saw the green meadow of the Firmament and the sickle of the new moon. | I remembered my own sowing and the time of reaping.’ In this dark night, Ḥāfiẓ sets the stage for the presence of the sun; he describes his time on earth as the night and his approaching death as the dawn: ‘I said, “O luck, you were sleep and the sun has come up.” | It answered, “In spite of all this, do not despair of the foreordained.” The poem’s narrator – one of several voices in the poem – contrasts the everlasting life of the heavenly bodies to the short lives of human beings. After death, he reflects, one has to stand before the judgment of the absolute. At this point, another voice speaks of an event in the past that may be the origin of hope. After this voice revives the poet’s hope, the voice mentions Christ and the sun as reasons for entertaining such hope.

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291 Clarke, 534, 6.
292 Clarke, 534, 12.
293 Clarke, 534, 5. For explanation of the musical term ('Irāḳ note) or șaut-i ʿIrāqī see p. 29 above. It should be noted that this ġazal is an instance in the Divan in which Ḥāfiẓ displays his mastery in emulation of the works of other great poets. He writes in the same rhyme and the same meter as his predecessor ʿIrāqī did in two ġazals where ʿIrāqī also uses the very words Masīḥā-yi muğarrad, and ham-visāqi. It is worth mentioning that ʿIrāqī’s usage of this word is in the context of Sufi-love. No poet before him used this word as frequently as ʿIrāqī. See the following two ġazals: Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, Mağmūʿ-e-ye ḍār-e Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, ed. Nasrin Muḥtašam (Tehran: Zawwār, 1372/1994), pp. 71–72; 146–147.
294 Avery, CCCXCIX, 1, p. 484.
295 Avery, CCCXCIX, 2, p. 484.
Although the poet is anxious about losing time, since he hasn’t yet attained detachment in this life, the guiding voice connects Christ’s ascent to the sun to an event in the past that may be understood as an allusion to God’s breathing life into Adam (Qur’an, 15:29). Death is referred to as a state in which the soul (breath of the divine) goes back to its original state of purity. Therefore, there is hope that the soul after death will be as pure as Christ’s soul during his life. Remarkably, the poet is not in a position to educate others; he listens to the voice along with his readers. In the seventh couplet, this voice goes a step further by criticizing the notion that the heavens are more elevated than humans and that humans should reach for them. This juxtaposition of heaven and human alludes to the story of original sin in which (according to the Islamic tradition) Adam and Eve eat the forbidden grain – wheat. Interestingly, the poet satirizes the event by replacing wheat with barely corn, a much cheaper grain – and, therefore, one eaten by poor – during the time of the poem’s composition: ‘Tell the heavens not to deck themselves out in all this pomp, because in love | The moon’s harvest would fetch one barely corn, and the cluster of Pleiades, two.’ The guiding voice belittles the heavenly bodies in front of humans. It mentions that humans are not only not repentant of their original sin, but that they are ready to give up paradise for an even lesser price – it is the only way for them to become capable of love.

We face the following questions: why is the poet himself still inclined to a path of purity, despite that the guiding voice tries to open his eyes to another perspective? Does the voice in fact advise the poet to turn his back to religion by abandoning the ascending approach that entails ascetic negative methods? The following couplet of this ġazal belittles the heavenly bodies and suggests: ‘From your mole may the Evil Eye be far, because on the chequer-board of beauty

296 See Ḥānlari, 399, 3. See also Qazvini & Ġāni, 407, 3. In Qazvini & Ġāni’s edition the Masīḥ is described with the adjective muġarrad.
297 Avery, CCCXCIX, 3, p. 484.
298 Wohlleben, 399, 3, p. 508.
299 Avery, CCCXCIX, 7.
300 Ibid., 6.
It has moved a pawn by which the moon and the sun lost the wager. A new set of metaphors emerge. The sun and the moon that belong to the ascending context are juxtaposed to the mole on the face of the beloved. In the discourse of ascent, we know that the sun stands for the Beauty and Truth and that the moon represents a lower level of emanation. In this couplet, the mole of the beloved is compared to the player who starts a game of chess by moving a pawn – the most insignificant piece on the board. With this move, the beloved beats the sun and the moon. From the verses we have analyzed thus far, therefore, we can infer that the mole of the beloved is a modification of the metaphor of the sun, redefined to reflect a new understanding of the relation between the transcendent and the world. We are now in a position to answer the first question above: the poet confronts his own finitude whenever he looks toward the sun, yet he is also aware of other ways of grasping the relation between the transcendent and the world. The beauty of the gazal is that the poet is not depicted as someone who has purified himself in the path of abstraction; in other words, the poet is represented neither as a teacher of new ways nor as an ardent follower of the older method. Rather, the reader relates to him and experiences the flow of the verses in real time.

The last couplet provides an answer to our second question. The voice of the guide invites us to be proud of original sin – and thus of our inclination to beauty and love. Does Ḥāfiz thereby mean to critique religion in the form of ḥikmat and Sufism? ‘The fire of hypocritical asceticism will burn up the grain heap of the Faith; | Throw off the woollen cassock, Ḥáfiz, and go.’ As we see in this couplet, the voice warns against a false notion of the method of pursuit of truth that the narrator appears to endorse. This couplet concludes the gazal by characterizing asceticism – and its symbol, the woollen garment (ḥirqa-yi pašmina) – as the wrong notion, one that jeopardizes the common understanding of religion (dīn).

300 Ibid., 6.
301 In the last chapter we will turn to the imagery of the face of the Beloved which includes the mole.
302 Consider that in the Enneads and Islamic Neoplatonic views the inclination of the soul to the body is considered the reason for the fall; therefore, the ascending path to return includes abstraction and disregarding the body. See the Ennead IV. 8. 7. Farrukh points out that, according to Ḩwān aṣ-Ṣafā, the entanglement of the soul with the material realm and its neglect of the heavenly glory was the reason for the fall: Farrukh, ‘Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, p. 297.
303 Avery, CCCXCIX, 8, p. 484.
The ear may be heavy with earrings of ruby and gold, but beauty's season is transient. Note the warning.304 Ḥāfiż's self-criticism is articulated by the guiding voice who points out that he neglects the beauty of this world for the material rewards of extreme negation. The voice sarcastically refers to the weight of the expensive earrings while the poet metonymically alludes to becoming hard of hearing (girāndārad gūš) after being rewarded for submission to suppressive ascetic rulers.305 The contrast between the desirable rewards and the ability to hear admonition is the key to appreciating this couplet's social critique.

Thus, Ḥāfiż does not turn his back to the transcendent itself, but rather criticizes the negative and excluding approach toward it. Furthermore, he sees a great danger in the pursuit of this path taken to an extreme. Such a pursuit is only for the few chosen ones, such as Christ. For normal human beings such as the poet himself, the process of abstraction must be seen in relation to the breath of God, which separates from the body after death. The fifth couplet conveys the reason for Adam and Eve's proud choice of beauty over abstraction. This choice is what Ḥāfiż sees as the true religion, which negative approaches can burn and corrupt.

One of the beauties of the Divan that differentiates it from works like those of Šáh Ni'matullāh, a Sufi-poet contemporary to Ḥāfiż, is that the Divan contains a critique of social and ethical problems. Such critique often takes the form of the poet's self-criticism or criticism directed to him by others. The reader of the Divan may try to imitate the abstract Christ, turning away from the pleasures of the beauty of the world. By doing so, the reader sympathizes with the poet and progresses through the poet's own stages of self-criticism. He thereby arrives at a new perspective and sees the possibility of achieving detachment after death, as the soul returns to its abstract form. In fact, the Divan does not abandon the possibility of giving up life in favor of experiencing such an abstract state. In the following section, I address this issue in the Divan.

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304 Avery, CCCXCIX, 5, p. 484.
I.3.5 Self-Annihilation as the Last Hope for Ascent and Union

According to the Platonic tradition, the path of purification runs against the ultimate barrier – the soul is trapped inside the body and is constantly deceived and misled by it. In the *Phaedo*, we saw that philosophy was defined as practice of death and as abstracting the soul from the origin of error. We also pointed out that Socrates abandoned hope of experiencing the transcendent truth within the body; suicide presented itself as a way to achieve the abstraction that the seeker of knowledge strives for.

Yet the seeker of truth who resorts to suicide alters his ability to perceive the truth, because he reverses the typical passivity of death. The main argument of Socrates against suicide stresses this act of will:

> I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be the only exception, and why when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be *his own benefactor, but must wait for the kindness of another.*

Destroying something that belongs to the gods and not the mortals is unlawful, Socrates thought. Even in this philosophical text, this law remains a mystery; philosophy can do nothing other than provide an analogy:

> I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run away; this is a great mystery, not to be easily apprehended. Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a chattel *of theirs.*

> Do you not agree?

> Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes.

> And if one of your chattels, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting itself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that it should die, would you not be angry with it, and would you not punish it if you could?

> Certainly, replied Cebes.

The same urge tempts the poet in the *Divan* in many cases – namely, to shorten the path to transcendent truth through an act of free will. This problem appears in the *Divan* in a number of *gazals* and takes the form of a dialogue between the poet and the beloved or simply as the poet’s self-criticism.

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307 Ibid., pp. 411–412, 62, a (my emphasis).
308 Ibid., p. 412. b & c.
The seeker of union with the transcendent is ready to sacrifice his life in order to fully experience its Goodness: ‘By his soul, if my life were at my disposal, | It would be the least of his slave’s offerings.’ However, what holds him back is that he (like Socrates) does not consider himself the owner of his own life.

The other issue concerns the act of free will regarding something that the poet does not see as his own. Ḥāfiẓ sees the matter in the context of the relation between an act of free will and elevation to a higher state. In the verses that follow, this problem finds poetic articulation in the image of kissing the beloved:

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When my life became the sacrifice for Thy lips I established the fancy
That a drop of its limpid water to the palate of ours falleth.
The fancy! Thy tress spake saying: ‘O Lover! make not (thy) life the means (of desire);
‘For, of this kind, many a pray into the snare of ours falleth.’
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In his fantasy, the poet is about to give up his life to join the beloved in union. But the beloved, looking at his proud face, responds that his life is not a rare gift at all – the beloved has countless lives at her disposal. Furthermore, the poet is wrong to suppose that an offering will suffice to attain union. As I mentioned earlier, even in the case of the poet’s highest example, i.e., Christ, the ascent is not the result of any direct action on the part of the seeker himself. Offering life to the source of life is futile – not for lack of free will, but rather because there can never be anything greater than the transcendent. Nothing can force the transcendent to react in a certain way.

In the Sufi context, the term for ultimate abstraction and emptiness is *fanāʾ* – annihilation. In the twentieth chapter of Šahāb ud-Dīn Abū Ḥaḍṣ Suhravardi’s (539–632/1145–1234) *ʿAwārif al-maʿārif*, we find a categorization of such abstraction in two levels: first, there is the outward abstraction in which the seeker of the truth experiences unity with *ḥaqqa taʿālā*. In other words, the seeker should be unable to distinguish *ḥaqqa taʿālā*’s will from his own. In the second stage of abstraction – the inward *fanāʾ* –, all existence is dissolved in the One. The self-knowledge attained in the first stage allows the will of

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309 Avery, CCCCXXXIII, 1, p. 523.
310 Clarke, 217, 5–6, p. 399. See: Avery, CCCCXXXIII, 5–6, p. 523.
311 Consider that in Neoplatonic philosophy the transcendent can logically never be influenced. As we discussed earlier, the reason for the One being named the Necessary Existent by Ibn Sinā (a Neoplatonist) was that it cannot be consequent to anything.
312 Abū Ḥaḍṣ Suhravardi uses the word Transcendent Truth (*Ḥaqq Taʿālā*).
the individual to fade into that of the One. Thereby, the seeker of truth’s personal wish for ascent must also fade into the will of the One.

This theme finds another expression in the Divan in the form of self-criticism, as Ḥāfīz speaks to himself: ‘Life is base coin, Ḥāfiz: | For festive confetti it’s not good.’

With such knowledge, the seeker of the truth has only one choice – to wait for the will and mercy of the beloved. Or as Socrates said in the quote above, to ‘wait for the kindness of another’ to free the seeker from the world in which absolute knowledge of the truth can never be attained. Ḥāfīz illustrates the experience of waiting for union and death in the following couplet: ‘This borrowed life the Friend entrusted to Ḥāfiz, | One day I might see His face, and this life surrender.’ The surrendering of force, as we demonstrated, is the result of the self-knowledge that Ḥāfīz has regarding the nature of the transcendent truth. In his symbolic metaphorical mode of articulation, he conveys this aspect of his world-view to his readers.

I.4 Body and Soul in Direct Pursuit of Knowledge of the Transcendent in Goethe’s Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfīz

I.4.1 Direct Negative Pursuit of Transcendent Truth

Before proceeding to the next chapter, I summarize the findings of this study thus far. I have argued that both texts illustrate a negative method of attaining knowledge based on exclusion of the corporeal realm. This method accords with Neoplatonic epistemology and ethics which consider the body a mixture of soul and matter, each striving in opposite directions. The soul seeks to ascend and exclude the material realm so that it can reunite with the ultimate truth.

I.4.2 Light Metaphors and the Call for Ascent

In both texts we encounter a plethora of metaphors of heavenly bodies and light that draw on the Platonic tradition. The relation between these metaphors and the influence they have on their observers bring to light one way of

314 Avery, CLIX, 7, p. 215.
315 Avery, CCCXLIII, 7, p. 422.
evaluating the relation between body and soul on the path to acquire knowledge. In section I.2 (discussing Faust) and sections I.3.3 and I.3.4 (discussing Ḥāfīz’ Divan), I showed that the sight of the sun and the moon gives rise to a desire for ascent. In the following chapter, I trace how these metaphors evolve against the background of the body and soul relationship in the two texts.

I.4.3 Suicide as a Failed Method of Ascent

In the scene Nacht of Faust, the heavenly bodies kindle Faust’s desire to ascend to the truth and address the full moon. They also shape metaphorical expressions of Faust’s wish to fly toward the setting sun and drink from its eternal light.316 We also observed that each attempt to reach directly for the heavenly body results in pain and failure; and Faust’s escape into fantasy only results in further failure.

In Faust, this circular pattern signifies a crisis, which Faust attempts to resolve through suicide. His suicide attempt is an expression of his despair at the possibility of realizing his desire of direct ascent while alive. In other words, his suicide attempt results in the realization that the individual can never attain to his goal qua individual; he needs to be annihilated in the extramundane non-individuated truth.

In the Divan, we find a similar desire for direct ascension to the sun as a metaphor for the transcendent truth. The negative method of abstraction of the soul from the body results in similar reoccurring experiences of pain and alienation from the world.317 The limitations of the body make it impossible for the seeker of knowledge to attain to his desired level of ascent. This problem brings the question of suicide, once again, to the foreground. Yet Ḥāfīz refutes suicide with arguments resembling those of Socrates in Phaedo.318 Furthermore, Ḥāfīz’s poems show that the absolute abstraction from the body is reserved for the Masihā; although it is conceivable that the Holy Ghost bestow this grace on others, the abstraction in question cannot be achieved through a negative process in life.319

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316 For textual articulations of the desire to drink the light of the sun in the Divan of Ḥāfīz, see p. 77 above. Regarding this metaphorical expression in Goethe’s Faust, see p. 64 above.
317 See the ḡazals cited and analyzed on pp 70; 72 above.
318 See §I.3.5 (‘Self-Annihilation as the Last Hope for Ascent and Union’).
319 See §I.3.4 (‘Masihā (Christ) and the Sun’).
I.4.4 A Critical Look into the Method of Seeking Knowledge

Both texts present poetic articulations of a rising consciousness about problems that arise from methods of radical purification and exclusion. In the scene Nacht, a conflict is dramatized between (a) a world-view based on the active immanence of the transcendent in the world; and (b) Faust’s multiple failed attempts at ascent for which he holds the body responsible. This conflict shows that Faust’s actions and views at this stage in the drama are deeply grounded in a radically transcendent view of the world – a view that keeps him segregated from nature and isolated from people. By the end of the scene Osterspaziergang, however, Faust becomes aware of the failure of the method of negative acquisition of knowledge. In the next chapter, I elaborate on Faust’s process of leaving this method behind.

In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, sensory experiences of natural beauty oppose the method that seeks to exclude everything other than the One. A voice speaks to Ḥāfiẓ, warning him about the problems of radical ascetic exclusion. Then the poet himself expresses his critique of this ascetic outlook. He realizes that these extreme ascetic views have filled his world with pain and prevented him from appreciating beauty. Ḥāfiẓ seeks the help of the Persians – from whom he expects sympathy with his human situation – to find an aesthetically pleasing path through the world.

In both texts, we find an expression of a need for external assistance: Faust seeks the help of the souls reigning between heaven and earth, and Ḥāfiẓ seeks the help of the Persians. In the chapter that follows, I explore in both texts the process of shifting away from a transcendent world-view. I also investigate the specific mediations introduced in this process and the state of the body and soul.

320 See the analysis of the presence of this voice on pp. 81ff above.
II Toward Life

II.1 The Process of Turning Toward Life in Faust

In his commentary on Faust, Jochen Schmidt remarks that most scholarly analysis of the Studierzimmer scenes focuses on the so-called wager scene. Thus, scholars focus less on the process of transition that opens the world of the drama to the appearance of the poodle and to the ambiguous character Mephisto with his multifaceted gestalt.¹ In this section, I trace this process of transition and analyze the turn from the negative Platonic direct approach to the truth. I also investigate light metaphors in this context. I then focus on the world that undergoes this change and follow the dramatic process by which Mephisto’s presence actively contributes to Faust’s turn toward life.

II.1.1 Reevaluations and Modifications

Since his first dialogue in the scene Nacht, Faust’s main endeavor has been reevaluating attempts at seeking knowledge in various fields – cosmology, epistemology and ethics, each inseparable from the others. Although this part of the drama was present in the earliest stages of its composition, it could not join the final version of 1808 unless the main character underwent an important modification. In Faust frühe Fassung, Faust was not depicted as an aged man. This depiction first appears in Faust die Tragödie erster Teil and intensifies the significance of Faust’s self-reevaluation and his claims to vast knowledge and life experience. Now, the main character is an old ‘Doktor’ who spent a lifetime seeking knowledge and self-knowledge. Yet he questions the fruits of his studies – maybe there are none, he thinks.²

In this section, I explore two aspects of Faust’s process of reevaluation: (a) his turn from the direct approach to acquiring knowledge via construction of the concept of mediation; and (b) possible modifications in his view of the relation between transcendent truth and the world. In exploring (b) I investigate the modifications of light and color metaphors relative to their use in the Platonic tradition – the origin of Faust’s direct and ascending approach, which we investigated in the previous chapter.

² Compare to ibid., p. 154.
II.1.1.1 Turn from Direct Approach to the Truth Toward Mediation

Faust’s reevaluations in the opening of the scene *Nacht* lead him to a series of attempts to summon a soul, whose union would bring Faust experiences of ascent.\(^3\) These attempts are first illustrated in verse 394 and 418. He hopes that magic – ‘Durch Geistes Kraft und Mund’\(^4\) – will help him find a way to realize his imagined secrets of nature. Throughout this stage, Faust does not look for guidance or instruction from an intermediary spirit. Rather, Faust aspires to summon the most elevated spirit, since he considers himself similar to the creator of the universe – ‘Ebenbild der Gottheit’.\(^5\) This phrase references *Genesis* (1: 26–27), according to which the human being was created after God’s likeness and is the image of God.\(^6\) Faust’s self-image becomes clearer in his constant denial of the *Erdgeist*’s rejection.\(^7\)

Yet as he reaches for the macrocosm sign and the ‘Erdgeist’, Faust makes compromises and adjusts his expectations: ‘Du Geist der Erde bist mir näher.’\(^8\) Faust evaluates his experience with the ‘Erdgeist’ only after Wagner brings him back to his senses; Faust becomes aware that ‘die Erscheinung war so riesengroß, | Daß ich mich recht als Zwerg empfinden sollte.’\(^9\) Subsequently, Faust expresses his desire for a mediating guide – ‘Wer lehrt mich? was soll ich meiden?’\(^10\) – and takes a step toward the formation of the idea of an intermediary agent that will later appear as Mephisto.\(^11\) This emerging knowledge, however, pales in comparison to the pain of his failure, which forces him to find fault in his human condition rather than his particular approach. The text warns us about Faust’s pending impulsive reaction: ‘Soll ich gehorchen jenem Drang?’\(^12\) In a self-reflective moment, Faust then describes this reaction as an interruption

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\(^3\) See p. 52 above.
\(^4\) V. 378.
\(^5\) See v. 516; 614.
\(^6\) As in Luther’s translation: ‘ein Bild, das uns gleich sei’ (Moses, 1: 26). Compare to Arens, *Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I*, p. 94. Arens holds that the moment that Faust is rejected by the Geist der Erde is a turning point in Faust’s life – a point of departure from ‘a world to which he neither can, nor wants to return.’
\(^7\) The ‘Erdgeist’ explicitly and repeatedly rejects Faust and reminds him of his limited horizon: ‘Da bin ich! – Welch erbärmlich Grauen | Faßt Übermenschendich!’ (V. 489–490) See also: ‘Du gleichst dem Geist den du begreifst, | Nicht mir!’ (V. 512–513)
\(^8\) V. 461.
\(^9\) V. 612–613.
\(^10\) V. 630 (my emphasis).
\(^11\) This becomes clear when we consider that Mephisto, in his second visit, lets Faust know that he had been observing Faust as he was about to commit suicide.
\(^12\) V. 631.

Filled with intense contempt for the ‘Sorge’, Faust forgets about mediation and takes his most extreme step yet toward the realm of ether – one that almost costs him his life. Faust’s suicide attempt is the culmination of a series of actions that he takes in accordance with his belief that he is ‘the likeness of God’. This self-conception leads Faust to aim directly for transcendent knowledge. Highlighting verses 712 and 713, Van der Laan rightly considers this act of Faust to be an attempt at apotheosis: ‘Das Geschöpf will auch Schöpfer werden.’

At the end of this scene, however, Faust’s self-deifying act of suicide results in his being given back to earth – in other words, in the middle. Another bold attempt to directly approach the highest spheres brings Faust no further than where he started – ‘die Erde hat mich wieder’. This failed attempt brings Faust closer to realizing the necessity of abandoning his direct approach. Faust’s new stage of development finds its articulation near the end of Osterspaziergang, where Faust turns from reaching directly to the highest spheres toward an indirect path through the sphere in the middle; he implores the souls that rule between heaven and earth to descend and guide him. A further sign of Faust’s change in approach is that he asks for guidance – and not, as he previously did, for companionship. The ultimate goal is still flight, but Faust’s wish for direct approach gives way to a wish for guidance and mediation:

O gibt es Geister in der Luft,  
Die zwischen Erd’ und Himmel herrschend weben,  
So steiget nieder aus dem goldnen Duft  
Und führt mich weg, zu neuem buntem Leben! 

Faust’s choice of words in describing his mediated ascent signifies a modification in his expectations. Whereas ‘Feuerwagen’, a metaphor for the sun, was once the means of Faust’s desired ascent, now he wishes for a ‘Zaubermantel’, which is

13 V. 632–633 (my emphasis).  
14 V. 634; 651. See p. 59 above.  
15 V. 719.  
16 On the early development of the problematization of Neoplatonic transcendence of truth along with the notion of its immanence in nature see pp. 54–55 above.  
18 See p. 63 above.  
19 V. 784. Faust’s boldness can be seen in the following verses: ‘Vermesse dich die Pforten aufzureißen, | Vor denen jeder gern vorüber schleicht.’ V. 710–711.  
20 V. 1118–1121 (my emphasis).
described as superior to a ‘Königsmantel’. From the scene *Nacht* to verses 1120–1221 of the scene *Vor dem Tor*, Faust’s views evolved to the point where he clearly recognizes his need for guidance.

II.1.1.2 The Sun, Its Light and the Colors: Modification of a World-View Through Metaphors

II.1.1.2.1 Color as Stained-Glass Windows (‘Gemalte Scheiben’)

In verse 1121 we find an indication of the developing shift in Faust’s cosmological and epistemological views. This shift is reflected by the modification of the metaphorical representation of color and colorfulness. As I will explain, the expression ‘das bunte Leben’ in verse 1121 represents this shift.

The word ‘gemalt’ in verse 401 is the first time in the drama that Faust himself uses a word associated with color. Faust describes how the light reaches his world (his study): ‘Wo selbst das liebe Himmelslicht | Trüb durch gemalte Scheiben bricht!’ In his world, colors are the result of light passing through stained-glass windows. But the colors in questions are gloomy; seeing color as a degradation of light coheres with the tradition of Platonic and Neoplatonic views regarding the ‘impurity’ of descent. This Platonic view of color is discussed in Mendelssohn’s *Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele*, which Goethe studied together with Plato’s work itself. In the *Ephemerides*, Goethe writes the following:

> Die Farben kommen unsern Augen öfters wie unverändert vor, und gleichwohl wechselt beständig neues Sonnenlicht mit dem vorigen ab. Wenn wir aber die Wahrheit suchen, so müssen wir die Dinge nach der Wirklichkeit, nicht aber nach dem Sinnenschein beurtheilen.

Plato’s dialectical and negative approach dictates that, if one is a true seeker of knowledge, one must go beyond the realm of ever-changing nature. As Mendelssohn’s Socrates asserts, colors, like bodies, are mere appearances. Goethe directly cites a passage from Mendelssohn’s *Phädon* that defines nature as follows: ‘Zwischen seyn und nicht seyn ist eine entsetzliche Kluft, die von der almäßlig wirkenden Natur der Dinge nicht übersprungen werden kann.’ This view characterizes the relation between light and color in Faust’s world.

21 See p. 44 above.
22 Mendelssohn, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele’, p. 64.
Turning our attention now to the scene *Vor Spiel auf dem Theater*, we see that the Poet’s metaphorical use of ‘bunt’ – here meaning ‘diverse’, ‘mixed’ and ‘colorful’ – is not different from Mendelssohn’s view. The Poet contrasts ‘jener bunten Menge’\(^{24}\) to ‘stillen Himmelsenge’\(^{25}\); that which is diverse and mixed is contrasted to that which is simple and pure. But the Poet refuses to participate in the kind of work that the Director supports: ‘Ich wünschte sehr der Menge zu behagen, | Besonders weil sie lebt und leben läßt.’\(^{26}\) Like Mendelssohn’s Socrates, the Poet is oriented toward that which is lasting and transcends time and change: ‘Was glänzt ist für den Augenblick geboren; | Das Echte bleibt der Nachwelt unverloren.’\(^{27}\) The same affinity toward the transcendent that we find in Faust’s character is also present here, expressed by the Poet as the desire to create a work that reaches the ‘Nachwelt’ – a timeless masterpiece, in other words. In the scene *Vor dem Tor*, we find further stages of the modification of the metaphors of light and color, an important step in the evolution of Faust’s views regarding the acquisition of knowledge.

### II.1.1.2.2 Colorful Lives and the Sun’s Will to Animate

The metaphorical representation of color in relation to light and the sun undergoes a significant modification in verse 913, where Faust utters the word ‘Farben’ for the first time. In this verse, colors are portrayed in a positive way – not as appearances and corruptions of the ‘Himmelslicht’, but rather as something that is willingly intended by the sun:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Aber die Sonne duldet kein Weißes,} \\
\text{Überall regt sich Bildung und Streben,} \\
\text{Alles will sie mit Farben beleben.}^{28}
\end{align*}
\]

Faust explains his observation that the sun is the source of life, emanating ‘Bildung’ and ‘Streben’; but then he ironically extends the sun’s influence into the human realm: ‘Doch an Blumen fehlt’s im Revier, | *Sie nimmt* geputzte Menschen dafür.’\(^{29}\) Significantly, the gate to the human realm is the ironic phrase ‘geputzte Menschen’. Faust points out to Wagner (and the reader) that the transcendent sun is linked to the human realm. Yet Faust stipulates a condition for

\(^{24}\) V. 59.  
\(^{25}\) V. 63.  
\(^{26}\) V. 37–38.  
\(^{27}\) V. 73–74.  
\(^{28}\) V. 911–913.  
\(^{29}\) V. 914–915 (my emphasis).
Wagner. If Wagner fulfills this condition, he will be able to see what Faust wants to show him: ‘Kehre dich um von diesen Höhen | Nach der Stadt zurück zu sehen’.\(^\text{30}\) This change in approach and perspective makes these speculations possible. Faust enthusiastically turns his gaze from the heights toward the city gates. The diversity and colorfulness he sees is contrasted to the darkness of the gate: ‘Aus dem hohlen finstren Tor | Dringt ein buntes Gewimmel hervor.’\(^\text{31}\) The light metaphors then take on even greater significance in the human realm as resurrected Christ brings the people out of their limiting walls and narrow worlds – ‘Aus der Kirchen ehrwürdiger Nacht | Sind sie alle an’s Licht gebracht.’\(^\text{32}\) From his elevated perspective, Faust enjoys and praises this activity, which emanates from the transcendent realm into the human and natural realms. He is fascinated by the immanence of the transcendent, which manifests in the vitality of the festival: ‘Selbst von des Berges fernen Pfaden | Blinken uns farbige Kleider an.’\(^\text{33}\) Faust’s praise of the sun in the Osterspaziergang scene show him to reject a basic Platonic view; rather than looking toward the sun, Faust looks away from it and toward its manifestations in the world. ‘Kehre dich um, von diesen Höhen’, he says to Wagner.

We are now in a position to return to verses 1120 and 1121, where Faust expresses his wish for mediation and guidance from the souls that reign between heaven and earth.

It is a significant moment in Faust’s intellectual life; his developing conception of the relation between the transcendent and the world finds its articulation in his appeal to intermediary souls and the path he imagines they would guide him down. Earlier in verses 704–705, believing himself to be in God’s likeness, Faust articulates his wish as follows: ‘Auf neuer Bahn den Äther zu durchdringen, | Zu neuen Sphären reiner Tätigkeit.’ The rhetoric of abstraction is present in ‘Äther’, the incorporeal matter of the heavenly bodies and the sun. In verse 1121, on the other hand, a new perspective articulates itself – in ‘neuem buntem Leben’. As I mentioned above, ‘bunt’ refers to the quality of diversity and imports a perspective other than that of mere purification and abstraction; the abstract perspective of verses 704–705 prefers pure (‘rein’) to colorful and diverse.

We can clarify the fundamental difference between the two paths in question – the paths that Faust envisions, respectively, in verse 1121 and verses 704–705 – by comparing Mendelssohn’s Platonic definition of ‘color’ in \textit{Phädon}

\(^{30}\) V. 916–917 (my emphasis).
\(^{31}\) V. 918–919 (my emphasis).
\(^{32}\) V. 927–928 (my emphasis).
\(^{33}\) V. 935–936 (my emphasis).
to Goethe’s definition of ‘color’: ‘Gegenwärtig sagen wir nur so viel voraus, daß zur Erzeugung der Farbe Licht und Finsternis, Helles und Dunkles, oder, wenn man sich einer allgemeineren Formel bedienen will, Licht und Nichtlicht gefordert werde.’

Goethe offers a definition of color as a vast realm of co-presence. He defines color as the realm in which light and non-light meet. This definition follows another definition of color, which defines it as ‘deeds and sufferings’ of light (‘Taten und Leiden’). Importantly, Goethe does not assign any sort of value, hierarchical or otherwise, to the components of his definition; therefore, in Farbenlehre, the issues of purity and impurity are irrelevant.

If we read Goethe’s definitions of color in Farbenlehre critically through the hierarchical Platonic perspective of Mendelssohn’s Phädon, the following issues arise: in Goethe’s first definition, because color belongs to the realm of mixture, it appears to be lower than that which is simple and unmixed. Goethe’s second definition, moreover, ignores Platonic principles that mandate ‘general definitions’. Goethe abandons this essentialist approach and turns to the phenomena themselves in terms of light’s ‘deeds and sufferings’; he explores colors by turning toward the realm of the changeable rather than the unchanging truth of Mendelssohn’s Socrates. This change radically diverges from the Platonic view. In other words, whereas the dialectic negative method moves from color to light, Goethe’s definitions invite us to explore the space in between.

Earlier, when Faust’s method of acquisition of knowledge was a direct and negative one, Faust described his path as flying through the ether in a fire chariot – a metaphor for the sun – toward ‘reiner Tätigkeit’. This path

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35 FA I, 23/1: p. 12.
36 I do not ignore the emphasis on the quality of ‘Reinheit’ in regards to light in Farbenlehre. (See: Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, pp. 85–93. Specifically, p. 86 contains Schöne’s explanation on the spectrum of meaning of presence of ‘rein’ in this study.) But I draw attention to the difference between pure in contrast to being composed of parts – that is the form of this quality in Farbenlehre in Goethe’s crusade against Newton’s view – on the one hand, and pure in contrast to devaluated and polluted as a result of being in a mediated relation with the many, on the other hand. It is in the context of the second semantic variant that the Platonic realms of ‘Schein’ and ‘Wahrheit’ as reflected in Phädon of Mendelssohn receive their significance. Regarding Goethe’s view on purity and pure, see also Lohmeyer’s treatment of the semantic specifications of ‘rein’ and ‘Reinheit’ in Goethe’s Faust II: Dorothea Lohmeyer, Faust und die Welt: Der zweite Teil der Dichtung Eine Anleitung zum Lesen des Textes (München: C. H. Beck, 1975), pp. 337–338.
accords with that of Socrates in Mendelssohn’s Phädon: ‘Wenn wir aber die Wahrheit suchen, so müssen wir die Dinge nach der Wirklichkeit, nicht aber nach dem Sinnenschein beurtheilen.’ As the drama progresses, we notice a significant shift from the rhetoric of ‘pure’ (‘rein’) to that of ‘colorful’ and ‘diverse’ (‘bunt’) in Faust’s description of his path forward. As I demonstrated above, this shift marks a fundamental divergence from the Platonic tradition of negative pursuit of truth through purification; the influence of this divergence encompasses all realms of knowledge, from cosmogony to ethics.

Taking a broad view of the scene Vor dem Tor, we see that the wish for a colorful life is expressed by someone who, just moments earlier, was flying over the seas, chasing the setting sun and eager to drink its eternal (though not colorful) light. In other words, a perfect poetic articulation of the Platonic world-view, including anamnesis and wish for ascent as a way of returning home, results in a fundamentally different cosmological conception of the world. Furthermore, Faust articulates his non-Platonic (and even anti-Platonic) view as the prospect for a negative, abstract yearning for separation and purification of the elevated soul. In Mendelssohn’s Phädon, we are told that a wise one ‘lernt seine ganze Lebzeit durch sterben. Der Tod setzt er voraus sey eine Trennung des Leibes und der Seele’. How can we account for Faust’s wish for life after this process of abstraction, if this separation of the inferior soul from the elevated soul is the practice of death?

At first glance, we might be inclined to think that Faust desires for himself a philosophical life in the Platonic sense. But on closer inspection, the difference between ‘rein’ and ‘bunt’ refutes this explanation. The co-presence of these contrasting views makes for a tempestuous moment in Faust’s intellectual and ethical life. Against this backdrop, Faust shifts from a world-view according to which ‘Ein Weiser stirbt gerne’ and one should be ready to take the risk ‘in’s Nichts dahin zu fließen’ to a world-view that justifies his seeking to lead a new colorful life. We are thus justified in describing this stage as one in which Faust turns away from death and toward life.

37 Mendelssohn, ‘Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele’, p. 64.
38 See v. 1092–1099. I explained the issue of anamnesis in these verses above p. 65.
39 Compare v. 1110–1117 to v. 1121.
40 Der Junge Goethe, p. 437.
41 Ibid.
42 V. 719.
II.1.2 Painful Walls of Exclusion

In the first chapter, I introduced the circular pattern of Faust’s actions and explained the flow of scenes as a cycle of pain, escape and fall.\(^43\) In the following we observe a phase of transition in Faust’s life that includes the appearance of Mephistopheles in the drama. In the scene Nacht, Faust’s feeling of pain motivates him to speak to the moon, and the conversation kindles an escape in speculative fantasy: ‘Fliehe! Auf! Hinaus in’s weite Land!’\(^44\) This escape culminates in an expression of amazement – ‘Welch Schauspiel!’ –, which is interrupted by a sigh of pain that springs from disillusionment: ‘aber \textit{ach! ein Schauspiel nur!}\(^45\)

In these verses, the movement from one stage to another is quick; the first escape is instantaneously followed by another escape from this newly felt pain, as Faust summons the ‘\textit{Erdgeist}’. As the drama unfolds, Faust’s various escapes in fantasy become lengthier and more painful. This pain causes Faust to reach for the deadly potion: ‘Ich sehe dich, es wird der Schmerz gelindert’\(^46\). It is necessary for us to explore Faust’s pain, since it drives the circular pattern that moves Faust through the beginning of the drama, from the scene Nacht to the end of \textit{Vor dem Tor}.

The pain in the scene Nacht is expressed immediately before Faust names the fields of knowledge he has studied. It finds articulation in a sigh – ‘ach!’ – that indicates Faust’s deep discontent with the knowledge he has accumulated. The problem appears to be insufficiency of knowledge.\(^47\) But what is insufficient can be improved with time and patience. So if insufficiency of knowledge were the only problem, then Faust’s lamentations would need to be understood in relation to a perceived lack of time. In fact, a perceived lack of time is precisely what Wagner, Faust’s pupil, expresses; but it is not Faust’s main concern. If we can answer how Wagner’s concerns are different from Faust’s, then we will have a clear understanding of the origin of Faust’s pain.

As Mayer asserts, ‘Wagner identifiziert Gelehrtentum mit Philologie und Historiographie. Das Wichtigste sind die Quellen, Texte, Pergamente.’\(^48\) Since Wagner is a philologist,\(^49\) his own expression of ‘Ach Gott!’ has a temporal color:

\(^{43}\) See pp. 52–53 above.
\(^{44}\) V. 418.
\(^{45}\) V. 454 (my emphasis).
\(^{46}\) V. 696.
\(^{47}\) V. 356–364.
\(^{48}\) Mayer, ‘Der Famulus Wagner und die moderne Wissenschaft’, p. 178.
\(^{49}\) Compare to: FK, p. 222.
Ach Gott! die Kunst ist lang!
Und kurz ist unser Leben.
Mir wird, bei meinem kritischen Bestreben,
Doch oft um Kopf und Busen bang'.
Wie schwer sind nicht die Mittel zu erwerben,
Durch die man zu den Quellen steigt!
Und eh' man nur den halben Weg erreicht,
Muß wohl ein armer Teufel sterben.50

Remarkably, displaying his textual knowledge, Wagner glosses his expression of emotional pain with a citation from Hippocrates’s Aphorisms I, I.51 The unrest Wagner feels is not due to a faulty method. On the contrary, Wagner has faith in his critical endeavor; if life were not so short, he would be able to attain to the level of knowledge he desires. Given enough time, Wagner would be able to apply a textual method of investigation to historical sources and follow the footsteps of his forefathers:

Verzeiht! es ist ein groß Ergetzen
Sich in den Geist der Zeiten zu versetzen,
Zu schauen wie vor uns ein weiser Mann gedacht,
Und wie wir’s dann zuletzt so herrlich weit gebracht.52

It is clear that Wagner sees no problem with this method. Furthermore, unquestioningly accepting of past scholarship, Wagner believes in upholding his forefathers’ traditions53:

Tut nicht ein braver Mann genug,
Die Kunst, die man ihm übertrug,
Gewissenhaft und pünktlich auszutüben?
Wenn du, als Jüngling, deinen Vater ehrst,
So wirst du gern von ihm empfangen;
Wenn du, als Mann, die Wissenschaft vermehrst,
So kann dein Sohn zu höh’erm Ziel gelangen.54

Wagner believes in following his sources to the letter – ‘Von Buch zu Buch, von Blatt zu Blatt!’55 He envisions an experience of ascent in his textual studies that

50 V. 558–565.
51 See in: FK, p. 222.
52 V. 570–573.
53 See above, p. 25, Mayer’s explanation of Wagner’s unquestioning attitude toward historical sources.
54 V. 1057–1063.
55 V. 1105. Schöne, in his comments on ‘pünktlich’ in this verse, points out the proper meaning in accordance with the historical context as follows: ‘Auf den Punkt genau’: FK, p. 239.
elevates him ‘zu den Quellen’.\textsuperscript{56} Moreover, he articulates a vision in which the heavens open up to those who read old parchments: ‘Und ach! entrollst du gar ein würdig Pergamen, | So steigt der Ganze Himmel zu dir nieder.’\textsuperscript{57}

As we see, Wagner doesn’t experience pain \textit{per se}, but rather fears not having enough time to reach his desired destination. This destination, however, is not a transcendent truth, as it is for Faust. Rather, Wagner hopes to leave behind an intellectual inheritance for his descendants.\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, Wagner’s primary concern is his lack of time; his secondary concern, which appears in the \textit{Faust II} in which Wagner produces the isolated incorporeal soul Homunculus,\textsuperscript{59} is his lack of a son to inherit his legacy. This latter concerns surfaces as Wagner expresses his admiration for Faust and his father, both of whom are venerated by the people: ‘Welch ein Gefühl mußt du, o großer Mann! | Bei der Verehrung dieser Menge haben!’\textsuperscript{60} But Wagner’s second concern (not having a son) is related to his first concern (not having enough time); Wagner’s wish for a son expresses his wish to attain an intellectual form of patriarchal immortality.

In the case of Faust, on the other hand, time is a secondary problem, and Faust’s concern about time is not the same as Wagner’s – i.e., Faust does not fear that his acquisition of knowledge will get cut short because of lack of time. Faust’s concern is not about insufficient time, but rather about wasted time: What has he gained, Faust asks, from all of his time-consuming efforts?

In the following verses, Faust criticizes institutions of learning and the practice of acquiring degrees. His polemic starts with a self-critique:

\begin{quote}
Heiße Magister, heiße Doktor gar,  
Und ziehe schon an die zehen Jahr,  
Herauf, herab und quer und krumm,  
Meine Schüler an der Nase herum\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

The critique is not directed at knowledge \textit{per se}, but rather at the seekers of knowledge – namely, ‘Doktoren, Magister, Schreiber und Pfaffen’\textsuperscript{62} – and the process of transmitting a faulty form of knowledge to students. In verse 364, Faust expands his self-critique as he describes the small institute (‘wir’) that centers around him: ‘Und sehe, daß wir nichts wissen können!’\textsuperscript{63} Notably, the

\textsuperscript{56} V. 564.  
\textsuperscript{57} V. 1108–1109.  
\textsuperscript{58} V. 572–573; 1063.  
\textsuperscript{59} V. 6882–6884; 8249; 8252.  
\textsuperscript{60} V. 1011–1012.  
\textsuperscript{61} V. 360–363.  
\textsuperscript{62} V. 367.  
\textsuperscript{63} V. 364.
next verse expresses a feeling of pain that is, for the first time, not expressed as an interjection. The sigh ‘ach!’ that once voiced a pain of unclear origin turns into an eloquent articulation of pain with a clear cause – namely, the awareness that ‘we cannot know anything’: ‘*Das will mir schier das Herz verbrennen.*’ In a final step, Faust expands his critique even further to cover all his contemporary polymaths – of whom, he claims, he is the most learned. This claim is consistent with the amount of respect that Faust receives in the *Osterspaziergang* scene on Wagner’s account:

```
Der Vater zeigt dich seinem Knaben,
   Ein jeder fragt und drängt und eilt,
   Die Fiedel stockt, der Tänzer weilt.
Du gehst, in Reihen stehen sie,
   Die Mützen fliegen in die Höh’:
   Und wenig fehlt, so beugten sich die Knie,
   Als käm’ das Venerabile.  
```

Wagner’s second-hand description of Faust’s status is reinforced by the first-hand account of a new student who seeks Faust’s instruction:

```
Und komme voll Ergebenheit,
   Einen Mann zu sprechen und zu kennen,
   Den Alle mir mit Ehrfurcht nennen. 
```

Faust begins his critique of knowledge by criticizing himself, but he then expands the scope of his critique to the method and institutions of knowledge in general. Yet Faust’s critique does not imply absolute impossibility of knowledge. The ‘*wir*’ in verse 364 refers to the practitioners of a faulty method by means of which true knowledge remains out of reach. Thus, Faust changes his method and approach: ‘*Drum hab* ich mich der Magie ergeben’. He is convinced that the knowledge he gained through study is empty: ‘Daß ich nicht mehr, mit sauern Schweiß, | Zu sagen brauche was ich nicht weiß’. Unlike Wagner, who fears that lack of time will interrupt his accumulation of knowledge, Faust is concerned with being trapped in a method of acquisition of knowledge that is a cause of pain and doomed to fail. Unlike Wagner,
therefore, Faust (a) does not have blind faith in the body of knowledge passed down to him; and (b) is confident that the method of acquisition of knowledge taught to him is wrong. Whereas Wagner seeks to continue accumulating knowledge, Faust seeks to interrupt a vicious cycle that he sees as the source of his pain: ‘O sähst du, voller Mondenschein, / Zum letztenmal auf meine Pein’.71

II.1.2.1 Exclusion and ‘Kerker’
The scene Nacht commences in the subjective realm of self-criticism. The setting takes form as Faust is described as sitting at a desk – ‘An diesem Pult’ –, where he resolves to end his pain.72 But after his first fantasy ends with disillusionment, his study is described as a ‘Kerker’73; Faust feels trapped. The significance of this room is brought to the foreground through the metaphor ‘Mauerloch’,74 which refers to Faust’s study. Goethe gives poetic articulation to his stage directions – ‘In einem hochgewölbten, engen, gotischen Zimmer’75 –, and the word ‘Mauerloch’ conveys the confinement that Faust feels within the walls of his study. The following verses further describe this setting of Faust’s pain; a series of statements oscillate between objective and subjective perspectives on the room:

\[
\text{Beschränkt von diesem Bücherhauf,}
\text{Den Würme nagen, Staub bedeckt,}
\text{Den, bis an’s hohe Gewölb’ hinauf,}
\text{Ein angeraucht Papier umsteckt;}
\text{Mit Gläsern, Büchsen rings umgestellt,}
\text{Mit Instrumenten vollgepfropft,}
\text{Urväter Hausrat drein gestopft –}
\text{Das ist deine Welt! das heißt eine Welt!76}
\]

The first verse conveys Faust’s feeling of being ‘beschränkt’ (subjective) by piled-up books (objective). The description conveys the function of this wall-like part of the inner space of the room. From verse 403, a subjective judgment is assigned to the rhyming words. In consecutive verses, the components of the inner space are related to the act of covering (exclusion seen from within)

71 V. 386–387 (my emphasis).
72 V. 387.
73 V. 398.
74 V. 399.
75 Goethe’s stage directions for the opening of the scene Nacht, according to FT. p. 33.
76 V. 402–409 (my emphasis).
and, more importantly, surrounding (exclusion from outside) – ‘bedeckt’, ‘umsteckt’, ‘rings umstellt’.

The room itself is filled with numerous objects that had once belonged to Faust’s ancestors; these objects are the elements of Faust’s world, a world of exclusions. This room, whose high walls confine (‘beschränken’) Faust, is the setting of Faust’s pain:

Und fragst du noch, warum dein Herz  
Sich bang’ in deinem Busen klemmt?  
Warum ein unerklärter Schmerz  
Dir alle Lebensregung hemmt?77

In this instance of pain, Faust’s description of his room merges with his description of the faulty method of pursuit of knowledge. The exclusion that Faust feels in this room is made clearer in verses 414–417. His world is a construct, stuffed with inherited instruments and books representing the form of knowledge that Faust strongly criticizes. This world excludes the natural realm, replacing nature with representations of nature – the calcified ‘Tiergeripp’ und Totenbein’ in a suffocating atmosphere of ‘Rauch und Moder’. The ‘wir’ in ‘wir nichts wissen können’78 and the world around Faust are one and the same. This form of pursuit of knowledge and the institution built it around cohere with the term ‘Stubengelehrtheit’; the term reflects the association between being knowledgeable and being separated from the natural world. Adelung defines ‘Der Stubengelehrte’ as follows: ‘ein Gelehrter, welcher seiner Wissenschaft bloß auf der Stube, d.i. aus Büchern, erlangt und ausübt; zum Unterschiede von demjenigen, welche sie im Umgang mit der Welt ausbildet und anwendet.’79 Faust’s complaints and Adelung’s definition of the term at hand illuminate the relation between Faust’s study as a ‘Gelehrtenstube’ and his world of ‘Stubengelehrtheit’.

The pain that motivates Faust to reevaluate his world of accumulated knowledge finds articulation in the following call for ascent and escape: ‘Flieh! Auf! Hinaus in’s weite Land!’80 In the first chapter of this study, I explored the series of attempts at ascent that Faust made in response to this call. As we saw, these attempts were all of an excluding nature; they aimed directly for the transcendent source of the natural world in accordance with the Neoplatonic

77 V. 410–413 (my emphasis).
78 V. 364.
80 V. 418.
negative purifying method. Yet none of these attempts required that Faust actually leave his ‘prison cell’. Thus, Faust’s direct and abstract approach to the transcendent truth proves to be another path that the walls of his study insulate from the realm outside.

Faust’s study and the objects within it play an active role in his suicide attempt. The phial that shines in the moonlight, an object that Faust inherited, testifies to the presence of his old world in his act of self-deification. Faust’s declaration that ‘die Erde hat mich wieder’ signifies that the phial (and the death it promises) has been overcome. After his aborted suicide attempt, Faust leaves his study for the first time in the drama. Outside, Faust’s views of mediation and his new (non-Platonic) perspective on color take form.\(^8^1\)

**II.1.2.2 The World and the Significance of Honorific Titles**

Faust’s first attempt to leave his study and directly experience nature in the scene Vor dem Tor marks a major change in Faust’s outlook on the world. This change finds articulation in the following verse: ‘Und führt mich weg, zu neuem buntem Leben!’\(^8^2\) Faust’s embrace of the outside signifies an enthusiastic turn toward the human realm. Yet this turn is subjective; distant from the people, Faust fantasizes about the immanence of the transcendent sun in the human realm.

> Ich höre schon des Dorfs Getümmel,
> Hier ist des Volkes wahrer Himmel,
> Zufrieden jauchzet groß und klein:
> Hier bin ich Mensch, hier darf ich’s sein.\(^8^3\)

Human beings derive meaning from relationships with other human beings. The question remains, however, whether Faust really has succeeded in escaping his study. Notably, unlike the scene Nacht, the scene Vor dem Tor does not begin with Faust’s subjective reconstruction. Goethe’s dramatic arrangement in this scene enables the reader to compare Faust’s descriptions to the reality in question itself, presented through the dialogue of ‘das Volk’. Furthermore, as Schöne clarifies, ‘Die Szenerie geht sehr genau auf Örtlichkeiten in der Umgebung Frankfurts und auf Jugenderinnerungen Goethes an beliebte Wanderziele zurück.’\(^8^4\) That this scene refers to a historical location was

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\(^{8^1}\) See the process of the turn that unfolds outside Faust’s room explored in the previous section: pp. 91–97.

\(^{8^2}\) V. 1121

\(^{8^3}\) V. 937–940.

\(^{8^4}\) FK, p. 230.
obvious to contemporary readers and performers of Goethe’s work; when an excerpt from *Faust* was performed on August 27, 1829 in Frankfurt, the scene *Vor dem Tor* was enacted in front of the backdrop of a scenic painting of the familiar path of the *Osterspaziergang*. In contrast to Faust’s subjective retelling of the events, the conversations of the people are far from sublime. Faust is far removed from the people whom he wants to join, as Wagner’s response to him makes clear:

\[
\text{Mit euch, Herr Doktor, zu spazieren} \\
\text{Ist ehrenvoll und ist Gewinn;} \\
\text{Doch würd’ ich nicht allein mich her verlieren,} \\
\text{Weil ich ein Feind von allem Rohen bin.} \\
\text{Das Fiedeln, Schreien, Kegelschieben,} \\
\text{Ist mir ein gar verhaßter Klang;} \\
\text{Sie toben wie vom bösen Geist getrieben} \\
\text{Und nennen’s Freude, nennen’s Gesang.} \]  

Wagner reluctantly tolerates this vulgarity because it gives him an opportunity to listen to Faust’s eloquent speech. Yet Wagner leaves no doubt that he disdains folk songs and games. A pupil created by the system of learning that Faust epitomizes, Wagner’s response reminds Faust of a bitter fact – he is still the ‘Doktor’. In Faust’s eyes, ‘diese Namen wollen nichts heißen, sie sind nur Namen der wissenschaftlichen Farce, die ihren Ungrund in der Unmöglichkeit des Wissens hat’. The ‘Kerker’ from which Faust tries to escape confines him even when he is not physically within it. Wagner and Faust are present at the festival, but they do not partake in it. Wagner reminds Faust of his title ‘Doktor’ – a mark of his distance from ordinary people. Even an old farmer gestures toward this distance as he addresses Faust, thanking him for not shunning the crowd:

\[
\text{Herr Doktor, das ist schön von euch,} \\
\text{Daß ihr uns heute nicht verschmäht,} \\
\text{Und unter dieses Volksgedräng’,} \\
\text{Als ein so Hochgelahrter, geht.} \]

---

85 FK, p. 230. Schöne provides us with this information in reference to Marianne v. Willemer’s letter to Goethe from September 25, 1829.
86 V. 941–948 (my emphasis).
87 V. 385.
89 V. 981–984 (my emphasis).
The walls of Faust’s study function not only to contain dead representations of nature; they also project a representation of Faust as a ‘Hochgelehrter’. Accepting a drink from the intimidated old farmer, Faust is reminded of the shortcomings of the form of knowledge he has inherited from his fathers. He rejects the image of ‘savior’ that the people project on him and finds himself submerged in an endless sea of error: ‘O glücklich! wer noch hoffen kann | Aus diesem Meer des Irrtums aufzutauchen.’

II.1.2.3 ‘Meer des Irrtums’

In the analysis of the scene Nacht above, I pointed out that Faust’s conception of his world changes. Faust’s cold reevaluation of his world fills him with discontent: ‘Das ist deine Welt! das heißt eine Welt!’\(^91\) Turning now to Hans Blumenberg’s views regarding the ‘Horizonterfahrung’, I explore the significance of the condition that articulates itself in verse 409. Furthermore, Blumenberg’s explanation of the ‘Horizonterfahrung’\(^92\) will help us understand the situation of setting out for the unknown and will thus prepare us for Mephisto’s entrance in the drama.

In Goethes Horizont: Welterfahrung auf dem Meer, Blumenberg refers to a note written by Goethe on April 3, 1787 in the Italienische Reise. In this note, Goethe describes his first experience of being surrounded by an open horizon on the sea. Goethe stresses the importance of his experience and admits that it changed his conception of world: ‘Hat man sich nicht ringsum vom Meere umgeben gesehen, so hat man keinen Begriff von Welt und von seinem Verhältnis zur Welt.’\(^93\) The nullification of one’s conception of one’s world, Blumenberg explains, leads to a ‘Horizonterfahrung’, in which the boundaries that once defined one’s world vanish or (viewed differently) expand in countless directions, each pointing toward an unknown destination. Blumenberg describes this condition as ‘phänomenologische Iteration von Horizonten’.\(^94\) The link between ‘Horizonterfahrung’ and change in one’s world-conception lies at the core of Blumenberg’s argument; he includes the term ‘Welterfahrung’ in the subtitle of his essay.

\(^90\) V. 1064–1065.
\(^91\) V. 409.
\(^93\) FA I, XV/1: p. 248.
Having clarified how ‘Horizontefahrung’ affects one’s conception of the world, Blumenberg contextualizes ‘the world’ in respect to ‘die goethezeitgenössische Definition der Welt als series rerum’ – in other words, ‘a more or less fixed quantity of things’. This conception of world is strongly present in Faust’s illustration of his study. In the scene Nacht, Faust’s ‘world’ does not have a single meaning for him. Its multiplicity of meanings indicates that Faust is in the process of ‘Welterfahrung’ – a crisis of definition. For instance, there is fundamental difference between ‘world’ as it appears in verse 382 (‘Daß ich erkenne was die Welt | Im Innersten zusammen hält’) and ‘world’ as it appears in verse 409 (‘deine Welt’ or ‘eine Welt’). For Wagner, on the other hand, the ‘world’ only has a single meaning – it is ‘die Welt’ in the humanistic and non-cosmic sense.

Blumenberg’s attempt to explain the ‘Horizontefahrung’ in a world that is understood as ‘series rerum’ clarifies Faust’s representation of his ‘Gelehrtenstube’ as the world in which he feels pain and the desire for change: ‘diese Dinge, aus deren Ansammlung die Welt bestehen soll, sind doch in der ›reinen‹ Horizontanschauung verschwunden. Es wäre die äußerste Verarmung des Weltbestandes, die allererst freiliegte, was denn eine Welt sei.’ After Faust experiences such an expansion, the objects of his old world appear worthless. This experience informs Faust’s description of his study, whose books and parchments are glorified by Wagner (‘steigt der ganze Himmel zu dir nieder.’) But Wagner’s path to heaven – ‘Von Buch zu Buch, von Blatt zu Blatt’ – now seems hopeless to Faust:

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95 Ibid.
96 Nele Bemong, Re-thinking Europe: literature and (trans)national identity (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), pp. 74–75.
97 V. 402–409. See the description of Faust’s world explained in terms of series rerum above pp. 102f.
98 V. 382–383 (my emphasis).
99 Wagner’s world is not the ‘unendliche Natur’ (v. 455) of Faust. Remarkably, throughout the drama, Wagner uses the term ‘world’ in an anthropological and specifically humanist sense [See in: FK, p. 221] to signify a certain group of people ‘Eine Menge Menschen’, ‘Die zu gleicher Zeit lebenden Menschen’ or ‘Menschen überhaupt, besonders die Menge Menschen und Dinge um uns her; als ein Collectivum ohne Plural’ as we find in: Adelung, Versuch eines vollständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, 5, pp. 158–161. This conception of world can be found in verses 531, 586, and 6875.
101 V. 1109.
102 V. 1105.
Faust’s ‘Horizontefahrung’ occurs within the context of his pursuit of knowledge; he questions his old world and his inherited institution of learning. Blumenberg stresses that ‘[d]ieser Übergang ist nicht selbstverständlich’; in Faust’s case, the transition is accompanied by cries of pain. In the context of Blumenberg’s metaphor of the sea voyage, Faust’s previous life of scholarly learning and academic degrees represents destinations that were part of his fathers’ world; Faust was sailing close to the shore. The world outside his study, on the other hand, appears as an endless cosmos.

In light of Blumenberg’s definition of ‘Horizontefahrung’ as ‘phänomenologische Iteration von Horizonten’, we should note that Faust’s experience unfolds slowly from the scene Nacht to the scene Osterspaziergang. The ‘Horizontefahrung’ is explained in Arbeit am Mythos as a polarity of anticipation and reaching out: ‘Horizont ist nicht nur der Inbegriff der Richtungen, aus denen Unbestimmtes zu gewärtigen ist. Es ist auch der Inbegriff der Richtungen, in denen Vorgriffe und Ausgriffe auf Möglichkeiten orientiert sind.’

In Osterspaziergang, Faust experiences the extension of the walls of his study beyond their physical location and bemoans Wagner’s compliments, which remind him of his academic identity: ‘Der Menge Beifall tönt mir nun wie Hohn’. Suddenly, Faust sees his condition in a new light that anticipates his path ahead: ‘O glücklich! wer noch hoffen kann | Aus diesem Meer des Irrtums aufzutauchen.’

Faust dismisses his accumulated knowledge as nothing but error; what surrounds him is unknown. The limitless world of the unknown discloses itself to Faust, who previously viewed his world in terms of ‘knowing’. Faust expresses the need that is the source of his pain: ‘Was man nicht weiß das eben braucht man, | Und was man weiß kann man nicht brauchen.’ His response

103 V. 602–605.
106 V. 1030.
107 V. 1065.
108 Blumenberg describes this state as follows: ‘Im Staunen sollte sich die natürliche Bestimmung des Menschen zur Kenntnis als Bewußtsein seines Nichtwissens angekündigt haben.’ In: Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, p. 33.
109 V. 1066–1067.
to this pain is to escape: ‘Doch laß uns dieser Stunde schönes Gut | Durch solchen Trübsinn nicht verkümmern!’\textsuperscript{110} Faust refers to his fantasy of flying toward the setting sun as ‘Ein schöner Traum’, and immediately after waking up from this dream, his pain returns with the expression of ‘Ach!’\textsuperscript{111} Faust tries one last time to escape the endless unknown and take refuge in his dream of flying; as Blumenberg explains, his dream represents an extreme form of escaping the endless sea of ignorance:

\begin{quote}
Der Traum ist reine Ohnmacht gegenüber dem Geträumten, völlige Ausschaltung des Subjekts und seiner Selbstverfügung inmitten seiner Bilder mit der extremen Disposition zum Angstzustand; doch zugleich ist er die reine Herrschaft der Wünsche, die das Aufgewecktwerden zum Inbegriff aller Enttäuschungen macht\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

After waking up from his daydream, Faust is determined to leave the old world behind and enter the unknown – ‘Und trüg’ er [der Zaubermantel] mich in fremde Länder’.\textsuperscript{113} Remarkably, however, for Wagner, the realm outside the ‘Studierzimmer’ does not stand for the unknown. He dismisses the outside as the realm that is familiar to him: ‘Berufe nicht die wohlbekannte Schar’.\textsuperscript{114} Wagner’s reaction to his mentor’s approaching the realm of the unknown dramatizes an aspect of the ‘Horizont erfahrung’ that contrasts with Faust’s. In \textit{Arbeit am Mythos}, Blumenberg elaborates on the tendency to avoid the unknown behind the horizon, a tendency that is informed by ‘Angst’: ‘Die Angst ist auf den unbesetzten Horizont der Möglichkeiten dessen, was herankommen mag, bezogen.’\textsuperscript{115} ‘Durch sie [die Angst] wird der ganze Horizont gleichwertig als Totalität der Richtungen, aus denen ›es herankommen kann.‘\textsuperscript{116} Wagner gestures toward the forbidden unknown realm that Faust approaches – a realm in which evil and Angst (on Blumenberg’s definition) are ubiquitous:

\begin{quote}
Berufe nicht die wohlbekannte Schar,
Die strö mend sich im Dunstkreis überbreitet,
\textit{Dem Menschen tausendflältige Gefahr},
\textit{Von allen Enden her, bereitet.}
\textit{Von Norden dringt} der Scharfe Geisterzahn
Auf dich herbei, mit Pfeilgespitzten Zungen;
\textit{Von Morgen ziehen}, vertrocknend, sie \textit{heran},
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} V. 1067–1068.
\item \textsuperscript{111} V. 1090.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Blumenberg, \textit{Arbeit am Mythos}, p. 17 (my emphasis).
\item \textsuperscript{113} V. 1123
\item \textsuperscript{114} V. 1126
\item \textsuperscript{115} Blumenberg, \textit{Arbeit am Mythos}, p. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 10.
\end{itemize}
Und nähren sich von deinen Lungen;
Wenn sie der Mittag aus der Wüste schickt,
Die Glut auf Glut um deinen Scheitel häufen,
So bringt der West den Schwarm, der erst erquickt,
Um dich und Feld und Aue zu ersäufen.
Sie hören gern, zum Schaden froh gewandt,
Gehorchen gern, weil sie uns gern betrügen,
Sie stellen wie vom Himmel sich gesandt,
Und lispeln englisch, wenn sie lügen.\textsuperscript{117}

In the verses above, Mephisto is introduced as the ‘Zerstörer’, a quality that re-appears in his self-representation in \textit{Studierzimmer [I]}. The unknown realm in Wagner’s view is an evil that manifests in the darkness from which Wagner wishes to flee:

\begin{quote}
Doch gehen wir! Ergraut ist schon die Welt,
Die Luft gekühlt, der Nebel fällt!
Am Abend schätzt man erst das Haus.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

In his comments on this dialogue, Schöne points to Harold Janz’s work \textit{Goethe’s Faust as a Renaissance Man}, in which Janz discusses Wagner’s perception of his world and the frightful darkness beyond its walls. In the view of these two scholars, Goethe wrote Wagner’s monologue with an engraving from Robert Fludd’s \textit{Medicinae catholicae} in mind. This book describes the state of the human being as ‘aus allen vier Windrichtungen (hier von allen Enden der Welt her: Norden, Morgen, Mittag und West) Scharen von bösartigen Windgeister auf einen Kranken abgeschossen werden.’\textsuperscript{119} In this engraving, the human being is depicted as safe and healthy within the walls of a cross-shaped fortress. The fortress has no gates, and at the top of each of the four chambers of the fortress stands one of the four archangels, Michael, Gabriel, Raphael and Uriel, who are fighting off threats coming from all directions. The only imaginable way to escape from this space is to ascend toward the sunlike source of light above and to pray.\textsuperscript{120} The world outside this sanctuary is a cycle, within which ‘tausendfältige Gefahren’ abound; the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[117] V. 1126–1141 (my emphasis).
\item[118] V. 1142–1144.
\end{footnotes}
sources of the danger lie beyond the dotted circular line that represents the horizon of this world. The only benevolence comes directly from above. Fludd and Wagner illustrate the Angst toward the approaching threat from beyond the horizon. It’s not surprising that Wagner – ‘ein braver Mann’ is so restless to go home. As Faust gazes into the darkness, a poodle emerges. Faust sees in the poodle the possibility of having his wishes fulfilled. Thus, the ‘Studierzimmer’ becomes host to a living being from the outside – this is the first act of inclusion in the drama.

II.1.3 The Process of Inclusion or ‘Wie kommen wir denn aus dem Haus?’

II.1.3.1 Lege dich zu des Meisters Füßen: Naming the Unnamable

Faust’s ‘Studierzimmer’, which had previously only admitted students and teachers, opens its doors to a new member:

Dem Hunde, wenn er gut gezogen,
Wird selbst ein weiser Mann gewogen.
Ja deine Gunst verdient er ganz und gar,
Er der Studenten trefflicher Scolar.121

Schöne points out that well-trained dogs were popular among students during Goethe’s time.122 This historical context is important for understanding the appearance of Mephisto in the drama. The playful quality of the dog surfaces in Wagner’s description: ‘Es ist ein pudelnärrisch Tier.’123 This quality was tolerated only outside these walls and not in a space that belongs to books and ‘Tiergeripp’ und Totenbein.’ Faust orders the restless dog to remain silent – ‘Sei ruhig Pudel!’124 The poodle appears to be strongly drawn to the room’s threshold: ‘An der Schwelle was schnoberst du hier?’125 Schöne recognizes in this act the dog’s awareness of the pentacle,126 placed deliberately at the threshold to prevent the evil spirits lurking outside from entering the house. It is also noteworthy that the poodle, from the moment it steps inside these walls, becomes a part of an episode in which the room turns into Mephisto’s dramatic opponent. The quality of the poodle as a disturbance in the old world (‘Studierstube’)

121 V. 1174–1177.
122 FK, p. 243.
123 V. 1167.
124 V. 1186.
125 V. 1187.
126 FK, p. 245.
surfaces as Faust’s ‘Studierzimmer’ becomes the stage of Faust’s attempts to translate the *Gospel of John*.

Faust’s denial of his deep discontent with the world that he inherited from his fathers is apparent from the way that he describes his room. The room that he once called a ‘Kerker’ and a ‘verfluchtes, dumpfes Mauerloch’ becomes a safe fortress. In this safe fortress, ‘des Lebens Quelle’ has nothing to do with the sun, and its tangible presence in the natural world. Rather, the source of life is associated with an inner light that burns within. Now, this house is a place where the inner light is appreciated far more than the natural one. The scanty light of a lamp burning in darkness suffices, and the sun and the moon make no appearance. In the following verses, for the first time in the drama, ‘narrowness’ is used without negative connotations (as it is in verses 398–417):

\[
\text{Ach wenn in unsrer engen Zelle} \\
\text{Die Lampe freundlich wieder brennt,} \\
\text{Dann wird’s in unsrem Busen helle,} \\
\text{Im Herzen, das sich selber kennt.} \\
\text{Vernunft fängt wieder an zu sprechen,} \\
\text{Und Hoffnung wieder an zu blühn;} \\
\text{Man sehnt sich nach des Lebens Bächen,} \\
\text{Ach! nach des Lebens Quelle hin.}
\]

Adelung and Campe both define ‘die Zelle’ as a small room, especially as dwelling place of a monk or a nun. They point out the inner relation between this word and the cloister and its ascetic renunciation of the world. Near the turning point in the drama (the wager with Mephisto) the ‘Studierstube’ appears as a hermitage. In the verses above, Faust describes his room in a way that denies his earlier views. Jochen Schmidt describes this phase of the drama as follows:

\[
\text{Daß Faust den Pudel mit nach Hause in sein Studierzimmer nimmt, wo er trotz aller inzwischen aufgebrochenen Weltsehnsucht noch einmal ins alte Gelehrtenleben zurückfinden scheint, signalisiert eine Phase des Übergangsgeschehens, in der noch nichts entschieden ist, aber alles zur Entscheidung drängt.}
\]

127 V. 1201.  
128 Compare with v. 913.  
129 V. 1194–1201.  
It is as if the presence of the poodle brings forth an extreme side of the room. In his comment on Wagner’s words in verses 1126–1141, Schmidt introduces Wagner’s wish to return home (a wish that Faust, who seeks adventure – ‘sucht das Abenteuer’132 – doesn’t share). In this scene, however, the house has the same meaning for Faust and Wagner. The two are closer to each other than at any other point in the drama. As Faust seeks refuge from his Angst in this fortress of health,133 he appreciates the protection of a steady island within the ‘Meer des Irrtums’ – even if that island is narrow.134

‘In der Weltabschirmung des mittelalterlichen Gehäuse leuchtet zuerst die schöpferische Potenz des Menschen auf; nur durch die Weltaskese entdeckte sich die Weltmächtigkeit.’135 This account of the gothic house is elucidating in the context of the two worlds mentioned by Blumenberg. We can differentiate between, on the one hand, a world whose darkness overwhelms one with the ‘Horizontерfahrung’ – seeing nothing but ‘Meer des Irrtums’ in all directions – and, on the other, a world that offers safety as darkness falls and ‘Mit ahnungsvollem heil’gem Grauen’136 awakens the better soul and sedates the ‘wilde Triebe, | Mit jedem ungestümen Tun’.137 This holy dread that momentarily changes the meaning of narrowness in Faust’s eyes is shared by Wagner as he faces darkness:

Doch gehen wir! Ergraut ist schon die Welt,
Die Luft gekühlt, der Nebel fällt!
Am Abend schätzt man erst das Haus.138

In his translation of the Gospel of John, Faust tries to find solace in the inner non-aesthetic light. He turns to a light that burns in the scripture and outside the aesthetic context of Osterspaziergang.139 Faust returns to a form of pursuit of knowledge that justifies and qualifies him as Wagner’s mentor. The ‘Erkenntnis’ of verse 1196 is one of inner light: ‘Dann wird’s in unserm Busen helle, | Im Herzen, das sich selber kennt.’ This kind of knowledge is acquired in exclusion from the natural world and brings about a form of ‘Weltmächtigkeit’

132 Ibid., p. 116.
133 See p. 110 above.
134 V. 1194.
136 V. 1180.
137 V. 1182–1183.
138 V. 1142–1144.
that belongs to the world of Faust’s ‘Studierzimmer’, as a gothic room, and it is valid and in force within these walls.

