The past ten years have seen the interest in Jainism increasing, with this previously little-known Indian religion assuming a significant place in Study of Religious. This timely collection presents original research from a cross-section of eminent scholars on varied aspects of Jaina Studies. The volume crosses disciplinary boundaries with a range of empirical and textual studies on Jainism and the Jains. Topics that are covered include the role of women in Jain society, Jaina law and property, and sectarian Jain traditions. *Studies in Jaina History and Culture* is a stimulating and representative snapshot of the current state of Jaina Studies that will interest students and academics involved in the study of religion or South Asian cultures.

**Peter Flügel** is Chair of the Centre of Jaina Studies at the Department of the Study of Religions in the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He has published extensively on the history and anthropology of contemporary Jain schools and sects, Jain stūpas, Jaina–Vaiṣṇava syncretism, and the social history of the Jain tradition. He is the editor of the *International Journal of Jain Studies* http://www.soas.ac.uk/ijjs
Jaina Studies have become an important part of the study of religion. This series provides a medium for regular scholarly exchange across disciplinary boundaries. It publishes edited collections and monographs on Jainism and the Jains.

STUDIES IN JAINA HISTORY AND CULTURE
Disputes and dialogues
Edited by Peter Flügel
STUDIES IN JAINA HISTORY AND CULTURE

Disputes and dialogues

Edited by Peter Flügel
IN MEMORY OF JULIA LESLIE (1948–2004)
CONTENTS

List of figures x
List of tables xi
List of contributors xii
Foreword xv
Preface xvi

PART I
Orthodoxy and heresy 1

1 Adda or the oldest extant dispute between Jains and heretics (Sūyagaḍa 2,6): part one 3
   WILLEM BOLLÉE

2 The later fortunes of Jamāli 33
   PAUL DUNDAS

3 The dating of the Jaina councils: do scholarly presentations reflect the traditional sources? 61
   ROYCE WILES

PART II
The question of omniscience and Jaina logic 87

4 The Jain–Mimāṃsā debate on omniscience 89
   OLLE QVARNSTRÖM

5 Why must there be an omniscient in Jainism? 107
   SIN FUJINAGA
### CONTENTS

6 Implications of the Buddhist–Jaina dispute over the fallacious example in *Nyāya-bindu* and *Nyāyāvatārā-vivṛti*  
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART III</th>
<th>Role models for women and female identity</th>
<th>155</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Restrictions and protection: female Jain renouncers</td>
<td>SHERRY E. FOHR</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Thinking collectively about Jain <em>sātis</em>: the uses of Jain <em>sāti</em> name lists</td>
<td>M. WHITNEY KELTING</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Religious practice and the creation of personhood among Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Jain women in Jaipur</td>
<td>JOSEPHINE REYNELL</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART IV</th>
<th>Sectarian movements</th>
<th>239</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Rethinking religious authority: a perspective on the followers of Śrīmad Rājacandra</td>
<td>EMMA SALTER</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 A fifteenth-century Digambar Jain mystic and his followers: Tāraṇ Tāraṇ Śvāmī and the Tāraṇ Śvāmī Panth</td>
<td>JOHN E. CORT</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Demographic trends in Jaina monasticism</td>
<td>PETER FLÜGEL</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART V</th>
<th>Property, law, and ethics</th>
<th>399</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Architectural, sculptural, and religious change: a new interpretation of the Jaina temples at Khajuraho</td>
<td>JULIA A. B. HEGEWALD</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

14  Jaina law as an unofficial legal system  419
    WERNER MENSKI

15  Ahiñsā and compassion in Jainism  438
    KRISTI L. WILEY

Index  457
| FIGURES |
|-----------------|------------------|-------|
| 10.1 Bhakti in the svādhyāya hall at Kōbā Āśram in 2000 | 244 |
| 10.2 A metal image of Śrīmad Rājacandra is processed during the inauguration of a new temple, Rājkoṭ 2002 | 248 |
| 11.1 Central shrine at Nisaījī | 284 |
| 11.2 Altar in the caityālaya in Sagar | 287 |
| 12.1 Yati Moṭī Sāgar of the A(n)cala Gaccha in Mumbaī | 318 |
| 12.2 Paraphernalia of Yati Moṭī Sāgar | 319 |
| 13.1 The small shrine attached to the rear of the Pārśvanātha Temple | 403 |
| 13.2 The Ādinātha Temple adorned with Hindu sculptures | 404 |
| 13.3 Wide cement grooves are visible between the two doorframes leading to the shrine | 409 |
| 13.4 Seated Tīrthaṅkara image with misplaced parasol inside the pradaksinā-patha | 412 |
TABLES

6.1 Sādharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa 122
6.2 Vaidharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa 124
12.1 Mūrtipūjaka sādhus and sādhvis 1987, 1990, and 1996 322
12.2 Regional distribution of Śrāmaṇa Saṅgha sādhus and sādhvis 1987, 1990, and 1996 327
12.6 Terā Panth sādhus and sādhvis 1987, 1990, 1996, and 1999 335
12.7 Initiations, deaths, departures, and total numbers of Terā Panth sādhus and sādhvis 1764–1997 336
12.8 Digambara ascetics in 2000 and 2001 355
12.9 Total number of Jaina sādhus and sādhvis 1987, 1990, and 1996 361
12.10 Total number of Jaina sādhus and sādhvis 1999 362
12.11 Percentage of sādhvis 1987–1999 364
CONTRIBUTORS

Piotr Balcerowicz is Lecturer at the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University, Poland, where he teaches Sanskrit and lectures on Indian philosophy as well as on intercultural relations and contemporary history and cultures of Asia. He organized four international conferences on Indology and is the editor of a number of Indological books. He published extensively on Indian philosophy, but also on the Middle East and Central Asia (approx. 70 papers in Polish, English, and German). He authored five books on Indian philosophy, Jainism, and history of Afghanistan.

Willem Bollée studied Classical Philology and Indology. He was a collaborator at the Critical Pali Dictionary in Copenhagen and Hamburg, Assistant Professor of Indo-European Linguistics at Münster University and, after his Habilitation, Professor of Indology at Heidelberg University. Among his books are the Kuṇālaṭātaka (1970), Studien zum Sūyagāda I–II (1977–88), Brhatkalpabhāṣya (3 vols, 1998) and The Story of Paesi (2002, 2nd edition, 2005) and many articles.

John E. Cort is Professor of Asian and Comparative Religions at Denison University in Granville, Ohio, USA. He is the author of Jains in the World: Religious Values and Ideology in India (New York: OUP, 1998) as well as several dozen articles on Jainism, and on South Asian religion, culture, and society. He also edited Open Boundaries: Jain Communities and Cultures in Indian History (Albany: SUNY, 2001), and the late Kendall W. Folkert’s Scripture and Community: Collected Essays on the Jains (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993).

Paul Dundas is Reader in Sanskrit in the School of Literatures, Languages and Cultures, University of Edinburgh. Among his extensive publications on various facets of Jainism is The Jains (second revised and expanded edition Routledge 2002; Italian translation 2005). His monograph History, Scripture and Controversy in a Medieval Jain Sect is forthcoming from Routledge.

Peter Flügel is Chair of the Centre of Jaina Studies at the Department of the Study of Religions in the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London. He has published extensively on the history and anthropology of contemporary Jain schools and sects, Jain stūpas, Jaina–Vaiṣṇava syncretism, and the social history of the Jain tradition. He is the editor of the *International Journal of Jain Studies* http://www.soas.ac.uk/ijjs

**Sherry E. Fohr** is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Converse College. She received her PhD from the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia and conducted research in India with Jain nuns with a Fulbright-Hays fellowship.

**Sin Fujinaga** is Professor of Ethics in the Minayonojo National College of Technology. He studied Jainism under the guidance of late Professor UNO Astusi, Hiroshima University and Muni Jambuvijayaji in India. He has written one book and nearly fifty papers on Jainism. Presently he serves as editor of the *Journal for Jaina Studies*.

**Julia A. B. Hegewald** is heading an interdisciplinary research group on Jainism in Karnataka at the South Asia Institute of the University of Heidelberg, Germany (Emmy Noether-Programm, DFG). She studied at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London and was Research Fellow in Indian Architecture at University College Oxford. She has published extensively on Jainism and on South Asian art and architecture.

**M. Whitney Kelting** is Assistant Professor of Religion at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts. Her book *Singing to the Jinas: Jain Laywomen, Mandal Singing and the Negotiations of Jain Devotion* (New York: OUP, 2001) examines the role of devotional singing in contemporary Jain laywomen’s theology and praxis.

**Werner Menski** is Professor of South Asian Laws at SOAS, University of London and author of several books on South Asian and Hindu law, including *Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity* (New Delhi: OUP, 2003). He first studied Jainism in Germany during the 1970s and is currently project leader of the AHRC project on “Jaina law and identity” at SOAS.


**Josephine Reynell** is a Research Associate at the International Gender Studies Centre, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. She received her PhD from the University of Cambridge.
She is also an Associate of the Centre for Jaina Studies at SOAS. She teaches anthropology for the Institute of Human Sciences at the University of Oxford and is Director of Studies for Human Sciences at Lady Margaret Hall. She has taught part-time for Oxford Brookes University and on the Women’s Studies MA at Ruskin College for mature students. She is beginning research on the Jain diaspora in the UK.

Emma Salter is Associate Lecturer with the Open University and teaches philosophy and religious studies at a sixth form college in north England. She was awarded a doctorate by Cardiff University, UK in 2003 for her ethnographic study of the devotees of Śrīmad Rājacandra. She has contributed to *The New Lion Handbook: The World’s Religions* (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2005).

Royce Wiles is currently working in the research library of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) in Kabul, Afghanistan. He is also helping with the restoration of other academic libraries in the city including the library of the Museum of Kabul. He studied Sanskrit and Jain Prakrits in Canberra with L. A. Schwarzschild and J. W. de Jong and in Pune with A. M. Ghatage.

Kristi L. Wiley is a Visiting Lecturer in the Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. She received her PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. She teaches Sanskrit and courses on religion in South Asia. She is the author of the *Historical Dictionary of Jainism* (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2004). Her research has focused on aspects of Jainism associated with *karma* theory.
This volume of essays is clear proof that the study of Jainism has assumed its rightful place in the academic study of Indian religion. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more vibrant field today in Indian religious studies than this once-neglected area. Written by scholars in North America, Europe, and Asia, the essays deal with diverse topics, ranging from the history of the Jain saṅgha, to subtle points of philosophy and doctrine; they are written by anthropologists concerned with contemporary practice and art historians who see in ancient monuments evidence of religious change. They also reflect trends both new and old: some of the essays involve a close reading of texts in a continuation of the best of nineteenth-century philology, whereas others speak a more contemporary language and deal with issues that are newer to academic debates, for example, the role of women in the religious community, defining personhood, and structures of authority. Together, the essays offer a comprehensive picture of Jainism. They allow us to see Jain studies today as a lively field that engages scholars of many different disciplines on issues that span the entire range of scholarly debates in religious studies. The next challenge for all of us will be to make use of the insights gained from scholarship on Jainism to achieve a broader understanding of Indian religions as a whole. “Jainology,” as a relative newcomer on the academic scene, can learn from “Buddhology,” its better-established older sister. There is everything to be gained by communicating between our “ologies,” and much to be lost by the creation of artificial boundaries. The study of Jainism must now be an integral part of the study of Indian religions, as the study of Indian religions must be an integral part of the academic study of religion. Volumes such as the present one will go a long way toward generating an awareness of the importance of the study of Jainism for the larger scholarly community.

Phyllis Granoff
New Haven
April 2005

Peter Flügel
London
February 2003
Part I

ORTHODOXY AND HERESY
1

ADDA OR THE OLDEST EXTANT DISPUTE BETWEEN JAINS AND HERETICS (SŪYAGAḌA 2,6)

Part one

Willem Bollée

The Sūyagaḍa is the second oldest book of the Śvetāmbara Jain canon. It has preserved in deliberately vague formulation doctrines of heterodox teachers in Mahāvīra’s times. A first English translation was made by Hermann Jacobi in 1895. The text is introduced by the Nijjutti which is not a proper commentary but an aide mémoire for the teacher in a religious class and contains basic points to be treated. The first word commentary is the cūrṇi in Prākrit followed by the ṭīkā in Sanskrit. Śilāṅka introduces this lecture with 17 Nijjutti stanzas, only the first four of which occur pratṭka-wise in Cū and are dealt with there. They commence with the nikṣepa of adda, the title of the lecture.

N 184. nāmaṃ thavaṇā addaṃ davv’-addaṃ c’eva hoi bhāv’-addaṃ / eso khalu addassa u nikkhevo cau-viho hoi //

d: V: nikkhevō cauvviho

N 185. udag’-addaṃ sār’-addaṃ chavi-y’-adda vas’-adda taha siles’-addaṃ / eyaṃ davv’-addaṃ khalu bhāvenam hoi rāg’-addaṃ //

N 186. ega-bhavie ya baddhāue ya a(b)himuhie ya nāma-goe ya / ee tiṇṇi pagārā davv’-Adde honti nāyavvā //

a: thus read with MSS in T; C: bhaviya-baddhāuya; TV: bhaviya-baddhāue; —
b: thus read with MSS in T; TV: abhimuhae

N 187. Adda-pure Adda-su(y)o nāmenaṃ Addao tti an-agāro /atto samuṭṭhiyam inaṃ ajjhayaṇaṃ Addaijaṃ ti //

N 188. kāmaṃ duvālas’-aṅgaṃ Jiṇa-vayaṇaṃ sāsayaṃ mahā-bhāgaṃ / savv’-ajjhayaṇāi tahā savv’-akkhara-saṃnvivāya ya //
N 189. taha vi ya kot attho uppa jai tammi tammi samayammi / puuva-bhanio anumao ya hoi Isibhāsiyesu jahā //

(N 184) Adda (‘wet’) can be looked upon as a designation, a figural representation, from a material and from a figural point of view: this fourfold nikṣepa of adda does exist, no doubt (khalu).

As is usual, the Nijjutti first nikṣepizes the title of the lecture, but for the details we mainly depend on Śilānka, because for the Cūṇṇi we only have C with its many textual corruptions at our disposal.

Though I do not understand Jinadāsa’s remark here, a hint can be drawn from him to the correct etymology of Addaya, namely, one born under the asterism Ārdra, as mentioned by Pāṇini (4,3,28).

(N 185) “Moist” in a material sense is moist with water (1), moist by nature (2), moist on the surface (3), oily (4) and sticky (5). Moist in a figurative sense is full of love-feeling.

Subsequently Śilānka gives the following examples for dāvv’-adda: mud (1), Gmelina arborea (?), Sochal salt and the like (2), camphor, red Āsoka etc. (3), smeared with a fatty substance (as marrow) (4) and pillars, walls etc. smeared with hard mortar (5).

(N 186) The quantity of life bound by a form of existence, the future name and the family – these are the three kinds of material adda one should know.

As to Śilānka, dravyārdra pertaining to Prince Ārdra can also be taken differently – according to Anuog § 491, that is, namely concerning a soul which immediately after returning from a heaven is reborn in the person of Ārdra-kumāra whose quantity of life, name and sex are the immaterial counterpart to dravyārdra.

(N 187) In Addapura there lived a vagrant ascetic named Addaya, the son of Adda. After him, viz. Addaya, this lecture obtained its name.

(N 188) The Jina’s word, namely, the twelve Āṅgas, indeed is everlasting and eminent, (and) so are all their lectures and all combinations of syllables.

(N 189) Nevertheless some truth appears this very moment as was said earlier and approved of in the Isibhāsiyāṁ.

As the stanza begins with taha vi ya a preceding jai vi is expected. Here apparently a stanza has dropped out which Śilānka still had before him as he glosses the words jai vi by yady api sarvam api đāmad dravyārthatah sāsvatam.

Isibhāsiyesu: the 28th lecture of this text is called Adaij’ ajjhayaṇaṁ. Besides, the Cūṇṇi on Anuog § 266 as well as Samav 23 mention our lecture and in T II 136b 7 it says tathā pūrvam apy asāv artho ‘nyam uddiśyokto ‘numataś ca bhavati Rṣibhāsītesūttarādhyanādiṣu yathā. Utt 31,16 mentions the 23 lectures of the Sūyagaḍa and Sāntisūri 616a 5 quotes Āvaśyaka-saṃgrahaṇi 36 (ĀvNHar 658a 12) enumerating the titles of the Sūy II lectures. Jinadāsa only tells us the Adda story, but does not comment on the following N stanzas.

N 190. ajj’-Addaena Gosāla-bhikkhu-bambha-vvat-ti-dāṇḍinām / jaha hatthi-tāvasāṇāṁ kahiyaṁ inamo tahā voccanām //
b: thus read m.c. for all edd.: bambhavat; – d: T: vucchaṁ
N 191. gāme Vasanta-purae Sāmaio gharāṇi-sahiō nikkhanto / bhikkhā-yariyā-diṭṭhā ohūsiya bhatta vēhāsān //

N 192. samvega-samāvanno māt bhattām caittu diya-loe / caṭūnaṁ Adda-pure Addaa-suyo Addao jāo //

N 193. pīḷ ya donha dīo pucchaṇām Abhayassa paṭṭhāve so vi / teṇāvī samma-diṭṭhi tīt hoijja padimā rahammi gayā //

N 194. daṭṭhūm sambuddho rakhtho ya āsāṇa vāhāṇa palāo / pavvāvanto dhario rajjāṁ na karei, ko anno ? //

c: thus to be corrected in Bollée 1995: 136

N 195. a-gaṇinto nikkhanto viharai padimāč đārigā-vario / su-yaraṇa-vasu-hārāo ranno kahāṇaṁ ca devē //

c: thus v.l. in Ṭ for the metrically faulty: suvaṇṇa-vasu read by VT

N 196. tam nei piyā ītse pucchaṇa kahāṇaṁ ca varaṇa-dovāre / jāṇāhi pāya-bimbaṁ āgamaṇaṁ kahāṇa niggamaṇaṁ //

N 197. padimāgaṇya-samīte sa-partvārā a-bhikkha padivayaṇaṁ / bhogā suvāṇa pucchanā suya-bādha puṇne ya niggamaṇaṁ //


d: thus read m.c. against VT and accordingly correct Bollée 1995: 136

N 199. vāe parāiittā savve vi ya saraṇam abbhuvagayā te / Addaga-sahiyā savve Jiṇa-vīra-sagāśe nikkhantā //

N 200. na dukkaram vā nara-pāsa-moṇyanṁ gayassā mattassā vanāṁmi rāyaṁ jahū u cattāvaliṇḍa tantunā su-dukkaram me paḍihaṁ moṇyanṁ

a: thus MSS in Ṭ for: naṁ; – c: all prints: vattā-

(N 190) That discussion of the monk Gosāla, the brahmin renouncer, the Tridanḍin and the elephant ascetic with the venerable Addaka I shall recount just as it happened.

Ti-dandiṇāṁ: at Ṭ II 154 b 4 Śīlāṅka holds the speaker of Sūy 2,6,46 to be an eka-dandiṇ; see my note on that stanza.

(N 191) In the village of Vasantapura, Sāmāya and his wife went forth into homelessness. Seen a-begging she was solicited (by him and therefore brought herself) to refuse food and hang herself.

Ohāsiya: Sa. *avabhāṣita (Bollée 1994, s.v.).

Bhatta vehāsaṃ: T II 137 b 7 bhakta-pratyākhyaṇa-pūrvakaṁ ātmādbandhanam akāri. Mahāvīra disapproved of violent deaths, but made an exception for hanging in extreme circumstances (Settar 1990: 16 and 22 where our reference, and its combination with terminal fasting, is not dealt with, however).

(N 192) Panic-stricken (and) subject to illusion (he renounced) food, (died and) was reborn in heaven. After ending that course he was reborn as Addaya, the son of Adda, in Addapura.

Mārt: ācāryasyānivedyāivāsa māyāvī (T II 137 b 9). After this stanza Śīlāṅka’s word commentary is silent till N 200. From N 195–199 the nījuttī’s character as a teacher’s aid of memory in a religion class becomes particularly clear. My rendering tries to mirror this style, but more than once cannot but be tentative.

(N 193) Affection between the two. Messenger. He put a question to Abhaya. In the idea that there might be a sudden comprehensive intuition (for Abhaya) a statue secretly travelled with this very (messenger).


As T II passes over these details of the statue story, he already may have read and not understood rahammī. In this word the metre requires a long second syllable.

(N 194) At (its) sight he did receive a revelation and though guarded he made off riding horses. Renouncing the world though held back, he did not rule. Who else (would)?


(N 195) Disregarding (a deity’s warning) he fled the world, but remained under a layman’s vow. (Then) he was sought in marriage by a young woman. Streams of golden gifts. Telling the king and queen.

(N 196) It was he whom her father brought her. Question and story about the way of choosing. You must recognize him by a disk on his feet/the shape of his feet. His arrival. Story. His renouncing worldly life.

(N 197) Near the man with the layman’s vow she was constantly surrounded by others. The answer. Enjoyments. A children’s question. The tying up by his son and his leaving into homelessness when (the twelve years’ period) had come to an end.

(N 198) At his return to Rāyagiha (his former guardians had become) dacoits out of fear of the king. Their story and renunciation. The dispute with a Gosāla and a Buddhist monk, a brahmin, a Tri-daṇḍin and an ascetic.

(N 199) After being besieged in a religious dispute all of Ādraka’s companions sought spiritual refuge with Mahāvīra and left worldly existence.
It is not difficult to free himself from the fetters of men for a mad elephant in the jungle, Oh king, but how to free myself from a thread turned around me as on a spindle seemed very difficult to me.

Jahā: etat tu me pratibhāti dukkaraṃ yac catatrāvalitena (!) tantunā baddhasya mama pratimocanam (Ṭ II 139 a 14). The very rare word catta, Sa. cātra probably designates the skewer in D. Schlingloff’s exemplary description of cotton manufacture in India. (Schlingloff 1974: 86)

According to Śilāṅka, in Vasantapuraka, a place in Magadha, there lived a layman named Sāmāyika who after hearing a sermon of his teacher Dharmaghoṣa renounced the world as did his wife. Once he happened to see her on his almsround and wanted her. She, however, refused and, realizing that he would pursue her in his passion, stopped taking food and eventually hanged herself. Disconcerted he, too, without telling his acārya stopped eating, died and reached heaven like she had before him. Then he was reborn as Ādraka, son of Ādraka, in Ārdrapura, whereas she obtained rebirth as a Sheth’s daughter in Vasantapura.

One day Ādraka betakes himself with an older attendant (mahattama) to King Śrenīka in order to present him as his father’s paramamitra with valuable gifts. When Ādraka hears that Śrenīka has a worthy (yogya) son, he begs his attendant to offer this Prince Abhaya, that is Ādraka Jr, presents of himself. This is done the day after the durbar in the royal palace. Abhaya kindly accepts the homage (?). When Ādraka is back home, return presents from the King arrive and from Abhaya a representation of the first Tīrthankara, the sight of which reminds Ādraka of his previous existences, inter alia, one as a deity. Not satisfied even by heavenly enjoyments, earthly ones interest him even less. His father was worried and therefore had him guarded by 500 Rājputs. Nevertheless, riding on horse-back (?) Ādraka manages to flee and subsequently renounce the world though a deity tries to prevent him and warn him of a danger.

When he reached Vasantapura and is exercising kāyotsarga under the eleventh layman’s vow he is seen by the Sheth’s daughter who wants to marry him. Then the deity rains six and a half koti of gold for the girl and prevents the king from seizing it only by letting arise snakes, etc. When wooed later she wants to be given only to that man in connection with whom there had been a gold rain and whom she will know by a foot mark (pāda-gatābhijñāna). This happens to be when Ādraka, who had continued wandering, returns after twelve years, is recognized and, pursued by the woman, remembers the deity’s warning, yet breaks his vow by an act of fate and becomes entangled with her. After the birth of a son Ādraka wants to go his way again while the woman begins to earn a living for herself and her son by spinning cotton (karpāsa-kartana). The son wraps his father up in twelve threads in order to persuade him to stay with his mother which the man then does for many years. Subsequently, Ādraka goes to Rājaγrha. Yet on his way he falls in with the 500 Rājputs who after Ādraka’s flight had not dared
return to the king and subsisted on dacoity in a jungle stronghold. Ārdraka instructs them and they become monks. On their entering the capital Gośālaka, the elephant ascetics and brahmīns are defeated in a dispute which establishes the connection with the theme of the canonical text below. When Ārdraka betakes himself to the king, an elephant tied up वाचिक्षितः sees him and wants to be freed by Ārdraka’s तेया-पध्वावः, but is destroyed (नाभिष्ठ, Cū ibid.). Ārdraka then speaks N 200 where, however, the mad jungle elephant does not fit the Cū story. In त, Ārdraka tells this episode to the king who asks him कथां तव-दर्शनातो hastि nirgalāḥ samyṛttā iti and the reply is mahān Bhagavatāḥ prabhāvah (Ṭ; II 139a 13), which also diverges from N 200.

Then follows the main text of verses in त्रिस्तुभ्स. In this metre the fifth syllable is in principle anceps, but in the Indian editions used here it is most times long, a fact I have not indicated just as I have left out the तत्त्व or substituted it by y.

The first two stanzas of the canon text are spoken by Gośālaka.

2,6,1

पुराकादम्, अद्दा, इमां सुनेहाः:
एगां-यार्त वामाने पुराऔसः
से भिक्षुः उवानेत्ता अन-ेगे
अिक्कहैं 'निम पुढो वित्ठरेणाम

a: thus J; TV: सुनेहा-म-; d: अिक्कहतिनिः, V: अिक्कहेनिः, J: अिक्कहेन्हम

HEAR, ADDA, WHAT HE [MAHĀVĪRA] DID LONG AGO:
AT FIRST HE WAS A SOLITARY MONK, THEN HE INITIATED
MANY MONKS AND NOW HE TEACHES THE DHAMMA TO
EACH OF THEM.

पुराकादम्: सर्वायं तिर्थकारायिः क्रतां पुरे-कादम् (Cū 417,6),
पुर्वम् यद अनेना भवत-तिर्थक्रतां क्रतां (Ṭ II 139 b 8 sq.).

सुनेहा: see Pi § 503 in fine. In Sanskrit, the use of the indicative pro
imperativo is restricted to the first person (Speijer 1886: 276).

Eg‘-ान्त-यार्त: the तिका� tradition uniformly reads meγांतो°. As an enjambment
of the a-पाद is out of the question and (m)e does not fit in the b-पाद nor does Śīlāṅka comment on it, we may assume a scribal error analogous with the many cases in Dasav and Utt where सुनेहा me occurs, especially at the beginning of a lecture, like at Utt 1,1 = Dasav 8,1 अंपुष्विं सुनेहा me; Utt 20,38 where सुनेही me is to be read instead of Charpentier’s मुनेही, or Utt 35,1 सुनेहा me एगमानाः (thus read m.c.). – This stanza portrays the Jain monk’s full responsibility for his destiny and control of his life, his original isolation and independence, which mirror the state of the soul as conceived by Jainism (Dundas 2002: 42 with parallels), but is also the old Buddhist ideal (Suttanipāta 35 sqq.).
An-ège: acc. masc. pl., as in Pāli. This form should be added in Pi § 435.
Āikkhai: also at Śuy 2,1,30 (cf. Pāli āikkhati, BHS āikṣati).

2.6.2
sā 'jīviyā paṭṭhaviyā 'thireṇaṁ
sabhā-gao ganao bhikkhu-majjhe
āikkhamāṇo bahu-janna-m-attham
na saṃdhayāi avareṇa puvvaṁ
d: TVJ: saṃdhayāi

THIS IS THE WAY OF LIFE ADOPTED BY AN INCONSTANT
MAN: BY GOING AMONG (OTHER) MONKS FROM HIS GANA
INTO AN ASSEMBLY AND TEACHING MASS SALVATION
HE BEHAVES DIFFERENTLY FROM THE PAST.

Ājīviyā: the use of this word by the Ājīvika Gosāla can hardly be by chance. According to Śilāṅka, Gosāla here accuses the Jains of hypocrisy respectively renunciation of principles: ‘Thinking “ordinary people do not respect a person living alone” for opportunist reasons he (Mahāvīra) has surrounded himself with many followers.’ A saying in T underpins this reproach.24

Sabhā-gao etc.: ‘to stand up in a crowd of men, surrounded by monks, and to teach his doctrines for the benefit of many people’ (Jac.) following T II 140 a 5 sabhāyāṁ gataḥ – sa-deva-manuja-parśadi vyavasthitah this being also possible. Here as in Vinaya I 5,12 we can still see traces of the Vedic reluctance (Āranyakas) to divulgate secret knowledge. – Gaṇao: gaṇaśo bahuṣo 'n-ekaśaḥ (T loc. cit.), which gaṇatas can hardly mean. Or is gaṇa(t)o a copyist’s error for gaṇaso? This remains unclear; it was left out in Jac.’s rendering.

Bahu-janna-: Pā. bahujaṇaṁ for which PED refers to bāhu- (in one idiomatic expression only). – Cū 418,2 janāya hitam janyam bahu-janāya bahu-janyam tam cārtham kathayati, T II 140 a 6 bahu-janēbhyo hitah arthe bahu-janyo ‘rthas. – Because of this adjective attham in my opinion is the object of āikkhamāṇo and not a postposition, as Jac. seems to think; but cf. stanza 4.

Saṃdhayaṭā: metrically conditioned form for which Cū 418,3 reads saṃdhayati, T II 140 a 7 saṃdhatte. For -āva- > -ā- see Pi § 165.

2.6.3
eg 'anta-m-eva-m-aduvā vi inihim,
do v'anna-m-annam na samei jamhā
puvvim ca inihim ca an-āgayam vā
eg 'anta-m-eva padisamdhayāī

(HE SHOULD LIVE) EITHER IN SOLITUDE OR (AS HE DOES) NOW, BECAUSE THESE TWO (MODES) EXCLUDE EACH OTHER.

(Adda speaks:)

HE COMBINES THE PAST WITH THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE (BY LIVING) ALONE.

c = Utt 12,32 a (with ca instead of vā and the variant puvvim ca pacchā ca tāh’eva majjhe)

Eg’-anta: yadi ekaṇta-cāritvam śobhanam, etad evātyantam kartavyam abhavisyat (Cū 418,6, similarly Ṭ). In unpolished dialogue style it is difficult to tell an adjective from a case form with no ending.25

Vi: for viy’? Unclear comments. Cū l.c. continues: uta manyase idaṁ mahā-parivāra-vṛttam sādhu(n) tad idam ādāv evācaraṇtyam āstī.

Puivim: according to Pi § 103 not corresponding to Sa. pūrvam (though the text of Sūy 1,3,4,4 reads puvam), but to Sa. *pūrvāṃ like sādharma equals Ved. sadhrīm. However, cf. BHS pūrvi m.c. for pūrve as an adjective.

2,6,4
samecca logaṁ tasa-thāvarāṇaṁ
khemām-kare samānaṁ māhaṇe vā
āikkhamāṇo vi sahassa-majjhe
eg ‘-antayaṁ sūrayāi tahacce

a: thus J and Pi § 591 for CTV: samicca

A ŚRAMANA OR BRAHMIN WHO UNDERSTANDS THE LIVING BEINGS – THE MOVING AND NON-MOVING ONES – ONE WHO MAKES (HIS FELLOW BEINGS) FEEL AT PEACE AND SECURE – TRULY SHOWS HIMSELF TO BE A MONK EVEN WHEN TEACHING AMIDST (A) THOUSAND(S).

Khemaṁ-kare: at Sūy 2,1,13 used of the rāja (Bollée 1977: 135).

Tahacce: other occurrences of this word, which is not found in PSM and APSŚK, seem restricted to Sūy 1,13,7 and 1,15,18. In the latter instance and in our place here Jac. rendered it by ‘(remaining in the same) mental disposition (as before)’, presumably following the commentaries. Cū 419,5 and Ṭ II 141 a 7 sq. explain it by tathārca equalling arcā (which in Sa. means ‘worship’ or ‘idol’ [MW]) with leśyā ‘mental disposition’ or šārtra and thus revealing their ignorance. Tahacce corresponds in meaning to Pā. tathattā and to BHS tathātva. The apparent development of -cc- < -tv- which Pischel (§§ S 281 and 299) and Roth (1983: 157) assumed was repeatedly shown improbable by Norman (1990 CP I: 12) not only for absolutives but also for caccara. In the case of tahacca I think
we have to do with a contamination of *tahatta and sacca.

2.6.5

dhammam kahantassa u n’athhi doso
khantassa dantassa jiy’-indiyassa
bhāsāē dose ya vivajjagassa
guṇe ya bhāsāya nisevagassa

a: CJ: kahentassa; – b: J: jitēndassa; – c: VTJ: bhāsāya

IT IS NO OFFENCE, WHEN A QUIET AND RESTRAINED MAN WHO IS IN CONTROL OF HIS SENSES AND DOES NOT USE SPEECH FOR NEGATIVE PURPOSES, BUT RATHER EMPLOYS IT POSITIVELY, PROFESSES HIS Dharma.

2.6.6

maha-vvae pañca aṇuvvae ya
tah’eva pañcāsava samvare ya
vira(y)iṁ iha-ssāmanīyammi panne
lavāvasakkī “samaṇe” ti bemi

c: V: puṇne (following Śilāṅka’s cty. pūrṇe)

WHO KNOWS THE FIVE MAJOR AND THE FIVE MINOR VOWS AS WELL AS THE FIVE INFLUXES AND THE WAYS TO WARD THEM OFF; WHO KNOWS THE OBSERVANCES A MONK IN THIS WORLD SHOULD KEEP; WHO PUSHES OFF (KARMIC) ATOMS, – HE IS A TRUE MONK. THUS I SAY.

d: cf. 20 d

Pañcāsava: I follow Śilāṅka (āśravān, Ṭ II 141 b 7) and Jacobi (Cū is unclear) taking ṛāsava as an acc. pl. m. -ā with m.c. shortened ending, as otherwise the second ya has no function.

Panne: Ṭ has this reading also in his text, but Śilāṅka must have read puṇne in his exemplar, for he sankritizes pūrṇe – kṛṣṇe samyame vidhātavye, but mentions prājña as a pāṭha. Jacobi translates ‘blessed (life of Śramaṇas)’ which would correspond to puṇye in Sa.; as to this he gives no explanation. In this way the sentence made up of the pādas a-c lacks a verb, which Śilāṅka supplies with prajñāpitavān and pratipāditavān, respectively, and Jacobi by ‘he teaches.’ Perhaps the commentator objected to panne, because prājñā resp. prajña (thus Cū 419,11) seems to be used only absolutely (‘wise’) resp. ifc. in Sa. and Pāli, though otherwise in the latter two languages an accusative of the object at deverbal nouns at least is known, if not as frequent as in Vedic. The appearance of
the *varia lectio* may have been caused by assimilation in the pronunciation of *a* and *u*.

*Lavāvasakkī*: see Bollée 1988: 63 note on 1,2,2,20.

2,6,7

\[\text{stödagam\, sevau\, btya-kāyam} \]
\[\text{āhāya-kammam\, taha\, itthiyāo} \]
\[\text{eg\,'-anta-cāriss\,'{	extit{i}ha\, amha\, dhamme} } \]
\[\text{tavassino\, nābhisisamei\, pāvaṃ} \]

d: J: *ṇo 'hisameti*

(Gosāla speaks:)

IN OUR FAITH NO EVIL (KARMA) ARISES FOR AN ASCETIC WHO DRINKS UNBOILED WATER, EATS SEEDS (OR) FOOD PREPARED ESPECIALLY FOR ALMS RECEIVERS, OR ENJOYS WOMEN, AS LONG AS HE LIVES ALONE IN THIS WORLD.

Āhāya-kammam: this form proves the new etymology *āghāta-karman* ‘(food) for which killing has taken place’ proposed by R. P. Jain (1983: 65 sqq.). Such food as alms has always been forbidden to Jain and Buddhist monks in so far as the animal was killed especially for them.\(^{29}\) The strict attitude concerning *ahimsā* may have accompanied the conversion of Rājputs in western India in the seventh to eighth century CE,\(^{30}\) a psychologically understandable phenomenon. Many Jains still consider themselves of Rājput origin.\(^{31}\)

Eg'-anta.: cf. Basham 1951: 115 ‘We have here a definite indication of lonely wanderers, not gathered in communities, living according to the ascetic rules laid down by Gosāla.’

Iha-\(^{-}\): after the caesura, but should belong to the preceding part of the *pāda*.

Abhisamei: *sambandham upayāti* (Ṭ II 142 a 12). In the sense of ‘to come up, appear’ *abhisamaiti* and *abhisameti* do not occur in Sa. and Pā., respectively.

2,6,8

\[\text{stödagam\, vā\, taha\, btya-kāyam} \]
\[\text{āhāya-kammam\, taha\, itthiyāo} \]
\[\text{eyājāna\, -\, padisevamāṇā} \]
\[\text{agāriṇo\, a-ssamanā\, bhavanti} \]

c: TVJ: *jāṇam*

(Adda speaks:)

(ASCETICS,) WHO USE UNBOILED WATER OR SEEDS, FOOD ESPECIALLY PREPARED FOR ALMS RECEIVERS OR WHO ENJOY WOMEN – KNOW THESE THINGS! – ARE LAYMEN, NOT MONKS.
Stôdagaṇa, etc.: with regard to this the Jains originally sided with the Ājīvīkas, as Sûy 1,3,4,1 sqq. show.

Jâna: T II 142b 1: jānti. jâna is found also in Āyâr 1,3,1,1.

2,6,9
bîyâ ya stûdaga itthiyāo
padîsevamâṇâ samanâ bhavanti
agârîṇo vi samanâ bhavantu;
sevanti ū te vi taha-ppagāram


IF (va) THOSE WHO USE SEEDS AND UNBOILED WATER, AND ENJOY WOMEN ARE MONKS, THEN ALSO LAYMEN MUST BE MONKS AS THEY, TOO, PRACTISE SUCH A REGIMEN.

Cû has a lacuna here: pratika, comment and stanza number 677 are left out. Śilânika explains: syâd etad bhavadiyaṁ matâṁ yathâ: te ekânta-cârîṇâḥ (...) katham te na tapasvîna ity etad âśântâ-yârdraka âha: yadi bijâdy-upabhogino 'pi śrâmaṇâ ity evam bhavatâbhyyupagamyate, evam tarhi (...). Though siyâ is typical for Jainism, it seems to me an early copyist's error influenced by the next stanza.

U: tu-r-avadhârâne (T II 142 b 6). A restriction, however, does not fit here, rather a reason or a confirmation. U, therefore, may stand here for va = eva.

2,6,10
je yâvi bţodaga-bhoi bhikkhû
bhikkhâm c’ihaṁ jâyai jivîy'-âţhî
te nâi-samjoga-m-avi ppaghâya
kâyôvâgā n’anta-karâ bhavanti

a: C: je yâvi stîtodagam eva (emended as: b tôdaga bhoti) bhikkhū; – b: C ca iha;
TVJ vihaṁ (T II 142b 8: bhiksâm ca); – d: J: ’nântakarâ

BESIDES, MONKS WHO USE SEEDS AND UNBOILED WATER, AND SEEKING THEIR SUSTENANCE IN THIS WORLD, GO FOR ALMSFOOD WILL REINCARNATE (AND) DO NOT SET AN END (TO SAĪMSĀRA), EVEN THOUGH GIVING UP THE CONTACT WITH / SEPARATING THEMSELVES FROM THEIR RELATIVES.

c = 21 c
B tôdaga:-°: probably read: stôdaga-. (cf. Cû 421,1).

Cû 420,14: koî namm ittho pariharatî loka-rava-bhto – bâlo vrddho vā – na dharma-yogyo vā stîr-varjâm api stîtôdaga-bhoji nāma bhikkhû bhiksâm ca iha

Bhikkhaṁ, etc.: cf. Dasav 9,1,6 jo vā visaṁ kāyai ātvīv-āṭṭhi, which passage in the same metre Śilāṅka may have had in mind when reading vihaṁ (though c and v are easily interchanged of course), but he does not comment on it and in fact it makes no sense here. Jacobi, too, passes over this word. I therefore adopted the Cū reading. – Another hint at a possible connection with the above Dasav passage is the sg. jāyai required by the metre as against jayanti. The short plural forms -bhoi bhikkhu may have contributed to jāyai.

Kāyōvagā: cf. SN II 24,26 bālo kāyassa bhedā kāy’ūpago hoti.

2,6,11
imam vayam tu tumā pāu-kuvvam
pāvāino garahasi savva(m) eva
pāvāino u pudho kiṭṭayantā
sayaṁ sayaṁ diṭṭhi karenti pāu


(Gosāla speaks:)

BUT IF YOU ADVANCE SUCH AN OPINION, YOU CATEGORICALLY REPROACH ALL WHO PROFESS A RELIGIOUS LIFE.

(Adda speaks:)

EVERY SINGLE PERSON, HOWEVER, WHO PROFESSES A RELIGIOUS LIFE, PRAISES HIS OWN PERSUASION AND MAKES IT PUBLICLY KNOWN.

Vayam: vāi corrected as vayam (Cū 421,4) resp. vācam (T II 143 a 6). For this reading there are therefore two, for the interpretation several possibilities all supposing not very satisfactory presumptions, e.g. vaiṁ requires an unfound Old Indian etymon *vāci, the -a- of which became -a- in a pretonic position (Pi § 413).\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, for Pā. vaci PED only gives Sn 472 and for the rest takes this form to be a compound form of vaco. Vāyam could also be an accusative and equal Sa. vacas, also in Pā. (Geiger/ Norman 1994: § 99), yet apparently in both middle Indo-Aryan canonical languages only the instr. of this word occurs, in Pā. also vaco ~ Amg. vao. Finally, the Amg. equivalent of Sa. vrata could be considered which, however, semantically does not fit here very well.

Pāu-kuvvam: in the canonical seniors pāu-karai is restricted to Sūy and Utt and has for objects dhhammam (Sūy 1,2,2,7 and 1,12,19), vinayam (Utt 1,1) and āyāram (Utt 11,1). Old Pāli (e.g. Sn 316 with dhhammam) is no help to our problem either and the same holds true for imam, which is acc. sg. mfn. (Pi § 430).
Pāvaiṁo: ‘philosophers’ (Jac.); pravadana-śīlā prāvādūkāh (Cū 421,7), similarly Śilāṅka. This word, as well as semantically in fact also the four preceding stanzas, must probably be connected with Āyār 1,4,2 and 3, esp. 1,4,2,6, where pāvāuyā are addressed, and with 1,4,3,2* pāvāyā and Sū 2,2,80 pāvαυyā. Schubring renders the Āyār references by ‘Widerredner’ and gives as their etymon JHS prāvādika and prāvāduka resp.; cf. Pā. pāvadati ‘to dispute’(PED). Sa. pravādin has a short first syllable and a slightly different meaning.

Pudho: cf. 1,1,3,13 cd pudho pāvāuyā savve akkhāyāro sayāṇ sayāṃ.

2,6,12
te anna-m-annassa u garahamāṇā,
akkhanti bho ! samanā māhanā ya
sao ya atthi a-sao ya n'atthi
garahāmō dīṭṭhim, na garahāmō kiṃci

a: C: thus corrected for originally: anṇamaṇṇassa tu te; – J: "assa vi garā"; –
b: J: akkhanti u samē

ŚRAMANAS AND BRĀHMANAS, SIR, CRITICIZE EACH
OTHER: THE OWN SIDE IS (RIGHT), THE OPPONENT (WRONG).
WE ONLY CENSURE A WRONG VIEW, (BUT OTHERWISE)
WE DO NOT CENSURE ANYTHING.

Akkhanti: ākhyānti (Cū 421,11), ācakṣate (Ṭ II 143 a 12). Formally, Jinādāsa is right (cf. Pi § 492), semantically there is no difference here.

Sao etc.: ‘(The truth, they say,) is all on their side [. . .]’ (Jac.). Svam ātmya-vacanam ity arthah, tasmāt sutaṃ śreyo 'sti nirvāṇam ity arthah (Cū 421,11 sq.), svata iti svakīye pakse svābhūpagaśe 'sti punyam tat-kāryam ca svargā-pavargādikam asti (Ṭ II 143 a 14 sq.). I have not found any parallels. Formally sao can equal Sa. satas as well, as is shown by 1,13,1 c (also triṣṭubh-metre): sao ya dhamma a-sao a-stām santim a-santim karissāmi pāum. – In Pā. the gen. sg. sato is not found apparently (PED, Geiger).

Garahāmō etc.: ‘But we blame only the wrong doctrines and not at all (those who entertain them)’ (Jac.)

Dīṭṭhim: at Cū 421,14 referable particularly to the Buddhists, as to which Jinādāsa may rather have had his own times in view than the past of the text. In the d pāda either the object must be supplied which is hard here or one must render the second garahāmo by ‘to call names’ and take kiṃci as a predicative attribute of the object (which, however, is missing then also) as apparently the commentators do: tān nanu kiṃca garahāmo? Jinādāsa asks and replies on Adda’s behalf: na, yathā tvam, pāpa-dṛṣṭiḥ mithyā-dṛṣṭiḥ mūḍho mūrkhāḥ a-jānako vēti (Cū 421,14) and similarly Śilāṅka: na kaṃcid (!)33 garhāmaḥ kāṇa-kunṭhōdghatāṇadi-prakāreṇa34 – Controversies abounding in invectives during religious disputes occurred not only long ago. Thus von Glasenapp
(1928: 14) wrote about Dayānand Sarasvatī, who originally was a follower of Śaṅkara and later founded the Ārya-samāj: “Mit seiner gewaltigen Stimme suchte er bei seinen endlosen Redekämpfen die Gegner niederzuschreien und sparte auch nicht mit Schimpfworten, wenn es galt, sich ihrer zu erwahren.”

2,6,13  
\[na kime n\]ü\[e\]n' abhidh\[a\]rayāmo\n\[sa-di\[t\]hi-maggam tu karemu pāum\n\[magge ime kitiē āriei\[hm\]\n\[an-uttare sap-purisehī ānjū\]

b: J: sam di\[t\]thimaggam tu karemo

BY NO MEANS DO WE CRITICIZE (A PERSON’S) PRIVATE QUALITIES, BUT WE (ONLY) PROCLAIM OUR OWN RELIGIOUS WAY. THIS WAY, THE UNEXCELLED (AND) STRAIGHT ONE, HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED BY NOBLE MEN, BY GOOD PEOPLE.

\[Na kime\] etc.: ‘We do not detract from anybody because of his personal qualities’ (Jac.). Śīlāṅka explains the opening words by \[na ka\[n\]cana śrama\[n\]ām brāhmaṇ\[a\]m vā (Ṭ II 143 b 10 sq.), cf. note on prec. stanza.

\[Rū\[v\]ena: according to Cū 422,1 apparently a physical quality by which one reviles a person is meant, ‘as when someone says to another who makes a mistake: One-eye ! Humpback ! Leper !’ or reviles him as to his origin: ‘He is doing the work of a Caṇḍāla.’ In the same way (one should not say): ‘Bloody Tridandin, damned sophist!’ What you preach here is wrong. What does the stupid Kapila think how the soul does act ?’ etc. Further, the Buddhists, too, are being abused and their doctrine of the skandhas attacked. At Ṭ II 143 b 11 the gloss on \[rū\[v\]ena is restricted to insult because of bodily parts provoking abhorrence, or caste or the (ab)use of caste marks.

\[Abhidh\[a\]rayāmo: vā\[c\]am bemi (Cū 422,7), garhanābuddhyōdghat\[t\]tayāmāmah (Ṭ II 143 b 11 sq.). The verb, which has a counterpart in Pāli and BHS, there means ‘to uphold, maintain’ (CPD) resp. ‘to support; assist’ (BHSD), in Sa. also ‘to resist’ (MW). In our passage, however, it can hardly be anything but equivalent to garahai, cf. Ved. abhibharati ‘to lay or throw upon (as a fault or blame)’ (MW); for the semantic development cf. jugupsati as a desiderative of GUP.

\[Magge\] etc.: ‘I have been told the supreme, right path by worthy, good men’ (Jac.). \[Ime\]: nom. m. sg. (Pi § 430).

\[Ariyehi\[m\]: sarva-j\[n\]ais tājya-dharma-dūra-vartibhiḥ (Ṭ II 144 a 3). According to Leumann (1921: 40) “das Beiwort edel fehlt bei Mahāvīra and others – im Gegensatz zum Buddha,” but Śīlāṅka apparently does relate it to Arhats and the same is the case, I would say, with Ayār 1,2,2,3 esa magge āriyehiṃ paveie. At SN III 4,15 ariyā are equalled to sap-purisā.
Anuttare: cf. DN II 246,6* esa maggo ujā3 maggo esa maggo an-uttaro.

2,6,14
uddham ahe yam tiriyaṃ disāsu
tasā ya je thāvara je ya pānā
bhūyābhiṣaṅkāe duguṇchamāno
no garahā vusimām kimci loe

A (PERSON) LEADING A MONK’S LIFE AND DREADING
TO HARM (OTHER) BEINGS – BEINGS THAT MOVE BEYOND,
UNDER AND HORIZONTALLY IN THE DIRECTIONS
AND SUCH AS DO NOT DO THAT – BY NO MEANS CRITICIZES
ANYTHING IN THE WORLD.

2,6,15
agantagāgārē ārāṃ ‘-āgāre
samanē u bhte na uvei vāsām
dakkhā hu santi bahave maṇussā
ūṇāirittā ya lavālavā ya

IN A HOSTEL OR HOSPICE IN A GARDEN, HOWEVER,
YOUR SOLICITOUS MONK WON’T STAY, FOR THERE ARE
MANY CLEVER PEOPLE (THERE), SOME OF WHOM ARE
TOO LITTLE COMMUNICATIVE, OTHERS TOO VOLUBLE.
Āgantasūtra etc.: the metrically wrong traditions may have been brought in from Āyār 1,8,2,3 āgantāre ārāmāgāre. Cū yields little here, but Śīlāṅka’s comment runs āgantukānām – kārpaṭikādinām agāram āgantāgārāṃ (Ṭ II 144 b 6 sq.). My conjecture restores the metre, and the compound has a counterpart in Pā. āgantukāgāra (SN IV 219,9 and V 51,24).

Uvei vāsam: vāsam upaiti (Ṭ II 144 b 8). The idiom once occurs in Pāli: tattha yo samāno vā brāhmaṇo vā vāsam upeti (SN IV 348,19), but of Buddhist monks apparently vāsam upagacchati was used (see PTC). Ṭ obviously read tattha before na. Cf. note on vs. 16 infra.

Dakkha: nipunāḥ prabhidhiṇaḥ-viśāra-viśāra (Ṭ II 144 b 9); strikingly, the Śākyas are not mentioned in first instance here.

Ūnāiritā: ‘lower or nobler men’ (Jac.). Cū 423, 6 sq. here comments kimcid āvad uṇena kecic atiriktā jattha uṇā atiriktā vā, tattha samādhi atthi (?) and Ṭ II 144 b 11 “vyūnāḥ” svato ‘vamā hīnā jaty-ādy-ātiriktā vā; tābhām parājītasya mahāmucchāyābhramśaḥ. Against Śīlāṅka’s interpretation it can be said that the monk does not belong to this world and as such stands outside the system of upper and lower classes.

Lavālava: ‘talkative or silent men’ (Jac.). Our commentators’ glosses run japa-lapa vyaktāyām vāci “lāpā-lapa” iti viśpā bhṛṣam-lapa lapālapā vā, jahā dava-davādi turītam vā gaccha gaccha vā; uktaṃ hi: “deva-devassa.” Athāpi yam evaṃ vāda-vadādi kim evaṃ lavalavesi ? (Cū 423,7 sq.); lapā – vācaalāḥ ghoṣīlaṇekātarka-vicitra-dandakāḥ tathā a-lapa – mauna-vratikā niṣṭhita-yogāḥ (!) gudikādi-yuktā vā, yad-vaśād abhidheya-viśayā vāg eva na pravartate (Ṭ II 144 b 12 sq.). Though the item mentioned last is an interesting piece of information about ascetics with a vow of silence who, if they were not completely bound by it, helped themselves by a pebble or so in their mouth ‘so that no word by which contents can be intimated was produced’ – a Jain monk would have little to fear from a silent ascetic. I would therefore like to agree with Jinādā and take lavālava in an intensive sense, in our passage also with metrically required -ā-. Lapalapa is not found in Sa.- nor is lapa, for that matter – but it does occur in Pāli. The meaning of the last line is, I believe, that the monk on the one hand can incur harm at the hands of an interlocutor who expresses himself too briefly and thus may provoke dubiosities, and on the other hand, by being washed away from his own persuasion into heresy by a flux of arguments an adversary might come up with.

2,6,16
mehaivīno sikkhiya buddhimantā
suttīhe atthehi ya nicchaya-ṇṇā
pucchimṣu mā ne an-agāra anne
ii saṅkamano na uvei tattha

b: J: nicchaya-ṇṇū; – c: J: anagāra ege

WITH THE UNEASY IDEA ‘SOME RECLUSE OR OTHER (OF THOSE WHO ARE) WISE; HAVE FINISHED THEIR TRAINING;
OBTAINED INSIGHT AND ARE WELL ACQUAINTED WITH YOUR SCRIPTURES AND THEIR MEANING MIGHT ASK ME QUESTIONS’ HE DOES NOT GO THERE.

d = 18 d

Sikkhiya: śiksītā an-egāni vyākarana-Sāmkhya-Viśeṣika-Bauddhājtvika-Nyāyādīni śāstrāni (Cū 423,9), śiksām grāhītāh śiksītāh (Ṭ II 145a 1). The final syllable of sikkhiya, handed down as short in all editions, is metrically anceps and therefore the lectio difficilior here. On this basis the form would have to be taken in an absolute sense though as such remarkable in the present context; cf. thavara in 14b, where according to the rules thavarā could be expected without prejudice to the metre.

Suttehi etc.: “sūtre” sūtra-viśaye viniścaya-jīnāḥ tathā artha viśaye ca niścaya-jīnā yathāvasthita-sūtrārtha-vedīna ity arthaḥ (Ṭ II 145a 1f.). For the loc. -hi – stated by Pi § 363 to occur only in Apabhrāṃśa – see Lüders 1952: § 220 (cf. note on vs. 22). Jacobi renders as ‘( . . . ) men, who are well versed in the sacred texts and their meaning’. Thus the monks of other denominations apparently knew the Jain sūtras so well, that Mahāvīra’s disciples did not like to enter into a discussion with them (and should not do so, Sūy 1,1,4,2; Āyār 2,3,2,17; Uvās 58 < Schubring 2000: § 163).51

Passages like these seem to corroborate Schubring’s thesis regarding the grounds for the disappearance of the Puṇḍaras.52 In the Pāli canon, however, not only the heretical doctrines are somehow discernible (as against the Sūyagaḍa – the remainder of the Puṇḍaras), but even the names of the teachers are mentioned. Furthermore, it may be asked, if only by mere accident Vaddhamāna and Gotama never met.

Pucchimsu mā: for the aorist as prohibitive tense cf. Pāli, e.g. MN I 387,22 mā maṃ etam pucchī.

Ne: in Pi § 431 and Geiger/Norman 1994: § 107 only given as acc.pl. of (e)ṇa/ṇa, but Pi § 415 mentions it also as acc. sg. of the personal pronoun of the first person, though in brackets, which may mean that he had not found the form in the texts.

Na uvei: upagacchati (Ṭ II 145a 3); cf. note ad vs. 15 supra.

(Adda speaks:)

2,6,17
no ‘kāma-kiccā na ya bāla-kiccā
rāyabhīyogena kuo bha(y)enaṁ
viyāgarejja pasīṇaṁ na vāvi
sa-kāma-kicceṇ iha āriyānaṁ

a: thus CT; VJ: nākāmakiccā; – c: VT: viyāgarejjā

HE SHOULD REPLY TO (A) QUESTION(S) OR NOT (AS THE CASE MAY BE), BUT NEITHER DO SO EAGERLY NOR
RASHLY NOR ON THE KING’S ORDERS OR BECAUSE HE IS AFRAID, YET WORTHY PEOPLE’S QUESTIONS HE SHOULD BE PLEASED TO ANSWER.