As Faust approaches the act of translation, the stranger in the room distracts him:

Knurre nicht Pudel! Zu den heiligen Tönen,
Die jetzt meine ganze Seel’ umfassen,
Will der tierische Laut nicht passen.¹⁴⁰

The contrast between the spiritual realm and the animal realm (represented in Schiller’s Versuch über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen)¹⁴¹ is also the contrast between the body and soul; Faust sees in the poodle the embodiment of the soul that he denigrated in the Ostersspaziergang scene.

The scene Studierzimmer [I] enters a phase of knowing in terms of naming. This phase begins with the translation of the Gospel of John, where the unnamable logos is translated as ‘Wort’, ‘Sinn’, ‘Kraft’ and finally ‘Tat’. Schöne discusses the influence of Herder’s commentary (from 1774) on the Gospel of John and critique of Luther’s translation of logos as ‘Wort’ on this scene.¹⁴² Specifically, Herder argues that the original term is unnamable: ‘[das] Alllicht, unsichtbarer Urglanz in [der] Tiefe seiner Fülle verborgen: kein Gedanke kann ihn denken: kein Wort ihn nennen’.¹⁴³ Herder describes the unnamable realm as divine and notes that it is the nature of the divine to be outside the reach of human understanding and language: ‘Nicht an Johannes, sondern an Uns liegts, daß wir ihn nicht verstehen: er gibt Nachricht von der Gottheit Jesu, wie

¹⁴⁰ V. 1202–1204.
¹⁴¹ See p. 61 above. It is important to note the similarity in approach to body and soul during the phase in which Faust turns to an ascending path with direct approach to the sun. In this phase of returning to the world of his fathers and inner light, Faust denies his previous discontent. In observing the two phases near one another, we find the ‘Studierzimmer’ capable of housing both phases, although in the first one the pain prepares Faust for stepping outside and for the wish for a form of mediation that would take him outside of the walls of his limited world.
¹⁴² See FK, p. 246. It is worth mentioning that Herder invites researchers to make enquires into the context within which logos was articulated in the Gospel of John. As a way to gain more clarity, he invites researchers to consider exploring the Chaldean and Zoroastrian texts. In his notes introducing the Zande Avesta, Herder explores the light metaphorical language that is common between the Zoroastrian text and those of John. See Herder’s further clarification of this view in the Introduction of Erläuterungen zum Neuen Testament aus einer neueröffneten Morgenländischen Quelle in: Johann Gottfried Herder, Aus der Schrift: ‘Johannes’ 1774, ed. Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols., Herders Sämtliche Werke (Berlin 1877–1913: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1884), vol. 7: pp. 335–354.
¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 321.
sie nur Menschliche Seele, Sprache und Zeitlauf faßen konnte.¹⁴⁴ Then, as Faust finds in ‘Tat’ the origin of that which ‘alles wirkt und schafft’,¹⁴⁵ the poodle becomes the center of attention and the process of naming and knowing the core of the poodle commences.

Schöne’s comments on verse 1232 cast light on the role of Faust’s companion (‘Geselle’)¹⁴⁶ by reminding us that, in the Prolog im Himmel, the Lord gave this companion (‘Geselle’) to Faust, as a way to keep Faust creative and active:

Des Menschen Tätigkeit kann allzuleicht erschlaffen,
Er liebt sich bald die unbedingte Ruh;
Drum geb’ ich gern ihm den Gesellen zu,
Der reizt und wirkt, und muß, als Teufel, schaffen.¹⁴⁷

Faust’s translation of logos as ‘Tat’ reminds the reader of the ‘Wirken’ and ‘Schaffen’ that the Lord associated with Mephisto in the Prolog im Himmel. This explains why Mephisto (in the form of a poodle) breaks out of his dormant state as soon as Faust utters the word ‘Tat’. It is remarkable that the poodle changes form at precisely the moment Faust becomes irritated by it. At first, Faust names the poodle ‘mein Pudel’.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the poodle soon overstays its welcome – ‘Einer von uns beiden | Muß die Zelle meiden.’¹⁴⁹

Faust admitted a stranger inside his house, but the stranger distances itself more and more from what the walls of the house can confine. Faust’s poodle refuses to be recognized as a dog – ‘Das ist nicht eines Hundes Gestalt’¹⁵⁰ – and fear overcomes Faust: ‘Welch ein Gespenst bracht ich ins Haus!’¹⁵¹ Faust seeks to recognize some familiar characteristic in the stranger; his attempts to do so oscillate between the realm of evil spirits and exotic animals. In quick succession, the dog appears to Faust as a ghost (‘Gespenst’); a hippopotamus; a ‘halbe Höllenbrut’¹⁵²;

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¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 320.
¹⁴⁵ V. 1232 (my emphasis).
¹⁴⁷ V. 340–344 (my emphasis).
¹⁴⁸ V. 1250.
¹⁴⁹ V. 1243–1244.
¹⁵⁰ V. 1252.
¹⁵² V. 1257.
and an ‘Elephant’.\textsuperscript{153} Unable to challenge Faust verbally, the creature challenges him by shifting its form.

The dramatic opposition between the stranger and the house is stressed once again by the spirits: ‘Drinnen Gefangen ist einer!’\textsuperscript{154} The reader perceives the room as a prison for the emerging Mephisto; furthermore, the threatening stranger is associated with useful acts (‘Denn er tat uns allen | Schon viel zu Gefallen’\textsuperscript{155}). Instead of trying to know the beast through naming it, Faust tries to know it through identifying its basic element: ‘Erst zu begegnen dem Tiere, | Brauch’ ich den Spruch der Viere’\textsuperscript{156}.

At this point, Faust’s attitude toward the stranger changes. At first, Faust tried to silence the poodle, which he considered a representation of the bestial. But when his attempt to silence the poodle failed, Faust moved to dispose of it.\textsuperscript{157} Furthermore, when Faust learns that the stranger is not corporeal, he becomes aggressive. To know the stranger is to harm it:

\begin{quote}
Keines der Viere  
Steckt in dem Tiere.  
Es liegt ganz ruhig und grins’t mich an;  
Ich hab’ ihm noch nicht weh getan.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

Before the ‘Studierzimmer’ fills with the poodle’s presence – ‘Den ganzen Raum füllt es an, | Es will zum Nebel zerfließen.’\textsuperscript{159} –, knowing in terms of inflicting pain evolves into knowing in terms of mastering.\textsuperscript{160} Mirroring his encounter with the ‘Erdgeist’, Faust naively claims superiority over the creature he does not know: ‘Steige nicht zur Decke hinan! | Lege dich zu des Meisters Füßen!’\textsuperscript{161}

\textbf{II.1.3.2 Inclusion and Paradox}

The stranger (the poodle) whom Faust brings into his world shifts its shape while grinning at Faust’s attempts to exert pressure on him.\textsuperscript{162} At the moment

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{153} V. 1311.
\item \textsuperscript{154} V. 1259.
\item \textsuperscript{155} V. 1269–1270.
\item \textsuperscript{156} V. 1271.
\item \textsuperscript{157} V. 1241–1246.
\item \textsuperscript{158} V. 1292–1295.
\item \textsuperscript{159} V. 1312–1313.
\item \textsuperscript{160} See above on page 58 Goethe’s strong objection to a view that understands knowing as torturing and persecution.
\item \textsuperscript{161} V. 1314–1315.
\item \textsuperscript{162} V. 1294.
he discloses himself as a travelling student,\textsuperscript{163} he starts talking in Faust’s language: ‘Wozu der Lärm?’\textsuperscript{164} When Faust threatens to scorch him with the holy flame, Mephisto responds sarcastically – it would only make him sweat! Mephisto evolves from Wagner’s ‘der Studenten trefflicher Scolar’ to a person whom Faust names ‘Ein fahrender Scolast’. Mephisto’s form and ironic tone prove that he is not dominated by Faust. Mephisto’s manifestation has all the qualities that the ‘Erdgeist’ did not offer. The ‘Erdgeist’ introduced itself fully, yet remained beyond apprehension; Mephisto, on the other hand, shows active inclination toward communication. Mephisto reaches for Faust in a communicative manner and facilitates the process of change.

In the following, I explore how Mephisto opens the closed walls of Faust’s world in his act of mediation. To understand Mephisto as a mediator, we need to turn to Faust’s question – ‘Wie nennst du dich?’\textsuperscript{165} This question launches a process that Peter André Alt characterizes as Mephisto’s ‘self-definition’\textsuperscript{166} and ‘Selbstdarstellung’.\textsuperscript{167}

There is a difference between these two terms. A self-definition is an articulation of one’s perception of one’s self: it defines one’s self through one’s perspective and does not requires a communicative aspect. ‘Selbstdarstellung’, on the other hand, is necessarily communicative: it is a self-exposition or self-presentation meant for someone else. Differentiating between these two terms helps us elucidate Mephisto’s role as a dramatic element in \textit{Faust} and examine Faust’s process of turning toward life.

If we view the episode as one of Mephisto’s self-definition, then we should expect to find an answer to the question of Mephisto’s essence – or as Peter Michelsen puts it, \textit{Mephistos eigentliches Element}.\textsuperscript{168} This approach considers Mephisto relative to the duality between good and evil, a duality that also appears in Dante’s and Milton’s devil. Furthermore, Goethe’s Mephisto is explored as an instance of the ‘Mephisto figure’ in its historical transformations from \textit{Historia von D. Johann Fausten} of 1587 to the story’s dramatic adaptation by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{163} ‘Scolast: von Universität zu Universität wandernder Student.’ In: FK, p. 251.
\item \textsuperscript{164} V. 1322.
\item \textsuperscript{165} V. 1327.
\item \textsuperscript{167} ——–, ‘Mephisto als Selbstbeobachter’, in \textit{Ästhetik des Bösen} (München: C. H. Beck, 2010), pp. 113–114. See also ‘Selbstdarstellung’ employed to describe verse 1335 in Schöne’s comment on this verse in FK, p. 251. We will discuss Schöne’s comment below.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Peter Michelsen, ‘Mephistos eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in Goethes \textit{Faust},’ in \textit{Das Böse: eine historische Phänomenologie des Unerklärlichen}, ed. Carsten Clope and Wilhelmi Schmidt-Biggemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Marlowe and to Goethe’s time.\textsuperscript{169} In this context, Goethe’s Mephisto represents evil in the era of the enlightenment\textsuperscript{170}; a Mephisto that defines himself in \textit{Faust} will, therefore, observe himself within the historical horizon of the work and will undergo an enlightened exorcism.\textsuperscript{171} In this context, the self-definition of Mephisto is seen as self-definition of the Devil. As Alt puts it, ‘The Devil interprets himself in the vanishing point of the old European tradition, thus becoming recognizable as the product of this cultural tradition.’\textsuperscript{172}

Although the above-mentioned attempts explore the text as a field for phenomenological and historical investigation of the concept of evil, they still treat the \textit{Faust} text and its Mephisto character with an essentialist approach that focuses on Mephisto’s words, rather than his deeds. Michelsen relativizes his approach to Mephisto by pointing to Goethe’s dramatic and aesthetic principles.\textsuperscript{173} Goethe discusses his aesthetic principles in a letter to Schiller from August 3, 1799; namely, he discusses his view of the impossibility of bringing the absolute good and evil into an aesthetic context where they are both active.\textsuperscript{174} Michelson further supports his argument by referring to the forty-ninth \textit{Paralipomenon} of \textit{Dichtung und Wahrheit}, where Goethe asserts that a relativization of good and evil is the prerequisite for aesthetic representation: ‘Konflikt des bösen und guten kann nicht ästhetisch dargestellt werden: Denn man muß dem Bösen etwas verleihen und dem Guten etwas nehmen, um sie gegeneinander ins Gleiche zu bringen.’\textsuperscript{175}

‘[W]er bist du denn?’, Faust asks Mephisto.\textsuperscript{176} Mephisto offers several answers, but the most controversial is the following: ‘Ein Teil von jener Kraft, | Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.’\textsuperscript{177} Seen through the perspective of self-definition, this statement corresponds to Leibniz’s theodicy, a part of the cultural context of Goethe’s time. This reading connects this statement to the Lord’s

\textsuperscript{169} Compare to: Eggensperger, ‘\textit{Den Bösen sind sie los. Überlegungen zu Mephistopheles und zum Bösen in Goethes \textit{Faust},’ pp. 191–197.

\textsuperscript{170} In the following article, Vaget explores evil in \textit{Faust} against the horizon of the enlightenment. He provides us with some important historical evidence on the manner of reception of Mephisto by Goethe’s contemporaries and their reading of \textit{Faust} in comparison to the image of the evil in Milton and Dante’s works. Hans Rudolf Vaget, ‘Mäßig boshaft: Fausts Gefährte. Goethes Mephistopheles im Lichte der Aufklärung’, \textit{Goethe-Jahrbuch}, no. 118 (2001), p. 235.


\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p. 152 (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{173} Michelsen, ‘Mephistos eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in Goethes \textit{Faust},’ p. 240.

\textsuperscript{174} See in FA II, 4: pp. 705.

\textsuperscript{175} FA I, 14: p. 946. Compare to: Michelsen, ‘Mephistos eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in Goethes \textit{Faust},’ p. 240.

\textsuperscript{176} V. 1335.

\textsuperscript{177} V. 1336.
words in verses 342–343. Thus, Alt maintains that Mephisto’s self-definition is a perfect example of theodicy: ‘He could not come up with an argument more Leibnizian and more by the book than by suggesting that evil’s right to exist is derived from the stabilizing function it performs with regard to good.’

Oskar Seidlin reads these verses as of Mephisto’s self-analysis ‘Wenn diese mephistophelische Selbstanalyse wirklich eine Antwort geben soll auf Fausts und unsere Frage, dann muß sie wohl über das “Böse” wie über das “Gute” eine endgültige Aussage machen.’ The tendency toward generalizing Mephisto as the embodiment of evil comes from reading Mephisto’s words as independent of their communicative and contextual contexts. In his next step, Seidlin seeks to overcome the paradoxical capacity in Mephisto’s words by pointing out that ‘das Gute’ in verse 1336 is represented within Mephisto’s set of values, in which he refuses to recognize himself as evil. Seidlin explains his decoded reconstruction of Mephisto’s paradox as follows: ‘Mephisto würde sich Faust voller Ehrlichkeit als der vorstellen, der er wirklich ist: ein Teil von jener Kraft, die Zerstörung und Sünde (was ihr das Böse nennt) will und das tote Nichts (das im teuflischen Sinne Gute) schafft.’

In his comment on verse 1336, Schöne agrees with Seidlin. However, he sees the verse as Mephisto’s ‘Selbstdarstellung’ – aimed at Faust – rather than his self-definition:

Mephisto kleidet seine berühmte Selbstdarstellung in einen höchst mißverständlichen paradoxen Satz. Um Fausts Argwohn zu beschwichtigen scheint er sich hier zunächst der Sprachreglung des Prologs (340ff.) anzupassen – als müsse er bei böser Absicht stets doch das Gute bewirken.

Schöne refers to biblical instances that condemn the misrepresentations of vice and darkness as virtue and light; such misrepresentations are themselves characterized as evil deeds. When Faust asks for further explanation of the

180 See v. 1342–1343.
182 FK, p. 251.
‘Rätzelwort’, Schöne suggests, Mephisto gives an honest answer and reveals his evil nature. Following Seidlin, Schöne, too, proposes a paradox-free, safe reconstruction of Mephisto’s (allegedly) failed attempt to manipulate Faust.

Other commentators are content to leave the paradox unresolved. In his article written in 1968, Albert Fuchs argues that Mephisto’s explanation of his puzzle does not end in verse 1344; rather, it continues through verse 1378. In this way, the full extent of the theodicy that is seen in Mephisto’s awareness and confession – ‘Und freilich ist nicht viel damit getan’ – can be perceived.

As the scene progresses, Mephisto doesn’t weaken his paradoxical statement. He simply elaborates on his earlier statement – namely, that the intended evil (‘Das Böse will’) resides in the tendency to negate and destroy the existing order. Regarding deeds (‘das Gute schafft’), Mephisto admits that ‘Geruhig bleibt am Ende Meer und Land’ and ‘immer zirkuliert ein neues, frisches Blut. | So geht es fort, man möchte rasend werden!’ Mephisto sees no need for further argumentation; he wants Faust to know him as a paradoxical being.

Reading this scene as one of Mephisto’s self-definition, Alt writes:

Mephistos Antworten auf Fausts Frage, wer er sei, verraten, daß der Teufel unter den Bedingungen der Theodizee in verschiedenen Rollen fortexistiert. Er verkörpert einen Flickenteppich aus Deutungen, die den Interpretationen entsprechen, welche der Höllenherrscher und sein Gefolge in der abendländischen Kulturgeschichte gefunden haben.

According to this view, Mephisto’s self-observation encompasses Greek and Judeo-Christian conceptions of the evil. However, Faust (and not Mephisto) is the one who connects Mephisto with this religious context. Faust calls Mephisto ‘Flüchtling der Hölle’ and ‘Fliegengott’. Faust even calls Mephisto a ‘Lügner’, a label that may be influenced by Zoroastrianism. In his notes on West-östlicher Divan, in the section entitled Aeltere Perser, Goethe discusses evil in Zoroastrianism:

185 V. 1362.
186 V. 1340–1344.
187 V. 1368.
188 V. 1374–1374 (my emphasis).
189 Alt, ‘Mephisto als Selbstbeobachter’, p. 103 (my emphasis).
190 V. 1299.
191 V. 1334.
192 Ibid.
Man betrachte ihre Hauptgebote und Verbote: nicht lügen, keine Schulden machen, nicht undankbar seyn! die Fruchtbarkeit dieser Lehren wird sich jeder Ethiker und Ascete leicht entwickeln. Denn eigentlich enthält das erste Verbot die beyden andern und alle übrigen, die doch eigentlich nur Unwahrheit und Untreue entspringen; und daher mag der Teufel im Orient bloß unter Beziehung des ewigen Lügners angedeutet werden.\(^{193}\)

In this scene, Mephisto will not name himself and refuses to let Faust to name him. Moreover, he insists on being seen as ‘ein Teil des Teils’.\(^{194}\) In this way, he refuses to have an identity or essence. Furthermore, Mephisto attacks the credibility of what humans call evil and the wholeness of humanity as an essence – ‘Wenn sich der Mensch, die kleine Narrenwelt, | Gewöhnlich für ein Ganzes hält’.\(^{195}\) Finally, Mephisto convinces Faust to arrive at a non-religious (but rather mythological and cosmological) understanding of him; Faust refers to him as ‘Des Chaos wunderlicher Sohn!’\(^{196}\)

It is worth noting that, as soon as Faust associates Mephisto with chaos, Mephisto asks for permission to leave.\(^{197}\) Elaborating on the concept of chaos and Mephisto’s claim that he is an offspring of the primordial mother-night, Michelsen points out the significance of Goethe’s study of Karl Philipp Moritz’s *Götterlehre* (1791). In his study of this work, Goethe found an explanation of Hesiod’s *Theogony*, in which Chaos is introduced as the origin of everything\(^{198}\): ‘Da wo das Auge der Phantasie nicht weiter trägt, ist Chaos, Nacht und Finsternis; und doch trug die schöne Einbildungskraft der Griechen auch in diese Nacht einen sanften Schimmer, der selbst ihre Furchtbarkeit reizend macht.’\(^{199}\)

The only attribute that Faust is able to ascribe to Mephisto relates to Chaos. In other words, Faust fails to define Mephisto’s ‘eigentliches Element’. In Moritz’s work, we perceive an echo of Mephisto’s identification with part of a paradoxical state:

\[
\text{Gleich im Anfange dieser Dichtungen}\(^{200}\) vereinigt sich die entgegengesetzten Enden der Dinge; an das Furchtbarste und Schrecklichste grenzt das Liebenswürdigste. – Das Gebildete und Schöne entwickelt sich aus dem Unförmlichen und Ungebildeten. – Das Licht steigt aus der Finsternis empor. – Die Nacht vermählt sich mit dem Erebus, dem}
\]

\(^{193}\) FA I, 3/1: p. 150–151 (my emphasis).
\(^{194}\) V. 1349.
\(^{195}\) V. 1347–1348 (my emphasis).
\(^{196}\) V. 1384.
\(^{197}\) V. 1385.
\(^{200}\) *Theogony* of Hesiod.
alten Sitze der Finsternis, und gebiert den Äther und den Tag. Die Nacht ist reich an man-
nigfaltigen Geburten, denn sie hüllt alle die Gestalten in sich ein, welche das Licht des 
Tages vor unserem Blick entfaltet.201

Bearing in mind Goethe’s reading of Moritz, we can better understand Faust’s 
surrender to the namelessness of Mephisto, after Faust tried to dominate 
Mephisto with names such as ‘liar’ and ‘corrupter’. Now Faust associates 
Mephisto with Chaos, which represents an auspicious beginning: ‘Was anders 
suche zu beginnen | Des Chaos wunderlicher Sohn!’202

Let us return to Mephisto’s paradoxical words. Reading this episode as one 
of Mephisto’s self-definition, Alt asserts the following: ‘Goethes Faust wird hier 
zum Drama des Teufels, der sich nur charakterisieren kann, indem er sich der 
Sprache der Menschen unterwirft.’203 Remarkably, Alt sees in Mephisto’s pre-
sentation of paradox the potential to elude the grasp of a ‘binary logic’; moreover, Alt introduces the deconstructive capacity of the lack of definitive identity 
that is the contribution of paradox.204 In a closer examination of the two ap-
proaches, we notice that Alt sees the same episode from two perspectives – as 
‘self-definition’ and as ‘Selbstdarstellung.’ In the first case, Alt explains the epi-
isode as Mephisto’s surrendering to the language of men. Seeing this episode as 
Mephisto’s ‘Selbstdarstellung’, on the other hand, Alt describes it as Mephisto’s 
acting within language and deconstructing the negative mind and its disposi-
tion to definitively separate good and evil. Mephisto’s paradoxical rhetoric 
contributes to the flow of this scene and to the development of Faust, who pre-
viously saw death or an escape into the old world as the only way forward.

Regarding paradox as a mode of thought and speech and its relation to the 
reader, Heinrich Plett clarifies:

Das Paradoxon ist ein Denk- und Sprachmodus, der sich in logischen Widersprüchen 
manifestiert. Diese Widersprüche sind Scheinwidersprüche; denn sie verhüllen verbor-
gene Wahrheiten. Ihre Enthüllung löst im Rezipienten psychische und kognitive Reaktionen 
aus. Auffällig ist das Plötzliche und geradezu Schockartige solcher Erkenntnisvorgänge.205

Paradoxical statements operate on an epistemological level, Plett asserts; they 
use language to pave the way for transitions. As a figure of speech, Jane Green

202 V. 1383–1384.
203 Alt, ‘Mephisto als Selbstbeobachter’, p. 113. The same subject is treated in the follow-

205 Heinrich F. Plett, ‘Das Paradoxon als rhetorische Kategorie’, in Das Paradox: Eine 
Herausforderung des abendländischen Denkens, ed. Paul Geyer and Roland Hagenbüchle
argues, paradox challenges views that dominate discourse: ‘[f]or the purpose of shaking a rooted prejudice there is nothing like a shattering paradox’.\textsuperscript{206}

Paradox provides the necessary space for the process of inclusion to expand the old world and break down its walls. In the statement ‘Ein Teil von jener Kraft, | Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft’,\textsuperscript{207} we find a space that includes two mutually exclusive elements – ‘das Böse’ and ‘das Gute’. The language practices this inclusion on the reader. Therefore, Mephisto is not disempowered as he steps inside language; rather, he acts upon the situation with the force of a rhetorical category that language itself offers.

The dramatic setting of the scene \textit{Studierzimmer [I]} – namely, Faust’s ‘Gelehrenstube’ – is based upon exclusion. Yet the ‘Drudenfuß’ leaves open a small space for inclusion. This object reflects the presence of Leibniz’s necessary evil:

\begin{quote}
Beschaut es recht! es ist nicht gut gezogen;
Der eine Winkel, der nach außenzu,
Ist, wie du siehst, ein wenig offen.\textsuperscript{208}
\end{quote}

Until Mephisto is viewed as a prisoner – ‘mein gefangner wärst denn du?’,\textsuperscript{209} his answers maintain a defensive stance. Even Faust’s inquiry regarding the possibility of a pact receives a short response,\textsuperscript{210} Mephisto asks Faust repeatedly and politely (‘hoch und höchst’)\textsuperscript{211} to let him out of the house: ‘Jetzt laß mich los! ich komme bald zurück; | Dann magst du nach Belieben fragen.’\textsuperscript{212} Faust, however, declines to do so: ‘Den Teufel halte wer ihn hält! | Er wird ihn nicht sobald zum zweitenmale fangen.’\textsuperscript{213}

Unfolding against the backdrop of overcoming the ‘Drudenfuß’, the process of inclusion compels Faust to reconsider his dominating approach. Mephisto’s statement ‘Du bist noch nicht der Mann den Teufel fest zu halten’\textsuperscript{214} echoes a statement by the ‘Erdgeist’: ‘Du gleichst dem Geist, den du Begreifst nicht mir.’ Faust clearly associates the two moments – ‘Bin ich denn

\textsuperscript{207} V. 1336.
\textsuperscript{208} V. 1400–1402.
\textsuperscript{209} V. 1404.
\textsuperscript{210} ‘Die Hölle selbst hat ihre Rechte? | Das find’ ich gut, da ließe sich ein Pakt, | Und sicher wohl, mit euch ihr Herren schließen?’ V. 1413–1415.
\textsuperscript{211} V. 1387; 1420–1421; 1424–1425. Here: V. 1420.
\textsuperscript{212} V. 1424–1425.
\textsuperscript{213} V. 1428–1429.
\textsuperscript{214} V. 1509.
“abermals betrogen?” he asks after waking up.\textsuperscript{215} Mephisto’s remark at the beginning of Studierzimmer [II] – ‘So gefälltst du mir’ – reminds us that the condition of dialogue is of seminal importance. As a part of nature, Mephisto is not excluded from the following rule:

\begin{quote}
Läßt sich Natur des Schleiers nicht berauben,
Und was sie deinem Geist nicht offenbaren mag,
Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit Schrauben.\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

\section*{II.1.3.3 Differentiating between Mephisto’s Intentions and Deeds}

Reading the first encounter between Mephisto and Faust as Mephisto’s ‘Selbstdarstellung’, I argued, accentuates the communicative aspect between the characters. This reading opens the way to exploring the dramatic relation between Faust and Mephisto. It interprets Mephisto based on his deeds (‘Taten’)\textsuperscript{217} rather than his intentions. However, there are also instances in the text that are not communicative in terms of the dramatic relation between the characters within the drama; rather, they communicate with the audience. When Mephisto directly addresses the audience, our analysis will have to follow Mephisto in relation to his self-definition or self-observation. Consequently, this approach requires more speculation, since the impact of Mephisto’s statements cannot be followed within the dramatic structure of the text.

\subsection*{II.1.3.3.1 Mephisto’s Evil Intentions and the Presence of Faust’s Old World}

Not all of Mephisto’s statements are directed to Faust. In some cases, statements that inform the reader’s judgment of Mephisto’s malevolence are directed to the reader himself and do not influence the flow of the drama.\textsuperscript{218} The first instance in which Mephisto voices his malevolence occurs near the end of the Prolog im Himmel – ‘Staub soll er fressen, und mit Lust’.\textsuperscript{219} This is a general statement and cannot be fully understood without reference to Mephisto’s view

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{215} V. 1526 (my emphasis).
\item \textsuperscript{216} V. 673–675.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Compare to Goethe’s words quoted on p. 21 above.
\item \textsuperscript{218} See: Johannes Anderegg, ‘Wie böse ist der Böse? Zur Gestalt des Mephisto in Goethes Faust’, Monatsheft, 96, no. 3 (University of Wisconsin Press, Fall, 2004), pp. 343–344. Anderegg explains this aspect of Mephisto as a ‘commentator’, ‘characterizer’, and ‘evaluator’ (p. 344) who forms the last impression of a scene; Goethe concludes 22 scenes of the drama with Mephisto’s words and only seven with Faust’s (p. 343).
\item \textsuperscript{219} V. 334.
\end{itemize}
of humanity. Anglet clarifies Mephisto’s critique of the human condition in the *Prolog im Himmel*:


In Mephisto’s judgment, the human being’s dependency on senses is incompatible with the glow of heaven’s light. Furthermore, this inconsistency creates constant misery for the human being: ‘Ein wenig besser würd’ er leben, | Hätt’st du ihm nicht den Schein des Himmelslichts gegeben’,²²¹ Mephisto says. He adds, ‘Die Menschen dauern mich in ihren Jammertagen, |Ich mag sogar die armen selbst nicht plagen.’²²²

Faust’s early views are remarkably similar to Mephisto’s – both describe two mutually exclusive souls residing in the human being.²²³ Furthermore, both Faust and Mephisto consider this mixture to be the source of human misery. This view is consistent with the Neoplatonic view of secondary evil, discussed earlier in this study.²²⁴ Considering the negative, exclusive tendency that Mephisto displays in his critique of the creation of human beings, it is not surprising that Mephisto denigrates light as impure due to its relation to the corporeal – ‘Von Körpern strömt’s, die Körper macht es schön, | Ein Körper hemmt’s auf seinem Gange’.²²⁵ Thus, Mephisto’s disdain for that which is mixed and impure shapes his understanding of the flow of light from generation to reflection and perception.

In verse 1851, after Faust leaves Mephisto to prepare himself ‘zur schönen Fahrt’,²²⁶ Mephisto dresses ‘in Faust’ s langem Kleide’²²⁷ and displays his malevolence to the reader:

> Verachte nur Vernunft und Wissenschaft,  
> Des Menschen allerhöchste Kraft,  
> Laß nur in Blend- und Zauberwerken

---

²²¹ V. 283–284.
²²² V. 297–298.
²²³ In addition to the verses above, see v. 634; 1090–1091; 1110–1117.
²²⁴ See p. 67 above.
²²⁵ V. 1355–1356.
²²⁶ V. 1850.
²²⁷ FT. p. 81.
Dich von dem Lügengeist bestärken,
So hab’ ich dich schon unbedingt\textsuperscript{228}

The value that Mephisto assigns to reason and knowledge negates what he
deems to be the animal and wild quality of life:

\begin{quote}
Den schlepp’ ich durch das wilde Leben,
Durch flache Unbedeutenheit,
Er soll mir zappeln, starren, kleben\textsuperscript{229}
\end{quote}

This judgment once again underscores that Mephisto shares more with Faust
than just clothing. Here again, Mephisto’s rhetoric in verse 1853 mirrors Faust’s
rhetoric earlier in the drama, as he curses a life that he characterizes as ‘Lock-
und Gaukelwerk’\textsuperscript{230} and ‘Blend- und Schmeichelkräft[e]’\textsuperscript{231} Later in the scene,
Mephisto’s conversation with the new student echoes Faust’s critique of the old
institution of knowledge. Mephisto even voices Goethe’s own opinions in many
cases,\textsuperscript{232} such as Goethe’s critique of jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{233}

Mephisto’s view of the corporeal world (v. 1363–1366) and his lamentation
before the scene \textit{Grablegung} reveal an important aspect of Mephisto’s negative
approach and point to a non-intellectual side of his negations. In verses
1363–1366, Mephisto claims to be a corrupting force in the world:

\begin{quote}
Was sich dem Nichts entgegenstellt,
Das Etwas, diese plumpe Welt,
So viel als ich schon unternommen,
Ich wußte nicht ihr beizukommen\textsuperscript{234}
\end{quote}

Mephisto’s evil intention is to corrupt the corruptible. By comparing the logical
justification of negative pursuit of truth to Mephisto’s views, we see Mephisto’s
negation and destruction in a different light.

As the force that corrupts the corruptible, Mephisto is part of the logic of ne-
gation and abstraction. The pleasure that Mephisto takes in corruption shows
that his highest principle is one of absolute emptiness. Throughout the drama,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{228} V. 1851–1855.
\item \textsuperscript{229} V. 1860–1862.
\item \textsuperscript{230} V. 1588.
\item \textsuperscript{231} V. 1590.
\item \textsuperscript{232} See in: Anderegg, ‘Wie böse ist der Böse? Zur Gestalt des Mephisto in Goethes \textit{Faust},’
pp. 344–345. Here, Anderegg explores the role of Mephisto as the ‘Sprachrohr Goethes’ who
voices the author’s critique of the method of acquisition of knowledge.
\item \textsuperscript{233} See v. 1972ff and compare to FK, p. 271.
\item \textsuperscript{234} V. 1363–1366.
\end{itemize}
Mephisto stakes a claim to the truth as he follows Hesiod’s view of the primordiality of Chaos. In other words, the process of purification for Mephisto proceeds with negative purification, until the impure ‘Etwas’ is turned into the purified ‘Nichts’ and returns to its origin in Chaos (rather than Nous). Negation is the foundation of Mephisto’s personal philosophy and ethics. Echoing his earlier statement in verses 1860–1867, Mephisto expresses this view after Faust’s death:

Ihn sättigt keine Lust, ihm gnügt kein Glück,  
So buhlt er fort nach wechselnden Gestalten;  
Den letzten, schlechten, leeren Augenblick  
Der Arme wünscht ihn fest zu halten.\textsuperscript{235}

In the following verses, Mephisto seems to lament Faust’s absence:

Vorbei! ein dummes Wort.  
Warum Vorbei?  
Vorbei und reines Nicht, vollkommnes Einerlei.  
Was soll uns denn das ewge Schaffen,  
Geschaffenes zu nichts hinwegzuraffen?  
Da ists vorbei! Was ist daran zu lesen?  
Es ist so gut als wär es nicht gewesen,  
Und treibt sich doch im Kreis als wenn es wäre.  
Ich liebte mir dafür das Ewig-Leere.\textsuperscript{236}

As Michelsen points out, Mephisto’s use of ‘uns’ signifies that he sympathizes with Faust:

Ein wenig scheint Mephisto demjenigen nachzutrauern, den ins Verderben hinabzustoßen doch sein eifrigstes Bemühen war; und \textit{für einen Moment nimmt er sogar} – indem er sich der identifizierenden ersten Person Pluralis bedient (‘Was soll uns denn das ew’ge Schaffen!’) – \textit{den Standpunkt des Menschen ein}, die all ihr Tun, \textit{vom Rückblick des Endes her, als ganz und gar vergeblich erkennen müssen}. ‘Geschaffenes zu nichts hinwegzuraffen’: das war doch gerade Mephistos Hauptgeschäft, das erreicht zu haben eigentlich seinen Triumph und nicht \textit{Wehmut über die Vergänglichkeit der Dinge zur Folge haben müßte}\textsuperscript{237}

The feeling of loss permeates this dialogue and the word ‘dafür’ suggests the logical process and its negative method in the Neoplatonic tradition. Furthermore, this ‘dafür’ gestures toward a reaction which Mephisto presents as a judgment that the changeable is unworthy of being the object of desire. In other words,

\textsuperscript{235} V. 11587–11590 (my emphasis).  
\textsuperscript{236} V. 11595–11603 (my emphasis).  
\textsuperscript{237} Michelsen, ‘Mephistos \textit{eigentliches Element Vom Bösen in Goethes Faust’}, p. 248 (my emphasis).
when Mephisto abandons his pretense of schadenfreude after Faust’s death, it comes to light that Mephisto’s self-observation is mostly the self-observation of the very agent of negation that is active in the process of abstraction in the method of dialectic. As he lowers his defensive mask of schadenfreude, we see that Mephisto’s tendency to avoid the pain of loss explains his ascetic and negating words following verse 1860.

Several facts allow us to deduce that there is a relation between the excluding views of Faust’s old world and the elements we find in the evil intentions of Mephisto: Mephisto wears Faust’s clothes as he reveals his evil intentions, Mephisto’s evil intentions have the logic of negation of the corporeal and the corruptible realm, and the logic above correspond to Faust’s old world. We can also detect that Mephisto claims a higher intellectual ground that is rooted in his love for eternal emptiness: ‘Ich liebte mir dafür das Ewig-Leere.’ In this verse, Mephisto expresses that he has chosen eternal emptiness in order to avoid the pain of loss. The moment he fails to exclude and negate, the ‘Klugerfahrener’ must suffer this pain.

The relation between Mephisto’s evil intentions and Faust’s old world becomes clearer when we take into account that evil, as Schmidt-Biggeman puts it, is regarded as such only subsequent to an experience which refuses to be recognized and categorized as known. Bearing in mind that Faust is absent in all the instances in which Mephisto expresses his evil intentions, we know that Mephisto is communicating these intentions directly to the reader. Furthermore, it is important to note that in all the instances above the reader is in a state of suspense. In the first instance (v. 1851–1867), Faust leaves his room to prepare for his journey – he has just ruined his old world; and in the second instance (v. 11595–11603), Faust has just died. In both cases, Faust steps into the darkness beyond the horizon (as Blumenberg might say). Therefore, the ominous feeling of the unknown that lies beyond the horizon – or as Faust puts it, the anxiety that ‘mit ahnungsvollem heil’gem Grauen | In uns die bess’re Seele weckt’ – dominates the scene in the form of Mephisto.

238 V. 11603.
239 V. 11841.
240 See: Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, ‘Über die unfaßliche Evidenz des Bösen’, in Das Böse eine historische Phänomenologie des Unerklärlichen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), p. 8. Here, we read: ‘Die Faszination dieses Phänomens muß wohl darin liegen, daß das Böse das tremendum, das Zitternmachen, an sich behält, das die Augenblickserfahrung der numinosen Evidenz charakterisiert. Und erst der zweite Augenblick macht dann die Beurteilung dessen, was sich zeigt, als Böse möglich – das Böse wird hinterher-gedacht.’
241 V. 1180–1181.
As Faust prepares to leave his old world of negation, Mephisto articulates those anxieties. And when Faust dies, the reader once again faces the fear of the unknown.

This form of communication with the reader is integrated into the drama and manifests in Mephisto's becoming the voice of fear of the darkness beyond the horizon. Thus, we see that Mephisto’s evil intentions have an affinity to Faust’s old world; Mephisto is the voice of anxiety of the ‘Horizontefahrung’. Yet this is true only insofar as we follow his intentions in statements that are not directed toward Faust and thus do not advance the plot of the drama. As we follow the process of Faust’s turn toward life, we must focus on Mephisto’s deeds, rather than his intentions.

II.1.3.4 Mephisto’s Deeds and Faust’s Turn Toward Life

II.1.3.4.1 Toward Life in the Song of the Spirits: Connecting the Sun with Wine

The song of the spirits casts Faust in ‘ein Meer des Wahns’ and provides Mephisto with the opportunity to escape the house. Employing light metaphors, the song creates a vision for Faust that is relevant to his wishes. It starts by breaking through the gothic ceiling of Faust’s study—the ‘dunkeln | Wölbungen droben’—and dispelling the dark clouds so that the light of the sun can flow. But the flow is not one of pure intellect; rather, it is an emanation of beauty as articulated in ‘Himmlischer Söhne | Geistige Schöne’. The beauty that the ‘heavenly sons’ disperse converts metaphors of light into a metaphor of wine; the sun ripens grapes that are turned into flowing wine. In this picture, humans appear as lovers:

Wo sich für’s Leben,
Tief in Gedanken,
Liebende geben.

This dream exerts a strong influence on Faust. It ends as the immanent flow of beauty reaches its peak. Once again, all things flow toward love and life:

242 V. 1511.
243 V. 1447–1448.
244 V. 1457–1458.
245 V. 1471–1480.
246 V. 1467–1469.
Alle zum Leben,
Alle zur Ferne
Liebender Sterne
Seliger Huld. 247

In his notes on *West-östlicher Divan*, Goethe discusses the affinity between light metaphors and wine metaphors. In this text, Goethe attempts to understand the culture of the ancient Persians, for whom both metaphors were important: ‘Alles wozu die Sonne lächelte ward mit höchstem Fleiß betrieben, vor anderm aber die Weinrebe, das eigentlichste Kind der Sonne, gepflegt.’ 248 In the song above, we detect the promises that calm Faust’s restless soul as well as his desire for a turn toward life.

**II.1.3.4.2 From Pain and Pleasure to Paradox and Partaking**

Mephisto’s entrance into Faust’s room in the scene *Studierzimmer [II]* marks a significant change in the relation between the two characters. Unlike their first encounter, their second encounter does not involve domination. Upon entering Faust’s room, Mephisto finds Faust willing to partake in his ritual – ‘Du mußt es dreimal sagen.’ 249 He explicitly describes to Faust the difference between this encounter and the first one: ‘So gefällst du mir. | Wir werden, hoff ich, uns vertragen’. 250

Mephisto sees himself as a mediator and a guide for Faust. His new appearance is meant to dispel Faust’s gloominess. He encourages Faust to likewise dress fashionably, promising that Faust will appreciate what life has in store for him: ‘Damit du, losgebunden, frei, | Erfahrest was das Leben sei.’ 251 Faust’s response – ‘In jedem Kleide werd’ ich wohl die Pein | Des engen Erdelebens fühlen’ 252 – contains one of the keywords in this study: ‘pain’. Faust explores this pain further: ‘Ich bin zu alt, um nur zu spielen, | Zu jung, um ohne Wunsch zu sein.’ 253 We recognize the inner conflict between, on the one hand, an understanding of being old – being experienced enough to regard many endeavors as childish games – and, on the other hand, a desire for new experience. Faust’s
II.1 The Process of Turning Toward Life in Faust

state of negation, the result of his age and experience, makes it impossible for
him to see the world with fresh eyes: this is what gives meaning to the pain-
ful ‘sollen’ that first echoes after ‘Entbehren’ and then comes to the foreground
in ‘Entbehren sollst du! sollst entbehren’. Faust acknowledges the existence
of his knowledge that ‘selbst die Ahnung jeder Lust | Mit eigensinnigem Krittel
mindert’. There is a gap between the pain that this knowledge foresees and
the possibility of a life of happiness: ‘Und so ist mir das Dasein eine Last, | Der
Tod erwünscht, das Leben mir verhaßt.’ Mephisto’s job is to help Faust
bridge this gap. In verses 1572–1645, Mephisto proves the sincerity of the claim
he made in the Prolog im Himmel: ‘Da dank’ ich euch; denn mit den Toten |
Hab’ ich mich niemals gern befangen. To turn toward life, Faust must first
address his suicide attempt, which, as I explained in the previous chapter, was
the most intense form of escape in Faust’s cycle of pain. In the next step of my
argument, I focus on how Mephisto contributes toward defeating Faust’s mor-
bid tendencies.

In the scene Studierzimmer [II], Faust appears to oscillate between pleasure
and pain. Faust’s statement in verses 1570–1571 vividly expresses his discontent
with his old world, which brings Faust to attempt suicide. Later, Mephisto
leads Faust to take a deeper look at his wish for death – ‘Und doch ist nie der

254 On the difference between (a) being wise and experienced in the sense of being able to
foresee and expect the outcome of an experience; and (b) being experienced in terms of being
trained in partaking in a process that each time challenges premises and expectations, see:
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik,
Erfahrung, die diesen Namen verdient, durchkreuzt eine Erwartung.’

255 V. 1549. Arens claims that Faust has felt ‘Entbehren’ (doing without), but never grasped
‘Entsagen’ (renouncing). It appears that Arens takes the scene Nacht as the measure for
Faust’s way of life, whereas in fact it is in the translation scene that Faust’s old world has clear
dominance. In this scene, Faust’s tendency to renunciation is dramatized in his attempts at
silencing the undesirable voices of the poodle. Furthermore, in the evil intentions of Mephisto,
Faust’s anxieties are reflected. They are rooted in a level of ascetic renunciation of the corrupt-
ible and changeable. (See above p. 127) The translation scene reveals Faust’s old world as it
was before the scene Nacht. It is in the process of reevaluation that starts in the scene Nacht
that the ‘Entsagen’ of his old world comes out as a painful ‘Entbehren’. See in: Arens,
Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 170.

256 V. 1558–1561.

257 V. 1570–1571.

258 V. 318–319. See another instance in which Mephisto is concerned about saving Faust’s life
in the following source: Huber, ‘Mephisto is the devil – or is he?’, p. 40. Here, Huber gives a
concrete example of Mephisto’s saving Faust’s life in their confrontation with Valentin.
Tod ein ganz willkommner Gast.”259 Faust’s response to Mephisto shows the other side of his pain:

O selig der, dem er im Siegesglanze
Die blut’gen Lorbeer’n um die Schläfe windet,
Den er, nach rasch durcrhas’tem Tanze,
In eines Mädchens Armen findet.
O wär’ ich vor des hohen Geistes Kraft
Entzückt, entseelt dahin gesunken!260

Faust’s experience of pain turns into an exulted wish for death; Mephisto even provokes him. Again, Mephisto uses sarcasm to move Faust – ‘Und doch hat jemand’261 – and to remind him that he does not actually want death. In a direct and rather impulsive reaction to Mephisto’s act,262 Faust suddenly takes a significantly radical negating step toward all sources of joy:

So fluch’ ich allem was die Seele
Mit Lock- und Gaukelwerk umspannt,
Und sie in diese Trauerhöhle
Mit Blend- und Schmeichelkräften bannt!263

These curses include the ‘childish’264 religious feelings that once saved Faust from suicide as well as the speculative faculty (‘die hohe Meinung, | Womit der Geist sich selbst umfängt’265) and what the senses perceive (‘Verflucht das Blenden der Erscheinung, | Die sich an unsre Sinne drängt!’266). When attacking the mundane, Faust revisits his views expressed in verses 634–651, in which he curses fame, worldly possessions (Mammon),267 and ‘Weib und Kind, als Knecht

259 V. 1572.
260 V. 1573–1578 (my emphasis). This glorified death shows its cosmic proportions when we compare these verses with the following citation from the essay Die Natur (1783) written by Christof Tobler, which was published and commented on by Goethe: ‘Ungebeten und ungewarnt nimmt sie uns in den Kreislauf ihres Tanzes auf und treibt sich mit uns fort, bis wir ermüdet sind und ihrem Arme entfallen’ in: FA I, 25: p. 11.
261 V. 1579.
262 Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 173. Arens too sees the sudden reaction as in respond to Mephisto’s provocation, whereas, he reads this negation as negation of all human weaknesses.
263 V. 1587–1590.
264 Compare v. 1585 to v. 781. See p. 64 above.
265 V. 1591–1592.
266 V. 1593–1594.
267 See Adelung, Versuch eines vollständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, vol. 3: p. 334. In the following verses of the New Testament in Luther’s translation Mammon refers to money as an object of desire: ‘Die Bible oder die gantze Heilige
At the peak of these radical negations of all mundane and exulted objects of desire, Faust proceeds to his last negations. As Schöne clarifies, these are curses directed at the ‘fundamentalen christlichen Tugenden’. The spirits then affirm that Faust has taken a serious step toward tearing down the walls of his old world:

\[
\text{Du hast sie zerstört,} \\
\text{Die schöne Welt,} \\
\text{Mit mächtiger Faust;} \\
\text{Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!}
\]

The unique character of this negation (compared to Faust’s negation after the bitter experience with the ‘Erdgeist’) is that it negates both spiritual and sensual sources of satisfaction. The experience of the fall of all forms of known values is a prelude to the formation of a new conception of the world:

\[
\text{Wir tragen} \\
\text{Die Trümmer in’s Nichts hinüber,} \\
\text{Und klagen} \\
\text{Über die verlorne Schönle.} \\
\text{Mächtiger} \\
\text{Der Erdensöhne,} \\
\text{Prächtiger} \\
\text{Baue sie wieder}
\]

Mephisto encourages Faust to focus on future happiness, rather than his current pain. He characterizes Faust’s radical negation, which informs those curses, as Faust’s ‘playing around with his grief’ (pain). Mephisto must help Faust to overcome two obstacles: a painful, negative and excluding knowledge; and a form of self-glorification that is rooted in the ascending aspect of the negative approach to knowledge. These two obstacles contribute to Faust’s isolation. In order to bring Faust out of his solitude, therefore, Mephisto must defeat them. Mephisto interprets the words of the Spirits as a call for Faust to break out of his isolation: ‘In die Welt weit, | Aus der Einsamkeit’.

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268 V. 1598.
269 FK, p. 257.
270 V. 1608–1611.
271 V. 1613–1620.
272 V. 1635. Compare to: Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 177.
273 See v. 1573 and compare to v. 702–719 and p. 92 above.
274 V. 1631–1632.
Mephisto approaches Faust gradually.\textsuperscript{275} He offers to change Faust’s appearance, but without compromising Faust’s individuality.\textsuperscript{276} The pact is introduced to Faust as a promise that would end Faust’s entrapment in cycles of pain; nonetheless, Mephisto does not kindle high expectations:

\begin{center}
Ich bin keiner von den Großen; \\
Doch willst du, mit mir vereint, \\
Deine Schritte durch’s Leben nehmen, \\
So will ich mich gern bequemen \\
Dein zu sein, auf der Stelle.\textsuperscript{277}
\end{center}

Mephisto’s goal in proposing the pact is to force Faust to acknowledge that he does not seek death.

It is noteworthy that Faust associates the earth with joys (‘Aus dieser Erde quillen meine Freuden’) and the sun with his pains (‘Und diese Sonne scheinet meinen Leiden’).\textsuperscript{278} This reminds us of the scene \textit{Nacht}, where the moon was depicted as shining upon Faust’s sufferings. Faust immediately asks Mephisto to help him transcend and exclude both joy and pain: ‘Kann ich mich erst von ihnen scheiden’.\textsuperscript{279}

Mephisto does not assist Faust in this act of radical exclusion of pain and joy. Rather, he continues provoking Faust to remain between both emotions. In verse 1635 Mephisto stresses grief; and in verse 1673 he stresses joy: ‘Verbinde dich; du sollst, in diesen Tagen, | Mit Freuden meine Künste sehn’. If the pact was what Mephisto desired, then he already had secured Faust’s interest (see v. 1649 and, in the scene \textit{Studierzimmer [I]}, v. 1413–1415). Yet Mephisto’s choice of words show that he is instigating a change in Faust. Mephisto emphasizes joy so that Faust once again may proudly speak of his ascetic negative knowledge.\textsuperscript{280} Mephisto argues that knowledge of the corruptibility of these natural sources of joy should not make Faust ignore their quality of facilitating life.\textsuperscript{281} Again, Mephisto mentions the joy that springs from a fleeting moment of rest; he stresses ‘Ruhe’\textsuperscript{282}

\textsuperscript{275} Through the perspective of intentions, one can follow the realization of v. 314: ‘Ihn meine Straße sacht zu führen!’
\textsuperscript{276} See V. 1639–1640.
\textsuperscript{277} V. 1641–1645.
\textsuperscript{278} V. 1663–1664.
\textsuperscript{279} V. 1665.
\textsuperscript{280} V. 1675–1685.
\textsuperscript{281} ‘Mit solchen Schätzen kann ich dienen.’ V. 1689.
\textsuperscript{282} V. 1691.
after Faust speaks of ‘Streben’.\textsuperscript{283} In this setting, Faust forms a wager that is based on eternal discontent.

The reoccurrence of pain and grief is more important to the context of this study than the ritual that integrates the wager into the traditional pact.\textsuperscript{284} The first influences of the paradox that Mephisto brings to the drama find articulation when Faust looks into the depths of sensuality for the shining light of passion.\textsuperscript{285} In contrast to his transcendent wish for the timeless, represented by his wish to drink from the eternal light of the sun in the scene \textit{Osterspaziergang}, Faust seeks something radically different from what his old world understood as knowledge. The oxymora of ‘Schmerz und Genuß, | Gelingen und Verdrüß\textsuperscript{286}’ form a space where Faust can finally arrive at a point foreseen by the Lord in the \textit{Prolog}: ‘Nur rastlos betätigt sich der Mann.\textsuperscript{287}’ Yet this newly discovered, paradoxical approach has a point. The dominance of grief resonates in the following verse: ‘In deinen Rang gehör’ ich nur.\textsuperscript{288}

Responding to the hidden grief in the structure of Faust’s paradoxical unity of ‘Schmerz’ and ‘Genuß’, Mephisto says, ‘Bekomm euch wohl was euch ergetzt.’\textsuperscript{289} He instigates in Faust a deeper investigation into the causes of his isolation – namely, pain and self-glorification. Emphasizing his pain,\textsuperscript{290} Faust admits that he sees the way ahead as a heroic act of self-deification that shall end in his annihilation:

\begin{verbatim}
Du hörst ja, von Freud’ ist nicht die Rede.
Dem Taumel weih’ ich mich, dem schmerzlichsten Genuß,
Verliebtem Haß, erquickendem Verdrüß.
Mein Busen, der vom Wissensdrang geheilt ist,
Soll keinen Schmerzen künftig sich verschließen,
Und was der ganzen Menschheit zugeteilt ist,
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{283} V. 1676.  
\textsuperscript{284} The verses following 1741 are where Faust has the space to sign the covenant. They bring the scene in connection to the failure to summon the ‘Erdgeist’. This consists of the broken relation to Nature (v. 1747) as well as the self-criticism that ‘ich habe mich zu hoch gebläht’ (v. 1744). In this self-criticism, the inner relation between pain and self-glorification can be seen clearly.  
\textsuperscript{285} V. 1750.  
\textsuperscript{286} V. 1756–1757.  
\textsuperscript{287} V. 1759.  
\textsuperscript{288} V. 1745.  
\textsuperscript{289} V. 1763.  
\textsuperscript{290} Arens explains Faust’s reaction as follows: ‘F. weist den Gedanken zurück, es gehe ihm um Freude, und betont vielmehr das Element des Schmerzes in seinen zukünftigen Erfahrungen.’ In: Arens, \textit{Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I}, p. 190.
Will ich in meinem innern Selbst genießen,
Mit meinem Geist das Höchst' und Tiefste greifen,
Ihr Wohl' und Weh auf meinen Busen häufen,
Und so mein eigen Selbst zu ihrem Selbst erweitern,
Und, wie sie selbst, am End' auch ich zerscheitern.291

The last verse cited above, as Arens points out, is still a ‘pseudoheroische Geste’.292 In its titanic claim to god-likeness and glorification of pain,293 it is far from being able to activate the inclusive potentials of the oxymora. Muschg is right to call these words spoken by Faust the ‘Oxymora der Selbstquälerei’.294 Mephisto’s response shows that he is trying to help Faust overcome this obstacle. He rephrases Faust’s titanic ‘was der ganzen Menschheit zugeteilt ist’ as ‘Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht.’295 Mephisto keeps the state of oxymora, but he refutes the element of self-deification that seeks glorification in pain. Faust pays attention to these words of Mephisto. His response shows that Mephisto’s attempts to address the excluding hindrance of self-glorification were successful: ‘Was bin ich denn, wenn es nicht möglich ist | Der Menschheit Krone zu erringen’.296 Furthermore, Mephisto insists on making his point through verses 1776–1809: ‘Du bist am Ende – was du bist297 and ‘Du bleibst doch immer was du bist298 Mephisto says. He makes it clear that he wants to be heard and that he wants to exert an influence. Reflecting Mephisto’s influence, Faust once again sees himself submerged in the sea of ignorance: ‘Ich fühl’s, vergebens hab ich alle Schätze | Des Menschengeist’s auf mich herbeigerafft’.299 Once again, the richness of the old world is dwarfed by the limitless horizon. Mephisto’s analogy leaves no place for glory:

Ich sag’ es dir: ein Kerl, der spekuliert,
Ist wie ein Tier, auf dürrer Heide
Von einem bösen Geist im Kreis herum geführt,
Und rings umher liegt schöne grüne Weide.300

291 V. 1765–1775 (my emphasis).
293 Compare to FK, p. 264.
295 V. 1783.
296 V. 1803–1804.
297 V. 1806.
298 V. 1809.
299 V. 1810–1811.
300 V. 1830–1833.
Again, Mephisto stresses joy while Faust stresses pain. Mephisto examines Faust again in the following verses: ‘Wir müssen das gescheiter machen, | Eh’ uns des Lebens Freude flieht’\(^{301}\); and ‘Doch alles, was ich frisch genieße, | Ist das drum weniger mein?’\(^{302}\) Faust’s response this time shows no resistance toward joy. He simply asks: ‘Wie fangen wir das an?’\(^{303}\)

Thanks to Mephisto’s persistent mediation, the oxymora of pain and pleasure reach the polar balance that can connect Faust to life. In inclusion of the excluded corruptible and natural, Faust takes his first steps toward a colorful new life.

Once again, the house is at the center of Mephisto’s attention:

\[
\text{Wir gehen eben fort.} \\
\text{Was ist das für ein Marterort?} \\
\text{Was heißt das für ein Leben führen,} \\
\text{Sich und die Jungens ennuyieren?}^{304}
\]

Mephisto sees the first step as fleeing this house of torture. He also points out how this house stifles the freshness of youth. Through the eyes of the newly arrived student, we review Faust’s critique of his old world and its exclusion of nature:

\[
\text{Aufrichtig, möchte schon wieder fort:} \\
\text{In diesen Mauern, diesen Hallen,} \\
\text{Will es mir keineswegs gefallen.} \\
\text{Es ist ein gar \textit{beschränkter} Raum,} \\
\text{Man sieht \textit{nichts Grünes}, \textit{keinen Baum},} \\
\text{Und in den Sälen, auf den Bänken,} \\
\text{\textit{Vergeht mir Hören, Seh’n und Denken}.}^{305}
\]

A new character appears within these walls as Faust prepares to leave them. Like the process of settling into the house, the process of breaking out of it is also gradual, Mephisto claims.\(^{306}\) The new student asks to be admitted: ‘Doch sagt mir nur, wie kann ich hingelangen?’\(^{307}\) Faust, on the other hand, poses a different question: ‘Wohin soll es nun gehn?’\(^{308}\)

\(^{301}\) V. 1818–1819.  
\(^{302}\) V. 1822–1823.  
\(^{303}\) V. 1834.  
\(^{304}\) V. 1834–1837.  
\(^{305}\) V. 1881–1887 (my emphasis).  
\(^{306}\) V. 1888–1893. It is remarkable how similar this student is to Faust; both are about to leave their respective familiar worlds.  
\(^{307}\) V. 1895.  
\(^{308}\) V. 2051.
At this moment, Faust notices his long beard and worries that he lacks the qualities necessary to partake in life. Faust’s words remind the reader of Mephisto’s fashion advice: ‘und rate nun dir, kurz und gut, | Dergleichen gleichfalls anzulegen’. Now Mephisto addresses Faust as ‘Mein guter Freund’ instead of as ‘Mein guter Herr’.

The significance of the house is stressed one last time before Faust and Mephisto depart. ‘Wie kommen wir denn aus dem Haus?’ Faust asks Mephisto. In his comments, Arens notices the extraordinary quality of this question: ‘Wunderlich naive Frage, als hätte er schon vergessen, daß sein Reisegefährte nicht ein normaler Diener, sondern ein Teufel ist.’ Considering the long battle that Mephisto waged with these walls, we can appreciate Goethe’s defamiliarization of the moment of departure from a place previously characterized as ‘Kerker’, ‘verfluchtes dumpfes Mauerloch’ and ‘Marterort’. This naïve question reflects the strength of the walls of the house and the anxiety Faust feels in the face of a ‘Horizontenfahrung’. Within these walls, a world was put together and the natural world was excluded. It is hard to imagine that Faust could leave this world of walls simply by walking out the door.

II.2 The Turn Toward Life in the Divan of Ḥāfiż

In the previous chapter, I explored ḡazals in the Divan that point to the poet’s vast knowledge of Sufi teachings, which prescribe a negative, ascending and direct approach to the truth. This is the main characteristic of an approach within Sufism known as ‘taṣāvвуf-i zuḥdī’ – ascetic Sufism. It emphasizes abstinence and the process of abstraction in a strict ascetic ascending manner. This approach to knowledge of the truth was a seminal part of the intellectual and literary tradition that a poet of Ḥāfiż’s rank was expected to master. Poetic articulations that have an affinity to this method are integrated into the Divan. This affinity inspired the poet to write two ḡazals (334 and 478) with one central theme uniting all the

309 V. 1540–1541.
310 V. 2061.
311 V. 1816.
312 V. 2063.
313 Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 211.
314 For a summary of views of philosophers and Sufis on abstraction from the worldly and corporeal, see the entry on zuḥd (asceticism) and zuḥhād (ascetics) in the following: Sayyid Ğa’far Saḥḥādī, Farhang-e ma‘āref-e eslāmī, 4 vols. (Tehran: Šerkat-e Mo‘allefān va Motarḵemān-e Iran, 1362/1983).
couplets of these ġazals.\textsuperscript{315} The ġazals 334 and 478 promulgate the ascent to the transcendent truth and the separation of the bodily realm from the spiritual realm. Yet the presence of an excluding, negative approach to the bodily realm is not restricted to these two poems. In other verses, the poet alludes to, criticizes or discusses this method of approach to knowledge of truth.

To explain Ḥāfiẓ’s specific manner of critique of ascetic exclusion of the bodily in pursuit of truth, I first explore the articulations of an inclination toward the natural realm. To understand Ḥāfiẓ’s critiques in their historical context, we need a clear view of the form of representation of nature in the Persian literary tradition. As his many allusions in the Divan prove, Ḥāfiẓ studied and committed to memory a vast body of Persian literature, ranging from the ninth century to works of his own contemporaries.

\section*{II.2.1 Nature in Persian Poetry of the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries}

As we know it today, classical Persian poetry developed in dialogue with Arabic poetry and rhetoric around the ninth century CE.\textsuperscript{316} In works of one of the earliest Persian poets, Rūdakī (c. 880–941) – ‘generally regarded as the father of Persian poetry’,\textsuperscript{317} according to Edward Browne – nature represents nature itself and evokes the experience of nature in the reader.\textsuperscript{318} This does not mean that the poet avoids anthropomorphic analogies; though nature in its objective sense is the center of the poet’s attention, anthropomorphism intensifies the poet’s empathy in the experience of the natural. For instance, in a qaṣida in celebration of the arrival of spring (a frequent theme in the poetry of Rūdakī and other poets of the ninth to eleventh centuries), Rūdakī constantly invites his readers to observe natural phenomena and he employs analogies through

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In §I.3.1 (‘Escaping the Cage of the Body’), I elaborated on these two poems as two ġazals that strictly describe the Sufi ascetic tendency to ascend in the process of separation of the soul from its inclinations to the corporeal. In the above-mentioned section, I provided translations of these two ġazals – i.e. the ġazals 334 and 478.
\item It must be noted that evoking joy and happiness and illustrating festivities was expected of high-ranking court poets, such as Rūdaki, Farruḥi (d. 1038), Ṣanṣuri (d. 1040), and Manūčehrī (d. 1041).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
which he brings the natural realm in connection with the human realm. The following five couplets from this qaṣīda illustrate this technique:

Look at that cloud, how it cries like a grieving man,
Thunder moans like a lover with a broken heart.
Now and then the sun peeks from behind the clouds
Like a prisoner hiding from the guard.
The world, which had been in pain for some time,
Has found a cure in this Jasmine-scented wind.
A shower of musk streams down in waves,
On leaves, a cover of shiny new silk.
Snow covered crevices now bear roses.
Streams that have been dry now swell with water.\textsuperscript{319}

After Rūdaki, Manūčihri of Dāmḡān made important advances in the poetic representation of nature. In his introduction to Manūčihri’s Divan, Dabirsiyāqi explains that Manūčihri has a unique mastery of the poetic representation of nature; he even suggests that students of Persian poetry and language turn to Manūčihri’s poems to develop their knowledge of different names of various flowers, birds and other natural phenomena.\textsuperscript{320} Discussing one of Manūčihri’s famous qaṣāʾid that was inspired by spring, Zipoli draws our attention to extraordinary and innovative imagery in which dark spring clouds ‘rain down’ on a meadow covered with tulips, which are compared to the breast of a maid from Ḥabaša (Ethiopia) nursing an infant\textsuperscript{321}; a further analogy likens the bent growth of a Narcissus to the curved stature of a lovesick person.\textsuperscript{322} In another one of his qaṣāʾid, Manūčihri describes the flourishing influence of the sun on grapes. He insists on specifying the exact number of days, spanning from early spring to the end of summer, during which the ripe grapes are plucked (in Transoxiana) and made into wine. Furthermore, the poet uses the image of the grape to compare the natural realm with the religious and customary rituals of intimacy between lovers:

\textsuperscript{322} Divān-e Manūčihri-ye Dāmḡānī, p. 34.
To the farmer, the grape once said:
From afar, the sun made me pregnant.
More or less than a hundred and seventy-three days
I spent in the luminous sun’s bed.
Between us, no covenant, no ceremony was held.
Neither a rite of matrimony nor were we wed.
I was never hidden and before me
My late mothers were not covered or shelled.323

II.2.2 The Space of Exclusion in Sa’dī and Ḥāfiz

The ascetic Sufi method of exclusion influenced the poetic depiction of nature and its beauty. Compared to the works of Rūdakī and Manūčihri, the works of Sanā’ī display an early stage of this influence. The following is an example from his gazals:

[1] When I behold her image, all
My life becomes a festival;
[2] My dwelling through her beauty rare
Converteth to a garden fair.
[3] Musk-laden though the breeze be borne
And rich brocades the earth adorn,
[4] Though blossoms on the leafy trees
Shine starry as the Pleiades;
[5] Though mid the hills the tulip shy
Gleams like the houri’s sable eye:
[6] These lesser glories all depart
When love’s own empire rules the heart.
[7] To yearn, to win: love’s little pain
Is worth a harvest’s load of grain;
[8] And union’s fortune cannot blind
The heart that hath in absence pined.
[9] No more the crow’s discordant cry
Disturbs the garden’s harmony;
[10] On every twig the philomel
Chants anthems to the happy dell.
Mid roses nests the nightingale,
[12] Trilling for joy that for this while
We bask at last in Fortune’s smile.324

323 Ibid., p. 39 (my translation).
As a Sufi-poet, Sanāʾī begins his ġazal with a description of a source of joy that is beyond the sensible realm; his beloved is the divine Beloved. His object of pursuit replaces the natural beauty. This is evident from the fact that the Beloved’s beauty is regarded as the poet’s garden. In the third, fourth and fifth couplets, he introduces the beauty of nature, and finally in the sixth couplet he transcends mundane beauty as the empire of love rules over his heart. Through his repeated qualifications (‘though’), Sanāʾī conveys that natural beauty is insufficient. The last four couplets, then, introduce the evil component of the natural world – a component that justifies the negation of nature despite its sensible beauty. This evil element is represented by the raven. In other words, the natural world is a mixture of the nightingale and the raven. In the ascent and negation of the natural realm, sublime beauty can be enjoyed.

A clear view of Ḥāfīz’s poetic treatment of nature, Giovanni D’Erme correctly argues, requires considering the treatment of nature in Sa’dī’s (d. 1292 CE) ġazals.325 The undisputed master of ġazal before Ḥāfīz, Sa’dī was a learned poet with profound knowledge of Sufism, theology and jurisprudence. Sa’dī’s ġazals mark an important development in the poetic representation of nature and are indispensible to understanding the literary tradition in which Ḥāfīz perfected his poetic skills and formed his intellectual views.

The following ġazal by Sa’dī evokes the image of spring, but also draws the reader’s attention to a ‘true delight’ that lies beyond nature:

> Roses are blossoming  
> And joyous birds do sing  
> In such a season gay,  
> A desert-faring day.

> Autumn the scatterer  
> Setteth the leaves astir;  
> The painter morning air  
> Decketh the garden fair.

> Yet no desire have I  
> In grassy meads to lie:  
> Where’er thou art in sight,  
> There dwelleth true delight.326

---

D’Erme writes that ‘his [Sa’di’s] visible world is of a complete negative kind and appears as a minimal token of the truthfulness of the transcendent world.’ In this section, I narrow the scope of the comparison between Sa’di’s and Ḥāfiz’s poetry to their respective poetic descriptions of spring.

In the following ḡazal, Sa’di makes it known that the poem was written in spring, a time of year during which everyone flocks to gardens around the city of Shiraz. Yet Sa’di is not overwhelmed by this natural phenomenon. He begins his poem with a description of a deep desire for union with a beloved; this desire consumes every moment of the poet’s life:

1. While you are heedless of the state of your desirers [friends], O beloved one, 
   Not a moment’s rest could possibly find us as occupied with you as we are
2. If you saw the beauty of your face in a mirror 
   You would have known what came upon the impatient one (the lover)
3. It is springtime, but let us (you and me together) 
   Leave to others the meadows and gardens
4. Instead of the tall cypress standing by the river 
   Why don’t you look upon beloved’s figure tall as a cypress as it is?
5. A figure in description of its fine composition, 
   The eloquent tongue falls short and remains speechless.

In the verses above, we recognize the process in which the beauty of the beloved and natural beauty are separated from each other. The beauty that moves Sa’di is of an extramundane kind; in the third and the fourth couplets, the poet explicitly advises the reader to leave behind the beauty of spring (represented by the natural cypress) and instead explore the sublime, ineffable beauty of his beloved, whose perfection transcends the beauty of tall cypresses.

Sa’di begins his poem without making any mention of spring. This differsiates his work from the works of poets of the tenth and the eleventh centuries, such as Rūdaki, who would frequently announce the arrival of spring in the poem’s first couplet. In the case of Sa’di’s poem, we find a world and a safe space that contains the ideal beauties; remarkably, however, this world is

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328 Sa’di, Kollīyat-e S’ādi, p. 5. Ḡazal 4. My translation of the couplets 1–5. Here, I must admit that the poetic beauty of Sa’di’s work is not rendered in my translations. These verses are translated solely to convey the intellectual content of the ḡazal and to clarify the literary and intellectual context within which Ḥāfiz wrote his works.
329 As an example of announcing the arrival of spring in the first verse, we can turn to the poem that I quoted earlier: ‘A Lush spring has arrived, colorful and effervescent, | With thousands of delight and decorations.’ As translated by Tabatabai in the following source: Tabatabai, Father of Persian Verse: Rudaki and his Poetry, p. 100.
articulated only in negation of the meadows and gardens – it does not have a ‘positive presence’, as the poet tells us in the second verse of the third couplet and the first verse of the fourth couplet. Another remarkable feature of this poem is that the poet uses simile to trace the negative process of ascending from the natural to the ideal. In the fourth and fifth couplets, the cypress tree is present on two levels – natural and metaphorical. The simile gives the natural phenomenon a last chance to be compared before it is left behind in the process of abstraction that brings the reader to the ideal, transcendent beauty.

In the following verses of Sa’di, we find a further articulation of the natural and the ideal worlds:

1. Facing our beloved, carefree of orchards we are.  
Whether it is spring, arriving, or the cold autumn’s breeze, blowing, carefree we are.  
2. If we attain the cypress-statured [beloved] that we desire,  
Then let there never more be a cypress in the world, carefree we are.  
3. If others go to meadows to find joy,  
With you, O solace of souls, in our solitude carefree we are.330

In the second couplet of this ġazal, a process of ascent abstracts the ideal form of the quality of tallness from the natural phenomenon that is the cypress tree. Having attained this intellectual vision, the poet claims to be carefree from the natural revolution of seasons. The intelligible content is not regarded as immanent and active in the natural phenomena; therefore, experiencing it is not of any value. After one has arrived at its intelligible content in the process of negation, the natural realm must be left behind. In the third couplet, the world that is founded on negation is given the name solitude (‘halvat’). This name describes the space that facilitates intellectual independence and ascent from the corruptible natural world. Implicitly, the poet reminds the reader that the cypress tree is corruptible and that the joys of meadow are fleeting. Witnessing the beauty of spring and its corruptibility, the wise poet abandons it to find its ideal everlasting form. He collects these ideal forms in his solitude, which provides safety and freedom from mundane concerns. At the end of each couplet, the poet boasts about being carefree, thereby expressing his negated care for the cypress trees, which perish and cause the poet grief. In contrast to the realm of ever-changing nature, solitude offers elevation from and sublimation of the mundane.