No ‘kāma⁰’: notwithstanding the uniform tradition of no ‘kāma. in Cū and Ṭ which, however, omit the avagraha, a reading nākāma⁰ can be concluded from the commentaries. I have therefore kept no, cf. Sūy 1,1,1,16.⁵³

Kuo bhayenam: ‘(nor) from fear of anybody’, which Jacobi can hardly have meant in the sense of kuo ci like the interrogative pronoun that can be used instead of the indefinite one in familiar German.⁵⁴

Viyāgarejjā: at T II 145a 12ff. several times sanskritized as vyāgrṇyād
Na vávi: T II 145a 13: na ca – nāiva.
Sa-kāma-kiccejā: sanskritized sva-kāma-kṛtyena (Ṭ II 145b 1), but as a pendant of a-kāma.⁰ in the a-pāda I would prefer sa-⁰.
Āriyānaṃ: āryānāṃ sarva-haya-dharma-dūra-vartināṃ tad-upakārāya dharma-desanāṃ vyāgrṇyād asau (Ṭ II 145b 2f.). This and the next stanza show that ā. means: fellow believers. Thereby, however, Adda recognizes Gosaḷa’s reproach as correct.

2,6,18

gantā ca tattha aduvā a-gantā
viyāgarejjā samiy’ āsu-panne
an-āriyā daṁsanao parittā
ii saṅkamāṇo na uvei tattha

a: VJ: tatthā

WHETHER HE GOES THERE OR NOT, QUICK-WITTED HE WILL GIVE CORRECT ANSWERS/EXPLANATIONS. FEARING LEST THEY BE HERETICS BECAUSE THEY HAVE TURNED AWAY FROM THE (RIGHT) BELIEF HE DOES NOT GO TO THEM.

d = 16 d

Gantā: taken by Śīlāṇka (T II 145b 4) and Jacobi to pertain to the monk’s pupils (vineya), who in my opinion are not meant here, at any rate not by Gosaḷa.

Samiy’: ‘impartially’ (Jac.), samatayā – sama-drṣṭitayā (T II 145b 6). The latter sanskritization is impossible; formally and semantically, however, samyak and samakam would do.⁵⁵ Cf. Sūy 1,2,2,6 samiyā dhammaṁ udāhare muni; Āyār 1,7,8,14 samiyā āhare muni and Sūy 1,2,2,8 pānā (….) samayām samīhiyā with samiyam uvehāe as a Cū variant and samayam tatth’ uvehāe in Āyār 1,3,3,1.

Asu-panne: ‘the wise man’ (Jac.), sarva-jña (Ṭ II 145b 6). With the exception of Āyār 1,7,1,3 (prose) I have only found references of this compound in triṣṭubh metre.⁵⁶ It seems to be absent in Pāli and Sa.
Parittā: ‘men have fallen (from...)’ (Jac.), pari – samantād itāh – gatāh prabhraṣṭāh (Ṭ II 145b 8). Paritta may be best taken as a ppp. of pra √RIC ‘leer werden’ [pwb] (to become empty), i.e. approximately ‘without’. This meaning is not attested in Sa. and Pāli.

2.6.19

panṇam jahā vanie ūday’-atthī
dyassa heum pagarei saṇgam
ta(y)-i̯vame samaṇe Nāya-putte
icc eva me hoi maḷ viyakkā


(Gosāla speaks:)

THE śramaṇa NĀYAPUTTA ACTS JUST AS A PROFIT-ORIENTED MERCHANT PROCURES GOODS FOR HIS INCOME (AND) THEREBY A KARMIC BOND/DEPENDENCE (FROM OTHERS). THIS IS MY VIEW AND OPINION.

b ÷ 21 d

Right from the start Gosāla’s attack was directed against Mahāvīra’s alleged inconsequence: the fact that he first lived alone and then decided to go into the public eye surrounded by monks and to proclaim his teaching (vss. 1–2).

Jacobi’s rendering of the first line runs: ‘As a merchant desirous of gain (shows) his wares and attracts a crowd to do business (. . .)’, which involves the assumption of a hard zeugma or a complementary verb to paṇṇam as provided by the commentaries. Prakaroti means ‘vollbringen, ausführen, bewirken, veranstalten, machen, anfertigen; s. aneignen, nehmen (dārān ein Weib)’ (pwb) as far as concerns the meanings possible here. The doctrine, which is not expressed clearly, represents Mahāvīra’s true doctrine; the asyndetically connected words paṇṇam and saṇgam share the notion of binding and form a unity of contrasts – the material and the spiritual – which their chiastic position underlines.

Paṇṇam: glossed by Śilāṅka inter alia as camphor, aloe, musk and amber.

Ūday’-atthī: cf. Pā. uday’-atthika (AṅguttaraN II 199,20) where the Jain Śākya Vappa complains to the Buddha that he is like a merchant making every effort to sell his goods yet does not realize any profit. As a disciple Mahāvīra’s he would believe himself seyyathāpi (…) puriso uday’-atthiko assa paṇṭiyam poseyya so udayaṁ e’va na labheyya. The commercial simile may be typical of the Jains and testifies to the great age of their professional activity (cf. also vs. 21).

Āyassa heum: cf. bahu-janna-m-atthāṇ in vs. 2.

Pagarei saṇgam: “saṃja saṃge” saṃjanaṁ saktir vā saṃgah (Cū 425,7; pagarei is not glossed), mahā-jana-saṇgam vidhatte (Ṭ II 146a 12). See further infra at vs. 21.
Viyakkā: in Pāli and Sa. only masc.

Nāya-putte: see note on 2,1,13 (Bollée 1977: 139) and on the Nāga tribe see Kosambi 1963: 33.

2,6,20

navaṃ na kujjā, vihuṇe purāṇam
ciccāmainī tā ya sāha evaṃ: eyāvayā bambha-vaya tī vuttā
tassoda-'atthā ‘samaṇe’ tī hemi


(Adda speaks:)

HE DOES NOT EFFECT NEW (KARMAN) AND CASTS OFF OLD (KARMAN) BY GIVING UP WRONG VIEWS. THEREFORE (sa) THE SAINT SPOKE ACCORDINGLY: IN THIS RESPECT THEY ARE CALLED MEN OF EXCELLENT VOWS. “ONLY HE WHO STRIVES AT THIS GAIN IS A MONK.” THUS I SAY.

Navaṃ etc.: here Cū 425,12f. quotes DasavN 383 (…) nāṇī navaṃ na bandhai.59

Vihuṇe: vidhāṇayati – apanayati (Ṭ II 146b 3).

Tā(y)i: apparently connected by Jinadāsa with √ TR: tīrṇo vi parān tāretīti (Cū 425,11f.). Silāṅka, however, glosses trāyīḥ – Bhagavān sarvasya paritrāṇa-śīlo (…) tāyī vā mokṣam prati; aya-vaya-maya-payaya-caya-t a y a-naya gatāv ity asya rūpaṃ.60 Jacobi (‘who protects others’) follows the latter and renders tāyī by ‘saviour’, but Schubring first started from tvāgīnah (Schubring 1926: 133 note 7; 2004: 2b 1f.), and later (Dasaveyāli, Isibhasiyāṁ) changed his mind in favour of trāyin (see Alsdorf 1965: 5). The etymological identity of tāniḥ, Pāli tādin and Sa. tādrś can be proved by Utt 23,10 gunavantāṇa tāinam and Petavatthu gunavantesu tādisu. See further Roth 1968: 46ff.

Sa eva – Bhagavān eva – āha, yathā vimati-parityāgena mokṣa-gamana – śīlo bhavati (Ṭ II 146b 5ff.).

Eyāvayā etc.: ‘Herein is contained the vow (leading to) Brahman (i.e. Mokṣa)’ (Jac.). Etāvato (Cū 426,1), etāvataḥ samdarbhena (Ṭ II 146b 6).

Bambha-vaya: brahmaṇaḥ padam brahma-padam vā brahma-vratam vā (Cū 426,1), brahmaṇa – mokṣasya vratam brahma-vratam (Ṭ, l.c.). Though the first explanation can also be defended – brahma-pada occurs in Sa. ‘Brahmas Stätte’ (PWB), here perhaps in the sense of ‘excellent way’.61 Pada is used in Pāli as a synonym of patha (PED, s.v.) – I consider the second one more probable. The word occurs also with -vv-, e.g. Mahānīsibhā 1794. – Cf. also Ayār 2,16,2 an-anta-samaya, for which see Bollée 1990: 32.

Tassa etc.: ‘this is the gain which a Śramaṇa is desirous of. Thus I say’ (Jac.).

WILLEM BOLLÉE
2,6,21

\[\text{samārabhāte vaniyā bhūya-gāman} \]
pariggahāṃ c’eva mamāyamānā 
tei nāi-sanjoga-m-avi ppahāya 
āyassa heum pagaranti saṅgaṃ
da: C: samārabhante hi vaniyā; – b: J: mamāyamānā; – d: J: pakarenti

MERCHANTS KILL MANY LIVING BEINGS AND EVEN THOUGH GIVING UP THE CONTACT WITH / SEPARATING THEMSELVES FROM THEIR RELATIVES THEY ACQUIRE PROPERTY; (IN DOING SO) THEY TAKE UP A (KARMATIC) BOND MERELY FOR THE SAKE OF MATERIAL GAIN.

b: cf. Āyār 1,2,5,3 where between pariggahāṃ and a-mamāyamānē the metre requires a short syllable like tu or ca; – c = 10 c; – d = 19 b

Arabhāte, etc.: Jacobi takes this form as a sg. and renders ‘a merchant kills (. . .)’. On account of their business activities with many waggons, draught-animals and camels merchants kill living beings.\(^{62}\)

Pariggahāṃ: du-padaṃ\(^{63}\) caup-padaṃ dhanam dhanaṃ-hiranaṇa-suvanā(d)i (Cū 426,4, similarly T). Sustaining a family compels the laymen to strive for property.

Pagaranti saṅgaṃ: bhṛṣaṃ kareṇti prakarenti; saktiṃ saṅgaṃ (thus read in stead of samyam, Cū 426,7), sambandhaṃ kurvanti (T II 146 b 12). Cf. Āyār 1,1,7,6 ārambhā-sattā pakarenti saṅgam ‘(….those are involved in sin who . . .) and engaging in acts, are addicted to worldliness’ (Jac.), ‘….der Betätigung ergeben wirken sie Verknüpfung [mit der Welt]’ (Schubring 1926: 72; 2004: 83).

2,6,22

\[\text{vitt’-esiṇo mehuṇa-sampagūḍhā} \]
te bhoyan’-aṭṭhā vaniyā vayanti, 
vayaṃ tu kāmesu ajjhovavannā 
aṇ-āriyā pema-rasesu giddhā

PROPERTY-MINDED AND ENGAGING IN SEXUAL RELATIONS THESE MERCHANTS SAY (THEY BEHAVE THUS) TO EARN THEIR LIVING (or: WANDER AROUND FOR PLEASURE). WE, HOWEVER, (BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE) GIVEN TO THE PLEASURES OF THE SENSES, NOT (SERIOUS) BELIEVERS (AND) LUSTFUL.

Mehuṇa\(^{a}\): why this and pema-rasesu giddhā should be particularly characteristics of merchants is not clear. Does vaniyā in fact stands for (Jain) laymen? Then the reason why these characteristics are mentioned here would become understandable for many souls are destroyed in sexual intercourse.\(^{54}\) Chiastically as to the a-pāda here property and disregard for living beings are taken up once more in vs. 23 a.
Jinadāsa then admonishes those who live in that way by means of several quotations citing the first: šiśnōdāra-krte, Pārtha! (426,9f.) in Cū 86,7f. ad Āyār 1,2,5,5, introduced by bhaniyām ca loge vi ād and completed as follows: prthivīm jetum icchasi / jaya šiśnōdaram, Pārtha! tatas te prthivī jitā. The first pāda reminds us of Mbh (cr. ed.) 1,164,13 b p. j. icchatā and the last one of Mbh 5,148,4 a tatas te prthivī-pālāḥ.

Vayanti: vrajanti (Cū 426,8), to which Śīlāṇka adds: vadanti vā (Ṭ II 147a 1), perhaps because Āyār 1,1,7,6 ārambhamāṇā viṇayaṃ vayanti / chandōvantīyā ā ajhovavannā / ārambahā-sattā pakarenti saṅgaṃ.

2,6,23
ārambhagyāṃ c’eva parigghaṃ ca
a-viussiyā nibhiyā āya-daṃḍā
tesiṃ ca se udae, jaṃ vayāṣī,
caur’-ant’ an-antāya duhāya, nēha

THEY NEITHER GIVE UP KILLING NOR PROPERTY,
BUT STICK TO IT. THEY ARE INCONSIDERATE, BUT THEIR
GAIN WHICH YOU MENTIONED (WILL SERVE) THEM ONLY
TO ENDLESS DISTRESS IN THE (WHOLE) SQUARE (WORLD),
NOT ONLY HERE.

A-viussiyā: ‘they do not abstain from (. . .)’ (Jac.), avosirium (Cū 427,1), a-vyutṣṛjya – a-parityajya (Ṭ II 147a 4). If anywhere, it is with this rare form that the occasional parallelism of verse numbers is remarkable, in this case 1,1,2,23 je u tattha viussanti, saṃsāraṃ te viussiyā,65 where I should now like to translate: ‘wer damit aber aufhört, beendet für sich den Saṃsāra’. Cf. also Theragāthā 784 a-vyosita.66

Nissiyā: for this form cf. sikkhiyā in vs. 16.
Āya-daṃḍā: see my comment at 1,2,3,9 (Bollée 1988: 75f.).
Vayāṣṭ: according to Pi § 516 = avāḍḥ, but cf. Pāli avacāsi (Geiger/Norman 1994, § 165.1); vayāṣṭ points to vs. 19.
Caur’-ant’: for this notion see Schubring 2000: § 103. Jacobi translates the second line as: ‘and their gain of which you spoke, will be the endless Circle of Births and pains manifold’. Perhaps he wanted to read: -antā ya duḥḥā ya.

Nēha: Jacobi here remarks: “Nehā or nedhā. According to Śīlāṇka it is na iha: ‘not even here (do they find the profit they seek)’. I think it maybe the Prākṛt equivalent of anekadāḥ or it could stand for snehāḥ, in which case the meaning would be: love’s (reward will be) pain”. Faute de mieux I have followed the commentator, as Jacobi did not convince me.

2,6,24
n’-egant’-an-accantiyā udae so
vayanti te do vi guṇōdayaṃmi.
se ūdae sāı-m-ananta-patte
tam ūdayaṇi sāhae tái nāt


THIS GAIN OF THEIRS IS UNCERTAIN AND NOT WITHOUT AN END. THEY EXPERIENCE (THESE) QUALITIES, BOTH OF THEM, (ONLY) IN THE BEGINNING. THE GAIN ACQUIRED THROUGH HIM (i.e. MAHĀVĪRA), HOWEVER, HAS A BEGINNING, BUT NO END. THE SAINT (AND) GUIDE/NĀYA GIVES AWAY HIS GAIN.

N’egant’: n’eganti n’accanti ity ādi, ekāntena bhavatity ekāntikaḥ (…) ātyantikāḥ sarva-kāla-bhāvī (Ṭ II 147a 9f.). For the seventh syllable -a see vs. 16 (sikkhiya).

Vayanti etc.: (…) tad-vido vadanti tau ca dvāv api bhāvau vigata-guṇōdayau bhavataḥ (Ṭ II 147a 11; similarly Cū 427, 5 f. where guṇa is glossed pagāra). Jacobi saw that this interpretation cannot be correct, yet to read guṇe ‘dayammi, as he does, is not necessary for guṇa° can represent guṇa + ū. or guṇ’ū°. The a-pāda, too, reads odae for ūdae. Vayanti ~ vrajanti, as in vs. 22.

Se ūdae: put chiastically and thus in a certain contrast with ūdae so.

Sāhaye etc.: ‘the saviour and sage shares his profit (with others)’ (Jac.). Sāhaye: ākhyāti silāhati (Cū 427,7), kathayati śāghate vā (Ṭ II 147a 14). As to the form, sāhaye (thus to be read m.c.) can correspond to śāghate or śāghayati as well as to sādhave or sādhayati. The verb last mentioned has many meanings, inter alia, ‘to grant, bestow, yield’ [MW] and these appeared better to me.

Tāi nāt: nātiti jñāthī kult (Cū 427, 8), jñātī jñātāḥ kṣatriyā jñātam vā vastujātām vidyate yasya sa jñāti, vidita-samasta-vedya ity arthah (Ṭ II 147b 2f.). Though his gloss is otherwise wrong yet Śilānka makes us suppose that we might read Nāe and consider this to be short for Nāyaputte, cf. Dasav 6,21 na so parīggaho vutto Nāyaputtena tāiṇā. Nevertheless I would prefer to take nāe ~ Pāli nāgo ~ Sa. nāyakah, as in Suttanipāta 522 (…)vimutto nāgo tādi pavuccati tathattā’ (…being completely released.) Such a one is rightly called “nāga”.’ (Norman 1992: 57).

2,6,25
a-himsayaṃ savva-payāñukampt
dhamme thiyam kamma-vivega-heuṇi
tam āya-danḍehi samāyantarā
to-bohie te padirūvā eyaṃ
HE DOES NOT HARM ANYONE, HAS PITY ON ALL BEINGS, 
IS OF UNSHAKEABLE FAITH (AND) MAKES THAT HIS 
ACTIONS ARE JUDGED CORRECTLY. HE WHO PUTS HIM 
ON A PAR (?) WITH INCONSIDERATE PEOPLE IS A MODEL 
OF FOLLY.

Savva-payānukampī: ~ī uniform reading for which, if correct, cf. Edgerton, 
BHSG 10.54; otherwise the ending might be emended -im̐̄ through nasalisation in 
MSS equals lengthening of the preceding vowel.

Dhamme thiyam: this expression is found also in Pāli, e.g. Sn 250, 327 etc.⁶⁷ 
Cū 427,11 dasa-vidhe dhamme,⁵⁸ 'īī II 147b 9 paramārtha-bhūte.

Kamma? : ‘(who) causes the truth of the Law to be known’ (Jac.).

Tām etc.: ‘him you would equal to those wicked men’ (Jac.).

Āya-dandehi: see at 1,2,3,9.

Samāyarantā: samācaranti iti samām ācarantā samācarantā, tulyām kurvantā 
ity arthaḥ; samānayanto vā samānām kurvantā ity arthaḥ (Cū 427,13), 
smācaranta – atma-kalpaṃ kurvantī vānīgādibhir udāharanaḥ (Īī II 147b 10).
Sa. samācarati means 1. ‘to act or conduct oneself towards’ (loc.); 2. ‘to practise, 
do; 3. to associate with’ (instr.; MW). In Pāli only the second meaning is testified 
to, but at our place, only the causative of the third meaning, if at all, would make 
sense. A possible alternative may be a derivation from /H11005 
KAR: samākaroti means 
‘to bring together, unite’ (MW). That would fit exactly, though the verb seems to 
oroccur in Vedic only and not at all in Pāli. Samāyantarā, however, cannot be 
anything else but a nom. pl. and therefore it is not clear to me, why Jacobi could 
separate it from te in the d-pāda.

A-bohie etc.: ‘This is the outcome of your folly’ (Jac.).

Quotations in the commentaries

As noticed elsewhere⁶⁹ Mbh quotations can present readings rejected in the 
critical edition.

aya-vaya-maya-paya-caya-taya-naya gatau (Īī II 146b 5 ad Sūy 2,6,20) = 147b 
1 ad Sūy 2,6,24. Cf. Hemacandra 1979: 101 (790ff.)
aśoka-vrksaḥ sura-puspa-vṛṣṭir divya-dhvanisānām ca bhā-māndalam 
dundubhirātā-patram sat-prātiḥāryāni Jñānānām (Cū 418,4 ad Sūy 2,6,2) 
aḥīṃsā satyam a-steyam brahma-caryam a-lubdhatā (Īī II 142b 1 ad Sūy 2,6,8).

Quotation of Mbh 14 App. 4. 2214.

āśvade śīghra-bhāve ca (Cū 426,12 ad Sūy 2,6,22) 
udaiṣa pakkheve (Cū 426,2 ad Sūy 2,6,20) 
kamu icchāyām (Cū 424,3 ad Sūy 2,6,17) 
citte tāyitave (Cū 428,6 ad Sūy 2,6,25) 
cira-samāsāthho ‘i me, Goyamā (Cū 424,7 ad Sūy 2,6,17). Quotation of Viy 14,7 
[samāsītthā].

chatram chātram pātram vastram yaṣṭim ca carpayāti bhikṣuḥ vevēna 
parikaraṇa ca kiyatāpi vinā na bhikṣāpi (Īī II 139b 14f. ad Sūy 2,6,2)
jahim jassa jam vavasiyam (Cū 421,13 ad Sūy 2,6,12)  
tvaci bhogāh sukham māmse (Cū 414,1 ad SūyN 185)  
dīth̥ham miyam a-saṃdiddham (Cū 419,8 ad Sūy 2,6,5). Quotation of  
Dāsav 8,48a.  
deva-devassa (Cū 423,8 ad Sūy 2,6,15)  
navaṃ na kujā vihune purāṇam (Cū 425,12 ad Sūy 2,6,20)  
nanam sikkhai nanam gunei nāne kiccaṁ nāni navam na bandhei,  
etc. (Cū 425,12 f. ad Sūy 2,6,20). Quotation of DāsavN 383 [bandhai].  
pāṇa khīṇa-davvā (Cū 423,14 ad Sūy 2,6,16)  
Brahmā lūna-śīrā Harir drśi sarug vālupta-śīśno Harah, Suryo 'py ullikhito  
'nalo' 'py akhila-bhuk Somāḥ kalanāṇāikitaḥ / svar-nātho 'pi visamsthulāḥ  
khalu vapuh-śaṃsthair upasthaiḥ kṛtaḥ, san-mārga-śkhalanād bhavantii  
vipadaḥ prāyaḥ prabhīnām api // (Ṭ II 143 b 12 ff. ad Sūy 2,6,13)  
Bhagavāṁ pāṇca-mahavvaya-gutto indiya-sāvūdo ya virao ya / annesīṁ pi  
tam-eva ya dhammaṁ dasei gāhe // (Cū 419,12 f. ad Sūy 2,6,6)  
mana puvvamāgamā [?] (Cū 428,5 ad Sūy 2,6,25)  
rāga-dveśau vinirjitya kim aranye karisyasi? atha no nirjitāv etau kim aranye  
karisyasi? (Ṭ II 141 a 10 f. ad Sūy 2,6,4)  
vidyā-vinivartaṇte nirāhārasya dehināḥ (Cū 426,12 ad Sūy 2,6,22). Quotation of Mbh 6,27,18ab.  
visāyā vinivartante nirāhārasya dehināḥ (Cū 426,12 ad Sūy 2,6,22). Quotation of Mbh 6,24,59ab = 12,197,16ab.  
śaṅke praharsa-tulā (Cū 425,1 ad Sūy 2,6,18)  
śiśnōdara-krōte, Pārtha! (Cū 426,9 f. ad Sūy 2,6,22. The complete śloka is  
found Cū 86,7 f. ad Āyār 1,2,5,5. Cf. Mbh 3,2,61a)  
śaṅja saṅge (Cū 425,7 ad Sūy 2,6,19)  
sukhāṇi dattvā sukṣhāṇī (Cū 420,6 ad Sūy 2,6,7)  

Notes

1 Part two appeared in the Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (1999) 411–437. The abbreviations for the titles of Indian texts are those adopted for my Studien zum Sūyagada:  
C = pratīkaś in Jinaḍāsa’s Cūṁ [1950]; T = Sūy text in Sīlānka’s commentary vol. II  
[1953]; V = Vaidya’s ed. [1928]; J = Jambūvijaya’s ed. [1978]; Cū = Cūṁ, T = Tīkā.  
2 Minor variants are noted in Bollée 1995: 135f.  
3 This “correction” of T by Vaidya, just as his adoption of T’s reading at N 198 d, shows  
the correctness of Alsdorf’s remark in his Itthiparīnā paper (Alsdorf 1974: 194 note 5).  
4 Vatthā na khiva-m-addena vann’-addaṁ citta-kamǎdīsū ārdakaṁ likhitam  
Ārdranākastraṁ likhitam (Cū 413, 12 sq.).  
6 Śrīparnt-sovarcalādikām (Ṭ II 136 a 2).  
7 Muktā-phala-raktāsokādikām (Ṭ ibid.).  
8 Vasāyapalīptam vasārdram (Ṭ II 136 a 3).  
9 Vajra-lepādy-upalīptam stambha-kudvādikām (l.c.).  
10 Tattha negama-samgaha-vavahārā ti-vihāṃ samkham icchanti, taṃ jahā: ekkabhaviyaṁ  
baddhāyāyam abhikmōha-nāma-gottam ca.
The particulars of this process, which *stricto sensu* seems to contradict Buddhist conceptions, are told by Buddhaghosa with regard to the future Buddha, but will represent a common Indian idea as the Tusita-devatā who form the setting see off the reincarnand in the Nandavana. Sumangalavilāsinī 430, 11 states *sabba-devalokesu hi Nandavanam athhi yeva*. Thus beings enjoying their positive karman in other *devalokas* will leave these in the same way (see Bollée, Physical aspects of some Mahāpuruṣas [in press in WZKS Hg (2005)])

12 Ekena bhavena yo jīvah svargāder āgatyā (…) āsannataro baddhāyuākah (…) āsannatamo’ bhimukha-nāma-gistro yo’ nantara-samayam evārdrakatvena samutpatsaye – ete ca trayo’ pi prakārā dravyārdrake draś tavyāḥ (Ṭ II 136a 6sqq.).

13 In another context (ĀvCū 526,4 and in a stanza from a longer metrical quotation in the *vyrtti* I 69 a 1 on Āyā 1,1,7,1*) mentioned as the teacher of Jiyasattu, Rājā of vasantapura. I do not understand why this prince in PrPN I, p. 288 no. 15 should probably be identical with a ruler of Rāyagīha of that name in Nirāyā 4, 1, as suggested by Chandra and Mehta at no. 38. A Jiyasattu of Vasantapura is also found at ĀvCū 498,6 and 503, 6.

14 For the formation cf., for example, Prince Selaga of Selagapura in Nāyā 1,5. Localisations like these naturally are of little importance for the historicity of Śūy 2,6 as already Basham 1951: 54 remarked.

15 Here Jinādāsa’s version diverges in that the nun is reborn in a foreign country (*mecca-visaye*) as Addaya, son of Prince Addaga and his queen Dhārīni, whereas Sāmāyiya returns to this world as a Sheth’s daughter in Vasantapura (Cū 415, 2 sq.).

16 Cū 415,4 sqq. only speaks of a dītā.

17 Abhaya-kumāreṇāpi parināmyābhuddhyā parināmitam (Ṭ I 38a a 5 sq.).

18 Derivate of *aśva-vāhāna* ‘das Reiten zu Pferd’ (Schmidt, *Nachträger*).

19 Cū 416,7 reads sāvaga-padimā instead of *aśvāsaga*- (see Schubring 2000: § 163). Thus the layman is completely put on an equal footing with the monks. At Ṭ II 138 b3 it reads *anytara-pratimā-pratipannah kāyōtsarga-vyavasthitaḥ*.

20 Read *vidhirto* instead of *vighṛto* at Ṭ II 138 b5.


22 Called dhījāti in Cū 417,2; see Bollée 1977: 112 and 1988: 279. The word in question seems to be first a term of abuse used by Brahmins for non-brahmins who returned the invective as a nickname for the former. Even Brahmins who had become Buddhism monks sometimes could not abstain from their old habit as stated Udāna 28, 11, where we hear of the brahmān bhikṣu Pilinda-Vaccha’s custom of addressing his confratres by *vasala-vāda*.

23 Even if this results in an impossible form like the imperative *jānam* in vs. 8.

24 Ekāki viharant lokaṃ ṭhān bhikṣūyata iti matvā loka-pāntki-nimittaṃ mahān parikaraḥ kṛtaḥ (on *loka-pāntki-nimittaṃ* see Bollée 1977: 151, thatā cācyate: “chattram chāṭtram pātram vastram vas tiṃ ca caraçayati bhikṣṣuḥ / veṣeṇa parikareṇa ca kiyatāpi vinā na bhikṣāpi”// (Ṭ II 139 b13 sqq.).

25 As to this see Jacob’s remark on Uṭt 1,7 and *infra* Śūy 2,6,6.

26 Cf. BHSG § 8,94.

27 Speijer 1886: § 52; Sen 1953 § 16. 

28 Speyer 1896: §25.

29 See e.g. Alsdorf 1962: 5 sqq.

30 See e.g. K. C. Jain 1963: 17f.


32 At the references mentioned in Pi §§ 56b and 409 *vayaṃ* corresponds to Sa. *vayas*.

33 Yet cf. *kiṅcīd* at Ṭ II 143 b10.

34 *Udghāṭṭana* must have an extended conception of ‘outbreak (of violence or passion)’ (MW), namely, ‘passionate utterance, abuse’, cf. *ghaṭte* ‘to hurt with words, speak of malignantly’ (MW).

35 ‘At his endless duels of words he tried to shout down his opponents with his formidable voice and was profuse in invectives when it was necessary to withstand them’.
ADDU OR THE OLDEST EXTANT DISPUTE

36 Cf. Āyār 2,4,2,1.
37 Cf. Āyār 2,4,1,8.
38 This translation of parivṛṭājaka follows Seidenstücker 1920: 125.
40 He kaśāya-kaṁtha! (Cū 422,5).
41 Jugupsitāṅgāvayavōdghāṭṭanena jātyā tal-liṅga-grahaṇōdghāṛanena vā.
42 Following this meaning Jacobi translates Utt 2,21 ‘sitting there he should brave all dangers.’ He may have read similarly to Charpentier tatthā se cīṭhamāṇassa uvasaggābhīdhārāe, yet I do not understand his construction then. Sāntisūri reads uvasagge ‘bhidhārāe, which does not solve the difficulty. Only his reading uvasaggabhayaṃ bhava allows for a harmony with cīṭhamāṇassa (thus also Alsdorf in a marginal jotting in his personal copy of Charpentier). The latest Utt edition, the one made by Punnavijaya and Bhojak (Bombay, 1977), in the b-pāda has the traditional version of the European edition. – The only other reference for abhidhārayai I have found seems to me just as suspect: Dasav 5,2,25 a monk is recommended to visit every house on his almsround and niyam kulam atkamma īsadhāma nābhiddhārāe, which Schubring renders by ‘he should not pass by a lowly house and go only to a noble one’. As to the meaning this no doubt is correct, just as Haribhadra paraphrases the verb by yāyāt. Then one should either assume a meaning ‘to patronize’ – which in fact would reverse things – or read abhidhāvāe.
43 Thus read for iju in the PTS ed.
44 See, for example, Hornell 1920: 174 sq.
45 In the Āyār chapter containing his analysis, p. 61, Schubring expresses himself to the effect that this line starts with prose. In his working copy, however, he later emended the text as follows: āgant ‘ārāmāgāre gāme nagare vi egayā vāso.
46 Chāyā-bhramaśa iti ‘loss of face’.
47 Similarly Basham 1951: 53.
48 Otherwise these formations have an -ā- in the joint of the compound; for examples from Pāli see PED s.v. kiccā-kiccā and Geiger/Norman 1994: § 33; for Sa., Wackernagel 1905: 148 (§ 61) and Debrunner 1957: 44; and for both, Hoffmann 1975: 113–119.
49 Mahāmiddesa 226,28 in the form lapaka-lapaka, in Vism 26,3 also as lapa-lapa, used of a talkative monk.
50 Buddhists, inter alios (Cū 423,12).
51 Interdictions of intercourse with heterodox people occur in Hinduism, for example, Viṣṇupurāṇa 3,18,79 and 96ff.
53 The verse number parallel 1,2,1,17 contains no... na ‘not at all’.
54 See Drostdowski 1984: § 579.
55 Cf. Milindapanha 82, 31ff.
56 Stūy 1,5,1,2; 1,6,3; 1,6,7; 1,6,25; 1,14,4; Utt 4,6.
57 Ghetṭūna (Cū 425,7) ~ grhitvā (T II 146a 12).
58 Karpūṭāgaru-kastūrikāmbārādikam, T II 146a 11.
59 Cū: bandheī.
60 Quotation from unknown source.
61 For brahma in this sense see Zaehner 1969: 214.
62 Kraya-vikrayārthaḥ sakata-yāna-vāhanōṣṭra-mandalikādibhir anuṣṭhānaiḥ (T II 146b9).
63 On slavery in India see, for example, Jain 1984: 140ff.
64 See Bollée 1977: 30.
Bibliography and abbreviations


Amg. = Ardhamāgadhī
AnguttaraN = Anguttara Nikāya
Anuog = Anugadārāṁ see Nandisuttam
ĀvCū = Āvassaya Cunṇī
ĀvNHHar = Āvassaya Nijjutti by Haribhadra
Ayār = Āyāraṅga


Dasav = Dasaveyāliya
DN = Dīgha Nikāya
Mbh = Mahābhārata
N = Nijjutti
Nāyā = Nāyādhammakahāṇo
Pā = Pali
Sa = Sanskrit
Samav = Samavāyāngam.
Seidenstücker, Karl. 1920. see Udāna.
Sn = Suttanipāta
SN = Samyutta Nikāya
Utt = Uttarādhyayanānī. 1937. Ātmavallabhagranthāvali 12.
Viy = Viyāhapannatti
WZKS = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie.
Those of us in the English-speaking world who commenced serious research into the history and practice of the Jain religion twenty or so years ago were of necessity autodidacts to a large extent. The reason for this was that there were virtually no academic specialists in the subject at whose feet one could sit and little by way of available instruction which went beyond that already provided by what in one’s darker and more frustrated moods often seemed to be, with a few exceptions, an uninspiring and repetitive secondary literature primarily concerned with the metaphysical basics of Jainism. The gaining of some sort of foothold and orientation within a huge, diverse and largely unexplored primary literature was by no means straightforward and methods had to be devised to get beyond the existing textbooks. I for one decided that a possible strategy might be to investigate the various sectarian controversies which had preoccupied the Jain community in its early period, on the assumption that it is generally in the area of internal dispute that religions expose both their cherished preoccupations and also possible inconsistencies in their structure.

To this end, it seemed an obvious course of action to consider the early Jain heretics, known in Prākrit as the pavayana-nihnaga, ‘concealers of the doctrine’, seven of which are listed at Sthānāṅga Sūtra 587 and who according to tradition arose in Mahāvīra’s lifetime and the immediate centuries after his death, in the expectation that here would be fruitful and extensive ancient source material on Jain disputes and, in the nature of heresies such as Arianism in Christianity (cf. Wiles 1994), a continuing vein of dissent and contention which would inevitably resurface at various times in Jainism’s history. It was with some surprise, then, that I quickly realised that with the exception of Jamāli, the first of these so-called heretics, the ancient scriptural texts had very little to say on the subject of the nihnava (‘concealments’, heresies; for the original sense, see Brough 1996: 77–78) and that Leumann’s paper of 1885, which amplified the exiguous canonical material with some of the early commentarial and postcanonical literature, had been virtually the first and last serious scholarly word on the subject (Leumann 1885 and cf. Balbir 1993: 146). In the light of this, I decided to pay no further attention to the subject of the nihnava.
However, my interest in this subject was revived in 1998 by two papers delivered at a conference held in Lund to honour Professor P. S. Jaini. One of these papers (for the second by Professor Johannes Bronkhorst, see Bronkhorst 2003) presented by Professor Georg von Simson drew attention to what he styled the principle of ‘characterizing by contrast’, a form of narrative parallelism which could throw light on the structures of the biographies of the Buddha and the Mahābhārata hero Bhīṣma by reference to a rival, antipathetic character. So, as in the Mahābhārata the impetuosity of the young and ambitious Karna, who demands the generalship of the Pāṇḍava army, highlights and contrasts with the qualities of the older and more temperate Bhīṣma, in similar manner the Buddha’s evil and jealous cousin Devadatta, who led a breakaway from the monastic community (one which, if the Chinese pilgrims are to be believed, was still in existence well into the common era; see Deeg 1999) to restore what he saw as the exclusively ascetic orientation of the path, points through contrast to the imperturbable nature of the great teacher and the correctness of the ‘middle way’ preached by him which viewed asceticism as an objectionable extreme (Simson 2003). In the light of this intriguing structural possibility identified by von Simson and the fact that there are certain similarities, if only at a superficial level, between the lives of the Buddha and the twenty fourth Jina Mahāvīra, it seemed legitimate to consider whether there might be any Jain equivalent of Devadatta. An obvious candidate would appear to be the first ‘concealer of the doctrine’, Jamāli, according to tradition Mahāvīra’s nephew (in some versions also son-in-law; see below) who as described in the Bhagavatī Śūtra attempted to reformulate a principle of Jain teaching and then led some monks away from the main ascetic community.

Yet an examination of traditional biographies of Mahāvīra demonstrates that Jamāli plays little part in the overall trajectory of the narrative and contemporary understanding by Jains today does not assign him any marked role as some sort of stock villain in a well-known story. All textual accounts concur that Jamāli’s misconception of the teaching was easily demonstrated to be false by Mahāvīra and his chief disciple, that the community of monks briefly under his influence melted away and abandoned its leader and that after a period of preaching he died alone. Jamāli’s personality only momentarily contrasts with that of Mahāvīra and the episode of his heresy and its overturning does not play any major structural role in the biography of the Jina. Although one later source asserts, albeit on no obvious authority, that Jamāli was the leader of the Ājīvika sect, there is no record of any sectarian movement claiming descent from him. Furthermore, no memory even of the name of Jamāli is preserved amongst the Digambara Jains, with only the Śvetāmbaras recording a narrative version of his life (Leumann 1998: 306).

In fact, as we shall see, the Śvetāmbaras eventually came to be interested more in the moral deviation which Jamāli came to represent and the karmic destiny which ensued from it rather than the details and implications of the heretical teaching which he advocated. In this short study I propose to consider the fortunes of Jamāli in respect to the manner in which he is portrayed in the canonical and
commentarial sources and his transformation into a flawed ethical type and exemplar of hostility towards one’s teacher. I will then draw attention to the dispute which developed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries concerning the karmic consequences set up by Jamāli’s actions and the nature of the rebirths which he experienced after his solitary and unrepentant death.

Jamāli’s portrayal in Bhagavatī Sūtra 9.33

The only extended source for Jamāli in the scriptural canon is provided by Bhagavatī Sūtra (henceforth Bhagavatī) 9.33, although there is evidence that a narrative relating to him occurred elsewhere within a now lost version. This section of what is the largest of the scriptural texts, which may in its earliest part date from the first century BCE but in its totality is no doubt several centuries later (Ohira 1994: 5–39), I will now proceed to summarise, following the text given on pp. 455–482 of the Jaina Āgama Series edition of Doṣī.

Jamāli is a mighty and rich ksatriya, or member of the warrior class, from the city of Ksatriyakunda, living a life of luxury and with eight beautiful wives, who is intrigued by the excitement aroused prior to what he learns will be a sermon preached by Mahāvīra at the Bahuśāla shrine (ceiya) outside the city of Brāhmaṇakunda. He goes to the shrine in a regal fashion, riding a chariot with parasol and martial retinue and pays homage to Mahāvīra. Moved by the Jina’s sermon, he resolves to renounce, a course of action for which he is described as being suited in every way. However, his mother is deeply dismayed at his decision and a debate ensues in which the pleasures of the householder’s life and the difficulties of the ascetic path are made clear to Jamāli by his parents. However, eventually they acquiesce and give their permission. A lavish preparation for renunciation ensues, with begging bowl and ascetic’s whisk being bought at great expense and a barber hired at high price to crop Jamāli’s hair so that only four tufts are left and what has been cut off being anointed, perfumed and worshipped (accittā) by his mother who then places it in a jewelled casket as a future devotional focus (darisane) on holidays and festivals. Thereupon, finely dressed, anointed and attended by glamorous young men and women, Jamāli is taken in a palanquin through streets thronged with onlookers and is formally presented to Mahāvīra by his parents. Then, ‘as in the case of the brahman Ṛṣabhadatta’ (see below), Jamāli pays homage to Mahāvīra, abandons his fine accoutrements, pulls out his remaining hair and renounces with 500 men to begin the career of an ascetic.

Subsequently, after much fasting and scriptural study, ‘developing himself through various acts of austerity’ (vicitehim tavokammehim appañam bhāvemāne), Jamāli petitions Mahāvīra to allow him to separate from the larger community to wander with the 500 monks who had renounced with him. The Jina makes no reply even when asked three times and so leaving his master Jamāli goes forth from the vicinity of the Bahuśāla shrine to wander through the countryside with the 500 monks. One day, while outside Śrāvastī, Jamāli falls ill of a fever brought
on by of the poor quality of the food he has consumed during his austerities and asks his monastic followers for a bed to be spread for him. On enquiring as to whether the bed was made (kade) or being made (kajjai), they reply that ‘the bed was not made (but) being made’ (no khalu... nam sejjāsamthārae kade kajjai).

Recalling Mahāvīra’s teaching (stated at the very beginning of the Bhagavat) that something which is in the process of moving has actually moved, Jamāli sees directly (paccekkham) that the bed which was in the process of being made has not actually been made and judges this to be a decisive counter-example undermining the Jina’s teaching and subverting his authority.

Persuading some of his followers of the force of his insight, but rejected by others, Jamāli goes to confront Mahāvīra, now at the famous Pūrṇabhadrā shrine outside Campā, claiming omniscience and equal status with him. Mahāvīra’s disciple Gautama challenges Jamāli and asks him to answer questions about the universe and the soul (jīva) in respect to whether they are eternal or non-eternal. Jamāli is unable to provide the correct answer, whereupon Mahāvīra states that even his less advanced followers are able to confirm that the world and the soul are simultaneously both eternal in the sense of being unchanging and non-eternal through being subject to temporal and locational modifications. Jamāli does not accept this and withdraws from Mahāvīra’s presence, continuing for a long time to follow the ascetic path and to seduce both himself and others ‘through preaching what was untrue and his excessive preoccupation with falsehood’ (asabbhāvubbhāvānāhiṃ micchattābhīhinivesehi ya).

Finally, he fasts to death ‘without having confessed and repented’ (anāloiyapadikkanante), to be reborn in the Lāntaka heaven as one of the class of gods known as Kilbiśaka for the lengthy time period of thirteen sāgaropamas.3 On being questioned by Gautama about his ‘bad pupil’ (kusisse), Mahāvīra describes the nature and heavenly location of the Kilbiśaka gods, confirming that Jamāli was born amongst them because of his hostility to his teacher and the community. Those who are hostile to the teacher, the preceptor, the monastic clan (kula), the monastic group (gana) and the community, who defame and calumniate the teacher and preceptor, who seduce themselves and others through preaching what is untrue and through obsessive preoccupation with falsity and live many years on the ascetic path, eventually die unconfessed and unrepenting and are reborn as Kilbisa ka gods. After falling from that state when their time runs out, ‘they wander through samsāra taking up to four (or) five existences among hellbeings, animals, men and gods and achieve liberation (that is to say) are then awakened and make an end’ (jāva cattāri pamaṇa neraivā-tirikkhaṇṇaṇi-manussa-devabhavagganaṁ samsāram anupariyāṭṭītā taocpacchā sijjhanṭi bujjhanṭi jāva antaṁ kareṇī). Some (atthevatiyā), however, ‘wander through the beginningless, endless4 and lengthy four-pointed5 forest of samsāra’ (anādyeyān ānavadaggam dhamaddham cāuramaṇa-samsārakaṁtaṇaṁ anupariyāṭṭhaṁ).

Mahāvīra predicts that Jamāli, in accord with his behaviour as both enemy of his teacher and community and rigorous ascetic, after exhausting his period of time amongst the Kilbiśaka gods, will wander through samsāra, ‘taking up to...
five existences amongst animals, men and gods, and then will attain deliverance which will bring his sufferings to an end’ (jāva paṃca tirikkhaṃya-manussa-devabhaggahanāṁ saṃsāram anupariyaṭṭitā tao pacchā sijjhīhitā jāva anāṃtam kāhiṇī).

Comments on Bhagavatī 9.33

Certain observations and expansions can be made with regard to the story of Jamāli as just summarised.

(1) The name Jamāli is slightly odd in appearance. However, as Bollée has shown, it is most easily to be taken as the equivalent of Sanskrit Yama-ari, ‘enemy of Yama, the god of death’ (Bollée 1994: 66), with r > 1 signifying an eastern provenance. Bollée also suggests a possible Vaiṣṇava (and thus possibly a Western?) connection for the name. However, equivalent epithets such as Yamāntaka tend to relate more normally to manifestations of Śiva.

(2) The text specifies that stereotyped passages found in the first upāṅga text of the canon, the Aupapāṭika Sūtra, are to be inserted (jahāa Uvavāe) to flesh out the description of the events prior to Jamāli becoming a monk. This section itself became a stereotyped passage, paradigmatic of the renunciation of wealthy young males as envisaged in early Jainism, incorporated into the story of Megha at Jñātīrdharmakathā 1.5 The reference to Jamāli’s mother worshipping his cut hair and placing it in a casket for future devotional use is reminiscent of the preservation and worship of physical relics, specific evidence for which is generally difficult to find in early Jainism.

(3) The description of Jamāli’s post-renunciatory career makes clear that he undoubtedly led a life of austerities in accord with the stipulation of the Jain path, but also that he left Mahāvīra and assumed the role of a teacher without specific authorisation. His demand when he had fallen ill that a bed be made for him thus infringes correct monastic practice which would normally expect that attentive service (vaiyāṛttya) be offered by one’s fellow monks. Furthermore, illness in Jainism is regarded as being the result of some sort of excess (Deo 1954–1955: 209–210), which in Jamāli’s case might be taken as overintense practice of austerities.

(4) The teaching challenged by Jamāli is famously enunciated at the beginning of the Bhagavatī where a series of nine doublets taking the form of present participle and past participle asserts the position that any action which is actually under way is equivalent to having been completed. The Bhagavatī invokes this principle sporadically in various contexts, some relating to monastic practice, others to ontology (Ohira 1994: 149). The principle is not one which seems to have been much referred to by later Jain philosophers. It is, however, deployed as an explanatory mechanism by the thirteenth century karma theorist Devendra Sūri in his autocommentary on verse 25 of his Caturtha Karmagrantha where he invokes the expression
grhyamānam grhittam, ‘what is being taken is taken’, a variant of calemāne calam, ‘what is in motion has moved’, of Bhagavatī 1.1 and kadēmāne kadam, ‘what is being done is done’, of Bhagavatī 9.33, with reference to the physical appropriation of atoms in the formation of the material (audārika) body (cf. Mahētā 1999: 95–96). Bhagavatī 9.33 does not provide any broader context for the teaching and Jamāli’s misconception of it is not specifically refuted. In effect, Jamāli seems to represent a type of naive empiricist, not dissimilar to King Prasenajit criticised in the Rājapraśātya Sūtra, in that he appeals to direct experience alone to justify the implausibility of a doctrinal principle (Dundas 2002: 94).

The only developed modern interpretations of the nature of Jamāli’s heretical teaching and the Jain tenet which he reformulates have been provided by Ohira and, most recently, Bronkhorst, who does not draw on the former’s work. Ohira bases her interpretation primarily on canonical material, whereas Bronkhorst largely refers to Jinabhadra’s Viśeṣāvyakabhaṣya (sixth century) and the canonical commentator Śilāṅka (ninth century).

Ohira (1994: 149–150) holds that the tenet challenged by Jamāli, namely that what is being done is actually done, represents a genuine difficulty in the analysis of action as located in time, in that the nature of action may in fact change during a period of time. She argues that the principle is most easily applicable to problems involving volitional action in the field of ethical conduct and that the Jain theoreticians subsequently applied the principle to other areas. Ohira concludes that as far as the nature of action is concerned, Jamāli was correct in his criticisms.

Bronkhorst cites Jinabhadra’s interpretation of Jamāli’s heresy as relating to the possibility of something emerging from an existent or non-existent entity and thus being located in a broader nexus of ontological issues involving production which orthodox Jainism found objectionable. He also refers to Śilāṅka’s argument that Jamāli failed to grasp the principle that what is being made is made in actuality operates in accord with the worldly standpoint (vyavahāranaya), thus misunderstanding how ordinary usage works. Bronkhorst interprets Jamāli’s heresy and the response by Gautama and Mahāvīra about the nature of the universe and soul as linked and suggests the possibility that anekāntavāda, the doctrine of the multiple nature of reality, has been developed in response to the problem of the production of entities (Bronkhorst 1999: 61–66).

(5) The Kilbīṣaka gods amongst whom Jamāli is reborn are the equivalent of the lowermost stratum of human society. The highest of their three classes is located in the Lāntaka heaven (Schubring 2000: 246)."
passage referring specially to Jamāli according to Dośī’s Jainā Āgama Series edition reads jāva paṃca, with cattāri given only as a variant, whereas the recent edition by Muni Dīparatnasāgara has cattāri paṃca, that is, without jāva, as does the 1953 Sthānakvāśī edition of Pupphabhikkhū, the 1974 Terāpanthī edition of Muni Nathmal and Lalwani’s text of 1985. The jāva which occurs later in both sentences in fact functions as an abbreviation marker, indicating that stereotyped or previously given material has to be supplied. Only the Terāpanthī edition specifically inserts the wording of this material.⁹

It is undoubtedly important for later Jain discussants that Jamāli’s destiny as predicted by Mahāvīra is finite in that he will attain liberation and put an end to his sufferings.¹⁰

The structure of Bhagavatī 9

The extensive Bhagavatī has generally been mined by scholarship without reference to the overall structure and coherence of its constituent parts. This clearly composite scripture’s recent students, most notably Deleu, have certainly been sensitive to the fact that conscious organisational principles were deployed by the monastic editors (Deleu 1970: 45–69), yet the possible implications of this for the interpretation of Bhagavatī 9 have not been adequately pursued. Here I wish briefly to draw attention to the manner in which the story of Jamāli can convey meaning not only by being detached from its moorings and treated simply as evidence of a possible trend in early Indian thought but by being situated more firmly in its scriptural context as a component of Bhagavatī 9 with some connections to the other sections of that chapter.

It would certainly appear to be natural to locate the central significance of Jamāli’s career exclusively in the heretical teaching he is described as propounding and so concentrate upon this, as do Ohira and Bronkhorst in their treatment of Bhagavatī 9.33. However, that is certainly not the approach taken in the commentary by the eleventh century Abhayadeva Sūri. This highly authoritative exegete devotes a great deal of space to elucidating the passage describing Jamāli’s progress towards renunciation, including his abandonment of what is effectively a kingly way of life, and relatively little to the issues involved in his teaching. Furthermore, a focussed reading of the ninth chapter of the Bhagavatī as a whole (rather than merely the portion of section 33 which deals with Jamāli) suggests that there is a single important theme under consideration throughout, namely the nature of omniscience and those who have attained it, which binds the various sections together and imposes a degree of unity.

Chapter 9 of the Bhagavatī commences, as do the other chapters of this scripture, with a verse summing up by catchwords in standard niruyktī style the various topics dealt with in each uddeśaka, or section. These are respectively seven: the continent of Jambūdvīpa, the planetary bodies above it, the intermediate continents in the Lavaṇa Ocean, those who have learnt and activated the
doctrine without hearing it from the appropriate people, Gaṅgeya (an ascetic follower of Mahāvīra’s predecessor Pārśva), the city of Kuṇḍagrāma and the killing of living beings.

The first three of these topics, constituting Bhagavatī 9. 1–30, involve answers given at Mithilā and Rājagṛha by Mahāvīra to questions asked by Gautama concerning terrestrial and celestial geography. The specific and detailed answers given by Mahāvīra can be viewed as guarantors of his status as a fully enlightened being and clearly serve to establish his unimpeachable omniscient authority at the outset of Bhagavatī 9.

The next utdēśaka, Bhagavatī 9.31, links up with the foregoing by discussing the nature of authority, its source and those who are connected with it. Mahāvīra describes how after the ‘destruction-calming’ (khaovasama) of knowledge-concealing karma and various other types of karma, an individual can gain an understanding of the teaching ‘without hearing’ (asoccā) it from one of the ten kinds of people who know (Deleu 1970: 108–109) and also gain wisdom, become a monk, practise asceticism of various kinds, ward off karma and eventually, after eliminating karma completely, gain omniscience. However, this particular type of person has only a limited capacity to proclaim the teaching and to initiate monks, although he will eventually attain liberation. Equally, the individual who actually hears the doctrine from one of the ten kinds of people who know and follows the same trajectory of career can proclaim the doctrine and teach pupils who are then able to form a preceptorial lineage.

The setting of the next utdēśaka, Bhagavatī 9.32, is the vicinity of Vāniyagrāma where Gaṅgeya, a follower of Pārśva, questions Mahāvīra about the dynamics of rebirth for the four main types of living creatures, with particular reference to the various hells. Mention is made of Pārśva’s teaching about the eternity of the world, with Mahāvīra asserting that through his own attainment of omniscience he gained an understanding of this truth independently (asoccā). He confirms that human beings are reborn as result of their own various activities. Gaṅgeya is converted on the textual model of another follower of Pārśva, Kālāśa Vaiśayaputra (Deleu 1970: 162–163 and Ohira 1994: 136).

The setting of the next utdēśaka, Bhagavatī 9.33, is located near Brāhmaṇakuṇḍagrāma, which seems to refer to the district of the city of Kuṇḍagrāma inhabited by brahmans. At this location Mahāvīra has homage paid to him by Ṛṣabhadatta and his wife Devānandā. The latter is declared to be Mahāvīra’s mother, a reference to the episode of the transfer of the embryo prior to the Jina’s birth in a ksatriya family (Dundas 2002: 26); a contrasting link might also be made with the grief of Jamāli’s mother in the following section. Ṛṣabhadatta and Devānandā both renounce in the manner of another brahman, Skandaka Kātyāyana, described in Bhagavatī 2.1, and eventually reach the goal of the path. The rest of the section deals with Jamāli who lives in the ksatriya quarter in the city of Kuṇḍagrāma. This develops as described earlier. Mahāvīra’s reference to the various stages of Jamāli’s rebirths in heavens both alludes to his own omniscience and points back to Bhagavatī 9.32 which deals
with the possible rebirth for hellbeings, animals, men and gods, concluding that individuals are reborn through morally positive (subha), morally negative (asubha) and mixed (subhāsubha) karma.

The final commentarial statement on this section by Abhayadeva Sūri deals with the issue of why Mahāvīra, who as an omniscient being must have known what would ensue, nonetheless still initiated Jamāli. One possible answer is that it is difficult to overcome (laṅgh) things which happen of necessity. Alternatively, it could be argued Mahāvīra saw some particular quality in Jamāli. As Abhayadeva Sūri puts it, the omniscient do not act purposelessly with regard to anything.

The final uddeśaka, Bhagavat 9.34, deals with the nature of violence, demonstrating that in killing one living creature, many entities are destroyed in conjunction. Such violence is caused by enmity. The section concludes by describing how lower forms of life and plants breathe each other in, effectively a kind of violence. Similar violence is caused by air bodies blowing as wind through the leaves of a tree and causing it to fall. Although Deleu does not see any connection between 9.34 and the uddeśaka preceding (Deleu 1970: 60), its discussion of the nature of completed action in terms of violence provides an obvious link with the teaching disputed by Jamāli. Furthermore, it connects directly to the theme of omniscience, since ability to pass authoritative judgment on unseen entities such as air bodies is of necessity restricted to the omniscient.

The Jamāli uddeśaka of the Bhagavat 9.33 can be regarded as making its point by means of a foregrounding throughout of the issues of enlightenment and concomitant correct understanding of the nature of reality, already established with reference to Mahāvīra at the beginning of the chapter as central source of authority on the Jain path. For Jamāli claimed to be an omniscient kevalin, the equal of Mahāvīra, in the same way as another ‘dubious’ figure to be described later in the Bhagavat, Makkhali Gosāla, and thus can be regarded as a limited type of teacher of the type described at 9.31. Gautama’s ignoring of Jamāli’s teaching and his posing to him of counter-questions about the nature of the universe and the soul automatically put the discussion within the framework of omniscience and also alludes to the episode of Gaṅgeya at 9.32 where Mahāvīra refers to his independent discovery of this truth. The only commentary we have on this passage, that of Abhayadeva Sūri, specifically contrasts Jamāli and Gaṅgeya which suggests that at least one highly authoritative reader interpreted the passage intertextually in conjunction with the preceding section. There is also reference to the episode of the brahman Skandaka Kātyāyana at Bhagavat 2.1 who was converted by Mahāvīra’s teaching about the nature of the universe and the soul and the description of whose renunciation was to be a paradigmatic stereotyped passage for the conversion of those of high class at other comparable parts of the text, as, for example, in the case of Rśabhadatta’s renunciation at the beginning of Bhagavat 9.33 which in turn serves as the model for that of Jamāli.