In the first verse of the second couplet, ‘cypress-statured’ now appears as a metaphor replacing the natural and the ideal. The natural disappears in the metaphor to mark the arrival at the transcendent and extramundane that is the space of exclusion in solitude. Since intelligible content has no active immanence in the

natural realm, we cannot expect to trace a corresponding relation between the
human faculty of appreciation of intelligible content (sublime beauty) and nature
itself. Stress is placed on the space of solitude formed in negation of the corrupt-
ible. In another poem, Saʿdi further describes this space of solitude (halvat) as well
as the method of finding it:

1. We shut the door to our solitude [halvat] before the masses;
   We turned back from all and with you we sat.
2. We detached ourselves from everything that was not an attachment to the Friend;
   We broke whatever promises that were not made to the Friend.  

In this solitude that excludes corruptible nature, Saʿdi celebrates his freedom
from the mundane spring and its flowers. He claims to perceive (in the vision
of his intellect) the sublime and the ideal form of fleeting natural beauty. This be-
comes clear in the following couplet: ‘If spring came no more, and if tulips and
roses ceased to grow, | Let it be! You unveil yourself, my rose, my tulip O! you
spring of mine.’

The term halvat (‘solitude’), belongs to a long tradition of ascetic Sufi
 teachings and their poetic articulations in the works of the Sufi-poets. This term
also appears in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. In the first couplet of the following ġazal of Ḥāfiẓ
we read:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ḫalvat guzida rā ba tamāšā ċi ḥāḡat ast?} \\
\text{Čun kū-yi ċust hast ba šahrā ċi ḥāḡat ast?} \\
\text{Wer die Abgeschiedenheit gewählt hat, wie sollte der noch eines Umblicks (in der Welt) } \\
\text{bedürfen?} \\
\text{Wenn die Gasse des Freundes da ist, welcher Bedarf bestünde dann noch nach dem Gang } \\
\text{ins Freie?} \\
\text{Who chose to dwell} \\
\text{In cloister cell,} \\
\text{To go abroad} \\
\text{What need?} \\
\text{Who chanced to gain} \\
\text{The Darling’s lane,} \\
\text{Of desert road} \\
\text{What need?}
\end{align*}
\]

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331 Ibid., p. 414. Ġazal 434 (my translation).
332 Ibid., p. 450. Ġazal 472, 4 (my translation).
333 Wohlleben, 34, 1, p. 91.
See also: Clarke, 51, 1, p. 129.
This couplet confirms that Ḥāfiẓ generally agreed with Sufi negative views regarding the independence of the one who has found the way into solitude and escaped natural beauty and its sensible appreciation. The rhetorical question denotes this point of agreement, since it appeals to commonsense discourse and denies a need for proof. The following couplet, in which solitude ‘expands itself’ into the house, shows another instance of this rhetoric:

What need of cypress and pine has my garden? || Less than whom is my home-grown boxtree?335
Wieso braucht mein Garten eine Zypresse und eine Pinie?
Mein im Hause aufgezogener Buchsbaum – wem kommt der nicht gleich?336

Through this rhetorical question, Ḥāfiẓ gives articulation to the poetic tradition of his time that denied the significance of sensory appreciation of the natural realm; the first verse of the couplet explicitly conveys the pointlessness of sensory vision, after the negative ascending process has led the seeker to ḥalvat (‘cloister cell’, as Arberry translates it). Unlike Sa’di, who follows Sanā’ī in constantly providing a poetic experience of the dialectic process of abstraction, Ḥāfiẓ does not invite or teach, but rather illustrates the space of solitude from within. The second verse of the couplet marks a shift in tone; the poet ironically suggests that his home-grown box-tree will not come up short in the face of any cypress or pine tree.

One of the clearest examples of Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic illustration of the world inside the space that is built around abstraction and exclusion of the natural elements is the following ḡazal. I quote couplets 4–6 and 9:

[4] In my abode I have a cypress in whose stature’s shade
I enjoy freedom from the cypress of any garden and the box-tree of any meadow.
[5] Although I might have a hundred armies of beauties laying
Ambushes for my heart, Praise and Thanks to God, I have an army-routing idol!
[6] It is fitting that through his ruby signet ring I boast myself a Solomon:
Where the Great Name is, what have I to fear from Ahriman?
[...]
[9] When I am proudly strutting in the rose bed of his acceptance,
Praise be to God,
I have no partiality for tulips and wild roses, nor the petals of the narcissus.337

335 Avery, XL, 1, p. 72 (my emphasis).
336 Wohlleben, 40, 1, p. 97 (my emphasis).
337 Avery, CCCXXII, p. 399.
In the above verses, once again, solitude is represented as a house. The resident of this house is kept safe from whatever the outside world has to offer. Ḥāfiẓ’s moderate style avoids Sa’dī’s bold claims – namely, that nature is irrelevant, as long as he is in his safe space of abstraction. Ḥāfiẓ only makes the humble claim that he has no desire for flowers of the natural world – a claim that other verses of the poem weaken. Nevertheless, as the sixth couplet shows, Ḥāfiẓ compares himself to King Solomon, who possessed a ring that dispelled all evil and granted him safety. Furthermore, Ḥāfiẓ identifies the unsafe and excluded realm with that of Ahriman, the supreme malevolent spirit in Zoroastrianism. Although he can do without natural beauty, Ḥāfiẓ conveys that he is moved by the force that tradition ascribes to the realm of Ahriman; ‘a hundred armies of beauties’, Ḥāfiẓ writes, attack his senses.

This approach to the natural world coheres with the direct approach that we examined in the previous chapter – namely, an approach of negation of whatever is changeable and of mixed. As Sa’dī explains in the verses above, the doors of solitude are closed to all that is recognized as the other. This negative space is filled with the unchangeable and everlasting forms that, in the sublunary realm, are present only in mixture with the corruptible substances. The house of solitude analogy is indebted to Sufism as well as the Neoplatonic doctrine of a process of ascent through negation. The greatest achievement of this world of exclusion is its constant differentiation: differentiation between the mundane and the extramundane as well as between the corruptible and everlasting. This differentiation allows for exclusion and abstraction.

The examples discussed in this section portray the natural realm as worthy of negation and exclusion. The inevitability of autumn and winter causes spring to lose its appeal, and the garden reveals its impurity because of the presence of the raven. In a remarkable ġazal in the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ denies that being fleeting and mixed provides an argument for negative ascent:

O Ḥāfiẓ, über den Herbstwind auf der Wiese dieser Welt grämme dich nicht.
Denke bitte vernünftig: Die Rose ohne Dorn, wo wäre die?

Ḥāfiẓ! grieve not of the (cruel) autumn wind (which bloweth) in the sward of the world:
Exercise reasonable thought. The rose (time) without the thorn (the autumn wind) is where?

339 Wohlleben, 27, 8, p. 84.
340 Clarke, 62, 10, p. 154.
In these verses, the autumn wind is accepted as part of the totality of the world, despite that it is the evil corrupter of sensible beauty. The poet appeals to a form of reason, but refuses to negate nature on account of its corruptibility. In order to understand how the poet attains to this inclusive form of reason, which praises the beauty of fleeting objects despite the pain they cause, we need to trace his critique of the Sufi argument for exclusion of the corruptible. In the following sub-section, I explore elements of negation and exclusion developed in the Sufi tradition and I introduce the terms of exclusion that formed a space in which abstraction was practiced.

II.2.3 Elements of Exclusion in the Sufi Tradition

As I explained earlier, the Sufis adopted, in a modified form, the Platonic and Neoplatonic notion of a process of ascent in pursuit of knowledge. In the development of Sufism, the theoretical and metaphysical aspects of this ascent gained importance. This is evident from philosophical and metaphysical treatises written by Sufis and Sufi-philosophers in Persian. One of the first of these treatises was Aḥmad Ġazzālī’s (d. 1126) treatise on love, titled Sawāniḥ ul-ʿuššāq (‘Inspirations’ or ‘Meditations’).341 In the course of their development, Sufi issues and terms became integrated into the intellectual and metaphysical sphere of Islamic culture (and, specifically for the purposes of this study, Persianate culture). Even non-Sufi philosophers and theologians partook in dialogue with Sufis and produced treatises on Sufi matters. Našīr ud-Dīn Ṭūsī’s Uwsāf ul-aṣrāf of the thirteenth century is an example of a philosopher’s work on Sufism.343

Sufi texts were most frequently written in verse. Even in the case of metaphysical texts such as the Sawāniḥ of Aḥmad Ġazzālī and Faḥr ud-Dīn-i ‘Irāqi’s Lamaʿāt (The Flashes) the prose is interspersed with verse. Gulshan-i ráz (The Rose Garden of Secrets) is a didactic work in verse that explains basic Sufi philosophy and imagery. Written by Sufi-philosopher Šayḥ Maḥmūd-i Ṣabistārī, it was the first such didactic work of its kind. Between the twelfth and fourteenth

342 Pourjavady, ‘Genres of Religious Literature’, pp. 298–299. See the author’s elaboration on the theoretical and metaphysical significance of this work, which historically stands between Ibn Sinā’s Treatise on Love and Suhrawardi’s Mūnis ul-ʿuššāq (The Intimate Companion of Lovers) and shows a major development and modification of the Platonic view of love.
343 Pourjavady points out that non-Sufi thinkers addressed Sufi issues as far back as the eleventh century. See: ibid., p. 283.
centuries, Sufi-poets reinterpreted the metaphors and imagery of the non-Sufi poetic tradition that was already fully developed in the tenth century. Sufi-poets played the most significant role in the further development of the literary tradition that Ḥāfīz inherited.  

In the Divan, Ḥāfīz employs metaphors for the quest for knowledge and the relation between body and soul that evoke Sufi poetry. Furthermore, considering Ḥāfīz’s knowledge of the evolution of poetic metaphors from Rūdakī to Sa’dī, we can read the Divan as a literary dialogue with poetic metaphors and Sufi terms.

To introduce these terms, I turn to the first Persian Sufi manual – Kašf ul-mahgūb, written by Huḡvīrī in the eleventh century. I also refer to Suhrawardī’s ‘Awārif al-maʿārif, a source introduced earlier in the first chapter. The established world-views offered here provide us background on the culturally dominant discourses and terms of Sufism in Ḥāfīz’s time.

II.2.3.1 Purification (ṭahārat) and Repentance (tauba)

In the Kašf ul-mahgūb, one of the first terms concerning the ascending process is ṭahārat – ‘purification’. In Islamic orthodoxy, this term pertains to a ritual practiced before each prayer. Huḡvīrī goes beyond the orthodox views of this term and gives it a deeper meaning in the context of Sufism. The process of developing Sufi ethics out of morality and religious practices can be witnessed in Sufi terminology that contributes to attainment of a negative and abstract knowledge of the truth or gnosis. Here is Nicholson’s translation:

After faith, the first thing incumbent on everyone is purification (ṭahārat) and the performance of prayer, i.e. to cleanse the body from filth and pollution, and to wash the three members, and to wipe the head with water as the law prescribes, or to use sand in the absence of water or in severe illness. Purification is of two kinds: outward and inward. Thus prayer requires purification of the body, and gnosis [maʿrifat] requires purification of the heart.  

344 In Bāde-ye ‘eṣq (The Wine of Love), Pourjavady asserts that the origin of poetic elements of analogy referring to wine, love and listening to music that Sufis used is to be found in the works of non-Sufi and secular poets and in between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries they gradually developed their Sufi symbolism from secular metaphors like those of early poets of the tenth and eleventh centuries: Nasrollah Pourjavady, ‘Bāde-ye ‘eṣq (2): Peydāyeš-e ma’nā-ye maḡāzi-ye bāde dar še’r-e Fārsī’, Našr-e Dāneš, no. 67 (1370/1991), p. 6.

345 Composed after Mustamlī of Buḥārā’s (d. 1042 CE) translation and commentary on Ta’arruf, written in Arabic by sheikh Kalābādy (d. 995). Compare to ———, ‘Genres of Religious Literature’, p. 277.

Regarding inward purification, the author prescribes the following: ‘The method of spiritual purification is to reflect and meditate on the evil of this world and to perceive that it is false and fleeting, and to make the heart empty of it.’

Hence, the inward purification is an intellectual negative process of emptying the heart (where the faculty of knowledge resides) from the corruptible, and therefore evil, natural world. After integrating purification (ṭahārat) into Sufism by introducing two hierarchic stages, Huḡvīrī introduces another term that is also of a negative nature concerning the process of acquisition of knowledge.

The term repentance (tauba) originally belongs to the religious non-Sufi context. In almost all lexicons, it is defined as ‘returning-to-God’; in other words, the term is introduced as a solely religious term. Huḡvīrī, however, provides his readers with an etymological account: ‘[e]tymologically tawbat means “return”, and tawbat really involves the turning back from what God has forbidden through fear of what He has commanded.’

Unlike previously, where Huḡvīrī introduced ‘purification’ from an orthodox religious viewpoint, in the case of ‘repentance’, the author provides an etymological account of the term and then connects it to ‘returning from the forbidden’ and being guided by the commands of God (amr).

In three levels, Huḡvīrī introduces his ascending, negative Sufi process of returning: ‘Repentance is of three kinds: (I) From what is wrong to what is right, (2) from what is right to what is more right, (3) from selfhood to God.’

The first belongs to the ‘ordinary men’; the second to ‘the elect’ (the seekers of the Sufi knowledge); and the third to those in pursuit of ‘Divine love (maḥabbat).’

At its highest level, this process of return arrives at the negation of the self. According to Kašf ul-maḥḡūb, the negative pursuit of ‘Divine love’ entails not only repenting of ‘the imperfection of a station below the station to which they [the seekers of Divine love] have attained, but also of being conscious of any “station” or “state” whatsoever.’

It is worth providing a brief explanation regarding the usage of love as it appears in ‘Divine love’ in Kašf ul-maḥḡūb, since love is a component of Neoplatonic and Sufi views and is one of the most frequently used words in the Divan of Ḥāfiz. Nicholson uses the word ‘love’ to translate ḥubb, a word that appears in Qurʾān. (See v. 54 of the Surah Māʾida – it is one of the most frequently cited verses from

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347 Ibid., p. 292 (my emphasis).
348 After providing his etymological suggestion, Huḡvīrī constantly uses ‘returning’ in place of ‘repentance’ in his section on tauba.
350 Huḡvīrī, Kašf ul-maḥḡūb, p. 379.
352 Ibid.
the Qurʾān in Persian Sufi literature.) The term ḥubb corresponds to Huḡvīrī’s views, which emphasize ascetic purification and remain as close as possible to the teachings of Ṣarī’ā. Yet the term meaning ‘love’ that is most frequently used in Ḥāfīz’s Divan is ḵiṣq.

From the tenth century onwards, the term ḵiṣq appears in philosophical, and Sufi texts. The term ḵiṣq appears in philosophical works such as Ibn Sinā’s Treatise on Love, Suhrawardī’s Fi ḥaqīqat al-‘iṣq or Munis ul-ʿuṣṣāq, and in the works of the Sufi thinkers such as Aḥmad Ǧazzālī’s Sawānīḥ ul-ʿuṣṣāq, and ʿAyn ul-Quḍḍāt of Hamadan’s Tamhidāt and the body of the Sufi literature that follows this line. Sufi thinkers cited a fragment of the above-mentioned verse that concerns the term ḥubb. But they then shifted from ḥubb to ḵiṣq as their ontological speculations regarding love developed. In Murūḏ ad-dahab (Meadows of Gold), al-Masʿūdī’s uses the word Ṹiṣq (and not ḥubb) to recount the intellectual exchange in Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥālīd al-Barmakī’s house on the subject of love. Accordingly, he names this section of his book ‘Aqwāl fī al-‘iṣq – Utterances on Love. There is no doubt, therefore, that the term ḵiṣq was common in intellectual circles a century before Kašf ul-maḥġūb; Nevertheless, Huḡvīrī opts to use ḥubb in his work in order to mark his affinity with the earlier school of ḥubb in Sufism.

Let us now return to the Sufi terms concerning abstraction and purification. Similar to the terms ‘purification’ and ‘repentance’, the process of negative return to the pure oneness in Sufism departs from an orthodox view that can be pursued within an ordinary social way of life. Yet Huḡvīrī insists that the basic requirements of religious law must be upheld as an elementary component. Those who wish to appreciate the knowledge of the truth must ascend until they arrive at the highest level of abstraction and are devoid of themselves and unified with the One. Huḡvīrī places distance between social life and natural beauty, on the one hand, and the ascending negative pursuit of union with the One, on the other hand. The isolation that awaits the followers of this path is evident from the author’s accounts of cases of severe obsession with outward purification: Kašf ul-maḥġūb contains multiple accounts of pioneers of early Sufism who performed sixty purifications before each prayer. For instance, Ibrāhīm Ḥawwāṣ (d. 904 CE and a contemporary of al-Ǧunayd) washed his whole body sixty

354 See more on this subject on p. 34f above.
times in one day and ‘died in the water.’**357** Huḡvrī emphasizes true knowledge in contrast to superficial obsession with outward cleansing of the body; nonetheless, his glorification of these masters of asceticism outweighs his emphasis on knowledge. For instance, Huḡvrī describes the Sufi Abû ʿAlî Rûdbârî spending all day – from dawn to sunset – in the sea to cure himself from obsession over cleansing. Finally, the sea itself answers his cry: ‘I cried out: “O God, restore me to health!” A voice answered from the sea: “Health consists in knowledge.”**358**

Even in the ordinary act of joining the community in a mosque for prayer, the great Šiblî has to face the following dialogue:

One day Shibli purified himself. When he came to the door of the mosque a voice whispered in his heart: ‘Art thou so pure that thou enterest My house with this boldness?’ He returned back, but the vice asked: ‘Dost thou turn back from My door? Whither wilt thou go?’ He uttered a loud cry. The voice said: ‘Dost thou revile me?’ He stood silent. The voice said: ‘Dost thou pretend to endure My affliction?’ Shibli exclaimed: ‘O God, I implore Thee to help me against Thyself.’**359**

These isolating acts of ascetic self-purification placed early Sufis at a distance from fellow Muslims. These cases may have been extreme, but they were held up as models for younger, aspiring Sufis. In the following section, I trace the concrete elements of abstraction and negation of the mundane in Sufism.

**II.2.3.2 The Sufi Frock (ḥīrqa, muraqqaʿ, dalq)**

In the twelfth section of his ‘Awārif al-maʿārif, Abû Ḥafṣ Suhravardi addresses the Sufi frock; he discusses the way in which a neophyte would receive his garment from his mentor in a ritual of initiation. Emphasizing the role of the mentor (pîr),**360** Suhravardi asserts that the Sufi garment was a sign of the pupil’s bond with his mentor and dedication to his mentor’s teachings: ‘Das Tragen des Flickenrockes ist also ein Zeichen der Machtübertragung (tafwydy) und der Selbstauslieferung (taslym).’**361** Suhravardi elaborates on the relation between the Sufi garment and the mentor. According to Suhravardi, the mentor personifies the mediator in the process of ascent to the transcendent truth. The mentor

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**358** Ibid.  
**359** Ibid., p. 294.  
**360** The term pîr (Mentor) together with the originally Arabic term šayḥ can be found in Persian sources including Ḥâfîz’s *Divan*.  
is expected to supervise the pupil each step of the way. In other words, the Sufi garment is a sign of belonging to an institution of learning.

In contrast to Suhravardi’s symbolic explanation of the Sufi frock, earlier works of Sufism explain the frock in a more objective way. In works of the tenth and the eleventh centuries explaining customs of Sufi dress, the issue of the mentor is of secondary importance compared to objective remarks concerning wearing a specific outfit.

In his Kitāb al-Lumaʿ (The Book of the Gleam on Sufism), Sarrāǧ (d. 988) expounds on the meaning of the word ‘Sufi’. In the context of these explanations, he gives his view on the meaning and significance of the Sufi garment. He asks: why is it generally the case that experts receive their titles from their respective fields – e.g., lawyers receive their title from their expertise in the field of law – while Sufis do not? Sarrāǧ explains that non-Sufi experts are only experts in one field, whereas Sufis draw on many sources and are experts in many areas; therefore, Sarrāǧ notes: ‘[ich habe] sie nach der äußeren Kleidung benannt. Denn Wolle (ṣūf) zu tragen ist die Gepflogenheit der Propheten und das Emblem der Freunde und Getreuen Gottes.’

It is remarkable that Sarrāǧ and Huǧvīrī used the same word to demonstrate the significance of the Sufi dress. Gramlich (translating Kitāb al-Lumaʿ) renders this word as ‘emblem’ and Nicholson (translating Kašf ul-mahgūb) renders it as ‘badge’: ‘[k]now that the wearing of a muraqqaʿa (patched frock) is the badge of aspirants to Śūfism.’ The word in question is šiʿār – it articulates the significance of the Sufi garment. This word bears the meaning of ‘mark’, ‘sign’, ‘totem’, ‘emblem’ and ‘badge’, and it is homonymous to another word that means clothes, thereby acquiring that association for itself. The two teachers of Sufism mentioned above assert that this dress is a sign of submission to an elite group who are on the Sufi path and dedicated to purification by way of abstraction (tağrid).

An anecdote recounted in the Kašf ul-mahgūb illustrates the relation between wearing this woolen garment and detachment from ordinary social life. According to the story, the Imam Abū Ḥanifa wore the woolen garment ‘and was on the point of retiring from the world’ until a dream changed his life: ‘he

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364 The homonym word šiʿār means a piece of cloth or underclothing in a general sense.

365 Al-Hujwīrī, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 45. See also on the relation between tağrid and abstraction on pp. 79f above.
saw in a dream the Apostle, who said: “It behoves thee to live amidst the people, because thou art the means whereby my Sunna will be revived.”

According to this dream, the Imam abandoned the woolen garment along with the path it represents – a path that would have detached him from ordinary Muslims. (Nonetheless, the Imam distanced himself from the mundane insofar as doing so was not detrimental to his connection to society.)

As we have seen, early texts introduce the Sufi woolen dress as the mark of sainthood – it is the garment of prophets and the elite. This dress is an emblem that both clothes the wayfarer and labels him throughout his life. Huğviri's anecdote also shows the difference between the Islamic orthodoxy, strongly tied to the community, and the Sufi's path of abstraction in pursuit of knowledge.

In order to analyze the ġazals in this section, we need to introduce three words that refer to the Sufi garment: ĥirqa, muraqqa', and dalq. Each of these three words conveys an aspect of the design of the garment. In Gramlich's translation of 'Awârif al-maʿārif ('Flickenrock') and Nicholson's translation of Kaşf ul-maḥğûb ('patched frock'), we saw that the Sufi dress is mostly made of patchwork cloth. This characteristic is conveyed in all three of the above terms.

Of the three words above referring to the Sufi garment, the word ĥirqa appears most frequently in the Divan of Ḥâfîz. Modern Persian also commonly uses this word to refer to the Sufi garment. In its literal sense, ĥirqa means 'tattered' and 'torn'; it thus conveys that the Sufi dress is a tattered patched frock. The other word for the woolen Sufi frock is muraqqa' ('patchwork frock'), which signifies the pieces of torn fabric from which the Sufi outfit is sewn together. Other forms of this word such as muraqqa'a and (even more so) ruq'a literally mean a piece of something or a patch with which one mends one's torn clothes: unlike ordinary members of society, the Sufis go to great lengths to avoid obtaining anything new. The Sufis' choice of clothing shows that their way of life is detached from customs.

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366 Ibid., p. 46.
367 Huğviri, Kaşf ul-maḥğûb, p. 50. Huğviri claims that he found this account in Târîh ul-maşyîh of Muḥammad ibn 'Ali at-Tirmîzi.
368 In Sufi literature, one of the most frequently used expressions for the death of a Sufi master is ĥirqa tuhî kardan or 'evacuating (abandoning) the woolen garment.' (See this figure of speech’s entry in Dehţodâ’s Loğatnâme)
369 For a complete list and lexicographical information on other variations used in Ḥâfîz’s Divan to denote the Sufi garment see the following: Aḥmad ‘Ali Rağâ'i Buţârâ'i, Farhang-e ašăr-e Ḥâfîz, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Elmi, 1364/1986), pp. 199–235.
370 According to Şeddîqîyan, this word is used 57 times in the Divan. Dalq is used 19 times and muraqqa' 3 times: Şeddîqîyan and Mir’âbedini, Farhang-e vâţenâme-ye Ḥâfîz, p. 406; 530; 1068.
372 Mu’in, Farhang-e Mu’in, pp. 4036–4037; p. 1667.
of the masses. Huḡvīrī describes a Sufi who belonged to the Malāmatiya sect of Sufism and exemplified the extreme ascetic detachment from the natural that his muraqqā’ā represents:

He neither ate nor wore anything in which human beings had a hand. His food consisted of things thrown away by men, such as putrid vegetables, sour gourds, rotten carrots, and the like. His clothes where made of rags which he had picked up from the road and washed: of these he had made a muraqqā’ā.373

The second most frequently used word for the Sufi garment in the Divan is dalq. In his lexicographic work, Buḫārāʾy asserts that the etymology of this word is uncertain, yet he likewise explains the word in relation to the garment’s design as a patchwork dress. Buḫārāʾy points out that a dalq can be made of a combination of pieces of leather, fur and textiles, sometimes in various colors. Other lexicons provide no further information.374

In this section, we saw that a ḥirqa surrounds the body of the Sufi seeker of the truth and marks his commitment to a mentor. The last Sufi term that is relevant to this study and is present in the Divan is the term for ‘convent’ or ‘cloister’.

II.2.3.3 The Convent (ḥānaqāh and ribāṭ)

Hāfiẓ uses several terms to refer to the dwelling place in which Sufis spent their lives in meditation, purification and prayer. Among those terms are ḥānaqāh, ṣaumaʾa, dayr and ribāṭ. The place of meditation and worship of Baṣṭām (a prominent Persian Sufi of the ninth century) was called a ṣaumaʾa. This is the most frequently used term in the Divan to refer to the Sufi dwelling place.375 Compared to the three other terms above, ṣaumaʾa denotes a smaller dwelling place. It translates literally as ‘hermitage’ – a place ‘where a Sufi lived in seclusion, separate from other people.’376

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373 Al-Hujwirī, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 50. Malāmatiya belong to a movement in Sufism whose followers hide their prayers and good deeds as well as their knowledge to keep their deeds pure of hypocrisy – i.e., they act piously for God alone and not to earn respect from others. Further in this study, I point out the differences between the followers of this view and Hāfiẓ’s views in the Divan against hypocrisy. A comprehensive review of the differences between Malāmati views and those of Hāfiẓ’s is beyond the space of this study, but scholars have already explored this subject in various works. See for instance: Mortaţavī, Maktab-e Hāfiẓ: Moqaddame bar hāfiẓenāsī, pp. 131–148. Also: Voğdānī Faride, ‘Naqdī bar entesāb-e Hāfiẓ be ṭariqe ye Malāmati’, Zabān va adabiyāt-e Fārsi, no. 64 (Spring 1388/2009).

374 Raḡāʾi Buḥārāʾi, Farhang-e ašʿār-e Hāfiẓ, pp. 231–232.

375 Şeddīqīyān and Mirʾābedinī, Farhang-e vâzenāme ye Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 778–779.

The word ḥānaqāh is the Arabicized form of the Persian word ḥānagāh. It is composed of ḥān and gāh<sup>377</sup>: ḥān (from which ḥān derives) means ‘house’ or ‘place of residence’ and gāh is a locative suffix.<sup>378</sup> Due to the function of these facilities – i.e., they provide shelter and food for travelling Sufis –, some scholars have argued that the word ḥān, meaning ‘inn’, is the etymological origin of the Persian term; however, as Böwering and ‘Adli assert, the origin for the term is the Persian noun ḥāna (‘house’).<sup>379</sup>

After ṣaumāʾ, ḥānaqāh is the most frequently used term in the Divan for the Sufi convent.<sup>380</sup> Yet this term is not reserved for Sufi convents in particular, and neither was it the first term to signify the Sufi convent. The earliest known mention of this term was in the tenth century. During this time, the term was used for the dwelling place of Manicheans in Samarqand, as evidence from the anonymously authored Ḥudūd al-ʿālam (372 H/982–983 CE) suggests. In this book, the word appears in its Persian (rather than Arabicized) form – ‘ḥānaqāh’.<sup>381</sup> In the ninth century, moreover, ḥānaqāh was not only used to refer to the Manicheans’ place of residence. Throughout Khorasan and Transoxiana during this time, many ḥānaqāhs existed in which the followers of Abū ʿAbdullāh Muḥammad b. Karrām (d. 869 CE) devoted themselves to extreme ascetic practices.<sup>382</sup>

In his work on the life of Abū Saʿīd Abū ʿl-Ḥayr (d. 1049 CE), Meier points out that in the tenth and the eleventh centuries, as Sufism was just beginning to develop, even scholars of Islamic orthodoxy, who were strongly against Sufis, named their places of teaching ḥānaqāh.<sup>383</sup> From the eleventh century onward, the madrasa flourished in the Islamic world. The madrasa was dedicated to scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and orthodoxy (faqīh/imam) and provided facilities for education and housing.<sup>384</sup> As the madrasa and ḥānaqāh became institutionalized, a traveling faqīh or Imam would seek accommodations in a

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<sup>378</sup> Ibid.


<sup>382</sup> Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Kānaqāh’, p. 460.


madrasa whereas a Sufi šayḫ would prefer a ḥānaqāh.\footnote{In the \textit{Divan} of Ḥāfīz there is an instance in which the terms \textit{madrasa} and ḥānaqāh are juxtaposed: 417, 9. Wohlleben translates the verse as follows: ‘Erzählungen von Schule [\textit{madrasa}] und Kloster [\textit{ḥānaqāh}] laß nicht verlauten, denn wieder fiel in den Sinn des Hafiz die Lust aufs Weinhaus [\textit{maḥāna}].’ Wohlleben, 417, 9, p. 528. Avery translates this verse as follows: ‘Recite no dicta of College [\textit{madrasa}] and the Dervish Hospice [\textit{ḥānaqāh}], because | Ḥāfīz’s head has once more become filled with lust for wine.’ Avery CCCCXVII, 9, p. 503.}

\textit{Manāqib ul-ʿārifin}, the hagiographic work of Aflākī written in the first half of the fourteenth century, provides an anecdote that illustrates an Imam’s reluctance to reside in a ḥānaqāh. According to the story, Bahā’ Walad (d. 628 H/1231 CE), the father of Rūmī, arrived in Baghdad, where he was received with due revere by Abū Ḥāfṣ Suhravardi. Invited to reside in Suhravardi’s ḥānaqāh, Bahā’ Walad refused; he declared that a \textit{madrasa} is more befitting for an Imam.\footnote{Šams ud-Dīn Aḥmad Aflākī, \textit{Manāqib ul-ʿārifin}, ed. Taḥṣīn Yāzīği, 2 vols. (Tehran: Donyāye Ketāb, 1362/1983), pp. 17–18.}

As I mentioned, the earliest textual evidence of the word ḥānaqāh is from the tenth century. The word \textit{ribāṭ}, however, was used as early as the seventh century to mean ‘fortified army camps at the coastline and frontiers of the nascent Arab empire of Islam.’\footnote{Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Ḫānaqāh’, p. 457.} The early use of the word \textit{ribāṭ} can be understood in the context of early Islamic conquests; at this point, the term had no connection to mysticism or Sufism.

In addition to war that aimed to expand the Muslim empire (ḡīhād), as Meier explains, another duty was required of Muslims – namely, residing in fortresses along territorial borders that separated cities from active theaters of war. The duties at these posts were those of ‘waiting and watching in military readiness, \textit{murābaṭa} or \textit{ribāṭ “being on guard duty or guarding the frontier”}.’\footnote{Fritz Meier, ‘Almoravids and Marabouts’, in \textit{Essays on Islamic Piety and Mysticism}. Translated by John O’Kane (Leiden . Boston . Köln: Brill, 1999), p. 336 (my emphasis).} According to Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, \textit{ribāṭ} became an important Sufi concept because of the Sufis’ mystical interpretation of the word \textit{ḡīhād}. Sufism interprets \textit{ḡīhād} (‘struggle on the path of God’)\footnote{Böwering and Melvin-Koushki, ‘Ḫānaqāh’, p. 457.} on two levels: the outward act of war is seen as the ‘lesser \textit{ḡehād}’ and the struggle for self-discipline and abstinence as the ‘greater \textit{ḡehād}’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 458.} We can see how a state of constant vigilance – a requirement for soldiers stationed in border posts – was metaphorically interpreted as a spiritual act of self-control and self-purification. The convent built in the eighth century in ‘Abbādān – founded by ‘Abd ul-Wāḥid
b. Zayd, a follower of Ḥāsan al-บาشري –, marks the first time that the term ṭibūṭ was used to refer to such a facility.

In a Sufi ḥānaqāh or ṭibāṭ, a community of Sufis would live under the guidance of a Sufi mentor – šayḫ. The ten rules of convent life composed by Abū Sa’īd Abū ‘l-Ḥayr (d. 440 H/1049 CE) was one of the first such sets of regulations. Suhravardi’s ‘Awārif al-maʿārif, written in the thirteenth century, is a remarkable example of a book ‘which served as the basic Sufi manual for Sufi life in ṭibāṭs for many generations.’

In ‘Awārif al-maʿārif, Suhravardi introduces his conception of ‘convent’ in association with the early notion of ṭibāṭ:

Ribāṭ bedeutet eigentlich den Ort, wo (an der Grenze eines Landes) die (kampfbereiten) Pferde festgebunden werden (yurbaṭu). Danach sagt man für jede Frontlinie, deren Besatzung die Bewohner des Hinterlandes verteidigt, ribāṭ. Der im ribāṭ postierte Kämpfer verteidigt also die, die sich weiter hinten aufhalten. Und durch den im Gehorsam gegen Gott im ribāṭ (=Konvent) Stationierten, und durch sein Gebet, wird das Unheil von Land und Leuten ferngehalten.

Suhravardi then describes how Sufism appropriated the military term:


This passage illustrates the Sufi interpretation of the concepts of early Islam and the era of Muslim conquests. The constant vigilance in anticipation of an approaching army is metaphorically repurposed as the constant control and purification of the lower soul (nafs) that Gramlich translates as ‘Seele’. In this context, Suhravardi propounds his rules of life in a convent:

Folgendes sind die Pflichten der Konventbewohner: Mit dem Verkehr mit den Menschen Schluß machen und mit dem Verkehr mit Gott beginnen; dem Erwerb entsagen und sich damit zufrieden geben, daß der Verursacher der Ursachen die Sorge für den Unterhalt

391 Ibid.
392 Ibid., p. 460.
393 Ibid., p. 461.
395 Ibid., p. 108.
Suhravardi accentuates the spiritual state of being in constant vigilance by casting light on the connection between the life in a convent and fortresses that guarded Islamic territory. Suhravardi viewed the act of purification as bringing health and safety to all the Muslim community. By purifying themselves from the desires of the lower soul, therefore, the Sufis bring security to themselves and the masses. The pupils are required to sever all attachments to the mundane world. In this negative process of exclusion, they seek knowledge of and union with the cause of all causes – God.

In this section, I introduced several elements and terms of negative and excluding nature in the Sufi world, which are relevant to this study and appear in the Divan of Ḩāfīz. In the next section, I discuss the experience of spring in a world in which natural beauty was considered devoid of the transcendent. As we have seen, Saʿdī and Ḩāfīz illustrate how the wise person seeks a life of seclusion (ḵalvat) to free himself from corruptible nature. Within this negative world-view, natural phenomena appear in their literary works either as objects of negation or as metaphors for an ideal and absolute truth.397

II.2.4 Spring as a Call for Reevaluation of Exclusion

Now that we have a clear view of the cultural background regarding the Sufi negative approach to the natural world, we can explore how spring influences Ḩāfīz’s critique of the negative approach of Sufism.

The following ğişal describes the first days of spring. Following the tradition of tenth and eleventh century poets such as Rūdakī, Ḩāfīz celebrates the new year (the first day of spring, according to the Persian calendar) by writing panegyric poems to be recited during the festivities:

2 Wenn du, wie die Rose, über Goldstaub verfügst, um Gottes willen, gib ihn für ein lustiges Leben aus;
dem Korah bescherte seine Leidenschaft, Gold zu häufen, nur Irrtümer.
3 Verschleierte Worte sage ich dir: wie die Rose, so tritt aus (deiner) Knospe hervor, (schließlich) währt die Herrschaft des Neujahrs-Fürsten nicht länger als fünf Tage.

396 Ibid., p. 109.
397 On solitude and space of exclusion in the Divan see pp. 142–147 above.
Hāfiẓ begins the poem by focusing on flowers and the stages they go through during spring. He invites the reader to receive illumination from spring’s breeze and let its reviving force touch his soul. In the second couplet, the flowers teach us to be generous for the sake of a joyous life. The poet alludes to the story of Korah (Qārūn) in the Qurʾān (28: 76–77), who is the epitome of greed in contrast to the natural generosity of the flowers.

The third couplet displays an element common to Hāfiẓ’s poems about spring – namely, the poet persistently reminds his reader that spring is fleeting. Yet this fact does not bring gloominess to Hāfiẓ. Rather, the desire to seize the passing opportunity energizes him. Hāfiẓ invites his reader to imagine a rose bud, as closed and isolated as a hermit in a hermitage. Hāfiẓ advises his reader to leave his closed rooms (‘bud’) and to be like the flower that (now) is fully opened and ready to spread its pollen.

In the fourth couplet, Hāfiẓ addresses the conflict between enjoying wine and the views of Sufism (as well as orthodox Islam). Wine had been an integral part of the spring celebration (as well as its poetic illustration) since the tenth century. Even though he has a wine as pure as the soul itself, Hāfiẓ complains, the Sufi still finds faults with it. Hāfiẓ articulates his critique in a witty and sarcastic manner; he does not directly doubt the Sufi’s sanity, but rather assumes that an unfortunate stroke of fate must have clouded the reasonable man’s judgment. This is a vivid example of Hāfiẓ’s sarcasm, reserved for his critique of zealot Sufis, hypocritical judges, faqīhs and muftīs.

In another couplet in this ḡazal, Hāfiẓ expands his criticism from Sufism in particular to the whole structure of acquisition of knowledge during his time, including philosophy and kalām (theology). He writes: ‘Excluded from the means of joy, in wonder of knowledge, one cannot be; | Sāḵū! come; to the fool arriveth, the largest victual-portion.’

Despite the warnings that he attributes to a certain form of knowledge that prohibits wine and forbids celebration of spring, Hāfiẓ calls for his wine-bringer.

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399 Including the Vizier Ǧalāl ud-Dīn Tūrānšāh, whose name is mentioned in the thirteenth couplet of this qaṣīda and who had a good relationship with the poet.
400 Here, the poet has in mind the simple nature of the soul in metaphysical, Platonic terms.
402 Mortazāvī, Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ: Moqaddame bar Ḥāfiẓenāsī, p. 7.
403 Clarke, 531, 8, p. 870. Qazvīnī & Šānī, 454, 11.
Once again employing irony, he casts his lot with the foolish and ignorant to show that he prefers to be associated with them – not with those opposed to joy. And once again, Ḩāfiz challenges those pursuing the excluding path by questioning their reason and sanity. There are two points worth mentioning in the poem above. First, the poet is aware of the shortness of life and the fleeting character of spring and natural beauty. Second, Ḩāfiz clearly considers the ascetic Sufi philosophy as inconsistent with reason. He expresses this in his sarcastic reference to the Sufi as a ‘reasonable’ person whose bad judgment must be due to bad luck. Nonetheless, some of Ḩāfiz’s ǧazals (analyzed above in comparison to Sa’dī) show an affinity to the negative Sufi views that prescribe a life of contemplation in ḥalvat (solitude).\[^{404}\] In light of this fact, it is not surprising that we find poetic expressions of an inner struggle with the dominantly excluding Sufi views. In the following section, I explore this inner struggle, which arises from the contrast between natural beauty (perceivable by the bodily senses) and an understanding of truth as attainable solely through negation and purification.

II.2.4.1 ‘The Repentance-Shattering Spring’
Referring to Huğviri’s work, I showed that repentance in Sufism transcends its basic religious aspect and becomes an ascending act of purification. As Huğviri explains, this purification is ascending, since the Sufi must repent of the inferior state in order to arrive at a higher state; to achieve the highest state, moreover, the Sufi must repent of all states.\[^{405}\] Against this background, we turn to a number of ǧazals that display the poet’s inner struggle with two conflicting desires – i.e., the desire for the beauty of nature and the desire to attain an elevated truth by way of a negation of the mundane. The following ǧazal is a clear instance of this inner struggle:

\[^{1}\] Ba ‘azm-i tauba saḥar guftam istihāra kunam
Bahār-i tauba-šikan mirasad čičāra kunam

\[^{2}\] Suḥan durust biguyam namitavānām did
Ki mai ḫurand rafqān u man niẓāra kunam

\[^{3}\] Ba daur-i ḥāla dimāq-i marā ’alāg kuniḍ
Gar az myān-i bazm-i ẓarāb kiniḍa kunam

[1] Intent on repenting at dawn I said, ‘I’ll take an omen for luck.’

Repentance-shattering Spring’s on the way. How can I manage?
[2] I must say frankly, I cannot see
Comrades drinking wine with me looking on.

\[^{404}\] On ḥalvat and the house as the place of negation and exclusion of the natural and corruptible, see pp. 145f above.

\[^{405}\] See p. 150 above.
[3] In tulip-time, physick me
If I step aside from the midst of the banquet of merriment.\textsuperscript{406}

This \textit{gazal} has a strong ironic tone. Ḩorramšāhi rightly remarks that repentance, being a mandatory component of the \textit{šari'a}, is not an object of counsel or considerations. Yet the call to celebrate the beauty of spring has made it into an object of speculation and interpretation.\textsuperscript{407} In this second instance of irony, the poet accentuates his own honesty; he is unable to merely observe others enjoying this beautiful season. Yet the irony turns to sarcasm as Ḥāfiz castigates those who demand repentance in spring. Ḥāfiz provides us with another instance of sarcastic refutation of the Sufi notion of constant repentance. In the third couplet, just as in the fourth couplet of the previously cited \textit{gazal}, Ḥāfiz ironically questions the Sufi’s sanity; if he were likewise to forgo the festivities of spring, he would want to be cured of his faulty intellect.

Repentance and spring appear to be mutually exclusive in the poet’s view. Repentance seeks to purify and negate in order to arrive at a simple state, while spring – with all its vigor – is a manifestation of multiplicity and diversity. In Ḥāfiz’s view, one cannot turn one’s back to the beauty of spring and strive for negation and isolation (\textit{ḥalvat}) – at least not if one is of sound mind. To convey this conflict between spring and repentance, Ḥāfiz employs a rather unfamiliar compound adjective in his description of spring: ‘repentance-shattering’ or (\textit{tauba-šikan}). In Persian, the compound verb \textit{tauba šikast}an – to break one’s repentance, as in breaking a promise (‘\textit{ahd šikast}an) – was commonly used during Ḥāfiz’s time and is also common today. The compound adjective ‘repentance-shattering’ in reference to spring has only one precedent in Persian literature; about five hundred years before Ḥāfiz, Rūdaki used this compound adjective in a single couplet of a longer poem.\textsuperscript{408}

\textit{Āmad in nau bahār-i tauba-šikan}
\textit{Parniyān gašt bāg u barzan u kāy}\textsuperscript{409}

Along came this repentance-shattering new spring
The gardens, streets and alleys turned to silk\textsuperscript{410}

In the Persian literary tradition before the emergence of the Indian School in sixteenth century, we scarcely encounter new inventions and obscure word-plays.

\textsuperscript{406} Avery, CCCXLII, 1–3, p. 421 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{407} Horramšahi, Ḥāfiz-nāme, vol. 2: p. 986.
\textsuperscript{408} See: ibid., vol. 2: pp. 987–988.
\textsuperscript{409} Divān-e Rūdaki-ye Samarqandi, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{410} My translation of the above couplet
such as ‘repentance-shattering’. Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic choice, therefore, would have certainly attracted his reader’s attention.

In the first couplet of ḡazal 388, Ḥāfiẓ uses this adjective again to describe spring: ‘Joy-exciting and repentance-shattering became the spring and rose: | With the joy of the face of the rose, grief’s root from the heart up-pluck.’ In this verse, we notice an alteration that opens the way toward a clearer understanding of this quality of spring. As Clarke’s faithful translation reflects, the spring becomes ‘repentance-shattering’ to the poet while he experiences it. Spring attains this quality by moving the poet aesthetically; in other words, it becomes repentance-shattering when perceived by the senses and then judged by reason.

II.2.5 Diving into the Sea of the Wine House

The inconsistency between the negative process of ascent and the joy of spring festivities goes beyond irony and reaches a new level in the following ḡazal, in which aesthetic appreciation of beauty appears in the context of the critique of the negative act of repentance:

[1] I am not the reprobrate [rind] to abandon the darling and the cup!
The moral police’s chief knows that I rarely act like this.
[2] I, who time and time again have censured repenters,
Would be mad were I to repent of the wine of the time of roses.
1 Ich bin nicht der Freigeist [rind414], der den Schönen und den Pokal im Stich läßt;
der Polizeimeister weiß, daß ich derlei kaum vollbringe.
2 Ich, der ich oftmals die Bußetuenden verlästert habe,
würde ja verrückt sein, wenn ich dem Wein abschwörte zur Rosenzeit!

Ḥāfiẓ ironically appeals to the chief of the morality police of Shiraz as his witness that he never abandoned wine; we are led to assume that Ḥāfiẓ had been

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411 In Qazvini & Ğanlı’s edition, and absent from Ḥānlari’s first vol., in the vol. 2: 32, p. 1020.
412 Clarke, 448, p. 750 (my emphasis).
413 Avery, CCCXXXVIII, 1–2, p. 417 (my emphasis).
414 In the two translations above, we find two attempts to translate the word rind in the Divan. It must be mentioned that, in case of rind (like other antinomian terms in the Divan), the poet employs a pejorative attribute (denoting a charlatan, a criminal or a drunkard) as a laudatory attribute. In the entire Divan, rind has a laudatory connotation in contrast to its pejorative literal meaning outside the Divan. Through the juxtaposition of these two attempts in the two above translations, we can attain an understanding of this aspect of the term rind in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan.
repeatedly arrested, though without feeling any regret. In a later verse of this ġazal, Ḥāfiz argues all parts of nature are affected by a universal inebriating force; yet only Ḥāfiz is labeled as a libertine: ‘The tulip a taker-up of the cup, the narcissus drunk, but for me, debauchery’s repute; | I have plenty to answer to: Whom, O Lord, shall I make the judge?’\(^{416}\) Using anthropomorphism, Ḥāfiz integrates himself into nature and complains about being surrounded by unreasonable judges who are alien to nature. The poet points out that the same force that affects nature brings him aesthetic pleasure. He articulates this point by comparing the tulip to a cup and the narcissus flower to an inebriated eye, as if the tulip were the cupbearer and the narcissus the drunkard in the natural realm.

In the following couplet of this ġazal, the critique of a negative ascending approach reaches a new level:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Garči gard-ālūd-i faqr-am šarmbād az himmat-am} \\
\text{Gar ba āb-i čišma-yī huršīd dāman tar kunam}
\end{align*}
\]

I am a poor and dust-stained beggar, yet let there be shame at my ardour
If I wet my garment with water from the spring of the Sun King\(^{417}\)

Although poor compared to the transcendent sun, Ḥāfiz would be ashamed to allow the skirt of his garment to be tainted with the light of the sun. To understand this couplet, we need to clarify two points. First, a wet or soiled garment is a conventional figure of speech in Persian and is attributed to someone whose honor and purity has been besmirched. It has a strong pejorative tone, for men and women alike. Ḥāfiz’s compound verb dāman tar kardan (‘to wet one’s garment’) refers to this figure of speech.

The second point pertains to the Persian word that Avery translates as ‘ardour’ – himmat. In his commentary, Ḥorramšāhi explains that the term himmat denotes an inner aspiration or an intention focused in a specific direction. In a Sufi context, himmat is a spiritual endeavor in which the Sufi constantly rules over the body and submits to the hardships of self-purification and ascent.\(^{418}\) In this context, himmat represents the intention that guides the Sufi in pursuit of his goal. As a combination of self-disciplined intention rooted in knowledge and constant zealous aspiration, himmat is considered indispensable to the

\(^{416}\) Avery, CCCXXXVIII, 4, p. 417.
\(^{417}\) Avery, CCCXXXVIII, 6, p. 417. The word ‘King’ is an addition of Avery’s and does not exist in the Divan. Compare to Wohlleben’s translation of this couplet: ‘Obgleich meine Armut staubbesudelt ist, müßte ich mich doch der Absicht schämen, | mit dem Naß der Sonnenquelle meinen Saum zu netzen.’ Wohlleben, 338, 6, p. 440.
Sufi – like wings for those on the path of ascension.\textsuperscript{419} In the couplet above, \textit{Hāfiz} poetically modifies the negative and ascending connotations of \textit{himmat}.

The metaphor of ‘the fountain of the sun’ (\textit{čišma-yi ḥuršid}) is mentioned three times in the \textit{Divan}. But its other two occurrences are fundamentally different from the one quoted above:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Ba havādārī-yi ā Zarra šifat raqsūkān}
\textit{Tā lab-i čišma-yi ḥuršid-i diraḥšān biravam}\textsuperscript{420}\\ (That) like a mote, in love for Him,
To the lip of the fountain of the resplendent sun, I will go.\textsuperscript{421}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Zarra rā tā nabuvad himmat-i `āli \textit{Hāfiz}}
\textit{Tālib-i čišma-yi ḥuršid-i diraḥšān našavad}\textsuperscript{422}\\ \textit{\textit{Hāfiz}! So long as lofty resolution is not the atom’s}
Seeker of the fountain of the gleaming sun, it becometh not.\textsuperscript{423}
\end{quote}

In the first chapter of this study, I analyzed the seventh couplet of the \textit{ġazal} 351.\textsuperscript{424} This couplet explicitly illustrates an individual of a lower level – namely, the mote – aspiring toward the sun. In the eighth couplet of the \textit{ġazal} 220, \textit{himmat} denotes an intention of an elevated (‘āli) quality – \textit{himmat-i ‘āli}, translated as ‘lofty resolution’ by Clarke and as ‘das hohe Streben’ by Wohlleben.\textsuperscript{425} This lofty resolution is essential to the desire for ascent to the fountain of the sun. In both cases, the mote reaches for union with that which is most elevated.

In the \textit{ġazal} 338, \textit{Hāfiz} refutes repentance, celebrates the cosmic rejuvenation in spring and beholds the whole nature as a feast of wine and beauty. In the same \textit{ġazal}, we find an alteration in the representation of the zealous intention for ascending to the sun. Whereas the mote (\textit{zarra}) in the two couplets above is determined to reach the fountain of the sun, in the sixth couplet of the \textit{ġazal} 338, \textit{Hāfiz} – stained with dust (poverty) – introduces another direction for his aspiration (\textit{himmat}). He is aware of his deprivation in comparison to the perfection of the sun. In Plato’s \textit{Symposium}, Plotinus’s \textit{Enneads} V. 1. 6 and Ibn Sinā’s \textit{Treatise on Love},\textsuperscript{426} this awareness accounts for the zeal that informs the

\textsuperscript{420} Ḵānlāri, 351, 7.
\textsuperscript{421} Clarke, 391, p. 670 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{422} Ḵānlāri, 220, 8.
\textsuperscript{423} Clarke, 193, 10, p. 365 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{424} See in this study §1.3.3 (‘The Mote and the Sun’) and above p. 77.
\textsuperscript{425} Wohlleben, 220, 8, p. 304.
love for the higher level. Yet another awareness is also at work here – one that defines a direct approach to the sun as besmirching human dignity. Admittedly, the poet does not claim to have a spotless reputation; on the contrary, his garment is dust-stained. Nonetheless, he sees more honor in preserving his deprivation and poverty than in reaching for the golden sun. To the beggar of the poem, the sun appears to be a king with limitless wealth in the sky and who is unconcerned with the poet’s humanity and place on earth. Torn between natural beauty and the cultural and intellectual values of his world, the poet is engaged in an intellectual struggle.

Against the backdrop of this struggle, Ḥāfiz makes a heroic resolution: ‘Love is a pearl-grain and I am the diver, and the sea is the tavern. | I have plunged in there. Let us see how I bob up.’ At this stage, ascent to the sun and the exclusion of the natural world seems to Ḥāfiz to contradict reason and truthfulness. Therefore, the restless poet introduces a new direction for his zealous pursuit of knowledge and self-knowledge: descending into the sea, rather than ascending toward the sun. Though Ḥāfiz characterizes his celebration of natural beauty as dangerous and heroic, it is supported by his sense and wisdom. As a diver (lover) he is only aware of two things: (a) that the object of his desire lies deep beneath the surface; and (b) that, having plunged into the sea, there is no guarantee that he will surface. On a metaphorical level, this poem illustrates a fundamental change in the direction of the seeker of knowledge (who is now also the lover): ascent toward the sun becomes descent into the sea of the wine-house. To grasp the significance of the metaphor of the sea, we need to examine the use of this word in the Divan.

In the Divan, the sea-voyage metaphor is associated with perilous quests. In his commentary on Ḥāfiz’s Divan, Ḥānlarī argues that ḡazal 147 illustrates the poet’s direct experience of the sea. Ḥānlarī points to a number of ḡazals in the Divan suggesting that Ḥāfiz’s correspondence with the Indian ruler Ġiyāṭ ud-Dīn Muḥammad Šāh (r. ca. 1325–1351 CE) resulted in his receiving an invitation to the ruler’s court. (Ḡiyāṭ ud-Dīn Muḥammad Šāh was known to be a generous patron of literature and the arts.) Ḥāfiz had to travel to India by sea. But shortly after boarding the ship, he witnessed a horrible tempest, which caused him to abandon the prospect of riches and return to Shiraz. According to Ḥānlarī, the following couplets represent the fierce and petrifying aspect of the sea. Here is Gertrude Bell’s poetic and clear translation:

427 Avery, CCCXXXVIII, 5, p. 417.
428 See the second couplet of this ḡazal and above p. 162.
Full easy seemed the sorrow of the sea
Lightened by hope of gain—hope flew too fast!
A hundred pearls were poor indemnity,
Not worth the blast.
The Sultan’s crown, with priceless jewels set,
Encircles fear of death and constant dread;
It is a head-dress much desired—and yet
Art sure ‘tis worth the danger to the head?430

In these couplets, a non-aesthetic pursuit is the object of desire. Therefore, unlike in the couplet that illustrates Ḥāfiẓ’s descending quest for love, the sea in the couplet above is not described as the sea of the wine-house. The poet sees no reason to risk his life solely for the sake of gold, where heroism (Ḥāfiẓ suggests) doesn’t apply; even hundreds of pearls are worthless in comparison to his priceless life. As a locus of immense horror, the sea is frequently present in the Divan; yet the object of desire determines whether an endeavor is heroic or idiotic. The following verses convey the significance of the sea in relation to the object of one’s quest:

When I was becoming a lover, I said, ‘I have borne off the sought-for pearl’. I did not know what blood-tossing waves this ocean has.431
The waves run high, night is clouded with fears,
And eddying whirlpools clash and roar;
How shall my drowning voice strike their ears
Whose light-freighted vessels have reached the shore?432

In these verses, the poet employs a heroic tone in his illustration of the horrors of the sea. In the first of these two couplets, just as in the fifth couplet of ḡazal 338 that we cited earlier in Avery’s translation, Ḥāfiẓ uses a heroic rhetoric to illustrate a diver looking for the one pearl of love – rather than someone on a ship looking to get rich.

II.2.6 Anxiety in the Field of Critique of the Old World

As we have seen, the bright scene of ascending to the sun is replaced by the image of plunging into a dark and bottomless sea. Abandoning his world-view based on exclusion, the poet turned toward the pursuit of beauty and its

430 Ḥāfiẓ, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, 21, P. 103. See also: Ḥānları, 147, 5 and 4; Qazvini & Ġani, 151, 5 and 4.
431 Avery, CXVI, 3, p. 161.
432 Ḥāfiẓ, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, 1, p. 63. See also: Ḥānları, 1, 5.
appreciation in love – a frightful step into the realm of darkness. Notably, the intellectual tradition handed down to Ḥāfīz considered the descending path to have a corrupting influence on the once elevated soul. Moving toward the natural world contradicts Sufi and Neoplatonic teachings. In case of the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā, the process of emanation from the material world takes a course that is no longer approved by the Intellect. The Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā held that the Individual Souls are banished into the world to ‘atone’ for neglecting the glory of the World-Soul.433 In their modified versions of Neoplatonic cosmogony, the story of the fall in the Qurʾān and previous Abrahamic Holy Books, the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafā condemned this change in direction.434 Furthermore, the Sufi method of acquisition of self-knowledge was founded on exclusion, as Sufi elements such as purification (ṭahārat), repentance (tauba), the Sufi garment (ḥirqa) and the convent (ḥānaqāḥ) show. So, it is no surprise that this excluded territory causes anxiety.

In the following ġazal, Ḥāfīz illustrates a perilous realm:

[1] If sword blades swish in the moon-faced’s street,
Our neck is ready. It is God’s decree.
[2] I too am informed of the requirements of piety,
But for luck gone astray, what is the remedy?
[3] Me a debauchee, and a lover, and then repentance?
God forbid! God forbid!
[4] We are not much given to recognizing Shaikh and Preacher.
Either give a bowl of wine or cut the cackle.435

The context of the verses sheds light on the reason the narrator anticipates danger. These verses are explicitly critical toward Sufi views of purity and piety; they rebel against the Sufi convent (ḥānaqāḥ), represented here by the šayḥ (the Sufi mentor) as well as preachers from the madrasa.

Ḥāfīz imagines himself stepping inside a realm that accords with his turn toward aesthetic beauty. But being in this state evokes extreme feelings of anxiety and dread. Despite these threats, Ḥāfīz does not retreat; he finds himself in accord with a greater divine truth than that of the Sufis and preachers – his God is capable of understanding the poet’s human nature. In the second

434 Ibid., pp. 297–298. See also Nāṣir Ḫusraw Qubādīyānī’s explanation of negative philosophical ascent. This philosopher of the eleventh century held that the soul, due to over engagement with the material realm (hyle), had drifted further and further away from Intellect. Only through philosophy, he claimed, can one elevate the soul to its original purity and abstraction: Nāṣir Ḫusraw Qubādīyānī, Zād ul-musāfīr (Tehran: Markaz-e Pažūheši-ye Mīrās-e Maktūb, 1384/2005), pp. 190–191.
435 Avery, CCCCX, 1–4, p. 495.
couplet, he displays his familiarity with the dictates of piety, yet he claims that they are against his nature; he finds the act of negation of natural beauty to be the very pollution from which he should purify himself. In the third couplet, which I translate literally, Ḥāfiz introduces this ironic form of repentance:

\[
\text{Man rind u ʿāšiq dar mausim-i gol} \\
\text{Āngāh tauba astaḡfurallāh} \\
\text{I, the libertine, the lover, and in the season of roses,} \\
\text{And then atonement! Of this (idea) I repent.}\]

436 My translation of the couplet in Ḥānlarī, 410, 3.

437 Avery, CCCIX, 4, p. 494.

438 Ḥānlarī, 409, 3 (my translation).

439 Avery, CCXIV, 4, p. 278.

440 In the following poem, Ḥāfiz uses a figure of speech that refers to a trick performed for entertainment in which the trickster hides some eggs in his cap to surprise the audience by revealing them as a trick. If someone found him out, he or she would break the eggs and that would bring the trickster humiliation. See: Ḥorramšāhi, Ḥāfiz–nāme, vol. 1: p. 544.

In another ḡazal, Ḥāfiz uses the same meter as above to develop the notion of repentance of negation: ‘We have repented of the ascetic’s profession, | And may there be God’s forgiveness for the carrying-on of the devotee.’437 In this same ḡazal, he sarcastically attacks – with even more vehemence – the institution of Sufism as represented by Sufi mentors (pīr) and their asceticism. ‘Thanks to the ignorant mentors [pīrs] and deluded šayḥs | Now I am a legend in libertinism’.438 Since the poet denies the possibility of (ignorant) Sufi šayḥs’ attaining truth, he decides to go in the very direction against which they warn. The following couplet provides a similar justification for Ḥāfiz’s turn from an abstract method: ‘In confusion I raised my head to the door of the tavern: | In the chantry there was no Elder [mentor] knowing you.’439 In these couplets, Ḥāfiz’s primary accusation against Sufism and its mentors appears to be that they are ignorant. The poet seeks a convincing explanation for the cosmic natural influence of beauty and the realm of the body on the intellectual and spiritual realm; he does not find an answer among Sufi mentors. In Ḥāfiz’s view, the ascetic not only deceives himself by claiming to be unmoved by the natural beauty; he also tries to deceive the universe. In the following ḡazal, Ḥāfiz compares the heavens to a master trickster who knows all the false tricks, and therefore cannot be duped by the Sufi.440 Here are the first two couplets of this ḡazal in Wohlleben’s and Bicknell’s translation:
Beginning in the eleventh century, the expansion and institutionalization of Sufism led to decline of sincerity and growth of hypocrisy. The following couplet throws into stark relief the corruption and emptiness of the institution of cloisters (ḥānaqāḥ) in Ḥāfiz’s time: ‘In this season no wise bird flies to the door of the conventicle, | Because a snare is laid in the congregation of every sermon.’ As we see in the two couplets above, the gatherings and teachings of Sufism are described as traps.

The institutionalization of Sufi convents paralleled the institutionalization of teaching colleges of Islamic jurisprudence (madrasa), both accelerated from the eleventh century to the time of Ḥāfiz. The patronage of rulers freed the Sufis from monetary and other mundane concerns. Many madrasas and ḥānaqāḥs were funded by charitable acts (waqf) by high-ranking individuals such as ‘sultans and viziers’. But this funding scheme contributed to the corruption of Sufis and their dependence on the authorities. Furthermore, piety and asceticism practiced for the sake of money and comfort alienated the institution of Sufism from the pursuit of truth and self-knowledge and turned it into a source of political power and financial gain. This historical context provides the background for another aspect of Ḥāfiz’s critique of Sufism and the institutions of madrasa and ḥānaqāḥ. The following is an example of Ḥāfiz’s sarcastic attacks against this corrupt institution:

441 Wohlleben, 129, p. 201 (my emphasis).
443 See in the following the trace of decline in Sufism: Mortażavi, Maktab-e Ḥāfiz: Moqaddame bar Ḥāfizehenāsi, pp. 20–44. For an account of early critiques of falsehood and hypocrisy in the tenth century, see pp. 21–26, and regarding the fourteenth century contemporary to Ḥāfiz, see pp. 42–44.
444 Avery, CCCCLVII, 4, p. 552 (my emphasis).
446 Ibid., p. 461.
See the town Súfí. Since he consumes the dubious morsel, May his crupper be extended, the well-foddered beast!⁴⁴⁸
Sieh den Sufi der Stadt, wie er verdächtige Brocken verschlingt; möge er ganz zum Tier werden, dieser strotzende Kerl!⁴⁴⁹

This couplet displays the full force of Ḥāfiẓ’s sarcastic attack against the Sufis of his time. He not only refutes their views; he also denies the sincerity of their quest for knowledge and even questions their humanity.

Ḥāfiẓ’s attacks are not limited to the convent and its mentors; they also target the corruption of the madrasa as well as of faqīhs and mufīṣīs. In the following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ sarcastically demonstrates a case of in vino veritas: ‘The School’s jurisprudent was drunk last night and issued a decree, | That, “Wine is unlawful, but better than the revenue from endowments”’!⁴⁵⁰ Mortaẓavī contributes to our knowledge of the Divan by pointing out that Ḥāfiẓ’s attack against the corruption of the institutions of Sufism (ḥānaqāḥ) and Islamic jurisprudence (madrasa) differs from Sufi literature’s rhetoric of blame (malāmat); Ḥāfiẓ’s criticism is not confined to mere (self)-criticism of hypocrisy, but rather in using irony and sarcasm Ḥāfiẓ goes beyond the ways of Malāmatīya and exposes the corruption in the two above-mentioned institutions, and their dependency on questionable financial means.⁴⁵¹ The Divan in many cases contains an ironic and sarcastic refutation of the Sufi negative and excluding elements. The distance between Ḥāfiẓ’s (negative) and Suhravārdī’s (positive) representations of the elements of Sufism show that, for Ḥāfiẓ, an essential element, which had once given meaning to people’s lives, had disappeared: ‘This patched gown that I own is better in pawn for drink, | And this idiotic book of texts, better drowned in good wine.’⁴⁵² In the remainder of this ḡazal, Ḥāfiẓ explores the experience of such a failure of values and teachings. These verses reference a religious requirement in Islam – a dress or prayer-mat stained with wine must be purified with water or else the owner’s prayers will be ineffective. In the verse above, Ḥāfiẓ pawns his imaginary Sufi garment for a cup of wine and provocatively suggests dumping his books of nonsense in wine. Let us not forget the significance of the Sufi garment; as we saw earlier, the Sufi garment symbolizes the path of purification. Yet Ḥāfiẓ would prefer to trade it for wine. Though he is knowledgeable about Sufi philosophy, clearly, Ḥāfiẓ rejects their negative ascetic methods.

⁴⁴⁸ Avery, CCXC, 8, p. 361.
⁴⁴⁹ Wohlleben, 290, 8, p. 380.
⁴⁵⁰ Avery, XLV, 4, p. 78.
⁴⁵¹ Mortaẓavī, Maktab-e Ḥāfiẓ: Moqaddame bar Ḥāfiẓshenāsī, pp. 133–134.
⁴⁵² Avery, CCCCLVII, 1, p. 551.
II.2.6.1 Between Inclusion and Exclusion: Dilemma of Purification and Pollution

The following ġazal in the Divan displays a remarkable instance of the state of anxiety. The poet paints a scene in which he converses with himself. He is torn between the path of purification and the pursuit of beauty and love.

[1] Still drowsy with sleep I went last night to the tavern door; The gown has been soiled, the prayer-rug stained with wine. [2] The magian child of the vintner came chiding. He said, ‘Wake up you drowsing wanderer. [3] Wash and launder yourself clean. Then boldly stride into the inn [ḥarābāt], When this temple [dāyr-i ḥarāb] will not be polluted by you. [4] How long, desiring the lips of sweet lads, will you Stain the jewel of the spirit with liquid ruby? [5] Pass in chastity the stages of old age and do not Make the robe of honour of the elderly tainted like the gaudy robe of youth. [6] Those who know the path of love have in this deep sea Drowned and yet not been sullied with water: [7] Be clean and pure and come out of the pit of nature, Because no cleanliness does dust-infected water give.’ [8] I said, ‘O soul and O world, the rose’s record book is not blackened If in the height of spring it has got stained with pure wine.’ [9] He replied, ‘Do not, Háfiz, foist riddles and conceit on your friends.’ Ah the pity of this charm, besmeared by all sorts of blame!453

The poet illustrates himself in a situation that is diametrically opposed to the path of purity. He does this by including in the ġazal the rhyming word ālūda (‘defiled’ or ‘polluted’). The poem illustrates the narrator’s perplexity from its first couplet. Notably, this ġazal has a straight narrative line; it concentrates on a single theme. (In most manuscripts, the order of the couplets – or at least the first three – remains the same.454) The poem is set in front of the door of the wine house on a dark night. Ḥāfiz once again depicts himself wearing a soiled Sufi garment455; furthermore, he carries a prayer-rug stained with wine. By the standards of Persian classical poetry, the poetic illustration of this prayer-rug would have been considered taboo.456 Several poems of Sanā’ī and Ṭāṭār mention prayer-rugs being cast aside or sent to the wine house as acts of concealing prayers in pursuit of purification and self-negation. Yet, as far as this writer can tell, the image of pouring wine on the prayer-rug appears only one time in classical

453 Avery, CCCCXIV, p. 500.
455 See p. 164 above.
Persian literature – in a quatrain written by Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqi of the thirteenth century.\(^{457}\) It must be noted that the prayer-rug was considered the purest space upon which the believers would direct their words to God.

From the second couplet onward, the young vintner castigates Ḥāfiz for having abandoned the path of purification and having fallen into nature’s pit. Yet in the third couplet, the poet paints an ironic image – why should he receive lessons in abstinence and piety on the door steps of a wine-house? The name even alludes to the Persian word ḫarābāt, which literally denotes a building for gambling and prostitution.\(^{458}\) ḫarābāt (translated above as ‘inn’ in the third couplet) literally means ‘ruins’. In the Divan, the word appears in forms such as ‘ḥarābāt-i muğān’, ‘ḥarābābād’\(^{459}\) and (in the case of this couplet) ‘dayr-i ḫarāb’ – literally, ‘the ruined cloister’, but translated above as ‘temple’. Here is Clarke’s translation of this couplet: “Washing and washing, do; then, to the tavern, proudly move; | “So that, by thee, this ruined cloister become not stained.”\(^{460}\) The irony is palpable: standing before the pleasure house, the young vintner chides Ḥāfiz for being sleepy and soaked in wine! He demands ablution lest this house become tainted. Stressing purification, ablution and seeking ascent from nature’s pit, the vintner mixes shaming and blaming. The resemblance between this dialogue and that which Ḥuḡvīrī narrates between Šiblī and God suggests that Ḥāfiz hears the voice of abstraction in front of the wine house – a voice that he vehemently criticized.\(^{461}\) This voice tries to remind Ḥāfiz of the necessity of the purification as well as the exclusion of the natural realm.

The image of the sea of love that we discussed earlier reappears in the sixth couplet. Through the perspective of abstraction and purification, it is reconstructed as the sea of God.\(^{462}\) In this vision, the seeker goes through the sea without being tainted or getting wet; he is able to do so on account of the purity of his soul. The grotesque, ascetic vintner chides Ḥāfiz for having turned toward life and tainted his abstract soul. It is important to note that Avery’s ‘jewel of the spirit’ in the fourth couplet translate the original Persian ḡauhar-i ṛūḥ – a philosophical term meaning ‘the essence of the soul’. Thus, as a simple entity in the Platonic context, the essence of the soul is described as in danger

\(^{457}\) ʿIrāqi, Maḵmū’-e ye ašār-e Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqi, p. 354.
\(^{458}\) On the literal and figurative meaning of ḫarābāt, see: Raḡāʾi Buḥārāʾi, Farhang-e ašʿār-e Ḥāfiz, pp. 179–183. Specifically see Buḥārāʾi’s citation from Šarḥ-i ta’arruf, vol. 1: p. 181.
\(^{459}\) See ‘ḥarābāt-i muğān’ in 327, 349 and for ‘ḥarābābād’ the ḡazals 36, 97, and ‘dayr-i ḫarābābād’ in 310 in: Ḥānlarī.
\(^{460}\) Clarke, 485, 3, p. 801.
\(^{461}\) See p. 152 above.
\(^{462}\) See p. 72 above.
of losing its unmixed nature. (Once again, this tradition equates being mixed with being degraded and defiled.) This explanation shows that Ḥāfīz comes under criticism (in this ironic setting) for debasing his elevated simple soul in the corruptible realm. His path is characterized as evil because it drifts away from the light of the truth and toward the ephemeral beauty of the world.