The intensity of Jamāli’s intellectual delusion is thus confirmed by his failure to grasp a teaching which served to convert two individuals who were not members of the Jain community. The overall context of Bhagavat 9.33 relates most
clearly to the establishment of the fact that Jamāli is an imperfect (chadmastha) and self-appointed teacher. It is clear that Mahāvīra and Gautama do not specifically disprove Jamāli (cf. Ohira 1994: 148), and a reading of this section in the light of the whole chapter suggests that Jamāli is a negative exemplar not so much because of the precise nature of his teaching as through his refusal to accept the authority of the omniscient Mahāvīra. As such, he provides a paradigmatic example of a type of misguided and unauthorised teacher challenging details of scripture (and thus in von Simson’s terms a type of contrasting characterisation) whose ambiguous identity as in certain respects both Jain and non-Jain was increasingly to preoccupy later Śvetāmbara Jain intellectuals, as sectarian splits developed within the community at a later period.

The development of the story of Jamāli

An expansion of the Bhagavatti version of the story of Jamāli in terms both of protagonists and refutation of the heretical teaching can be found in the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi (pp. 416–420) of Jinadāsa (seventh century). The location of the story of the first pavayananinhaga in Jainism within this text is significant in that it occurs after the story of the seventh pavayananinhaga Goṣṭhāmāhila. As with the other heretics, the only canonical reference to Goṣṭhāmāhila is Sthānāṅga Sūtra 587 which gives a list of designated teachings and the names of teachers and places of origin correlated with them. The full significance of Goṣṭhāmāhila’s teaching is adumbrated for the first time by the Āvaśyaka commentarial literature where it is said to involve a modification of Jain doctrine, positing a situation where the soul is merely ‘touched’ by karmic matter and not bound by it, a notion which recalls Bhagavatti 9.34, the uddeśaka immediately following the Jamāli section, which describes somebody who kills as being ‘touched’ by enmity. In the case of both these teachers, there occurs what seems from an analytical perspective to be little more than a readjustment of a detail of standard doctrine, rather than any major reframing of the basic premises of the path as a whole. Yet, as Jainism developed, the doctrinaire position of many orthodox members of the community was that rejection of just a small fragment of the teaching was tantamount to rejection of the entirety.12

With regard to the early part of Jamāli’s career, the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi describes itself as being in accord with the Bhagavatti, but in fact introduces a significant novelty. Not only is Jamāli said to be the son of Mahāvīra’s eldest sister Śudarśanā and so his nephew, he is also presented as the husband of the Jina’s daughter Anavadyāṃgī, more normally called Priyadarśanā and thus his son-in-law.13 As in the Bhagavatti, the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi depicts Jamāli as realising on the basis of direct experience of one particular case that Mahāvīra’s teachings are false. However, while some monks of his group believed his interpretation, others did not and the text switches from Prākrit to Sanskrit to show how the orthodox teaching of calemāne calitam, ‘something in the process of moving has moved’ is correct, with specific reference to the operation of karmic matter and employing
the analogy of the production of a woven cloth (pāṭa).\textsuperscript{14} Jamāli refuses to accept the force of this and his monks leave him, returning to Mahāvīra.

The focus of the narrative shifts to Priyadarśanā, who following her husband, renounced with a thousand nuns and then joined his breakaway community. Her mistaken acceptance of Jamāli’s heresy through love for him is overthrown when after performing the ceremony of caityavandana she visits the house of the potter Dhamka. Informed by Priyadarśanā of Jamāli’s teaching, he knows that she is mistaken, but tells her that he does not understand the issue in detail (vīsataram). Later, while Priyadarśanā was carrying out the necessary ascetic duty of ‘study at the appropriate time of the day’ (saṭṭha-pōṣita), Dhamka was engaged in manufacturing ( tvatmaṇḍana) dishes. A spark of fire flew (from his kiln?) which burnt the top part of Priyadarśanā’s robe (samghādi). She indignantly told the potter that it had been burnt and he retorted by invoking what must logically be her view derived from Jamāli, namely that ‘something being burnt is not burnt’ (dajjhamaṇe adaddhe). So in that case how can her garment be burnt since only a part of it has been affected? Priyadarśanā gained understanding (sambuddhā) with regard to that matter and went to Jamāli to explain it. He, however, did not understand it and so with her followers Priyadarśanā rejoined Mahāvīra. The rest of the section follows the Bhagavatt’s account of Jamāli’s lack of repentance and we hear no more of his erstwhile wife.

Close approximations to the Āvaśyaaka Cūrmi’s version, with generally somewhat lengthier consideration of the philosophical issue at stake, were to be deployed by several later Śvetāmbara writers, most notably Hemacandra (1089–1172) in his Trīṣaṭṭhaśalākāpurusācarita 10.8.28–108 (Johnson’s translation, vol 6. pp. 197–198), Jinapati Sūri (1153–1220) in his commentary on Jineśvara Sūri’s Paṇcaliṅgprakaraṇa (pp. 33a–44b) and Jinakuśala Sūri (1280–1332) in his commentary on Jinaḍatta Sūri’s Caityavandanakulaka (pp. 55–58).\textsuperscript{15} Predictably, they repeat the Āvaśyaaka Cūrmi’s claim that Jamāli was Mahāvīra’s son-in-law. Schubring (2000: 33) notes that this fact is not actually mentioned in the two canonical biographies of Mahāvīra, namely book two of the Ācārāṅga Sūtra and the Jinačarita section of the Kalpa Sūtra,\textsuperscript{16} nor in the Bhagavatt, and he cites the Āvaśyaaka literature as the authority, claiming that Jamāli’s name had been suppressed in the earlier texts. Deleu, who is, as we have seen, commendably aware of some connections between sections in Bhagavatt 9, argues for something similar, claiming that the two episodes in Bhagavatt 9.33 ‘are linked up to oppose Jamāli, the heretical monk of kṣatriya birth, whose relationship with [Mahāvīra] the text expressly conceals, and Devāṇandā, the righteous nun of brāhmaṇa birth who [Mahāvīra] says is his real mother’ (Deleu 1970: 60).

Here we have an example of how an acceptance of Jain tradition can distort a critical understanding of Jain history. The particular relationship between Mahāvīra and Jamāli, which Schubring and Deleu claim has been ‘hushed up’ in the early biographical literature of the Jina, does not in textual form predate the Āvaśyaaka commentary literature, although it is understandable how invoking such a family tie would give added point to the story. Furthermore, through Jamāli’s
supposed marriage with his mother’s brother’s daughter, there occurs a clear instance of cross-cousin marriage, a practice normally associated with the south of India and so generally styled Dravidian. Trautmann (1974) has drawn attention to the fact that cross-cousin marriage of the Dravidian pattern has been a constant feature of family alliances in western India (which of course is and was non-Dravidian ethnically) and that any sources which describe it (in fact he only adduces one of Jain provenance) cannot be of eastern origin, even though their subject matter is located in that region, because there is no obvious evidence of cross-cousin marriage being or having both practised in the Ganges basin.

Thus the conclusion must be that the story of Jamāli’s marital relationship with Mahāvīra cannot be based on historical actuality, let alone involve, as claimed with regard to the Bhagavatī, some sort of suppression of information, but rather reflects the western Indian provenance of the Āvaśyaka Cūrṇī. It might be going too far to suggest that the whole story of Jamāli has been anachronistically linked with Mahāvīra by the redactors of a scriptural tradition whose centre of operations was in western India, but it might instil caution with regard to accepting everything in the Jain scriptures as being of an original eastern origin (cf. Tieken 2001: 587).

The emergence of Jamāli as a type and the question of his rebirths

The Āvaśyaka Cūrṇī (p. 418) explains Bahuraya, the name of Jamāli’s heresy according to Sthānāṅga Sūtra 587, as signifying that ‘many were delighted by his belief’ (etā e dīṭṭhe bahue jīvā ratā). However, there seems to be no evidence of any distinctive sect which perpetuated the master’s insight. The early common era collections of Prākrit commentarial verses refer to Jamāli as emblematic of a type inimical to the Jain community, but make no obvious reference to his teachings. According to Sūtrakṛtāṅga Niryukti v. 125, ‘The man of devious arguments who undermines with devious mind what has come down through succession of teachers will die as Jamāli died’. This verse was often quoted by later writers as a warning against selfishly causing strife in the Śvetāmbara Jain community.

Bṛhatkalpaśaḥya v. 1324 is similar in tone: ‘But whatever ignorant man having traduced that same (true) path, by (following) his own logic resorts to what is the wrong path is like the unperturbed (?) Jamāli’. Another influential text from a later period, Śānti Sūryi’s (tenth century) Ceiyavamāṇaṁmahābhāsa v. 131 again characterises Jamāli as the epitome of all negative tendencies: ‘The man who despises the community, considers himself learned and adopts what is bad (nonetheless) contrives to think of himself as different from people, just like Jamāli’.

A still later writer, Jinamaṇḍana Gani (fifteenth century) sums up in his Śrāddhaṅgaṁvarana (p. 52a) what had become the standard image of Jamāli as an abhinivasā, a man in the grip of an obsession who ‘as a rule attempts to establish a teaching of his own making through failing to consider the fundamentals of Jain philosophy’.
As mentioned earlier, Bhagavatī 9.33 describes Mahāvīra’s confirmation that those who have been born as Kilbiṣaka gods will after subsequent rebirth experience a maximum of five births in the four possible types of existence and then achieve deliverance, while others will continue to be reborn throughout samsāra. Jamāli, asserts Mahāvīra, will fall into the first category, apart from the fact that he will be reborn only amongst animals, gods and men, not amongst hellbeings. The later narratives of Jamāli are not uniform in reproducing this prediction. The Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi only refers to the heretic’s birth as a god and says nothing about his future existences. Siddhārṣi (ninth–tenth centuries) in his commentary called Heyopadeya on Upadeśamālā v. 459 has Jamāli bringing to conclusion a period as a Kilbiṣaka god and endless existence (kilbiṣakadevatvam bhavam cānantaṁ nivartitāvān). Vardhamāna (eleventh century), however, another commentator on the Upadeśamālā, describes in the same manner as the Bhagavatī how Jamāli will experience four or five existences as animal, human and god before attaining deliverance. Hemacandra in the Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpurusācarīta has him undergoing five rebirths (Johnson’s translation, vol. 6: 198). Jinapatī Śūri (see previous section) simply describes the heretic as experiencing various (anyāṇya) existences after ceasing to be a god, while Jinakusāla Śūri (see previous section) gives no information at all about his post-Kilbiṣika destiny.

It can be said that medieval Śvetāmbara tradition became increasingly more preoccupied with the precise characteristics of Jamāli’s rebirth destiny than with any possible ramifications of his heretical teaching. Succinct evidence for this can be seen in a question posed in the Hīrapraśnottarāṇi, a collection compiled by Kīrtivijaya in the second decade of the seventeenth century comprising answers provided by the great teacher Hīravijaya Śūri to various problems and a key source for assessing what issues members of the important Śvetāmbara subsect, the Tapā Gaccha, found difficult or controversial at that time. The question is put simply (p. 17): on the basis of the evidence of three textual sources, the Bhagavatī, the Karnikāvṛtti commentary on the Upadeśamālā and the Viracaritra, how many existences did Jamāli experience? The answer is even simpler: these texts show that he experienced fifteen existences.23

In his Vicāraratnākara (pp. 42b–43b) the afore-mentioned Kīrtivijaya expands on this. He describes how some ‘contemporary pseudo-scholars’ (ādhunikāḥ panditamanyāḥ) appeal to scripture in order to form the conclusion that Jamāli underwent endless (ananta) existences. The specific scriptural reference adduced by them is from Nandī Śūtra 116–117 which asserts that throughout all periods, past, present and future, the result of ‘damaging’ or ‘disrupting’ (virāhanā) the scriptural canon (duvālāsangam gaṇipidagam) through promulgating something contrary to it in terms of wording, meaning or both is to wander through ‘four pointed’ (cūranta) samsāra. By contrast, a respectful attitude (arāhanā) towards scripture enables one to get beyond samsāra.24

Those who argue on this basis, claims Kīrtivijaya, fail to understand the point (tātparya) of the scriptural passage. Although the commentary has given Jamāli as an example of wandering through four-pointed samsāra on the grounds of his
damaging scripture through wilfully misreading it,25 this example is in fact partial (ekadeśena), that being no complete correlation (sarvātmanā tulyatvam) of the example and the point which is to be derived from the example (dārśāntika). In the same way as the simile ‘her face is like the delightful moon’ is incomplete as an index of a woman’s beauty,26 the example of Jamāli simply relates to wandering through sāṃsāra, not to the ‘fourpointed forest’ (cāūñatām kantāram) of sāṃsāra. Wandering through sāṃsāra for Jamāli is completed by (sammāpannā) fifteen existences. If the example of Jamāli is not taken as partial but as a totality (sarvātmanā), then contradiction with the Bhagavatī would be involved (sammāpanipadāye), for the scripture states that he will experience only four or five existences in respect to three stages of rebirth (gati) and does not refer to limitless (ananta) existences.27

Kīrtivijaya’s discussion bears witness to the fact that by the early seventeenth century the nature of Jamāli’s karmic destiny had come to be a factor in the dispute between the rival Sāgara and Vijaya lineages of the Tapā Gaccha. While it goes without saying that practical issues of power and authority were involved, a central feature of the dispute as intellectually constituted revolved around the moral status of those who did not belong to the Tapā Gaccha and the uprightness or otherwise of teachers who promulgated paths different from orthodox Jainism, with Jamāli functioning as a possible primordial example of such an individual (Balbir 1999 and Dundas forthcoming).

Dharmasāgara, who flourished in the second half of the sixteenth century, is clearly the individual who is being criticised by Kīrtivijaya in the Vicārāratnākara. His highly controversial Sarvajñaṭaṅka, ‘One Hundred Verses on the Omniscient Ones’, a work proscribed by the leaders of the Tapā Gaccha for its intolerant stance, strongly reasserts (vv. 103–104 with autocommentary) the view of the Bhagavatī that Jamāli was in the grip of false doctrine through irrational obsession and a promulgater of what is contrary to scripture (utsūtra) in that he misrepresented the words of the teachings. As an agent of disrespect (āśūtaṇā) towards the Jinas, Dharmasāgara claims against what would appear to be the specific statement of the Bhagavatī that Jamāli must on such grounds inevitably be anantasamsārin, an individual who will be reborn for an ‘endless’ period of time (see below), rather than having his existences restricted to fifteen, albeit eventually attaining deliverance after this. This judgement fits into the broader strategy directed by Dharmasāgara at what he perceives to be false teachers and self-appointed leaders of sectarian splits.

I will now give a highly condensed account of the salient points of Dharmasāgara’s argument and then demonstrate how they were countered in the second half of the seventeenth century by Yaśovijaya, the main representative of the irenic wing of the Tapā Gaccha. Of necessity, I will omit the fine detail of what is often a rather involved argument.

**Dharmasāgara on Jamāli’s rebirths**

The root verses of the Sarvajñaṭaṅkā are composed in Prākrit. Verse 103 runs as follows: ‘The obsessive (abhinivēṣi) who is deeply involved in disrespect towards
the Jinas and their teachings (āsāyanā) is certainly an ocean of suffering brought about by endless (ananta) sāṃśāra, as in the example of Jamāli’.  

In his Sanskrit autocommentary, Dharmasāgara provides as supporting scriptural authority Gacchācāra v. 31 which prescribes endless (ananta) sāṃśāra for monks who have set out on the wrong path (unmārga, glossed as nihnavamārga, the ‘path of concealing the doctrine’) and those who destroy the true path. He then refers to the fact that the term ananta, literally ‘without end’, is in actuality divided into gradations, from the lowest (jaghaṇa) upward; in other words, ananta does not literally mean ‘endless’. Dharmasāgara claims that since ascribing to the Jina what has not been preached by him is the worst sort of fault, the consequence must be commensurate in intensity. Therefore at the maximum (utkṛṣṭatayā) the length of rebirth in sāṃśāra experienced by such an individual as, for example, Jamāli, who evinced great disrespect (āsatanā) towards the Jina and his words, can be said in technical terms to consist of ‘half a pudgala-parāvartta less a part’ (deśonapārddha-pudgala-parāvartta). Given that a pudgala-parāvartta represents ‘the time required by a soul to absorb as karman at least once all the atoms of the universe and release them after they have come to fruition’ (Tatia 1958: 291), a soul such as that of Jamāli, who represents a standard exemplification of an enemy of the doctrine, can be regarded as condemned to a vast period of rebirth, albeit not a literally endless one, for eventually he will gain deliverance, as is clearly stated in the Bhagavatti. Dharmasāgara backs up this judgement by reference to the authoritative Śīlāṅka (ninth century) who in commenting on Śūrakṛtānga Niryukti v. 125 (referred to earlier) uses the analogy of a pot revolving on a mechanical waterwheel (aragha-ṭaghāṭyantra) to describe the rebirth destiny of such an individual who misrepresents the doctrine which has descended through the teacher lineage (cf. Bollée 1977: 113, n. 35). 

Dharmasāgara clarifies the context of this analogy by claiming that it applies to whoever experiences a particularly long (drgaṇyanā) period of sāṃśāra through repeated rebirth amongst one-sensed creatures and the rest. This is confirmed by reference to Haribhadra (sixth century) who describes at Upadeśapada v. 16 how the fault of carelessness in respect to one’s surroundings (pramāda) as a result of ignorance leads to long ‘life-duration’ (kāyasthitī) amongst one-sensed creatures. Municandra (eleventh–twelfth centuries), the commentator on this verse, expands it by reference to the analogy of the waterwheel. Dharmasāgara then goes on to quote Nandi Śūtra 116–117 (also cited by Kīrtivijaya in his Vicārāratnakara; see above) which refers to the consequence of harming the scriptural canon as being wandering through four-pointed sāṃśāra, and the eleventh century Malayagiri’s commentary thereon which invokes Jamāli as an example of someone who damages the scriptures through reading them differently (anyathā sūtram pathati) because of obsession (abhiniveśa). This position is clinched by Dharmasāgara by reference to a verse from the Pañcasamgraha (eleventh century): ‘He who does not approve of one word of scripture, even though approving of the rest, is of false belief like Jamāli’. If in the light of these various authoritative references Jamāli, who has evinced massive disrespect
towards the word of the Jinas, were not to be anantasamsārin but rather one whose rebirths are delimited to a mere fifteen, then, Dharmasāgara claims, there would be massive inconsistency.

Dharmasāgara goes on to deal with the issue of possible discrepancy between some of the textual accounts of Jamāli’s fate by reference to the standard description in Bhagavatti 9.33 and Siddharṣi’s commentary on Upadeśamālā v. 459. The Upadeśamālā, which describes Jamāli as abandoning a kingdom and becoming leader of the Ājīvikas (see note 1), does not provide any details about his fate. Siddharṣi’s commentary, which Dharmasāgara specifically dates to the Vikrama era year 720 (i.e. 663 CE) and so confirms as an old but non-canonical authority, describes Jamāli as first being reborn as a Kīlbīṣaka god because of the intense austerity he had performed and as thereafter experiencing endless rebirth (bhavān cānantaṃ nivartitavān) until he attained deliverance.34 The Bhagavatti, however, refers to ‘four (or) five’ (cattāri paṃca) animal, human and god existences prior to final deliverance (which demonstrates that Dharmasāgara is not following the reading of the Jaina Āgama Series edition). In reply to the obvious objection that the meaning of the scriptural passage does not signify endless rebirths, however that is interpreted, Dharmasāgara states that the numerical expression ‘four (or) five’ relates sequentially (kramena) to moving (trasa) and stationary (sthāvara) types of life and thus gives a total of nine when comprising all jīvas (namely one-sensed earth-, water-, fire-, wind-, tree-life forms, and two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed and five-sensed creatures). Rebirth amongst humans and gods certainly relates to the five-sensed category, but rebirth amongst animals, Dharmasāgara claims by applying the term to lower forms of life, involves all nine categories and is ‘endless’ for those expressing contempt towards the Jinas and their teachings. This, he claims, is the position in authoritative scripture in general.

Dharmasāgara goes on to explain the implication of the foregoing. It is normally an accepted principle that those who are enemies of their teachers wander endlessly in samsāra among the nine possible types of life in the four states of rebirth (animal, hellbeing, human and god). However, Bhagavatti 9.33 has to be taken separately as describing a special case because it states that Jamāli through his own specific and unique destiny (tathābhavyatva) will be reborn among only three of these states, that is, with the exception of that of hellbeings. So an individual can through fate be reborn among the gods, and among the hellbeings also, without being reborn in animal and human state.35 However, taking birth amongst animals and human beings is necessary to bring about endless wandering throughout samsāra and subsequent deliverance. Thus the expression ‘taking birth amongst animals amid the nine states of existence’, which is how Dharmasāgara interprets Mahāvīra’s prediction of Jamāli’s destiny in Bhagavatti 9.33, must be regarded as denoting such endless wandering. In actuality, Dharmasāgara claims, reference to animal rebirths also conventionally (samayabhāṣayā) denotes endless existences.36

In addition, there is evidence of a more unambiguous account of Jamāli’s fortunes. Dharmasāgara refers to a manuscript of the Jamāli section of Bhagavatti 9.33
which does not contain the word ‘four’ (and thus is in accord with Jaina Āgama Series reading), so that the reference is simply to rebirth among the five types of life defined as one-sensed to five-sensed. The account of Jamāli given by Hemacandra in his Trīṣaṭīśaḷaḷaṅkāpuruṣacarīta seems to reflect this, describing him as falling from heaven, then wandering for five times (pañcakṛtyvah) among animals, men and gods. Dharmasāgara interprets this as meaning rebirth five times amongst animals only and suggests that since Jamāli has indulged in great disrespect towards the Jinas and their teachings, his fate could unquestionably involve an endless period of time in that even if one is reborn five times amongst animals, one could still experience endless rebirths multiplied endless times.

Furthermore, Dharmasāgara continues, the general applicability (prayoga) of the scriptural statement about Jamāli wandering through saṃsāra has of necessity to relate to endless existences. For such a general point relating to a predestined soul (bhavya) whose deliverance is imminent after a brief period of finite existences does not occur in any authoritative text. What is being indicated is that Jamāli, having ceased his period of existence among the Kilbiśaka gods, thereupon experienced some low and contemptible human births not conducive to following Jainism, being subsequently reborn among minute (sūkṣma) one-sensed creatures.37 It is impossible, indeed against scripture, that somebody who has erred as Jamāli did in being inimical to his teacher will, immediately on ceasing to be a Kilbiśaka god, re-enter the Jain path. Thus what is stated about Jamāli’s wandering through saṃsāra in the Bhagavatī and other authoritative sources (sāmānyasūtram) can be said to be consistent. The more radical statement of the Bhagavatī that some wander for ever through beginningless and endless four-pointed saṃsāra must be understood as referring to the souls called abhavya, who are doomed to eternal rebirth because of their innate negative propensities, since there is no mention in the text of their gaining of deliverance.

Dharmasāgara then attacks the possibility that the number ‘five’ mentioned in the Bhagavatī should be multiplied by the three rebirth states to give a total of fifteen existences for Jamāli, which was Hīravijaya’s Sūri’s conclusion recorded in the Hirapraśnottarāṇī (see above). Leaving aside the problem of the word ‘four’ also occurring in the Bhagavatī (here Dharmasāgara does not refer to the manuscript he has previously adduced) and thus the possibility of differing calculations of the relevant numbers, how would the five existences be divided up? Would it be two existences as animal, two as god and one as human? Or three as animal, one as human and one as god? Or what? There is no reference in any authoritative text which would make such a calculation valid.

Dharmasāgara argues that the general example of scripture which prescribes the period of rebirth for delinquents must hold good. Otherwise Marcici, the grandson of Rṣabha the first Jina of this time cycle who is ultimately reborn as the final Jina Mahāvīra, would have taken birth for an incalculable (asanikhyeya) number of existences among one-sensed creatures simply as a result of an ill-judged statement (durvacana) which ultimately led to the promulgation by his pupil Kapila of the heretical Sāṃkhya doctrine. On the other hand,
Prince Subāhu, who honoured the word of the Jinas yet subsequently experienced sixteen rebirths, would suffer more than Jamāli who actually traduced the word of the Jinas.38

Dharmasāgara insists that indifference to the incorrect view that Jamāli attained liberation after a mere fifteen existences would entail that disrespect towards the Jinas has no consequence. Anybody aware of this would have no sense of fear and so engage in inappropriate behaviour. In fact, the teaching of those who speak what is contrary to the scriptures unquestionably results in endless samsāra and so liberation from rebirth has to be far distant for those guilty of this fault. Rejection of even a fraction of what has been spoken by the Jinas implies contempt for the entire scriptural canon because it involves lack of trust (pratyaya) in the authoritative teachers.39 It cannot be claimed that Jamāli could simultaneously reject the proposition ‘what is being made is made’ and maintain his faith in all the other teachings. This would be tantamount to claiming that he could have contradictory means of gaining knowledge (upayoga).

Yaśovijaya’s response to Dharmasāgara

Yaśovijaya’s (1624–1688) reply to Dharmasāgara’s argument about Jamāli occurs in his Dharmaparīksā (pp. 203–231) and is a component of a broader argument concerning the nature of the upright heretic, that individual who, while not following all the specifications of the Jain path, nonetheless advocates a morally blameless soteriological path which does not substantially deviate from that of the Jains. Yaśovijaya deals with Dharmasāgara’s points in reverse order of their occurrence in the Sarvajñaśataka and as he frequently matches his opponent in complexity and minutiae of detail. I provide here only the gist of his position on the subject of Jamāli’s rebirths.

As we saw, the scriptural commentator Śilānka asserted that Jamāli will wander through samsāra endlessly in the same way as a pot revolves on a mechanical water wheel. Yaśovijaya argues that to interpret this as signifying repeated rebirth in the four possible states of existence is the result of misreading the scriptures. He criticises those who rely on Śilānka’s statement alone as a proof, claiming that it could equally well establish what Dharmasāgara does not and, because of the testimony of Bhagavatī 9.33, cannot accept, namely Jamāli’s rebirth in all four states of rebirth.

In broad terms, since rebirth in the various states of existence is different in respect to every person, why can there not be a different trajectory of rebirth in terms of difference of will (adhyavasāya) exercised by an individual?40 Yaśovijaya claims that if, as is stated by Gacchācāra v. 31, one of the main proof texts used by Dharmasāgara, there is endless samsāra for those who preach what is contrary to the scriptures, then by following another authoritative source, Upadeśapada vv. 422–423,41 there also would have to be endless samsāra for monks of lax behaviour (pārśvastha).42 However, that there is difference in that respect is conveyed through the fact that the respective mental activity (parināma)
informing action is not the same. Moreover, if one understands that the analogy of the waterwheel used with reference to wandering through samsāra implies the endlessness of the process, then one would also have to accept that there is endless samsāra also for those addicted to sexual activity in the same manner as for those who teach matters contrary to the scriptures. For the analogy must operate with regard to them as well, as can be seen when Śīlāṅka uses it in his commentary on Ācārāṅga Sūtra 1.3.2.2. In actuality, this analogy is used in many places and cannot have the burden of significance ascribed to it by Dharmasāgara.

Yaśovijaya also claims that Dharmasāgara has overinterpreted Bhagavatī 9.33’s description of Jamāli’s rebirths in insisting that the words ‘four (or) five’ refer to types of existences (jāti), such as two-sensed and one-sensed. In doing so, he flouts the basic rules of grammar which would by this reading of the text require the locative case. Furthermore, if endless samsāra for Jamāli were to be intended by the sūtra, then the wording would have to be phrased differently and contain the expression ‘endless’. Similarly, the account of the destiny of the Ājīvika leader Makkhali Gosāla, described in chapter thirteen of the Bhagavatī, would require to be reformulated. How could there be endless rebirth among nine types (jāti), since there could in actuality be completion of the whole process after nine occasions? Generalisations about being reborn among every type of creature (vyakti) are not derived from literal words (aksara) and are incompatible (bādhita) with the examples of all the animals, gods and humans who are reborn in this way. What is the point of resorting to the scriptures for an explanation, as Dharmasāgara repeatedly does, when one has already idiosyncratically established one’s interpretation upon the presupposition of fixed endless rebirth? This, claims Yaśovijaya, is itself disrespect for the Jinas.

Yaśovijaya then discusses Hemacandra’s description of Jamāli being reborn five times amongst animals, men and gods. According to Dharmasāgara, the sense of this must be that Jamāli will be reborn five times amongst animals, with the necessary implication that he will be subjected to endless rebirths in other states. Yaśovijaya rejects this on linguistic grounds. The word ‘five’ can only be taken with the whole of the following compound, so that the overall sense is ‘having been reborn five times amongst animals, humans and gods’. There is no authority for Jamāli being reborn amongst lower forms of life nor is there any warranty for the idea that he gains liberation after a particularly long time period of time. Predestination (tathābhavyatva), already referred to by Dharmasāgara, determines the specific nature of one’s rebirth and there is no point in comparing the destinies of other individuals recorded in Jain legend who seem to have suffered more than Jamāli despite their piety. Yaśovijaya invokes as a counter-example in this respect the figure of Drdhaprahārin, a byword for evil actions in Jain tradition, who nonetheless gained liberation. Furthermore, scriptural texts which do not mention liberation can not be taken, as Dharmasāgara claims, as referring to the abhavya, the type of individual who will never gain release, since that is easily contradicted by reference to other passages in the Bhagavatī.
Yaśovijaya is untroubled by Dharmasāgara’s strictures about the force of the expression ‘four (or) five’, adducing evidence to show that the expression can simply have the sense of ‘five’, as Hemacandra and others interpret with reference to Jamālī. It is noteworthy, however, that Yaśovijaya does not specifically refer to the conclusion of earlier Tāpā Gaccha teachers such as Hiravijaya Sūri and Kīrtivijaya that Jamālī’s rebirths were fifteen in number, but simply points to grammatical authority for taking ‘five’ with each component of the compound ‘animals, men and gods’.

In the final stages of his riposte Yaśovijaya addresses the issue of textual sources. He quotes the Doghaṭṭi commentary on the Upadeśamālā which describes Jamālī being reborn four or five times amongst animals, humans and gods and is thus in accord with the words of scripture as evinced in Bhagavatī 9.33. He then refers to Siddharṣi’s commentary on the Upadeśamālā, showing that different manuscripts of this text give different accounts of Jamālī’s fate, with one stating that he underwent endless existences and so being viewed by Dharmasāgara as vindication of his position.

Yaśovijaya asserts that on the basis of this evidence those who are qualified and of a neutral disposition (madhyasthātārthāḥ) interpret the situation as follows. According to many texts, most notably the Bhagavatī, Jamālī is known to have experienced a delimited number of rebirths, whereas by following particular readings of Siddharṣi’s commentary on the Upadeśamālā he can be said to have experienced endless existences. In other words, the textual evidence adduced by Dharmasāgara is exiguous. Although it might be held that the real situation is only to be understood by those who already know the truth about reality, one can nonetheless conclude that there is at least partial agreement between the differing accounts and that one must accept the good faith of the learned. As Yaśovijaya puts it, texts are not to be tortured on the wheel of negative preconceived ideas.

**Conclusion**

Dharmasāgara and Yaśovijaya offer two different interpretations of a scriptural passage in Bhagavatī 9.33. For the former, the passage’s purport, after some creative interpretation and reliance on restricted evidence, can only be that Jamālī’s disrespect for his teacher and the Jain doctrine is such that he must be reborn for a vast period of time in low forms of existence before achieving liberation. For Yaśovijaya, the scriptural passage does not have to be taken too far from its literal sense to establish that Jamālī only experienced a relatively short number of rebirths to expiate his misdemeanour. This disagreement is itself a component of the dispute within the Tāpā Gaccha concerning the moral status of non-Jain teachers and Jain teachers who promulgate sectarian versions of Jainism.

We have seen that if the figure of Jamālī never entirely disappears from Śvetāmbara Jainism, he is not so much associated with a particular teaching as deemed to be an exemplar of a moral failing which manifested itself most
markedly in challenging Mahāvīra’s omniscience. So the disagreement between monastic intellectuals of the Tāpā Gaccha in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries turned around the rebirth status of Jamāli as an example of a type who develops hostile tendencies towards his teacher, not his possible loss of status as a Jain through his false teaching; for he never challenged the ascetic ideology at the basis of the Jain path. Similarly, the modern monk Nyayavijaya (1998: 207) can in his recent extensive survey of Jain teaching and philosophy simply describe Jamāli as being an example of abhiniveśa-mithyātva, someone who obsessively follows false doctrine, without deeming it necessary to delineate in any way the nature of the false doctrine to which he subscribed.

Recent students of heresy have drawn attention to the manner in which medieval Christian heretics, while deviant in terms of items of practice or belief, nonetheless broadly endorsed the dominant discourse of the Christian church (Berlinerblau 2001: 347–351). Although the term ‘heretic’ cannot be fully mapped on to the conceptual world of traditional Indian soteriologies, Jamāli might be held by the religious historian to represent heresy as just described, in that he is both a participant within normative Jainism as represented by the scriptures through his full espousal of the ascetic path and at the same time outside it through his attempt to reconfigure an aspect of the authoritative teachings.\(^50\)

For the Jain devotee, however, the significance of Jamāli must lie in the fact that whatever his moral turpitude, his eventual deliverance from rebirth and attainment of liberation are prophesied as inevitable by Mahāvīra. Representative in this respect not so much of irredeemable evil but of the possibility of purging the effects of one’s errors and eventually gaining the goal of the path, as even Dharmasāgara had to admit, the story of Jamāli is in its totality a means of inculcating optimism even in the midst of the indignities of rebirth.\(^51\)

**Notes**

1 *Upadeśamālā* v. 459: Ājīvagagānaneyā rajjasirin payahātā ya Jamāli/hiyam appano karimto na ya vayānijī ihā padamto.

2 A mnemonic verse quoted by Sīhānāga Sūtra 755 (p. 310 of Jambūvijaya’s Jaina Āgama Series edition) refers to Jamāli as being the subject of the sixth chapter of the *Antakṛddasāḥ*, a judgment not borne out by inspection of the text as transmitted.

3 For the sāgaropama as a length of time, see Schubring 2000: 226.

4 For the expression *anavadaggā*, see Burrow 1979: 42–43.

5 The expression cāuraṃta (elsewhere sometimes cauraṃta) refers to the four possible types of existence.

6 This was noted long ago by Leumann 1997: 534–535 and more recently by Ohira 1994: 148.

7 *Sīhānāga Sūtra* 355 specifies four reasons for being reborn as a Kilbīṣaka god, one of which is teaching what is contrary to the path (*ummagga-desanā*). For the dimensions of the Lāntaka heaven and its location as the fourth vimāna, see Kirfel 1967: 211, 297.

8 The expression jāva cattāri paṃca occurs elsewhere in the *Bhagāvati* and the *Jīva-bhīgama Sūtra*, as pointed out by Yaśovijaya, Dharmaparīkṣā (see later), p. 224.

9 The specific inserted wordings are *muccanti parinīvāyamti savvadukkhānaṃ* and *bujjhiti mccihiti parinīvāhiti savvadukkhānaṃ*. 

53
10 Bhatt 1983: 112 regards the mokṣa-indicating phrase of the type savvadukkhānām antam karehītī as ‘on the whole’ connected in the Bhagavatī with laymen.

11 Note that the three locations mentioned in Bhagavatī 9.32 and 9.33 are connected with the three classes of brahman, warrior and merchant.

12 See note 33. Of course, both Jamāli and Gosthāmāhila are presented as viewing their teachings as representing a major challenge to the Jina’s doctrine.

13 Cf. Uttarādhiyana Niryuktī v. 167. Verses 2825 and 2832 of Jinabhadrā’s Viśeśavasyābhaṣya, a text approximately contemporary with the Āvasyaka Cūrṇi, refer to Priyadarśanā following Jamāli out of love for her husband and then rejoining Mahāvīra (Mehta and Chandra 1970: 456).

14 Āvasyaka Cūrṇi p. 417 suggests that the issue disputed by Jamāli turned around the identification of the precise instant in the process of production when an object could be deemed to have come into being. The general response to this is that if an object which is to be involved in movement were not to be regarded as having moved at the very first instant of a succession of instants, then it would be difficult to argue that it had moved at the second and subsequent instants. A cloth comes into being when the first thread is deployed at the precise time of the beginning of the action bringing it into being. If it were not to come into being at that instant, then that action would be pointless because it would not have any result. For since an action has as its aim producing what is to be produced, and as something which has not arisen at that particular initial instant would certainly not arise at later instants, what particular physical manifestation would those and subsequent actions take in respect to an entity, in that it is being argued that it does not come into being through an initial action but through the later ones? Jamāli’s position logically entails non-origination and the non-efficacy of action and time. Cf. Ohira’s interpretation given above.

15 Hemacandra in a brief disproof of Jamāli’s position argues for the significance of the name of an object being mentioned even when it has just begun to be made. ‘If an object is not said to be completed in the first instant, it does not come into existence at another moment because of the non-distinction between moments’ (Johnson’s translation, p. 195).

Jinapati Śūri discusses the nature of difference between entities, describing (v. 226) the unreflecting view that something being made is not made as ‘standard’ (laukika).

If, Jinapati Śūri suggests (v. 229), there is complete difference between something which has been made and what is being made through their being unconnected, how could the thought of the object being made manifest itself, because it would be continually non-existent throughout? Jinapati Śūri appeals (vv. 24–25) to the two levels of truths structure which here would locate ‘being made’ and ‘made’ as separate on the transactional vyavahāra level but non-different on the more profound niścaya level.

Jinakūśāla Śūri depicts Jamāli as basing his position on the likelihood of an infinite regress (anavasthā) of initial instants with regard to the performance of an action. This is rejected on the grounds that it would undermine cause and effect.

16 Tieken (2001) argues for the chronological priority of the Jinacarita.

17 Cf. Uttarādhyayana Niryuktī v. 165: bahu-rayā Jamāli-pabhavā. The alternative Āvasyaka Cūrṇi explanation (bahuṣu samaesu kaijjasiddhiṃ paducca ratā saktā bahu-ratā) fancifully plays on the nature of Jamāli’s teaching that an act only comes into being over the course of many instants.

18 āyariyaparamparaena āgayaṁ jo u cheyabuddhe/kovei cheyavādi Jamālināsāṁ sa nāśiḥi.

19 Cf. the eleventh–twelfth century Municandra’s Pāksikasaptati v. 53, the twelfth century Prabodhacandra’s commentary on Jinadatta Śūri’s Sandhehadolavali-prakaraṇa pp. 41b–42a and the fourteenth-century Dharmakīrti’s commentary on Devendra Śūri’s Caitya-vandana-bhaṣya p. 337 v. 47.
20 jo puna tam eva maggaṃ dāseum apāndio sattakkāe / ummaggaṃ padivajjai akoviyyappā Jamālīva.
21 saṅghaṃ avamannaṃto jānagaṃni jaño asaggāhi / kaham avi bhinnam mannaī Jamālīpumamaṇam appaṇāṃ.
22 abhinīviṣṭo hi pumān prāyas tatvādivicārabahirbhūvena svāṅgikṛtam eva samarthayate. According to Yaśovijaya (see later), Pratimāśatapa p. 149, Mahāvīra, who was well aware of Jamālī’s nature, responded with silence rather than specific rejection when he asked for permission to leave his teacher, on the grounds that ‘true words used to guide one who is of undisciplined behaviour have untruth as their result’ (avinithe hi satyavācaḥ prayogo ‘pi phalato ‘satya eva).
23 The Karnikāvṛtti on the Upadeśamālā was written by Udayaprabha Sūri in 1243 (Sandesara 1953: 71 and 187–188), while the Viracarita could be the tenth book of Hemacandra’s Trīṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacarita (Johnson’s translation, volume 6) or the Prākrit kāvyā by Gunacandra (a monk in the lineage of the eleventh century teacher Abhayadeva Sūri) referred to by Yaśovijaya, Dharmaparikṣā p. 225.
24 Text from the Jain Āgama Series edition p. 47: icceiyaṃ duvalāsaṃgam ganipidagam tie kāle anamtā jīvā ānāe virāḥettā cāuraṃtam sāmsārakarmāram atupariyaṭṭhīṃsu. icceiyaṃ duvalāsaṃgam ganipidagam padupannaṃkāle parittā jīvā ānāe virāḥettā cāuraṃtam sāmsārakarmāram atupariyaṭṭhīṃti. icceiyaṃ duvalāsaṃgam ganipidagam anāgatā kāle anamtā jīvā ānāe virāḥettā cāuraṃtam sāmsārakarmāram atupariyaṭṭhīṃti.

Kīrtivijaya abbreviates the second section.
25 See Haribhadra’s commentary on the Nandī Sūtra, p. 94.
26 The description by Gerow 1971: 153 of ‘partial’ (ekadeśin) simile suggests that Kīrtivijaya’s point is that the expression ‘the girl’s face is like the moon’ requires a wider range of similes to give a complete description of her body.
27 In quoting the Bhagavati, Kīrtivijaya’s omits the ājva found in the Jaina Āgama Series edition.
28 so ‘bhīṇivesṭ niṃmā anamtaṃsāmāradukkhasalilaniḥ/āsāyanāḥ bahalo jahā Jamālī tavoanayaavo. ummaggamaggasampaṭṭhiṇa sāhūṇa Goyamā nūṇam/sāmsāro a anamto hoi a sammaggamāṇāṃ.’

The Gacchācāra belongs to the prakirṇaka category of scripture and is clearly one of the younger texts of the Śvetāmbara canon.
30 This subtlety was well known to medieval Jain karma theory. See Caturtha Karmagrantha of Devendra Sūri v. 79 and cf. Mahetā 1999: 259–261 who sets out the various gradations involved.
31 Tatia 1994: 304 defines (s.v.) ardhapudgala-parivartana as ‘half the time it takes all karmic particles to undergo their complete course of binding and falling from the soul.’ On p. 35 he gives a fuller definition: Those who are destined to attain liberation are capable of achieving the requisite enlightened world view through suppressing, eliminating or partially suppressing and partially eliminating the view deluding karma. Once they do this, they have a set period of time before achieving liberation. The maximum span of this period is equal to half the time it takes for a soul
to bind and release all the karmic particles scattered in the cosmos (something it has done an infinite number of times in its beginningless career).

For canonical occurrences of this notion, cf. Deleu 1970: 182–185 and 184 where poggala-pariyatta is rendered by ‘atomic regroupment’. Ohira 1994: 91 explains pudgala-parivartanā as the ‘time cycle for a jīva in taking in and out the total matters in the universe.’ For remaining in samsāra for half a poggala-pariyatta, see Deleu 1970: 193. The expression deśona, ‘less a part’ would seem to imply ‘just under’ and possibly refers to the period of life lived or karma exhausted immediately before the fixed period of time comes into play.

32 eam puna eam khalu anānāpamāyadosao ṇeṇam / jaha dwā kāyathī bhaniā egindīānam.

33 eyam akkharam pi jo na roei suttaniditham / sesam roamto vi hu micchāditthī Jamālī vva. Jamālī’s hiseresy effectively turned around one syllable, a private ‘a’ added to the second component of the formula kademāne kade. For the Pañcasamgraha of Candrarsi, see Mahetā and Kāpadā 1968: 123–126. An edition of Pañcasamgraha is not available to me.

For a similar sentiment to that of the Pañcasamgraha, see Hemacandra, Trīsaṣṭiśālakāpuruśasaracarita 10.8 (Johnson’s translation, vol. 6: 195): ‘The Arhats do not speak falsely, devoid of love and hate. There is not an atom of error, obscured perception, et cetera, in their words’; Jinapati Sūri on Paścalingiprakaraṇa p. 43a v. 268: viropadiṣṭakapadapalāpāt sanghe Jamālīrīta dura durbhago ‘bhit / vyāṅgah punmā angulimātraḥhangat kim aniga mangalyapaḍam labheta; and Jinakusāla Sūri on Caityavandanakulaka p. 57a v. 56: śraddhaḥāty arhatāṃ yo nākṣaramātram api śrutam / miṣṭhāravam yāto so ‘vasyam durgatiṃ ca tataḥ param.

34 Scholarship generally dates Siddharṣi to around 870–920.

35 Dharmasāgara states at Sarvajñāśataka, p. 268, that the expression cāuraṃta is an epithet of samsāra and need not literally refer to the four locations of rebirth (gati). Not all those designated anantasamsārin are reborn in the four gati. Everyone’s rebirth is different because of tathābhavayvatva.

36 Dharmasāgara states at Sarvajñāśataka, p. 268, that the minimum requirement for being anantasamsārin is animal and human rebirth, otherwise it would be impossible to be anantasamsārin and also subsequently achieve deliverance.

37 Dharmasāgara cites Daśaśaivikālika Sūtra 5.2.47–48:

And when he is to be born as a god and come to existence as a [Kilbiṣaka] god, he does not know which of his deeds results in this. When his life there has come to an end, he will be born with impediment in his speech, then in one of the hells or as an animal, where it is very difficult to attain enlightenment.

(Schurbing 1977: 214–215)

38 For Marīci and Kapila, see Hemacandra, Trīsaṣṭiśālakāpuruśasaracarita (Johnson’s translation, volume 1): 3–8. The nature of the relationship between the two and its relevance to the case of Jamālī is discussed by Dharmaśāgara, Sarvajñāśataka v. 104 with autocommentary. For Prince Subāhu, see Mehta and Chandra 1972: 823–824.

39 Cf. note 33.

40 For adhyavasāya, see Glasenapp 1991: 94 s.v.

41 stiyalavihāra ko khalu bhagavantāsāyanā niogena/tatto bhavo anamto kilesahulho jao bhaniyam.

   tithhavapavanāsūyun āyariya ānunāhara mirdhīyam/āsāyamto bahuso anantasamsārio hoti.

42 Here Yaśovijaya refers to but does not quote the Mahāniśthā Sūtra.

43 See p. 106 of Jambūvijaya’s edition of the Ācārāṅga Sūtra. The sūtra specifically talks about the one who lives through violence (ārmbhāpajīvi). Destruction of life forms is, of course, a consequence of sexual congress according to Jain prescription.
Yaśovijaya proposes the rephrasings tiriyamanussadevesu anāmābhi bhavaggāhaṇāmīṃ samṣāram anupariśītita pacchā sījhiṣsai and jahā Gosāle Māmklāliputte teheva neraivaṃj samṣāram anupariśītita tao pacchā sījhiṣsai.


Drāhpahārīn was a merciless cutthroat prior to becoming a Jain monk. See Mehta and Chanda 1970: 354.

Yaśovijaya, Dharmaparīkṣā, pp. 222–223, refers to the case of the layman Śāṃkha described at Bhagavati 12.1.

The Doghāṭti commentary was written by Ratnaprabha Sūrī in 1182 (Caudhari 1973: 324 and Sandesara 1953: 188). There is a Gujarati translation of this work by Hemāsāgara Sūrī, Mūṃbāi: Ananda Hemagranthamālāvali 1975, but I have not had access to it.


The early seventeenth century Senaprasāna, p. 42, states that the various heretics (nīhāvāna) are still members of the Jain community (svapakṣa).

Cf. the location of a lost, possibly original version of the story of Jamāli in the Antakṛdaśāḥ (see note 2), a text describing those who attained liberation.

Bibliography

Primary sources


Āvaśyaka Cūṛṇi of Jinadāsa, Ratlām: Rṣabhdevīji Keśarmalji Śvētāmbaruṣasmāthā, 1928.


Caiyavandanabhāṣya of Devendra Sūrī with the commentary of Dharmakīrti. Mūṃbāi: Jinaśāsana Ārādhana Trāṣṭ, samvat 2045 [CE 1988].


Hirapraśnottarāṇī compiled by Kāśyapijaya Gaṇin. Mumbaī: Jina Śāsana Ārādhana Trāst, samvat 2045 [CE 1988].
Sandehadolāvaliprakarana of Jinadatta Sūri with the commentary of Prabodhacandra Gaṇin. Jetaran: Sheth Chhaganlal Hirachand, 1918.
Upadeśapada of Haribhadra with the commentary of Municandra. Mumbāi: Jinaśāsana Ārādhana Trāst, samvat 2046 [CE 1989].

Secondary sources


——. *The Doctrine of the Jainas Described after the Old Sources* (second revised edition). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.


3

THE DATING OF THE JAINA COUNCILS

Do scholarly presentations reflect the traditional sources?

Royce Wiles

The oldest manuscripts of Śvetāmbara canonical texts are palm-leaf ones from the eleventh to twelfth centuries CE. As shown by Hoernle (Uvāsagadāsā 1880–90), Alsdorf (1965: 42), Bollée (1977–1988) and by my own doctoral work on the Nirayāvaliyā (Wiles 2000) there is, in all likelihood, only one recension of most, if not all, Śvetāmbara canonical texts. A definitive interpretation of the material available on the history of the Śvetāmbara ‘canon’ has not yet been written, however, current views on this are summarized in the standard scholarly accounts of Jainism (Dundas 1992: 53–70, Jaini 1979: 42–88, Schubring 1935 §37–56). Since the first descriptions of the canon by Jacobi (1879) and Weber (1883–1885), the most original contribution to the description of this history has been the work of Kapadia (1941) who provided citations of evidence from the primary source materials. Here I wish to query a consistent feature of scholarly presentations about the redacting councils to which the Śvetāmbara canon is attributed, namely a recurring weakness to adequately identify and examine the sources upon which these scholarly presentations are based, especially the bases for the dating of the councils. I want to show that current scholarly accounts do not adequately represent the sources.

According to the Śvetāmbara tradition, the final council of Valabhi under Devardhīgaṇin was critical to the recension of the extant canon transmitted to us. I will therefore focus more attention on it, and present only an outline of the material on the other councils.

Bhadrabāhu and the council of Pāṭaliputra

Dundas gives a clear version of the current scholarly opinion on the first council:

The first recitation [of the Jaina scriptural canon] is supposed to have been held at Pataliputra (modern Patna) 160 years after Mahavira’s
death, as a result of which knowledge of the twelve-limbed canon was deemed to be imperfect and, with the subsequent disappearance of the *Drishtivada*, it was officially reduced to eleven limbs.

(Dundas 1992: 62)

Dundas adds further down the page that ‘the earliest accounts of any of the recitations date from the second half of the seventh century…’ (Dundas 1992: 62). What is not stated however, is that the date just indicated – 160 AV – does not come down to us from the second half of the seventh century. According to my readings, the date of 160 AV is based (solely?) on Hemacandra’s *Pariśīṭaparvan* (9.112) which was written during v.s. 1216–1229.

Most scholarly accounts of the first council, at Pātāliputra, demonstrate a failure to accurately present information about the original sources. Schubring includes material on the first council in his epitome of the Jaina lineage of teachers, his version is based on Hemacandra’s *Pariśīṭaparvan*, which he dates to v.s. 1216–1229 (Schubring 1935 (§23): 34 = 1962: 45). Although Schubring does remind us that Hemacandra’s account would have been based on earlier literary sources, in particular the Āvassaya literature, he does not make explicit here that Hemacandra’s comments in *Pariśīṭaparvan* 9.55–67, can only be matched with the Āvassaya-cūṇṇi version, that is, to my knowledge there is no other identified early source for information on the Pātāliputra council.

When Jaini (1979: 5, n. 6) cursorily mentions the Pātāliputra council he cites no direct references to Prākrit sources, nor does he give an explicit date for it. Further on he does imply a date, when he gives Bhadrabāhu’s era as ‘circa 300 BC’ (ibid., p. 50), however, he does not attempt to justify or discuss that date. Only Kapadia appears to have had access to the Āvaśyaka-cūṇṇi and he cites an extract which is clear and unequivocal:

> At that time there was a famine of twelve years. [The Jaina mendicants] lived here and there on the coast, then, [after the famine] they met again in Pātāliputra. From some they gathered chapters and pieces [of texts] and so put together the eleven Aṅgas. The *Ditthivāda* did not survive. Bhadrabāhu was living in Nepal, he knew the fourteen Pūrvas. The saṅgha sent emissaries to him to say: ‘Teach [us] the Dīthivāda.’ They went and related that edict from the saṅgha. He replied to them: ‘Because of the famine I could not begin the mahāprāṇa [practice], now I have undertaken it.’ So he did not go. The emissaries returned and told the saṅgha this. They sent more emissaries [to ask]: ‘What is the punishment for someone who disobeys an order of the saṅgha?’ They went and said that. He said: ‘That one is to be expelled.’ He then said to them: ‘Do not expel me, send intelligent [students], I will give seven instructions.’

Given the close similarity between the wording of the Āvaśyaka-cūṇṇi account and that of Hemacandra, it seems that here Hemacandra has indeed closely
followed the cūrṇī version, making it more intelligible in the process. What is highly significant is that no date is offered by the cūrṇī passage.

Apart from the Āvassaya-cūnṇī and the – probably derivative – account in Hemacandra’s Pariśiṣṭapurva, I have not come across other citations of original sources for information on this first council. The Āvassaya-cūnṇī is written in Prākrit and is certainly ancient, it preserves much otherwise unrecorded information, and is generally dated between Samvat 650 and 750 = 593–693 CE (Balbir 1993: 1, 81). If the Āvassaya-cūnṇī is the sole original source of information on the first council, in my opinion that needs to be stated in scholarly accounts, instead of those accounts simply repeating earlier statements without adequate reference to any textual basis for their assertions. Similarly, if the date of the first council is based solely on Hemacandra’s work then that also needs to be stated by scholars.

The councils of Mathurā (under Skandila), Valabhi I (Nāgārjuna) and Valabhi II (Devarddhigaṇin)

Accounts of the history of the Jaina Āgamas almost always refer to the redacting work of the two Jaina Ācāryas Skandila and Nāgārjuna and to Devarddhigaṇin Kṣamāśramaṇa. These three individuals are all cited as having ensured the transmission of the teaching of the Jina Mahāvīra at different ‘councils’, in spite of that teaching being endangered by times of famine. Devarddhigaṇin is held to have been directly responsible for causing the teachings gathered by the two earlier Ācāryas (Skandila and Nāgārjuna) to be written down. Sometimes datings are also offered for these individuals and their work. However, on examining the textual references used to justify these statements the evidence for the composite account they present is at best extremely weak, particularly with regard to datings. Later I will attempt to demonstrate how accounts of this aspect of the canonical texts of the Śvetāmbara Jainas rarely indicate the severely limited foundations upon which they are based. Few scholars have examined original sources, instead most accounts have repeated received information uncritically, often obscuring the speculative nature of the basic information.

First I will give a survey of scholarly accounts of the final redaction of the Jaina Āgamas, to show the evolution of received scholarly opinion on the place of the teachers mentioned earlier in the history of the Āgama. I will then examine the textual bases cited as evidence, to test those scholarly accounts.

Scholarly accounts of the Jaina councils

The first printed account of the events surrounding the editing of the Jaina Āgama was published by Jacobi in the introduction to his landmark edition of the Kalpasūtra (1879). Jacobi quotes what he refers to as a ‘common and old tradition’ that the ultimate redaction of the Śvetāmbara Jaina canonical works was made by Devarddhigaṇin Kṣamāśramaṇa in 980 AV (Jacobi converts this date to
454 or 514 CE): Devarddhiganin saw the Āgamas almost being lost and so had them written down by the san̄gha of Valabhī. Jacobi continues:

Devarddhiganin, the Buddhaghoṣa of the Jainas, has most probably arranged the whole of the traditional Jaina literature, which he gathered in the Āgamas from books and from the mouth of living theologians. He was nearly too late for his task. For in many cases, fragments only of books were left, and he put them together to make up a book as he thought best.⁵

(Kalpasūtra 1879: 15–16)

Jacobi provides three references to back up his account: (1) his notes on Kalpasūtra §148, (2) Jinaprabhamuni’s Sandehavisauṣadhi and (3) Padmamandiragiri’s Rśimandapprakaraṇa (Śaṃvat 1553) – each of these will be taken up in turn when the traditional sources for information on the councils are examined later. For now it is enough for my purposes to show that Jacobi, ever a careful scholar, has stated explicitly the basis for his conclusions.