Remarkably, Ḥāfīz’s only counterargument to the vintner is to remind him of spring; Ḥāfīz identifies himself with the red roses in spring – both are shaped by the natural forces of spring. Yet this answer does not convince the vintner. Despite the vintner’s efforts, Ḥāfīz remains unshaken; he continues to identify himself with nature as influenced by spring. In other words, spring itself becomes an argument in this poem. At the end of the ġazal, Ḥāfīz ironically notes that the only flaw in the lovely, young vintner is his disposition to negate natural beauty.

II.2.7 Mediation and Going Beyond Exclusion

In the first chapter, I showed that Ḥāfīz’s poetic formulation of the direct and excluding method of ascending to an extramundane truth corresponds to Platonic views and has a strong affinity with the Sufi path of exclusion and purification. Yet I did not discuss the presence of a mediating figure, which is an essential part of the philosophical and Sufi traditions in the Islamic world.463 One characteristic of Islamic Neoplatonists is that they offer a modification of the Soul of the World as a mediating agent, who imparts forms to the universe and guides the seekers of the truth toward union. In Ibn Sinā’s treatise Ḥayy ibn Yaqqān, the Active Intelligence assumes an anthropomorphic appearance464; similarly, in Šahāb ud-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhravardi’s ‘Aql-i surḵ, it appears as a wise old man ‘bright like the sun’.465

Ibn Sinā describes an encounter he had with a personification of Active Intelligence (a sage) as Ibn Sinā and his companions visited a garden near the city. This sage appears to him as ‘beautiful’ – ‘his person shone with a divine glory. Certainly he had tasted of years; long duration had passed over him. Yet there was

seen in him only the freshness proper to young men’.\textsuperscript{466} In his encounter with the sage, Ibn Sinā feels the intellectual love that each member of the lower level has for the level above. He recounts: ‘I felt a desire to converse with him. From my inmost depths arose a need to become intimate with him and to have familiar access to him.’\textsuperscript{467} The sage defines human bodily aspects as companions of humans; thus, we may infer that Ibn Sinā had been alone and that the companions he mentions in the opening of his account were his bodily senses, anger (violence) and his bodily needs: ‘These companions who are about thee and never leave thee are evil companions. It is to be feared that they will seduce thee and that thou wilt remain captive in their bonds, unless the divine safekeeping reach thee and preserve thee from their malice.’\textsuperscript{468}

Like Plato’s Socrates in \textit{Phaedo}, Ibn Sinā’s sage informs him that humans cannot separate themselves from the erroneous knowledge of their senses and bodily desires; yet the sage encourages Ibn Sinā to train his senses and gain mastery over them. As for traveling across the cosmos with the sage, the sage tells Ibn Sinā and all humankind the following: ‘the road is closed to you all, unless thy fortunate destiny should aid thee, for thy part, to separate from these companions. But now the hour for that separation is not yet come: there is a time set for it, which thou canst not anticipate.’\textsuperscript{469}

In Šahāb ud-Dīn Yahyā Suhravardi’s treatise ‘\textit{Aql-i surḥ} (The Red Intellect),\textsuperscript{470} Suhravardi similarly describes an encounter with the intermediary agent. The setting of this encounter, however, is beyond the realm of senses and occurs in a state of ascent. Suhravardi metaphorically refers to his divine soul as a bird. As a human being answering the questions of his pupils, Suhravardi remembers the time when he was a bird trapped in the sublunary realm. The bird’s (i.e., his) vision was impaired and tied with ‘four different bounds’\textsuperscript{471} – the four elements\textsuperscript{472} – ‘with ten wardens’ watching over his divine soul. Suhravardi then differentiates between these ten Wardens as follows:

\textsuperscript{466} Corbin, \textit{Avicenna and the Visionary Recital}, p. 137.
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{468} Ibid., p. 138.
\textsuperscript{469} Ibid., p. 141.
Five of them faced me with their backs toward outside, while the other five stood facing the outside with their backs to me. The five who faced me kept me in the world of perplexity so that I forgot my nest, my realm and everything I had known. I thought I had always been the way I was then.\footnote{Suhrawardi, \textit{The Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Suhrawardi}, p. 35.}

The five senses are allegorically rendered here as the ten wardens. In contrast to Ibn Sinā, Suhrawardī does not view the stage of finding the intermediary agent as one of companionship of the five senses; after a while, Suhrawardī (in a process of abstraction) flees from his wardens and, with his shackles (the four elements), he finds his way into the wilderness, where he meets the intermediary agent. Throughout this treatise this intermediary agent is constantly called the \textit{pīr}\footnote{Suhrawardi, \textit{Mağmû-e ye mosan nefât-e Šayh-i Išráq}, p. 228.} – ‘the elder’ or ‘the master’.

As we saw earlier, the Sufi mentor (\textit{pīr}) has the important role of guiding the wayfarer and presiding over the \textit{ḥanāqāh} (convent).\footnote{See pp. 152f above.} Abū Ḥafṣ Suhrawardī’s explanation of the Sufi \textit{pīrs} resembles Yahyā Suhrawardī’s (the Sufi-philosopher’s) intermediary agent, who approaches the seeker of knowledge and guides him through each step. Yet according to Abū Ḥafṣ Suhrawardī, the mediating figure of the Sufi mainly refers to a personal mentor, rather than a non-personal, intellectual and spiritual agent. As Abū Ḥafṣ Suhrawardī explains in ‘\textit{Awārif al-maʿārif}, Sufism, from its earliest masters onwards, considered a \textit{pīr} to be indispensable. Emphasizing the importance of having a \textit{pīr}, Abū Ḥafṣ Suhrawardī refers to Bāyazid of Baštām of the ninth century: ‘Von Abū Yazid (al-Baštāmī) wird berichtet, er habe gesagt: „Wer keinen Meister hat, dessen Autorität ist der Satan.“’\footnote{Suhrawardi, \textit{Die Gaben der Erkenntnisse (‘Awārif al-maʿārif)}, p. 101.}

\section*{II.2.7.1 The Mediating Agent Pīr-i Muğān}

As I mentioned earlier, there is no evidence in the \textit{Divan} to support the conclusion that Ḥāfiz belonged to a Sufi order. Furthermore, Ḥāfiz’s sarcastic polemic against \textit{šayhs} and \textit{pīrs} does not stop at non-personal attacks on ignorance, greed, and hypocrisy;\footnote{See p. 169 above.} rather, as Muʾīn points out and Ḥorramšāhi and Heravi corroborate, Ḥāfiz attacked a prominent, contemporary Sufi master, Šāh Niʿmatullāh-i Wali-yi Kīrmānī. Šāh Niʿmatullāh wrote in a \textit{gazal}: ‘With a
glance of ours, we turn the dust to gold.\textsuperscript{479} In the final couplet of this ġazal, Šāh Ni‘matullāh invites the seekers of truth to become his disciples so that he can lead them toward God. The following is Ḥāfīz’s ironic response:

[1] Those eyes that with their alchemy
   Convert base dust to gold,
   Will they of their great courtesy
   One moment us behold?
[2] ’Twere best from doctors fraudulent
   To keep my pain concealed;
   By that unseen medicament
   I may at last be healed.\textsuperscript{480}

Furthermore, Ḥāfīz expands his poetic polemics and addresses famous early Sufi masters. For instance, Ḥāfīz even attacks Bāyazid Baštāmī:

[1] Get up so that we might take the Súfí gown to the tavern:
   Take ecstatic outpouring and ejaculations of the possessed to the market of superstitions.
[2] Let us, by way of a novelty brought from a distant voyage,
   Take to the wild wandering calendars the Bastámí cloak and rapturous exclamations.\textsuperscript{481}

Despite Ḥāfīz’s attacks against Sufi masters, there are still instances in the Divan in which the poet conveys his interest in finding an intermediary agent. Yet nowhere in the Divan does Ḥāfīz express an interest for a person as a guide. The guide he desires is what he describes as dalīl-i rāh – ‘guide of the path’\textsuperscript{482} or ‘Wegführer’,\textsuperscript{483} as Clarke and Wohlleben, respectively, translate the term. Ḥorramšāhi claims that there was a phase in the poet’s intellectual development, after his refutation of the Sufi pîrs, during which he recognized the need for an intermediary agent; eventually, he invented a mythological one.\textsuperscript{484} Considering that devotion to a personal Sufi master was very common among poets of the time, Ḥāfīz’s invention of a literary character that guides him intellectually and spiritually resembles the intellectual practice that goes back to Ibn Sinā and Yahyā Suhravardī.\textsuperscript{485}

\textsuperscript{480} Immortal Rose: an Anthology of Persian Lyrics, p. 164. See Ḥānlar, 191.
\textsuperscript{481} Avery, CCCLXVI, 1–2, p. 448.
\textsuperscript{482} Clarke, 428, 5, p. 716.
\textsuperscript{483} Wohlleben, 356, 5, p. 460.
\textsuperscript{484} Ḥorramšāhi, Ḥāfīz–nāme, vol. 1: p. 96.
\textsuperscript{485} See: Pourjavady, ‘Pîr-e Golrang,’ p. 49.
Yet Ḥāfiz’s mentor is not a super-natural sublime entity like the sages of Ibn Sinā and Yaḥyā Suhravardī. The pir that Ḥāfiz invents, as numerous cases in the Divān illustrate, is a fictional character named Pir-i Muğān – Master of the Magi. The words Magi (muğān) and Magus (muğ) appear forty times in the Divān.486 This term appeared in Persian poetry from as early as the time of Sanāʾī (in the eleventh century), yet Ḥāfiz was the only poet who portrays the character as the sole mediating figure.487 The difference between Ḥāfiz’s use of Pir-i Muğān and that of other poets like Sanāʾī lies in the fact that these other poets do not criticize great Sufi masters, whom they revere as saints. Sanāʾī uses Pir-i Muğān to show he is a Malāmati and that he desires to conceal his piety; accordingly, he praises Bāyazīd of Bastām. Furthermore, unlike Ḥāfiz, Sanāʾī writes numerous didactic poems inviting his disciples to join the path of Sufism. The name of Ḥāfiz’s fictional character alludes to Zoroastrianism;488 the word muğ, in the pre-Islamic Iran, denoted a high-ranking Zoroastrian priest.489 Nonetheless, as Gānī, Ḥorramšāhī,490 and Muʾīn assert,491 in post-Islamic Iran, this term must be understood in relation to the prohibition of consumption and production of wine; after this prohibition, Muslims would commonly turn to Christians or Zoroastrians in order to enjoy wine. In his book on the influence of Zoroastrianism (Mazdayasnā) on Persian literature, Muʾīn demonstrates that, for scholars and historians of the Islamic world, wine was commonly accepted as a component of Zoroastrian religion; furthermore, leading a joyous life and drinking were considered to be in service to the religion.492 This background allows us to understand an aspect of Ḥāfiz’s invention of his mentor. In relation to his ironic crusade against Sufi zealots and their ascetic praise of purity, Ḥāfiz turns to the Pir-i Muğān instead of to the mentors of the Sufi path (pirān-i ṭariqat).493 The following couplet illustrates how the poet introduces his intermediary character in contrast to the šayḥs of convents:

486 Ṣeddīqiyyān and Mir ābedīnī, Farhang-e vājenāme-ye Ḩāfiz, pp. 1087–1088.
488 Mortazavi, Maktab-e Ḩāfiz: Moqaddame bar Ḩāfiz-šenāsī, p. 284.
As we saw above, Pir-i Muğān fulfilled the promise once made by the Sufi šayḥs – namely, to provide guidance in pursuit of self-knowledge. Several couplets of the Divan illustrate the poet’s devotion to his intellectual invention. In the following couplet, Ḥāfīz reaﬃrms his commitment to Pir-i Muğān, in whom he sees a path to a joyous life:

\[
\begin{align*}
Az \, ast\,a\,n \, Pir\,i \, Mu\,g\,a\,n \, sar \, \, cir\,a \, k\,a\,s\,a\,m \\
Daulat \, dar \, an \, sar\,a \, u \, gu\,\,s\,a\,yi\,s \, dar \, an \, dar \, ast \\
Why \, should \, I \, shun \, the \, Magian \, Elder’s \, threshold? \\
Good \, fortune \, is \, in \, this \, mansion, \, and \, opening \, in \, this \, door.\end{align*}
\]

In the following couplet, Ḥāfīz asserts that his bond with this intellectual guiding agent is eternal:

\[
\begin{align*}
T\,a \, z\,i \, m\,a\,i\,h\,a\,n\,a \, u \, m\,a\,i \, n\,\,m \, u \, n\,i\,\,s\,a\,n \, h\,’a\,h\,a\,d \, b\,u\,d \\
Sar\,i \, m\,a \, h\,a\,k\,-i \, r\,a\,h\,-i \, Pir\,i \, Mu\,g\,a\,n \, h\,v\,a\,h\,a\,d \, b\,u\,d \\
So \, long \, as \, of \, the \, wine-shop \, and \, wine \, there \, will \, be \, the \, name \, and \, the \, sign, \\
Our \, head \, will \, be \, the \, dust \, of \, the \, Magian \, Elder’s \, path.\end{align*}
\]

These couplets praise Pir-i Muğān as a literary personiﬁcation of the possibility of moving beyond the failed teachings of Sufis. In the following couplets, the poet attempts to move beyond praise and provide the reader with details about Pir-i Muğān’s contribution as a mediator:

\[
\begin{align*}
Z\,a\,n\,r\,i\,z \, b\,a\,r \, d\,i\,l\,a\,m \, d\,a\,r\,-i \, m\,a\,’\,n\,i \, g\,u\,s\,u\,da \, s\,u\,d \\
Kaz \, s\,a\,k\,i\,n\,\,a\,-i \, d\,a\,r\,g\,a\,h\,-i \, Pir\,-i \, Mu\,g\,a\,n \, s\,u\,d\,a\,m \\
The \, door \, of \, True \, Meaning \, was \, opened \, to \, my \, heart \, from \, that \, day \\
That \, I \, became \, one \, of \, the \, dwellers \, in \, the \, Court \, of \, the \, Magian \, Guide.\end{align*}
\]

In the following couplet, moreover, we read that Pir-i Muğān liberated the poet from ignorance. In this couplet, Ḥāfīz juxtaposes the slavery of ignorance to a kind of knowledge that truly frees the knower. This act of liberation, described as ‘ayn-i ‘ināyat, is one of the contributions of this pir:

\[
\begin{align*}
\end{align*}
\]

494 Avery, CXLI, 8, p. 192.
495 Avery, XL, 3, p. 72.
496 Avery, CCI, 1, p. 263.
497 Avery, CCCXIV, 7, p. 391.
The phrase ‘āyn-i īnāyat can be translated literally as ‘the essence of grace’, ‘the spring of favor’ or ‘the image of care’. This term makes another appearance later in the same ḡazal from which the couplet above originates: ‘The ascetic—self regard and prayer, and I—drunkenness and supplication: | Well now, which of the two would you be disposed to favour?’ In this translation by Avery, ‘īnāyat conveys intentionality. As Ḥoramšāhi explains in his commentary on the Divan, the term ‘īnāyat, in philosophical and theological contexts, pertains to a divine perspective. This perspective lies beyond human. In a different context, Ḥāfīz uses this term in his polemic against the Sufi master Šāh Ni‘matullāh, whom we mentioned earlier:

In the couplet above, this term is used to show that neither the pious person nor the libertine can be judged by conventional morality. By attributing ‘īnāyat to his fictive mentor, Ḥāfīz points out that his emancipation from ignorance is not a reward for ascetic piety, but rather a reward for realizing the existence of a perspective that goes beyond the simple laws of religion. This perspective is a divine one. Pir-i Muğān maintains that what is perceived as good can in fact be evil, and vice versa; judgment belongs to a perspective that lies beyond these human notions. Ḥāfīz deploys this teaching of Pir-i Muğān against the self-aggrandizing Sufi (Šāh Ni‘matullāh). He reminds the Sufi that neither of these two qualities—i.e., debauchery and abstinence—grant higher or lower moral ground. The act of judgment belongs to a divine perspective beyond good and evil, and it obeys a logic that is incomprehensible to the human’s binary mind.

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498 My translation according to the Divan edited by Qazvini & Ğanī, 158, 6.
499 Avery, CLIV, 6, p. 209.
500 Sağğadi, Farhang-e ma‘āref-e eslāmī, pp. 377–379.
502 Avery, CXCI, 4, p. 251.
II.2.7.2 Ḥāfiẓ’s Mentor and Inclusion in Paradox

In Čārdah revāyat, Ḥorramšāhi dedicates an article to explaining the third couplet of ḡazal 101. The couplet in question has been the object of various controversial interpretations; Sūdī recounts consulting with experts about this couplet during his many journeys and pilgrimages. The couplet itself is not complicated with respect to its vocabulary or structure, but its paradoxical irony challenges the reader. Here are three different translations:

Said our Pir: ‘On the creator’s pen, passed no error.’
On his (the Pir’s) pure sight, error covering, afrin[505] be!

Der Alte sprach: des Künstlers Schrift
Ist ganz von allen Fehlern frey.
Sein Blick voll Nachsicht soll dafür
Von mir gepriesen seyn.

Unser Alter sagte: Ein Fehler ist in das Schreibrohr der Schöpfung nicht eingeflossen.
Lob und Preis sei Seinem klaren Blick, welcher Fehler zudeckt.

The couplet operates on two levels: the level of action (the demiuramic level) and the level of a perspective through which discernible flaws are not recognized as such. The irony of the second verse spares the reader a mystical statement indifferent to the fact that evil exists. The controversy surrounding this verse stems from this humanist ironic perspective.

According to Sūdī, the main controversy of the couplet concerns how to interpret the existence of evil in a world that is held to originate from a principle of absolute Good. Sūdī recounts the views of several experts, whom he personally requested to interpret the couplet. Among these experts were Mullā Aḥmad Qazvīnī from Šām (modern day Syria); Mullā Muṣliḥ ud-Dīn Lāri (from modern day Iran), who was both a clergyman and a poet; and Šayḥ Ḥūsain-i Ḥā’arazmi, who resided in Āmid (modern day Diyarbakır) and who

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503 Transcription of the Persian couplet is the following: Pir-i mā guft ḥaṭā bar qalam-i ṣun’ naraft | Āfarin bar nažar-i pūk-i ḥatāpūš-aš bād
505 Praise
506 Clarke, 237, 4, p. 428
508 Wohlleben, 101, 3, p. 171.
510 Compare to Zarrinkūb’s treatment of this subject in relation to this couplet in the following: Zarrinkūb, Az kūče–ye rendān, pp. 140–143.
was also a clergyman and a poet. All three agreed that this couplet alludes to a Quranic story in which Moses find a mentor (whose identity the Qur‘ān does not reveal) with divine wisdom.\textsuperscript{511} When Moses asks permission to be the mentor’s follower,\textsuperscript{512} the mentor reluctantly grants it, but on one condition – Moses must not ask the mentor to explain why he acts as he does. Moses enthusiastically accepts the offer, but he fails to uphold his part of the bargain. On three consecutive occasions, Moses loses his patience and asks the mentor to explain his actions: an act of vandalism, an act of homicide and rebuilding an old city wall without expecting compensation. (The first two of these actions appear to be evil.) The mentor finally parts ways with Moses, but not before offering a partial explanation: his apparently evil actions in fact benefited other people.

Another story to which Ḥāfīz may have alluded in the couplet above, Südi suggests, is the story of Šayḫ-i Šan‘ān. A great Sufi master, Šayḫ-i Šan‘ān abandons his religion after falling in love with a Christian girl. He follows his beloved’s customs, drinks wine and burns the Qur‘ān. His own former disciples accuse him of having succumbed to evil temptation; yet, in fact, his apparently evil action brought about his enlightenment.\textsuperscript{513}

Südi’s enquiries show how the poem kindles among scholars a strong curiosity regarding this enigmatic mentor, who speaks about the world and evil in a paradoxical, ironic tone.

Since Ḥāfīz’s mentor is non-personal and formed from various intellectual sources known to the poet, we may further explore the mentor’s views regarding the problem of evil in light of the views of Ḥāfīz’s contemporaries. In his article on this couplet, Ḥorramšāhi directs his reader’s attention to ‘Aḍud ud-Din Īǧī’s views on evil, expressed in his book Mawāqif (Stations). A contemporary of Ḥāfīz, Īǧī was a highly respected scholar and judge. The poet respected him as an expert and teacher.\textsuperscript{514}

\textsuperscript{511} The Qur‘ān (18: 65–82)
\textsuperscript{514} Ḥorramšāhi, Čārdah revāyat: Mağmu’e-ye maqāle dar bāre-ye še’r va šahṣiyat-e Ḥāfīz, p. 37 & 39. See also Mu’in, Ḥāfīz-e širinsoḥan, pp. 181–182.
In the *Divan*, there is a *qaṭʿa* in which Ḥāfīz eulogizes five great men in the time of Šāh Šayḥ Abū Ishāq (ruled ca. 1342–53); in this *qaṭʿa*, he praises Īǧī as the ‘king of knowledge’ and refers to Īǧī’s masterwork, *Mawāqif*. Despite the fact that Īǧī played an important role in the court as a judge, advisor and ambassador, however, Ḥāfīz does not praise Īǧī as a judge or a politician; rather, Ḥāfīz praises him for his intellectual achievements. Another important aspect of this poem is that it reflects Ḥāfīz’s genuine faith in greatness of these men; Ḥāfīz did not expect any reward for his expressions of praise, since, by the time all five of these men had died, Shiraz was ruled by the enemies of the Īynū dynasty. Here are several couplets of this poem:

1. In the time of the rule of Shāh Shaikh Abū Ishāq
   By five wonderful persons, prosperous was the country of Fārs.

5. The next the king of learning, Ṣad, who in composition
   In the name of the King (Shāh Abū Ishāk), laid the foundation of the work of ‘Stations.’

[7] Equal to themselves, they left none; and departed (in death);
May God, great and glorious, cause all to be forgiven!

In *Mawāqif*, Īǧī discusses metaphysical views regarding the existence of evil.

Beings are either pure good, absolutely devoid of evil, like the intellects and the spheres; or the good outweighs the evil in them as in our world, namely, the sublunar realm. Here, however, for example, diseases are many, health still outnumbers them, and if there are sufferings, there is still more rest and joy. In the philosophers’ view, beings are of one of these two categories. Yet absolute evil, and evil which outweighs or is equal to good, does not exist. If anyone were to ask why this world is not purged of evil, the answer would be that absolute abstraction in this world is impossible, for that [the outcome of this abstraction] would belong to the first category, whereas the realm of many goods which necessarily contain a little evil [the second category or the natural world] is our concern here, and a proposition that considers dispensing with the necessary [lāzim] part of something is an absurd one. And the good entered the divine

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515 *Qaṭʿa* (or *qiṭʿa*) is a form of poetry in which the second verse of each couplet rhymes.
518 Ḥāfīz’s phrasing here is ṣahanšah-i dānīš, which can be literally translated as ‘king of the kings of knowledge’.
519 Clarke, 579, p. 936.
520 Fārābī and Ibn Sinā explain the stages of emanation in modification of Plotinus’s emanation as the different stages of Intellect; Active Intelligence (Soul of the World); and the sublunar realm (nature).
determination by prior intentionality, and it is original and essential to it, whereas evil comes about by necessity [bi ʾd-ḥarūra], and contingently [bi ṭ-tabʿ]. And it would be far from wisdom if the rain, the delicacy of which no one can deny and upon which the life of this world depends, were to be dispensed with just to eliminate a possibility that it might ruin a few houses or possibly do a few travelers harm.\textsuperscript{521}

Īği argues that evil is a necessary part of the existence of this world (in contrast to the intelligible realm). He explicitly refutes the view, which appears in various religions, that evil is a self-contained entity. Most importantly, Īği differentiates between the intention of the demiurgical act and the contingent presence of imperfection that makes the sublunary realm possible.

Ḥāfiẓ’s pīr teaches that there are evils and imperfections in the sublunary world, but that the good far outweighs the evil. To appreciate the natural world, one needs to go beyond the limited binary perspective of good and evil and accept that evil makes the sublunary world possible and beautiful. Ḥāfiẓ’s experience of spring testifies to this beauty. If we agree with Ḥāfiẓ, then we must accept evil as part of the pursuit of beauty and truth in the natural realm.

This teaching of the Pīr-i Muğān is no longer based on an outlook of exclusion. Rather, it turns toward life in the world and it recognizes an aesthetic and cosmogenic necessity in what appears as evil; exploring the world aesthetically or as seeker of knowledge means exploring it as a whole. Thus, Pīr-i Muğān impresses upon Ḥāfiẓ, the necessity of going beyond the dualities of evil and good; pure and defiled; and corruptible and everlasting.

The following couplet, quoted in three English translations, illustrates the necessity of inclusion in the view of Pīr-i Muğān:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Ba māī sağiḍāda rangīn kun garat Pīr-i Muğān gūyad}
\textit{Ki sālik bihabar nabvad zi rāḥ-u-rasm-i manzilhā}
\textit{Stain the prayer-mat with wine, if the Magian Elder tells you:}
\textit{The traveler won’t be ignorant of the road and of how to behave at the halts.}\textsuperscript{522}
\textit{Stain with the tinge of wine thy prayer-mat, if thus the aged Magian bid,}
\textit{For from the traveller of the Pathway no stage nor usage can be hid.}\textsuperscript{523}
\textit{Hear the Tavern-keeper who counsels you:}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{521}My translation of Ḥorramšāhi’s Persian translation in: Ḥorramšāhi, Čardah revāyat: Mağmū’-e ye maqāle dar bāre-ye še’r va šahṣiyat-e Ḥāfiẓ, pp. 39–40. For the sake of comparison with the original work, I provide the necessary original Arabic terms italicized in brackets: ‘Adud ud-Dīn Īği, al-Mawāqif, 8 vols. (Cairo: Maṭbaʿa as-Saʿāda, 1907), vol. 8: pp. 179–180.

\textsuperscript{522}Avery, I, 3, p. 18 (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{523}Hafiz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman Bicknell, I, 3, p. 4 (my emphasis).
‘With wine, with red wine your prayer carpet dye!’
There was never a traveller like him but knew
The ways of the road and the hostelry.524

In this couplet, the mentor encourages Ḥāfīz to stain (or dye) the very locus of purity – the prayer carpet. Yet this is no act of rebellion; it is a necessary step on the way to becoming involved in the realm of nature and appreciating natural beauty. In the couplet that follows, Pir-i Muğān is again introduced as the teacher of inclusion:

Guftam ḍarāb u ḥīrqā na āyīn-i mazḥab ast
Guft īn ‘amal ba mazḥab-i Pir-i Muğān kunand

Ich sprach: Wein und Kutte, das paßt nicht zur selben Ordensregel.
Er sprach: Dies ist Praxis im Orden des Alten Magiers.525
I said: ‘Wine and the patched gown are not religiously ordained.’
He answered: ‘These comprise the rite performed in the Magian Elder’s sect.’526

This couplet comes from a ġazal that poetically narrates the dialogue between Ḥāfīz and his beloved; Ḥāfīz asks questions, and the beloved answers. As the beloved brings up the topic of wine, Ḥāfīz is prompted to recall the exclusive elements of purification and the Sufi frock. The beloved reminds Ḥāfīz that, according to Pir-i Muğān, wine and the Sufi frock are two fundamental parts of existence; they cannot be excluded from each other, even though they are diametrically opposed.

The poet recognizes the gravity of stepping outside the space of exclusion and abstraction. In the following couplet, Ḥāfīz uses an ironic tone to show how turning toward the excluded realm ruins the world built around exclusion:

Na ba ḥaft-āb ki rangaš ba ṣad ātaš naravad
Ančī bā ḥīrqā-yī zāhid maī-i angūrī kard

Weder in sieben (rituellen) Waschungen noch hundert Bränden weicht der Farbfleck,
den auf der Kutte des Frömlings der Traubensaft hinterläßt.527
Not with the prescribed seven dippings nor in a hundred fires will the stain go
That the wine of the grapevine has dropped on the ascetic’s gown.528
Not by water in seven cleansings
Nor by a hundred fires’ blazing
Its trace shall be gone

524 Ḥāfīz, The Hafez Poems of Gertrude Bell, 1, p. 63 (my emphasis).
525 Wohlleben, 193, 6, p. 275.
526 Avery, CXCIII, 6, p. 253.
527 Wohlleben, 135, 6, p. 208.
528 Avery, CXXXV, 6, p. 184.
What to the ascetic’s frock
The grape’s wine
Has done.  

Turning toward the inclusion that unfolds in the paradoxical space of co-presence of conventionally and logically mutually exclusives, another world is revealed to the poet. Following the teachings of his fictional mentor, Ḥāfīẓ views the evil of the world as a condition of its beauty:

Qand-i āmīhta ba gul na ‘alāg-i dīl-i māst
Būsaʾī čand barāmīz ba dušnāmī čand
Kandis mit Rosenwasser vermischt, das ist keine Medizin für mein Herz,
ein paar Kisse mische auf mit ein paar Gemeinheiten.  
Candy mixed with the rose (rose-conserve), is not the remedy for our sick heart:
Some kisses mix with some abuse.  
Davām-i ‘aįš u tana’um na šiva-yī ‘ișq ast
Agar mu’aįšir-i mā’ī binūš niš-i ğamī
Dauerndes Vergnügen und Ergötzen ist nicht die Art der Liebe.
Wenn du Unsresgleichen bist, schlucke den Stachel des Grams!  
The rites of love are not uninterrupted pleasure nor sybaritic living.
If you are our companion, imbibe the poison of grief.

In his pursuit of beauty and love, the poet finds more truth in tenderness and bitterness than in a pure and flawless constant adoration. In the first of the two couplets above, Ḥāfīẓ reveals to his beloved the secret that he learned from his intellectual pir – namely, in the natural realm, evil is a condition of beauty. For Ḥāfīẓ, love stands in relation to two contradictory pairs – affection and distance; and pain and pleasure. In Ḥāfīẓ’s view, the space of paradox is the space in which one can pursue truth and beauty.

Az ḥalāfāmad-i ‘ādat bițalab kām ki man
Kasb-i ğam’iyat az ān zulf-i parīšān kardam
By strange ways only can thy wish be blest:

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529 My translation of the verse: Ḥānlarī, 135, 6. In my translation the gravity of Ḥāfīẓ’s choice of word ‘ānci [. . .] mai-i angūri kard’ is conveyed. Here, the simple harmless but excluded wine has done something to the gown, which is a life-changing event. The stain here stands for the permanent mark of stepping outside the safe space of exclusion.

530 Wohlleben, 177, 4, p. 256.

531 Clarke, 141, 4, p. 286.

532 Wohlleben, 462, 7, p. 579.

533 Avery, CCCCLXII, 7, p. 558.
That lock so restless set my heart at rest.\textsuperscript{534}
From the contradictory to the customary
seek your desire, for I
Found composedness in those scattered locks of hair.\textsuperscript{535}

In this couplet, the poet articulates his theory of the fundamental role of paradox in attaining his object of aspiration. The phrase that Bicknell translates as ‘strange ways’ is ‘\textit{ḥalāfāmād-i ‘ādat}’ – literally, it means ‘contradictory to the customary’. In the first verse, Ḥāfīz states that a paradox has revealed to him the fulfillment of his wishes; in the second verse, he uses the metaphor of multiplicity – namely, the locks of hair that brought him to unity –, which alludes to the metaphor of the mole of the beloved.\textsuperscript{536} In the third chapter, I return to the paradox of unrest and composedness of the beloved’s hair and I elaborate on the allegorical meaning of this paradox in Ḥāfīz’s world-view.

Pīr-i Muğān inspires Ḥāfīz to go beyond the negative and excluding methods of ascetic Sufism and opens space of inclusion in paradox.

\begin{quote}
\textit{Zi kunğ-i sauma’a Ḥāfīz mağūy gauhar-i ‘iṣq}
\textit{Qadam burūn nih agar mail-i ġust-u-ğu dārī}
Do not, Hāfiz, search in the recesses of the hermit cell for the jewel of love.
If you want to make the quest, step outside.\textsuperscript{537}
Vom Winkel im Kloster aus, o Hafiz, suche nicht nach dem Juwel der Liebe,
tritt dort heraus, wenn du wirklich nach ihm forschens willst.\textsuperscript{538}
\end{quote}

This rejection of the exclusive elements of Sufism – ḥalvat (solitude), ḥānaqaḥ (convents) and ḥirqa (the Sufi frock) – marks a turn toward the natural realm, both aesthetically and intellectually.

\section*{II.3 Toward Life in Goethe’s \textit{Faust} and Ḥāfīz’s \textit{Divan}}

Thus far, we have seen that the direct approach toward a transcendent truth is reevaluated in Goethe’s \textit{Faust} and Ḥāfīz’s \textit{Divan}. In both cases, the critique of the method of attainment of knowledge in abstraction of the bodily and natural realms has brought about a turn toward life. I now review the

\textsuperscript{534} Ḥafiz, \textit{Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman Bicknell}, CLVI, 8, p. 216.
\textsuperscript{535} Ḥānlarī, 312, 3 (my translation).
\textsuperscript{537} Avery, CCCCXXXVII, 9, p. 527.
\textsuperscript{538} Wohlleben, 437, 9, p. 551.
similarities and differences between these two texts in light of their historical and cultural differences.

II.3.1 Space of Exclusion

The negative method of attaining knowledge in both texts forms a world of exclusion in which nothing of the natural sphere is admitted. In Faust’s case, this world is the legacy of his fathers, and in the case of Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan*, it is the historically dominant method of attaining truth. In both cases, this world provides a safe place in which the bodily and natural realms are excluded, and the seeker of such negative knowledge is able to pursue his negative ascending process of self-development.

As I showed in sections II.1.2 and II.1.2.1, this space in *Faust* corresponds to Faust’s study.539 In this space, Faust repeatedly denigrates his body and wishes to transcend its limits, until, finally, he decides to take a poison inherited from his father. As I explored in detail in section II.1.2.1, the study is explicitly illustrated as a place that prevents the natural life force from reaching Faust. Consequently, Faust desires to leave his old world of exclusion and return to nature and life.540

To explore the presence of a space defined in accordance with the exclusion of the natural realm in the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ, I demonstrated the difference between, on the one hand, the tenth and eleventh-century poetic representations of natural phenomena in early Persian poetry and,541 on the other hand, the representation of nature in works of Saʿdī of the thirteenth century and in several ḡazals by Ḥāfiẓ, in which traces of Sufi exclusive views are present.

The space introduced as ḥalvat (solitude) by Saʿdī and Ḥāfiẓ is a space in which the seeker of truth aspires for freedom from changeable natural phenomena in order to arrive at the unchangeable ideal of truth. Thus, those who reside in this house of exclusion are kept safe from the confusions of the natural realm. In section II.2.2,542 I explored the details of this space and pointed out that, in Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan*, this space is referred to as his house.543

539 See p. 103 above.
540 See p. 112; 116 above.
541 See pp. 139–141 above.
542 See pp. 142–147 above.
543 See pp. 147f above.
II.3.2 Elements of Exclusion

In section II.1.2, I discussed Faust’s inheritance from his forefathers, which forms a space of exclusion. I demonstrated that Faust’s institution of knowledge separates him from the natural world. The walls of exclusion follow Faust outside the study. In society, he is revered as ‘Herr Doktor’ and thus remains distant in his subjective world.

Furthermore, I explained the negative elements in the Sufi tradition that excluded Sufi followers from ordinary life and the natural world. The ḥānaqāḥ and ḥirqa represent the objective aspect of these Sufi excluding views; purification and repentance represent the subjective aspect. In the Divan, elements of purification in the Sufi tradition are constantly present, since Sufism was the dominant discourse during Ḥāfīz’s time. I explored Ḥāfīz’s poetical critique of these elements, in which Ḥāfīz exposes their contradictions with his experience of the natural world.

II.3.3 Influence of Spring in the Turn Toward Life

In both texts, the arrival of spring casts doubt on the method of exclusion of the natural realm. Both Ḥāfīz and Goethe illustrate spring as a landscape in which an immanent cosmic force invigorates nature after winter. More importantly, the seeker of knowledge sees that the same cosmic force extends its influence into the human realm.

In the Osterspaziergang scene, I discussed two instances of change in Faust’s intellectual development: his assessment of the relation between the light and color; and his new conception of mediation.

As I explained in section II.2.4, the narrator of Divan finds himself aesthetically impressed by the same force that revives nature in spring. Like Faust, Ḥāfīz of the Divan sees the feasts and celebrations that bring joy to people’s lives as an extension of the force that animates the natural and heavenly realms. Thus, Ḥāfīz criticizes the teachings of extreme ascetic Sufis as hypocritical and ignorant. In the

544 See p. 103 above.
545 See §II.1.2.2 (‘The World and the Significance of Honorific Titles’).
546 See §II.1.1.2 (‘The Sun, Its Light and the Colors: Modification of a World-View Through Metaphors’).
547 §II.1.1.1 (‘Turn from Direct Approach to the Truth Toward Mediation’) demonstrates this line of Faust’s intellectual development.
548 See p. 164 above.
poet’s view, spring and abstraction are mutually exclusive, since abstraction prescribes exclusion of the natural realm whereas spring provides evidence of the immanence of the heavenly source of life.

Whereas Faust clearly expresses a wish to lead a new ‘colorful life’ (v. 1121), a clear instance of an early step towards the modification of light metaphors cannot be found in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ. A reason for this is the Divan’s different genre. Whereas in drama and narrative literary works, we can identify turning points of a given plot or sub-plot, in a lyrical work – even one with Ḥāfiẓ’s stylistic form that suggests narrative characteristics –, detecting and highlighting such nuanced modifications is nearly impossible. We simply don’t have enough information to date the composition of each poem – not to mention, the poet constantly reedited his works.

II.3.4 Anxiety and Leaving the Old World Behind

The two texts illustrate the experience of finding that one’s old world has lost its value. In the scene Nacht, Faust finds nothing worthy in his study. He finally sees himself drowned in the sea of error. In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ poetically articulates the experience of facing the ruins of one’s old world; he recounts wishing to drown all his books of nonsense in wine and pawn his imaginary Sufi-frock for a glass of wine.

I showed that Ḥāfiẓ explicitly abandons a desire for union with the sun. As an instance of this change in direction, we saw that the poet describes himself as a diver submerged into a bottomless and shoreless sea in pursuit of the pearl that represents his love.549

In both cases, the act of abandoning the space of exclusion is intertwined with the experience of anxiety. Referring to Blumenberg’s view of ‘Horizontefahrung’, I showed that each of Faust’s steps into the excluded realm is seen as a step inside the realm of darkness and the unknown. Moreover, the mediating figure Mephisto, who approaches from behind the walls of Faust’s study, receives his evil traits from that excluded space; Mephisto is the guide Faust desired, who will lead him beyond the limits of his world. The feeling of anxiety in Faust first appears in Wagner’s warnings, as Faust stares heroically into the darkness just before the poodle emerges.550 In the scene Studierzimmer [I], Mephisto reveals himself while Faust describes his study as a hermitage. I delineated the relation between the

549 See §II.2.5 (‘Diving into the Sea of the Wine House’).
550 See pp. 109ff above.
values of Faust’s old world and Mephisto’s evil intentions. Furthermore, I explained the exclusive, ascetic characteristic of Mephisto’s personal philosophy. Through Wagner, Faust and Mephisto, the dramatic work conveys the experience of stepping inside the unknown.

In the Divan, in addition to Ḥāfīz’s constant usage of sarcasm to attack extreme ascetic Sufism, we also find poetic depictions of anxiety and settings filled with threats. We explained this state of anxiety with reference to a gazal that illustrates the poet stepping inside a space where swords are raining down from the sky. Yet the poet is determined not to turn back to the safety of his solitude or the teachings of zealot ascetics; these no longer represent a safe place where truth can be attained, but they rather appear as an institution that perpetuates ignorance and self-deception. By resisting the false promise of safety (now seen as a trap), the poet shows heroism. This heroism, however, does not stop him expressing his doubts and anxieties. Outside the walls of the excluding world (ḥalvat), Ḥāfīz faces an inner conflict, since his turn toward life is seen by the followers of purification as besmirching his pure and elevated soul.

II.3.5 Mediation and Inclusion in Paradox

Mephisto’s mediation is dramatized in stages: first, he frees himself from his imprisonment in Faust’s study; then, he succeeds in convincing Faust to leave his house. Mephisto resists Faust’s attempts to dominate him. He presents himself in a paradoxical manner that nullifies the binary categories of good and evil, which are the basis of Faust’s method of exclusion. In Studierzimmer [II], Mephisto (again) employs paradox to help Faust overcome two obstacles. He helps Faust move beyond the duality of pain and pleasure to arrive at a paradoxical co-presence of these two categories; and he also persistently challenges Faust’s self-deification.

In the Divan, Ḥāfīz follows the tradition of philosophers such as Ibn Sinā and Suhravardi by introducing a non-personal mediatary figure. However, unlike the mentor of these philosophers, Ḥāfīz’s mentor is not an extramundane modification of the Soul of the World or Active Intelligence. Rather, Ḥāfīz

551 See §II.1.3.3.1 (‘Mephisto’s Evil Intentions and the Presence of Faust’s Old World’).
552 See §II.2.5 (‘Diving into the Sea of the Wine House’) and §II.2.6 (‘Anxiety in the Field of Critique of the Old World’).
553 See §II.2.6.1 (‘Between Inclusion and Exclusion: Dilemma of Purification and Pollution’).
554 V. 1784. See §II.1.3.4.2 (‘From Pain and Pleasure to Paradox and Partaking’).
creates a fictional character who serves as his guide and reflects his own views as well as those of Sufis and theologians. The mentor’s name, Pīr-i Muğān, highlights his difference from the personal mentors of the institution of Sufism. This mentor represents the culmination of the poet’s critique of the Sufi abstract and negative method of attainment of knowledge. As I demonstrated in section II.2.7.2, the mentor helps Ḥāfiẓ find a way out of the isolation of his solitude (ḥalvat). Pīr-i Muğān makes use of the potentials of paradox to uproot the dualistic basis of the negative views. By integrating the notion of ‘ināyat into his teachings, Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor nullifies the binary system of evaluation by which the follower of purification negates evil in order to attain to the good.555 Furthermore, Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor teaches him that the evil that is a necessary element of the sublunary realm does not outweigh the good.556 Therefore, Ḥāfiẓ’s mentor teaches that one should partake in the natural realm by following the principle of inclusion in paradox.557 Ḥāfiẓ is guided by his mentor to overcome his anxiety and step out of his house of exclusion into the realm of nature and life.

Unlike in Faust, in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, the ‘protagonist’ (Ḥāfiẓ) does not come into conflict with his mediating agent. As a lyrical and non-dramatic work of poetry, the Divan reserves its sarcastic attacks for zealot ascetics who fail to appreciate the beauty of the natural world.

In Faust, the conflict between Faust and Mephisto dramatizes the process of mediation. The challenge between the poodle and Faust’s room reveals the similarity between this room and a hermitage. Thus, an aspect of Faust comes to light that had been hidden behind his rebellious attacks on the world he inherited from his fathers. This sophisticated manner of illustration of the process of inclusion in paradox is possible through the genre of dramatic literature.

555 See p. 180 above.
556 See pp. 183ff above.
557 See §II.2.7.2 (‘Ḥāfiẓ’s Mentor and Inclusion in Paradox’).
III Colorful Reflections

In this chapter, I explore in both texts the consequences of the turn toward life that we investigated in the previous chapter. As I demonstrated, in both texts, the turn was taken from a direct, ascending approach to the truth, which excluded its seekers from life; its pursuit was defined as separating the higher soul that desires ascent from the lower part that is concerned with the needs of the body. In this subchapter, I analyze Goethe’s Faust, and in the following one I turn to the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.

III.1 The World of Reflections in Goethe’s Faust

III.1.1 The Activity of the Faculty of Appreciation of Beauty

Auerbachs Keller in Leipzig is the first scene in the drama after Faust leaves his old world. Considering the terms of Faust’s contract with Mephisto and the words of the Lord in Prolog im Himmel (v. 342), we know that the way ahead of him cannot be that of rest. Mephisto must offer Faust a quest in which he would be willing to partake. In an early draft of the drama (Faust frühe Fassung), Mephisto takes Faust to Auerbachs Keller to find out whether he has any interest in the company of rude drinking companions. In other words, the visit to Auerbachs Keller was an experiment designed to help Mephisto plan Faust’s next quest. In line with Faust’s youthful character in the early draft, Faust is the acting magician who performs the wine trick as an engaged participant of the scene. In the final version of the drama, however, Faust is depicted as an older man.

In fact, the difference between the ‘early’ Faust character and the ‘late’ Faust character is even more pronounced. In the final version of the drama, Faust is conspicuously passive and disinterested. The reader is led to believe that Mephisto performs these tricks for the audience to lighten the mood after the previous two intense scenes; or perhaps the scene functions to give the reader an image of the society that will (later) judge Gretchen and her choices. Mephisto (in the final version) explains his reason for bringing Faust to Auerbachs Keller: ‘Damit du siehst wie leicht sich’s leben läßt.’ Yet the process of inclusion and partaking in life (a process that was kindled in the scene

1 FT, p. 486. V. 54–55.
2 V. 2160.
Studierzimmer [II] cannot start in Auerbachs Keller. After greeting the guests, Faust’s only words are to articulate his wish for leaving: ‘Ich hätte Lust nun abzufahren.’ Schmidt points out that, in Auerbachs Keller, sensuality is present, but not in its sexual aspect. In Schmidt’s view, the sensuality of Auerbachs Keller does not go beyond an animal desire for eating and drinking. Yet the verses that follow verse 2101 bring sexuality into the scene. According to Schmidt sexuality is first introduced into the drama in the scene Hexenküche. Yet, on closer investigation, we see that it is not sexuality that is absent in the scene Auerbachs Keller, but rather beauty and love. Auerbachs Keller offers nothing worthwhile for Faust. This proves that a life of revelry is not what Faust missed when he uttered ‘Fehlt mir die leichte Lebensart.’ The Auerbachs Keller is not even repellent or ugly enough to become an experience for him. As such, Auerbachs Keller fails to elicit even a single word of evaluation from Faust.

In contrast to Faust’s apathy in Auerbachs Keller, Hexenküche begins with a clear judgment: ‘Mir widersteht das tolle Zauberwesen.’ Faust rejects this space immediately. In Faust’s rejection of the Hexenküche, Melzer highlights the significance of the word ‘toll.’ In comparison to the previous stages of his short journey with Mephisto, the setting of Hexenküche defies Faust’s attempts at rationalization. The song of the spirits at the end of Studierzimmer [I] (as we saw in the previous chapter) was built around motifs and metaphors that belonged to Faust’s speculative and theoretical world; and Auerbachs Keller was described twice by Mephisto

3 V. 2183.
5 Ibid., pp. 144–145.
6 Arens points to the sexual association of these verses in his comments on Faust I by casting light on the similarity between the pithy mention of ‘Riegel auf’ (v. 2105) and ‘Riegel zu!’ (v. 2107) in Auerbachs Keller with Gretchen’s statement that, if it wasn’t for her mother’s being a light sleeper, she would have gladly left the door unbolted for Faust: ‘Ich ließ dir gern heut Nacht den Riegel offen’ (v. 3506) See: Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 215.
7 Compare to Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 144.
8 V. 2056.
9 Rickert rightly emphasizes that ‘Faust muß wirklich interessiert, ernsthaft beteiligt werden.’ The Hexenküche is another chance for Mephisto to win Faust’s interest and participation in the world – and thereby win the wager. Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, p. 211.
10 V. 2337.
as debased and bestial. The space of *Hexenküche* is a place where Faust expects to be healed – ‘Verspricht du mir, ich soll *genesen*’, Faust says. The extent and the quality of this healing can be reconstructed in reference to two passages in the work: (a) verses 410–413 in the scene *Nacht*, and (b) verses 2055–2060 at the end of the second *Studierzimmer* scene.

The healing in question is a rejuvenation by thirty years. In this healing process, we should consider the intellectual problems that stem from Faust’s long years of residing in his world of exclusion (v. 410–413) and his lack of confidence due to his old-fashioned looks. ‘Sobald du dir vertraust, sobald weißt du zu leben’, Mephisto tells Faust. As Dane asserts, Faust’s healing depends on his overcoming his lack of confidence – and this is exactly what the potion achieves. I concentrate on the aspect of the process of healing that is relevant to Faust’s intellectual problems and unfolds before he takes the potion.

The readers witness the gravity of the irrationality that unfolds in *Hexenküche* only after Faust tacitly accepts to tolerate the conditions of the place (‘so muß denn doch die Hexe dran’) following his refusal to limit himself to the requirements of Mephisto’s suggested ‘natürlich Mittel’. With their seemingly nonsensical rhyming words, the animals in *Hexenküche* play an important role in the formation of the atmosphere of this mysterious space. It is important to note that

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12 See the following verses for Mephisto’s two attempts at characterization of *Auerbachs Keller*: v. 2159–2167 and v. 2297–2298.
13 V. 2338 (my emphasis).
14 V. 2342.
15 ‘Doch da er Kenntnis g’nug erworben, | Ist er der Welt fast abgestorben. […] Sein Äußeres nicht von rechter Art, | Zu lang der Rock, zu kraus der Bart’ in *Mask processions* of 1818 v. 608–609; 612–613 in: FAI, 6: p. 849. Compare to Schöne’s comment in: FK, p. 274. In Witkowski’s biographic work on Goethe, we find the young Goethe’s experience of being dressed in an out of fashion manner as a newcomer and his attempts at adapting himself to life in Leipzig, the city where *Auerbachs Keller* is located. See: Georg Witkowski, *Das Leben Goethes* (Berlin: Knaur, 1932), p. 43.
16 V. 2062.
18 V. 2365.
19 V. 2348. See Dane’s clarification of the background of Mephisto’s suggestion in Dane, ‘*Die heilsame Toilette*’: *Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der Mann von funfzig Jahren’*, pp. 104–106. Referring to Christoph Hufeland’s *Makrobiotik oder die Kunst, das menschliche Leben zu verlängern* (written in 1798), Dane highlights the practical aspect of Mephisto’s suggestion to Faust, who must have suffered from ‘traurigen Folgen des sitzenden Lebens’ and ‘körperliche Schwächen und seelische Krankheiten’.
20 V. 2394ff.
*Hexenküche* appears nonsensical to Faust, since Faust has just abandoned his safe world. On closer inspection, however, we recognize that the apes allegorically refer to the contemporary realities of the poet’s time, including the life of mindless gamblers; the ever-changing and brutal world of politics; and even the decline of literary taste among writers and readers. Faust experiences his first step toward life as a step inside the ‘Hexenküche des Lebens’, which challenges his capability to tolerate the nonsensical and distasteful; he finds the animals ‘so abgeschmackt als ich nur jemand sah!’ Only after Faust’s eyes were exposed to the ugly and his cognition to the nonsensical do his eyes – in a ‘Zauberspiegel’ – bring Faust another experience, which he articulates as follows: ‘Was seh’ ich? Welch ein himmlisch Bild’.

Accentuating Mephisto’s responsibility for the quality and influence of the image that emerges in the mirror, some commentators do not recognize the epistemological aspect of the events in question. Referring to Faust’s reaction to the image in the mirror, Rickert notes ‘zu bemerken ist dabei vor allem, daß Fausts Leidenschaft in voller Stärke erregt ist, bevor er den Zaubertrank erhalten hat.’ This textual fact brings us closer to accepting the independency of Faust’s intellectual faculty from Mephisto’s direct influence, yet it is not compelling enough for Rickert, who interprets the image in the mirror as ‘von Mephistopheles zu dem Zweck hervorgebracht worden ist, Faust in geschlechtliche Leidenschaft zu verstricken.’ Though he agrees with Rickert on stressing the first point, Schöne remains undecided regarding the nature of the mirror; he suggests that the mirror can be interpreted either as an instrument of

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21 V. 2400–2401.
22 See the following verses: ‘Das ist die Welt; | Sie steigt und fällt’ V. 2402–2403. Compare to FK, p. 285. ‘O sei doch so gut, | Mit Schweiß und mit Blut | Die Krone zu leimen!’ V. 2450–2452. See Schöne’s interpretation of this verse in relation to the events of the French Revolution that caused the crown to break, thus requiring reparation with sweat and blood: FK, p. 286.
25 V. 2387.
26 V. 2430.
27 V. 2429.
29 Ibid., p. 216–217.
30 ‘Ehe noch der obszöne Hexentrank ihm eingeflößt wird, spricht Faust doch (2431ff.) zur Liebe, sieht und begreift er die Schönheit als den Inbegriff von allen Himmeln.’ FK, p. 283.
Mephisto’s or as a medium ‘welches freisetzt und zur Erscheinung bringt, was
dem Bezauberten selber eingebildet ist.’ Acknowledging Faust’s active influ-
ence in the events in front of the magic mirror, Schmidt emphasizes Faust’s sub-
limating words as responsible for bringing the ambivalence between ‘einerseits
die treibhafte Sinnlichkeit, andererseits eine edlere Liebe’ into the otherwise
primarily sensual space of *Hexenküche.*

Melzer’s analysis of the dramatic role of the magic mirror invites the reader
to consider two levels, inner and outer, that are in play in *Hexenküche*: ‘Der
Zauberspiegel ist in diesem Zusammenhang wohl nur so zu verstehen: Goethe
will nicht, daß Faust durch das Hexenstück ganz von außen verwandelt wird. So
läßt er ihn diesem Zauber *innerlich* entgegen kommen.’

Trunz evaluates the level and the quality of Faust’s involvement in this
scene as follows: ‘Faust ist äußerlich, nicht innerlich passiv.’ In other words,
Trunz emphasizes the epistemological aspect of the scene. Trunz’s interpreta-
tion of the mirror and its effect is consistent with his view of the inner activity
of Faust in front of the mirror: ‘Da der Zauberspiegel nur als Gegenstand zu der
Hexenwelt gehört, nicht in dem, was er zeigt, kann sich hier im Kontrast zu der
mephistophelisch-hexischen Sphäre das Faustische-Veredelnde auswirken.’

Furthermore, in Trunz’s view, each scene that follows *Hexenküche* con-
stantly ‘erhält auch von Faust seine Prägung infolge seiner *Innerlichkeit.*’ In
light of its epistemological significance, I interpreted Faust’s experience in front
of the mirror as a necessary step toward life. But first we must note that the
*Hexenküche,* dramatologically speaking, is the place where Faust becomes aware
of the activity of his faculty of appreciation of beauty; he becomes receptive to
what the world has to offer him. We can then approach this process as a part of
an epistemological structure.

Faust’s experience in front of the mirror is articulated through terms and meta-
phors that are familiar to the reader. The clearest of these metaphors is Faust’s
wish to acquire wings to fly after his object of pursuit. Of course, we have seen this
metaphor before. In the section ‘Flying toward the Setting Sun,’ I analyzed the first

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31 FK, p. 283.
33 See ibid., p. 154.
36 Ibid., p. 550.
37 Ibid., p. 549 (my emphasis).
38 Friedrich Bruns, ‘*Die Mütter* in Goethes Faust: Versuch einer Deutung,’ *Monatshefte,* 43,
no. 8 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1951), p. 384.
instance in which Faust yearns for wings. In that section, I mentioned the close correspondence between the logic of Faust’s justification of his wish for ascent and the doctrine of anamnesis expounded in Phaedrus.\textsuperscript{39} I also discussed the epistemological significance of anamnesis for the body and soul relation. In short, as Allen argues, ‘the doctrine of Anamnesis is an answer to epistemological problems entailed by the separation of Forms from the particulars in Platonic thought.’\textsuperscript{40} But now that Faust has taken up the path toward life, his wish for wings has a different epistemological significance.

In front of the mirror, after beholding a heavenly image in the form of human beauty,\textsuperscript{41} Faust addresses love as a goddess and asks her for wings: ‘O Liebe, leihe mir den schnellsten deiner Flügel, | Und führe mich in ihr Gefild!’\textsuperscript{42} Just as in Osterspaziergang, Faust is engaged in a cognitive act that motivates him to move toward the object of his desire. But whereas in Osterspaziergang Faust was surrounded by the natural ‘beauty of earth’,\textsuperscript{43} in Hexenküche Faust’s surroundings are irrational and ugly; they do not correspond to the conditions that could activate the Platonic ‘recollection of those things which our soul once saw when it travelled in company with a god and treated with contempt the things we now say are, and when it rose up into what really is.’\textsuperscript{44} The cognitive process in which Faust recognizes what he sees in the mirror as desirable and worthy of pursuit (flying after) is not a Platonic recollection. The beautiful image in the mirror contrasts to the hideousness of Faust’s surroundings: ‘Mitten in diesem Wust von Raserei erhebt sich das Gegen-spiel’, as Schöne says.\textsuperscript{45} Against the background of these surroundings, the reclined female beauty in the mirror appears to Faust as the epitome of the heavens.

In Goethes Farbentheologie, Schöne traces Goethe’s intellectual development from his acquaintance with Susanne Katharina von Klettenberg to his study of Gottfried Arnold’s Unpartheyiche Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{39} See pp. 64f above. Compare to Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Christopher Rowe, p. 67. 249 d 5ff.  
\textsuperscript{41} See the following verses: ‘Welch ein himmlisch Bild’ v. 2429. ‘Das schönste Bild von einem Weibe’ v. 2436.  
\textsuperscript{42} V. 2431–2432.  
\textsuperscript{44} Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Christopher Rowe, p. 67. 249 b 5ff.  
\textsuperscript{45} FK, p. 283 (my emphasis).}
other sources pertaining to ancient Indo-Iranian and Alexandrian thought. Throughout his work, Schöne singles out elements of Goethe’s ‘vorkritische Erkenntnistheorie’. Referring to Goethe’s letter to Zelter from December 31, 1829, Schöne clarifies that, in Farbenlehre, we should look for the poet’s convictions rather than empirically proven principals. Goethe writes: ‘Ich aber muß bei meiner Überzeugung bleiben, weil ich die Folgen die mir daraus geworden nicht entbehren kann.’ Farbenlehre is one of the sources in which we can trace the poet’s epistemological views. Though the epistemological content of Farbenlehre is not the result of scientific investigation, as Schöne shows, it is informative regarding the intellectual world of the poet, and thus it sheds light on epistemological questions in Faust. I therefore turn to Goethe’s Farbenlehre to explain the emergence of beauty and the sublime on the magic mirror.

In his Farbenlehre, Goethe classifies colors in three categories: physiological, physical and chemical. In the first section of the Farbenlehre, Goethe places the physiological colors ‘[billig obenan], weil sie dem Subjekt, weil sie dem Auge, teils völlig, teils größtens zugehören’. In contrast to chemical colors, which belong to the objects – ‘[wir können] uns nun objektiv als den Gegenständen angehörig denken’ –, the physiological colors, Goethe explains, are subjective and belong to the eye. The physiological colors are subjective because they are produced through the eye’s action and reaction: the eye generates the polar opposite of whatever stimuli it is exposed to. Exposed to a certain degree of lightness, the eye generates a corresponding degree of shade; and exposed to a particular color, the eye produces its complement. The circle of colors and shades is closed in and by the eye: ‘[d]as Auge verlangt dabei ganz eigentlich Totalität und schließt in sich selbst den Farbenkreis ab.’ Chol Han’s explanation of this function of the eye, a fundamental part of Farbenlehre, brings to light its epistemological significance: ‘Die Fähigkeit des Auges, in sich selbst das Ganze zu bilden, ist mit der Immanenzstruktur der Natur zu begründen. Das Auge kann das Ganze produzieren, weil das Ganze dem Auge

46 Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, pp. 11–23; 53; 68–75; 102.
49 For a concise yet precise introduction see: ibid., p. 24.
50 FA I, 23/1: p. 31.
53 FA I, 23/1: p. 50.
54 See FA I, 23/1: p. 31; 1044. Compare to: Schöne, Goethes Farbentheologie, p. 103.
immanent ist’. Both Schöne and Han refer to the following poem by Goethe, written on September 1, 1805, in order to shed light on the immanence of his epistemology:

Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Wie könnten wir das Licht erblicken?
Lebt’ nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie könnt’ uns Göttliches entzücken?

Referring to the third and fourth verses, Han elaborates: ‘die göttliche Identität ist “in uns” eingeschlossen. Diese Immanenz der Identität ist hier hervorzuheben, weil sie Kommunikation zwischen dem Menschen und der Natur ermöglicht.’ In this context, we must consider Goethe’s view that ‘das Auge hat sein Dasein dem Licht zu danken.’ According to this epistemological view, an active cognitive faculty resides in us which is the direct and immanent presence of the divine: ‘im Auge wohne ein ruhendes Licht, das bei der mindersten Veranlassung von innen oder von außen erregt werde.’ Unlike Platonic anamnesis, this form of immanence of the divine does not initiate a process of ascent, but rather acts upon the reception of the stimuli.

The principally immanent epistemological view developed in Farbenlehre sheds light on the events before the mirror in the Hexenküche scene. In the scene Osterspaziergang, the faculty of remembering the distance from the transcendent was described as ‘jedem eingeboren’ and this ‘remembering’ inspired Faust’s wish to grow wings. In Hexenküche, on the other hand, Faust’s inner activity, as Trunz names it – or, in terms of Farbenehre, the immanent light in Faust’s eye – responds to the outer stimuli by bringing forth the opposite in the magic mirror to create the whole. This inner activity is not capable of creating the whole in the sense of anamnesis – i.e., remembering the absolute knowledge that was available to it prior to a supposed descent of the intellectual soul. Rather, Faust’s inner activity in Hexenküche follows another theory of

55 Han, Ästhetik der Oberfläche, p. 77.
57 See p. 46 above.
59 Han, Ästhetik der Oberfläche, p. 51 (my emphasis).
60 FA I, 23/1: p. 24 (my emphasis).
62 V. 1092–1093.
63 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, p. 418. 67 d.
knowledge – one that is based on immanence. In the following passage, Goethe discusses this view in the context of the eye:

Es ist die ewige Formel des Lebens, die sich auch hier äußert. Wie dem Auge das Dunkle geboten wird, so fordert es das Helle; es fordert Dunkel, wenn man ihm Hell entgegenbringt und zeigt eben dadurch seine Lebendigkeit, sein Recht das Objekt zu fassen, indem es etwas, das dem Objekt entgegengesetzt ist, aus sich selbst hervorbringt.\footnote{FA I, 23/1: p. 41 (my emphasis).}

Faust’s inner faculty, in Hexenküche, brings forth the polar opposite of the particular it confronts. The result is an image that creates a whole in coexistence with all contributing parts: a constellation comprised of Faust, Mephisto, the apes, the space of the Hexenküche and the mirror. In this setting, Faust beholds a heavenly-earthly image, whose beauty kindles his desire to approach it. Faust’s question signals his newfound interest in life and earth: ‘So etwas findet sich auf Erden?’\footnote{V. 2440.} Yet the image does not initiate an ascending process. Instead of flying toward the beauty, Mephisto offers to bring the beauty to Faust’s home:

Ich weiß dir so ein Schätzchen auszuspüren,  
Und selig wer das gute Schicksal hat,  
Als Bräutigam sie heim zu führen!\footnote{V. 2445–2447.}

In the context of Faust’s experience in front of the mirror, Hexenküche is a space reserved for inner, cognitive activity – ‘Für diesmal sieh dich immer satt’.\footnote{V. 2444.} In this space, the inclusion of all the contributing parts creates a totality. The events of the scene then unfold in two stages: first, Faust’s desire is activated (the above-mentioned cognitive process); second, a wish for possessing the desired one is uttered by Mephisto.

Hexenküche is one of two moments in Faust in which the dramatic seed of a quest for beauty and love is sown. The second moment spans the scenes Finstere Galerie and Rittersaal in Faust II. On the similarity between the scenes Hexenküche and Rittersaal, Rickert remarks:

Kurz, wie einst das Bild der Hexenküche, das eine nackte, sinnlich wirkende Schöne darstellte, die eine Vorbereitung auf Fausts Leidenschaft zu Gretchen war, so ist jetzt das Bild der Helena eine Vorbereitung auf das Leben im Verein mit der klassischen Schönheit der wirklichen Helena des dritten Aktes.\footnote{Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, p. 324.}
Rickert singles out preparation for the quest to find beauty as the common characteristic of the scenes Hexenküche and Rittersaal. Bruns, reads the scenes Finstere Galerie and Rittersaal in the context of generating a desire for beauty and preparing Faust for his quest to find it.\textsuperscript{70}

On two occasions, the reader is led to consider the above-mentioned similarity between the two moments. In the scene Finstere Galerie, when Mephisto explains the conditions of the realm of the Mothers to Faust, Faust responds as follows: ‘Hier wittert’s nach der Hexenküche’.\textsuperscript{71} Then in the scene Rittersaal, Faust places the phantom of Helena above the image he saw in the magic mirror.\textsuperscript{72} This comparison is articulated in the text as follows:

\begin{quote}
Die Wohlgestalt die mich voreinst entzückte,  
In Zauberspiegelung beglückte,  
War nur ein Schaumbild solcher Schöne!\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}

Faust’s journey to the realm of the Mothers in the scene Finstere Galerie and his production of Helena’s phantom in the scene Rittersaal mirror the two stages that are present (though less explicitly) in the scene Hexenküche – namely, first, being exposed to the specific form of stimuli that hitherto had been excluded from one’s world; and, second, the cognitive faculty’s production of the polar opposite of the stimuli.

I turn to the first stage that unfolds in Finstere Galerie and I further explore Mephisto’s reluctant (v. 6212) exposition of the realm of the Mothers, as well as Faust’s responses.\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{quote}
Um sie kein Ort noch weniger eine Zeit,  
[...]  
Kein Weg! Ins Unbetretene,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{70} Bruns, ‘Die Mütter in Goethes Faust: Versuch einer Deutung,’ p. 384.
\textsuperscript{71} V. 6229.
\textsuperscript{73} V. 6495–6497.
\textsuperscript{74} Though I cast light on one aspect of the abode of the Mothers, a thorough clarification of this mysterious part of the drama remains out of the scope of this study. Eckermann’s report of his conversation with Goethe (who read this scene to Eckermann on January 10, 1830) shows that Goethe did not feel any need for further definitions: he provides no information about the scene, other than mentioning to Eckermann that, according to Plutarch, the ancient Greeks regarded Mothers as deities. Since this vague attempt failed to help Eckermann, Goethe offered him the manuscript: ‘Ich gebe Ihnen das Manuskript mit nach Hause, studieren Sie alles wohl und sehen Sie zu wie Sie zurecht kommen.’ FA II, 12: p. 374. See also FK, pp. 466–467.
Nicht zu Betretende; ein Weg ans Unerbetene
Nicht zu Erbittende. Bist du bereit?
–
Nicht Schlösser sind, nicht Riegel wegzuschieben,
Von Einsamkeiten wirst umhergetrieben.
Hast du Begriff von Öd' und Einsamkeit?
[…] 
Nichts wirst du sehn in ewig leerer Ferne,
Den Schritt nicht hören den du tust,
Nichts Festes finden wo du ruhst.75

It is evident that this space can be described only by naming the attributes it lacks. Rickert is right to point out that the most important and all-encompassing negative description is already present in the first of the verses above – time and space are absent from the realm of the Mothers.76 In this scene, Faust is exposed to absolute privation and emptiness. This experience expands Faust’s intellectual horizon. Imagining this space strikes him like a blow and provokes a shudder.77 In response to Mephisto’s provocative question (‘bist du bereit?’),78 Faust shows his grasp of the logic of oxymora that has been at work since his acquaintance with Mephisto:

Du sendest mich ins Leere,
Damit ich dort so Kunst als Kraft vermehre.79
[...] wir wollen es ergründen,
In Deinem Nichts hoff ich das All zu finden.80

Though Mephisto encourages his mentee (‘Ich rühme dich eh du dich von mir trennst, | Und sehe wohl daß du den Teufel kennst’).81 Mephisto’s words disclose Faust’s apprehension toward the unknown: ‘Bist du beschränkt daß neues Wort dich stört? | Willst du nur hören was du schon gehört?’82

The abode of the Mothers represents absolute emptiness and privation. Yet it is not entirely empty: it contains images of all creatures (v. 6289) as well as a mysterious tripod that can summon ‘Held und Heldin aus der Nacht.’83 The purpose of Faust’s journey is to retrieve the tripod that he will later use in the

75 V. 6214, 6222–6227, 6246–6248.
76 Rickert, Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung, p. 314.
77 See v. 6265 and 6216.
78 V. 6224.
79 V. 6251–6252.
80 V. 6255–6256.
81 V. 6257–6258.
82 V. 6267–6268.
83 V. 6298 (my emphasis).
Rittersaal scene. On the theatrical level, the tripod justifies the presence of the apparatus necessary for the ‘Laterna Magica’.84

The images that populate the realm of the Mothers – namely, images of all existing creatures – invite an interpretation of the scene as a dramatization of a Platonic realm of forms.85 Witkowski’s interpretation of Faust’s journey to the Mothers is an example of a Platonic reading of the scene.86 Yet Bruns rejects this interpretation. He denies that the nebulous and shadow-like phantoms in the realm of Mothers are Platonic forms and rejects reading them as ‘Urtypen’ referring to Goethe’s intellectual exchange with Schiller; in Glückliches Ereignis.87 Goethe asserts that both ‘Ideen’ and ‘Urphänomen’ are visible and objective.88 Bruns was one of the earliest scholars to interpret the realm of the Mothers as the realm of the past.89 Gaier denies that Platonic forms are relevant to the realm of the Mothers; he describes it as a ‘Bild- und Gestalten-Archiv’.90 Schneider concurs: ‘[es handelt sich] doch bei Fausts magischem Tun um die Rezeption von bereits in den Archiven des kulturellen Gedächtnisses vorhandenen Bildern.’91 This interpretation is a reduction of the realm of the Mothers as seen in retrospection.92 The important point is that the realm of the Mothers, as the archive of cultural memory, cannot be described as ‘ungekannt | Euch Sterblichen, von uns [the immortals] nicht gern genannt.’93 This verse also poses a significant

84 Schöne explains Goethe’s acquaintance with the ‘Laterna Magica’ as a part of ‘Magia naturalis’ (FK, p. 483.) and asserts “‘Phantasmagorie’ war der den Zeitgenossen völlig geläufige Fachterminus für solche Geisterbeschwörungen.” FK, p. 484. Another reason for the existence of the shining tripod, as Gaier explains, concerns lighting Faust’s unconscious body in the darkness after the explosion. Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-Dichtungen, vol. 2: p. 645.
87 FA I, 24: p. 437.
92 V. 6277.
93 V. 6218–6219.
challenge to the Platonic reading of the realm of the Mothers. According to *Phaedrus*, the realm of forms is not unknown to humans – all human souls have been there. The process of anamnesis allows us to remember our origins and return to them. Moreover, the realm of forms is not a place that the immortals would mention with reluctance.