The next account of the creation of the Jaina canon was by Weber (1883–1885: 218), cited here in the English translation by Smyth (1888):

the transmission was only oral; for which, according to tradition, writing was not substituted till eight centuries later, in the year 980 Vīra [converted by Weber to 543 CE (p. 220, n. 1)]. This was effected by a council in Valabhī under the presidency of Devarddhigan Kṣamāśramaṇa; though others state that this ensued 13 years after (993 Vīra [556 CE]) at the hands of a council in Mathurā under śrī Skandilācarya. In connection with this the statement may be placed that in the year 980 the Valabhī king Dhruvasena commanded that the Kalpasūtram should be recited publicly. Herein a special participation of the king in the work is indicated, be it in that of Devarddhigan or in that of Skandila, to whom by this act he gave decisive support.

Weber is clearly depending on Jacobi, but disagreeing with the date conversions, he does not cite any sources or information other than those given already by Jacobi. He places Devarddhiganin at the Valabhī council prior to a Mathurā council under Skandila.

Not until Charpentier (1922: 1, 15–17) do we have another overview of the academic interpretation of this element of Jaina history. Charpentier summarizes earlier views in the introduction to his edition of the Uttarādhyayana. His version is:

A famous teacher, Devarddhiganin, called the kṣamāśramaṇa, who saw that the sacred lore was in danger of becoming obsolete – no doubt because of the scarcity of manuscripts – convoked a second great Council at Valabhī. This is said to have taken place in 980 or 993 AV, and seems to have been connected in some way with a public recitation of
the *Jinacaritra*, or ‘Life of Mahāvīra’ before king Dhruvasena of Anandapura (a town not mentioned elsewhere). Now, as king Dhruvasena I of Valabhi is supposed to have succeeded to the throne in 526 AD, and 993–526 is = 467 (BC), the actual year of Mahāvīra’s death, I think we are entitled to assume, that this was the real date of the Council of Valabhi, and that it was in some way protected by Dhruvasena. Devarddhigaṇin, the president of the council, no doubt took down from the members all the scriptures considered as canonical that did not at that time exist in written form, and we need not doubt that the whole external form of the Siddhānta dates from about 526 AD.

There are quite a few problems with Charpentier’s account. According to his footnote (page 16, n. 1) he is basing his comments on the commentaries cited by Jacobi in his 1879 edition of the *Kalpasūtra* (page 270 to be specific). As will be shown later, those commentaries are far from definite in their interpretation of the old dates, and they date from several hundred years after the events to which they refer. In my opinion Charpentier has gone too far in his assumptions to link Dhruvasena to the council. This will be seen later when the commentary passages in question are considered.

In 1926 Schubring’s *Worte Mahāvīras* appeared. The opening twenty-six pages of this important collection of translations from Jaina canonical texts deals with the canon of the Śvetāmbara Jainas:

> It was probably in the first quarter of the sixth century [500–525 CE] that the city of Vaḷā, called Valabhi in Sanskrit, on the Kāthiāwād peninsula in Gujarat, was witness to a religious conference of the ‘white’ Jainas. Under the presidency of Devarddhī, one of their principals, in the convocations of the believers an attempt was made to settle and copy down the wording of the sacred texts. Therewith were the testaments of the teaching of Mahāvīra, almost a thousand years – according to the tradition – after the passing away of the master, saved from the steady advance of decay. Since then the Canon of the white-robed has in essence remained unchanged.6

The date suggested for the council under Devarddhigaṇin is 500–525 CE. Importantly, no citations at all are brought forward to justify this. The main point I want to make here is that the account of the council is presented without any substantiating evidence that would allow readers to judge the tradition’s reliability for themselves, or even ascertain how definite or not, it might be. The account by Guérinot (1926: 72) repeats the now standard view, also without giving any sources. In both of these scholarly accounts the ‘facts’ have become self-evident and need not be backed up with original citations or even references to them.

Winternitz, paving the way for his brief (but still indispensable) tour through Jaina literature, provides a summary history of the Councils, but, like the other

6
accounts cited so far, he does not give any references to original sources (1933: 2, 431–435). In the section on canonical history Winternitz cites Weber, Jacobi and von Glasenapp (1925) yet only speaks of one council in Valabhī, and makes no mention of Skandila (the position of the Jaina teacher Nāgārjuna has not even been referred to by Western scholars yet).

Schubring (1935: 55, n. 4) is again brief, but at least cites Jacobi while adding a reference to a note by Bhandarkar (Report, 1883–1884: 129) – first pointed out by von Glasenapp (1925: 466, n. 9) – that the council in Mathurā under Skandila occurred earlier than Devarddhī’s work in Valabhī. Again, however, there are no new original sources and Jacobi’s work of fifty years earlier is repeated (although without the date equivalents). This seems to have remained a settled matter for Schubring, in 1959 he wrote the following (although his phrasing, as usual, is careful): ‘The authoritative texts of the Śvetāmbaras…in their oldest portions date from the 3rd to 2nd century BCE. The canon was collected at a council in Kathiawar (Gujarat) in the 6th cent.’ The remarks of all the preceding scholars have ultimately been based on a single source, Jacobi’s work of 1879. A new contribution was only made in 1941 in Kapadia’s A history of the canonical literature of the Jainas. This was the first account since Jacobi to provide citations from traditional sources as evidence. For this reason it has been the basis for the more careful account of Jaini (1979: 51–52) and has influenced Folkert (1993: 46, n. 6, see later) and Dundas (1992), as well as the ‘revised German edition’ of Schubring (1962: 2000).

The section of Kapadia’s work relevant here is the chapter, ‘Redaction of the Jaina canon.’ Kapadia (1941: 61) says: ‘So Skandila summoned a council of Jaina saints at Mathurā and made up the kāliyasuya by taking note of whatever could be gathered from them’. Disappointingly, Kapadia adds boldly: ‘It appears that this happened sometime between Vīra Śaṁvat 827 and 840’ (1941: n. 4). There is no additional information, nor are original sources cited to give any idea where this date came from. Kapadia also notes (pp. 61–62) that there was a similar project under Nāgārjuna in Valabhī.

Kapadia’s summary account cites the texts listed later (in the same sequence) and although he is providing much new information, his account lacks any sense of chronology. I have added the currently accepted dates for these texts (sources for dates are given below when the texts are taken up individually):

- *Nandīśātra-cūrṇi* 676 CE
- Bhadreśvara’s *Kahāvalī* c.1150–1200 CE
- Hemacandra’s *Yogaśāstra* auto-commentary 1088–1172 CE
- Malayagiri’s commentary on *Jośakaraṇḍāga* c.1093–1193 CE
- Samayasundara’s *Sāmācārtśātaka* c.1630 CE

Kapadia does not mention dates for any of these and he presents them all as equally valid. He is after all interested in the events recorded in the tradition and is not concerned about dates. For most scholars his presentation is uncritical in
that regard but at least he made the original citations available for the first time. His important contribution was published in India during the second World War and that may have limited its impact. It has only recently been reprinted (2000). Renou in his account of the Jaina canon, for example, shows no sign of familiarity with the new information provided (1951: 2, 633). The more recent accounts of P. S. Jaini (1979: 51–52) and Folkert (1993) are based on Kapadia and can be cited from Folkert’s summary (1993: 46):

The Jains themselves point to three significant councils at which their texts were at issue. The first is placed at Mathurā, ca. 350 CE, under the leadership of Skandila. The second is placed at Valabhī, in Saurashtra, at about the same time, under Nāgārjuna. The third council is again placed at Valabhī, ca. 500 CE, under Devarddhiganin. The function of the first two councils apparently was to commit to writing the texts subscribed to by the Śvetāmbara monastic groups (gacchas) represented at each. The third council appears to have produced a uniform version of those texts, noting certain important variants, and to have seen that copies were made and delivered to major Jain centers.

As Folkert suggests in a footnote, European scholars have not had access to the original materials, this may explain why scholarly presentations of the councils and statements about the redaction of the canon have not been seriously reexamined.

The final account to be presented here is that of Dundas (1992: 61–64) who has provided the most recent comprehensive account of Śvetāmbara traditions of the transmission of their scriptures. Dundas’s account is perhaps the best contemporary formulation of the academic position regarding the councils (p. 62):

The first recitation [of the teachings] is supposed to have been held in Pataliputra (modern Patna) 160 years after Mahavira’s death . . . . The second recitation took place 827 years after Mahavira but, on this occasion, was held at two places simultaneously, at Mathura in the north under the auspices of Skandila and at Valabhī in the west under the auspices of Nagarjuna . . . . The final recitation held at Valabhī in the first half of the fifth century was convened by Devarddhiganin and the accounts of it stress that, to avoid the complete disappearance of the scriptures, the canon was redacted in manuscript form.

What none of these scholarly accounts of the councils makes clear is the late date of the sources on which they are based. Certainly the statements made reflect the Śvetāmbara tradition, but they exclude the notable equivocations present in the tradition, equivocations which take away any element of certainty about the dating of these events. If we now turn to the original sources for information on the councils it will be seen that the scholarly views expressed earlier are
considerably more definite than the tradition itself. A few scholars have raised
doubts about the datings but none has highlighted the lateness of the sources for
the datings, for example Ohira (1994: 3 (§7)) in her study of the Viyāhapāṇṇatti,
simply questioned the dating of the third council (‘the Third Canonical Council
[was] held in Valabhī (453 AD or 466 AD according to tradition) which is again
discutable’.

Accounts of the council of Valabhi in Śvetāmbara texts

Based on the citations of Jacobi and Kapadia mentioned earlier, I will now turn to
the original sources concerning the events of the councils and the redacting of the
canon. The extracts are taken up here in approximate chronological order.\(^{13}\) The
information relied on by scholars is largely from the commentary literature, only
two sources (§1 and §2) are not from there, and those two are the most undetailed.

The following textual sources will be examined:

\begin{itemize}
\item §1 Devavācaka, Nandīśūtra (Therāvalī)
\item §2 Kalpasūtra, Jinaçaritra, section 148
\item §3 Jinadāsagani, Nandīśūtra-cūrṇi (676 CE) (plus the Āyāra- and Daśāsrutaskandha-cūrṇis)
\item §4 Harībhadrā (700–770 CE) Laghuvṛtti on Nandīśūtra
\item §5 Śīlāṅka (9th century) Āyāraṭkā
\item §6 Śāntyācārya Vādīvēḷā (d. saṃ. 1096 [1039]?), Śīṣyāhītā on Uttarādhyayana
\item §7 Hemacandra (1088–1172), Yogaśāstra commentary
\item §8 Malayagiri (c.1093–1193) āṭkā on the Prakṛṭnaka entitled Joisakaraṇḍaga
\item §9 Bhadreśvara (c.1150–1200) Kahāvalī
\item §10 Jinaprabhamuni (1307) Sandehavisauṣadī, commentary on Kalpasūtra
\item §11 Vinayavijaya (1559) Subodhikā, commentary on Kalpasūtra
\item §12 Dharmāsāgara (1571), Kirāṇāvalī or Vyākhānapaddhati, city on Kalpasūtra
\item §13 Samayasundara (c.1630), Sāmācārīṣataka
\item §14 Samayasundara (1642), Kalpalatā, commentary on Kalpasūtra
\item §15 Lakṣmīnīvallabha (<1835 CE) Kalpadruma, commentary on Kalpasūtra
\end{itemize}

\section{1 Devavācaka}

The Nandīśūtra as transmitted to us has at its beginning a list of elders
(Sthavirāvalī) which is attributed to Devavācaka.\(^{14}\) This is the earliest source to
name the teachers Skandila and Nāgārjuna and link them (vaguely) with the trans-
mission of the teachings. The very careful scholar Muni Jambūvijaya has shown
that the Nandīśūtra itself was known to Mallavādin (fifth century) in a form
different to the one it has now.\(^{15}\) There is, however, no way of knowing if the
Sthavirāvalī dates from an older version of the Nandīśūtra or the newer one.
Since the Nandīśūtra-cūrṇi, which comments on these verses is dated 676 CE
(Nandtsūtra 1966b: 83) it is enough for my purposes to say that the Sthavirāvalī was written before then.

At the start of the Nandtsūtra a sequence of forty or so verses praises Mahāvīra and the saṅgha, gives a list of the ford-makers and the ganadharas, before praising the teaching of Mahāvīra, and finally the list of elders (verses 23–43). The verses naming the teachers Skandila and Nāgārjuna are:

I bow down to him Skandilācārya, whose method of explanation (anuyoga) is even now spreading in half of Bhārata, whose fame has spread to many cities. Then I bow down to Himavanta, who has prowess as great as the Himālaya, has great fortitude and valour, the bearer of limitless spiritual study. We bow down to Himavanta Kṣamāśramana [and] Ācārya Nāgārjuna, bearers of the mode of explanation of the kāliya texts, bearers too of the Pūrvas. I bow down to Vācaka Nāgārjuna, endowed with tenderness and mildness, who attained the state of Vācaka in due course, transmitter of the flood of scripture. I bow to the pupil of Nāgārjuna, Ācārya Bhūtadīnī, whose colour is like excellent purified gold, a campaka flower, the heart of a choice blooming lotus, whose heart is compassionate toward souls capable of liberation, skilled in the virtue of compassion, wise, foremost in half of Bhārata, foremost amongst experts in all kinds of spiritual study, the best expert who expounds the scriptures, delister of the line of the Nāgila clan, forward in the benefitting of beings, up-rooter of the danger of existence. I bow to Lohitya, who knows well what is eternal and what is not, who always bears the meaning of scriptures well-understood, the actuality of developing those of good nature.16

Whether or not Skandila and Nāgārjuna are the spiritual forefathers of Devarddhigāni need not detain us here. The verses place the names Skandila and Nāgārjuna firmly in the lineage of expounders of the texts, but no hint of dates is given. All that is established here is that these teachers existed before 676 CE (the date of the Nandtsūtra-cūrṇī).

§2 Kalpasūtra §148

This is the key passage for Western scholars’ statements, since it, or rather Jacobi’s comments about this passage in the introduction to his edition (1879), are the ultimate source of the scholarly views presented in the section about the date of the redacting council. First, the passage, which comes at the end of one section and just after the description of the death of Mahāvīra:

samaṇṇassa bhagavao Mahāvīrassa jāva savva-dukkha-ppāhiṇasassa nava vāsa-sayāiṃ viikkaṃtāiṃ, dasamassa ya vāsa-sayassā ayaṃ astime
samvacchare kāle gacchai. vāyān’ amtare puna: ayam tenaue samvacchare kāle gacchai iti [variant disai].\(^\text{17}\)

(Kalpasūtra 1879: 67)

Since the time that the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra died, etc. (all down to) freed from all pains, nine centuries have elapsed, and of the tenth century this is the eightieth year [= 980 AV]. Another redaction has ninety-third year (instead of eightieth [= 993 AV]).\(^\text{18}\)

(Kalpasūtra 1884: 270)

So 980 or 993 years have passed since the death of Mahāvīra. But the brief passage does not say to what event the reference is made: the text does not indicate in any way what happened after the lapse of that number of years, likely candidates however could reasonably be the composition of the Kalpasūtra itself or its redaction.

In 1879 Jacobi took this statement to refer to Devarddhiganīn: ‘It needs hardly be remarked that the passages containing the dates 980 and 993 AV do not refer to the author [of the Kalpasūtra, Bhadrabāhu], but to Devarddhiganīn, the editor of the Kalpasūtra’ (p. 23). In Jacobi’s footnote to his translation he also listed this as the first option (1884: 270, n. 1, the other options will be dealt with later when the commentaries are presented). The passage just cited – or rather the combined remarks by the later commentators about it – is at the heart of Jacobi’s 1879 statements about the dates for the redacting councils cited earlier. *In the text itself,* however, there is no mention of Mathurā, Valabhi, Skandila, Nāgārjuna or Devarddhiganīn, those associations are only made later in commentary literature (extracts §10 onwards).

\(^\text{19}\)§3 Jinadāsa Nandī-cūrṇī

The colophon to the cūrṇī on the Nandīsūtra is dated Śaka 598 [676 CE]. Since the verses have been translated under extract §1 earlier, only the cūrṇī comments on those are given here.

The verse [no. 32] ‘Whose [mode of explanation]’: How then his mode of explanation? It is said, there was a time of profound and difficult famine for twelve years, because [the ascetics] were again and again (ānṇāṇnato = anyānya-tah?) lapsing [from the rules]\(^\text{20}\) for the sake of food, scriptural learning (sūta) perished through the absence of understanding (gahana), text-work (guṇanā), [and] anuppeha [?]. Then in the time of plentiful food in Mathurā there was a great meeting of ascetics with the faithful, headed by Ācārya Khandila, saying: ‘Who remembers whatever [let them recount that for us].’ Thus the Kāliyasūta [texts] were gathered. Because this was done in Mathurā it is said to be the Mathurā recension. And that approved by the Ācārya Khandila was done
in his presence and is said to be the mode of explanation. The rest is easy.

Others say: that scriptural learning (sūta) was not destroyed, but in that very difficult famine the other main bearers of the mode of explanation perished. Only the teacher Khandila remained.21 In Mathurā the mode of explanation was again set forth for the ascetics, therefore it is called the Mathurā recension, the mode of explanation in his presence it is said.22

The only contribution of the cūrṇi on v. 34 is that Nāgārjuna was the pupil of Himavanta.

[Verse 35] cūrṇi: ‘In due course’ by grasping the texts [beginning with] ‘Sāmādiyā…’ and so on: and in time, with the turn of those ahead, succeeding the person [ahead of him], he attained the stage of vācaka. He directs the flood of scripture, the pouring out [of scripture?]. The rest is easy.

This is the oldest dated source for the account of the councils: the teachers’ names are mentioned, but there is no indication at all of their dates.

Two other sources in the ancient layer of the cūrṇis can be treated here (I cite these references from Mehta and Chandra (1970–1972, Nāgajīnā sv): the Āyāra-cūṇi, (also ascribed to Jinādāsa, 593–693 CE, see Balbir 1993: 1, 81) mentions the two names: Nāgārjuna (Āyāraṅga-cūṇi 1941: 219, 232, 237, 244, 313) and Devardhigāṇin (page 207). Another (unascribed?) cūrṇi on the Daśāśrutakandha mentions the name Nāgajīnā (Nāgajīnīyā tu evam padantī evaṃ tu guṇappehī āguṇā‘navvijjae (Āyāradāsāo 1954: 204)).23 These occurrences which add nothing to what we know, merely confirm the continuity of the tradition. The references which follow all echo this information, until we get to the commentary speculations (§10 and so on which follows).

§4–8

Because of their brevity and derivative nature, these text references can be treated together. Reference §4 is by Haribhadra (700–770 CE) in the Laghuvrtti on the Nandīsūtra (cited here from the edition of Pūnyavijaya (1966b: 16f.)).24 Because Haribhadra is merely re-presenting the cūrṇi version in Sanskrit his passages need not be examined in detail. He adds nothing to the previous entries, but merely transmits that information in the more widely known Sanskrit. Reference §5 comes in the ninth century when Śīlāṅka, an important Śvetāmbara commentator, refers in his commentary on the Āyāraṅga to Nāgajīnā (*Āyāraṅga 1916: 303). This is hardly a major reference, but does show the continuity of the tradition through the ninth century and that the earlier information was available. Similar is reference §6 by Śāntyācārya Vādīvetāla (he died in Saṃvat 1096 [1039]?)

71
In his *Uttarādhyayana* commentary entitled *Śisyahītā* (*Uttarādhyayana* 1933: 149) he refers to the name Nāgarjuna.

The great Hemacandra (1088–1172) in his *Yogaśāstra* commentary (1926 or 1939 edition p. 207) seems to re-present the version from the *cūrṇi* or from Haribhadra, and merely says that the Āgamas were written down by Skandila and Nāgārjuna and others fearing that because of a famine the teachings would be lost. The major later commentator Malayagiri (c.1093–1193) provides the eighth reference, in his commentary on the *Joisakaraṇḍaga* (1928: 41) he gives only the traditional account. While in his commentary on the *Nandasūtra* he adds that Skandila was a ‘Disciple of preceptor Śiha of the Bambhadivā branch.’

§9 Bhadreśvara Sūri, Kahāvalī

This work has been dated by Jacobi (1932: xii–xiii) to the twelfth century *Samvat*. Jacobi offers further comment: ‘Bhadreśvara’s tales are, as a rule, but a more elegant version of the kathānakas contained in the *cūrṇis* and *ṭīkās*’ (p. xii). ‘Bhadreśvara’s work has few literary merits. It is scarcely more than a collection of disconnected materials for the history of the Śvetāmbara church, culled from the ample literature of *cūrṇis* and *ṭīkās*’ (p. xiii). So this extract cannot be used as evidence, seeming to rely as it does on the earlier sources already cited.

§10 Jinaprabhāmuni, Sandehavīṣaṇadhī.

It is of vital significance that none of the citations up to this point has given any indication of the dates of the teachers. This extract is the first indication of a tradition of dating. Jinaprabhāmuni completed the *Sandehaviṣaṇadhī*, a commentary on the *Kalpasūtra*, on Āśvina sudi 8, *Samvat* 1364, or 1307 CE. This is the first of several comments on the extract given at §2 earlier. Jacobi makes it clear that he has not seen the ‘*cūrṇi*’ on the *Kalpasūtra* but he thinks all the Sanskrit commentators are deriving their information from it (*Kalpasūtra* 1879: 25). This may explain his trust of the commentatorial tradition here, that is, the antiquity of the *cūrṇis* supposedly vouching for the authenticity of the tradition. A lengthy extract is cited by Jacobi (1879: 114–115) from a manuscript supplied by Bühler (presumably from Bühler’s personal collection (Jacobi 1879: 25–26)). In the passage cited by Jacobi (and then concisely paraphrased by him) we are presented with the following options for the meaning of the dates given in the *Kalpasūtra* text. The first choices relate to the year 980, which is explained as the number of years to have elapsed: (1) since the passing away of Mahāvīra and the composition of the *Kalpasūtra* by Bhadrabāhu, (2) since Devarddhi saw the teachings in danger and set them down, or (3) since the death of the son of king Dhruvasena, though some say that was 1080 years ago, (4) the year 993 could be the number of years since *Pājusūnaṇā* was moved from the fifth to the fourth of *Bhadravapada*.

The traditions available to Jinaprabhāmuni did not allow him to decide, he relegates the option of the council dating to second place. This is the earliest
source to link a date with the redacting council of Devarddhiganin, it does so cautiously and qualifies all its options with *bahuśrutā vā yathāvad vidanti*, ‘the learned know how it was.’ This passage is the oldest source I have found for the dating repeated in the scholarly accounts presented in the first section earlier, although not one of those accounts communicated clearly the lack of definiteness, nor the other choices for the meaning of the date given in the tradition, nor even the fact that this option for the date’s meaning is not recorded before 1307 CE.

§11 Vinayavijaya, Subodhikā

This commentary on the *Kalpasūtra* (as yet unpublished), is also cited by Jacobi (1879: 116–117). It was written in *Samvat* 1616 [1559]. Once again this passage relates to extract §2.  

The commentator begins by stating that he is having to rely on earlier commentators. He then presents two choices, the first is that this verse was written by Devarddhiganin himself to show when the *Kalpasūtra* was written, that is, the writing down of the canon was in 980, so the *Kalpasūtra* was also written down then. He then cites a Prākrit verse stating that 980 years after Mahāvīra in the town of Valabhi, Devarddhiganin wrote down the teachings. The second option is that 980 was when the *Kalpasūtra* was first read aloud in Ananda[pūra]. He then goes on to present the traditions about the date being 993 etc. This commentator, while giving the Devarddhī option first, nevertheless says, ‘the omniscient ones know the reality [of it, ie. what the truth is]’ *tattvam punah kevalo vidanti*. The tradition is not firm and the dating is being offered a thousand years after the relevant event.

§12 Dharmasāgara, Kiraṅgāvalī or Vyākhānapaddhati

This commentary on the *Kalpasūtra* by Dharmasāgara, *Kiraṅgāvalī* or *Vyākhānapaddhati*, was written in *Samvat* 1628 [1571]. This is still unpublished but was cited by Jacobi (1879: 115–116). The opening line of the relevant section shows that the writer of the *cūrṇi* used by Dharmasāgara has not commented on this line: *yady api cūrṇikāreṇa kuto ‘pi kāraṇām na vyākhyaṇam*. He is relying on a statement in an old and worn commentary, *avāpta-jīrṇa-tīkākadeśa*. He repeats the Devarddhī option. Once more the overall tone is uncertainty and we are told ‘to find out the truth from the learned’, *tattvam tu bahuśruta-gamyam*, and ‘to ask the experts in scripture or those knowing the innermost details of the teachings’ *tattvaṁ tu śrutadharā-gamyam praṣṭavyāḥ vā pravacana-rahasya-vidah*. Even the oldest commentators then are consistently representing the traditional interpretations as uncertain, surely there should be some sign of this uncertainty in modern interpretations of this evidence.

§13–14 Samayasundara, Sāmācārīśataka and Kalpalatā

Before turning to the final commentary on the *Kalpasūtra* passage we have a statement by Samayasundara, who lived around 1630 CE. In his *Sāmācārīśataka*
he repeats the statements of the earlier sources, apparently on the basis of the Nandīsūtra-cūrṇī, without adding anything new.33 The same author is responsible for the next citation, in his Kalpalatā, a commentary on the Kalpasūtra written sometime before Samvat 1699 [1642]: ‘[I]n 980 VN at the end of the second famine, a council of monks met under [Khandila’s] chairmanship in Mahurā to redact the canon’ (Kalpasūtra *1939: 107). Jacobi says ‘The comment of the Kalpalatā is a mere abstract of the Sandehaviṣaṣadhit [extract §10]’ (1879: 115). This means Samayasundara is likely to have based his comments on that text, therefore neither of these quotations from him qualify as an independent confirmation of the tradition.

§15 Lākṣmīvallabha’s Kalpadruma

This final dated text, is a commentary on the Kalpasūtra written sometime before 1835 CE. The mention of the names here shows the tradition of commenting continued, but this text is too late as a source to be of interest here. Already by the 1500s the commentaries were merely repeating earlier accounts.

Conclusion about the dates of the Jaina redacting councils

The original sources containing information about the redacting teachers and their activity can be divided into those which provide a date and those which do not. None of the sources before Jinaprabhamuni’s Sandehaviṣaṣadhit of 1307 give any indication of a date for the redactions, while the statements from 1307 onwards are consistently tentative and qualified. Accordingly, there is no justification for scholarly accounts to link the councils with the suggested datings in anything but the most preliminary way. Certainly to present these dates as unquestionably well established facts is misleading.

A tradition about something happening in 980 (or 993) AV is certainly found in the Kalpasūtra (§2 cited earlier). What the dates refer to is not clear, as Jacobi (1884: 270, n. 1) states in the footnote to his translation:

The commentators confess that there was no fixed tradition, and bring forward the following four facts, which are applied at will to either date:

1. The council of Valabhī under the presidency of Devaruddhi, who caused the Siddhānta to be written in books.
2. The council of Mathurā under the presidency of Skandila, who seems to have revised the Siddhānta.
3. The public reading of the Kalpasūtra before king Dhruvasena…
4. The removal of Pajjusāṇā by Kālākācārya from the fifth to the fourth Bhādrapada.
Jacobi cited – from manuscript sources – four commentators on Kalpasūtra §148 and another text, Padmamandiragiri’s Ṛṣimāndalaparakaṇa (Śaṃvat 1553) (Kalpasūtra 1879: 114–118). These turn out to be the sources of the four alternatives he gives earlier. What is notable about these works as sources is that they are not definite even about what event is being dated, that is, they present alternatives, and three suggest that readers look elsewhere for clarification: bahuṣrūtā vā yathāvad vidanti (Sandehaviśauṣadhi), tattvam tu śrutadharamgamyam praṣṭavyā vā pravacanarahasyavidāḥ (Kiraṇāvalī) and tattvam punaḥ kevalino vidanti (Subodhikā), which shows there was no clear traditional information on which to base a judgement.