In verse 6298 (referred to above), Faust should summon the heroes and heroines from the night. In the following verse, the glowing tripod marks the deepest point of this radical descent, implying that darkness rules over the realm of the Mothers:

Ein glühnder Dreifuß tut dir endlich kund  
Du seist im tiefsten, allertiefsten Grund.  
Bei seinem Schein wirst du die Mütter sehn.94

In the scene *Studierzimmer [I]*, Mephisto names the beginning of all beings as ‘Mutter Nacht’. Earlier in this study,95 I explained this phrase in reference to Karl Phillip Moritz’s *Götterlehre*. Remarkably, Moritz’s illustration in *Die Nacht und Fatum, das über Götter und Menschen herrscht* characterizes the night as both fate and the primordial mother of creation: ‘Aus ihrem Schoße wird des Tages Glanz geboren, worin alle Bildungen sich entfalten’.96 According to Moritz, this night intimidates gods and mortals alike: ‘Es gibt also *etwas*, wovor die Götter selber Scheu tragen. Es ist das nämliche geheimnis-volle Dunkel, worin sich noch *etwas* über Götter und Menschen Obwaltendes verhüllt, das die Begriffe der Sterblichen übersteigt.’97

In the beginning of *Finstere Galerie*, Mephisto makes it clear that Helena and Paris are in Orcus and therefore out of his reach. In Moritz’s work, death and dreams are described as the sons of the mother night98; and the three goddesses Parcae (Parzen) are described as the night’s daughters, who control fate of all the humans by bringing about death and life.99 They are the

94 V. 6283–6285.  
95 See p. 121 above.  
97 Ibid., p. 633 (my emphasis). Compare to v. 6212–6215.  
98 The importance of dream in this second pursuit of beauty can be sensed from the unconscious Faust’s dream in *Laboratorium* (v. 6933); Helena’s words describing her union with Achilles (v. 8880); and Faust’s words describing his union with Helena ‘Es ist ein Traum, verschwunden Tag und Ort.’ (v. 9414)  
‘unerbittlichen Parzen’. Moritz provides a replica of ancient representations of the three goddesses, illustrating them sitting, standing and walking. Two of them hold spindles (in which they spin and measure the threads of life and fate) and the third holds a dagger – an instrument of death. The following verses remind us of this depiction:

Die einen sitzen, andre stehn und gehn,
Wie’s eben kommt. Gestaltung, Umgestaltung,
Des ewigen Sinnes ewige Unterhaltung.

Thus, the realm of the Mothers is defined as the realm that has been radically excluded from the worlds of humans and immortals. It is the place of beginnings, a realm of radical absence of any quality.

After being exposed to this absolute privation, Faust produces and projects the image of the heroine and the hero before the courtiers and the Emperor. The tripod and the stage act like the magic mirror; from a timeless and formless realm, the historical characters appear. As the agent, Faust plays a heroic role. The projection he generates impresses everyone – most of all Faust himself. The remainder of the scene Rittersaal also shows similarity to Faust’s experience in front of the magic mirror. Here, too, the delightful image resulted from an experience of horror: ‘Mein Schreckensgang bringt seligsten Gewinn’. And the image of beauty once again brings ‘Erkenntnis’. Independently of Mephisto, Faust expresses the need to possess the object that he recognizes as beautiful: ‘Wer sie erkannt der darf sie nicht entbehren.’ In his journey with Mephisto, a new form of cognition becomes active in Faust; he recognizes the image in Rittersaal in reference to the image he saw previously in Hexenküche, and he detects the continuity of an entity (beauty) in both images above. Overwhelmed by the image in Rittersaal, Faust describes it as an instance of perception of the constant flow of beauty from its spring: ‘Zeigt sich tief im Sinn | Der Schönheit

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101 In ibid., p. 638. We read: ‘hält die hohe Göttin spielend den Faden in der Hand, an welchem sie die Umwälzungen der Dinge und die stolzesten, Entwürfe der Königlen lenkt.’
102 Ibid., pp. 637–638.
103 V. 6286–6288.
104 We should highlight here the difference between privation and active resistance against qualities. There is no textual support for the latter, but the text (e.g., ‘rengsam ohne leben’) implies that this dark and empty place is filled with possibilities.
105 V. 6489 (my emphasis).
106 As I showed above, Mephisto kindled Faust’s desire to possess the object in the magic mirror.
107 V. 6559 (my emphasis).
Quelle reichlichstens ergossen? Apart from articulating Faust’s ecstasy, the superlative modifier invites comparison with Faust’s experience in front of the magic mirror. The object of pursuit, beauty, is no longer a transcendent object, but rather an immanent entity that is instantiated in the multiplicity of its images. Unlike Platonic anamnesis, which requires an ascending process, in the Rittersaal scene, what once was described by Faust as the ‘Inbegriff von allen Himmeln’ is now reevaluated as the ‘Schaumbild’ of the ‘Inbegriff der Leidenschaft’. This ironic textual suggestion points to the immanence of the object of pursuit in the world and its relative accessibility for the senses and cognition through its images.

III.1.2 Within Life as the Space of Inclusion

As I proceed to explore the modifications of the relation between the body and soul in this comparative study, I do not treat the tragedy of Gretchen. I firmly assert that a treatment of these scenes would be incomplete without paying due attention to Gretchen’s experience and perspective in its specific context. In other words, in this study, Gretchen is not treated as the protagonist of the ‘Gretchen’s tragedy’, but rather as an element in the dramatization of Faust’s pursuit of beauty subsequent to a turn toward life.

III.1.2.1 Faust’s Encounter with Gretchen

The inclusion of the sublime and the sensual aspects of love is constantly present in the scenes that dramatize Faust’s and Gretchen’s love. In this regard, Schmidt writes the following:

Faust ist beides: Verführer und Liebender, der Sexualität verfallen und doch immer wieder zur Sublimation fähig. Allerdings wird der Gretchen-Handlung nicht gerecht, wer, statt diese Ambivalenz ernst zu nehmen, überall nur glaubt herauslesen zu können, wie Faust zwar in der mephistophelischen Sphäre des bloßen Sinnengenusses

108 V. 6487–6488.
109 V. 2439.
110 V. 6497.
111 V. 6499.
112 Compare to: Mohammad Nadeem Niazi, ‘Faust’s Violence against the Mothers’, The German Quarterly, Vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer, 1999), p. 228.
sich bewege, aber diese dann wie eine bloße Anfechtung überwinde, um sich zur höheren Sphäre der Liebe zu erheben.113

When Faust first sees Gretchen, just like when he saw the image of the reclined woman in the mirror, mention of the heavenly realm elevates her beauty. Faust articulates his aesthetic experience through an oath: ‘Beim Himmel, dieses Kind ist schön! | So etwas hab’ ich nie gesehen.’114 Faust’s justification of his judgment about Gretchen’s beauty shows his appreciation for an inclusion that brings forth Gretchen’s whole character. Two qualities in particular impress Faust: she is ‘so sitt- und tugendreich, | Und etwas schnippisch doch zugleich.’115 These two qualities attract Faust irresistibly to Gretchen.116 Faust then describes Gretchen’s face: ‘Der Lippe Rot, der Wange Licht’.117 Yet as Mephisto enters the scene,118 the emerging equilibrium between the sublime and the sensual takes a sharp turn toward the desire to possess the object of beauty: ‘Hör, du mußt mir die Dirne schaffen!’119 As Schmidt correctly recognizes, Mephisto represents an aspect of Faust’s own character: ‘Wie kaum sonst im Drama wird damit deutlich, daß Mephisto eine Valenz Fausts selbst ist. Sein “Auftreten” ist hier nichts anderes als das Hervortreten des anderen Teils in Fausts ambivalentem Wesen.’120 The aesthetic judgment that develops here diverges from the ‘two souls principle’ and the excluding approach that ruled over the previous scenes of Faust, which gave priority to the sublime and the transcendent realms. From the first moment of Faust’s encounter with Gretchen, Faust unites the qualities of sublime and sensual to experience an ‘übersinnlich-sinnliche’ love.121

III.1.2.2 The Sun in Gretchen’s Room
Thus far, we have examined a number of light metaphors in Faust: in the opening monologue of the scene Nacht; in Faust’s two speeches in the scene Vor dem Tor; and in the song of the spirits at the end of Studierzimmer [I]. In each case, I pointed out how the light metaphors (integrated into their respective poetic contexts) stand for larger conceptual issues: Faust’s evaluation of body and

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113 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 158.
114 V. 2609 (my emphasis).
115 V. 2611–2612.
116 Remarkably, Gretchen, too, expresses her inclination toward the stranger in two qualities that exist together: ‘wacker’ and ‘keck’. V. 2680; 2683.
117 V. 2913.
118 FT, p. 112.
119 V. 2619.
120 Schmidt, Goethes Faust, Erster und Zweiter Teil: Grundlagen Werk Wirkung, p. 159.
121 Compare to Mephisto’s words in v. 3534: ‘Du übersinnlicher, sinnlicher Freier’.
soul, and the transcendence or immanence of the principle which light represents. The scene Abend presents another important instance of the light metaphor. Upon stepping inside Gretchen’s room – ‘nach einigem Stillschweigen’\(^{122}\) –, Faust asks Mephisto to leave him alone. In Mephisto’s absence, Faust welcomes the ‘sweet light of the dusk’\(^{123}\) in his beloved’s room.

The relation between light and the space it illuminates in the scene Abend is of great importance to this study. In the scene Nacht, light was adored in itself and in its purity – ‘das liebe Himmelslicht’\(^{124}\) in Faust’s ‘Kerker’. But in the scene Abend, light receives its significance through its relevance to the room that it illuminates. The room is revered as a ‘Heiligtum’\(^{125}\); the text employs religious language in its description of the place, and not the light that fills it.\(^{126}\) Gaier points out that ‘Margaretes reinliches Zimmer ist als “Kerker” eine Replik auf Fausts “Kerker” (V. 398)’.\(^{127}\) Furthermore, he notes that the experiences of macrocosm sign and ‘Erdgeist’ in Faust’s old room were ‘getrennte, unvereinbare Visionen’.\(^{128}\) They were experienced in the room from which nature was expelled and where the furnishings were alien to Faust. In Gretchen’s room,\(^{129}\) on the other hand, nature nurtures and flows: ‘Entwirkte sich das Götterbild!’\(^{130}\) The light of Gretchen’s room, which reveals the natural realm to be divine nature, brings Faust as close as he has yet come to appreciating the instruction of the ‘Erdgeist’: ‘wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.’\(^{131}\) Therefore, unlike the ‘Kerker’ of the scene Nacht, this ‘Kerker’ is a place of bliss and a shrine (‘Heiligtum’). Goethe closely associated ‘Kerker’ and the body; in two consecutive poems of West-östlicher Divan, he used ‘Kerker’ as a metaphor for the body.\(^{132}\) In the modification of the ‘Kerker’ metaphor as the place of appearance of God’s image, we see the elevation of the particular and the natural realm. Yet the longer Faust stays in Gretchen’s room, the stronger his tendency grows to distance himself from the desire for pursuit of beauty and

122 The stage directions according to FT, p. 115.
124 V. 400.
125 V. 2688.
127 Ibid., p. 344.
128 Ibid., p. 344.
129 Ibid., pp. 344–345.
130 V. 2716.
131 V. 509.
132 See the following two poems in: FA I, 3/1: p. 106; 410. Also, see Hendrik Birus’s attempt to explain these poems in: FA I, 3/2: pp. 1320–1322.
its possession – the same desire that brought him to Gretchen’s room. Faust renounces the desire\(^{133}\): ‘Und du! Was hat dich hergeführt?’\(^{134}\) When Mephisto returns, he provokes Faust by reminding him of his life as ‘Herr Doktor’:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ich kratz' den Kopf, reib' an den Händen} - \\
\text{Um euch das süße junge Kind} \\
\text{Nach Herzens Wunsch und Will' zu wenden;} \\
\text{Und ihr seht drein,} \\
\text{Als solltet ihr in den Hörssaal hinein,} \\
\text{Als stünden grau leibhaftig vor euch da} \\
\text{Physik und Metaphysika!}\(^{135}\)
\end{align*}
\]

Despite these moments, Faust’s movement is directed toward love and the desire for beauty. On this path, Faust frequently approaches a fragile point of equilibrium between the heavenly and worldly realms. In this context, we can appreciate Mephisto’s remarks that are directed to the spectators (despite the lack of an explicit stage direction ‘ad Spectatores’\(^{136}\) after Faust exits in the scene *Spaziergang*:

\[
\text{So ein verliebter Tor verpufft} \\
\text{Euch Sonne, Mond und alle Sterne} \\
\text{Zum Zeitvertreib dem Liebchen in die Luft.}\(^{137}\)
\]

Mephisto, a cold observer of human behavior, finds it ridiculous that a lover would place the beloved above the celestial sources of light and life. Even Hatem does not place his beloved above the sun in *West-östlicher Divan*; rather, the beloved appears as elevated to him as the light. The following few verses from *Nachklang* in *Suleika Nameh* highlight the importance of these words of Mephisto:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Laß mich nicht so der Nacht dem Schmerze,} \\
\text{Du allerliebstes, du mein Mondgesicht!} \\
\text{O du mein Phosphor, meine Kerze,} \\
\text{Du meine Sonne, du mein Licht.}\(^{138}\)
\end{align*}
\]

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\(^{134}\) V. 2717.

\(^{135}\) V. 2744; 2746–2751.


\(^{137}\) V. 2862–2864.

\(^{138}\) FA I, 3/1: p. 95.
III.1.3 The Articulations of Faust’s Views in the World of Inclusion

In the second Strasse scene, the attempt at forming articulations of the views and specifications of the new chapter of Faust’s life commences. The scene begins with Faust’s focus on action (‘Will’s bald gehn?’), but Mephisto shifts the focus to an articulation of Faust’s new world and world-view. The worldview that starts articulating itself here is developed piece by piece in the scenes Strasse [II], Garten, Wald und Höhle, and Marthens Garten. I analyze these scenes while referring to a selection of Goethe’s poems, which the Hamburger Ausgabe titles Die weltanschaulichen Gedichte and the Frankfurter Ausgabe titles Gott und Welt. Furthermore, a poem from the West-östlicher Divan will help us elucidate Faust’s articulations of his new world-view, which, as I will demonstrate, reconceives the body and soul relation and abandons the Platonic excluding process of attaining knowledge. Importantly, in this study, I avoid passing moral judgment on Faust’s behavior. I focus exclusively on exploring the modifications of Faust’s view of body and soul and comparing them to Ḥāfīẓ’s Divan.

III.1.3.1 From Naming to Wandering with the Senses

The scene Strasse [II] opens with Mephisto’s question – ‘Find’ ich euch in Feuer?’ Forced to answer this question, Faust must articulate his thoughts. If we follow Schmidt in reading Mephisto as one of two opposing poles in Faust’s own ambivalent personality, then Mephisto’s question appears to challenge the sublime aspect that Faust ascribes to his feelings. Yet Faust refuses to admit that he is just seducing a girl; he insists that his love is genuine (‘Und zwar von Herzen.’) Mephisto tries to identify love with eternal faithfulness. Will Faust remain eternally faithful to Gretchen? Mephisto wonders. Faust responds as follows:

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139 V. 3025.
141 FA I, 2: 489–512. On the reason behind the choice of this title see Karl Eibl (the editor’s) remarks on p. 1072.
142 V. 3026.
143 V. 3054. As Arens explains, for Faust, being from the heart is the greatest sign of genuineness. Arens, Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I, p. 286. In addition to this scene, we can find confirmation of this view in Faust II in verse 9378.
144 It is worth noticing that Gretchen never asks Faust about faithfulness. She only asks him (indirectly) about whether he loves her.
Wenn ich empfinde,  
Für das Gefühl, für das Gewühl  
Nach Namen suche, keinen finde,  
Dann durch die Welt mit allen Sinnen schweife,  
Nach allen höchsten Worten greife,  
Und diese Glut, von der ich brenne,  
Unendlich, ewig, ewig nenne,  
Ist das ein teuflisch Lügenspiel?\textsuperscript{145}

In these verses, Faust’s new world-view begins to come into focus. Faust is aware of being moved by something, but he doesn’t know what that ‘something’ is. He only feels (‘das Gefühl’) an urgent need to act and explore a chaos that surrounds him (‘das Gewühl’). Just as Faust tried to name Mephisto and thereby expose his ‘eigentliches Element’, Faust now tries to name his feelings. Again, for Faust, naming a thing is equivalent to knowing its essence. But Faust’s attempts to name the fire that burns in him only bring failure. Having failed to name this feeling, Faust explores the world with his senses. Trying to grasp the source of this movement, Faust reaches after ‘allen höchsten Worten’.

Faust’s words here appear to be an early variation of a constantly present theme in Goethe’s view regarding the exploration of infinite nature. Goethe writes later in \textit{Zur Morphologie}: ‘Willst Du ins Unendliche schreiten, | Geh nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten.’\textsuperscript{146} In the end, Faust is only able to say that this flame (‘diese Glut’) extends itself through all his pursuits. The common denominator here is the energy that moves Faust. At the end of these verses, this fire is recognized to be eternal (‘ewig’) and infinite (‘unendlich’). It is worth noting that, in the scene \textit{Grablegung}, Mephisto himself experiences the effect of beauty in love. He likewise appeals to the metaphor of fire: ‘Ist dies das Liebeselement? | Der ganze Körper steht in Feuer’.\textsuperscript{147} For further clarification, however, we need to explore further instances in which Faust’s articulations in his new world develop.

\textbf{III.1.3.2 Abandoning the Self}

Near the end of the scene \textit{Garten}, Gretchen turns to a form of oracle to determine whether Faust loves her. Faust professes his love in the third person – ‘Er liebt dich!’\textsuperscript{148} He tries to lead Gretchen through the same process that he went through in the above-mentioned scene. The feeling of being moved by love

\textsuperscript{145} V. 3060–3065.  
\textsuperscript{146} FA I, 24: p. 441. See also p. 1070.  
\textsuperscript{147} V. 11784–11785.  
\textsuperscript{148} V. 3185.
remains inexpressible for Faust. ‘Verstehst du, was das heißt?’\(^{149}\) he asks Gretchen, who remains overwhelmed and speechless. Again, they are unable to name what moves them. Faust invites Gretchen to follow his lead: ‘durch die Welt mit allen Sinnen schweife[n].’\(^{150}\) As we read in the following passage, the cognitive faculty perceives the unnamable through senses in moments and instances:

Laß diesen Blick,  
Laß diesen Händedruck dir sagen,  
Was unaussprechlich ist\(^{151}\)

Importantly, in verses 3191–3192, Faust expands this form of cognition through the senses of the body. By surrendering to the unnamable feeling, Faust says, one can experience an eternal delight: ‘Sich hinzugeben ganz und eine Wonne | Zu fühlen, die ewig sein muß!’\(^{152}\) It should be noted that, unlike in the previous scene, Faust does not reach out for the most exalted of words in his turn to the senses and the body.\(^{153}\) The touch of two hands clasping and the look between the lovers are perceived in themselves and are appreciated as the effect of that which cannot be named. This perception, however, only leads to eternal bliss if the self is surrendered. In *Eins und Alles*, written on October 6, 1821,\(^{154}\) Goethe gives poetic articulation to his view of bliss as a consequence of surrendering the self:

Im Grenzenlosen sich zu finden  
Wird gern der Einzelne verschwinden,  
Da löst sich aller Überdrüß;  
Statt heißem Wünschen, wildem Wollen,  
Statt läßt’gem Fordern, strengem Sollen,  
Sich aufzugeben ist Genuß.\(^{155}\)

These verses show that Goethe’s views are consistent with Faust’s remarks to Gretchen. Underscoring the significance of these verses, Karl Eibl describes the *Eins und Alles* as a poem that gives voice to ‘die Parole des ›spinozistischen‹ Pantheismus’\(^{156}\). The necessity of surrendering the individuated self is also

\(^{149}\) V. 3186.  
\(^{150}\) V. 3062.  
\(^{151}\) V. 3188–3189.  
\(^{152}\) V. 3191–3192.  
\(^{153}\) V. 3063.  
\(^{154}\) FA I, 2: p. 1084.  
\(^{156}\) FA I, 2: p. 1084. The issue of the position of *Ethics* in respect to the individuated self has been a part of the discourse around Spinoza’s *Ethics*. Other than mention of this issue in the
characterized as a prerequisite for a pantheistic perspective by Hegel in his *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik*. In the literary works of ‘den mohammedanischen Persern’,\(^{157}\) Hegel finds a perfect example of the poetic articulation of pantheistic joy. For our purposes, it is important to note that Hegel refers to the realm of multiplicity (‘allem’) as the image where the presence of the eternal and the divine can be felt and known:

Indem sich nämlich der Dichter das Göttliche in allem zu erblicken sehnt und es wirklich erblickt, gibt er nun auch sein eigenes Selbst dagegen auf, faßt aber ebensosehr die Immanenz des Göttlichen in seinem so erweiterten und befreiten Inneren auf, und dadurch erwächst ihm jene heitere Innigkeit, jenes freie Glück, jene schwergerische Seligkeit, welche dem Orientalen eigen ist, der sich bei der Lossagung von der eigenen Partikularität durchwege in das Ewige und Absolute versenkt und in allem das Bild und die Gegenwart des Göttlichen erkennt und empfindet.\(^{158}\)

### III.1.3.3 Oneness with the Brothers in Nature

In *Wald und Höhle*, Faust reflects upon his new ‘Lebenslauf’.\(^{159}\) As Schmidt rightly points out, the scene gives Faust space for reflection through a momentary suspension of action: ‘[d]ie Szene Wald und Höhle bildet eine geistige Mitte jenseits der Handlung’.\(^{160}\) The scene commences with a soliloquy that takes the form of a thanks-giving prayer.\(^{161}\) It is addressed to the exalted spirit that previously revealed itself to Faust in fire. Almost all commentators on *Faust* agree that it was the ‘Erdgeist’ who (according to the stage directions) appeared in a red flame and spoke to Faust.\(^{162}\) In this study, I am not interested in naming the exalted spirit; rather, I follow Faust’s understanding of this spirit, which is reflected in the acts that Faust attributes to it.

Each gift for which Faust expresses his gratitude adds further detail to the image of his new life. Faust claims that the exalted spirit gave him everything he asked for.\(^{163}\) Faust’s expression of satisfaction and gratitude, Trunz notes,

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\(^{158}\) Ibid., p. 474 (my emphasis).

\(^{159}\) V. 2072.


\(^{161}\) FK, p. 314.

\(^{162}\) Rickert dedicates a considerable amount of attention to refuting this view: Rickert, *Goethes Faust: die dramatische Einheit der Dichtung*, pp. 239–252.

\(^{163}\) ‘Erhabner Geist, du gabst mir, gabst mir Alles, | Warum ich bat.’ V. 3217–3218.
indicates that Faust has forgotten about his former object of pursuit – knowledge of what holds the world together ‘im Innersten’.\textsuperscript{164} Notably, beginning with the scene \textit{Hexenküche}, the pursuit of love increasingly proves to be a modification of the earlier ascending negative pursuit of knowledge. If we do not recognize the transition between these two stages and the modification of the earlier path, then Trunz’s question would be justified: ‘er scheint innerlich gewandelt; ist es der Einfluß des Erlebten?’\textsuperscript{165} In his article on \textit{Wald und Höhle}, Hans Jaeger elucidates the inner relation between love and knowledge in Goethe’s ‘pantheistic’ worldview; however, he only applies Goethe’s theoretical views to \textit{Wald und Höhle} and \textit{Marthens Garten}: ‘In both scenes love is the soil in which Faust’s pantheism is rooted.’\textsuperscript{166} Thus, the question posed by Trunz remains unanswered.\textsuperscript{167} Schmidt is in accord with other commentators in accentuating that the role of love in this scene can hardly be regarded as the result of the previous scenes: ‘Aus dem bisherigen Verlauf der Gretchenhandlung haben sich diese Dimensionen des Liebeserlebnisses noch keineswegs erschließen lassen.’\textsuperscript{168} In this study, I explained the process of modification of Faust’s pursuit of knowledge as the inner activity of Faust in appreciation of beauty that is dramatized in the scene \textit{Hexenküche}. A further instance of Faust’s new worldview, I argued, is present in Faust’s modification of the relation between the sun and the place it illuminates in Gretchen’s room. It is also present in Faust’s recognition of Nature as the mother who actively nourishes Gretchen and forms her as an image of the divine. These scenes express the process of moving from an understanding of the world based on transcendence and exclusion to one based on immanence. The views expressed in the \textit{Wald und Höhle} monologue find early articulations in the scenes \textit{Strasse} [II] and \textit{Garten} (as Faust speaks to Gretchen). I further highlight this attempt at an articulation of Faust’s views that can be traced from the previous scenes. In each step, I single out the elements that are added to the previous step.

The exalted spirit is credited with bestowing upon Faust the capability to feel and enjoy. In the scene \textit{Strasse} [II], Faust expressed his awareness of a fire that provokes in him a constant and overwhelming feeling. In that scene, the

\textsuperscript{164} HA 3: p. 558.
\textsuperscript{165} HA 3: p. 557.
\textsuperscript{167} Jaeger draws our attention to Goethe’s letter to Fritz Jacobi from May 10, 1812, in which Goethe asserts that passion and love are parts of the process of attaining knowledge: ‘Man lernt nichts kennen als was man liebt, und je tiefer und vollständiger die Kenntnis werden soll, desto stärker, kräftiger und lebendiger muß Liebe, ja Leidenschaft sein.’ ibid., p. 403.
element of ‘Genuß’ was absent, but the struggle to name the feeling was present. The feeling persisted, motivating Faust to explore the world with his senses. In the scene Garten, Faust accepts that the feeling cannot be named – it is ‘unaussprechlich’. Instead of seeking to name the feeling, Faust explores its particular manifestations in the natural realm – in the sense of touch and in the non-verbal human emotions that a gaze can communicate. Thus, Faust moves one step further as he recognizes that surrendering the self is a prerequisite for feeling the joy that he conceives as eternal. In Wald und Höhle, feeling is followed by rejoicing as Faust surrenders his self. Faust’s surrender of the self can be seen in the fact that, in Wald und Höhle, Faust counts all of his achievements as gifts of the exalted spirit. Faust abandons naming, a relic of his negative excluding approach. Instead, he allows himself to be included and moved; through the senses, he perceives the influence of the fire that integrates him into a world beyond his cold entrapment in his self. It is of great import to note that the spirit in question rejects a cold approach. Schöne contrasts this surrender of the self to Faust’s early titanic tendency. Without tracing this surrender of the self back to Faust’s words to Gretchen in Garten, Schöne leaves the relation of this development to Faust and Gretchen’s love as an open question:


In this soliloquy, pleasure includes both a cognitive and an intellectual component. The spirit, according to Faust, grants him the capability to gaze into its ‘tiefe Brust’ – not as an invader or a conqueror, but rather as a friend (‘Wie in den Busen eines Freund’s zu schauen.’) Importantly, the ‘Kraft, sie zu fühlen, zu genießen’, was a gift of the very spirit that gives individuation and motion to ‘die Reihe der Lebendigen’. In the absence of a titanic apotheosis,

169 V. 3189.
170 V. 3221.
171 FK, p. 314.
172 V. 3223.
173 Compare to v. 673–675.
174 V. 3224.
175 V. 3221.
176 V. 3225.
Faust attains knowledge through the awareness that he is a facet of the multiplicity moved by a single force: the apotheosis of titanic nature (‘Ich Ebenbild der Gottheit’)\textsuperscript{177} becomes a human with glorious nature as his ‘Königreich’.\textsuperscript{178}

This change, as I will explain, cannot be understood unless we turn to a reinterpretation of the significance of the presence of the image of God in humans as a faculty of perception of unity. In Goethe’s letter to Auguste zu Stolberg from January 1775,\textsuperscript{179} the activity of this faculty remains limited to human love, explained as the image of the Infinite recognizing Its likeness to others. The letter’s clear allusion to Goethe’s \textit{Prometheus} ode clarifies the relation between this humanist scope and the titanic apotheosis:

\begin{quote}
  wenn das Bild des Unendlichen in uns wühlt. Und was ist das als Liebe! – Musste er Menschen machen nach seinem Bilde, ein Geschlecht das ihm ähnlich sey, was müssen wir fühlen wenn wir Brüder finden, unser Gleichniss, uns selbst verdoppelt.\textsuperscript{180}
\end{quote}

In \textit{Wald und Höhle}, this active identity (‘das Bild des Unendlichen in uns’) expands its field of activity beyond the human realm\textsuperscript{181}; Faust recognizes all natural phenomena, and not just other humans, as his brethren. The extent of the human being’s integration into nature in the \textit{Wald und Höhle} soliloquy goes beyond Goethe’s remarks in his letter from 1775. Schöne points out that the \textit{Wald und Höhle} soliloquy coheres with the results of Goethe’s osteological discovery in 1784, which proved that humans and other animals belong to the same family. Yet that discovery does not cover the universal spectrum of beings and phenomena that are recognized as Faust’s brothers\textsuperscript{182}:

\begin{quote}
  Du führst die Reihe der Lebendigen
  Vor mir vorbei, und lehrst mich meine Brüder
  Im stillen Busch, in Luft und Wasser kennen.\textsuperscript{183}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{177} V. 614.
\textsuperscript{178} V. 3220.
\textsuperscript{179} Jaeger draws our attention to the first line of the letter in order to explain the interconnectedness of love and pantheistic feeling for Goethe. Jaeger, ‘The \textit{Wald und Höhle} Monologue in \textit{Faust},’ p. 400. And Schöne turns to this letter’s first sentences in order to explain the problem of the inexpressibility of love in the scene \textit{Strasse} (FK, p. 305).
\textsuperscript{180} FA II, 1: p. 427.
\textsuperscript{181} We should note the phrase ‘wenn wir Brüder finden’ implies that we are exploring. Yet in this letter, the field of exploration is limited to the anthropological realm – in other words, there is no attempt made to expand this field.
\textsuperscript{182} FK, p. 315. See also FA I, 24: p. 23.
\textsuperscript{183} V. 3225–3227.
The same force that brings forth all beings as members of a family is what allows humans to recognize their own brethren. In relation to this act of knowing the multiplicity in unity, ‘die herrliche Natur’\textsuperscript{184} becomes Faust’s kingdom.

At this stage, Faust recognizes the pleasing as well as the awesome aspects of the natural world as his brothers. Furthermore, he admits the imperfection of his human self: ‘O daß dem Menschen nichts Vollkomm’nes wird, | Empfind’ ich nun.’\textsuperscript{185} Mephisto is a necessary part of Faust – as well as of human destiny more generally. He is the polar opposite of ‘die Wonne’\textsuperscript{186} that is felt (according to the scene \textit{Garten}) only in total surrender of the self and that brings the subject close to the divine – ‘Die mich den Göttern nah’ und näher bringt’.\textsuperscript{187} Mephisto’s cold, separating and individuating influence on Faust fuel’s the fire that motivates Faust to pursue beauty in images. Mephisto and the feeling of bliss both are gifts of the spirit and belong to Faust’s faculty of recognizing his brethren in nature:

\begin{quote}
Er facht in meiner Brust ein \textit{wildes Feuer}

Nach jenem schönen Bild geschäftig an.

So taum’ ich von Begierde zu Genuß,

Und im Genuß verschmacht’ ich nach Begierde.\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

Mephisto annihilates Faust’s bliss,\textsuperscript{189} causing him to cycle between rejoicing to craving, as verses 3249–3250 convey. Mephisto spurs Faust on to action, crashing down on Faust’s contemplative ‘Wandel in der Öde’\textsuperscript{190} and ruining the feeling of cosmic unity that Faust felt in surrendering his self\textsuperscript{191}:

\begin{quote}
Alle sechs Tagewerk’ im Busen fühlen,

In stolzer Kraft ich weiß nicht was genieß’n,

Bald liebewonniglich in alles überfließen,

Verschwunden ganz der Erdensohn,

Und dann die hohe Intuition –

\textit{Mit einer Gebärde}

Ich darf nicht sagen wie – zu schließen.\textsuperscript{192}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{184} V. 3220. 
\textsuperscript{185} V. 3240–3241. 
\textsuperscript{186} V. 3241. 
\textsuperscript{187} V. 3242. 
\textsuperscript{188} V. 3247–3250 (my emphasis). 
\textsuperscript{189} V. 3244–3246. 
\textsuperscript{190} V. 3279. 
\textsuperscript{191} See: FK, p. 318. 
\textsuperscript{192} V. 3287–3292.
III.1.3.4 Knowing the ‘Allumfasser’

In the scene Marthens Garten, Gretchen asks Faust about his views on religion. Concerning Christianity, Faust declines to give a direct answer. Yet when asked about God, Faust enthusiastically answers. Faust’s God is a principally immanent one: ‘der Allumfasser’ and ‘der Allerhalter’ that is by definition all-inclusive. These two terms highlight the relation between that which encompasses and that which is encompassed. As the all-inclusive being, it cannot be named: ‘Wer darf ihn nennen?’ In the first stage of this relatively short speech, Faust includes Gretchen, himself and finally the All-encompassing Itself into the One:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Der Allumfasser,} \\
\text{Der Allerhalter,} \\
\text{Faßt und erhält er nicht} \\
\text{Dich, mich, sich selbst?}
\end{align*}
\]

Goethe’s poem Prooemion, written in March of 1816, poetically explores the problem of naming the indefinite divine: ‘In Jenes Namen, der, so oft genannt, | Dem Wesen nach bleibt immer unbekannt’. Here, too, knowing the Indefinite and Infinite proceeds in stages: announcing the impossibility of naming; turning to the senses and phenomena; and asserting the immanence of the divine and its accessibility to the senses, albeit as images. The following verses testifies to this process:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{So weit das Ohr, so weit das Auge reicht} \\
\text{Du findest nur Bekanntes das Ihm gleicht,} \\
\text{Und deines Geistes höchster Feuerflug} \\
\text{Hat schon am Gleichnis, hat am Bild genug}
\end{align*}
\]

In addition to the similarity between referring to the phenomena as ‘Bekanntes’ and referring to them as Faust’s brethren in Wald und Höhle, Goethe’s argument in Prooemion in favor of trusting the senses exhibits similarities to Wald und Höhle. By way of sensory perception, the self knows that it is included

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193 V. 3425.
194 V. 3432.
195 V. 3438–3441.
196 FA I, 2: p. 1075.
199 See specifically v. 3225ff.
in the force that moves the senses: ‘Es zieht dich an, es reißt dich heiter fort’.200 At the same time, it is clear that the same force that moves the senses also unravels the manifold phenomena before them: ‘Und wo du wandelst schmückt sich Weg und Ort’.201 This view is further expounded in the following verses:

> Was wär’ ein Gott, der nur von außen stieße,  
> Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen ließe!  
> Ihm ziemt’s, die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,  
> Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen,  
> So daß was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist,  
> Nie Seine Kraft, nie Seinen Geist vermißt.202

Faust’s answer to Gretchen shows another important aspect of his view of the world in which the immanent divine is active always and everywhere:

> Wölbt sich der Himmel nicht dadroben?  
> Liegt die Erde nicht hierunten fest?  
> Und steigen freundlich blickend  
> Ewige Sterne nicht herauf?203

In these verses, natural phenomena are depicted as instantiations of the acts of the ‘Allumfasser’. These acts give the phenomena their qualities: the heaven arches, the earth remains steady and the heavenly bodies cast friendly glances. The phenomena are illustrated as extensions of the ‘Allumfasser’, but each as a separate aspect and an instance of the ‘Allumfasser’. In this manner, Faust explores that which is beyond naming – ‘[d]em Wesen nach bleibt immer unbekannt’.

In West-östlicher Divan and the last poem of Suleika Nameh (Book of Suleika) we find another poetic treatment of the subject of the naming that we find above in Faust.204

In the following verses, naming is not an attempt at grasping a thing’s essence, but is rather a kind of exploration and identification of attributes of Suleika’s Allah with the senses in nature. The poem begins by bringing together love, knowledge and recognition:

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200 FA I, 2: p. 489. V. 11.  
201 FA I, 2: p. 489. V. 12.  
203 V. 3442–3445.  
204 FA I, 3/2: p. 1305.
In tausend Formen magst du dich verstecken,
Doch, Allerliebste, gleich erkenn’ ich dich,
Du magst mit Zauberschleier dich bedecken,
Allgegenwärtige, gleich erkenn’ ich dich.\textsuperscript{205}

Immediately, the poet shows us how vast the immanence of his ‘Allgegenwärtige’ is. The straight and beautiful growth of a cypress exhibits the attribute of ‘Allschöngewachsene’: ‘An der Cypresse reinstem, jungen Streben, | Allschöngewachsne, gleich erkenn’ ich dich’.\textsuperscript{206} The formation and transformation of clouds displays the ‘Allmannigfaltige’\textsuperscript{207}. Throughout this natural exploration, the poet introduces active and passive qualities such as ‘Allbuntbesternte’ and ‘Allumklammernde’. Next, he includes emotions as well: ‘Allerheiternde’ and ‘Allherzerweiternde’.\textsuperscript{208}

After exploring the qualities of natural phenomena and recognizing them as a form of inclusion in All, Faust, like Suleika, turns to human emotions. Just as the earth is steady as an active instance of the All, the ‘Allerliebste’ in the look between Gretchen and Faust permeates them from head to heart.\textsuperscript{209} These are eternal acts of the Infinite, immanent in the world: ‘Und webt in ewigem Geheimnis | Unsichtbar sichtbar neben dir’.\textsuperscript{210}

The verses from \textit{Suleika Nameh} mentioned above bear a striking similarity to the following verses from \textit{Faust}:

\begin{verbatim}
Dann durch die Welt mit allen Sinnen schweife,
Nach allen höchsten Worten greife,
Und diese Glut, von der ich brenne,
Unendlich, ewig, ewig nenne\textsuperscript{211}
\end{verbatim}

These verses of Faust cannot be understood completely if read independently from Faust’s invocation of the exalted spirit – ‘Gabst mir die herrliche Natur zum Königreich, | Kraft sie zu fühlen, zu Genießen’\textsuperscript{212} – and his gratitude toward the exalted spirit for supplying the senses with objects of perception and cognition:

\textsuperscript{206} FA I, 3/1: p. 101. V. 5.
\textsuperscript{207} FA I, 3/1: p. 101. V. 12.
\textsuperscript{208} FA I, 3/1: p. 102. V. 18; 20.
\textsuperscript{209} V. 3446–3448.
\textsuperscript{210} V. 3449–3450.
\textsuperscript{211} V. 3062–3065.
\textsuperscript{212} V. 3220–3221.
Du führst die Reihe der Lebendigen
Vor mir vorbei, und lehrst mich meine Brüder
Im stillen Busch, in Luft und Wasser zu kennen.\textsuperscript{213}

In \textit{West-östlicher Divan}, the attribute ‘Allerliebste’ in the second verse becomes ‘Allbelehrende’ in verse twenty-two, where the All is portrayed as the source of knowledge. Finally, all the names and attributes of the divine are recognized as different aspects of the beloved, which is disclosed in the natural realm.

Was ich mit äußerem Sinn, mit innerm kenne,
Du Allbelehrende, kenn’ ich durch dich.
Und wenn ich Allahs Namenhundert nenne,
Mit jedem klingt ein Name nach für dich.\textsuperscript{214}

In this poem of \textit{Suleika Nameh}, we find a lyrical articulation of the active, all-encompassing immanence of the divine in love – the dramatic subject of \textit{Faust}, from \textit{Hexenküche} onward.

Faust returns to Gretchen’s question: ‘Glaubst du an Gott?’\textsuperscript{215} He mentions that attempts at grasping and feeling the Infinite are relative to the subject who perceives and names:

\begin{quote}
Erfüll’ davon dein Herz, so groß es ist,
Und wenn du ganz in dem Gefühle selig bist,
Nenn’ es dann wie du willst,
Nenn’s Glück! Herz! Liebe! Gott!\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

In \textit{Studie Nach Spinoza}, written between 1784 and 1785,\textsuperscript{217} Goethe discusses the impossibility of contemplating the Infinite without limiting It in accordance with our intellect: ‘Wir können nur Dinge denken die entweder beschränkt sind oder die sich unsre Seele beschränkt.’\textsuperscript{218} Yet there is a problem: ‘Sie [die Menschen] werden dasjenige was sie am \textit{bequemsten denken worin sie einen Genuß finden können für das Gewissesste und Sicherste halten}.\textsuperscript{219} This attained satisfaction is held up as ‘das letzte Ziel’.\textsuperscript{220} Goethe does not criticize faith per se, but rather refuses to follow those who claim ‘daß sie im Wahren eine Sicherheit gefunden

\textsuperscript{213} V. 3225–3227.
\textsuperscript{214} FA I, 3/\textit{I}: p. 102. V. 21–24.
\textsuperscript{215} V. 3425.
\textsuperscript{216} V. 3451–3453.
\textsuperscript{217} Compare to FA I, 25: pp. 863–866.
\textsuperscript{219} FA I, 25: p. 16 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{220} FA I, 25: p. 16.
welche über allen Beweis und Verstand erhaben sei." Faust shares his author’s indefatigable yearning for knowledge. At the end of his speech in the scene Marthens Garten, having acknowledged the relative nature of seeking to know the infinite all-including One, Faust does not refute orthodox religion—he never intended to: ‘Will niemand sein Gefühl und seine Kirche rauben.’ Rather, Faust asks for tolerance of his unorthodox speculative view of immanence:

Es sagen’s aller Orten
Alle Herzen unter dem himmlischen Tage,
Jedes in seiner Sprache;
Warum nicht ich in der meinen?223

The scenes we analyzed above give space to Faust’s contemplation. After the scene Marthens Garten, however, the drama is mostly dedicated to Gretchen’s struggle with her social and historical challenges as well as Faust’s duel with Valentin and its consequences. (After killing Valentin in self-defense, Faust flees from the town.) The consecutive scenes Am Brunnen, Zwinger, Nacht and Dom illustrate the historical and social realities of Faust’s and Gretchen’s unconventional relationship. Moreover, as Schöne demonstrates in his work Götterzeichen, Liebeszauber, Satanskult,224 the scene Walpurgisnacht mirrors the social conditions that determine the tragic fate of Gretchen and bring Faust to the place in which we find him next – Anmutige Gegend.

III.1.4 Faust’s Rebirth in Anmutige Gegend

The scene Anmutige Gegend bridges the gap that Goethe identifies ‘zwischen dem bekannten jammervollen Abschluß des ersten Theils und dem Eintritt einer griechischen Heldenfrau’.225 Referring to this function of the scene, Schöne characterizes it as an interlude (‘Zwischenspiel’).226 The scene creates a space of symbolic temporality and locality, a dramatic device that Goethe employs again

221 Ibid.
222 V. 3420.
223 V. 3462–3465.
224 Schöne demonstrates that Walpurgisnacht dramatizes Gretchen’s tragic end as a victim of a witch-hunt (even though she herself is not present in the scene): See in Albrecht Schöne, Götterzeichen, Liebeszauber, Satanskult: neue Einblick in alte Goethetexte (München: Beck, 1982), pp. 179–189.
225 FT, p. 637. Compare to FK, p. 396. Also compare to Gaier, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Faust-Dichtungen, pp. 525–526. Gaier asserts that this scene functions as the prologue to Faust II.
226 FK, p. 396.
in *Faust II* in *Klassische Walpurgisnacht*, where the ‘Halbwirklichkeiten’\(^{227}\) of Faust’s union with Helena is made possible. Later in this section, I cast light on other specifications of the space of *Anmutige Gegend*. The scene consists of two smaller sections: first, the events of the night and the song of the Ariel and the choir; and second, the breaking of dawn and Faust’s soliloquy.

The first verse of *Faust II* starkly contrasts to the opening of the scene *Nacht* in *Faust I*. Unlike the first verse of the scene *Nacht*, where the eliminated subject ‘Ich’ in ‘Habe nun . . . ’ announces the commencement of a subject-centered drama, *Faust II* begins with a conditional sentence (‘Wenn der Blüten Frühlings-Regen’)\(^{228}\) that situates Faust within an idyllic natural scene\(^{229}\); then Faust is included in ‘Allen Erdgeboren’.\(^{230}\) In order to attain a deeper understanding of the space in which Faust’s articulations in the second part of *Anmutige Gegend* is made possible, I further compare the first part of *Anmutige Gegend* to the scene *Nacht*.

In *Anmutige Gegend*, Goethe presents Faust in a vulnerable state. Ariel and the choir of elves – and not Faust himself – describe what Faust undergoes. This third person perspective opens a window to Faust’s state of mind. In contrast to *Anmutige Gegend*, the scene *Nacht* is mediated through Faust’s own subjective self-descriptions, thus leaving the reader always a step behind Faust.

The objective quality of *Anmutige Gegend* is further apparent from the scene’s setting, which contrasts to the setting of *Nacht*. The scene *Nacht* took place in a study (a historical setting) and a world of ‘unerklärter Schmerz’, which hindered the flow of the life force that could have revived Faust.\(^{231}\) In *Anmutige Gegend*, on the other hand, the natural surroundings are conducive to healing and nourishment. Yet, as Michelsen observes, nature in this setting has an intensified quality: ‘So bietet sich die Eingangsszene dar als ein sinnlich-sittliches Experiment der Natur, als objektiver Versuch, bei dem die Anordnung der Versuchsbedingungen in idealer Reinheit erfolgt.’\(^{232}\) The pure and uninterrupted flow of immanence of the natural forces in this scene

\(^{227}\) See Goethe’s early planning for *Faust II* from 1816 in paralipomenon 92 of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* in: FA I, 14: p. 983.
\(^{228}\) V. 4613 (my emphasis).
\(^{229}\) See Schöne’s comment in FK, pp. 387–388.
\(^{230}\) V. 4616.
\(^{231}\) See v. 410–417.
contrasts starkly to Faust’s *Mauerloch*.

The contrast is so extreme that it suggests what it tries to avoid – it again resembles a laboratory for experience of immanence of the natural forces! Therefore, Michelson reminds the reader that the spatial and temporal setting of the scene *Anmutige Gegend* is to be understood allegorically. In *Anmutige Gegend*, we find the objective realization of Faust’s ideal Nature.

There is another aspect of the first part of the *Anmutige Gegend* that is of great importance to this study. In the first chapter, I compared the words of the Wise One in the scene *Nacht* to Goethe’s quatrains first written in Lauchstädt in 1805 that reflected Goethe’s productive reception of the *Ennead* I. 6. 9. In Goethe’s quatrains, I argued, purification as a hard and long process of abstraction is absent, while in the words of the Wise One there is an element of negative process and ascent. The Wise One refers to the act of purification by inviting the seeker to bathe. ‘Dann badet ihn’, Ariel says, recalling the two mentions of bathing in the scene *Nacht*. In the scene *Nacht*, the act of bathing was an act of purification and a step on an ascending path. In *Anmutige Gegend*, the act of bathing has a different significance: Faust is not bathing in the ‘Morgenrot’, but is rather being bathed; he is a passive subject, not an actor. Michelson is right to stress the importance of Faust’s passivity:


Faust does not reach or strive for nature as he did in the *Nacht* scene: ‘Wo fass ich dich, unendliche Natur? | Euch Brüste, wo? [. . .]’. Rather, nature embraces him. In *Anmutige Gegend*, like in Goethe’s quatrains of 1805, there is no place for active purification. Ariel and the elves appear to be in control of

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233 See Lohmeyer’s explanation of *rein* in the context of *Arkadien* as the state of uninterrupted and uncompromised immanence and realization of the divine in nature. Michelsen explains the purity of *Anmutige Gegend* in reference to this view of Lohmeyer: Lohmeyer, *Faust und die Welt: Der zweite Teil der Dichtung Eine Anleitung zum Lesen des Textes*, pp. 337–338.

234 Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 98.

235 See pp. 55f above.

236 V. 4629.

237 The first instance reads ‘In deinem Tau gesund mich baden!’ (V. 397) The second instance, in the words of the Wise One, reads: ‘Auf, bade, Schüler, unverdrossen’. (V. 445)

238 Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 98.

239 V. 455–456.
Faust’s body: ‘Erst senkt sein Haupt aufs kühle Polster nieder’.\(^\text{240}\) Then, Faust is bathed in Lethe’s dew:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Besänftiget des Herzens grimmen Strauß,} \\
\text{Entfernt des Vorwurfs glühend bittre Pfeile,} \\
\text{Sein Innres reinigt von verlebtem Graus.}\(^\text{241}\)
\end{align*}
\]

At the peak of this regeneration, the holy light is restored to Faust: ‘Vollbringt der Elfen schönste Pflicht | Gebt ihn zurück dem heiligen Licht.’\(^\text{242}\) It is essential to note that something is given back to Faust that he already had; in the Prolog im Himmel, Mephisto tells us that the glow of heaven’s light has been given to humans. (Mephisto wishes that the Lord had denied them this light.)

Drawing our attention to the note on Lethe in Hederich’s mythological lexicon,\(^\text{243}\) Goethe’s reference book,\(^\text{244}\) Michelsen remarks that the act of nature in Anmutige Gegend may go beyond healing and signify a rebirth.\(^\text{245}\) As Schöne correctly notes, the dew from the river Lethe makes this ‘Bad der Wiedergeburt’\(^\text{246}\) possible. In the third and fourth verses of the quatrain from 1805, this divine light is articulated as the presence of God’s own force in humans, which enables them to recognize the divine in the world and rejoice in it. This faculty is not attained through an ascending negative effort, but it is rather active in the appreciation of immanence.

\(^\text{240}\) V. 4628.
\(^\text{241}\) V. 4623–4625.
\(^\text{242}\) V. 4632–4633.
\(^\text{243}\) Michelsen and Schöne provide information regarding Goethe’s letter to Zelter from February 15, 1830. In this letter, a context different from that of Faust, Goethe advises his friend to actively use the human faculty of forgetting: ‘Man bedenke daß mit jedem Atemzug ein ätherischer Lethestrom unser ganzes Wesen durchdringt, so daß wir uns der Freuden nur mäßig, der Leiden kaum erinnern. Diese hohe Gottsgabe habe ich von jeher zu schätzen, zu nützen und zu steigern gewußt.’ FA II, 11: p. 228. For Michelson’s mention see: Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 105. See also FK, p. 401.
The song of Ariel further highlights Faust’s passivity. Ariel explicitly states that the merciful act of the elves is not due to any merit on Faust’s part – it is certainly not a reward for Faust’s ascending purification. It is not even due to Faust’s being virtuous. Rather, it is the eternal role of the elves to help the person in pain – the virtuous and wicked alike:

Kleiner Elfen Geistergröße
Eilet wo sie helfen kann,
Ob er heilig? ob er böse?
Jammert sie der Unglücksmann.\(^\text{247}\)

III.1.5 Turning from the Sun to Its Colorful Reflections

Upon awakening, Faust opens his eyes to a space shaped for the reader through the songs of Ariel and the elves. This space is unique in the drama not only because it is the realization of the ideal of Nature. Faust’s soliloquy in the scene \textit{Anmutige Gegend} has three distinguishing features that highlight its seriousness.

The first feature is that, unlike Faust’s soliloquy in front of the macrocosm sign – ‘Welch Schauspiel! aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!’\(^\text{248}\) –, Faust’s soliloquy in \textit{Anmutige Gegend} does not arrive at a painful disillusionment followed by lamentation. Nor does it culminate in an act of taking distance consequent to disappointment, as does Faust’s monologue at the end of \textit{Osterspaziergang}, in which Faust expresses a wish to fly after the setting sun: ‘Ein schöner Traum’.\(^\text{249}\) Another distinguishing feature that is of great importance pertains to the fact that, unlike all of Faust’s other monologues and soliloquies, which are interrupted, variously, by Mephisto, Wagner and Gretchen, no one interrupts Faust in this case. Interruption by these companions, Parker notes, ‘pulls Faust’s subjective lyricism back down into a dramatic relation.’\(^\text{250}\) In absence of interruption, the scene suspends the dramatization of the chain of intersubjective and communicative actions, and moves toward a dramatization of stages that lead to the articulation of verse 4727. A further distinguishing feature is that Mephisto is not present in the scene. Without Mephisto, Faust’s remarks are free of moral judgments. This secluded space intensifies the seriousness of

\(^{247}\) V. 4617–4620
\(^{248}\) V. 454.
\(^{249}\) V. 1089.
the soliloquy. Bearing in mind these qualities of the setting, we now turn to the second part of *Anmutige Gegend*.

With the heavenly light restored to him, Faust utters his first word – ‘life’. Life’s pulse beats in him afresh. This awakening is in harmony with nature. Faust is integrated into nature and moved to greet the day that is about to dawn: ‘Ätherische Dämmerung milde zu begrüßen’. Faust’s integration into nature is reflected in his description of the earth beneath his feet: ‘Du Erde warst auch diese Nacht beständig | Und atmest neu erquickt zu meinen Füßen’. At this early point of Faust’s soliloquy, having just mentioned the part of his body closest to earth, Faust points out that the earth inspires in him the desire and energy to strive toward the highest being: ‘Du regst und rührst ein kräftiges Beschließen, | Zum höchsten Dasein immerfort zu streben.’

This conception of earth is different from Faust’s conception of earth in the scene *Nacht*, in which Faust understood the earth as the theater of *Sorge*. Based upon the changeable and confusing character of the bodily realm, the earth is seen as the source of *Sorge*, disguised in the mundane realm ‘als Haus und Hof, als Weib und Kind’. Faust considered the source of life to be transcendent: ‘Die uns das Leben gaben, herrliche Gefühle, | Erstarren in dem irdischen Gewühle.’ Furthermore, in the scene *Osterspaziergang*, I showed that the earthly and bodily part of Faust’s soul had the characteristic of clinging to the earth, while the heavenly part desired ascent and separation. Faust’s abstracting epistemological and ethical approach developed from this assessment of the mundane and bodily realms. In *Anmutige Gegend*, however, nature returns to Faust the heavenly light, and the earth inspires his movement toward the highest being. In this ideal space, an epistemological shift finds articulation. The shift from an excluding ascending method of attaining knowledge to one that includes all the senses and the natural realm is a pleasing aesthetic experience. In his essay *Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele*, Herder, whose works had a direct influence upon Goethe, outlines such an epistemological and ethical turn:

251 V. 4680.
252 V. 4681–4682.
253 V. 4684–4685.
254 See p. 64 above.
255 V. 648.
256 V. 638–639.
257 See p. 66 above.
258 One way in which Herder clearly influenced Goethe is that he encouraged Goethe to read Spinoza’s *Ethics*, in which Goethe found speculative epistemological views close to his own: Albert Jungmann, *Goethes Naturphilosophie zwischen Spinoza und Nietzsche: Studien zur*
Erkennen und Empfinden scheinen für uns vermischte, zusammengesetzte Wesen in der Entfernung zweierlei; forschen wir aber näher, so läßt sich in unserm Zustande die Natur des einen ohne die Natur des andern nicht völlig begreifen. Sie müssen also vieles gemein haben oder am Ende gar einerlei sein.259

In Herder’s characterization of humans as mixed beings and his effort to clarify the inner unity of the two faculties at hand, we find a theoretical attempt to address the problem of two souls that Faust recognized in himself – a recognition that brought Faust the familiar sensation of pain, as I explained in first and second chapters of this study. There is a striking similarity between Herder’s unifying explanation and Faust’s experiences after waking up.

Disagreeing with Plato’s Socrates in *Phaedo*, Herder asserts that knowledge cannot be attained in separation of the body from the soul:

[D]as Erkennen der Seele kann als ein deutliches Resultat all ihrer Empfindungszustände betrachtet werden; die Empfindung also kann nichts anders sein als gleichsam der Körper, das Phänomenon des Erkennens, die anschaubare Formel, worin die Seele den Gedanken siehet.260

In Herder’s organic epistemology, each sense (‘Sinn’) is ‘ein Organ, der Seele Empfindung und unter der Hülle derselben Erkenntnis zu geben.’261 The relation between sensation and cognition, therefore, is that of multiplicity and unity, since the goal of this organic activity is recognition of the oneness that is of divine character: ‘Sie [die Seele] soll unter allen Gestalten nichts als Wahrheit und Güte ernten, die eins sind. Sie übt sich immer im Erkennen, indem sie empfindet.’262 Herder’s view of emanation resembles Plato’s views, but with a twist – for Herder, emanation of the divine is radically immanent in the cosmos. The core of the process of knowing, according to Herder, is the practice of recognizing the Good and the Truth in the cosmos. The sensation nourishes the growth of the intellectual faculty: ‘Jede Empfindung endlich liefert die Kenntnis auf die fruchtbarste und leichteste Weise: das ist das Kriterium der Empfindung. Viel ist in ihr zusammengefüllt, das auf einmal in die Seele kommt, dadurch sie zur Entwicklung gelockt wird.’263

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260 Ibid., p. 402.
261 Ibid., p. 403.
262 Ibid., p. 406.
In Herder’s view, pleasure and cognitive activity of the soul are so interwoven that the soul’s cognitive activity may elude our attention, leading us to believe that the soul is engaged with nothing but pleasure: ‘Sie [die Seele] unterhält sich selbst so unmühsam, als ob sie ganz von der Empfindung unterhalten würde und nicht wirkte, sondern genösse.’

Herder does not deny that the process of knowing is susceptible to error and confusion. After all, the multiplicity brought to the cognitive faculty is extraordinarily complex. Yet when error occurs, Herder argues, the senses are not to blame. Rather, he holds that the evil comes about through the weakness of the cognitive faculty:


Hence, Herder’s ethics does not concentrate on transcending the multiplicity, but rather on guiding the cognitive faculty to recognize the inclusion of the multiplicity into unity as reflections of the Good and the Truth in multiple manifestations: ‘Darauf beruht nun auch die ganze Sittenlehre. Die Seele nämlich zu leiten, daß sie sich nicht täusche, daß sie in jedem Spiegel des Guten und Wahren auch nichts als diese reine Substanz erblicke’.

Direct experience of nature provides the soul with the pleasing nourishment that is intertwined with recognizing the immanent divine. Herder specifically singles out spring as the source of this nourishment:

Ein Blick in die Natur des Frühlings z.E., welche reiche Ernte für die Seele! Duft, Lied, schöne Farbe, Wohlgestalt – alles fließt zusammen und füllt die Empfindung – ein angenehmes Chaos von Schöpfersideen voll Weisheit und Güte, das auch das Bild Gottes die Schöpferin in uns, so viel und weit sie kann, nachempfindet und sich, soviel sie kann, zu einer Welt voll Wohlordnung für sich bildet.

The passage above shows the deep similarity between Goethe’s and Herder’s epistemological views. As I mentioned earlier, the image of the divine that is rooted in Judeo-Christian tradition and Plotinus’s philosophy is modified as an immanent identity active in the human recognition of the immanence in the

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264 Ibid., p. 407.
265 Ibid., p. 408.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid., pp. 408–409.
world. Herder formulates this idea in its clearest form as follows: ‘Wäre dies Erkennen nicht der tiefste Grund der Seele, so wäre ihr ja alles gleichviel: so wäre sie für jede äußere Empfindung taub.’ This is the core of the view that is articulated on numerous occasions in Goethe’s poetry: in his quatrain on the sun-likeness of the eye; in Prooemion; in Wald und Höhle in Faust; and in the poem in West-östlicher Divan from the Book of Suleika.

Now we can return to Anmutige Gegend. How does the earth (nature) motivate Faust to strive constantly toward the highest being? Verses 4686 to 4694 contain the poetic articulation of Faust’s sensory exploration of his natural surroundings (‘die Welt’ in verse 4686). Yet it is important to note that Faust explores what has been disclosed by the light of the dawn (‘In Dämmerschein liegt schon die Welt erschlossen’) – namely, the inner space of the valley that is full of fog (‘Tal aus, Tal ein ist Nebelstreif ergossen’). Immediately after describing the valley and the streams of mist (‘Doch senkt sich Himmelsklarheit in die Tiefen’), Faust confirms the crucial role of light – it makes the depth of the valley perceivable to him. What is explored at this stage is not the one source of light itself, but rather the multiplicity that the light makes perceivable by Faust’s senses. In the polyphonic voices of the valley (‘Der Wald ertönt von tausendstimmigem Leben’) and the manifold scents and colors of flowers and leaves, Faust’s awareness of the multiplicity comes to life.

The text provides an answer to the question I posed above: these manifold extensions in life pleasantly activate Faust’s senses (‘Ein Paradies wird um mich her die Runde’) and motivate him to strive for the highest being – ‘Hinaufgeschaut!’ The word ‘life’ and the quality of being invigorated appear frequently, in various forms, within the first fifteen verses of the soliloquy: ‘Leben’ (twice), ‘frisch’ (twice), ‘lebendig’, and ‘erquickt’ (twice). In sequences of pleasing observations of the multiplicity, Faust is led upward from the depth of the valley to the summits of mountains (‘Der Berge Gipfelriesen’). At this point in the soliloquy, Faust directs his attention to the light and the stages in

270 Herder, ‘Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele [1774]’, p. 413.
271 V. 4685.
272 V. 4686.
273 V. 4688.
274 V. 4689 (my emphasis).
275 V. 4687 (my emphasis).
276 V. 4690–4694.
277 V. 4694.
278 V. 4695.
279 V. 4695.
which it reaches the world: ‘Und stufenweis herab ist es gelungen’. As the day breaks, Faust – ‘vom Augenschmerz durchdrungen’ – interrupts his upward movement. In the allegory of the cave, Plato describes the ascending movement of a prisoner from the depth of the cave toward the sight of the sun. Though the sun hurts the eyes, Plato insists that the seeker of knowledge should endure the pain until the eyes grow accustomed to the sun’s light. Having seen the sun, the former prisoner would pity those who have not yet broken out of the cave to reside in the realm of truth. In Herder’s words, as Faust explores the depth of the valley, he observes that ‘unten am Berge sind vielgestaltige Nebel’ and recognizes that ‘oben am Gipfel scheint’s helle’. Yet as the ‘Flammen-Übermaß’ threatens to destroy his senses, Faust integrates himself into humanity through his use of the pronoun ‘wir’: ‘Des Lebens Fackel wollten wir entzünden’. Abandoning the ascending process, Faust turns his gaze back to the earth: ‘So daß wir wieder nach der Erde blicken, | Zu bergen uns in jugendlichstem Schleier.’

The choice to turn away from the sun and face the earth has other articulations in Goethe’s poetic works. In the dramatic fragment Pandora, Prometheus explains the relation between people and the light of the sun as follows: ‘Daß nicht vor Helios Pfeil erblinde mein Geschlecht, | Bestimmt Erleuchtetes zu sehen, nicht das Licht!’ A similar motif is present in the poem Vermächtnis alt persischen Glaubens in Parsi Nameh (Book of the Persians) of the Westöstlicher Divan. In this poem, Goethe interprets the Zoroastrian adoration of fire as adoration of the sun on the earth. He illustrates the desire for knowledge of the divine source of life. But the ascending process is interrupted, and the knower turns back to the earth to explore the natural realm:

Wenn die Sonne sich auf Morgenflügeln
Darnawends unzähligen Gipfelhügeln
Bogenhaft hervorhob. Wer enthielt

280 V. 4701.
281 V. 4702.
282 V. 4703.
284 Herder, ‘Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele [1774]’, p. 422.
285 V. 4708.
287 V. 4713–4714.
288 FA I, 6: p. 693. V. 956–957.
Sich des Blicks dahin? Ich fühlte, fühlte
Tausendmal in so viel Lebenstagen
Mich mit ihr, der kommenden, getragen.
Gott auf seinem Throne zu erkennen,
Ihn den Herrn des Lebensquells zu nennen,
Jenes hohen Anblicks werth zu handeln
Und in seinem Lichte fortzuwandeln.
Aber stieg der Feuerkreis vollendet,
Stand ich als in Finsterniß geblendet,
Schlug den Busen, die erfrischten Glieder
Warf ich, Stirn voran, zur Erde nieder.
Und nun sey ein heiliges Vermächtniß
Brüderlichem Wollen und Gedächtniß:
Schwerer Dienste tägliche Bewahrung,
Sonst bedarf es keiner Offenbarung.290

With the sun behind him, Faust gazes upon the countless droplets of the waterfall with growing joy (‘mit wachsendem Entzücken’).291 For a passing moment, he sees the droplets illuminated and individuated by the light of the sun. Faust describes the rainbow that he sees by way of the oxymoron ‘Wechsel–Dauer’.

Goethe refuted the theory of refraction. In Goethe’s view, each droplet contains an image of the sun and takes on a particular color.292 Recall Goethe’s formula from the Farbenlehre: ‘[d]ie Farben sind Taten des Lichtes’.293 The individuation of each droplet with a color as an image of the sun is the deed of the light. Goethe brings together his cosmological and natural views to modify the concept of the presence of an image of God in humans: the droplets receive their individuality and life (their color) from the divine source that is present in the sun.294 This view evolves from the titanism in the so-called Erdgeist scene to Wald und Höhle, in which the presence of the All allows humans to recognize their natural brethren. In Anmutige Gegend, in the soliloquy that starts and ends with life, this view appears again in the oxymoron ‘Wechsel-Dauer’:

291 V. 4717.
292 Michelsen proves this in reference to Goethe’s letter to Boisserée from January 11, 1832 as well as from multiple passages in Farbenlehre (see for instance FA I, 23/1: pp. 700–702; 1038): Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 97.
293 FA I, 23/1: p. 12.
294 As I mentioned earlier, we also find this view expounded in Plotinus’s Enneads V. 1. 10–12 as the undescended presence of the One in the individual soul.
Allein wie herrlich diesem Sturm entsprießend
Wölbt sich des bunten Bogens Wechsel-Dauer
Bald rein gezeichnet, bald in Luft zerfließend,
Umher verbreitend duftig kühle Schauer.
Der Spiegel ab das menschliche Bestreben.
Ihm sinne nach und du begreifst genauer:
Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben.  

Herder also uses metaphors of the sun and the rainbow to explain perceptual knowledge. Despite constantly mentioning that sensation and cognition are identical, however, Herder does not follow Faust in limiting his field of exploration to reflections. Faust’s knowledge and exploration of colorful reflections is grounded in his awareness that they are acts of light and the images of the divine. Herder specifically mentions that knowing is enjoying each ray of light and feeling is enjoying the colors of the rainbow:

Erkennen ist Glanz der Sonne genießen, die sich in jedem Strahle abspiegelt: Empfindung ist ein Farbenspiel des Regenbogens, schön, wahr, aber nur als Abglanz der Sonne. Gehet diese klar auf am Firmament, so verschwindet der Regenbogen mit all seinen Farben.  

But Herder’s assertion that the senses do not deceive us goes beyond the view that required the separation of the soul from the realm of confusion and deception. Thus, Herder can define the exploration of the natural realm as a nourishing process intertwined with the attainment of knowledge:

Kein Sinn, als Sinn kann sie [die Seele] trügen: alle Vorstellungen, selbst die dunkelsten, sind prägnant von Wahrheit im Schoße der Empfindung: Irrtum ist nichts als eine Vermischung und Zusammenwerfung zu vieler Teile, deren Grund wir noch nicht sehen, also nichts als ein Übel unterwegens [sic] auf dem Gange zur Wahrheit.  

In the turn from the absolute source of the life toward life itself in Anmutige Gegend, we find a clear articulation of Goethe’s view on the impossibility of direct and unmediated knowledge of the truth, which he expressed in Versuch einer Witterungslehre (1825):

Das Wahre mit dem Göttlichen identisch, läßt sich niemals von uns direkt erkennen, wir schauen es nur im Abglanz, im Beispiel, Symbol, in einzelnen und verwandten

295 V. 4721–4727.
Erscheinungen; wir werden es gewahr als unbegreifliches Leben und können dem Wunsch nicht entsagen, es dennoch zu begreifen.\textsuperscript{298}

The following aphorism sheds light on this view: ‘Wie das Unbedingte sich selbst bedingen, | Und so das Bedingte zu seines Gleichen machen kann.’\textsuperscript{299}

The Indefinite (or Faust’s ‘Allumfasser’) steps into the realm of appearance by limiting itself in the act of assuming determinate individuations; each such finite limitation contains an image of the Infinite. The two passages above shed light on the modification of the titanic God-likeness, which becomes a likeness of the Indeterminate in each act of revealing Itself in the multiplicity of unique instances, similes and reflections.

Exploring the world via the faculty that is the living presence of ‘Gottes eigne Kraft’\textsuperscript{300} in us is, therefore, the attempt to know the acts of the Indeterminate – or in terms of the Farbenlehre, ‘Taten des Lichtes’.\textsuperscript{301} Knowing is not the painful practice of death as a means to arrive at the transcendent, but rather the joyful recognition of the acts of the Indeterminate in Its living finite reflections. In this spirit, Suleika moves through a thousand veils of the One saying: ‘Du magst mit Zauberschleyern dich bedecken, | Allgegenwärtige, gleich erkenn’ ich dich.’\textsuperscript{302} Suleika recognizes the act of the One (Du) that veils itself as the manifold ‘Allgegenwärtige’. Again, in the same spirit, Faust takes shelter in the sphere of youthful veils from the destructive influence of the direct pursuit of the unveiled truth – ‘Zu bergen uns in jugendlichstem Schleier.’\textsuperscript{303}

At this point, it is worth examining whether Faust’s soliloquy in Anmutige Gegend contains any feature of his immanent world-view not already articulated in the context of Faust’s pursuit of Gretchen’s love. In the scenes Anmutige Gegend, Strasse (v. 3062) and Wald und Höhle (v. 3225–3227) we find the poetic articulation of Goethe’s famous proposition – ‘Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten, | Geh nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten.’\textsuperscript{304} Moreover, as I discussed in detail, the relation between enjoying the unity in all and being freed from an isolated perspective found its articulation in Faust’s remarks to Gretchen (v. 3191), as well as in Wald und Höhle and Marthens Garten. The experience of unity through abandoning one’s self can be found in Faust’s passivity in his sleep as well as in his use of the pronoun ‘wir’ to refer to himself as

\textsuperscript{298} FA I, 25: p. 274.
\textsuperscript{299} FA I, 13: p. 60.
\textsuperscript{300} FA I, 23/1: p. 24.
\textsuperscript{301} FA I, 23/1: p. 12.
\textsuperscript{303} V. 4714.
\textsuperscript{304} FA I, 24: p. 441. See also Ibid., p. 1070.
integrated into humankind. A variation of the oxymoron of ‘Wechsel-Dauer’ is also present in *Marthens Garten*: ‘Und webt in ewigem Geheimnis | Unsichtbar sichtbar neben dir’.\textsuperscript{305}

On closer investigation, it becomes clear that the views expressed in *Anmutige Gegend* cohere with those which Faust formed during his life-changing experience with Gretchen. But there is a difference: in this ideal space, absent reference to other stages of the drama, Faust’s soliloquy assumes the traits of a lyrical poem.

The soliloquy appears self-sufficient to the reader. It invites interpretation in reference to Goethe’s world-views regarding the aesthetic exploration of the realm of multiplicity as the path to acquiring knowledge.

### III.1.6 Exploring the Reflections in Faust’s Path to Helena

*Anmutige Gegend* exhibits the same understanding of unity in multiplicity that we find in Faust’s love for Gretchen. In Faust’s relation with Gretchen, the sublime aspect of their natural love was constantly challenged by Mephisto, opening the way for the moral judgment of the events in question. After Gretchen’s tragic fate, Faust’s aesthetic quest for love does not end; however, he rediscovers and follows the quest of love only in the images that his own magical power erects before him. Significantly, this quest is limited to outside the historical context of Faust and Gretchen’s relationship and of *Faust I*.

As Helena’s phantom emerges through the veil of Faust’s own magical representation on stage, Faust is overcome by a desire for her beauty. Thus, Faust’s second experience of sublime, bodily and natural love commences. In the scene *Rittersaal*, the medium of art opens the possibility for sublime and natural love to be represented and appreciated without the threat of moral refutation, even though some of the spectators deem the spectacle inappropriate.\textsuperscript{306} Mephisto does not understand how it is possible that Faust is falling in love in his own work – ‘Machst du’s doch selbst das Fratzengeisterspiel!’\textsuperscript{307} This lack of understanding shows us that it is not ancient Greece to which Mephisto is a stranger; rather, he fails to grasp the possibility of seeing the sublime in an

\textsuperscript{305} V. 3449–3450.
\textsuperscript{306} See verses 6466, 6470 and 6513. The complaints follow Goethe’s plans of 1826; as Paris appears, the men find fault in his behavior. Some of the women do the same as Helena becomes visible before them. See FT, p. 631, H P123B, *Reinschrift von der Hand Johns mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen*.
\textsuperscript{307} V. 6546.
image and a reflection: ‘Hübsch ist sie wohl, doch sagt sie mir nicht zu.’\textsuperscript{308} Faust has a strong reaction to Helena’s appearance: ‘Verschwinde mir des Lebens Atemkraft, | Wenn ich mich je von Dir zurückgewöhne!’\textsuperscript{309} Faust expresses his need to seek Helena by rejecting a life without her. The pursuit of love is also intertwined with the pursuit of knowledge; just before reaching for Helena and falling unconscious, Faust declares, ‘Wer sie erkannt der darf sie nicht entbehren.’\textsuperscript{310}

In \textit{Laboratorium}, attesting to the truthfulness of Faust’s claim, Homunkulus says: ‘Erwacht uns dieser, gibt es neue Not, | Er bleibt gleich auf der Stelle tot.’\textsuperscript{311} Homunkulus has access to Faust’s dream and he gives voice to the urgency of Faust’s need to leave the gothic room (his old world) and find Helena.

Homunkulus’s creation highlights an irony of this scene. Homunkulus is the new born spiritual bodiless being and the highest fruit of Faust’s old world. Thus, Homunkulus embodies the isolation of that world, as he himself acknowledges:

\begin{quote}
Das ist die Eigenschaft der Dinge:
Natürlichem genügt das Weltall kaum,
Was künstlich ist, verlangt geschloßnen Raum.\textsuperscript{312}
\end{quote}

Homunkulus is the fulfillment of Wagner’s wish to purge reproduction of sen-suality and corporeality. Wagner wants the brilliant human mind to procreate intellectually: ‘Und so ein Hirn, das trefflich denken soll, | Wird künftig auch ein Denker machen.’\textsuperscript{313} Wagner sees nothing sublime in natural love, and he succeeds in separating the body from the soul in its most radical form. Ironically, within these walls, the paralyzed Faust dreams of an event that contributed to the conception of his beloved Helena. In this house of exclusion, Faust dreams of an instance of inclusion of the divine in the human sphere. In \textit{Göttlerlehre}, preparing to discuss the myth of Leda, Karl Philipp Moritz describes Jupiter’s inclination toward the mortals as an act of descending and extending the divine into the mortal world:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{308} V. 6480.
\textsuperscript{309} V. 6493–6494.
\textsuperscript{310} V. 6559 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{311} V. 6930–6931.
\textsuperscript{312} V. 6882–6884.
\textsuperscript{313} V. 6869–6870.
Mit seiner Macht und Hoheit vereint sich die ganze Fülle der Jugendkraft, welche durch nichts gehemmt ist. Der Himmel faßt die Fülle seines Wesens nicht. – Um seine Götterkraft in manchem Heldenstamme auf Erden fortzupflanzen, richtete er auf die Töchter der Sterblichen seine Blicke.

Faust’s dream is an instance of the fertility of the mediated presence of the divine in an image. This image accords with the view that Goethe expresses at the beginning of Versuch einer Witterungslehre and in the soliloquy of Anmutige Gegend: Since once Juno’s jealousy of Semele taught Jupiter not to reveal himself to the mortals as he is, he disguised himself – ‘hüllte der Allesdurchwebende in täuschende Gestalten seine Gottheit ein.’ Furthermore, Moritz’s illustration of this scene conveys the sublime and natural beauty of Leda that is irresistible even for Jupiter. Her beauty drags Jupiter down to earth from his throne: ‘Die Schönheit der Leda zog den Jupiter von seinem Sitz herab; er senkte sich an den Ufern des Eurotas in der Gestalt eines Schwans zu ihr hernieder.’

Correggio’s painting ‘Leda and the Swan’ helps the reader visualize Faust’s dream and grasp the sharp contrast between the local setting of the scene and the dream itself. Homunkulus highlights this contrast (while alluding to Faust’s prediction in verses 6493–6494); he warns that Faust will die if he wakes up in this room:

Waldquellen, Schwäne, nackte Schönien,
Das war sein ahnungsvoller Traum;
Wie wollt’ er sich hierher gewöhnen!
Ich, der bequemste, duld’ es kaum.

Reading between the lines, we find the dramatization of a dire need to leave – a need for emigration (or in Arabic ‘Hegire’ the title of the opening poem of West-östlicher Divan) from the setting of Gretchen’s catastrophic end to a setting in which the exploration of the sublime and natural beauty in love does not subject the lovers to torture and death. The need for a ‘Hegire’ is present throughout Faust II. In the ideal refuge of Anmutige Gegend, Faust is revived through the dew of the river Lethe. We see the reflection of Goethe’s wish for rejuvenation in ‘Chisers Quelle’ in the poem Hegire of Moganni Nameh:

314 Moritz, ‘Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtung der Alten’, p. 656 (my emphasis).
315 Ibid., p. 656.
316 Ibid., p. 754 (my emphasis).
317 FK. p. 514.
318 V. 6932–6935.
319 FT, Trüber Tag Feld, l. 1–4. also l. 26–27.
The remedy of the *Anmutige Gegend*, however, cannot keep Faust on his feet and conscious for more than an act. The Greek and Oriental (Persian and Arabic) elements of the mask processions in *Weitläufiger Saal* show the need for an expanded world, and in the second and third act, Faust leaves the historic context of *Faust I* in pursuit of beauty and love. As far as Faust’s pursuit of love in *Faust II* is concerned, the text leaves no doubt that Faust embarks on a mythological journey. Homunkulus expresses this clearly:

[...] setz’ ihn nieder  
Deinen Ritter, und sogleich  
Kehret ihm das Leben wieder,  
Denn er sucht’s im Fabelreich.

The quest of love in *Faust II* closely relates to Faust’s realization of the significance of reflections. Upon regaining consciousness in *Pharsalische Felder*, Faust redirects his attention from the unmediated presence of his object of pursuit (‘Wo ist sie? – Frage jetzt nicht weiter nach’) to a multiplicity that stands in relation to her:

Wär’s nicht die Scholle die sie trug,  
Die Welle nicht die ihr entgegen schlug:  
So ist’s die Luft die ihre Sprache sprach.

The relation between the multiplicity and the beloved can be compared to the relation between the ‘Allumfasser’ and the all. Whereas the ‘Allumfasser’ became manifest as the qualities of the multiplicity, here the multiplicity receives its significance through its relation to the beautiful beloved. In this sense, the beloved has a divine quality. As we might expect, the path to her is

321 In *Goethe und 1001 Nacht*, Mommsen proves the influence of Goethe’s study of *1001 Nights* on the dramatic construction of *Faust II*, specifically from the act one to the end of the Helena-act. She singles out the motifs that *Faust II* shares with *1001 Nights* and stories from the *1001 Nights* that are productively assimilated into Goethe’s work. Katharina Mommsen, *Goethe und 1001 Nacht* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1960), pp. 185–290.  
322 V. 7052–7055.  
323 V. 7070.  
324 V. 7071–7073.
neither direct nor of an excluding nature; rather, it entails inclusion and exploration of the most peculiar of individuals. As Faust says, ‘Und find’ ich hier das Seltsamste beisammen, | Durchforsch’ ich ernst dies Labyrinth der Flammen.’

In its next step, this exploration arrives at a poetic image that is significant to the mediated appreciation of the object of desire in its reflections. Following the sound of the nymphs, Faust is attracted to the aesthetic natural beauty; yet he lets himself be touched and pleasingly educated by them: ‘Ich wache ja! O laßt sie walten | Die unvergleichlichen Gestalten’. Faust’s new understanding of ‘Abglanz’ is so central to his approach in this act that he praises the reflection of the beautiful and healthy ‘Frauenglieder’ in the water for doubling the intensity of the pleasure they bestow upon the eye:

Gesunde junge Frauenglieder,  
Vom feuchten Spiegel doppelt wieder  
Ergötztem Auge zugebracht! 

Faust’s awareness of the (not yet visible) beauty of Helena does not bring him to negate the beauty of her companions; rather he praises their beauty, recognizing their form as ‘unvergleichlich’. Faust is simply aware of a beauty even more dazzling. He will not stop until he finds it, although he does enjoy the (lesser) beauty of the nymphs:

Begnüge sollt’ ich mich an diesen,  
Mein Auge sollte hier genießen,  
Doch immer weiter strebt mein Sinn. 

Importantly, the beautiful images of healthy bodies that reflect in the water do not pose an obstacle for Faust, since they do not stop or delay his pursuit of Helena. While Faust conducts this pleasing experiment, Chiron arrives and becomes the first one in the strange land to guide Faust toward Manto.

In each step of Faust’s mediated path toward Helena, the mediating figures confirm the value of Faust’s quest. In response to Faust’s bidding (‘Nun sprich auch von der schönsten Frau’), Chiron attributes the quality of ‘Anmut’ to Helena, while showing disinterest in addressing her human beauty. Chiron assigns a higher value to ‘Anmut’ (relative to beauty) as the source of Helena’s

325 V. 7078–7079.  
326 V. 7271 (my emphasis).  
327 V. 7283–7285.  
328 V. 7289–7291.  
329 V. 7398.
being – ‘ein Wesen [...]’ Das froh und lebenslustig quillt.’ This is not the first time that the word ‘Anmut’ appears in Faust II: we saw it in the paratextual level in the title Anmutige Gegend as well as in the stage directions just before the opening verse describing the impression made by the movement of the spirits. In other words, before ‘Anmut’ is ever attributed to a person, the reader has already witnessed the dramatization of the concept’s influence on Faust as a moving quality in nature.

The linear steps through which Goethe introduces ‘Anmut’ (‘grace’, ‘charm’ or ‘pleasantness’ in English) into the drama are significant in light of the concept’s historical development in the eighteenth century in the field of aesthetics, particularly with regard to the reception of ancient Greek art. In his work of 1759, Winckelmann asserts that the quality of grace or pleasantness is reserved for humans: ‘Die Grazie in Werken der Kunst geht nur die menschliche Figur an.’ This quality, which appears in the movements of human figures, pleases the beholder: ‘Aller Menschen Thun und Handeln wird durch dieselbe angenehm.’ For Winckelmann, ‘Anmut’ is the ‘reasonably pleasant’ beauty and, at the same time, ‘das sinnlichste’ in a work of art. In Schiller’s Über Anmut und Würde of 1793, ‘Anmut’ remains strictly reserved for humans. ‘Anmut,’ Schiller ascertains, is an expression of the subject’s moral emotion. Further, he holds that ‘Anmut’ is a movement that affects the beholder; he describes it as ‘bewegliche Schönheit.’

330 V. 7401–7402 (my emphasis).
331 Compare to: Dane, ‘Die heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der Mann von funfzig Jahren’, pp. 154–161. Here, Dane explores the significance of this term in Goethe’s work Der Mann von funfzig Jahren and provides a brief account of the historical development of this term as well as the controversies around its application to non-anthropological realm. She discusses the views of Winkelmann, Schiller, Goethe, and Kleist.
334 Compare to ibid., p. 157.
335 Ibid., l. 3, p. 158.
336 Dane, ‘Die heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der Mann von funfzig Jahren’, pp. 157–158. See also Michelsen, ‘Fausts Schlaf und Erwachen’, p. 100–101. Here, Michelsen, within the limitations of the scene Anmutige Gegend, mentions the difference in opinion between Schiller and Goethe on nature as relevant in the context of ‘Anmut’.
the moral emotion, and the beholder is impressed by this charming and sublime event: ‘Wo also Anmut stattfindet, da ist die Seele das bewegende Prinzip, und in ihr ist der Grund von der Schönheit der Bewegung enthalten.’

Goethe, however, sees the quality of Anmut as applicable to nature and art – not only to humans. Goethe’s all-encompassing view of nature, according to which nature revitalizes human perception and intellect, differs from Schiller’s narrow definition of nature that excludes nature from pleasantness. In Glückliches Ereignis in Zur Morphologie, Goethe criticizes Schiller (and thereby Kant) for having a view of the subject that does not grasp it as an extension of nature. Goethe then reminds the reader about the all-encompassing Mother Nature, who lives in the perceivable realm as well as in the subject. This view is consistent with Goethe’s quatrain on the sun-likeness of the eye and with the views that are articulated in Faust during Faust’s relationship with Gretchen and in the scene Anmutige Gegend:

Die Kantische Philosophie, welche das Subjekt so hoch erhebt, indem sie es einzuengen scheint, hatte er [Schiller] mit Freuden in sich aufgenommen, sie entwickelte das Außerordentliche was die Natur in sein Wesen gelegt, und er, im höchsten Gefühl der Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung, war undankbar gegen die große Mutter, die ihn gewiß nicht stiefmütterlich behandelte. Anstatt sie selbstständig, lebendig, vom Tiefsten bis zum Höchsten gesetzlich hervorbringend zu betrachten, nahm er sie von der Seite einiger empirischen menschlichen Natürlichkeiten.

In Faust, Goethe attributes ‘Anmut’ first to nature and then to Helena. The influence of nature on Faust is described clearly in the scenes Abend and Wald und Höhle. This influence remains constantly present throughout Faust’s aesthetic quest for beauty. An important aspect of pleasantness (‘Anmut’), Chiron says, is that it becomes manifest in a pleasant (‘anmutig’) phenomenon; it extends its influence into the beholder as ‘unwiderstehlich’. Beauty, on the other hand, resides in ‘die Schöne’ as a self-sufficient and self-referential quality:

338 Ibid., p. 334.
340 See also Dane’s explanation of Goethe’s critique of Schiller in his Zur Morphologie, in which Goethe points out Schiller’s anthropomorphization of nature and disregard for its all-encompassing quality in: Dane, ‘Die heilsame Toilette’: Kosmetik und Bildung in Goethes ‘Der Mann von funfzig Jahren’, pp. 158–159.
Chiron mentions the aspect of grace that extends itself to others and that makes the pleasant so irresistible that the beholder turns into a lover and a seeker. In mythological works contemporary to Goethe, such as Hederich’s and Moritz’s, this differentiation is traceable in the differentiation between Venus’s girdle and Venus herself. Schiller refers to Venus’s girdle as an allegorical explanation of the difference between beauty and attractiveness: ‘Die griechische Fabel legt der Göttin der Schönheit einen Gürtel bei, der die Kraft besitzt, dem, der ihn trägt, Anmut zu verleihen, und Liebe zu erwerben.’ In Goethe’s view, ‘Anmut’ reaches a universal level when it encompasses nature and includes humans. In Anmutige Gegend, ‘Anmut’ appeared as the active influence of nature that revived and embraced Faust’s human endeavor. In the case of Helena, ‘Anmut’ appears as Helena’s attractiveness that drives Faust toward her.

In the ideal context of Klassische Walpurgisnacht, Faust’s pursuit of love faces no criticism; before Faust descends into Hades as the second Orpheus, Manto, whose vision reaches beyond the limits of time, praises Faust’s character and embraces his impossible quest: she loves those who desire the impossible.

III.1.7 Lynceus between the Sun and Helena

In the ideal setting of Faust’s second quest for love, Goethe’s productive concept of world literature shows its most vivid colors. Horst Rüdiger’s article, Weltliteratur in Goethes Helena, introduces six forms of world literary production: the Greek tragedy, the German Minnesang, the Persian ḡazal, the European Pastoral, the Italian-German Opera, and modern English literature. In this sub-section, I concentrate

342 V. 7403–7405.
343 Hederich, Gründliches mythologisches Lexikon, pp. 2438–2439; Moritz, ‘Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtung der Alten’, p. 685.
344 Schiller, Theoretische Schriften, p. 330.
345 V. 7481.
346 V. 7488.
on Faust’s encounter with Helena, and I analyze Lyceus’s and Faust’s articulations that poetically describe their experience of Helena’s beauty, in the scene *Innerer Burghof*.

Distinguished for being lynx-eyed, Lyceus is the first to witness Helena’s beauty. Further in the scene *Innerer Burghof* he is also singled out by his ability to voice his sharp observations in song and rhyming verse. Lyceus’s monologue is the first instance of rhyming verse in act three.348 His proficiency with rhyme fosters a meeting of world literary elements and contributes to the dramatization of Faust’s union with Helena. In his verses, we find the poetic motif of the presence of the sun in relation to the multiplicity that it illuminates. Here is how Lyceus describes Helena’s bedazzling beauty by way of an analogy to the sun:

Harrend auf des Morgens Wonne,  
Östlich spähend ihren Lauf,  
Ging auf einmal mir die Sonne  
Wunderbar im Süden auf.349

Rüdiger and Mommsen both mention this analogy of the sun. In his explanation of these verses, Rüdiger remains within the boundaries of Goethe’s allusion to Heinrich von Morungen’s lyrical poetry. Goethe was familiar with this poetry through the edition of *Minnelieder* translated by Tieck, in which Tieck dedicates a section to Morungen.350 Yet Mommsen locates the sun analogies within a wider context of Persian and oriental literary motifs that pave the way for the dramatization of Faust and Helena’s union; in the dramatization of the union, Helena’s rhyming verses allude to the legend of Dilārām and Bahrām-i Gūr and the invention of rhyme.351

349 V. 9222–9225.
Referring to the Paralipomenon 92 of Dichtung und Wahrheit, written in December 1816, in which Goethe discusses his preliminary plans for Faust II, Mommsen highlights Goethe’s view that Faust, as a German knight, appeared bizarre to the Greek heroine – he must therefore find a way to her heart with flattering words. Goethe writes: ‘Sie findet ihn abscheulich, allein da er zu schmeicheln weiß, so findet sie sich nach und nach in ihn, und er wird der Nachfolger so mancher Herren und Halbgötter.’

In this early sketch, Goethe had originally planned for Faust to perform the eulogizing function that is assigned to Lynceus in the final text. In any case, in the final text, the key feature of the plan remains unchanged; praise – in word and action – brings together the two distant worlds. Clarifying the scene’s complicated dramatization, Mommsen points out that Faust follows the pattern of the oriental kings of 1001 Nights: having sentenced a culprit to death, the king will show forgiveness after the intervention of a wise and high-ranking person. In the final text Lynceus is an aspect of Faust’s own character: first, Faust dignifies Helena as the queen and the judge; second, Lynceus grasps Helena’s magnificence and voices his adoration. The text highlights the connection between Lynceus and Faust, who pose the same question – ‘was bin ich nun?’ – after beholding Helena’s beauty, as though the experience of her beauty transforms them.

Mommsen draws our attention to the oriental elements of Lynceus’s praise of Helena; apart from Lynceus’s first song, Mommsen argues, Lynceus’s gift of jewels and gold to Helena also exhibits these elements. Furthermore, Mommsen casts light on the significance of the metaphor of bow and arrow in Faust’s verses; the metaphor of the beloved’s eyebrows and glance as bow and arrow, and the lover’s heart and eyes as the target, has a long tradition in Persian and Arabic poetry.

To appreciate the specific quality of Lynceus’s first mention of Helena in relation to the sun, we should consider that, in retrospect, Lynceus’s praise is hyperbolic. First, Lynceus likens Helena’s splendor to the sun; he then places Helena above the sun, since he cannot help but gaze at her alone – ‘Statt der Erd- und

352 Numbering according to: FA.
353 Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, p. 266.
354 FA I, 14: (Paralipomenon 92.) p. 983.
355 Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, p. 266.
356 ‘So hohe Würde wie du sie vergönnsst, | Als Richterin, als Herrscherin [. . .]’ V. 9213–9214.
358 Mommsen, Goethe und 1001 Nacht, p. 268.
Himmelsweite, | Sie die Einzige zu spähn.\textsuperscript{359} And in his second hyperbolic adoration of Helena, Lynceus again places her above the sun: ‘Vor der herrlichen Gestalt | Selbst die Sonne matt und kalt’.\textsuperscript{360} The hyperbole explicitly challenges the logic of the simile; as the highest source of warmth and brightness, the sun (the vehicle of the simile) first intensifies Helena’s beauty, but the sun is then subordinated to Helena in order to achieve a hyperbole of cosmic proportions.

Comparisons of the beloved to the sun appear frequently in Morungen’s songs. For instance, Morungen compares the purity of his beloved’s virtue to the glow of the sun – ‘Ihre Tugend reine ist der Sonnen geleich’.\textsuperscript{361} In another instance, the simile becomes hyperbole as the poet identifies himself with the moon and his beloved with the sun: ‘Ich muß immer dem geleiche spählen | Wie der Monde thut, der seinen Schein von der Sonnen Schein empfaht’.\textsuperscript{362} In Morungen’s comparison of the beloved to the sun, the sun always remains the superior element; the beloved is never placed above the sun.\textsuperscript{363}

In \textit{West-östlicher Divan} – specifically in the \textit{Suleika Nameh} – comparisons of the beloved to the sun occur repeatedly. In fact, the book’s epigraph is a quote from Heinrich Friedrich von Diez’s \textit{Denkwürdigkeiten von Asien}, attributed to Sultan Salim I:\textsuperscript{364} ‘Ich gedachte in der Nacht, dass ich den Mond sähe im Schlaf. | Als ich aber erwachte, gieng unvermuthet die Sonne auf.’\textsuperscript{365}

In Sultan Salim’s Persian verses, the comparison with the sun has the same conventional hierarchy as the ascending logic of Morungen’s simile above. Diez explains this hierarchy as follows: ‘Mond und Sonne heissen hier Schöne oder Geliebte, in der Schönheit abgestuft wie beyde Gestirne.’\textsuperscript{366} In another instance in \textit{Suleika Nameh}, a verse that we mentioned earlier in this study in \textit{Nachklang}, the poet refers to his beloved as follows: ‘O du mein Phosphor, meine Kerze, | Du meine Sonne, du mein Licht.’\textsuperscript{367} In the poem \textit{Wiederfinden}, Goethe uses the metaphor of the sun as the star of stars: ‘Ist es möglich, Stern der Sterne, |
Drück’ ich wieder dich ans Herz!’\(^{368}\) In his *Buch Suleika*, Goethe does not employ the form of hyperbole that places the beloved above the sun. Rather, we encounter this rhetorical device in *Faust*. As I pointed out earlier, this form of hyperbole is first introduced into the drama as Faust attributes the sun’s magnificence to the place it illuminates in the scene *Abend*. In the scene *Spaziergang* Mephisto says in Faust’s absence:

So ein verliebter Tor verpufft  
Euch Sonne, Mond und alle Sterne  
Zum Zeitvertreib dem Liebchen in die Luft.\(^{369}\)

In Lynceus ‘der Gottbetörte’,\(^{370}\) a strong attraction to Helena spurs him to reach for a rhetorical device adequate to the aesthetic moment. The attraction to a phenomenon is articulated in the light metaphors belonging to the drama’s semiotic context thus far. Notably, in the *Divan*, Goethe does not use hyperbole that subordinates the sun to the beloved.\(^{371}\) In *Faust*, even though Goethe uses the bow and arrow metaphors of the *gazal* tradition, the most exaggerated comparison – the one that places Helena above the sun – comes from Lynceus, whose keen vision, divine madness and eloquence makes him well suited to such hyperbole.

The Persian poetic tradition offers numerous examples of such hyperbolic rhetoric employed in the context of light metaphors. Specifically, the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ contains several examples that operate on the highest level of sophistication. Hammer-Purgstall’s translation of Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan*, which Goethe was familiar with, successfully conveys several instances of this form of hyperbole. In the following sub-chapter, I discuss how the comparison to the sun in the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ is a part of a larger constellation of light metaphors in the *Divan*. But first I provide instances from Hammer-Purgstall’s translation that cast light on this rhetorical device.

Just like in Morungen’s songs, the hyperbolic praise of the sun analogies can be employed in a non-aesthetic context in which the poet praises someone for his or her virtues; Ḥāfiẓ, for example, praises the dervishes as true kings: ‘Die Sonne legt die Krone ihres Stolzes nieder, | Vor jenem Scheine der

\(^{368}\) FA I, 3/1: p. 96.  
\(^{369}\) V. 2862–2864. See pp. 210f above.  
\(^{370}\) Compare to: V. 9257.  
\(^{371}\) Goethe’s last conversation with Eckermann (11 March 1832) clarifies that, in Goethe’s view, the sun is the highest of the natural phenomena: ‘Denn sie [die Sonne] ist gleichfalls eine Offenbarung des Höchsten, und zwar die mächtigste, die uns Erdenkindern wahrzunehmen vergönnt ist. Ich anbete in ihr das Licht und die zeugende Kraft Gottes, wodurch allein wir leben, weben und sind, und alle Pflanzen und Tiere mit uns.’ FA II, 12: pp. 747–748.
umstrahlet die Derwische.  

Most frequently, however, Ḥāfiẓ uses these forms of hyperbole to praise beauty of an aesthetic nature; the eye and the light metaphors contribute to an organic whole:

\[
\text{Nicht mein Aug’ allein betrachtet} \\
\text{Die Liebkosungen der Wangen,} \\
\text{Mond und Sonne machen immer} \\
\text{Diesem Spiegel ihren Kreislauf.} 373
\]

In the following two couplets, Ḥāfiẓ compares his beloved to a superb polo player; not even sun dares to win the ball:

\[
\text{Wer unterstände sich, den Ball} \\
\text{Der Schönheit zu entwenden dir,} \\
\text{Die Sonne selber ist kein Held,} \\
\text{Der festen Zügel hat.} 374
\]

Hammer-Purgstall’s translation clearly captures a metaphor in which the sun follows the poet’s beloved like a shadow:

\[
\text{Deinen Schimmer sah bei mir} \\
\text{Eines Tags die Sonne,} \\
\text{Seitdem geht dem Schatten gleich} \\
\text{Von der Thür’ sie nimmer.} 375
\]

These examples show the sophistication of the hyperbole in Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan*, in which the sun is subordinated to the beloved. This form of hyperbole is absent from Morungen’s songs, which were available to Goethe through Tieck’s edition.

More importantly, this form of hyperbole does not make an appearance in *West-östlicher Divan*; and in *Faust*, it only appears in Lyceus’s (and not Faust’s) speeches. Lyceus dares to voice what Faust cannot; as Schöne correctly mentions, Lyceus ‘faßt zugleich doch an dessen [Fausts] Stelle in Worte, was an zu sprechen die Etikette dem Burgheren selber zunächst verbietet.’ 376 Dorothea Lohmeyer also points to this unity between Faust and Lyceus: ‘In ihm erhielt eine Erfahrung Stimme, die in Faust stumm blieb’. 377 Through light metaphors that are remarkably similar to those in the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ, Lyceus articulates the peak of the aesthetic experience of Faust’s last pursuit of love.

373 Ibid., vol. 1: CX, p. 369.
374 Ibid., vol. 1: XXXIII, p. 258.
376 FK, p. 609.
Once again, Lynceus poetically articulates the shift from the direct approach toward the sun to the visual exploration of aesthetic beauty.

The Faust/Lynceus combination facilitates the dramatic progress of the scene toward Faust’s union with Helena. In the scene *Innerer Burghof* the metaphors of light, eye and glance have a leading dramatic role. Faust’s metaphors of bow and arrow belong to a larger constellation of metaphors of aesthetic pursuit of love; these metaphors poetically illustrate how the beloved’s eye and eyebrow inspire love, whether cosmic love, divine love or human love – and sometimes all three. In her explanation of the bow and arrow metaphors, Mommsen remains limited to the possible influences of the *1001 Nights* on Goethe’s work. But these metaphors also appear in the *Divan* of Ḥāfiz. Considering that Goethe also uses the bow metaphor in *West-östlicher Divan*, it is necessary for us to consider the presence of these metaphors in Ḥāfiz’s *Divan*, which represents the peak of the Persian literary tradition. Here is one example from Hammer-Purgstall’s translation of the *Divan* of Ḥāfiz in which light metaphors and metaphors of bow and arrow come together in praise of aesthetic human beauty:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Die Sonne seines Angesichtes} \\
\text{Ist von dem Flaum des Barts versteckt,} \\
\text{O Herr verleih’ ihm ew’ges Leben,} \\
\text{Weil er die ew’ge Schönheit hat!} \\
\text{Die Seel’ entfliest nicht seinem Auge,} \\
\text{Denn überall, wohin ich schau’,} \\
\text{Seh’ ich, wie er im Hinterhalte} \\
\text{Die Pfeile auf dem Bogen hält.}
\end{align*}
\]

In the two final acts of *Faust II* before the scene *Grablegung*, the pursuit of love and beauty, which had been Faust’s quest since his encounter with Gretchen, has no presence. The scene *Hochgebirg* bridges, on the one hand, the dramatization of the path from an abstract pursuit of the transcendent truth to a pursuit of beauty as immanence of the divine in the world; and, on the other hand, the drama of the colonizer Faust, whose pursuit of development is situated against the backdrop of modernism. Unlike the first two stages of Faust’s life, the last stage cannot be explained or interpreted in comparison to poems of Ḥāfiz, since the two above mentioned subjects of pursuit – namely, the pursuit of knowledge and beauty – appear to be abandoned and the terms I developed in this study are not applicable

378 For the presence of this metaphor in Goethe’s *West-östlicher Divan* see: FA I, 3/1: p. 37.
to the modern semiotic horizon. For instance, the terms ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ cannot be applied to Faust’s act of separating the land from the sea or eliminating the traces of Philemon and Baucis, regardless of the semiotic context of modernism. The scene *Hochgebirg* marks the transition between Faust in pursuit of beauty and Faust the colonizer. Thus, verses 10039 to 10067, before Mephisto’s entrance, are relevant to Faust’s experiences of love and beauty.

In *Hochgebirg*, Faust recognizes the images of Juno, Leda and Helena in one of the clouds formed out of the cloud that carried him after Helena. The first cloud’s metamorphosis illustrates a descending path from the divine to human beauty. Yet as Joachim Müller rightly mentions, ‘Helena ist in der Erinnerung nun schon keine feste Individualität mehr, keine abgegrenzte Person, sondern Symbol und Idee der Schönheit’. The other cloud, which Schöne (based on Paralipomenon 179.3 in his edition) names ‘Gretchen-Wolke’, is described and experienced differently: it moves Faust in a delicate and intimate manner. Müller explains this difference as follows:


Furthermore, unlike the image of Helena, the image of Gretchen does not dissipate: ‘Löst sich nicht auf, erhebt sich in den Äther hin’. From the first cloud’s metamorphosis to the second one, an ideal, mythological beauty becomes a historically experienced one. Faust recognizes this second cloud as ‘längstentbehrtes höchstes Gut’. He recalls the first time his eyes met Gretchen’s eyes. Faust’s description of that glance as outshining all treasure – ‘überglänzte jeden Schatz’ – resembles Lynceus’s verses: ‘Vor dem Reichtum des Gesichts | Alles leer und alles nichts.’

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382 FK, p. 645.
384 V. 10065.
385 V. 10069.
386 V. 10063.
387 V. 9354–9355.
In the final moments of Faust’s pursuit of love in the drama, Gretchen returns; the pursuit of love has been traced back to the divine from Helena to Leda and Juno, and despite Faust’s ideal love for Helena, he missed Gretchen’s love. The second ideal experience brings Faust a greater appreciation for Gretchen and her historical, natural and human love. Faust finds Gretchen’s love no less sublime than the ideal one, which faces no moral negation because of its isolated phantasmatic character. This greater appreciation shows itself in the fact that Gretchen elevates the best part of Faust’s innermost being with her to the ether; this fact is of great significance, since it leads the reader to modify his understanding of the love that is dramatized in Faust I.

The dramatization of the inner oneness of the two experiences of love implies that all that was true in case of the ideal beauty is also valid for Faust’s historical and natural love for Gretchen.

III.2 The World of Reflections in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ

The previous chapter traced the anxiety that Ḥāfiẓ expresses when he approaches the excluded realm of nature. He depicts himself as a wayfarer ready to taste whatever he finds desirable and reasonable and to question any tradition that stands in his way. In this sub-chapter, I explore possible instances in the historical development of Sufism pertaining to questions comparable to those posed by Ḥāfiẓ when moved by natural and aesthetic beauty and its appreciation in love. Then I explore the dialogue between the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ and Sufi literature in ḡazals that describe the pursuit of love with regard to aesthetic beauty.

III.2.1 A Historical Account of the Pursuit of Beauty in Sufism

III.2.1.1 Being Moved by Beauty and Its Poetic Representation

From the late ninth and the early tenth century CE onwards, we find accounts of a group of Sufis, who changed the way they responded to visible and sensible beauty. Certain Sufis prostrate upon seeing a beautiful person\(^{388}\); they were known as Ḥulmāniya, the followers of Abū Ḥulmān-i Damišqy (Abū Ḥulmān of Damascus),\(^{389}\) who believed (according to his followers) that God is directly


\(^{389}\) Abū Ḥulmān was originally from the province of Fārs, a province that includes the city of Shiraz. See: ibid., p. 186.
present in beautiful people. These Sufis were labeled as the ḥulūlī – believers of God’s incarnation in the natural sphere, specifically in people. Harshly rejecting the ḥulūlī school, Huḡvīrī disputed that Ḥulmān actually held these views. Surprisingly, further in Kašf ul-mahgūb, Huḡvīrī admits that he does not know Ḥulmān or what he said; nonetheless, Huḡvīrī insists that the view attributed to Ḥulmān contradicts monotheism and thus has no place in the religion (dīn).390

Despite facing accusations of heresy, the Ḥulmāniya did not turn their backs to natural beauty. In the section of Taḏkarat ul-auliyyā’ dedicated to Abū ‘l-Qāsim-i Naṣrābādī (d. 367 H./978 CE), ‘Aṭṭār recounts Naṣrābādī’s response when asked about a group of people (Sufis of different levels of maturity) who enjoy the companionship of women and claim to be untouched by sin while looking at them: the Sufi master replies that it is important to exercise control over the body for as long as it exists and that what is prohibited by religious law should be shunned.391 Thus, no reconciliation between natural beauty and the extramundane truth is conceivable at this stage, since inclination to the natural is identified with divergence from the truth – a sin. No living human being is exempt from this judgment.

In Kašf ul-mahgūb, Huḡvīrī strongly condemns Sufis who would frequently visit taverns to listen to love poems, accompanied by music and dance.392 Huḡvīrī’s vehement condemnation attests to the fact that turning toward the realm of the aesthetically moving was not limited to occasional encounters. Rather, it was conceivable for certain Sufis to leave the hānaqāh to experience integration into the environment. As the manuals of Sufism reflect, from the tenth century onwards, this practice became more and more common.

Recall that Sufi pupils were distinguished not just by the excluding function of their hānaqāh, but also by their clothes.393 Furthermore, they constantly purified the body through cleansing rituals and the mind through acts of repentance. Now imagine a Sufi disciple with the Sufi woolen garment in a tavern or


391 Compare to: ‘Aṭṭār, part II, p. 265. See also Pourjavady’s ‘Bāde-ye ’eṣq (2): Peydāyeš-e ma’nā-ye maḏāzi-ye bāde dar še’r-e Fārī,’ p. 12. This account follows another one that ascertains that the first step to proximity to the Transcendent Truth (ḥaqq taʿālā) is the disciplining of the lower soul (nafs).


393 See p. 153 above.
a brothel (harâbât), where almost everything is impure according to religious law! In such a radically different space, the Sufi pupil must have experienced anxiety.\(^394\) Furthermore, customers of harâbâts or the ordinary passersby would have viewed the (probably drunk) Sufi pupil in their midst with suspicion. Did these tavern-going Sufis not consider themselves wayfarers on pursuit of truth (sâlik) anymore? Or did they consider themselves Sufis, but with a different understanding of the method of seeking the divine truth?

Huğvîrî provides the earliest Persian account that these Sufis did not, in fact, abandon Sufism. They justified their interest in music, poetry and the companionship of beautiful people through a simple argument: ‘we are listening to the Truth (haqq)’.\(^395\) But these practices were harshly condemned by many Sufi masters. Abû Ḥâmid Muḥammad Ğazzâlî (1058–1111 CE) pronounced a fatvâ condemning to death any Sufi in a Sufi garment (whom he calls muraqqa’-dârân) who drinks wine and practices unlawful deeds.\(^396\) This fatvâ was a hasty measure taken to protect the reputation of the institution of Sufism in the eyes of the public and to prevent the spread of antinomianism; as I mention later in this study, Muḥammad Ğazzâlî’s harsh judgment in this case was aimed at Sufis who practice what religious law prohibits.\(^398\) While condemning this cruel judgment, Pourjavady juxtaposes Ğazzâlî to the Sufi master Abû ‘l-Qâsim Naṣrâbâdî, who lived around a century and a half before him and who reacted completely differently to a pupil, probably the singer (qavvâl) of his convent, drinking wine.\(^399\) ‘Αττâr mentions this in two stages: first, the master hears that ‘Ali (the qavvâl) drinks wine; he then finds him drunk in the street, but responds with tolerance:

> It is narrated that the Šayḥ [Abû ‘l-Qâsim Naṣrâbâdî] was told the following: ‘Ali the qavvâl drinks wine at night and attends your [the Šayḥ’s] sessions in the morning’. The Šayḥ knew it was as they said, yet paid no heed to those words. One day, the Šayḥ accidentally came across ‘Ali the qavvâl so drunk that he had fallen on the ground. From afar, the Šayḥ pretended he had not seen him, until one of his pupils told the Šayḥ, there

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\(^{394}\) See §II.2.6 (‘Anxiety in the Field of Critique of the Old World’).

\(^{395}\) Huğvîrî, Kašf ul-mahğûb, p. 533 (my translation). Nicholson in these cases translates haqq as God, but without considering the sensitivity of Sufis’ in using various aspects of the divine with corresponding names and attributes of the divine. It is not right to translate a multitude of attributes and names as God, lest we ignore the subtle differences conveyed in each case. Compare to Al-Hujwîrî, The Kashf al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, p. 409.


\(^{397}\) ———, ‘Do maktûb-e Fârsî az imâm Muḥammad-e Ğazzâlî,’ p. 19.

\(^{398}\) Ibid., p. 35.

\(^{399}\) Ibid., p. 20.
he is! ‘Ali the qavvāl! Then the Šayh addressed that very pupil, asked him to carry him ['Ali] on his shoulders and take him to his own house.400

In the cruelty of Ġazzālī, Pourjavady finds evidence of the considerable growth of these antinomian behaviors around the beginning of the twelfth century. But there were many Sufis who avoided these two extremes – ascetic Sufism, on the one hand, and openly violating mores and religious laws, on the other hand. These moderate Sufis (mostly in Ḥurāsān) neither avoided what moved them in sensible beauty and its poetic representation nor disrespected the religious law, which they adhered to with devotion and obedience.401 Within this relatively moderate approach, excluded elements of aesthetic beauty found a place where the margins of religious law were unclear.

In the taverns, places of gambling and brothels (ḥarabāt), wine and other inebriating drinks were served by beautiful cup bearers, and music, dance and love songs often contributed to the festive atmosphere. Whereas drinking and dancing were prohibited by religious law, love poetry and music were conditionally allowed. Belonging originally to non-Sufi commoners, these mediums of artistic expression, as I explain in the following sub-section, found their way into the Sufi gatherings. But their source of inspiration and the manner of their reception became controversial issues among Sufi masters. These controversies gave rise to a new approach in Sufism, within which many Sufis expressed their views regarding the possibility of the relation between sensory beauty and the divine in prose and verse.

III.2.1.2 Integration of Love Poetry in Sufi Recitals (samā’)
According to the earliest extant Sufi manuals, recital (samā’) was a common practice among Sufis. Literally, the word samā’ means ‘listening’. Specifically, in the context of Sufism, samā’ means listening to something being read aloud in a soothing voice, which may approximate singing more or less closely, depending on the nature of the recital. Samā’ can be accompanied by specific musical instruments; Sufi masters differ on which instruments are permissible. In Šarh at-ta’arruf li-madhhab it-taṣawwuf, Mustamli Buḥārī (d. 1042) dedicates a chapter to samā’. He first turns to the Sufi interpretations of the Qur’ān to educate his readers about the origins of samā’ and its influence. In surah 7, verse 172, the seeds of all human beings answer affirmatively to the Lord’s question:

‘am I not your Lord?’ (alastu bi rabbikum?). In Islamic culture, this event is known as the covenant (mīṣaq or ‘ahd) of alast – an instance of sealing a covenant between God and humans which was uttered in voice and perceived through samā’. This covenant is regarded as the mark of a relation between the divine and humans in Sufism based on voice and hearing – whether literally or allegorically. Sufis held that the reminiscence of that first voice is what moves them in their recitals; Sufis believe that their intellectual as well as their aesthetic faculties originate from the divine voice – from the knowledge of the Lord and the beauty of the Lord’s voice, respectively. The other Quranic instance which Buḥārī introduces in his manual refers to God’s command ‘kun’ – ‘Be!’ According to five verses in the Qurʾān, the divine begetting occurs in response to God’s command: ‘Be!’ The Sufis held that the power of their recitals comes from the resonance of that first word.

After reviewing the divine origins of samā’ based on the interpretation of the holy text, Buḥārī turns to the natural aspects of samā’ by mentioning examples of the direct influence of musically soothing voices on children, the mentally ill and animals. However, Buḥārī asserts, the fact this influence is in accordance with nature does not imply that is beneficial to a Sufi’s self-development – nature is more prone to corruption than to obedience, Buḥārī argues. Of all the pleasures of nature and the senses, the Sufis only permit samā’ – it helps them survive in the face of ascetic denial of food and sleep. Buḥārī repeatedly mentions that samā’ is only meant to prepare the exhausted Sufi for the next meditation, prayer or mortification of the body. As Buḥārī explains, the most important condition is the receptive state of the listener: if the listener’s receptive state is approved, the recital is approved; otherwise, regardless of what is being sung, the recital should be condemned. Although the recipient’s mood and mode of reception are the determining criteria, Buḥārī...
believes that the profane and natural descriptions of human love (ğazal)⁴⁰⁹ should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary.⁴¹⁰

Huğviri’s treatment of samâ’, unlike Buḫâri’s, begins with a brief definition of the senses – they are the irreplaceable agents that provide the heart (dil),⁴¹¹ the cognitive faculty, with knowledge.⁴¹² The four senses other than hearing, Huğviri explains, provide knowledge of the natural world which can guide reason (‘aql)⁴¹³ in the dialectical process of tracing the changeable back to the unchangeable; the effect to its cause; and the finite to the infinite. Thus, from gnosis (maʿrifat),⁴¹⁴ one arrives at the knowledge of the Lord. At this point in Huğviri’s analysis, hearing is praised as the noblest of senses (without reference to the Quranic verses discussed above); the knowledge attained through other senses is not ‘binding’ (vāǧib).⁴¹⁵ Knowledge attained through reason and the other senses only becomes binding after hearing the scripture’s words. Huğviri’s justification of samâ’ testifies to the interwoven primacy of the religious law and hearing. Having clarified this point, Huğviri begins a chapter dedicated to the benefits of reciting the Qur’ān among Sufis. The manuals of Sufism show that the earliest common form of samâ’ was the recital of the Qur’ān. Second to the Qur’ān, listening to moral poems was common. Yet the recital of moral poetry encountered resistance. In Kašf ul-maḫğūb, Huğviri complains that ‘[s]ome declare that it is unlawful to listen to any poetry whatever, and pass their lives in defaming their brother Moslems.’⁴¹⁶ Huğviri considers certain kinds of poetry to be prohibited, and certain kinds to be admissible:

[W]hatever is unlawful, like backbiting and calumny and foul abuse and blame of any person and utterance of infidelity, is equally unlawful whether it be expressed in prose or in verse and whatever that is lawful in prose like morality and exhortations and inference drawn from the evidences of the Truth, is no less lawful in verse.⁴¹⁷

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⁴⁰⁹ Ğazal and muğâzila literally refer to all the acts that are customary between lovers.
⁴¹¹ Nicholson’s translation of dil (‘mind’) is a rather good choice in this case. However, in the translations of Sufi poetry and the ğazals of Ḥâfiẓ we frequently encounter the word ‘heart’ as a translation for the Persian word dil (or the originally Arabic word ‘qalb’, commonly used in Persian). So it is more clarifying here to use the word ‘heart’.
⁴¹² Huğviri, Kašf ul-maḫğūb, p. 508.
⁴¹³ Ibid., p. 509.
⁴¹⁴ Ibid.
⁴¹⁵ Ibid., p. 510.
⁴¹⁷ Ibid., p. 398.
Huḡviri’s disapproval of Sufis who listen to prohibited poetry provides the first mention in a Persian Sufi text of love poetry that contains imagery of the beloved’s face and body418: ‘Some on the contrary, hold that all poetry is lawful, and spend their time in listening to love-songs and descriptions of the face and hair and mole of the beloved.’419 Huḡviri’s categorization of admissible and prohibited poetry contains two points of importance for this study. In Huḡviri’s view, there is a direct relation between actualities and words and their spoken form: ‘[i]n fine, just as it is unlawful and forbidden to look at or touch a beautiful object which is a source of evil, so it is unlawful and forbidden to listen to that object or, similarly, to hear the description of it.’420 Just as we perceive the world through sight, taste and touch, we also perceive the world though hearing – through listening to words, arguments and the Qur’ān or poetry. This point comes out clearly in the following passage from Kašf ul-mahḡūb:

Those who regard such hearing as absolutely lawful must also regard looking and touching as lawful, which is infidelity and heresy. If one says, ‘I hear only God and seek only God in eye and cheek and mole and curl,’ it follows that another may look at a cheek and mole and say that he sees and seeks God alone, because both the eye and the ear are sources of admonition and knowledge; then another may say that in touching a person, whose description it is thought allowable to hear and whom it is thought allowable to behold, he too, is only seeking God, since one sense is no better adapted than another to apprehend a reality; then the whole religious law is made null and void421

Huḡviri makes no distinction between an actual act or object and its poetic, mediated representation. Thus, no distinction is drawn between an experience and its poetic articulation. Experience in a mediated manner, whether of a poetic productive sort or of a reception of such a mediated representation, is absent from Huḡviri’s analysis. It follows that aesthetic representations of actions are judged no less harshly than the actions themselves.

Almost four decades after Huḡviri, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ġazzālī (theologist, muftī, and Sufi) issued a different judgment regarding the limits of samā’.422 In his Persian work Kīmyā-yi saʿādat (The Alchemy of Happiness), Ġazzālī introduces samā’ through its influence on the recipient and the origin of that influence:

420 Ibid., p. 398.
421 Ibid., p. 398 (my emphasis).
422 Pourjavady, ‘Še’r-e ḥalāl, še’r-e ḥarām,’ p. 12.
The cause of that [samāʿ] is a kinship that the essence of human beings has with the heavenly world, which is called the world of the spirits. And the heavenly world is the world of beauty and pleasance, and the basis of beauty and pleasance is proportionality, and whatever is proportionate is a locus of disclosure of the pleasance of that world. For all pleasantness and beauty that are in this sensible world are the fruits of the beauty, pleasance, and proportionality of that world.423

It is important that Abū Ḥāmid Ḥazzālī introduces the incorporeal world in terms of beauty, rather than truth. He asserts that there is a likeness between the heavenly world and humans. He then introduces the effect of the reception of beauty in the perception of a proportionate voice that ‘brings about awareness in the heart, and a movement and a desire, though one might not know what it is’.424 This movement and desire is the effect of the perception of beauty through the senses and the recognition of the likeness of the beautiful object of perception to the incorporeal world of spirits. Regarding songs, Ḥazzālī accepts a relation between sensible and intelligible beauty based on proportionality. According to Ḥazzālī, the senses do not provide knowledge of reality, but rather perceive a mediated disclosure. The kinship between the essence of humans and the realm of beauty and pleasantness plays the central role in this shift in approach. Hence, reception through a mediated presence is given high significance in Ḥazzālī’s analysis. In contrast to Huḡvīrī, who refuses to differentiate between a mediated articulation or reception and the actual deeds that can be penalized, Abū Ḥāmid Ḥazzālī defines the human essence as the locus of a faculty that has an affinity to the realm of beauty and recognizes the intelligible beauty in sensible instances.

Regarding love poems that describe the body and face of the beloved or drinking wine and visiting taverns, Abū Ḥāmid Ḥazzālī is mostly concerned with one’s state of reception:

But it is not prohibited to write or listen to a poem that describes the tress and mole and pleasance and gives accounts of union and separation and all that pertains to the moods of lovers. It becomes unlawful if one in one’s mind compares it to a woman whom he loves or to a child. Then his thought is unlawful. But if he listens to it while thinking of his own wife or slave-girl it is not prohibited.425

Regarding the mention of wine and places of pleasure in those poems, Ḥazzālī also judges the matter based on the reception of the listener. Ḥazzālī does offer some suggestions for interpreting the imagery in question, yet as Pourjavady

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425 Ibid., vol. 1: p. 484 (my translation).
rightly mentions, during Ġazzālī’s time, a developed metaphorical and allegorical reading did not exist.\(^{426}\) For Ġazzālī, the most important issue is that the listener not take the imagery literally.\(^ {427}\) He stresses ‘I say here that the verdict over \( \text{samā’} \) is dependent upon the state of one’s heart, for \( \text{samā’} \) brings nothing to the heart that is not already there. Rather, it motivates what is in the heart.’\(^{428}\) In Ġazzālī’s view, the intention of the author is irrelevant, since the work simply provides a reflecting surface for the spiritual state of the listener. Hence the poetry of a non-Sufi poet can be received by a Sufi, and love poetry per se cannot be judged. Ġazzālī’s view resembles the view of the Sufi master ‘Ayn ul-Quḍḍāt of Hamadān, who was an independent pupil of Āḥmad Ġazzālī, Abū Ḥāmid’s younger brother. The following is ‘Ayn ul-Quḍḍāt’s general view on the reception of poetry. In the original Persian text, this passage follows a quatrain that contains the controversial tropes of love poetry:\(^ {429}\)

You should take each of these poems as a mirror! You know that the mirror does not have an image indwelling in it (in itself), but whoever sees into it, can see his own face. Similarly, know that there is no meaning to poetry in itself, though each person sees by it the gist of his current state and to the extent of his receptiveness. If you were to say that the meaning of poetry is that which was intended by the poet, and others make up meanings on their own, it is just as though someone were to say: the face (figure) of the mirror is the face of the polisher (maker) for his was the first face to appear in the mirror.\(^{430}\)

‘Ayn ul-Quḍḍāt’s view assigns a high level of significance to mediated truths: looking in the mirror, one can trace self-development over time (‘current state’).

### III.2.1.3 Āḥmad Ġazzālī: Love as an Existential Relation

As Pourjavady has shown, Sufi love poetry describing the beloved’s body and face did not exist until the middle of the eleventh century.\(^ {431}\) The controversies mentioned above reveal that profane poetry by non-Sufi poets had a widespread presence in convents and Sufi recitals. Yet those who included non-Sufi
love poetry into the ḥānaqāh did not give any priority to a clear allegorical reception; even as Sufi-poets began to employ tropes of love poetry in their own poems, there existed no consensus as to their allegorical meaning.432 This is not surprising, since the first Persian treatise to modify and define the pursuit of truth and self-knowledge in terms of love and beauty was Sawānīḥ ul-ʿuṣṣāq, the work of Aḥmad ṇazzālī (d. 520/1126),433 Abū Ḥāmid’s younger brother.

In Sawānīḥ, Aḥmad ṇazzālī frequently quotes quatrains, by himself and others, with the same controversial tropes of love and wine. In Sawānīḥ, love and the soul are depicted as intertwined from the moment the soul passes the threshold of existence. In a quatrain that uses light metaphors and wine metaphors, Aḥmad ṇazzālī articulates this view:

Our steeds started on the road from non-existence along with love;  
Our night was continuously illuminated by the lamp of Union.  
When we return to non-existence, you will not find our lips dry,  
From that wine which is not forbidden in our religion.434

In prose, he then elaborates on this quatrain as follows:

When the spirit came into existence from non-existence, on frontier of the existence, love was awaiting the steed, the spirit. I know not what kind of combining took place in the beginning of existence – if the spirit was an essence, then the attribute of that essence was love. Having found the house vacant, it resided therein.435

Further in the text, the combination between love and the essence of the soul is conceived as an instance in which an image of the Beloved is cast on the empty mirror of the soul: ‘When it finds the house vacant and the mirror has become clean, then a form is reflected and established in the air of the purity of the spirit’.436 The ontological aspect of the human soul appears as a reflected image of the Beloved cast upon the receptive surface (the mirror) of the formless soul, the ontological ground of the individuated human soul.

In chapter 11, section 3 of Sawānīḥ, Aḥmad ṇazzālī conceives loves as ‘a connecting band attached to both sides’437 – namely, the lover and the Beloved. In chapter 40, section 1, he distinguishes between (a) the ‘real nature

433 Compare to Pourjavady’s introduction to: Ghazzālī, Sawānīḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 2.
434 Ibid., p. 17.
435 Ibid.
436 Ibid., p. 18.
437 Ibid., p. 33.
of love’ with respect to which the Beloved doesn’t need the lover’s love; and (b) what he calls love’s ‘customary generosity’ that ‘binds the lover to the beloved’ such that ‘the lover is always the object of the beloved’s contemplation’.

Aḥmad Ḡazzālī wrote his work in a historical context in which Huḡvīrī and others (Sufis and theologians) who shared Huḡvīrī’s views held love to be irrelevant in relation to the divine. Love could only exist between two things that are similar: since (they thought) there is no likeness between the divine and the finite human individual, no love between them is possible. Aḥmad Ḡazzālī goes even further than elaborating on the relation of love between humans and the divine and asserting that the Beloved is constantly contemplating the lover: he goes so far as to admit that the Beloved needs the lover. Aḥmad Ḡazzālī introduces this view by differentiating between two aspects of the Beloved’s beauty: the self-referential, independent act of ḡusn (which is for itself and non-communicative) is called kirīšma-yi ḡusn; and the communicative aspect that is no longer for itself is called kirīšma-yi maʿšūqī. Here, I introduce these two attributes untranslated. The words and combinations that Ḡazzālī employs in this treatise are his own; he is the first Sufi writer to ever set out to develop these terms; therefore, knowing what these terms mean in Persian outside this context will not further the reader’s understanding of Ḡazzālī’s work. Instead of offering a translation of these two terms, I quote two translations – one in English and one in German – of the first section of the eleventh chapter, which is dedicated to defining these two aspects of the Beloved. In each case, in brackets, I add the original Persian terms, if not provided by the translators:

The (amorous) glance of loveliness (kirishmah-i ḡusn)\(^{440}\) is one thing and the (amorous) glance of belovedness (kirishmah-i maʿšūqī) is something else. The glance of loveliness has no ‘face’ turned towards anything ‘other’ (other than love itself) and has no connection with anything outside (of love). But as to the glance of belovedness, and the amorous gestures, coquetry and alluring self-glorification (nāz), they are all things sustained by the lover, and without him they will have no effect. Therefore, this is why the beloved is in need of the lover. Loveliness is one thing and belovedness is something else.\(^{441}\)


\(^{438}\) Ibid., p. 57.

\(^{439}\) Aḥmad’s older brother informs us of the above mentioned historical context in Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat. He defends love poetry and the possibility of a Sufi reception of profane love poetry: Ġazzālī, Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat, vol. 1: p. 474.

\(^{440}\) Pourjavady uses a different form of transcription.

\(^{441}\) Ghazzālī, Sawānīḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 31.
jedoch, die Ziererei, die Koketterie, die Hochnäsigkeit all dem wird Unterstützung vom Liebenden zuteil, ohne ihn kommt es nicht zustande. Demnach ist hier der Ort, wo der Geliebte auf den Liebenden angewiesen ist. Schönheit ist eines, Geliebtsein ein anderes.\footnote{Ahmad Ġazzāli, \emph{Gedanken über die Liebe}, trans. Richard Gramlich (Mainz: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 1976), p. 24.}

The connection of love is based on the Beloved’s communicative inclination toward the receiving end of the Beloved’s beauty. Loveliness in itself, without the coquetry of belovedness, is like food without salt; Ġazzāli defines \textit{malāḥat} (‘being agreeably salty’\footnote{Ġazzāli, \textit{Sawānīḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits}, p. 32.}) in the context of \textit{Sawānīḥ}. Thus, \textit{malāḥat} (‘pleasance’) in this work pertains to the communicative belovedness of the Beloved’s loveliness that needs the lover’s quest.

In chapter 13, Ġazzāli further elaborates on the relation between the noncommunicative, self-referential \textit{ḥusn} (the beauty of the Beloved and the communicative \textit{malāḥat} – pleasantness) and the Beloved’s need for the lover:

> The eye of (the beloved’s) loveliness (\textit{ḥusn}) is shut to her own beauty (\textit{jamāl}), for she cannot perceive her own perfect loveliness except in the mirror of the lover’s love. Therefore, beauty necessitates a lover so that the beloved can take nutriment from her own beauty in the mirror of the lover’s love and quest. This is a great secret in itself and the key to many other secrets.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 33–34.}

The most important aspect of \textit{Sawānīḥ} is that the author locates love at the ontological core of individual souls.

The Beloved needs the lover’s quest in order to take nourishment from Her or His own beauty. Insofar as the lover’s existence is intertwined with love, the lover holds a mirror to the beauty of the Beloved. In this context, time (or ‘the chameleon of Time’ as Ahmad Ġazzāli names it) plays a central role. The soul wants to see itself with the ‘eye of inspection’,\footnote{Ibid., p. 18.} Ġazzāli says; this quest of self-discovery turns to seeing the Beloved – yet not in Herself, but rather in ‘the image (\textit{paykar}) of the beloved or her name or her attribute together with it, and this changes [according] to (the dictates of) Time (\textit{waqt}).\footnote{Ibid.} As long as the individual exists and develops itself in self-knowledge through the pursuit of beauty, one can only know the face of the Beloved in accordance with one’s own state in time. Each moment of this quest is a color on the surface of the chameleon.

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{III Colorful Reflections}
\end{itemize}
The lovers perceive their being as arising from the Beloved’s continuous contemplation of Her/His own image, which appears in the mirror of their (the lovers’) souls. Since the lovers conceive their being as the being of an image of the Beloved reflected in them, their colorful quest can be appreciated in relation to the Beloved; this colorful quest includes the moments of self-deification.\textsuperscript{447} Since the quest of love only unfolds through seeing images of the Beloved (or names and attributes of the Beloved within the colorations in time), the manifold, timely colors of the colorless Beloved are the instances in which the Beloved takes nourishment from the communicative aspect that is the Beloved’s belovedness. In this way, the difference between the term \textit{talvîn} (‘coloration’) and \textit{tamkîn} (‘rest in total annihilation’) acquires more significance. The two terms \textit{talvîn} and \textit{tamkîn} were part of Sufi terminology and are documented in the earliest manuals handed down to us. In Rûmî’s \textit{Maşnâvi-yi ma’navî}, coloration belongs to the realm of multiplicity and life, whether in the heavenly realm or on earth: ‘All the colorations spring from the moments, | He who is freed from the moments is emancipated from coloration’.\textsuperscript{448} On the relation between the quest and the coloration, on the one hand, and abiding in annihilation of the individuation in the union, Rûmî writes: ‘There are uphills and downhill, o flood in your way | As you reach the sea, the coloration shall wash away’.\textsuperscript{449} In the following poem, Rûmî defines the state of \textit{talvîn} as the Beloved’s attempts to develop Her lovers in different states:

\begin{quote}
He who makes bodies out of dirt, and turns smoke into Saturn
O dirt of the body, you smoke of the heart! See what out of you she shall make
A moment gives you wings, a moment an anchor,
A moment makes you day, a moment night
A moment shakes you, a moment makes you laugh
A moment inebriates you, a moment a goblet she makes out of you
Like a pawn in her hand, once her wine, once inebriated by her
She shall break your pawn, by God she shall make you complete
A moment being this, another moment that, and your end shall be abiding (\textit{tamkîn})
Yet by these colorations (\textit{talvînhâ}) she tames and makes you receptive.\textsuperscript{450}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{450} Ibid., vol. 1: 543, couples 5–9, p. 219 (my translation).
Although his treatise is not written in a systematic and logical manner, Aḥmad Ġazzālī’s contributions to Sufism in Sawāniḥ pave the way for understanding the pursuit of love and beauty as the Sufi’s object of pursuit. The treatise became influential, although it was originally meant for his own pupils, and not the wider public. Consequent to this work, Sufis gave greater ontological significance to love and modified the quest for truth in accordance with the quest for beauty in love. The greatest of the Sufi-poets – Sanā’i, ‘Aṭṭār, Rūmī, ‘Irāqī, and Auḥad ud-Dīn Kirmānī – appear after Aḥmad Ġazzālī, and in their poetry they turn the tropes of non-Sufi poetry pertaining to the description of the beloved, as well as bacchanalian tropes, to metaphors with allegorical meanings. In the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ, as I explain in the section ‘Alliance of Beauty and Pleasance’, we can trace the influence of Aḥmad Ġazzālī and the term malāḥat as he defined it – namely, in relation to the communicative aspect of the beloved’s beauty. In addition to his intellectual and literary contributions to the development of Sufi love, Aḥmad Ġazzālī contributed to the history of Sufism through his enjoyment of human beauty as a locus of mediated divine beauty. While condemning Ġazzālī’s behavior, Ġauzy recounts the following story: once, Ġazzālī’s pupils entered his house to find Ġazzālī with a beautiful young man holding a red rose; Ġazzālī looked at the flower, then at the beautiful person, without paying attention to his pupils. Following A. Ġazzālī, the adorers of beauty (ḡamāl parastān) among the Sufis held that the Infinite exists in a mediated relation with the finite. Hence, they perceived each beautiful phenomenon as a reflecting surface upon which divine beauty can be explored and enjoyed.

III.2.1.4 Seeing the Reflection of the Moon on the Water

Among the Sufi adorers of beauty, Auḥad ud-Dīn of Kerman, a follower of the school of Aḥmad Ġazzālī, is among the most famous. Considering human beauty as a shadow, image or reflection of divine beauty, he wrote many poems (mostly quatrains) describing beautiful young men. Human body as the locus of disclosure testifies to divine beauty, according to the Sufi adorers of beauty. Thus, a beautiful person (regardless of gender) was referred to as a šāhid – literally, ‘witness’. And the aesthetic contemplation of these šāhids was called šāhid bāzī. However, outside the context of Sufism, and according to the use of
this compound verb in Nizâmi’s (d. 1209) Ḥusrau u Širin, šâhid bâzî refers to the sensual pleasures that unmarried couples allow themselves.453

Both Aflâkî (in Manâqib ul-ʿârifîn) and Ġâmi (in Naʿfat ul-uns) recount a meeting between Šams of Tabriz (Rûmî’s mentor) and Auḥad ud-Dîn that shows the importance of the mediated perception of the object of pursuit among Sufis that pursued beauty in human and natural form. During a musical recital of love poetry, Šams finds Auḥad ud-Dîn looking at a beautiful šâhid; Šams expresses his disapproval. In the conversation between the two Sufis, human beauty is metaphorically referred to as the reflecting surface of water, and divine beauty is likened to the moon in the sky.454 It should be noted that, since Manâqib ul-ʿârifîn was written as a biographical work in praise of Rûmî, the account of this encounter is biased against Auḥad ud-Dîn:

He [Šams] asked: ‘what is occupying you?’ He [Auḥad ud-Dîn] said: ‘I am watching the moon on the water in the basin’; he [Šams] said, ‘if you do not have a boil on the back of your neck why don’t you look at it on the sky? Now find yourself a physician to cure you so that you see the true object of pursuit in whatever you look at.’455

In Manâqib ul-ʿârifîn’s account, Šams attributes two faults to Auḥad ud-Dîn. First, Šams holds that Auḥad ud-Dîn has an illness that prevents him from directly pursuing the truth; the boil represents lust and inclination toward the bodily. The second fault that Šams attributes to Auḥad ud-Dîn is in tension with the first one; if Auḥad ud-Dîn were cured of his illness, he would have to look directly at the moon, rather than at its mediated presence in all he would look at.

Ġâmi quotes Aflâkî’s work. But Ġâmi eliminates the second fault that Šams attributed to Auḥad ud-Dîn and mentions that Auḥad ud-Dîn was, allegedly, accused of heresy by Abû Ḥafîṣ Suhravardî:

It may be that Šayḫ Suhravardî accused him [Auḥad ud-Dîn] of heresy, for it is said that he [Auḥad ud-Dîn] relied on witnessing [ṣuhūd] the truth in formal manifestations (visible world),456 and witnessed the absolute (indeterminate) beauty in the determinate forms [ṣuvar-i muqayyadāt], and as mentioned before, Šayḫ Šams ud-Dîn Tabrizî asked him:

456 In this translation, ‘form’ and ‘formal’ are opposed to ‘spiritual’ or ‘inward’. ‘Formal’ is suggested as a translation for şûrî, and ‘form’ for şûrat. Specifically, in Auḥad ud-Dîn’s
‘what is occupying you? He answered I am watching the moon in the basin of water’. So Šams replied: ‘if you do not have a boil on the back of your neck, why don’t you look at the moon on the sky?’  

In both accounts, the Sufi adorer of beauty is not inclined to defend his views. Ğāmi’s cautious words provide a window to Auḥad ud-Dīn’s views, which are explained in a non-aphoristic manner:

Some greats among the ‘ārifīs (the gnostic), may the exalted Allah sanctify their souls, say on the matter of monism (tauhīd), and verification (tahqīq), that perfect is he who witnesses with his eyes the absolute beauty of the pure Truth (ḥaqq subḥāna) in the sensible, begotten manifestations, just as they [the ‘ārifīs] witness the spiritual manifestations with insight. […] And the perfect beauty of the pure Truth has two attributes: one unbound that is the truth of the beauty of essence in respect to what it is in itself, and the ‘ārif can witness this absolute beauty in annihilation in Allah the pure; and the other is bound (determinate) and is possible due to its descent in the sensible or spiritual manifestations. So, if the ‘ārif sees those of beauty, he sees them in this light, and considers them to be the beauty of the Truth descended in the graduations of the existents, and the non-‘ārif who lacks this manner of vision (naẓar), should avoid looking at those of beauty so he does not fall into the abyss of bewilderment.  

Ğāmi adduces several quatrains and an ode by Auḥad ud-Dīn’s to help the reader understand the idea behind Auḥad ud-Dīn’s inclination to human beauty; Ğāmi also provides discursive explanation, as in the passage above, where he uses Sufi theosophical and metaphysical terminology developed by the disciples of Ibn ‘Arabi.

Auḥad ud-Dīn was a friend of Muḥiyy ud-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī (1165–1240), commonly known as Ibn ‘Arabī, one of the most prolific Sufi masters. Ibn ‘Arabī was the founder of theoretical sufism (taṣawwuf-i naẓari) and wrote many volumes explaining his Sufi theories that later become known as the doctrine of the Unity of Existence. In Futūḥat al-makkīa, Ibn ‘Arabī praises Auḥad ud-Dīn; in fact, Ibn ‘Arabī even entrusted his stepson (and greatest exponent) Ṣadr...
ud-Din Qūnāvī (1207–1274) to Auḥad ud-Din for a period of time. Unlike Ibn ‘Arabī, Auḥad ud-Din, despite charges of heresy, did not expound his views regarding his adoration of beauty (ḡamālparastī) in prose; these views only appear in his quatrains. Ġamī, a follower of Ibn ‘Arabī’s school, provides the explanation above based on his own understanding of Ibn ‘Arabī’s theories gained through the comprehensive commentaries of Ṣadr ud-Din Qūnāvī.

Since Ibn ‘Arabī’s oeuvre is written in Arabic, his views did not immediately influence the Persian Sufi literature that had taken an approach to the immanence of the divine in the world expressed in the tropes of non-Sufi love. Ibn ‘Arabī influenced Persian Sufi thought and its literary articulation in stages; Ṣadr ud-Din Qūnāvī played a central role in this process. During the education he received under the guardianship of Auḥad ud-Din, the young Qūnāvī traveled to Shiraz and stayed there, with Auḥad ud-Din, for two years. Through his contact with Rūmī (who also lived in Konya), Qūnāvī was the ideal person to communicate the views of Ibn ‘Arabī to the Sufis of Ḥurāsānī tradition. Faḥr ud-Din ‘Irāqi (d. 1289) integrated the views of Ibn ‘Arabī, which he received directly from Ṣadr ud-Din Qūnāvī, into the language of love poetry and the views of Aḥmad ḡazzālī.

III.2.1.5 A Brief Note on ‘Irāqi’s Life

The Sufi adorer of human beauty who shared the greatest intellectual affinity to Ḥāfīz was Faḥr ud-Din ‘Irāqi. Both used the tropes of wine and the beauty of the beloved’s face in their ḡazals, and Ḥāfīz frequently alluded to ‘Irāqi’s ḡazals. ‘Irāqi’s work spans both classical poetry (in which he shows the highest level of mastery) and prose – he authored a famous Sufi treatise titled Lama’āt, which is interspersed with verses, both his own and those of other Sufi-poets. His life is the subject of several Sufi hagiographies, such as Nafaḥāt ul-uns of Ġamī and Maḡālis ul-ʿuṣṣāq of Gāzargāhī, attributed to Sultan Ḥusain Bāyqara. According to Ġamī’s account, one of the main sources

461 Ġamī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns, p. 556.
463 Qazvīnī & Ġamī, 460, pp. 322–323.
of Browne and Schimmel,\textsuperscript{465} the life of the precocious ‘Irāqī, who lectured in several important madrasas while he was still young, reached a turning point when he was seventeen years old and a group of antinomian dervishes took up residence in his home town Hamadān. Among the guests was a young man of extraordinary loveliness, to whom ‘Irāqī owed his first experience of love. When the antinomian dervishes left the town to continue wandering, ‘Irāqī followed them. His travels led him to India and the city of Multan, where he met Bahā’ ud-Dīn Multānī, his Sufi mentor for the next 25 years.

Remarkably, even though Ğāmī’s account distances itself from ‘Irāqī’s way of life, it contains more instances of ‘Irāqī being moved by the beauty of young men or boys than even Mağālis ul-ʿuşšāq, a popular book not written by a Sufi master.\textsuperscript{466} ‘Irāqī had been appointed the successor to his mentor; but after his mentor’s death, as Ğāmī explains and the writer of Mağālis ul-ʿuşšāq corroborates, ‘Irāqī instead left Multān – his habit of keeping company with beautiful men, reported to the governor, disqualified him from the position. Leaving Multan, ‘Irāqī pilgrimaged to Mecca and Medina. He reached Konya in Asia Minor, where he received lessons on Ibn ‘Arabi’s Fuṣūṣ ul-ḥikam directly from Ibn ‘Arabi’s best commentator and disciple, Ṣadr ud-Dīn Qūnāvī. During this time, ‘Irāqī composed Lamaʿāt, which he submitted to Qūnāvī, who approved of the work.\textsuperscript{467} Ğāmī recounts that Mu’in ud-Dīn Parvānā, one of Qūnāvī’s influential disciples, offered ‘Irāqī financial support; ‘Irāqī declined the offer, suggesting that Parvānā instead do him the favor of bringing to his ḥānaqāh Ḥasan Qavvāl, a singer (qavvāl) whose beauty was exemplary. In Nafaḥāt ul-uns, four instances of love accompany each turn of ‘Irāqī’s life. They are all instances of ‘Irāqī’s adoration of the beauty of men; in some cases, however, Ğāmī shows clearly that ‘Irāqī’s love was of a sublime nature.

‘Irāqī’s ḡazals are colored by the fact that ‘Irāqī was also an accomplished prose writer. In his lyrics, ‘Irāqī is always illustrating and articulating his complicated views on divine beauty, the world, and the lover, in terms of self-disclosure and the emanation of beauty.\textsuperscript{468} In Lamaʿāt, he quotes his own


\textsuperscript{466} Compare to: Mağālis ul-ʿuşšāq, (Lucknow: Munshi Naval Kishore, 1293/1876), pp. 119–123.

\textsuperscript{467} Ğāmī, \textit{Nafaḥāt ul-uns}, p. 603; Browne, \textit{A Literary History of Persia}, vol. 3: p. 127.

\textsuperscript{468} As Izutsu rightly mentions, in the works of the Sufis who were under the direct influence of Ibn ‘Arabi, emanation and self-disclosure of beauty are one and the same. See in: Toshihiko Izutsu, \textit{Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts} (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984), p. 155.
gazals in order to provide a rhetorically perfected articulation of the views he explains in aphoristic prose. Most modern editions of ʿIrāqī’s works contain a terminological lexicon, attributed to him, which explains almost all the tropes and metaphors used by early Sufi-poets. In order to understand several of Ḥāfīz’s most important gazals, we need to turn to Aḥmad Ǧazzālī, ʿIrāqī and Šabistarī – a Sufi master I will discuss later.

III.2.2 Emanation of Beauty

In the epilogue to Lamaʿāt, ʿIrāqī acknowledges the thematic connection between his work and A. Ǧazzālī’s Sawānīḥ. Lamaʿāt’s style of prose interspersed with verse can be traced to Sawānīḥ’s influence, but Lamaʿāt also further develops specific aspects of Sawānīḥ in accordance with ʿIrāqī’s own views and the teachings of Ibn ʿArabi, received from Qūnāvī.

In the first chapter of Lamaʿāt, love is introduced as the source from which the beloved and the lover are derived.469 Immediately after this explanation, ʿIrāqī asserts in the first Lamʿa470 that ‘Love upon Its mighty Throne is purified of all entification’.471 ʿIrāqī clarifies that there are two aspects to love: one that faces itself, and one that faces the multiplicity. This distinction is reminiscent of Ǧazzālī’s distinction between two aspects of divine beauty – non-communicative and communicative. As a historical extension of Sawānīḥ, Lamaʿāt characterizes self-revealing and self-knowledge of the communicative aspect as different images of the One cast upon mirrors; thus, although many images appear in the multiplicity, there is only one being, beyond entification in Itself, that pervades all existence.

The will of the One (Love) to manifest and appreciate Itself necessitates that It show Itself in two different mirrors: that of the lover [or loverhood (ʿāšiqī)] and that of the beloved [or beloved-ness (maʾšūqī)].472

Thus, that It might manifest Its perfection (a perfection identical both with Its own Essence and Its own Attributes), It showed Itself to Itself in the looking-glass of ‘lover’ and ‘Beloved.’ It displayed Its own loveliness to Its own eyes, and became viewer and

470 Each chapter of Lamaʿāt (Flashes) is a Lamʿa (Flash).
471 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, p. 73.
472 ʿIrāqī, Mağmūʿ-e ye āshār-e Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 457.
viewed; the names ‘lover’ and ‘Beloved,’ the attributes of seeker and Sought, then appeared. When Love revealed the Outward to the Inward, It made the lover’s fame; when It embellished the Inward with the Outward, It made known the Beloved’s name.473

In ‘Irāqī’s emanative cosmology, the first emanation after the absolute, non-communicative level is referred to as the beauty of the face of the Beloved. The rays of beauty emanate in two directions: (a) ‘the viewed’ (Beloved) or, as we read above, ‘the embellishing of the inward with the outward’474; and (b) the direction of recipient of the beauty (lover) – ‘revealing of the outward to the inward’ to beget the viewer. These are two attributes of the One.475

According to ‘Irāqī, in its communicative act, Love discloses itself in countless attributes and names. The extension of these names and attributes in the natural world makes up the realm of multiplicity and aesthetic beauty – or what ‘Irāqī calls the aspect of being viewed ‘manẓūr’.476 The Beloved’s malāḥat – ‘the amorous glance of belovedness’, to use Pourjavady’s translation of Sawānīḥ – discloses countless aspects of the Beloved’s infinite being by limiting the Beloved behind the veil of countless attributes and names. In other words, by willingly limiting itself in the act of veiling, the communicative aspect of the Infinite discloses itself.477 In the seventeenth Lam’a, ‘Irāqī writes: ‘Each moment from each of the myriad windows of the Attributes the Beloved shows the lover a different face’.478 Nature attains its existence in virtue of being the locus of disclosure of the attributes of the Infinite. The disclosure of the attributes is conceived as the acts of the Infinite, which are done willingly. This willing act of disclosure accounts for the immanence of the Infinite in the finite realm.

III.2.2.1 Alliance of Beauty and Pleasance

In the Divan of Ḥāfīẓ, there are a number of gazals that go beyond the familiar poetic topoi of gazals from Sanā‘i to Sa‘dī – the beauty of a beloved’s face or

473 ‘Irāqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, p. 73.
474 Here, we should highlight ‘Irāqī’s assessment of entification in which the inward (the intelligible) is not described as descended or denigrated, but is rather embellished by the outward (the bodily).
475 ‘Irāqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, p. 73.
477 In §III.2.2.3 (‘Love as an Artist’), I explain this aspect in connection with the presence of this view in the Divan of Ḥāfīẓ.
Considering the distinction between ḥusn and malāḥat that A. Ġazzālī makes in Sawānīḥ, we grasp that this ġazal poetically describes the first step of the begetting of the world, as the self-referential aspect of beauty [ḥusn] joins the communicative aspect [malāḥat]. which Wohlleben translates as ‘Anmut’. This

479 In this connection, it should be mentioned that this approach can also be recognized in some of ‘Aṭṭār’s works. However, the mythological narrative form of recounting the events of the past remains the distinguishing characteristic of ‘Irāqī and Ḥāfiz. The following is an example from ‘Aṭṭār’s ġazals that comes close to what we find in ‘Irāqī and Ḥāfiz’s ġazals; however unlike those two, ‘Aṭṭār describes the events as if they are occurring in front of him and not in the past: Farīd ud-Dīn ‘Aṭṭār, Divān-e ġazalīyāt va qaṣā‘ed-e ‘Aṭṭār, ed. Taqi Tafażżoli, Enteşārāt-e Angōman-e Āṣār-e Melli (Tehran: Bahman, 1341/1962), p. 254, couplets: 3096–3098.

480 Wohlleben, 87, p. 152.


482 This translation successfully conveys the communicative aspect of pleasure beside the self-referential ‘Schönheit’, which I explained on pp. 240–243 above.
conjunction makes the disclosure of the Infinite in the multiplicity of the finite world possible.

Ḥāfiz provides two instances of the candle and the rose to show how the Infinite veils itself to reveal an aspect of itself in nature. Ḥāfiz mentions the inclination of the Infinite to disclose Its luminosity as one instantiation of candle’s flame, the poet implies that the candle is not allowed to utter the attribute for which it is an instance – it just instantiates that attribute. The agent that is allowed to recognize the immanence is actively present in the poet’s (human) heart, an intellectual light of which the sun is but one flame in the sky. In other words, the most general form of luminosity resides in the human heart.\footnote{In the following I return to the significance of the human heart in this world-view.} Moreover, the rose’s colorfulness and scent are described as attributes of the Beloved. The rose exhibits these attributes as though it wanted to name the attributes of being fragrant and colorful. But it can’t; the morning wind that represents the immanence draws the line between recognizing an attribute in reference to the One and instantiating it in the multiplicity of entifications. Thus, the rose remains a specific rose in nature.

Through the distinction that it makes in this ḡazal of Ḥāfiz, the morning wind in fact defines the Beloved (viewed) and the lover (viewer). This distinction is the ground for one of the meanings of ḡayrat that is relevant in the context of self-disclosure of Love.\footnote{Arabic: ḡayra} ḡayrat literally means ‘otherness’ or ‘exclusiveness’;\footnote{Lewisohn, Ḥafiz and the Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry, p. 53.} it is often translated as ‘Eifersucht’ in German and ‘jealousy’ in English.\footnote{See Dādbeh’s attempt to explain different aspects and meanings of ḡayrat in the Divan of Ḥāfiz: Aṣgar Dādbeh, ‘Ḡayrat va ma’ānī-ye ān dar še’r-e Ḥāfiz (1)’, Golcēhr, 1, no. 4 (1371/1992); ———, ‘Ḡayrat va ma’ānī-ye ān dar še’r-e Ḥāfiz (2)’, Golcēhr, 1, no. 5 (1371/1992). Though these two articles cover all instances of this term in the Divan, Dādbeh does not specify the meaning of ḡayrat in the context of self-disclosure of love among A. Ġazzālī, ‘Irāqī and Ḥāfiz.} But these translations do not convey the whole spectrum of meanings of ḡayrat in its historical development from A. Ġazzālī to ‘Irāqī and Ḥāfiz. No less than Persianate readers, the reader of Ḥāfiz in translation needs to be sensitive to the semiotic variations of this word in different contexts. In Sawānīḥ, ḡayrat is described as the blade ‘of jealousy for cutting the attention (of the lover) from things “other”’.\footnote{Ghazzālī, Sawānīḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits, p. 23.} It is a negating, purifying element that acts between the lover and the world, and between Love and the Beloved. In the first case, it purifies the lover from all that is other than the Beloved in the world, and in the second case it confines the Beloved to the nourishment that
He or She takes in His or Her belovedness in relation to the lover. With regard to the relation between the lovers and colorations of time, however, ġayrat confines the lovers to their engagement with various images of the Beloved that appear to them in accordance with their state. Ġayrat keeps the lovers on their quest for the Beloved and away from selfish engagement with the self. In the fourth Lam’a, ‘Irāqī redefines this traditionally excluding element of Sufi love as an all-inclusive force:

The ġayrat of the Beloved necessitated that the lover does not love anything other [ġayr] than the Beloved and does not covet [anything] other [ġayr] than Her. Therefore, necessarily, She turned Herself into the essence [ʿayn] of all the existents, so that all that the lover loves and covets is Her, and nobody loves anything the way they love themselves. Here, you may know who you are.

In Lamaʿāt, an all-inclusive formative aspect of ġayrat is described as a force that diversifies the One by assigning the attributes of the One to the multiplicity. Therefore, with respect to the One, ġayrat has a diversifying function. Since the attributes of the One, which are assigned to the multiplicity by ġayrat, make up the ontological ground of the phenomena, ġayrat ontologically unifies the phenomena. Thus, in respect of the multiplicity of phenomena, ġayrat has a unifying function.

The ʿayn (essence) of a given phenomenon is an attribute of the One reflected in it. It should be noted that ʿayn has many homonyms in Arabic and Persian: ’eye’, ‘the sun’, ‘essence’, ‘the likeness’, ‘form’, ‘character’, ‘people’, ‘one’s person’, ‘ring’, ‘spring’ and source of water, and ‘the opening of an arc’ are just a few examples. In the meaning of the likeness, which is connected to a thing’s essence, ʿayn is an antonym of ġayr (other). Hence the above passage shows the fusion of otherness (ġayrat) and sameness (ʿayn) in the plurality of essences that have a single ontological identity – the Beloved. The wide semantic spectrum of the word ʿayn is conveyed in the loan translations of that word into the Persian word čašm. These two words are employed frequently in Persian literature from the twelfth century onwards. In Lamaʿāt, ‘Irāqī makes use of the semantic potentials of this homonym to convey his views. In the first Lamʿa, ‘Irāqī cites a verse from a qaṣīda of ʿAṭṭār, in which ʿAṭṭār rejects the existence of anything other [ġayr] than the absolute, ‘for all that exists is a

488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
different form [‘ayn] of the One that has made its appearance’.\textsuperscript{492} Through these intertextual references, ‘Irāqi contextualizes his world-views in the historical tradition of Persian Sufi-literature. In this light, the act of ḡayrat (‘Eifersucht’) regarding the rose in the above-cited ḡazal of Ḥāfiẓ can be understood. It assigns to the rose the two attributes of colorfulness and fragrance, which belong to the Beloved. But the rose is not allowed to admit that its fragrance and colorfulness is that of the Beloved; rather the rose is merely the locus of the disclosure of these attributes, which constitute the rose’s being.

As I have shown, a defining characteristic of Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry is that Ḥāfiẓ will often treat multiple subjects within a single ḡazal. Therefore, the subjects of the intelligible world and the lover emerge in the ḡazal 87 from the first verse of the second couplet, where the intelligible attributes of the One are described as mysteries of solitude. The third, fifth and sixth couplets exclusively concern the lover or viewer. In this world-view, as ‘Irāqi stated, the viewer and viewed are ultimately one, and it would have been a great flaw if Ḥāfiẓ had not mentioned these two as one. But for the sake of clarity, I confined my analysis of this ḡazal to the relation between the communicative malāḥat and the multiplicity of instantiations of the attributes of the Beloved.

\textbf{III.2.2.1.1 Disclosure of the Ray of Beauty in \textit{Lamaʿāt} and Ḥāfiẓ’s \textit{Divan}}

In the second \textit{Lam’a}, ‘Irāqi cites one of his own ḡazals, which illustrates the emanation of beauty through a mythological account of the disclosure of ‘the ray of beauty’ (partau-i ḫusn):

\begin{center}
\textit{Partau-i ḫusn-i ū ču piydā šud}  
\textit{‘Ālam andar nafas huvaydā šud}  
\textit{Vām kard az ḡamāl-i ḫud naẓārī}  
\textit{Ḥusn-i rūyaš bidid šaydā šud}  
\textit{‘Āryat bistad az lab-aš šikari}  
\textit{Ẓauq-i ān čun biāft gūyā šud}  
\end{center}

As the ray of Its Beauty was disclosed,  
The universe appeared in one breath.  
It borrowed sight from Its Beauty,  
It saw the beauty of Her face and became infatuated.  
It borrowed sugar from Her lip  
Having received Its taste, it became eloquent\textsuperscript{493}


\textsuperscript{493} \textit{———, Maḡmū’e-ye āṣār-e Faḥr ud-Dīn ‘Irāqi}, p. 459 (my translation).
In these verses, ‘Irāqī describes the universe (the viewed) as the direct consequence of the self-disclosure of the ray of the beauty of the Beloved. As I explained above, this self-disclosure is impossible without the collaboration of the self-referential and communicative aspects of the absolute beauty.

The faculty of appreciation of beauty is conceived as borrowed from the beauty that discloses itself. In this manner, according to ‘Irāqī, the self-disclosure of the ray of beauty extends itself to the level of reception (the viewer). In ‘Irāqī’s ḡazal, the light metaphors that once stood for the light of truth now refer to beauty and the faculty of its reception. This usage of light metaphors also brings Sufi love poetry, which borrowed imagery from early non-Sufi profane poetry, closer to a clearer Sufi reconstruction of those tropes as a part of the view of self-disclosure of the absolute Indefinite.

The most frequently used Persian words for the face of the Beloved are ṭūr or ruḫ. The face can now be grasped within Sufi poetry as a metaphor for the whole realm of disclosure; different parts of the face represent different attributes of the One. After the self-disclosure of the ray of beauty as the viewed, the faculty of reception of beauty (the viewer) recognizes the face of the Beloved as the immanence of the Beloved in all the parts contributing to the face of the Beloved.

In one of the most celebrated ḡazals of the Divan, Ḥāfiz uses ‘Irāqī’s same words to describe the self-disclosure of ‘the ray of beauty’ (partau-i ḥusn). Here is Avery’s translation of this ḡazal; I include in brackets selected Persian words in order to shed light on the intertextual relation between Ḥāfiz and ‘Irāqī:

[1] In Eternity before Time, the light of your beauty [partau-i ḥusn-at] boasted of the glorious epiphany [taḵallī];
Love appeared and set the whole world on fire.
Out of jealousy [ḡayrat] of this, it turned into a fountain of fire and struck Adam.
[3] Reason was wishing to light a lamp from this flame.
The lightning of jealousy [ḡayrat] shot forth and smote the world into confusion.
[4] The Adversary wanted to reach where the mystery might be observed.
The Invisible Hand came and smote the breast of the one excluded from the secret.
[5] Others cast the lot of fate on living the good life;
It was our sorrow-witnessing heart that drew the lot of yearning;
[6] The high-aspiring soul possessed the desire for the dimple in your chin.
It struck out the hand into the ring of those curls of enmeshed tresses.

494 Compare to: Muʿin, Ḥāfiz-e širinsohan, pp. 374–375. Also see: Ḥorramšāhi, Ḥāfiz–nāme, vol. 1: p. 670.
Háfiz wrote the song-book of your love that day
When the pen cancelled out the encumbrances of the cheery heart.495

This ġazal is the most celebrated illustration of the events that transpire after the Infinite emanates a ray of Its beauty.496 In this first disclosure (tağallī) of beauty, the poet does not speak of beauty as instantiated or ideated in intellectual attributes; therefore, he does not mention the beauty of the Beloved’s face and its particular feature. Rather, he discusses the acts of beauty on a general level. To denote this first stage of disclosure of beauty, Ħâfiẓ uses the phrase partau-i ḫusn, which 'Īraqī also uses in one of his ġazals quoted in his Lamaʾāt.497 In such an indeterminate state, the next entification mentioned by Ħâfiẓ is Love. In the second couplet, the face (cheek) of the Beloved appears as the next emanation. In its communicative belovedness, the disclosure of the face of the Beloved is offered to the angels (this communicative act of beauty needs to be appreciated and received). But the angels were not the proper recipients, since they lacked the faculty of appreciation of beauty. Finally, the formative aspect of ġayrat turns to Adam, the archetype of humanity, and forms its faculty of appreciation to become receptive to the image of the face of the Beloved, thereby conveying that humanity is identical with loverhood.

The negating quality of ġayrat excludes reason and the adversary from appreciation of the beauty of the face of the Beloved. This negation is an act of diversification, since human and other intelligible beings are specified by this act. An expert in Qurʾān exegesis, Ħâfiẓ alludes to surah 33, verse 72, in which God offers ‘the Trust’ (amānat, which Sufis interpret as ‘loverhood’) to heavens and earth. But none of them dared to keep it, leaving only humans to become its keeper.498

In his comment on the third and fourth couplets, Heravī mentions that reason and the adversary are one and the same, and he points out that Südi

495 Avery, CXLVIII, p. 201. For other translations see: Wohlleben, 148, p. 223; Clarke, 186, pp. 354–355; Immortal Rose: an Anthology of Persian Lyrics, p. 143; Hafiz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman Bicknell, p. 130.

496 See also the following article: Leili Anvar, ‘The Radiance of Epiphany: The Vision of Beauty and Love in Ḥâfiẓ’s Poem of Pre-Eternity’, in Religion of Love in Classical Persian Poetry, ed. Leonard Lewisohn (London & New York: Tauris, 2010), pp. 127; 129. Here, the author provides a useful commentary on this poem. However, Anvar holds that the pursuit of beauty in the context of this poem is an anamnestic ascending process; as I will show on p. 289 below, this description can be revised in light of the active presence of the Beloved in the lover’s faculty of apprehension of beauty.

497 I provided a translation and a transcription of 'Īraqī’s ġazal at the beginning of this subsection.

interprets the adversary as Satan. As Heravi mentions and Āšūrī’s comprehensive study in *Mysticism and ‘Rindi’ in Poetry of Hafiz* confirms, the angels and evil in these verses stand in an intertextual relation to *Mīrṣād ul-‘ibād* of Naǧm ud-Dīn Rāzī, a contemporary of Auḫad ud-Dīn Kirmānī, Saḍr ud-Dīn Qūnāvī, ‘Irāqi, and Rūmī. Naĝm ud-Dīn Rāzī’s Sufi interpretation of the Qur’ān was based on the views of the Sufi adorers of beauty, specifically A. Ġazzālī. In his narrative and mythological account, Naĝm ud-Dīn Rāzī describes Iblīs, before his fall, as the most inquisitive angel; he enters and explores the body of Adam while his heart is still being formed. Iblīs observes that every element of the macrocosm (‘ālām-i buzurg) has a corresponding part in the human intellect or body as a microcosm (‘ālām-i kūčak). But when Iblīs wants to examine the human heart, he finds it as closed and impenetrable as a citadel without gates; so he returns empty handed. *Mīrṣād ul-‘ibād* depicts Iblīs as unable to access the heart; in that respect, Iblīs resembles rationality, as Ḥāfīz conceives of it. In this manner, the angels (including Iblīs) and humans are distinguished from each other. In the fifth couplet, the poet once again mentions that only the human heart is capable of love, which is described as having experienced care (ḡam-dida). Avery’s translation (‘sorrow-witnessing’) brings out that the heart is

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502 See the introduction of Rīvāḥī to his edition of *Mīrṣād ul-‘ibād*: ibid., p. 60. Also, Pourjavady in his introduction to *Sawānīḥ* names Naĝm ud-Dīn as one of the Sufis who were under direct influence of A. Ġazzālī: Ghazzālī, *Sawānīḥ: Inspirations from the World of Pure Spirits*, p. 8.
receptive to the seed of a specific care. Therefore, the heart is suitable for what A. Ġazzālī and ʿIrāqī describe as the Beloved’s desire to see Its beauty in the mirror of the lover’s love.505

In the penultimate couplet, as the poet turns to the descent of the most exalted spirit (translated above as ‘high-aspiring soul’), he mentions the parts of the face. This descent is due to the desire to fall into a depth that is a part of the Beloved’s face. The rope that makes this descent possible is the curly, manifold tress of the Beloved. Further in this study, I investigate the significance of the Beloved’s hair and its relation to humans.506

In such a primordial state, the quality of caring for and coveting the beauty of the Beloved is placed in the human heart by the formative ġayrat, thus unifying humanity and loverhood. By claiming that he wrote the book of joy of his love for his Beloved on the day he abandoned the pursuit of a care-free heart,507 Ḥāfiẓ conveys that loverhood cannot be realized unless one differentiates between the selfish needs of the individuated self and the desire to recognize and appreciate the One in its disclosures. This paradox of abandoning selfish joy and living a joyful life of caring for the Beloved is constantly present in the Divan. It can be understood as the activity of the heart that is formed to desire the disclosed beauty of the Beloved.

The poet’s choice to leave the metaphors of inebriety out of this ġazal provides an opportunity to study the description of the emanation of beauty independent of other tropes. Yet it is rare that the poet limits himself to a single set of metaphors. As I explain in the following sub-section, the metaphors of beauty and inebriety are elaborately connected.

III.2.2.1.2 Interwoven Metaphors of Light, Wine and Beauty

In the second Lamʿa, after quoting his own ġazal that begins with the illustration of the disclosure of ‘the ray of beauty’, ʿIrāqī explains the formation of the faculty of appreciation in the lover: ‘The splendor of Beauty bestowed upon the


506 See §III.2.2.4 (‘A Separation Willed by the Beloved and the Love of Beloveds’). Especially on the relation between the lover, the hair and the realm of multiplicity see p. 316 below. Compare to Anvar, ‘The Radiance of Epiphany: The Vision of Beauty and Love in Ḥāfiẓ’s Poem of Pre-Eternity’, p. 134.

507 Compare to Lewisohn’s translation of this ġazal in: ibid., p. 125.
lover’s entity [ʿayn] a light with which that very Beauty might be seen; for only through It can It be perceived. ʿIrāqī continues: ‘[w]hen the lover grasped the joy of this Witnessing he caught the taste of existence. He heard the whispered command— “BE!” Earlier, I discussed the significance of the command ‘Be!’ in the context of the Sufi Quranic interpretation. This interpretation unites light, sight and the aesthetic appreciation of beauty [laẓẓat-i ṣuhūd], which is followed by a taste of existence [zauq-i vuḡūd bičišid] and life. Then, ʿIrāqī recapitulates the content of his ḡazal in theosophical and mythological prose. He cites a Quranic verse and a ḥadīth of the Prophet:

The Morning of Manifestation sighted, the breeze of Grace breathed gently, ripples stripped upon the sea of Generosity. The clouds of Effusion poured down the rain of ‘He sprinkled creation with His Light’ (H) upon the soil of preparedness; so much rain that the earth shone with the Light of its Lord (XXXIX: 69). The lover, then, satiated with the water of life, awoke from the slumber of non-existence, put on the cloak of being and tied round his brow the turban of contemplation; he cinched the belt of desire about his waist and set forth with the foot of sincerity upon the path of the Search.

Sunrise is a frequent motif in the works of ʿIrāqī and Ḥāfīẓ. In the passage above, the ‘Morning of Manifestation’ has two aspects: the aspect of the viewed and the aspect of the viewer (the lover). Both the viewed and the viewer – or the viewer’s faculty of appreciation of the viewed – are ontologically grounded in the One being. This ontological emanation is articulated through a combination of light metaphors, bacchanalian tropes and tropes of the aesthetic pursuit of beauty. Before Ḥāfīẓ, ʿIrāqī was the greatest poet to articulate these sophisticated views in metaphors. The following is one of ʿIrāqī’s most important qaṣāʾid, the first few couplets of which he cites in the second Lamʿa:

Cups are those a-flashing with wine,
Or suns through the clouds a-gleaming?
So clear is the wine and the glass so fine

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508 The homonymy between ‘entity’, ‘quiddity’, and the word ‘eye’ in Arabic must be noted here. ʿIrāqī’s constant usage of the word ʿayn (the eye) underscores the significance of aesthetic appreciation of beauty extending from this manner of formation of the faculty of appreciation of beauty. See p. 273 above.

509 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, p. 75; ʿIrāqī, Maḡmūʿ-e ye ṣāḥ-e Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 460.

510 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, p. 75.

511 See p. 255 above.

512 ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, p. 76.
That the two are one in seeming.  
The glass is all and the wine is naught,  
Or the glass is naught and the wine is all:  
Since the air the rays of the sun hath caught  
The light combines with night’s dark pall,  
For the night hath made a truce with the day,  
And thereby is ordered the world’s array.  
If thou know’st not which is day, which is night,  
Or which is goblet and which is wine,  
By wine and cup divine aright  
The Water of Life and its secret sign:  
Like night and day thou mayst e’en assume  
Certain knowledge and doubt’s dark gloom.  
If these comparison clear not up  
All these problems low and high,  
Seek for the world-reflecting cup  
That thou mayst see with reason’s eye  
That all that is, is He indeed,  
Soul and loved one and heart and creed.513

The first couplet, ‘Irāqi’s translation of an Arabic poem attributed to Şāhib ibn  
‘Abbād of the tenth century, introduces the parallel tropes of light and wine to  
describe emanation.514 In this poem, ‘Irāqi stresses immanence through de-
scriptions of three dualities: rays of light and the masses of clouds; wine and  
the cup; and day and night. These metaphors stand for form (soul) and the re-
cipient of form (matter) – the body is the perfect union of the two.  
In the Divan of Ḥāfiz we find the same combination of wine metaphors and  
light metaphors – wine and the cup represent the sun and the world, which  
receives the sun’s light. In the following ḡazal, the beloved wine-bringer (ṣāqi)  
brings the (illuminating) wine at dawn; like in the above passage of the  
Lama’āt, the lover will soon wake up to the taste of this vivifying wine. But  
Ḥāfiz does not restrict the semiotic horizon of wine to the Sufi’s allegorical  
wine; he extends the metaphor even further:

[1] ‘Tis morn, O Sāḵī; fill the wine-cup high!  
Be quick: the heavens delay not as they fly.  
[2] Ere yet this Fading World to ruin goes,  
My senses ruin with thy wine of rose.

513 Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. 3: p. 130. See also the poet’s two poetic attempts  
514 In its Arabic form, this couplet appears in Persian literature from the thirteenth century  
onwards in the context of immanence of the divine in its emanations. See Muḥtašam’s note in  
[3] The sun of wine has the cup’s East made bright:
Abandon slumber, dost thou seek delight.
[4] When Fate at last makes flagons of my clay,
With wine, forget not, fill my skull that day.
[5] No zeal, no scruples, no remorse are mine:
Speak with a goblet full of limpid wine.
[6] Wine-worship, ḤĀFIŻ,
Is to Virtue dear:
Arise; to Virtue
Let thy will adhere.515

Importantly, both ʿIrāqī and Ḫāfīz view emanation as the constant, timeless source of being; it is not an event in the past. The light of dawn reminds Ḫāfīz of the constant self-disclosure of the One through its ray of beauty; and Ḫāfīz finds the same symbolism in the image of red wine being poured into a colorless glass. The influence of wine on the human body and mind can be seen in its likeness to the effusion of existence into the multiplicity (according to the views of ʿIrāqī and the Sufi adorers of beauty).

In another ġazal, Ḫāfīz begins the poem by comparing wine and the sun. In the second verse of the first couplet, he transitions from light metaphors and tropes of wine to the imagery of the face of the beloved: ‘Whenever in the east of the cup the sun of wine comes up, | In the garden of wine-server’s cheeks a thousand tulips bloom.’516 Since all the events in this context concern the wine-bringer who pours the wine and drinks it, the poet shows us a single existence at work in the universe – the beings, here represented as tulips, are different moments or aspects of the face of the Beloved on the level of multiplicity. In the following poem, we find another articulation of this view:

[1] When your face’s reflection fell onto the mirror of the wine-bowl,
Because of the wine’s laughter the mystic fell into raw desire.
[2] Beneath the veil, on the Day of Eternity without beginning your cheek displayed a splendour:
All these images fell onto the mirror of illusions;
[3] All this reflection in wine and these contrasting figures that have appeared,
Are a single light fallen into the bowl from the wine-boy’s cheek.517

To understand how the multiplicity of phenomena can be grasped by the viewer as different aspects and images of the One, we need to return to the last verse

515 Ḥafīz, Hafiz of Shiraz: a Selection from his Poems Translated from the Persian by Herman Bicknell, p. 235. See also Ḫānlarī, 388.
516 Avery, CCXXX, 1, p. 295.
517 Avery, CVII, 1–3, p. 151.
of ‘Irāqī’s poem above, which instructs us to seek the world-revealing cup and find its relation to the human faculty of appreciation of the Beloved’s beauty. In the following sub-section, I discuss the formation of the faculty of appreciation of beauty and I trace the metaphor of the world-revealing cup in the Divan of Hāfiz.

III.2.2.1.3 The Heart of the Lover: The World-Revealing Cup

A cup in which the beholder can see the world has deep roots in Iranian myth and legend. In the Šāhnāma, Firdausī claims that this cup was in possession of the Kayāni King Kay Ḫusraw. Other sources from the twelfth century onwards claim that this cup was possessed by the mighty Pīšdādī King Ġamšīd, who is often identified with the prophet Solomon. In addition to the presence of the abovementioned legends, the Divan of Hāfiz reflects the cultural influence of a further legend that attributes the cup to Alexander.518

This remarkable cup is an allegorical object of pursuit in Sufi literature. In the last poem by ‘Irāqī that I discussed above, ‘Irāqī advises his reader to seek the world-revealing cup in order to view in it the immanence of the One. The Sufi-poet ‘Aṭṭār, a predecessor of ‘Irāqī, mentions the world-revealing cup in the following ġazal:

You are the mirror of Her beauty,
And your mirror is the whole world.
O Wine-Bringer of our feast be quick and rise;
Give wine, for I am heavy-headed with wine.
Pour in our world-revealing cups,
That wine which is the elixir of life.519

In this ġazal, ‘Aṭṭār mentions two mirrors: humans are the mirror for the Beloved (in which the Beloved sees her beauty) and the universe is the mirror for humans (in which they see the Beloved). Yet in order to appreciate humanity and the world, the wine that gives existence to us must first be poured in our cups. It is clear that humans, the Beloved and the world are connected through the mediation of the Beloved’s reflections: there is only one true entity, which is reflected differently in different mirrors. In the following quatrain, ‘Aṭṭār describes the world-revealing cup while praising humanity. He asserts that the world-revealing cup exists in the human heart:

You wondrous bird! the stars are your grain,
From Pre-eternity, this has been your lot.
If it’s the world-revealing cup you seek:
It is in a safe, placed in your chest.520

The quest for the world-revealing cup has a complex presence in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ. The poet dedicates an entire ḡazal to the nature and meaning of this object of pursuit. In the first three couplets, Ḥāfiẓ describes the problem and seeks the advice of his fictive mentor:

[1] Years the heart was seeking Jamshíd’s cup from us:
That which it itself possessed, it was desiring of a stranger.
[2] A pearl that is outside the shell of time and place,
From the lost in the ocean main it was seeking.
[3] Last night I took my problem to the Elder of the Magians,
Because with the help of vision he was for solving the riddle.521

In these verses, Ḥāfiẓ specifies that the problem concerns the heart, since the heart is what seeks the cup. In the second verse of the first couplet, before providing an account of his meeting with the mentor, Ḥāfiẓ conveys the result of his consultation: the fault of Ḥāfiẓ’s quest, the mentor says, is that Ḥāfiẓ’s heart already has what it seeks. Ḥāfiẓ then describes his meeting with Pīr-i Muğān:

[4] I found him smiling and heart-elated, wine-cup in the hand,
In that mirror, enjoying a hundred varieties of spectacle.
[5] I asked, ‘When did the All-wise give you this world-seeing cup?’
He replied, ‘The day He was fashioning this azure dome’ [gunbad-i minâ].522

Ḥāfiẓ encounters Pīr-i Muğān holding a cup that has all the qualities of Ġam’s cup. Ḥāfiẓ describes the cup as qadaḥ-i bāda – a goblet of wine –, thereby implying that the cup in question can be interpreted literally. But a literal reading of the poem is hard to justify, given that Ḥāfiẓ later (in consultation with the mentor) describes the (same) cup as ġām-i ġahānbīn – the world-revealing cup. By challenging both literal and metaphorical interpretations, Ḥāfiẓ leads the reader to reconcile the sublime and the mundane – an approach that harmonizes with Ḥāfiẓ’s view of the sensible world and the immanence of the One. The joyful mentor imparts two pieces of knowledge. First, he received the cup through the same divine force that created the heavens, and on the same day

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521 Avery, CXXXVI, 1–3, p. 185.
522 Avery, CXXXVI, 4–5, p. 185.
(ān rūz). (In other words, he did not acquire the cup through any particular qualification on his part.) The second point is illustrated through the imagery of the second verse of the fifth couplet, in which two cups face each other: the cup held by Pīr-i Muğān and the dome of the sky. This ʿgzal extends ʿAṭṭār’s view that the world-revealing mirror is not outside of humans. Without mentioning the image of the Beloved in the cup that Pīr-i Muğān holds, Ḥāfiẓ describes the two mirrors in this ʿgzal as ‘facing each other’; he juxtaposes the cup to the dome of heaven and stresses that the two were formed simultaneously. Ḥāfiẓ refers to the heavens by alluding to the intelligible content of the universe, which had been the object of his quest for years; now the mentor reveals to him that the faculty of grasping this intelligible content is at the core of his being (his heart). The appearance of the face of the Beloved in the mirror of the cup is mentioned in other ʿgzals in the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.

Following A. Ģazzālī’s view expressed in the thirteenth chapter of Sawānīh523 Ḫrāqī defines the heart as a mirror for the Beloved. The image of the Beloved’s face is the ontological ground of humans and their faculty of appreciation of the beauty of the Beloved:

Bestow a light of vision
Upon the mirror of my heart;
In it so I may see
Your heart alluring face.
My world-revealing cup,
Is your exulting face
Though my very essence
Is your world-revealing cup.524

The relation between the communicative aspect of the non-entified Being (the belovedness of the Beloved, as A. Ģazzālī formulates it) and the world is based on reflections in mirrors. Yet Ḫrāqī does not hold that there is a duality between the mirror and the One; in Ḫrāqi’s view, the mirror has no ontological reality without an image of the Beloved. The mirror without an image of the Beloved is absolute non-existence (ʿadam) without any direction or extension – i.e., it is absolute privation which can reflect the images of the One. The following verses by Ḫrāqi articulate what I have elaborated on from A. Ģazzālī to ʿAṭṭār and Ḫrāqi:

523 See p. 262 above.
524 Ḫrāqi, Mağmū’e-ye ʾāṣār-e Faḥr ud-Dīn Ḫrāqi, p. 239 (my translation).
[1] If the sun of your face casted a shadow upon the dust,  
The terrestrials all would rise to the firmament.  
[2] Look at me, for through me the beauty of your face becomes disclosed.  
The ray (of the sun) could not become visible without dust [in the air].  
[3] My heart is your mirror keep it clean,  
For a clean mirror shows a clean face.  
[...]  
[6] It is for the sake of your own face that you look my way  
Otherwise you would never look toward the non-existence, never!  
[7] You embellish me with the ornament of your existence  
So, through me you can perceive your beauty.525

On multiple occasions in the *Lamaʿāt*, ʿIrāqi mentions that the faculty of appreciation of the Beloved constitutes the essence (ʿayn) of humans. In the seventeenth *Lamʿa*, ʿIrāqi asserts that the ray of beauty of the Beloved provides the inner core (ʿayn) of the lover (human) – a light with which to see the light of beauty. By emanating different aspects of beauty, the Beloved thus expands the humanity of humans and their faculty of appreciation of the Beloved. According to ʿIrāqi, this faculty is immanent in the lover and cannot be acquired. It corresponds to the Beloved’s perpetual act of self-disclosure.526

In the *Divan*, the following ʿgazal recounts events that took place ‘last night’, a phrase that Ḥāfīz often uses to signal that the events in question are timeless and concern humans on an archetypal level. Here are the first two couplets of this ʿgazal in Clarke’s and Avery’s translation527:

[1] Last night, at morning time, me freedom from grief, they (Fate and Destiny) gave.  
And, in that darkness of night, me the water-of-life they gave.  
[2] Through the effulgence of the ray of His essence, me senseless (and full of love for Him),  
they made:  
(In the world) from the cup of splendour of His qualities, me wine they gave.528  
[1] Last night as dawn broke I was salvaged from sorrow  
And in that darkness of night, given the Water of Life.  
[2] By the radiance of the ray from True Existence, I have been taken outside myself:  
They’ve given me wine from the chalice of the epiphany of the Attributes.529

525 Ibid., p. 331. Verses 1–3 and 6–7 (my translation).  
527 See Ḥānlarī, 22; 178; 179; 307.  
528 Clarke, 218, 1–2, p. 400.  
529 Avery, CLXXVII, 1–2, p. 237.
The image of the water of life betrays the ontological aspect of the poem and puts the reader in mind of receiving the images of the attributes of the One. In the second couplet, Ḫāfīz is careful not to claim that he has been exposed to the very Essence of the Absolute; rather, Ḫāfīz has been given wine from the cup of the disclosure of attributes (ḡām-i taḡallī-ye ṣafāt). This wine is introduced as the water of life, which leaves no space for self-interest. Becoming inebriated represents the moment one is influenced by the all-encompassing Being; there is no place for grief that stems from ignorance of the immanence of the One. The freedom from selfish concerns is mentioned at both the beginning and the end of this poem. In the last verse, the poet specifies the general grief (ḡuṣṣa) of the first verse as ḡam-i ayyām – concerns of everyday life as opposed to the care (ḡam) that comes from being in love.530

Throughout this ḡazal, the poet describes himself as passive. In fact, the only attribute Ḫāfīz assigns to himself (before dawn) is being destitute enough [mustahaqq] to receive alms [zakāt]. In other words, the only quality that can be assigned to him before the reception of the attributes of the One is privation: ‘If I have become gratified and happy at heart, no wonder – | I was deserving, and these as righteous alms they gave me.’531

In the following verses, Ḫāfīz describes being in the world after drinking the water of life. Here is Avery’s translation followed by my own (literal) translation:

[4] After this, it’s a case of my face and the beauty-reflecting mirror,
Because then news of the unveiling of the Divine Being was given.532
[4] Henceforth my face shall be turned to naught but the illustrative mirror of pleasance,
For therein they have informed me of the disclosure of the Essence.533

In just a few words, Ḫāfīz articulates an important aspect of his world-view. Ḫāfīz continues to face the mirror, in which the Essence discloses Itself to humans. He introduces the action of the first couplet as the consequence (‘henceforth’) of the conditions described in preceding couplets regarding the wine and the cup. In other words, as he explores the diversification of the One in the world, Ḫāfīz turns his gaze toward the reflections, which he perceives as though they were reflected in a mirror. But this form of appreciating the sensible through the mirror of the Beloved’s pleasance does not entail an exclusive approach toward the world; on the contrary, as the bearer of this mirror, the

530 See pp. 277f above.
531 Avery, CLXXVIII, 5, p. 237. See also: Clarke, 218, 7, p. 401.
532 Avery, CLXXVIII, 4, p. 237. See also: Clarke, 218, 5, p. 400.
533 My literal translation of Ḫānları, 178, 4.
III.2.2 The Inner Connection Between the Heart and the Eye of the Lover

In the two preceding sub-sections, I showed that Ḥāfīz’s Divan mentions two related mirrors (or two cups): in the first mirror, the One diversifies itself through its attributes; and in the second, it recognizes its own diversification. In the ḡazal we examined above, receiving wine from the cup of disclosure of attributes is a metaphor for the formation of the heart (the lover’s coming into existence). In this sub-section, I address how Ḥāfīz illustrates his life as facing nothing but the illustrative mirror of pleasance; I also examine the aesthetic aspect of this reception of the world through the eye and the heart.

In the seventeenth Lam’a, ‘Irāqī explains the formation of the essence (‘ayn) of humans ([bandagān] servants), and then clarifies the relation between the human essence and sensible phenomena (‘ālam-i šahādat) as follows:

The Transcendent Truth [haqq ta’ālā] in the world of the unseen (intelligible realm ['ālam-i ḡayb]) manifested a potentiality [isti’dād] in the essence ['ayn] of the servant [banda] with which he receives the (intelligible) essential disclosure [taḡallī-yi ‘ayni]. Then upon mediation of that disclosure [ba vāsita-yi ān taḡallī], the servant finds another potentiality in the sensible world ['Ālam-i šahādat], so with the latter potentiality he becomes receptive of the existential visible disclosure [taḡallī-yi šahādati vuġūdil]; and then, in accordance with his state each moment, the servant attains another potentiality.

This fragment from the Lama’āt integrates the potentiality of grasping the One’s attributes into the humanity of humans – their ‘ayn, both in its concrete meaning (eyes) and its abstract meaning (essence). But this potentiality is not something that can be acquired; rather, it is intrinsic to humanity. Furthermore, recognizing the One in phenomena is ultimately an act of the One itself – and not of the individual. In fact, based on the idea that there is only One being, in the fourth Lam’a, ‘Irāqī alludes to a ḥadīth of the Prophet; and in the seventh Lam’a, he paraphrases that same ḥadīth to support his view that the senses of human beings are in reality those of the One.

In the nineteenth Lam’a, ‘Irāqī addresses the heart of the lover. He describes the heart as the locus of the intelligible attributes (baḥr-i ḡayb) of the One, which interact with sensory perceptions (baḥr-i šahādat) to form the

534 See my translation of Ḫānli, 178, 4 above.
536 Ibid., p. 465. ‘For you are my hearing, and my sight’ (či sam‘ u baṣar-i man tuʿy).
537 Ibid., p. 477.
experience of the lover. According to ʿIrāqi, the heart is ‘that place where the seas of the Seen and Unseen flow together.’

I have already elaborated on the formative, inclusive aspect of ḡayrat (otherness) in the fourth Lamʿa, in which ʿIrāqī uses ʿayn in its two interrelated meanings of ‘essence’ and ‘the likeness.’ ʿIrāqī introduces ʿayn near ḡayrat in order to show that the all-inclusive One does not admit ḡayr (others), an antonym of ʿayn. Thus, through the force that negates otherness (ḡayrat), the One diversifies Itself through the attributes that are Its likenesses – ḡāgaram ḥud rāʿ ʿayn-i hama kard. In the diversity of aʿyān (essences/like-nesses), the One forms the multiplicity, and in the eye (ʿayn) of the lover It recognizes Its own unity diversified.

This structure of understanding the relation between the One and the many, as well as the recognition of the former in the latter, has a central position in the Divan of Ḥāfīz, on both ontological and epistemological levels. In the following verses from the Divan, Ḥāfīz shows that his heart and his eye lead him through life as a lover in the natural visible world; the heart and the eye are both defined in relation to the Beloved.

[1] The pavilion of his love is the heart,
The holder of the mirror to his countenance, the eye.
[2] I who do not bow down to either of the two worlds,
My neck is under the burden of obligation to him.
[3] You and the paradisial Tūbā tree, and we, and the form of the friend —
Everyone’s idea is commensurate with their devotion.

In the first couplet, the eye and the heart are described in relation to each other: the heart is the dwelling place of Love, and the eye stands before the visible, which it recognizes as the mirror held to the Beloved’s face. The second and the third couplets articulate Ḥāfīz’s preference for the pursuit of Love over the rewards of this world and the next one. Even the Tūbā tree, the tallest tree in paradise, appears to the lover to be just one instantiation of the attribute of tallness. The lover’s quest for beauty is not directed solely toward the discovery of the most intense instantiation of a given attribute; rather, the quest for beauty consists in appreciation of each instantiation of each attribute of the

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539 See p. 273 above.
540 ʿIrāqi, Maṣmūʿ-e āšār-e Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 464. See also p. 226 couplet 2671.
541 Avery, LX, 1–3, p. 97. See also: Clarke, 22, p. 75, as well as Friedrich Rückert’s translation of this ġazal in: Hafis, Dreiundsechzig Ghaselen des Hafis, p. 29.
One. Therefore, being aware of the tallness of the Tūbā tree is not the end of the activity of the lover’s faculty of recognizing the One in the many. Thus, answering the zealot ascetic who chides him for being tainted with the natural, Ḥāfīz acknowledges that he belongs to the natural realm, while ironically reminding the ascetic about the medial immanence of the One: ‘What is the loss if I am stained? | The whole world is witness to his innocence’.

At this stage, we can recognize the epistemological aspect of Ḥāfīz’s conceptions of the faculty of sight, the object of sight and the cognitive activity of recognizing the One in the all. The active immanence of the One in the faculty of Its appreciation in humans guides the observer in his exploration of nature and recognition of the intelligible attributes of the One that are disclosed in nature. Importantly, Ḥāfīz does not mention possessing beauty; he is concerned exclusively with appreciating beauty in its numerous forms: ‘Every leaf of the book in the meadow tells of a different state. | It would be a pity if you were neglectful of the state of all.’

This epistemological view differs from the doctrine of anamnesis by claiming that intelligible content resides in both the viewer and the viewed; the One is active both inwardly and outwardly. The act of diversification unfolds through the viewed, and specific instances of immanence are recognized by the viewer as disclosures of the Beloved. Thus, as in the couplet cited above, lamentations over separation become experiences of rejoicing in beauty: ‘Each freshly blossomed flower which rose to be an embellisher of the meadow | Bears the mark of conversing with Him in color and fragrance’ Ḥāfīz recognizes the Beloved while enjoying the instantiation of each specific fragrance and color. In a further step, Ḥāfīz introduces himself as a successor of Mağnūn. The time is limited, he warns. Now it is our turn to be lovers; soon, we will leave the world to the next generation of lovers, to whom Love will show other instances of belovedness in natural and human form: ‘The time of Mağnūn has passed, now the turn is ours | As short as five days each one’s turn is.’

In the beginning of another ǧazal, Ḥāfīz once again illustrates the relation between the eye and the heart: ‘Mein Augenmann hat nur dein Angesicht im Blick, | mein wirres Herz gedenkt nur deiner.’ Wohlleben’s translation of

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542 Avery, LX, 4, p. 97.
543 Avery, CCCXCVII, 4, p. 538.
545 Ḫānlarī, 60, 6. My literal translation
546 Wohlleben, 71, 1, p. 131.
mardum-i dida as Augenmann\textsuperscript{547} (pupil of the eye) can be traced back to Hammer-Purgstall’s translation. Rosezweig-Schwannau also uses this translation.\textsuperscript{548} The modern reader may overlook the intellectual significance and poetic potential of mardum-i dida, which appears to be an archaic variant of the commonly used word mardumak-i čašm (pupil of the eye). On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that this word combination is a calque of the Arabic insān ul-‘ayn.\textsuperscript{549} Bearing this fact in mind allows us to better understand the couplet cited above.

The loan-translation is constructed as follows. The first component, insān, is translated as mardum, based on the literal meaning of the Arabic word – ‘human’. Along the same lines, the word ‘āyn is translated as čašm or dida. In his lexicon, Lane glosses insān ul-‘ayn as follows: ‘The image that is seen [reflected] in the black of the eye’ and ‘what is seen in the eye, like as is seen in a mirror, when a thing faces it’.\textsuperscript{550} Then Lane offers the following translations: ‘pupil’ or ‘apple of the eye’.\textsuperscript{551} The same explanation can be found in lexicons from the ninth century onwards, such as Adab al-kātib (ninth century), Kitāb at-talḥīṣ fī maʿrifat-i asmā’ al-ašyā’ (tenth century) and Šarḥ maqāmāt ul-ḥarīrī (thirteenth century). Exploring these lexicons further clarify the image that Lane mentions in his lexicon: the reflection on the black mirror of the pupil of the eye is the image of the person who looks into it.\textsuperscript{552}

In the first chapter of Fuṣūṣ ul-ḥikam, Ibn ‘Arabī describes the self-disclosure of the One as Its casting of Its own image upon the mirror. In this

\textsuperscript{547} In the following case, ‘Augenmann’ is also Wohlleben’s choice, although he mentions ‘Pupille’ in the footnote: Wohlleben, 69, 2, p. 129. In another case, he translates mardum-i čašm as ‘Pupille’. Wohlleben, 385, 6, p. 494.


\textsuperscript{549} Compare to Avery’s brief note in: Avery, LXXI, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{550} Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, vol. 1: p. 115.


image, the relation between humans and the One is likened to the relation between the pupil of the eye (insān ul-ʿayn) and the eye; the pupil is the window through which sight is possible. In a qaṣida, Ḥaqqī describes the primordial state in which his being is formed. In the penultimate couplet, he poses a rhetorical question: ‘If I am not the pupil of the eye of that Beloved, | Why of all the world I bear the name human.’ In another verse in one of his famous strophic poems, he asserts, ‘I am the pupil of the eye of the world.’ At first, this may appear to mean simply that humans are the creatures most dear to the universe – the apple of its eye. Yet the verse has a deeper meaning. We can better understand this verse by consulting Šabistarī’s Gulshan-i rāz. (Šabistarī was a Sufi master contemporary to Ḥaqqī and the work in question was written in verse.) This book clarifies the principles of Sufism and gives an allegorical interpretation of some of the tropes found in Sufi love poetry.

In Gulshan-i rāz, Šabistarī illustrates the world as the place where one can explore the truth in a mediated manner. Šabistarī uses the sun as a metaphor for the truth:

Since the eye of the head has not strength enough,  
You may look on the brilliant sun in the water.  
Since its brightness shows less brightly therein,  
You can bear to look on it for a longer space.  
No being [non-being] is the mirror of absolute Being,  
Therein is shown the reflection of ‘The Truth.’

Šabistarī suggests that the One’s reflection, cast upon the mirror of non-being (ʿadam), generates the image of the whole universe in the shape of a person. Each atom of this cosmic image contains the same image, but there is only one

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554 ʿIrāqī, Maḏmūʿ-e-yey aṣār-e Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 309. Verse 3660. This qaṣida starts with the following couplet: Hanūz bāṭ-i ḡāhān rā nabūd nām u nišān | Ki mast būdam az ḏān mai ki ḡām-i āst ḡāhān. This couplet can be translated as follows: There was neither trace nor name yet of the garden of the world, | As I was inebriated by that wine the cup of which is the world.
558 Ibid.
559 It should be noted that ʿadam, or hayūlā in this context goes back to the reception of the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic hyle.
mirror (in the cosmic image itself) capable of reflecting the image in its entirety—i.e., the pupil of the eye of this cosmic image. This dark mirror in the cosmos is humanity: ‘Non-being is the mirror, the universe, the image and the human | Like the pupil of the image in which the person is concealed’.\(^{560}\) Šabistārī describes the image of the Beloved in the pupil of the eye as the light by which the eye perceives; what it sees is the face that is in front of it. Finally, he mentions: ‘If you take a deep look into this matter, | It is He who is the seer, the eye and the sight’.\(^{561}\)

‘Irāqī claims that the human is the insān ul-‘ayn of the Beloved as well as of the world; the likeness humans bear to the whole image of the Beloved is their essence (‘ayn), and this image is active in their eyes (‘ayn) perceiving the world of the diversifications of the One through the light that is again the image of the One itself. This claim is another articulation of the inner connections between the humanity of humans, the heart (‘ayn in the meaning of ‘essence’ and ‘likeness’), and the eye that perceives the One in Its diversifications.

The relation between the eye and the heart allows us to appreciate Ḥāfiz’s couplet quoted above, in which he claims that the pupil of his eye gazes upon nothing but the face of the Beloved and that his heart, as an intellectual faculty, is ruled by nothing but the images of the Beloved.

This view of the sight and perception of the phenomena corresponds to Ḥāfiz’s turn toward natural and human beauty, which he understands as a noble act that entails going beyond one’s limited selfish interests and recognizing the Beloved as the only source of Beauty. In the following couplet, Ḥāfiz describes his view of being a lover. He personifies the image of the Beloved in his pupil (mardum-i čašm) while his heart actively explores the garden of the world (bāğ-i ālam): ‘Was ist das Ziel des Herzens bei Betrachtung des Welt-Gartens? | Mit Hilfe [mit der Hand] der Pupille von deiner Wange Rosen zu pflücken.’\(^{562}\) The image of the Beloved comes to life, extending His or Her Hand beyond the reflecting surface of Ḥāfiz’s pupil (mardum-i čašm) to gather flowers from the garden of the world, which is identified with the face of the Beloved. Ḥāfiz thereby becomes what he claims to be in the opening verse of this gazal (385) – the famous lover in the city of Shiraz. The pupil of the eye extends its


\(^{561}\) Ibid.

\(^{562}\) Wohlleben, 385, 6, p. 494. The explanation in brackets comes from Wohlleben’s footnotes. Avery translates this couplet as follows: ‘What, gazing on the garden of the world, does the heart desire? | With the pupil of the eye to pluck a rose from your cheek.’ CCCLXXXV, 6, p. 470.
activity between the heart that is formed by the Beloved (and that desires the Beloved) and the world that reflects the Beloved.

The emphatic praise of ogling (naẓar-bāzi) in the Divan of Ḥāfīz can be appreciated in light of the connections between the heart; the humanity of humans (i.e., their ʿayn); and the human faculty of sight. Here is Arberry’s translation of the passage from the Divan that contains Ḥāfīz’s most famous praise of ogling:

[1] When I exchange the amorous glance
   The ignorant look all askance;
   Yet am I as I seemed to be—
   And all the rest they know of me.
[2] The man of Mind the centre is
   Of Being’s pair of compasses;
   Yet Love doth know, that in this wheel
   The minds of many thinkers reel.
[3] It is not in my eye alone
   The image of his face is shewn;
   The moon and sun alike delight
   To hold a mirror in his sight.563

Unlike the followers of abstraction, the lovers explore the phenomena with the active image of the face of the Beloved in their eyes. In each phenomenon, they find an aspect of that image; the moon and the sun are also recognized to be holding mirrors to the face of the Beloved. Through this capability, human sight detects the disclosure of the Beloved’s beauty in the most unexpected places. Ḥāfīz proudly and daringly announces that he perceives the light of God in the pleasure house of the magi, a place where no one expects it to be perceived: ‘I see the light of God in the Magian Tavern. | Behold this marvel, from where I see such a light!’564 In Ḥāfīz’s view, the images of the Beloved’s face lead the lovers through their quest of beauty:

[5] The highway robber of my imagination is every moment a vision of your face.565
   To whom can I tell what things I am seeing behind this veil?
[7] Friends, do not fault Ḥāfīz’s eye-playing,
   Because I see him as belonging to your loved ones.566

563 Immortal Rose: an Anthology of Persian Lyrics, p. 162. See the Persian verses in Ḫānlari, 188.
564 Avery, CCCXLIX, 1, p. 429.
565 It should be noted that the word naqš in the Persian verse does not mean vision; rather, it is a visible object of sight – an image, shape or figure connoting a multi-colored trace. This becomes clear in the second verse: ‘what things I am seeing’, Ḥāfīz says.
566 Avery, CCCXLIX, 5 & 7, p. 429.
III.2.2.3 Love as an Artist

In the couplets cited above, in addition to illustrating the activity of his eye (ogling) in recognizing the images of the face of the Beloved, Ḥāfiẓ describes the experience of being in the world as one of looking at a scrim. Ḥāfiẓ explicitly states that his experience of beauty relates to the images of the face of the Beloved. In other words, his relation to his object of pursuit is mediated through images. Whereas the early Sufis wished to approach the truth by casting aside the veil of the world of mixture and transience, the Sufi adorers of beauty, and specifically ‘Īraqi, viewed the mediated presence of the Beloved in the world as valuable in itself.

In the prolog to Lamaʿāt, ‘Īraqi cites one of his own ǧazals in which Love appears as a minstrel (muṭrib), whose music guides lovers through their pursuit of beauty.567 In the third Lamʿa, while quoting a couplet from Auḥad ud-Dīn Kirmānī,568 he describes Love as the ‘Painter’ (naqqāš), who is deeply infatuated with His own paintings. Further in this Lamʿa, the whole of existence is described as a painting of this Painter, and the different aspects of the multiplicity of beings are likened to the painter’s face:

[E]ach image painted
On the canvas of the existence
is the form
of the artist himself.
Eternal Ocean
spews forth new waves.
‘Waves’ we call them;
but there is only the Sea.569

In the sixth Lamʿa, Love is described as a Beautifier (maṣṣāṭa), an expert in coloring who begets truth in the hue of images that cause lovers to fall in love.570 Finally, in the sixteenth Lamʿa, a relatively short but important section of the work, ‘Īraqi further elaborates on the relation between Love and Its act as an artist. He characterizes Love as the master shadow artist, whose acts, movements and decrees constitute the world.571

This definition of Love as an artist, who delights in communicating aspects of Its indeterminate Self under the limitations of finite images, calls for a

568 Ibid., p. 462, l. 111. See also Muḥtašam’s note on line 111.
571 Ibid., pp. 497–498.
reevaluation of the finite. The limitations that constitute the attributes of the Beloved and the natural and bodily sphere are no longer understood as limitations imposed on the Infinite; rather, they are conceived as choices of the Artist, who limits Himself in order to communicate an intelligible, aesthetically pleasing aspect of His infinite Self.\(^{572}\) ʿIrāqī concludes the sixteenth Lamʿa with a reminder: ‘[t]he source of the activity is one, but everywhere displays new colors and is called by a different name.’\(^{573}\)

According to ʿIrāqī, the images and colorations of the Beloved have their effect even if the lover does not know that they are acts of the Beloved. In the seventh Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī explains:

It is not so much wrong as impossible to love other than Him, for whatever we love (aside from that love which springs from the very essence of the lover, the cause of which is unknown), we love either for its beauty, or its goodness—and both of these belong to Him alone.\(^{574}\)

In the Divan of Ḩâfiz, there are passages in which Love is rendered as a ‘minstrel’ (muṭrib), who moves lovers with melodies. In the following ḡazal, Ḩâfiz describes the wailing of lovers, who covet their beloveds, as part of the Minstrel of Love’s music:

[1] Love’s minstrel has a wonderful song and tune;
The theme of every chord he’s struck finds a home.
[2] May the world never be empty of lovers’ wailing,
For it has a secret note and a joy-imparting echo.\(^{575}\)

A minstrel himself, Ḩâfiz viewed his songs as an extension and culmination of the divine song of love. In fact, he never aggrandizes himself, except for with regard to his work as a minstrel and poet. He boasts that his songs move people of all nationalities, as well as the heavens and angels:

To the poetry of Ḥâfiz of Shíráz they are dancing and pirouetting,
The dark eyes of Kashmîr and the Turks of Samarqand.\(^{576}\)

Spread the rumour of love in the Hejáz and ‘Irāq:


\(^{573}\) ʿIraqī, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, p. 109.

\(^{574}\) Ibid., p. 85 (my emphasis). See also: ʿIrāqī, Maḏmūʿe-ye āṣār-e Faḥr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqī, p. 474, l. 209.

\(^{575}\) Avery, CXIX, 1–2, p. 165. See also: Wohlleben, 119, 1–2, p. 190.

\(^{576}\) Avery, CCCXXX, 9, p. 520.
The singing and the voice of the lyrics of Ḥáfiz of Shíráz.\textsuperscript{577} There’s no wonder if, at the words of Ḥáfiz, in the heavens Venus’s ecstasy makes the Messiah dance\textsuperscript{578} At the time of morning, a chorus was coming from the Throne [of heaven]. Reason said: ‘It seems angels chant poems of Ḥáfiz by heart.’\textsuperscript{579} Ḥáfiz describes the maker of the natural world as a beautifier (\textit{maššāṭa}) in the following couplet: ‘The decker-out of creation’s pen will record no gratification | For any who have not acknowledged this God-given beauty.’\textsuperscript{580} Through this warning, Ḥáfiz emphasizes that recognizing the aesthetically moving work of the divine is the prerequisite for grasping the advantages of whole macrocosmic creation. In another ġazal, Ḥáfiz praises the Painter (\textit{naqqāṣ}) of the universe and the multiplicity of images that emerge through His artistic production: ‘Get up so that for that limner’s pen we may sacrifice the soul, | Because he has all this marvellous imagery in a compass’s twirling.’\textsuperscript{581} These passages, in which the multiplicity is depicted as a work of art produced by the Artist, should be considered in relation to the couplet mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section.\textsuperscript{582} There, too, Love acts as a master shadow artist, perpetually disclosing different images of the face of the Beloved. Love constantly leads Ḥáfiz through experiences of beauty and enables him to recognize the light of the divine in the pleasure house of the magi. The presence of light – no matter where – testifies to the Artist’s activity.

III.2.2.4 A Separation Willed by the Beloved and the Love of Beloveds
In the fourth chapter of \textit{Sawānih}, A. Ġazzālī defines union in the negative tradition: ‘Since union (with love) is partition (from the self), partition (in this sense) is nothing other than union. Therefore, parting from one’s self is the same as union.’\textsuperscript{583} In the fortieth chapter, however, we recognize an inclusive aspect as the consequence of abandoning the self. Furthermore, this move from exclusion to inclusion is only conceivable if we allow for a communicative aspect of Love. Here are the two first sections of this chapter of \textit{Sawānih}:

\textsuperscript{577} Avery, CCLII, 7, p. 321.
\textsuperscript{578} Avery, IV, 8, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{579} Avery, CXCVI, 10, p. 254.
\textsuperscript{580} Avery, CXXXVIII, 7, p. 188. See also: Wohlleben, 138, 7, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{581} Avery, LXXIX, 5, p. 119.
\textsuperscript{582} Avery, CCCXLIX, 5, p. 429.
(1) From the point of view of the real nature of love, the beloved acquires no gain and suffers no loss by (the lover’s) love. However, in virtue of its customary generosity, love binds the lover to the beloved. The lover is always the object of the beloved’s contemplation through the binding of love.

(2) This is why separation willed by the beloved is more union than union willed by the lover. For when separation is willed by the beloved, then (there is a duality of contemplator and that which is contemplated; so) the lover becomes the object of contemplation for the beloved’s heart, and the object of her will and intention. On the other hand, when the lover wills union, there is no contemplation of the beloved and she does not take him into account at all.

In this passage, A. Ġazzālī introduces another aspect of abandoning the self, which is based on the communicative, formative aspect of Love that binds the lover to the Beloved. Within this communicative aspect, the lover is the object of the Beloved’s contemplation, since (as I explained earlier) the Beloved takes nourishment from Her beauty through the lover’s being and desire. If the lover seeks an intentional union, however, the formative contemplation of the Beloved is interrupted.

ʿIrāqī alludes to these chapters of Sawānīḥ in the twenty-first and twenty-second Lamʿa. In the twenty-fourth Lamʿa, he explains his view of the significance of a separation that is willed by the Beloved. In the twenty-first Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī declares that lovers must abandon all desires belonging to their limited self: ‘[w]hat you get by wanting is only as big as your capacity for desire.’ Then in the twenty-second Lamʿa, ʿIrāqī asserts that the lover should love whatever the Beloved loves, whether union and closeness or remoteness and separation: ‘After all, in nearness and Union the lover is merely qualified by his own desire, while in exile and separation he is qualified by the will of the Beloved.’ Thus, ʿIrāqī interprets ‘being the object of contemplation of the Beloved’ as ‘being qualified by the Beloved’. Based on this reading, ʿIrāqī takes a significant step toward a shift from negation of the lovers’ qualities to an inclusive approach: ‘Know then that the cause of the lover’s remoteness is his own attributes—but that these attributes are the Beloved Himself.’

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584 *Real nature of love* is Pourjavady’s translation of ḥaqīqat-i kār-i ʾišq, which pertains to Love in Itself and in Its Essence.
587 Ibid., p. 116.
588 Ibid.
Lamʿa, the abandoning of the self goes beyond negation of the attributes that form the lovers; it leads to the recognition that the attributes that constitute the lover belong to the One. In this knowledge, the lovers recognize their individuated beings as willed and intended by the Beloved. This view is articulated in the twenty-fourth Lamʿa:

The lover’s search and desire is [sic] but a sign of the Beloved’s aspiration. Indeed, all his attributes—shame, desire, taste, and laughter—everything he ‘owns’ belongs in truth to the Beloved. The lover but holds it in trust; he cannot even be called a partner, for partnership in attributes would demand separate essences. But in the lover’s contemplative eye there exists in all reality but a single existent Essence.589

Having abandoned the false conviction that they have a self of their own, the lovers can appreciate that they are attributes of the One – instances capable of recognizing the attributes of the Beloved in all beloveds, each of which is a work of the Artist Love, who communicates an aspect of Its infinite Self in the multiplicity of veils of finite works of art.

Throughout Lamaʿāt, ʿIrāqi carefully argues that choosing a separation willed by the Beloved over a union is a compromise: the lovers no longer seek to purify themselves from the attributes that form them; rather, in the process of self-knowledge, they realize that these attributes belong to the Beloved (the only being that can have attributes).590 In Mystical Dimensions of Islam, Annemarie Schimmel mentions that ʿIrāqi’s view goes ‘beyond the early formulation that love means staying at the friend’s door even if sent away’.591 Yet Schimmel does not go further than highlighting the importance of the articulation of this view in Lamaʿāt.

An Arabic couplet cited by ʿIrāqi in the twenty-second Lamʿa provides one of the most beautiful poetic articulations of the compromise described above. Here is Chittick’s translation:

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589 Ibid., pp. 118–119.
590 The realization that all the attributes belong to the One does not mean that one can harm others or remain passive to harmful deeds of others. The human faculty of appreciation of beauty sees the face of the Beloved everywhere, even in unpleasant deeds; however, this is a face of disapproval. ʿIrāqi asserts that the lover can harmonize the attributes that pertain to the disclosure of wrath with those that pertain to the disclosure of pleasance. Compare to the twenty-first Lamʿa in: ʿIrāqi, Maḏmūʿe-ye āṣār-e Fāhr ud-Dīn ʿIrāqi, pp. 514–516. Also see: ʿIraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson, pp. 114–115.
I want Union with Him
He wants separation for me—
so I abandon my desire
to His.592

The Arabic couplet as cited in Lamaʿāt is ‘Urīdu wiṣālahu wa yurīdu hiḡri | Fa-
′atraku mā urīdu limā yurīd’.593 And Ḥāfīz’s graceful Persian translation: ‘Mail-i
man sūy-i viṣāl u qaṣd-i ī sūy-i farāq | Tark-i kām-i ḫud giriftam tā barāyad kām-
i dūst’.594:

My leaning, towards unity; his intention, separation:
My inclination I have forgone, to achieve the purpose of the friend.595

Meine Neigung zielt ab auf den Liebesbund, und sein Bestreben zielt auf Trennung,
auf meinen Wunsch habe ich Verzicht getan, damit sein Wunsch in Erfüllung gehe.596

In his translation of this Arabic verse, Ḥāfīz employs the identical noun viṣāl
(union). He masterfully integrates the Arabic verb for ‘abandoning’ (from the
root t-r-k) in the Persian compound verb that includes this verb (tark giriftan).
To translate the noun hiḡr (separation), Ḥāfīz uses a close synonym – farāq.
A. Ġazzālī uses the word farāq in the fortieth chapter of Sawānīḥ, and ‘Īraqq uses farāq much more frequently than hiḡr in his Persian expositions of this
particular Arabic verse.

Ḥāfīz’s acceptance of the Beloved’s remoteness cannot be appreciated with-
out considering ‘Īraqi’s contextualization of the Arabic couplet above in his
views in the twenty-first to the twenty-fourth Lam’a. We also need to consider
the allegorical symbolism of the imagery of the face of the Beloved in the
poems of the Sufi adorers of beauty – specifically, the Beloved’s mole, face,
down and tress.

592 ‘Īraqi, Divine Flashes: Translation and Introduction by William Chittick and Peter Lamborn
Wilson, p. 115.
593 ‘Īraqi, Maḡmū’e-ye ʿasār-e Faḥr ud-Din ‘Īraqi, p. 516. The author of this couplet is not known;
without attribution of authorship, the couplet is found in Abū Ḥāmid Ǧazzālī’s Ḵyāʾ-y ‘ulûm ad-
594 Ǧānlari, 63, 7.
595 Avery, LXIII, 7, p. 100.
596 Wohlleben, 63, 7, p. 123.
III.2.2.4.1 A Note on Allegorical Meanings of the Mole, Face, Down and Tress of the Beloved

The profane love poetry that was integrated into Sufi recitals would often describe the beloved’s facial features – for instance, the mole, down and hair – and their influence on the lover (or the lover’s subjective world). More often than not, the mere mention of the beloved’s hair or cheek suffices for the reader to form a mental picture of the beloved. On their heroic quests, therefore, lovers would face the arrows of coquetry from the bow of the eyebrow; endure ensnarement in the beloved’s hair – or in the noose of its curls; reach for the fountain of life of the beloved’s lip and mouth of the beloved; and much more. In this mode of articulation, the person of the beloved is conceivable only as a suggested identity.

Earlier in this chapter, I briefly traced the controversies among Sufis surrounding the turn toward adoration of human beauty and the poetic articulation of human love. In both Huḡvirī and Abū Ḥāmid Ġazzālī’s works, love poems are characterized as ‘those poems that describe the face, mole, and hair of the beloved’. The tropes of love poetry retain their recognizable form, rhetorical power and popularity from the earliest extant poems to the time of Ḥāfīz’s poetry – and even to the beginning of the twentieth century. For instance, both Ḥanẓala Bāḡisī (ninth century) and Rūdaki (tenth century) use imagery and similes found in ġazals of Ḥāfīz. Yet in the course of three centuries, the imagery that was once reserved for the description of human beauty underwent an allegorical transformation, after which Sufi poets produced a greater volume of love poetry than non-Sufi poets. Ġāmī’s account of ‘Irāqī as a young man documents this remarkable turn. If the early Sufis included the poetry of the taverns into their convents, now the direction of influence was reversed – Bahā’ ud-Dīn Multānī, ‘Irāqī’s mentor, was informed that a ġazal composed by the young ‘Irāqī in seclusion had become popular in the taverns. A relatively clear explanation of the allegorical Sufi interpretation of the metaphors of the parts of the face of the beloved (as well as other tropes of Sufi love poetry) emerges in Gulšan-i rāz, written two years after Ḥāfīz was born.

597 See §III.2.1.2 (‘Integration of Love Poetry in Sufi Recitals (samā’)).
598 See in this section the citations relevant to the footnotes 419 and 425.
600 Ġāmī, Nafaḥāt ul-uns, p. 602.
Šabistari’s *Gulšan-i rāz* was composed in 1317 in response to a list of questions posed by the renowned Sufi from Ḥurāsān, Amir Ḥusain Ḥusainī Hiravī, in a letter written in verse. Šabistari explicitly mentions that the questions were originally in verse; he cites each question from Hiravī’s letter: Lāhīghi, *Mafāṭīḥ ul-i’gāz fi šarḥ-i Gulshan-i rāz ta’līf-e Šayḥ Muḥammad Lāhīghi* az ‘orafā'-ye qarn-e nohom ba moqaddame-ye kāmel be qalam-e Keivān Sami’ī, p. 725.

Ǧāmi rightly notes that these questions provide the foundation of *Gulšan-i rāz*. The questions are designed such that a discussion of the basic principles of Sufism precedes the explanation of the allegorical meaning of the imagery of love poetry.

This allegorical interpretation takes its point of departure from a question that juxtaposes the seeker of inner intellectual content (*mard-i ma’ni*) to those who use poetic tropes of love and beauty. In a related question, Hiravī asks: ‘[w]hat does he indicate by “curl”, “down” and “mole?”’ The answer to this question will cast light on the meaning of the imagery of the face of the Beloved that Ḥāfīẓ employs in the context of describing his choice of a separation that is intended by the Beloved.

Šabistari’s answer starts as follows:

Whatsoever is seen in this visible world,  
Is a reflection from the sun of that world.  
The world is as curl, down, mole and brow,  
For everything in its own place is beautiful

Šabistari uses the metaphor of the sun (familiar to us, of course, from the Platonic tradition) to describe the communicative aspect of the One in the emanative relation between the Beloved (the totality of the face) and the world of multiplicity (the image of the face). Using the macrocosm/microcosm argument, he asserts that the world, like the human face, has many parts, each with a distinguishable form. Taken together, these parts make up the beauty of the whole. Developed by Ibn ‘Arabī and integrated into the Persian tradition of Sufi

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601 Šabistari explicitly mentions that the questions were originally in verse; he cites each question from Hiravī’s letter: Lāhīghi, *Mafāṭīḥ ul-i’gāz fi šarḥ-i Gulshan-i rāz ta’līf-e Šayḥ Muḥammad Lāhīghi* az ‘orafā'-ye qarn-e nohom ba moqaddame-ye kāmel be qalam-e Keivān Sami’ī, p. 725.

602 Ǧāmi, *Nafaḥat ul-unṣ*, p. 605. It must be mentioned that Hiravī’s Sufi mentor, according to Ǧāmi’s *Nafaḥat ul-nṣ*, was Bahā’ ud-Din Multānī (who was also ‘Irāqī’s mentor); yet Ǧāmi also mentions that other sources name Bahā’ ud-Din’s descendants as Hiravī’s mentors. See also Sami’ī’s introduction in: Lāhīghi, *Mafāṭīḥ ul-i’gāz fi šarḥ-i Gulshan-i rāz ta’līf-e Šayḥ Muḥammad Lāhīghi* az ‘orafā'-ye qarn-e nohom ba moqaddame-ye kāmel be qalam-e Keivān Sami’ī, pp. LXXV–LXXVII.

603 Shadistari, *The Gulshan Rāz of Najm ud Din, Otherwise called Sa’d ud Din Mahmud Shabistari Tabrizi*, p. 88.

604 Ibid.
love through ‘Irāqī,605 the cosmological emanative view of disclosure of the One that asserts the similarity between the microcosm and the macrocosm provides the key to the allegorical reception of these tropes of love poetry. Consistent with this cosmological image, a specific level in the hierarchical emanative structure is assigned to each part of the face.

The mole on the Beloved’s cheek (face) is described as the metaphor for the center point of absolute Oneness. Hammer-Purgstall’s translation of the following couplets is sensitive to the meaning of basīṭ, which stands for ‘being simple’ (as opposed to ‘being mixed or composed of parts’) in the Platonic tradition:

_Einfacher Punct [sic] ist in dem Angesicht das Maal,  
Der Einheit Mittelpunct, der Kreis der Vielheit Zahl,  
Aus diesem Punct geht aus der Kreis der Doppelwelt,  
Geht aus das Lineament, wodurch das Herz zerfällt._606

In his fifteenth century commentary, Lāhīği notes:

Know that the origin and the extremity of multiplicity is oneness, and the mole denotes it, for the dot of the mole due to its being dark is analogous to the dot of the Essence [ẓāī] which is the state of nullification of sense, disclosure, and cognition; this is represented by [metaphors of] darkness, while the manifest disclosures [tağallī-yi ẓuhūr] are represented by metaphors of light.607

In other words, the mole symbolizes the Beloved’s non-communicative aspect, which stands at the very center of the whole – beyond intelligibility or entification.

The cheek (that has the down grown around it) stands for of the Beloved’s communicative aspect. Lāhīği writes: ‘know that the cheek (face) connotes the divine Essence in respect to the disclosure of the multiplicity of names and attributes from It.’608 And the down, resembling the first intelligible attributes, grows around the cheek. Lāhīği writes: ‘know that just like the down grows upon the cheek, the entifications [ta‘ayyunāt] of the realm of the intelligible [‘alam-i arvāh] grow around the divine Essence [zāt-i ilāhī].’609

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605 As I showed earlier, Șabistari’s explanation of the place of humanity as the pupil of the eye of the Beloved in the reflected image of the Beloved on the macrocosmic level was influenced by Ibn ‘Arabī and ‘Irāqī.
608 Ibid., p. 587 (my translation).
609 Ibid., p. 588 (my translation).
The hierarchical relation between the curls of the hair and the down is explicitly articulated in the following couplet: ‘From the curl learn the affair of the world, | In the down read at large the “the hidden secret!’”\textsuperscript{610} On this couplet Lāhīǧī comments:

Know that by the hair the multiplicity, variety, and the scattered nature of the world are meant, and by the down of the Beloved – the nebulous mystery, that is – the growth of the down of the multiplicity on the face of the oneness is meant, which is the mediator between the absolute unseen and the absolute sensible. […] Know that the down and the hair are similar in regard to their being analogous to the multiplicity; however, since the inclusiveness of the hair is vaster, it is identified with the absolute multiplicities and entifications. And sometimes, it is reserved for the visible realm, and the down is reserved for the entifications of the spiritual (intelligible) realm\textsuperscript{611}

In the opening (\textit{matla‘}) of the only ǧazal in the Divan with husn (beauty) as its fixed rhyme, Ḥāfīż illustrates the mole, face and down in a hierarchical order corresponding to the allegorical semiology of Sufi love: ‘O Thou, whose face, moon in appearance, (is) the fresh spring – of beauty; | Whose mole and down (are), the center of grace and the circle— of beauty!’\textsuperscript{612}

\textbf{III.2.2.4.1a The Mole of the Beloved and the Eye of the Lover}

I mentioned that the mole stands for the Beloved on its most infinite non-entified level. I also pointed out that ‘Irāqī, uniting the traditions of A. Ḥazzālī and Ibn ʿArabi, holds that the Beloved has a direct presence in the lover’s faculty of appreciation of beauty – one of the fundamental principles of the Sufi adoration of beauty. Next, I examine whether this relation extends to the relation between the mole of the Beloved and the eye of the lover.

Ḥāfīż illustrates the relation between the mole of the Beloved and the eye of the lover in the following verses:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Savād-i dida-yi ǧam-dida-am ba ašk ma-šūy}  
\textit{Ki naqš-i ḥāl-i tu-am hargiz az nazar na-ravad}  
Do not with tears wash out the black of my grief-experienced eye,  
Because the reflection of your mole should never leave my sight.\textsuperscript{613}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Īn nuqṭa-yi siyāh ki āmad madār-i nūr}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{610} Shadistari, \textit{The Gulshan Rāz of Najm ud Din, Otherwise called Sa’d ud Din Mahmud Shabistari Tabrizi}, p. 94.


\textsuperscript{612} Clarke, 447, 1, p. 749. See also: Ḫānlari, 386, 1.

\textsuperscript{613} Avery, CCXIX, 3, p. 284.
As we see in these verses, the mole is mentioned in direct relation to the eye. The pupil (or insān ul-ʿayn) of the lover is repeatedly described as a reflection of the mole of the Beloved. This reflected image is repeatedly referred to as a permanent mark. Furthermore, this image of the mole is described as the source of light and sight. Early instances of these two metaphors can be found in works of Sanāʾī and ʿAṭṭār.

III.2.2.4.1b The Mole of the Beloved and the Heart of the Lover

The other pivotal principle in Sufi adoration of beauty that finds articulation in ʿIrāqi’s work is the relation between the eye and the heart of the lover. Both contain an image of the Beloved, which unites the faculty of appreciation of beauty (the eye) and the ontological ground of humanity (the heart). But the relation between the eye and the heart of the lover, I argue, is mediated by the (distinct) connection that each has to the mole of the Beloved. In the previous sub-section, I discussed the first of these connections – the connection between the mole of the Beloved and the eye of the lover. In this sub-section, I show that the heart of the lover likewise bears a connection to the Beloved’s mole.

In the two following couplets in the Divan, Ḥāfiz expresses in a cerebral manner the view that the Beloved is directly present in the heart of the lover. Ḥāfiz’s expression of this view can be elucidated by following the poetic logic that links the similes and metaphors Ḥāfiz employs to unite literary beauty with sophisticated intellectual content:

Čun làła mai mabīn u qadaḥ dar miyān-i kār
In dāg bīn ki bar dīl-i hūnīn nahādāaim
Do not see the tulip-like wine and the cup in the forefront of things.
See this brand-mark that we have impressed on our blooded heart.


615 Šud ḥāl-i ruḥ-i tu iyy nigārīn / Šūr-i dīl u nūr-i didagānām. In: Sanāʾī, Divīn, p. 937, 235, 10. In ʿAṭṭār, Maqāmī-e ye robāʿīyāt [Muhtārnamā], p. 186., we read the following quatrain:
Ḥāl-i tu ki ḡāvidān ba dū bitvān did | Bar rū-yī tu rū-yī ḡān ba dū bitvān did
Gar mardumak-i dida-yī zībāʾi nīst | Pus čūn ki hamī ḡahān ba dū bitvān did?

616 Avery, CCCLVI, 6, p. 437.
Schau nicht dauernd auf uns wie auf die Tulpe, die mitten im Treiben den Becher
(hochhält).
Dieses Brandmal schau an, das wir uns aufs blutende Herz gesetzt haben!617
Ču lála dar qadah-am rız sāqiyā māl-u mušk
Ki naqš-i ḫāl-i nigār-am namirávad zī žamīr
Boy, into my tulip-like cup pour wine and musk,
Because the image of the mole of my idol won’t leave the mind.618
Ganz wie bei der Tulpe, o Saqi, gieß Wein und ein Moschuskorn in meinen Kelch;
das Abbild vom (Schönheits-)Mal des Bildschönen geht mir nicht aus dem Sinn.619

In the first couplet above, Ḥāfiẓ compares a red tulip to a cup of wine. He then
directs our attention to the dark mark inside the tulip, which he compares to
the dark brand-mark that he believes to have on his heart. Thus, the reader is
led from the natural image of the tulip to the cerebral image of the heart with
its permanent dark brand.

In the second couplet’s first verse, Ḥāfiẓ revisits the similarity between a tulip
and a cup of wine. Seen from above, the tulip resembles a cup in which wine is
served with small, dark, grain-like pieces of musk added for fragrance.620 Ḥāfiẓ
likens the tulip and the cup of wine to his heart (žamīr), which contains the image
of the mole of the Beloved that resembles the dark marks inside the tulip and the
musk of the wine cup. While other translators translate žamīr (in the second
couplet cited above) as ‘mind’ (English) and ‘Sinn’ (German), Hammer-Purgstall’s
choice – ‘Innern’621 – comes closer to the meaning of žamīr in this poetic context.
In both instances, this mark is described as permanent: in the first example, it is a
brand-mark; and in the second, its permanence is explicitly mentioned through
its identification with the image of the mole of the Beloved.

Cast in the depth of the human heart, the image of the mole of the Beloved
is the ontological ground of the human being (žamīr). The image of the mole
also forms the pupil of the eye, which allows the human being to recognize the
unity (of the mole) in the multiplicity (of the down and tress).

III.2.2.4.2 Ḥāfiẓ’s Compromise and Its Articulations in the Imagery of the Face
of the Beloved
Having explained the state of the semiotic field in which Ḥāfiẓ employs the
tropes of love poetry, I now turn to the context in which Ḥāfiẓ voices his

617 Wohlleben, 356, 6, p. 460.
618 Avery, CCLI, 6, p. 318.
619 Wohlleben, 251, 6, p. 337.
compromise in choosing a separation willed by the Beloved. First, I return to that ġazal that contains Ḥāfiẓ’s translation of the Arabic couplet quoted by ‘Irāqi in the twenty-second Lamʿa.622 Here is Avery’s translation of the full ġazal:

[1] Welcome messenger to those who long! Deliver the message of the friend, 
So that in desire I might sacrifice the soul, in the name of the friend. 
[2] Woeful and forever distracted, like a nightingale in a cage, is 
My parrot-nature, because of yearning for the sugar and almonds of the friend. 
[3] His curls are a snare and his mole the grain in it, and I, 
In hope of a grain, have toppled into the snare of the friend. 
[4] Not till Resurrection Day morning do any leave off drunkenness, 
Who, like me, in Eternity without Beginning drank a draught from the cup of the friend. 
[5] I was telling a small part of the description of my passion, but 
I am anxious no more than this to importune the friend. 
[6] If the chance were granted, as tutty to the eyes would I apply 
The dust of the road that has been honoured by the steps of the friend. 
[7] My leaning, towards unity; his intention, separation: 
My inclination I have forgone, to achieve the purpose of the friend. 
[8] Go on burning, Ḥāfiẓ, in grief for him and put up with lack of a cure, 
Because there is no remedy for the unremitting longing for the friend.623

The ġazal begins with the poet’s welcoming of the morning wind,624 the messenger of the divine that pervades the natural world as an intermediary agent. In the second couplet, Ḥāfiẓ compares his poetic taste (ṭābʿ) to a parrot. This metaphor for Ḥāfiẓ’s poetic taste is likened to a nightingale in a cage, which is, in turn, a metaphor for the soul in the body. According to the Divan, the source of poetic taste and practice is the Beloved: just as parrots are trained to speak, so too is poetic taste developed medially by the Friend625 – the Friend’s eye (almond) and lips (sugar) develop the poet’s faculty of sight and eloquence. There is a striking correspondence between this couplet and the ġazal by ‘Irāqi that opens with an illustration of the disclosure of ‘the ray of

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622 See p. 299 above.  
623 Avery, LXIII, p. 100.  
625 During Ḥāfiẓ’s time, the trainer would speak to the parrot from behind a mirror in which the parrot would see its own image. Imitating the trainer, the parrot would think that it was imitating another parrot. Compare to: Ḥorramšāhi, Ḥāfiẓ-nāme, vol. 2: pp. 1074–1075. In the following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ describes this manner of training parrots. Here is Wohlleben’s translation: ‘Hinter einen Spiegel hat man mich wie einen Papageien gesetzt; | was der Lehrer der Urewigkeit mir vorsagte – “Sag” –, das sage ich.’ In: Wohlleben, 373, 2, p. 480.
the beauty’ of the Beloved, and which explains the influence of the Beloved on the human faculty of appreciation of beauty.626

In the third couplet, the poet describes the hair of the Beloved as a snare and the mole as the grain (bait) that attracts lovers. The image of the Beloved’s mole in the lover’s pupil and its mark in the inner part of the lover’s heart represent (in this allegorical context) the faculty that recognizes the mole of unity in the diversity of the Beloved’s hair; therefore, Ḥāfiẓ bravely steps inside the realm of the many, of which he is a part. Thus, lovers are defined by partaking in the level of diversification (the hair) that is furthest from the Infinite (although ultimately unified with it). The ultimate unity between the ineffable mole and the hair becomes clear if we consider that they are parts of one identity – the Beloved.

In the fourth couplet, Ḥāfiẓ explains his loverhood in connection with the events of pre-eternity, when humans were formed. This allusion is made through the metaphor of tasting wine from the cup of the Friend. In the fifth couplet, Hafiz expresses his longing for unity with the Beloved; however, the Beloved accuses Hafiz of being importune.

In the seventh couplet, Ḥāfiẓ announces that he will abandon his unrequited desire for union with the Beloved. The metaphors of the third couplet (the hair and mole as the snare and grain) provide the key to understanding this couplet, in which the Beloved’s hair gains its significance from the Beloved’s mole. The third and seventh couplets articulate the view of turning from direct pursuit of union with the Beloved toward an indirect adoration of Her in the multiplicity of Her hair.

The Beloved extends Her unifying Being through all Her parts. Describing Her hair, which stands for the realm furthest from the ineffable, Ḥāfiẓ employs an oxymoron to show the uninterrupted immanence of the unifying Being in the multiplicity of phenomena. He illustrates the hair in this way in the second verse of the following couplet: ‘Hidden techniques of sorcery in your sultry drunken eye, | In your disordered tress, beauty’s fixity manifest.’627 The allegory of grain and snare appears again in the same ġazal, suggesting a metonymical relevance between this oxymoron and the allegory in question: ‘Because of your tress’s snare and the grain of your mole | In the world no single bird of the heart is not left beauty’s prey.’628 In the following couplet, Ḥāfiẓ wishes to recognize that his nature is integrated into the multiplicity of the Beloved’s hair;

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626 See p. 274 above.
627 Avery, CCCLXXXVI, 2, p. 471 (my emphasis). Here, ‘disordered’ and ‘fixity’ are translations of bi-qarār (restless) and qarār (rest/composedness).
628 Avery, CCCLXXXVI, 5, p. 471 (my emphasis).
he once again uses the oxymoron of ‘assembly of dispersion’ (*mağmaʾ-i parišānī*): ‘With kindness, tranquillise Ḥāfiz’s heart, | O Thou, whose (beau-

teous) tress-coil is the *assembly-place* (perfection) of dispersion!’629 Thus, the hair of the Beloved represents the immanence of the One in the multiplicity of phenomena, which includes the lovers. This all-encompassing inclusion is voiced in the oxymoron that unites the changeable and the never-changing. In other words, the allegory of the grain (the mole, the One) and the snare (the hair, the multiplicity) is in fact another expression of the immanence of the One, which is alluded to by the oxymoron of assembly of dispersion.

In another instance in the *Divan*, Ḥāfiz again expresses his decision not to bother the Beloved with his persistent quest for unity, which (in this context) we may equate to the annihilation of his individuated self in the Beloved; rather, he opts to keep his distance: ‘No more than this will your street’s dust put up with our importunity: | O idol, you have shown kindnesses. I abate the importuning.’630 This couplet, does not seem to be an articulation of Ḥāfiz’s abandoning of loverhood; it is immediately followed by the anticipation of the difficulties that a lover ensnared in the hair of the Beloved must endure after abandoning the direct pursuit of union with the Beloved: ‘The heart stealer’s tress is the snare in the Way, and his glance, temptation’s arrow; | Remember, heart, the sundry counsels I am making yours.’631

In another instance in the *Divan*, Ḥāfiz revisits the metaphor of hair and mole:

[4] Since the tress of the holder of the heart demands the pagan girdle,
Go away, O Shaikh: the dervish gown is unlawful for our body.

[5] The bird of my spirit that was singing from Lote Tree
The grain of your mole in the end cast into snare.632

In these verses, the hair of the Beloved rejects the Sufi garment and the purity it represents. The Beloved orders the poet to move in the direction of inclusion – i.e., to go beyond the conventional confessional boundaries. Through the allegory of the mole and the hair, Ḥāfiz alludes to the story of the Fall. Metaphorically identifying with Adam, Ḥāfiz describes the story of the Fall as one in which he himself was the protagonist, since he was motivated by the desire for the mole of the Beloved. Ḥāfiz’s interpretation of the story of the Fall

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629 Clarke, 568, 13, p. 921 (my emphasis). See also: Ḥānları, 464, 11.
630 Avery, CCCXLIV, 5, p. 423.
631 Avery, CCCXLIV, 6, p. 423. Compare to Schimmel’s remark on ‘Irāqī’s 21st, 22nd, 24th *Lamʿa* p. 298 above.
632 Avery, CCCIV, 4–5, p. 378.
leaves no doubt about the significance of the hair of the Beloved; and the unity of humanity and loverhood.

The allegory of the grain and snare is, therefore, a cosmic image of the relation between the human and the ineffable One. The lover realizes that he belongs in the multiplicity, since he is an entification of the One. Furthermore, the lover realizes that, like all the entifications in the multiplicity, his (the lover’s) entification is willed by the One. As a consequence of this self-knowledge, the lover/human chooses remoteness and resides within the intended entification that loves, in a mediated manner, the mole of unity by the active presence of the image of the mole in him. This form of self-knowledge modifies the negative self-annihilation and leads to a definition of the lover that states that the lover is distant from the Beloved and resides in the realm of beloveds.

For Ḥāfīz failing to appreciate the beauty of the beloveds is a sign of a person’s ignorance of the immanence and activity of the Beloved in the beloveds and the lover. According to Ḥāfīz, the negative pursuit of union with the One springs from an egoistic impulse that is directly opposed to being a lover. Given that loverhood constitutes humanity, therefore, negative egoism appears to be a quality of the Devil. In the following couplet, the egoist is equated to both the adversary and the person who is ignorant about love: ‘Don’t tell the contentious the mysteries of love and intoxication, | So that unenlightened he may die in the pain of self-worship.’

In addition to being the ontological ground of humanity, being a lover, Ḥāfīz writes, is the only way to grasp the final purpose of existence: ‘Become a lover, otherwise the business of the world will be over, | The intended plan of being’s workshop undeciphered.’ In accordance with this view, Ḥāfīz deems erotic rejoicing in human and natural beauty a condition of appreciating the intelligible sublime beauty promised in paradise: ‘From Paradise’s fruits what relish might find | He who hasn’t bitten the apple of a darling’s chin?’ It is important to differentiate the metaphor of the apple, which represents part of the beloved’s face, from the other imagery that love poetry shares with Sufi literature. By clearly referring to ‘a darling’ and not ‘the Darling’, Ḥāfīz conveys to the reader that he is describing the desire for a human beloved. Furthermore, the poetic articulation of the poet’s desire to take a bite out of the apple (of the beloved’s chin) brings into relief the vivid,

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633 Avery, CCCXXVI, 1, p. 514.
634 Avery, CCCXXVI, 5, p. 514.
635 Este’lāmī, Ḍars-e Ḥāfīz, vol. 1: p. 634.
636 Avery, CCXXIV, 9, p. 289 (my emphasis).
erotic tone of the couplet.\textsuperscript{637} Other ġazals in the Divan leave no doubt about Ḥāfīz’s erotic longing for human beauty, which he expresses through a non-Sufi analogy – a desire to pluck the fruits of pleasure from the garden of a beloved’s beauty: ‘Were I to pick one fruit from your garden, would it matter? | Were I to see clearly by your lamp, would it matter?’\textsuperscript{638}

The interwoven adoration of sublime and natural beauty in the Divan has its roots in the recognition of the immanence of the Beloved in the belovedness of all the beloveds. This recognition is made possible through the active immanence of the Beloved in the human being – a quality that constitutes humanity. Thus, the bodily sphere gains its significance as the locus of disclosure of the One, which wills this disclosure in each instance. Moreover, the particular instantiations of the One deserve adoration and attention, since the human observer only has a limited time to appreciate the unique image of the Beloved that appears in each being.\textsuperscript{639}

Ḥāfīz’s poetic dialogue with the Sufi philosophy of love represents the peak of the poetic articulation of the views of the Sufi adorers of beauty, which were developed from Ḥāmad Ġazzālī to the time of Ḥāfīz. In a historical context dominated by radical asceticism, these Sufis charted a Sufi path of their own by embracing beauty. Balancing the body and soul (the mundane and the sublime), this view of Sufi love provided an important intellectual framework for Ḥāfīz’s Divan.

\section*{III.3 The World of Reflections in Goethe’s Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfīz}

\subsection*{III.3.1 Beauty as the Object of Pursuit}

In the previous chapters, we followed Faust’s forays into the world outside his ‘Studierzimmer’. We saw that he rejected the carefree life of Auerbachs Keller,
where beauty and love are absent. In Hexenküche, the beauty that Faust saw in the mirror became his next object of pursuit. That first experience in front of the mirror prompted Faust to reconceive his earlier world-views; he sought to explain how the sublime and sensual aspects of his love are intertwined. In the form of soliloquies, monologues and disputations with Mephisto, Faust’s attempts to construct a new world-view are reflected in his pursuit of Gretchen and Helena. I explored how these moments in Faust connect to views that Goethe expressed in other literary and theoretical works. I also referred to Herder’s Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele, which viewed aesthetic sense perception as interlaced with attaining intellectual knowledge – a view that Goethe adopted.

In the previous sub-chapter, I first explored a precedent (within the history of Sufism) for a turn toward beauty and love, despite that these views met with condemnation from orthodox and ascetic Sufis. I argued that the school of the Sufi adoration of beauty developed, over the course of four centuries, from the views and experiences of this earlier group. Furthermore, I argued that Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan is remarkably consistent with the theoretical and theosophical views of the Sufi adorers of beauty, specifically A. Ḡazzālī and ‘Irāqī, whose works contributed to the conception of loverhood that the Divan praises.

In this sub-chapter, I review several similarities and differences, discussed in the third chapter, between the respective representations of the pursuit of love and beauty in Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ.

III.3.2 The Mediated Immanence of the Infinite

In both texts, the pursuit of beauty and love emerges subsequent to a rejection of the view of Truth (as well as Beauty and the Good) as absolutely transcendent. This view is replaced by an understanding of the One as immanent, according to which the One has a mediated immanence in the multiplicity of phenomena. The world-view that emerges from this mediated immanence of the One in the multiplicity extends itself in an organic manner in its different aspects. By revisiting this theme on multiple occasions, and highlighting (each time) the connections between components of their views, Goethe and Ḥāfiẓ are able to articulate this

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640 See p. 194 above.
641 The importance of maintaining equilibrium between the sublime and sensual experience of love can be observed in Faust’s inner activity in front of the magic mirror (v. 2431; 2436–2440), as well as in his first encounter with Gretchen (§III.1.2.1).
642 See §III.2.1.1 (‘Being Moved by Beauty and Its Poetic Representation’).
entire view in their respective literary works. This technique of revisiting the same subject from different angles is more clearly present in Ḥāfiẓ’s *Divan*. But it is present in *Faust* as well; in addition to Faust’s two love stories – the two instances where Faust becomes receptive to the experience of love⁶⁴³ – we also find Faust revisiting his views on love and beauty in multiple other occasions and from different angles. After exploring the two texts separately, it becomes clear that the respective immanent world-views of *Faust* and the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ exhibit profound similarities. These views are rooted in the authors’ respective historical contexts. I have not argued that the texts contain identical elements. Rather, they resemble each other in virtue of a common intellectual theme – the turn from a transcendent world-view to an immanent one, in which beauty is conceived as the mediated immanence of the One in the world.

### III.3.3 The Communicative Aspect of the Infinite

In the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ, the One has two aspects: a self-sufficient aspect that is in itself and for itself; and a communicative aspect oriented toward the realm of multiplicity. The essence of the divine cannot be comprehended, but through its communicative aspect – its actions, disclosures and images – it moves humans to pursue love and beauty. Following A. Ḥāfiẓ differentiates between the self-referential Beauty in its essence and the communicative pleas-ance of the Beloved. He explains the One’s disclosure in the many in relation to this communicative aspect. In section III.2.2.1, I explained this aspect in reference to my previous explanation of the tradition with which Ḥāfiẓ was in dialogue.

Chiron’s distinction between ‘Schönheit’ and ‘Anmut’ is based upon the distinction between the non-communicative and communicative aspects of beauty. In section III.1.6, I argued that Goethe had a universal and cosmic conception of ‘Anmut’, according to which ‘Anmut’ is a communicative force encompassing the natural and the human realm, including the realm of art; in both of these realms, ‘Anmut’ influences humans, bringing them to rejoice in beauty. I observed the influence of this aspect of beauty in *Anmutige Gegend* and in Faust’s pursuit of Helena. But this influence appears in all instances in the drama in which Faust experiences the moving force of beauty, both natural and human, as well as the influence that his theatrical creation on the stage has on him in the scene *Rittersaal*.

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⁶⁴³ See p. 201 above.
⁶⁴⁴ See pp. 260–262; 269–270 above.
III.3.4 The World as Diversification of Attributes of the One

In both texts, the phenomenal world represents different images of the One; in its disclosures, the One instantiates itself in different aspects in the realm of multiplicity. In *Wald und Höhle*, the exalted spirit, to whom Faust addresses his thanks-giving soliloquy, is credited with begetting all natural beings, described as Faust’s brothers. This brotherhood, which cuts across species, is based on a unifying Identity that Faust recognizes in the natural realm. In the scene *Marthens Garten*, Faust introduces his divine ‘Allumfasser’ (or ‘Allerhalter’) in relation to its diversifications in attributes instantiated in natural phenomena. I also located this conception of the world in Goethe’s *Prooemion* and in the last poem of *Book of Suleika*, in *West-östlicher Divan*. Furthermore, Faust considers the human individuals to be diverse images of the divine; in Gretchen’s room, Faust refers to Gretchen as ‘Götterbild’, and Lynceus addresses Helena as ‘gottgegebene Frau’.645

In case of the reception of *Faust*, we are able to take into account the author’s experimental explorations of nature; in a reading of the *Divan* of Ḥāfīẓ, on the other hand, such a level of engagement with the examination of nature cannot yet be deemed relevant, given the absence of any extant autobiographical documents. In his comment on the verses in *Wald und Höhle* concerning Faust’s brothers in nature, Schöne draws our attention to Goethe’s comparative osteological studies and his inclusion of humans into the general category of animals.646 But we should note that Goethe’s remarkable discovery does not encompass all natural entities; it is limited to the demonstration of morphological unity among the organic beings. (Thus, it excludes entities such as wind and water.) The extended all-encompassing variation of this view that we find in *Wald und Höhle* can be traced back to Goethe’s non-experimental speculative world-views.

In the *Divan* of Ḥāfīẓ, the communicative aspect of the divine is described as the ray of Beauty of the Beloved (*partau-i ḥusn*), which discloses Itsel in countless attributes and images. I showed that Ḥāfīẓ regards the qualities that specify each phenomenon as contributing to a unique instantiation of the intelligible attributes of the Beloved disclosed through the communicative aspect of Beauty. In Ḥāfīẓ’s view, the fragrance and color of flowers; the straight growth of the cypress tree; the beauty of the narcissus; and the luminosity of the candle’s flame are all unique instantiations of attributes of the One, disclosed in

645 See §III.1.3 (‘The Articulations of Faust’s Views in the World of Inclusion’).
646 See p. 217 above.
phenomena. This view, as I demonstrated, is consistent with ‘Irāqi’s view of Love in Lamaʿāt, according to which Love’s self-disclosure begets the multiplicity of phenomena that have their ontological ground in the One.

In accordance with this immanent world-view, the metaphor of the sun also undergoes modifications. In ǧazals that engage with the world-view of adoration of beauty, Ḥāfiẓ follows ‘Irāqi in interweaving metaphors of sun and light with metaphors of wine and beauty. The sun’s influence on the world is likened to the wine’s influence on the body; the sun invigorates the world and brings forth flowers, which resemble the rosy cheek of the inebriated Beloved, drunk on the same wine that She or He passes around.

### III.3.5 The Active Presence of the One in the Human Being

An important dimension of immanent world-view in Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ is the view that the One is immanent both in the diversifications in the realm of multiplicity, and in the human faculty of recognizing the One in its diversifications. In the scene Hexenküche, I argued, Faust’s inner active role relates to the views developed in Farbenlehre regarding the physiological colors. Faust’s journey to the realm of Mothers also exhibited this activity. With regard to the Divan, we cannot refer to such intertextual aspects relevant to the study of nature; nonetheless, the intellectual aspect of Goethe’s views expressed in Farbenlehre accords with the immanent views that we also find in the Divan.

In Wald und Höhle, we find an explanation of the immanence of the One in humans that is closer to Ḥāfiẓ’s own episteme. Faust defines his faculty of appreciation of beauty and knowledge of phenomena as a gift given to him by an exalted spirit. Presenting the phenomena before Faust, this spirit gives Faust the capability to recognize them as his brothers. I demonstrated that this active immanence in Faust is what enables him to recognize all phenomena as members of his family. I referred to Goethe’s letter of January 1775 to Auguste zu Stolberg, in which Goethe describes the human being as an image of the Infinite. This image recognizes other images of the same Divine – in other

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647 See pp. 272–274 above. See also the verse cited on p. 289 above.
648 See p. 269 above.
649 See §III.2.1.2 (‘Interwoven Metaphors of Light, Wine and Beauty’).
650 See p. 281 above.
651 See pp. 198f above.
652 See pp. 202ff above.
human beings – as its brothers. This recognition accounts for the feeling of love. In *Wald und Höhle*, every entity is conceived as an image of the One, but only humans reflect an aspect of the One’s image that is capable of recognizing and loving the One in all; in his soliloquy, Faust expresses his gratitude for this gift. The active immanence of the One in the human faculty of perception enables it to recognize the Indeterminate in each instance. The epistemological component of this world-view differs from Faust’s earlier anamnestic world-view, which was rooted in an exclusive, ascending approach toward the transcendent truth.

I traced the development of the ideas of the Sufi adorers of beauty from A. Ġazzālī and Ibn ‘Arabī to ‘Irāqi, and I showed how the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ reflects these ideas. I explained in detail that the immanence of the Infinite being in humans constitutes their ontological ground as well as their faculty of recognizing the One in the many. Based on these two aspects of this immanence in humans, being human is identical with being a lover. The heart of the lover, therefore, which holds up the mirror in which the Beloved views Her or His own attributes, is the locus of this ontological ground. The significance of the eye and its relation to the heart is evident from Ḥāfiẓ’s frequent mentions of his pupil and its activity. I situated the metaphor of the pupil in the *Divan* within its larger allegorical context – namely, Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Fuṣūṣ*, ‘Irāqi’s poetic works, and Šabistari’s *Gulshan-i rāz*, which describes the phenomenal world as an image of the Beloved cast upon the mirror of non-being (*hyle*). In that image, the Beloved’s pupil represents humanity, uniquely receptive to the whole image of all the attributes of the Beloved and able to reflect on the One that is facing it – in the mirror’s reflected image, only the pupil is still a mirror. (That is why the pupil is the apple of the eye of the universe.) The inner connection between the heart and the eye shows that the human being’s appreciation of beauty and pursuit of love are the activities of the immanent image of the One, capable of recognizing that all phenomena share a likeness to the One Beloved. This active faculty also constitutes the humanity of humans and accounts for Ḥāfiẓ’s ability to perceive the divine acts of diversification in everything he perceives. This perception accounts for his constant practice of ogling (naẓar-bāzī) – literally, ‘glance-playing’ –, which makes him the eternal lover that he is.

653 See pp. 216f above.
654 See §III.2.2.1.3 (‘The Heart of the Lover: The World-Revealing Cup’) and §III.2.2.2 (‘The Inner Connection Between the Heart and the Eye of the Lover’).
655 See pp. 291f above.
656 See pp. 289–292 above.
III.3.6 Veils as the Medium of Disclosure

In the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ, Love is described as an Artist who veils Itself in order to disclose an aspect of Itself in Its diversifications. Through the active immanence of the Infinite within them, the lovers (humans) recognize this mediated, pleasing presence and explore these veils. This approach to the veil is different from that of the excluding direct pursuit of the transcendent, which seeks to lift the veil of phenomena and reveal what is limited by it. The turn from a negative, direct pursuit of the transcendent to exploring the mediated immanence of the One is based on the view that the veils are not imposed on the Infinite; rather, Its communicative aspect wills the veils as the medium of self-disclosure, just as artists limit themselves in order to articulate beauty. Thus, Ḥāfiẓ not only praises the beauty of the human and natural realms as works of art made by his Beloved; he also takes pride in his own work as a poet and minstrel, believing that his songs move the heavenly bodies and whoever else listens to them.657

Near the end of the scene Anmutige Gegend, after turning his back to the blinding sun, Faust describes the realm that he gazes upon as the realm of the most youthful of veils. He turns away from the direct pursuit of the transcendent and toward its mediated presence in the veils. Referring to an aphorism of Goethe’s, I showed that Goethe himself does not consider the veils to be limitations imposed upon the Infinite; rather, he considers them chosen in order to facilitate the disclosure of the Infinite in a specific image: ‘Wie das Unbedingte sich selbst bedingen, | Und so das Bedingte zu seines Gleichen machen kann.’658 In Suleika Nameh, I traced this form of understanding of the veils, according to which the veils are mediums of disclosure that enable the lover to recognize the One in the many and rejoice in its beauty. In the scene Rittersaal and the theatrical performance that Faust prepares for the Kaiser and his courtiers, Faust personally experiences love through the mediation of a work of art, a veil that leads him to his beloved.659

III.3.7 Abandoning the Self and Rejoicing in the Multiplicity

In the first chapter, I observed that the ultimate stage of the ascending process of exclusion toward union with the transcendent truth is conceived in both

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657 See §III.2.2.3 (‘Love as an Artist’).
658 FA I, 13: p. 60.
659 See pp. 235f above.
texts as the annihilation of the particularized self; both texts conceive of individualization and particularization as consequences of a descending process in which the transcendent truth, step by step, mixes with matter and becomes impure. In the third chapter, after the turn toward an inclusive, immanent worldview, I discussed the modified form in which the concept of abandoning the particularized self appears.

Throughout Faust’s pursuit of Gretchen, the pursuit of love and beauty took primacy over the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. But this shift toward the pursuit of beauty does not signify a fundamental break with the pursuit of knowledge. The thematic similarity between Faust’s expressed conception of love and Goethe’s metaphysical, epistemological and ethical views, as they appear in his lyrical works, testifies to this fact. The subject of abandoning the self and being moved by the pleasance of the immanence appears for the first time in Faust’s dialogue with Gretchen. In the Wald und Höhle scene, this subject is further developed, and the drama presents a specific form of self-knowledge as the first step toward recognizing the immanence in nature. In Anmutige Gegend, Faust has a passive presence throughout the night in which the holy light is returned to him. After observing the inclusion of the natural world in the light of the sun and recognizing the influence of the earth’s vivid pulses on his revival, Faust’s gaze ascends to the sun itself. Faust faces a choice: being blinded and annihilated by the light of the sun; or turning toward the realm of the light’s mediated immanence (the youthful veils) and observing the act of the light in the multiplicity of its images in the droplets of the rainbow.

Faust articulates his twofold realization concerning his self and the world through the oxymoron of ‘Wechsel-Dauer’. The sight of the rainbow pleases him; it reminds him that his self is but an image of the sun, which constantly discloses its passing images in the multiplicity of phenomena. The abandoning of the self is no longer an annihilation of the self; rather, it represents self-knowledge gained within a knowledge of the world. This self-knowledge motivates Faust to turn toward the realm of the reflected images and explore, through the direct, active presence of the Infinite in humans, the pleasance and grace (‘Anmut’) immanent in the multiplicity of phenomena.

In section I.3.5, I discussed the issue of the annihilation of the self in union with the transcendent truth with regard to the Divan of Ḥāfiẓ. In the third chapter, I traced – from A. Ğazzālī to ‘Irāqī – the modification of this issue within the immanent world-view of the Sufi adoration of beauty. Further

660 See §III.1.3 (‘The Articulations of Faust’s Views in the World of Inclusion’).
661 See §III.1.3.2 (‘Abandoning the Self’) and p. 233 above.
developing A. Ḥāzzālī’s theory, 662 ʿIrāqī asserts that the pursuit of annihilation of individual attributes is a sign of ignorance – individuals have no attributes, ʿIrāqī argues, since all attributes belong to the One. 663 The rejection of seeking annihilation in the Infinite is a compromise that one makes after attaining this knowledge. The Sufi school of adoration of Beauty expresses this thought as follows: The Beloved intends this separation and entification on both the level of the viewed (natural and human beauty) and the level of the viewer (the lover); moreover, the Beloved takes nourishment when humans (lovers) appreciate of the beauty of Her own mediated instantiations in the beloveds. The lover faces the paradox of pain and pleasure that arises from the mediated love of the Beloved in the realm of multiplicity; according to the Divan, those who do not love (the Beloved in the beloveds) are egoists – adoring their limited selves, they hinder the active immanence of Love within them, which is the basis of their humanity. Furthermore, egoists fail to realize that the final cause of Being is relevant to them – i.e., that humans are entities that adore and recognize the One Beloved in the many beauties in the natural and human spheres. 664

After explaining the historical and literary background of the Divan, I discussed a ǧazal in the Divan in which Ḥāfiẓ translates an Arabic poem quoted by ʿIrāqī in the same section of Lamaʿāt in which he elaborates on opting for a separation intended by the Beloved. 665 In the same ǧazal, Ḥāfiẓ makes use of the metaphor of the mole and tress as grain and snare, which (I argued) allegorically expresses the mediated pursuit of the Beloved in the multiplicity of beloveds. 666 I then showed that Ḥāfiẓ always employs a variation of this metaphor in the Divan when he articulates the choice of such a separation. Thus, Ḥāfiẓ’s separation must be understood in reference to ʿIrāqī’s. 667 While discussing the metaphor of the mole and tress, I argued that Ḥāfiẓ, as a lover, seeks the mole (the One) in a mediated manner – namely, by exploring the tress, which represents the realm of diversifications as images of the mole. These metaphors permeate the Divan. The immanence of the mole, as a brand or image, is active in the poet’s heart (his ontological ground) and in his eyes (his sight). By the

662 See pp. 296f above.
663 See pp. 297–299 above.
664 See p. 309 above.
665 See p. 299 above.
666 See §III.2.2.4.1 (‘A Note on Allegorical Meanings of the Mole, Face, Down and Tress of the Beloved’).
667 See §III.2.2.4.2 (‘Ḥāfiẓ’s Compromise and Its Articulations in the Imagery of the Face of the Beloved’).
activity of this image of the One in the poet, he recognizes the One in the multiplic-
ity of its images.668

Furthermore, I showed that the tress of the Beloved is described through two oxymora: ‘the assembly of dispersion’ (mağa‘ma-i parišānī) and being restless (bī-qarār) in the state of composedness (qarār, translated by Avery as ‘fix-
ity’).669 Through this rhetorical device, Ḥāfīz expresses the immanent, inclusive aspect of his world-view,670 which he owes to A. Ġazzālī and ‘Irāqī. This imma-
nent world-view encompasses four levels: the One in itself; the communicative aspect of the One; the multiplicity as diversifications and instantiations of the One; and the active immanence of the One in humans. Thus, in contrast to a world-view based on radical transcendence, which views the realm of multiplicit-
ity as polluted and a source of confusion, in Ḥāfīz’s immanent world-view, this realm becomes the object of exploration and adoration.
Conclusion

In the first chapter, I explored Faust’s wish to attain knowledge. At first glance, this wish takes the form of the desire to grasp the immanence of the divine forces that hold the world (universe) together. Yet the immanence of the transcendent divine truth in nature appears not to have deep roots in Faust’s view of the world. The constant presence of the heavenly bodies in Faust’s speculative fantasies provides the first clues about the roots of Faust’s Neoplatonic wish for ascension beyond the realm of matter. The wish for ascent – the wish to fly directly toward the heavenly bodies, as in verses 391–397, 418 and 702–705 – clearly indicates Faust’s desire to leave the earthly realm behind. The heavenly bodies are metaphors for Faust’s Neoplatonic approach to the transcendent, which prescribes ‘cleansing’ the soul and the senses of all that is mundane and material. But Faust’s excluding world-view in the early part of the drama is not shared by Goethe, whose poetic translation of the Ennead I. 6. 9 conspicuously omits one of the central elements of Plotinus’s philosophy – the process of purification. After failing to grasp the ‘Erdgeist’, Faust finds the fault in his human condition. His Platonic conception of the human condition reveals the deep roots of a negative, excluding method of attainment of knowledge. Faust’s body – the material component of his being – is the greatest obstacle on his path of ascent to knowledge.1

Vividly articulated near the end of the scene Vor dem Tor, when Faust (famously) describes himself as possessing two souls, this view of the body accords with Plotinus’s notion of ‘secondary evil’, which states that the body hinders the divine nucleus of the human being from separating itself from its corporeal component. In the scene Vor dem Tor, the sight of the setting sun kindles Faust’s desire for ascent, which Faust justifies in reference to the doctrine of anamnesis, according to which the sight of the elevated and the sublime activates an inborn memory of a home, to which one can ascend only by separating the soul from the corporeal sphere.2

In the Divan, I discussed ġazals 334 and 478 as examples of the dominance of the ascending, negative view of approaching the transcendent truth. In contrast to the pāšān style of many of Ḥāfīz’s poems, these two poems, written without irony or sarcasm, are characterized by the linear development of a single theme.3 Both poems describe the body and its desires as impediments on the ascending path toward truth, and prescribe negation and purification of the

1 V. 634–639.
2 See pp. 65ff above.
3 On the pāšān style of Ḥāfīz’s ġazals, see pp. 9f above.

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soul. Like Faust, Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan describes the heavenly bodies as the destination of ascent, and the sight of the heavenly bodies as the impetus to ascend. Anamnesis appears to be a component of this view in the Divan; Ḥāfiẓ describes his soul as a bird (a nightingale or a falcon) trapped in the cage of the body with a memory of its homeland, the source of goodness and truth. In both texts, the journey of the descended individuated soul back to its place of origin ultimately entails the elimination of the individual. But neither Faust nor the narrator of the Divan takes this radical step: in Faust, the song of the angels and childhood memories of feeling close to the divine pull Faust back from the ledge; and in the Divan, the poet conveys that he does not consider his life to be at his disposal. I argued that Ḥāfiẓ’s arguments in this case resemble those of Socrates in Phaedo. In addition, Ḥāfiẓ argues that offering one’s life to the unchanging origin of being is pointless; by definition, the unchanging realm is unaffected by the sacrifice. Thus, the human being does not ascend to the transcendent realm on the basis of merit; he does so only through mercy, which is best exemplified by Christ, who is purified from the mundane by the grace of the divine – only Masihā and whomever else the divine chooses can ascend to the most transcendent truth. In the section ‘Masihā (Christ) and the Sun’, I explained the role of mercy through the poet’s use of the sun as a metaphor for the purest extramundane object of pursuit.

In the scene Nacht, we find Faust trapped in a vicious cycle: pain leads him to seek escape in speculative fantasy, which quickly turns to disillusionment – and more pain. Eventually, Faust attempts to escape this cycle once and for all through suicide. In the Divan, this dramatic illustration of the state before change cannot be expected.

In the Divan, Ḥāfiẓ uses sarcasm and irony to refute ascetic abstraction of the sublime from the mundane. Expressions of acceptance and appreciation of the human condition in the Divan mark Ḥāfiẓ’s rejection of an excluding approach to the bodily realm. In gazal 399, we find the poetic narrator – a mouthpiece for Ḥāfiẓ himself – critique the hypocrisy of asceticism and glorify the human condition. In gazal 351, the pārsāyān are differentiated from the tāzyān through their sympathy for the human condition and ability to introduce joy into Ḥāfiẓ’s pursuit of truth. The pārsāyān bear a strong resemblance to the magi, and specifically the Pir-i Muğān, who appears as the mediating figure in the Divan, as I discussed in the second chapter of this study.

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4 Avery, XXXVII, 4–5, p. 68. See also pp. 70ff above.
5 Except for the two gazals 334 and 478.
In chapter two, I explored the shift from an excluding approach to the bodily and the natural sphere toward an embrace of life and nature. I demonstrated that the institution of knowledge that Faust criticizes in the scene Nacht is based on the practice of exclusion in accordance with the negative view of transcendence. I argued that Faust’s study excludes him from the outside world; in place of the living natural phenomena outside its walls, Faust’s study contains lifeless representations of nature as never-changing objects of exploration. Faust’s academic degrees exclude him from the realm of nature and act as subjective extensions of the walls of his study; thus, even when Faust leaves his study in the scene Vor dem Tor, he is still metaphorically trapped within it. In contrast to his descriptions of his study in the scene Nacht, Faust describes his study in Studierzimmer [I] as a hermitage in which the inner light of the extramundane source of life can be appreciated. This scene opens a window to Faust’s past. While Faust suppresses his experiences of pain, on the theatrical level, the struggling poodle casts light on the excluding function of Faust’s study.

To show Ḥāfiẓ’ s turn from an excluding world-view toward life and natural beauty, I discussed the respective representations of nature in Persian literature before and after the dominance of Sufism by comparing the poetry of Rūdaki and Manūčīhrī to Sa’dī’s ǧazals and several poems in Ḥāfiẓ’s Divan. Whereas the works of the earlier poets contain vivid illustrations of natural phenomena, the latter poets juxtapose the space of ḥalvat (solitude) to the perishable beauty of nature. This space is described as a refuge for the ideal forms of ephemeral beauty, where the wise can enjoy their liberation from the pain of perishable beauty of the world. After demonstrating the relevance of Sufi views to the concept of ḥalvat, I briefly explained several of the elements and terms of ascetic Sufism: the subjective elements of tauba (repentance) and ṭahārat (purification); and the objective elements of ḥānaqāḥ (convent) and ḥirqa (the Sufi tattered frock). With respect to the Divan, I demonstrated that the experience of nature – and specifically, spring – leads the poet to recognize an immanent, invigorating force present in all beings. I argued that Ḥāfiẓ articulates his integration into the natural sphere through an anthropomorphic analogy; he defends his inclination to enjoy natural beauty on ground that this inclination is universal. Having experienced nature, the poet uses irony to express his skepticism toward the excluding elements of the ascetic Sufi method, specifically

6 See pp. 102f above. The description of Faust’s house and the impression it makes on the new student (verses 1881–1887) are explained on p. 137 above.
7 Compare to Ḥānları, 338, 4 (explained on p. 163 above.) In Ḥānları, 414, 8, we find the same logic at work; see p. 174 above.
the notion of repentance. Alluding to the poetry of Rūdaki, Ḥāfīẓ refers to the ‘repentance-shattering spring’, whose cosmic display of immanence refutes the logic of exclusion; the poet finds it irrational to prefer solitude over celebrating the beauty of spring.⁸ Spring provides the backdrop for ḡazal 338, in which Ḥāfīẓ places his human condition above the heavenly sun; instead of wishing to ascend to the sun, Ḥāfīẓ describes descending into a bottomless sea, which he compares to a wine-house, in pursuit of the pearl of love. Again, in ḡazal 414, Ḥāfīẓ struggles to decide between inclusion and exclusion in a bizarre setting – in front of a pleasure house. He reminds the ‘youthful vintner’, who plays the role of the reproachful ascetic, that spring itself is an argument against a negative approach to truth.

In Faust, too, the arrival of spring has a significant role. Faust’s monologue in verses 903–940 extends the uninterrupted immanence of the divine to the natural and the human realms. I argued that, in this monologue, Faust modifies his view of the relation between the colors and the light of the sun in accordance with the immanent world that he envisions; he no longer views color as polluted light. It is also in the spring that Faust recognizes that his knowledge fails to grasp the dark unknown of the excluded natural realm. Based on Blumenberg’s theory of the experience of horizon, I explained Faust’s self-description of his state in verses 1064–1065 as one in which he is submerged in a sea of errors; his entire accumulated knowledge is cast into doubt.

In the Divan of Ḥāfīẓ, I showed how the poet’s inner struggles emerge from his rejection of the values that had shaped his world previously – namely, the values of ascetic Sufism and Platonism. Unable to ignore the beauty of spring, Ḥāfīẓ sarcastically attacks the theory of purification and exclusion of the natural realm; he describes the ḥānaqāḥ as a snare and a trap, rather than a fortress of spiritual and intellectual safety. Symbolically, he wishes to wash with wine the parchments filled with false knowledge. He discredits the Sufi mentors, faqīhs and muftīs as agents of the ḥānaqāḥ and madrasa, corrupt institutions in which charlatanism and hypocrisy masquerade as knowledge and self-development.

Regarding the rejection of negative world-views, another important topic of this study has been the role of mediating figures, which appear in both texts. Whereas in Faust, Faust’s process of reevaluation of his conception of mediation is dramatized in several steps,⁹ the Divan does not contain a linear representation of Ḥāfīẓ’s changing approach to mediation. On many occasions, the Divan emphasizes the

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⁸ See Ḥānlarī, 342, 1–3 and Avery’s translation on p. 161 above.
⁹ See §II.1.1.1 (‘Turn from Direct Approach to the Truth Toward Mediation’).
role of mediation in the process of turning toward an inclusive approach to the natural realm. In the case of Faust, I argued that it is necessary to differentiate between Mephisto’s deeds and intentions. Mephisto’s evil traits, I argued, must be understood in reference to the negative views of Faust’s old world and the anxieties that arose from them. This connection becomes clear when we compare Mephisto’s speeches directed to the audience (in Faust’s absence) to Wagner’s cautionary monologue at the end of the scene Vor dem Tor.\(^\text{10}\) I also discussed Mephisto’s acts of mediation, which lead Faust to leave the house that symbolizes his old way of life. Mephisto’s conflict with Faust’s house dramatizes the symbolic opposition between the mediator (Mephisto, both as poodle and person) and the excluding space (the house). Finally, Faust and Mephisto’s departure from Faust’s study at the end of Studierzimmer [II] marks Mephisto’s success as a mediator and his victory over the excluding elements of Faust’s world. In case of the Divan, Ḥāfiz’s mediating figure takes the form of Pīr-i Muğān, an eclectic fictive mentor based on theological, philosophical and Sufi views known to Ḥāfiz. The mediating figure in the Divan of Ḥāfiz contrasts to the mediating figures of both Sufis and philosophers: Ḥāfiz’s mediating figure is neither the personal mentor envisioned by the Sufis nor the anthropomorphic representation of the Active Intelligence envisioned by philosophers such as Ibn Sinā and Suhravardī. In both Faust and the Divan of Ḥāfiz, the mediating figures use paradox and oxymora to nullify the binary logic that is the basis of the process of purification. In Faust, this process begins in Studierzimmer [I] with Mephisto’s paradoxical self-presentation. In Studierzimmer [II], Mephisto actively leads Faust to partake in life and accept both pain and pleasure. Mephisto also leads Faust to abandon his self-deifying wish for death and to accept his human condition as the combination of the spiritual and material spheres (‘Tag und Nacht’) in accordance with divine will.\(^\text{11}\) In the Divan, Ḥāfiz’s mentor helps him transcend the duality of purification and pollution.\(^\text{12}\) He teaches Ḥāfiz that the human notions of good and evil are not valid from the perspective of the divine (‘ināyat’). Hence, one cannot achieve ascension by means of ascetic purification and self-mortification, since these are practices grounded in human values. In light of Ḥorramšāhī’s discussion of Īgī’s remarks on the issue of the presence of evil in the sublunary realm, I further explained that Ḥāfiz’s mentor argues that evil contributes to the totality of phenomena; as contributing parts, evil and goodness coexist in particular phenomena – but the evil part never outweighs the good part.\(^\text{13}\) Aided by his mentor, Ḥāfiz attests to

\(^\text{10}\) See pp. 109f and compare to §II.1.3.3 (‘Differentiating between Mephisto’s Intentions and Deeds’).
\(^\text{11}\) V. 1784.
\(^\text{12}\) See pp. 184ff above.
\(^\text{13}\) See pp. 182ff above.
the beauty of nature (which also contains pain) and thus abandons his excluding views.

A conspicuous difference between Faust and the Divan is that Faust challenges his mediating figure, whereas the narrator of the Divan does not. This difference can be explained in light of different genres of the two works. Faust’s struggle with Mephisto dramatizes his critique of his old world-views and his difficulty leaving his old world. In the Divan, on the other hand, the relation between Ḫāfiẓ and his mentor, Pir-i Muğân, is nurturing, rather than hostile. Pir-i Muğân educates Ḫāfiẓ intellectually and spiritually. As a pupil of Pir-i Muğân, Ḫāfiẓ articulates his critiques of ascetic exclusion through ironic self-criticism and sarcastic attacks on the institutions of the madrasa, ḡānaqāh and the intolerant morality police (muḥtasib).

In the third chapter, I explored the immanent world-views that, in both texts, replace the exclusive world views discussed above. The first consequence of the turn from an exclusive to an inclusive world-view is the increased importance of the beauty as the object of pursuit. The first decisive event in Faust’s new ‘Lebenslauf’14 is his experience of beauty in the magic mirror of the Hexenküche – this is the moment in which Faust becomes a lover. In the Divan of Ḫāfiẓ, we find the poet’s praise of beauty constantly intertwined with his sarcastic critiques of ascetic Sufi views. Moreover, Ḫāfiẓ’s poems on love and beauty justify the significance of beauty and explain the relation between the divine and the one who appreciates beauty. In Goethe’s Faust, the sublime aspect of that which is aesthetically moving is inseparable from its worldly aspect. In his pursuit of beauty and love, Faust constantly explains why the beautiful appears beautiful to him; how it affects him; and how love and beauty have their ground in the immanence of the divine. The investigations of the third chapter yield the following result: in both works, love and the appreciation of beauty are informed by an organic immanent world-view based on the constellation of (a) the world, (b) humans and (c) the divine. By repeatedly revisiting this theme from various perspectives, Goethe and Ḫāfiẓ are able to articulate different aspects of the connection among these three components of the immanent world-view. In the Divan, Ḫāfiẓ employs numerous metaphors and allegories in order to illustrate and justify the appreciation of beauty. But his use of different sets of metaphors and allegories,15 often in an interwoven

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14 V. 2071.
15 The sets of metaphors in question are those of intoxication (wine, goblet, the vintner, the wine bringer, the drunkard); the imagery of the beauty of the beloved (eye, eyebrow, mole, cheek, down, tress); and the light metaphors.
manner, presents a challenge for the reader. I discussed ġazals in which Ḥāfīẓ brings one set of metaphors (and one component of his world-view) to the foreground, while leaving others in the background. By analyzing these ġazals, as well as others in which more than one set of metaphors (and more than one component of Ḥāfīẓ’s world-view) are present, I was able to illuminate the immanent world-view that finds articulation in the *Divan*; understanding the *Divan*’s intertextual relations with other relevant texts also advanced that goal. In Goethe’s *Faust*, Faust’s soliloquies, disputations with Mephisto and conversations with Gretchen reveal Goethe’s own theories of love and beauty. Furthermore, the theme of the pursuit of love is dramatized twice in *Faust*—first in the case of Gretchen, and second in the Helena act. Gretchen’s love is further alluded to in the scenes *Hochgebirg* and *Bergschluchten*.

The core principle of the immanent world-views in the *Divan* of Ḥāfīẓ and Goethe’s *Faust* rests in the recognition that the One contains two aspects. The first aspect, the absolute essence of uniqueness, is in itself and for itself; the second aspect is oriented toward multiplicity and diversification. This second aspect is the basis of the One’s uninterrupted active immanence, which operates on two levels in both the *Divan* and *Faust*: (a) the active, mediated immanence of the One in the world as Its self-diversifications and self-disclosures through Its numerous attributes, images and reflections that instantiate beauty; and (b) the active, mediated immanence of the communicative aspect of the One in humans.

The non-communicative aspect of the divine lies beyond the reach of the intellect and aesthetic appreciation. In the *Divan*, this non-communicative aspect of the One is referred to as Ẕāt (‘the essence’). In the metaphorical imagery of love, the non-communicative aspect is represented by the mole of the Beloved, and the communicative aspect is represented by the face of the Beloved. The face of the Beloved is compared to the sun as the source of emanation. Like the sun, the face cannot be seen directly, but its mediated immanence can be appreciated in the world. I elaborated on this point in the *Divan* in reference to A. ḡazzālī’s distinction between the beauty (ḥusn) and belovedness (malāḥat) of the Beloved; I showed that this distinction appears in Ḥāfīẓ’s work. Regarding the essence of the One, I showed that Faust’s admission of the ineffability of the source of his love for Gretchen accords with Goethe’s view, expressed in *Prooemion*, that the essence of the Infinite, too, is ineffable. In his monologue praising the arrival of spring, Faust expresses the sun’s

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16 See my explanations of ġazal 147 on pp. 275–278 above, and §III.2.2.1.2 (‘Interwoven Metaphors of Light, Wine and Beauty’).
17 See my analysis of ġazal 87 §III.2.2.1 (‘Alliance of Beauty and Pleasance’).
18 See v. 3059–3065; 3433 in *Faust*. Also see p. 219 above.
willingness to diversify its light in colors and to extend its being into the multiplicity of nature. On another level, the sun’s influence also extends to human beings.\(^{19}\) The communicative act of the sun illustrates Goethe’s universal conception of ‘Anmut’, according to which the quality of ‘Anmut’ applies (universally) to nature, humans and art. The scene Anmutige Gegend dramatizes the influence of ‘Anmut’ (immanent in nature) on Faust’s body and mind; in the scene Rittersaal we observe the influence of ‘Anmut’ working within the work of art; and, finally, in Chiron’s description of Helena, the human form of ‘Anmut’ is described as having an effect on Faust.

One of the corollaries of the communicative aspect of the One is the mediated immanence that is communicated from the One to the world and that unites the One with its many reflections and images.\(^{20}\) Both texts consider the image of the One in a given phenomenon to be the ontological ground of that phenomenon. I argued that the ‘disclosure of the ray of beauty of the Beloved’ in ‘Irāqī’s poetry modifies the Neoplatonic view of the emanation of the Intellect; I also showed that Ḥāfiẓ in ġazal 148 uses the ‘disclosure of the ray of beauty’ in the same sense as ‘Irāqī does in his poem. In ġazals 87 and 148, I explained the diversification of the One in instantiations of Its attributes using ‘Irāqī’s definition of ġayrat. ‘Irāqī does not define the phenomena as entities other (ġayr) than the One (a definition that belongs to the exclusive Sufi doctrine). Rather, he defines them as many likenesses (a’yān) of the One, each of which instantiates an attribute or several attributes of the One. Thus, whereas in ascetic Sufism ġayrat is a force of exclusion, in ‘Irāqī’s Lamaʿāt it becomes a formative force that diversifies the One in the multiplicity of Its attributes.\(^{21}\) I then showed that Ḥāfiẓ grasps perceivable qualities of phenomena – the fragrance and colors of flowers, the straight growth of a cypress tree, the light of a candle – as instantiations of the attributes of the One, whose likeness (‘ayn) in a given phenomenon constitutes its ontological ground.\(^{22}\) In Faust, each entity that Faust recognizes as beautiful is conceived by Faust as an image of one indeterminate entity. Furthermore, Faust defines the influence of beauty of each image as an extension of the influence of that indeterminate entity.\(^{23}\) In the scene Marthens Garten, Faust frames his view of the divine in terms of Its

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19 V. 911–913. See §II.1.1.2.2 (‘Colorful Lives and the Sun’s Will to Animate’).
20 The component mentioned above as (a).
21 See p. 273 above.
22 See p. 274 above.
23 For instance, the image in the mirror is recognized as ‘ein himmlisch Bild’ (v. 2429) and ‘Inbegriff von allen Himmeln’ (v. 2439) and Gretchen is referred to as ‘Götterbild’ (v. 2716). See also my explanation of Faust’s reaction to the phantom of Helena on p. 206 above.
inclusion of the multiplicity; the divine is the ‘Allumfasser’ and ‘Allerhalter’, whose immanence constitutes the qualities of phenomena and enables humans to recognize the All in everything.

The immanence of the One is the ontological ground of finite phenomena; this is true of human beings as well. The image of the One that is the ontological ground of humans is at the same time the human faculty that recognizes the diversifications of the Indeterminate in Its determinate instantiations.

Both Goethe’s letter to Auguste zu Stolberg of 1775 and the scene Wald und Höhle describe recognizing natural phenomena as one’s own brethren. Through comparing these two texts, I argued that this epistemological aspect of immanence is extended from being limited to recognizing the likeness in other humans (Goethe’s letter) to an all-inclusive faculty of recognition of the likeness of the One in natural phenomena (Wald und Höhle). Faust recognizes nature as his brethren, since natural phenomena also contain an image of the divine – similar to the image that he contains. This image constitutes humanity and actively appreciates and loves the beauty of similar images. I located this epistemological immanent world-view in Herder’s Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele and argued that Herder also viewed the image of the divine as the ontological ground of the human being.\(^{24}\) The active immanence of the One in human beings has another articulation in Faust – one that can be appreciated in reference to Goethe’s view, expressed in his Farbenlehre, of the inner activity of the eye in the context of physiological colors. I showed this active immanence in Faust’s inner activity in front of the magic mirror and in his inclusion of the darkness and absolute emptiness of the abode of Mothers. The physiological component of Goethe’s immanent world-view has no direct parallel in the Divan of Häfiz. Yet, as I have argued, this component is an extension of the ontological and epistemological components of Goethe’s immanent world-view, which do find parallels in the Divan.

In my discussion of the Divan, I explained the metaphor of the world-revealing cup, and I introduced the active immanence of the One in the human heart as the faculty of recognizing the Beloved in all the beauties (beloveds) in the world.\(^{25}\) I explained this active immanence in reference to Sawāniḥ, Lamaʿāt and ġazal 178 of the Divan.\(^{26}\) I then demonstrated that the eye and the heart are intimately connected in the Divan; in many cases they appear to be almost identical. The image of the Beloved that resides in the human heart is actively present

\(^{24}\) See p. 230 above.
\(^{25}\) See §III.2.2.1.3 (‘The Heart of the Lover: The World-Revealing Cup’).
\(^{26}\) See p. 284 above.
in the eye, which recognizes the likeness of the Beloved in the multiplicity of phenomena. In my explanation of the phrase ‘mardum-i dida,’ a calque of the Arabic ‘insān ul-ʿayn’ (pupil of the eye), I argued that the image of the Beloved reflected in the pupil of the eye is a metaphor for the immanence of the One in human beings. This notion is conveyed through the word ‘ʿayn, meaning ‘essence’, ‘likeness’, and ‘the eye’. On the basis of this analysis,27 I clarified the poet’s anthropomorphic illustration of the insān ul-ʿayn (pupil) in the sixth couplet of ḡazal 385 in the Divan. Using anthropomorphism, Ḥāfiẓ tersely depicts the connection between the eye and the heart, which is the space where the Beloved is active in the lover (the human being) and recognizes Her own diversifications in the beloveds of the world.28

Whereas anamnestic epistemology defines the body as an obstacle to attaining truth, the immanent world-views that find articulation in both texts view the body as the field in which the transcendent extends its active immanence by way of images and reflections. Unlike the anamnestic wish to ascend beyond the phenomenal world, the immanent epistemology in our two texts is based on the mediated activity of the One in humans, which recognizes particulars as instantiations of the attributes of the One.

Based on the communicative aspect of the One and Its will to disclose Itself in the multiplicity of phenomena, I showed that the two texts offer similar assessments of veils. In the Divan, I explained the extension of the communicative aspect of the One in reference to ʿIrāqi’s argument in Lamaʿāt: the One, ʿIrāqi argues, cannot be limited by the finite; rather, It limits Itself, as an artist does, in the veils of the finite in order to communicate particular aspects of its Indeterminate Self. Thus, the world is a work of art, and humans are its spectators. In this context, Love is depicted as a minstrel; as a painter, constantly painting self-portraits from countless different perspectives; and as a beautifier that conveys Itself in phenomena and appreciates Itself through Its active immanence in humans (lovers). In the Divan, human art is praised in reference to the works of the divine artist. Extolling his mastery in minstrelsy and poetry in hyperbolic terms, Ḥāfiẓ describes the influence of his work on humans, heavenly bodies and angels.

In the scene Anmutige Gegend, Faust describes the landscape before him as the realm of ‘the most youthful veils’.29 I explained this phrase in reference to Goethe’s aphorism: the Indefinite willingly limits Itself in order to render finite
beings in Its likeness.\(^{30}\) I also pointed to another instance of grasping the veil as a medium of unveiling in *West-östlicher Divan* – namely, in Suleika’s ability to recognize ‘das Allgegenwärtige’ behind its ‘magical veils’.\(^{31}\)

In both works, I argued, the pursuit of unity with the transcendent that necessitates self-annihilation is replaced by the pursuit of the mediated presence of the One in the multiplicity of phenomena, and particularly in humans themselves. The emergence of this new, immanent world-view represents a compromise, which is articulated in both texts through oxymora: ‘Wechsel-Dauer’ (in *Faust*) and the ‘assembly of dispersion’ (in the *Divan*).\(^{32}\) ‘Wechsel-Dauer’ represents Faust’s self-knowledge in his realization that he is an image of the sun – a quality that he shares with other phenomena. Referring to the realm of multiplicity as the colorful reflections of the sun is a clear instance of the modification of light metaphors in accordance with the immanent world-views explained thus far. Faust’s integration in the ‘Wechsel-Dauer’ resembles Hafiz’s conception of the world as the multiplicity of likenesses of the Beloved in the *Divan*.\(^{33}\) In chapter three, I showed the modifications made to the light metaphors in *Faust*, in which Gretchen and Helena are elevated above the sun and the heavenly bodies; I demonstrated that this representation of the beloved is similar to the sun analogies in the *Divan*, specifically in Purgstall’s translation, which Goethe read.\(^{34}\)

In this study, I limited my comparison between Goethe’s *Faust* and the *Divan* of Ḥāfiẓ to the parts of *Faust* relevant to the turn from a transcendent to an immanent world-view – namely, Faust’s quests for knowledge, beauty and love. Acts four and five of *Faust*, which dramatize his colonialist reincarnation, did not fall within the scope of this study. Furthermore, my study was limited to a comparison between the two *texts*, rather than the two authors. In light of the lack of information about Ḥāfiẓ’s life, generalizing the findings of this comparative study to the two authors themselves would be purely speculative.

The detailed findings of this study provide a basis for critically evaluating Goethe’s attempts to understand the intellectual world of Ḥāfiẓ in the *Noten und Abhandlungen zum besseren Verständnis des West-östlichen Divans*; they also provide a basis for further analysis of Ḥāfiẓ’s reception in the writings of the nineteenth-century orientalists and philosophers.

\(^{30}\) See p. 235 above.
\(^{31}\) See pp. 220–221 above.
\(^{32}\) See §III.3.7 (‘Abandoning the Self and Rejoicing in the Multiplicity’).
\(^{33}\) See §III.2.2.2 (‘The Inner Connection Between the Heart and the Eye of the Lover’), and Ḥānları, 107 cited in Avery’s translation on p. 281 above.
\(^{34}\) See pp. 247–249 above.
Throughout this study of *Faust*, we encountered the concept of God-likeness (‘Gottesebenbildlichkeit’) on multiple occasions and in various forms – being the equal of gods\(^{35}\), being a god\(^{36}\), and being an image of the divine.\(^{37}\) This notion appears frequently in the *Divan*; it relates to the image of the Beloved in the mirror of the lover’s heart and the image of the Wine-Bringer in the cup. Furthermore, the frequently used metaphor of the pupil of the eye (*insān ul-ʿayn*) in the *Divan* also alludes to the concept of God-likeness.

In this study, I mentioned the importance of the concept of God-likeness to the immanent world-views of the two works. But a thorough comparison of the concept of God-likeness in the two works is a project for a future study. This future study should be carried out in reference to the two cultural contexts in question and should take into account, the theological and intellectual extensions of this Judeo-Christian notion and its Neoplatonic parallel, both of which are actively present in Sufism and thus in the cultural space of the *Divan*.

\(^{35}\) V. 500.

\(^{36}\) V. 439.

\(^{37}\) V. 516, 614, 2716.
Bibliography


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