A second notable feature is the late date of these commentaries. Listing them here using Jacobi’s dates (1879: 25–36), which are in general supported by Velankar (1944), we have:

- 1307: Jina-prabhamuni, Sandehaviśauṣadhi (completed Śaṃvat 1364)
- 1496: Padmamandiragiri, Ṛṣimāndalaparakaṇa (Śaṃvat 1553)
- 1559: Vinayavijaya, Subodhikā (Śaṃvat 1616)
- 1571: Dharmaṣāgara, Kiraṇāvalī or Vyākhānapaddhati (Śaṃvat 1628)
- <1835: Lakṣmīvallabha, Kalpa-druma

‘[T]he common and old tradition’ referred to by Jacobi, turns out to be neither so common nor so old. We cannot blame Jacobi if his early remarks (1879) have not been tempered by the qualification given in his footnote to the translation of Kalpasūtra §148 (1884). Remarks in the introduction to a truly pioneering translation are more likely to be widely read than a footnote deep in the English version of a Jaina religious text. His later more qualified remarks have not been taken up by scholars, who have instead relied on his earlier – perhaps overconfident – assertion linking Devarddhigaṇin with the date 980/993 A.V. The continued overstatement of the case for accepting these datings for more than a century however cannot be defended.

Kapadia, the only other scholar to publish original source passages, was vague when he connected the references detailing the councils to the dates 980/993 A.V. He cited the Nandīṣṭhāra-cūrṇī text and added as a footnote ‘It appears that this happened sometime between Vīra Śaṃvat 827 and 840’ (1941: 61, n. 4). He then cited a text linking the dates with Devarddhigaṇin – text §14 earlier – but that text is dated from 1642 and hardly authoritative in this matter.

In the sources that have come to light so far, references about the activities of Skandila, Nāgārjuna and Devarddhigaṇin are straightforward, if vague, for the most part. The passages suggesting the date for their activities appear only in the later commentatorial traditions, where they are presented with indications that the tradition is not definite on this point. The misrepresentation of these matters as definite, when the tradition clearly indicates that they are not definite, is what I hope to correct in the standard accounts of the history of the councils in the transmission of the Jaina canon. We can certainly say that the tradition speaks of
councils, and I endorse the versions of Folkert and Dundas cited earlier, with the addition of the information that late traditions ascribe those councils to 980 (or 993) AV.

Notes
1 Presumably the editing of the texts, or at least the majority of them, was completed sometime prior to the great commentator Abhayadeva (fl. 1058–1071 according to the dates of his commentaries on the Uvārāyaṇa and Viyāhapaṇṇatti, Saṃvat 1115 and Saṃvat 1128 respectively (Velankar 1944: 64a, 290a)).
2 Other problematic aspects of the Śvetāmbara ‘canon’, its contents etc., are dealt with by Kapadia (1941), Jaini (1979: 47–77), Bruhn (1987) and Folkert (1993: 87).
5 In a footnote Jacobi added:

About 30 years earlier, between 410 and 432 AD, Buddhaghosa caused the Buddhist pitakas and arthakathas to be written down ‘for the more lasting stability of faith.’ As the redaction of the Buddhist works in Ceylon and that of the Jaina works in Guzerat occurred about the same time, it may be inferred either that the Jinas adopted that measure from the Baudhas, or that it was in the 5th century that writing was more generally made use of in India for literary purposes.

(Kalpasūtra 1879: 16, n. 1)
Perhaps a desire to see the Jaina and Buddhist moves as contemporaneous has led Jacobi to state the case for linking the councils with the date 980 so strongly.

6 Schubring 1926: [1]:


7 ‘Im Jahre 980 nach Mahāvīra, nach anderer Überlieferung 993, fand zu Valabhī (heute Vala) auf Kathiawar unter dem Vorsitz des Gaṇin Devarddhi eine Mönchsversammlung statt mit dem Ziele, die heiligen Bücher zu vervielfältigen.’


9 Kapadia’s account, and even his citations, are also reproduced by India-based authors, for example, Ratnaprabha and Kanu Chhotalal Jain Śrāmanā Bhagavān Mahāvīra (1942–1951) in v. 5, pt. 1 pp. 215–216. For ‘Yugapradhāna Nāgārjuna’ there is a brief mention in this work (p. 317), but it seems to be a reworking of Kapadia’s information, with the addition of an (unsourced) date for Nāgārjuna’s death VN. This is a confused and confusing publication offering unsourced extracts with translations. Derivative accounts almost entirely based on the early pioneers continue to be published in India, for example, Muni Uttam Kamal Jain in Jaina sects and schools (Delhi: Concept), (1975: 44–45) but he misleadingly adds a citation from Epigraphia Indica (XVI, 17) purporting to indicate a date for the council of Valabhī, when in fact there is no mention there of the council. (I am grateful to Peter Flügel for pointing out this reference.)

10 This point being one of the few cases where the English version is better than the original German. In that it follows Kapadia’s account (1962: 77, n. 4).

11 This seems to be the first mention of the Jaina teacher Nāgārjuna in scholarly accounts. The references in Jaina commentaries to the two traditions of reading, the tradition of Valabhī or the tradition of Mathurā are dealt with in the text.

12 Jagdishchandra Jain’s versions have not been used. He prints the following contradictory statements a few lines apart: ‘. . . after the redaction of the canon in these councils, ācārya Skandila and Nāgārjunasūri could not get an opportunity to meet each other and hence the two different versions remained unreconciled.’ ‘The council of Valabhī was attended by both Ārya Skandila and Nagārjunasūri’ (Jain 1984: 40).

13 In each case I think it vitally necessary to cite extensively the text of each source. Not paying attention to the original sources has been a major contributing reason to the inexact scholarly position now holding sway. Even in India the original sources are extremely difficult to locate, for example, the old commentaries cited by Jacobi in 1879 have still not been published to my knowledge, that is, Jinaprabhamuni’s Sandehavisaudadhī, Vinayavijaya’s Kiranāvali/Vyākhānapaddhati, Samayasundara’s Kalpalatā.

14 Punyavijaya has examined material about the links between the writer of the Nandīśūtra, Devavācaka and Devarddhigani Kṣamāśramana (Punyavijaya 1961: 29–31), although he cites Devendra Sūri (author of the Navyakarmagranthas) using ‘Devarddhī-vācaka’ and ‘Devarddhī-kṣamāśramana’ several times while citing Nandīśūtra readings – which may strengthen the case for separating the two authors.
since Jaina authors tend to be careful about epithets and honorifics – he prefers not to decide on whether there was one author or two (see also Nandīṣṭāra 1966a: 5).


17 Jacobi’s oldest dated manuscript was Vikrama 1484 [1427 CE], presumably on paper (1879: 28). Muni Puṇyaṇavijaya’s edition of the Kalpasūtra (1952) is based on six manuscripts, including five on palm leaf, one from Kambhāt dated Samvat 1247 [1190]. His text for this passage is: samanassa nam bhagavao Mahāvīrassa jāva savadukkhaṭṭhaṇassā nava vāsasayām viṅkāntām, dāsamassa ya vāsasayassāya āyam aṣṭime sāṃvaccharekāle gacchāci / vāyāṇangare puṇa āyaṃ teṣāṃ saṃvaccharekāle gacchāci iti disai / 147 //.

18 Stevenson’s version, in his presentation of the Kalpasūtra, need not detain us. Jacobi’s comments on its unreliability (Kalpasūtra 1879: 27) were echoed by Winternitz (1933:2, 462, n. 1).

19 Śakarājīno paccasu varṣaṣaṭtesu vyattrikrānteṣu aṣṭanavatesu Nandyaḥdhayamacūrṇi samappāti ti // (Nandīṣṭāra 1966b: 8, 83); Schubring prefers ‘677’ (1935: 43).

20 The Paśa-tadda-mahānnavo gives for phūda: bhramaa-prāpta naṣṭa, cyuta; atīkrānta, uḷāṅghita. The commentary on the Nandīṣṭāra says that the Visama-pada-tippanakam, glosses this as nirgatānāṃ (Nandīṣṭāra 1966b: 182) while Kapadia’s text (1941: 61, n. 3) gives annato thītanāṃ probably using Nandīṣṭāra-cūrṇi 1928.

21 Reading samthare with Kapadia’s citation (1928: 61, n. 3).


23 A more complete list of these internal citations is given by Puṇyaṇavijaya (1961: 31–32) although he omits the occurrence on p. 244. The use of the respectful term Bhadanta makes Puṇyaṇavijaya think the unnamed cūrṇi writer was of the line of Nāgārjuna, or at least identifying with his lineage.


26 iha hi Skandilācārya-pravṛttau dusmmānuḥbhave durbhikṣapravṛttvyā sādhānām pathanagunanāđīdakam sarvam apy anesat / tato durbhikṣātīkrame subhikṣapravṛtttyau dvyauṃ saṅghayor melāpako ’bhavat / tad yathā – eko Valabhyām eko Mathurāyām / tatra ca sūtrārthaṃsaṅghātane parasparam vācanābhedo jātaḥ / (cited by Kapadia 1941: 62, n. 3).

27 Jacobi knew of only one palm leaf manuscript of the text and that was of indifferent quality: ‘There are two Bhadrēsvara-Stīris in Peterson’s Index of Authors in the 4th Report. The first in the list is probably the author of the Kāhāvati, in the second half of the 12th century of the Samvat era [c. 1100–1150 CE]’ (Jacobi 1932: xii).

28 Bhadrēsvara also names Nāgajunāna in his Kāhāvati: atthi Mahurā’urte suyasamsīddho Khandilo nāma Sūri, tahā Valahī nayarī Nāgajunō nāma Sūri/tehi ya jāe bārasavariś ca dukkāle nivvādbhāva viphutthēm (?) kātūna pesiyā disodīsim sahāvogaṃium ca kāhāvī durtham te pumo mīlyā sugāie/jāva sajīhāyantī āvāv haṃkuḥhurudhiṃtyam puṃvāhiṃ/ta cā sayuvaḥcchitī hou tī pāredho sārṭhīm siddhantudhārtho/tathaḥ tī jām na visarytam tam teva santhāvya/panmuhṭhānaṃ una puṇvavarāvadantasuttaṭṭhumāsūṇa kāyā saṅghādanā (cited by Kapadia (1941: 62, n. 1) from a manuscript).

29 From notes by Pūnyavijayā (Nandīśutra 1966b: Prastāvāṇā) and Velankar (1944: 75) there is clearly more than one cūrṇi on the Kalpasūtra, however without access to more materials I cannot clarify the situation beyond saying that the following texts have been referred to by earlier authors: (1) Kalpa-cūrṇi (Nandīśutra 1966b: Prastāvāṇā 6–7) – (2) Kalpa-viśeṣa-cūrṇi (Nandīśutra 1966b: Prastāvāṇā 6–7) – (3) Kalpaśtrasya cūrṇi Nīryukti-garbha (printed Kalpasūtra 1952: 83–[115]) Prakrit prose around 67 verses, this is probably the same as the ‘Nīryukti by Bhradhabhū…68 gāthās’ (Velankar 1944: 75b). It begins: sambodho sattamāsiyam phāṣētā verses begin Pajjonasaṃpanāe akkharāṃ. It makes no comment on §148 (= §147 in Pūnyavijayā’s edition) but jumps from a comment on the preceding passage to §201 – (4?) Cūrṇi, 700 granthas (Velankar 1944: 75b) – In addition Pūnyavijayā cites a Kalpcārṇi (different from the Daśāśrutaskandhacārṇi) which ends: tao ya arāhanāto chiṇnasamsārī bhavati samārasamtaṃtīm chettum mokkham pāvattii. Kalpcārṇi samāpāt, gaṃhāgram 5300 pratyaśakaragānanaiyā nirrītan. [sarvagranhāgram 14784] (Nandīśutra 1966a: Prastāvāṇā, 7). He also cites a Kalpaviśeṣacārṇi ending: Kapavisesacārṇi samatettii.
However the Niruykti embedded in a cūrṇī published by him in Kalpasūtra 1952 does not end like this and so is presumably another cūrṇī.


32 yady api cūrṇikāreṇa kuto’pi kāraṇān na vyākhyātam, avāptajñāntaṅkaṅkādeṣe tv asyā vācanaḥ ity evam vyākhyātam; tathā’pi asṛtyadhikāṅkavaṃsāte vāṣṭāṅkrīmve
sarvān granthān vyavacchidyamānānānāṃ drṣṭvā pustakeṣu nyasadbhir āhārī DeVarddhigantamāsamāramaṇaṁ āhārīKalpasūtrasāyaḥ pī vācanāḥ pustake nyaste 'ti kecit sambhāhavyantī. tathā punar iływātālikārāme Dhrusvananaprasya putramaranātartyasa samādhim āhārāḥ. Ānandapure sabhāsamakṣaṇī āhārīKalpāvācanāḥ pī ajanī 'ti kecit; tattvam pu bahuṣrutagamyam iti. trnavatiyatanavasatapakse tu: tenaua-nava-saheīm sanaikkamtehi Vaddhamānaṃ // pajosavana-cauṭhī Kālagasūrīhimo thayivā // ityāde saṃmataṁ udbhāve yatāvātālikārāme bhādṛisitataturationyāṃ paryuṣanāpapravpravṛtir iti kecid vyākhāyanyantī. evam vyākhāyāne kriyāmāne śatraṃsadyaṣayaṇāsaka-Gardabhillocchedakārī-Kalasākūṭīyām bhinnā eva sampadyate. na caīvaṁ, yataḥ prabhāvākacaritaraKalakācāryakathāprabhṛtyagranthyesa eka evo'ktah. tathā Kalpacūrī-Niśīthacūrīnyādiśu tu BalamitraBhūmnitryayor māṇulena paryuṣanāpārava caturyāṃ pravartitam; BalamitraBhūnu (mitra)Tirthodgraprakārnādiśu āhārīVrajinaVikramādityarājarīṣu antarālavarṇvācāyaṇāvī api Vikramādityaprātyāsannāvī uktau; tatrāḥ pī kiyātākalavācāyaṇāvī api Vikramādī-tyakālabhāvānāvī api sambhavatāḥ, tathā śālavāhāna Vikramādityaprābhandhādiṣu tayor yuddhasamagatiṣ ca. kim ca, cāṅkikāra api: kathām idaṁi aparvarāpāyāṃ caturyāṃ paryuṣane'? 'ti śīyaṅodanaṁyām: yugapradhānāKalikasārīvacanāṇād eva evy evam uttaram dattavantah, na punah: vāyaṁ naṁtare puṣaḥ ayam tenau samvacchare kāle gacchayi tti pravacanacacanenye'pi ādī svayam eva 'locyam. tasmād: aśītapakṣe Dhrusvananapṛāṇa(m)grāhāḥ Paryuṣanākālaph parsādi vācaśitum ārabdhāḥ, trnavatiyapakṣe tu paścakāpekaśayā kālanaivyatayena parsādi Kalpāsūtvācāne pravacanaṁaryādābhanga iti paryālocanāyā: 1) abhivardhīte varṣe vimśatā dīnair grhiṇātaptaryuṣanā, 2) paṇcakāhānyā svābhīhgrīta-paryuṣanā ce 'pi ubhayam api yuvacchedya saṅghādesād ekai 'va vācānā caramapācake vyavasthāpīte ti vastutyā vyākhāyānikriyā ita ti vastutyāḥ vyākhāyāne kriyāmāne parsādvācāntāḥ paṇcakāhānyādyavaccheydenai ca caramapācanke yā vācānā sā vācānāntaram iti arhasamagatī api. kecit tu vicāryamānām yaḥ aśītapakṣe tad eva vācānāntarena rājaṇaviyapakṣe pi yuktisamgatam drṣṭaye. kathām anyathā, ii disai tti akathayavisyān? tattvam tu śrutadharagamyam prastāvīya eva pravacanapraṣyāvīdāh.

Śrīdevarddhigantakāmsaṃramanena śrīvīrādaśītyadhanākanaśāta (980) varṣe jātena dvādaśavārṣyayudbhīkṣaśvādah bhautarasādhibhūyāyyapattau bahuṣrutavacchitattau ca jātāyām...bhavisyad bhavyalokopakāryāḥ śrutabhatktae ca śrīsaṅghāgrahāḥ mṛtyuviśiṣṭatakālinasarvasādhān Valabhyāmākārya tannukhādīcchinnāvatisiṣan nyūnādhiḥkā rutiśrutīrutīnāgamālāpākānunakramena svamatiḥ saṁcakhyā puṣkārūḍhāḥ kriyaḥ / tataḥ mālata ganañadharabhisārānāmapi āgāmānām kartā śrīdevarddhigantakāmsaṃramana eva jātāḥ / (cited by Kapadia 1941: 63, n. 1, repeated by Jaini 1979: 52, n. 17).

Dated to Sāṃvat 1696 [1639] (Velankar 1944: 77).

Jacobi was not able to give a date for this work, but Velankar refers to it as the Kalpadrumakalikā, and says it was composed during the reign of Jinasabhāgyasūri, who became Sūri in Sāṃvat 1892 [1835] (Velankar 1944: 78a).

Bibliography

* indicates volumes I have not been able to physically consult.

Primary sources

Āyāradasāo


81
Āyāraṅga-sutta


Āyāraṅga-cūṇṇī


Āvāsyaka-cūṇṇī


Kalpasūtra


1913 *[Kalpasūtra with Jinaprabha’s Sandheavivasadhi]. Jāmagnagara: Hirālāl Hamsarāj, 1913. [Velankar 1944: 74b]

1939 *[Kalpasūtra Kalpalatā, with Samayasundara Gaṇi’s Kālikācārya kathā]. Bombay: Jinadattasūri Prāchīna Pustakoddhāra, 1939. 4, 196 p.


Mallāvādīn

THE DATING OF THE JAINA COUNCILS

Nandisūtra


Nandisūtra-cūrṇi


Pariśīṭaparvan

1932 Sthaviravālīcarita or Pariśīṭaparvan, being an appendix of the Trīṣaṭṣṭi-śalākāpu-rusacarita, by Hemacandra; edited by Hermann Jacobi. 2nd ed. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Uttarādhyayanasūtra


Uvāsagadasāo

1880–1890 The Uvāsagadasāo, or, The religious profession of an Uvāsaga, expounded in ten lectures, being the Seventh Anga of the Jains, edited in the original Prākṛt with the Sanskrit commentary of Abhayadeva and English translation by A. F. Rudolf Hoernle…2 v. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1890, 1880. (Bibliotheca Indica work 105.)

Secondary sources


Charpentier, Jarl. 1921–1922, see Uttarādhyayana 1921–1922.


Jacobi, Hermann. 1932, see *Pariśīṣṭaparvan* mentioned earlier.


THE DATING OF THE JAINA COUNCILS


Smyth 1888–1892, see Weber, Albrecht. 1883–1885.
Part II

THE QUESTION OF OMNISCIENCE AND JAINA LOGIC
4

THE JAIN–MĪMĀṂŚĀ DEBATE ON OMNISCIENCE

Olle Qvarnström

Introduction

A central theme of research within the history of religious philosophy has been the debate concerning reason and revelation, which had its roots in the Greco-Roman tradition on the one side, and the Judeo-Christian tradition on the other. Initiated in the second and third century of the common era by authors such as Celsos, Porphyrius and Emperor Julian,\(^1\) it came to dominate medieval scholasticism and was brought to the fore after the Renaissance as a result of the development of natural science and biblical criticism, among other things. Today, the debate has re-emerged, and grown in momentum as well as complexity, largely due to Islamic and Christian fundamentalism.\(^2\)

The result, as one might expect, has been the production of a plethora of scholarly studies that have looked at the question of reason vs. revelation from numerous angles of vision.\(^3\) To date, however, judging from the content of these studies, the scholarly community has not adequately attended the fact that, in certain respects, a similar debate took place in India. This debate originated from a religious conflict that arose between the followers of the Vedic tradition, on the one hand, and those of various non-Vedic traditions, on the other. As with the debate in the West, the Indic controversy thus had a double heritage and stemmed from an irreconcilable antagonism between those who held that man was doomed to ignorance and thus fully dependent upon revelatory scripture and those who held that man was not only predetermined for knowledge, but capable of acquiring it through his own natural faculties.

The controversy in India differed, however, in several respect from that in the West. One principal difference was that whereas the Western controversy consisted of an encounter between two fundamentally incompatible worldviews, and thus extended from radical opposition to attempts at reconciliation, the Indic controversy involved traditions that had mutually influenced one another and thus shared fundamental values, including a common cognitive universe and lingua franca.\(^4\) Moreover, the most ancient sciences in India – ritual science and linguistics (including grammar, semantics, phonetics and prosody) – as well as
geometry and mathematics were all intimately connected to the Vedic religion. Because of this, the Indic debate was not marked by the same opposition or need of synthesis.

The central question at issue was similar to the one that many medieval Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers grappled with relative to Greek philosophy: What constitutes the source of all knowledge? A set of truths, insights and injunctions that man acquires through non-human revelation; or, a set of truths, insights and injunctions that man acquires through his own natural faculties? Or phrased differently: Does man acquire valid knowledge by means of non-human revelation or is he capable of apprehending it directly by means of his own natural faculties?

In terms of the Indian debate, this question concerned the very foundation of the Vedic and non-Vedic traditions and was largely responsible for the emergence of Brāhmanical systematic theology as well as Buddhist and Jain logic and epistemology. Ultimately, it came to revolve around the issue of omniscience (sarvajñatā). In contrast to the Western debate, however, those on the side of omniscience were not monotheists arguing the cause of an omniscient God in heaven, but Buddhist and Jain ‘atheists’ who were claiming the possibility of omniscience in human beings. The debate reached its height during the seventh and eighth centuries when the well-known Mimāṃsā theologian, Kumārila, made a final effort to defend his Bhaṭṭa school from the epistemological critique of the Buddhists. In the words of Kumārila, although the Mimāṃsā tradition had gradually descended into materialism (lokāyata), through his efforts it would be restored to the path of orthodoxy (āstikapatha) once again. Adopting his opponents’ terminology, Kumārila thus contrasted the allegedly personal omniscience of the Buddha with the non-personal, that is, authorless (apauruseya), Veda.

In contrast to the Jain tradition, but not unlike Christian, Muslim and Jewish ecclesiastics, Kumārila and the Mimāṃsakas viewed man as intrinsically flawed, impaired by defects such as attachment, desire, etc., and thus incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, dharma and adharma. Only the Veda, consisting of words that were eternal (i.e. not created by a fallible author), could bridge the insurmountable gulf between man and the imperceptible reality of the Veda, thus informing him of his duties or dharma. Even religious traditions such as Saṃkhya and Yoga, which entertained identical doctrines to those of the Veda, were nonetheless deemed unauthoritative due to their human origin. Decreed as ‘wolves in sheep’s clothing’, they were said to provide merely ‘the appearance of dharma’ (dharmabhāsa), and nothing more.

This declaration, stemming from one of the most prominent thinkers of the Brāhmanical tradition, was the outcome of a long and complex historical development, originating with the religious polemics between Vedic and non-Vedic traditions as confirmed in the canonical scriptures of the Buddhists and Jains. But it was, above all, the critique leveled at Kumārila and his predecessors by the Buddhist philosophers, Dignāga and Dharmakirti, that constituted the primary impetus for Kumārila’s philosophical repudiation of the idea of an omniscient being in his Ślokavārttika and Brhaṭṭikā. The challenge of Jain philosophers
both prior to and contemporary with Kumārila – philosophers such as Samantabhadra and Akalanka – are also thought to have played a significant role in compelling Kumārila to systematize and refine his arguments with respect to the doctrine of human omniscience. Along with their criticism of Brāhmaṇical theology, the Buddhists and the Jains were occupied with composing texts which validated the omniscience of their respective founders and discussed the epistemology and structure of omniscience as well.

The debate on human omniscience was related to the concept of dharma, in terms of its definition as well as the means by which it could be validated and known. According to Kumārila, mankind could receive valid instruction regarding right and wrong conduct only through the injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions (pratīṣedha) of Vedic revelation, and not via perceptual or inferential proof. By definition, dharma was that which had the Veda as its sole authority and the Veda had been revealed neither by man nor a supreme God. It was beginningless (anādi), authorless (apauruṣeya), and of self-sufficient validity (svatāhprāmāṇya).

In response to Kumārila, the eighth century Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher, Śantarākṣita, and his Śvetāmbara Jain colleague, Haribhadra, composed texts which sacrilegiously argued that man was already in possession of everything knowable, including dharma. It remained only for him to uncover the truth that resided within himself, thus realizing his inherent omniscience.

The main arguments advanced by Haribhadra and Śantarākṣita, in support of an omniscient being and in criticism of the Veda as an absolute authority, were later used by their respective co-religionists, such as Vidyānanda (ninth century) and Ratnakirti (eleventh century), in an ongoing effort to refute Kumārila and the Mīmāṃsakas. Hence, in order to fully appreciate the arguments propounded by these later writers, it is first necessary to understand the philosophical and religious nuances of the original debate.

Over the years we have seen the completion of a few extensive studies that systematically examine the Buddhist contribution to the debate on omniscience, most remarkably, the Jain contribution has more or less escaped the eye of historians of religion and Indologists alike. Consequently, no attempt has thus far been made to integrate the Buddhist and Jain doctrines of omniscience into a broader Indological religious and cultural context.

The first major Śvetāmbara Jain response to Kumārila’s criticism of an omniscient being (sarvajña) appears to be the Śāstra-vārtāsāmuccaya and Sarvajñasiddhi of Haribhadra (eighth century). By undertaking an examination of the former text along with its professed autocommentary, the Dikprada, this article constitutes a small beginning step in the direction of such a comprehensive effort.

The Śāstra-vārtāsāmuccaya or ‘Summary of the Main Topics of the Philosophical Treatises’ belongs to Haribhadra’s doxographical writings. These consist of texts that thematically describe the Jain faith in relation to that of different opponents – be they philosophers, as in the Śāstra-vārtāsāmuccaya, or ordinary people, as in the Lokatattvaniṁnaya and Aṣṭakaparakarana; or, deliver summaries of entire systems of philosophy, including his own, as in the
In the Śāstravārtāsamuccaya, Haribhadra puts himself in the vāda-tradition (i.e. the tradition of debate), whereas in his Sarvajñāsiddhi he argues with the Mīmāṃsāsakas from within the pramāṇa tradition of logic and epistemology.

In what follows, I intend to paraphrase the relevant section in the Śāstravārtāsamuccaya in light of the Dikpradā, and thereafter comment upon some of its fundamental tenets.

**The Śāstravārtāsamuccaya of Haribhadra (vv. 580–626)**

Haribhadra’s account of the Jain-Mīmāṃsā debate is organized in terms of two diametrically opposite propositions which bring the polemics to a close – one negating and the other affirming the existence of an omniscient being. The first proposition states that dharma and adharma can only be established on the basis of the tradition known as Veda. The second attributes the establishment of dharma and adharma to any person capable of directly perceiving objects residing beyond the reach of the senses (atīndriyadarśin). The main narrative structure of the text may thus be divided into four parts, the first two consisting of the position of the proponent (pravapakṣa) and the latter two, that of the opponent (uttarapakṣa).

In the first part, the Mīmāṃsakas advance the argument that it is not possible to prove the existence of an omniscient being (sarvajña) (whose word would serve as a valid means of cognition) through the five means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), namely perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāṇa), verbal testimony (āgama), or presumption (arthāpatti), and that this fact constitutes evidence of his non-existence (abhāvapramāṇatā). Regarding the first three means of cognition, the Mīmāṃsakas point out that in the absence of an inherent mark (liṅga) identifying an omniscient being, perception, along with inference and analogy, are all invalidated. Since the very object of perception is unestablished, knowledge drawn from either a characteristic mark, or a correspondence between things with the same properties, is not achievable. As for the remaining two, Mīmāṃsakas argue that the presence of an omniscient being cannot be proven either on the basis of the Jain tradition, since it stands in opposition to the prescriptive statements (codanā) of the Veda, or by presumption, since everything, including the teaching of dharma, can be explained without positing the existence of an omniscient being.

Because of the apparent insufficiency of the valid means of cognition to solidly establish the existence of an omniscient being, the Mīmāṃsakas reject the notion entirely. Instead, they argue that the establishment of dharma and adharma rests entirely upon the Veda, which is considered trustworthy (āpta) (not being subject to human error), without origin (apauruṣeya), and having as its object that which is beyond the senses.

In the second part of Haribhadra’s text, the Mīmāṃsakas continue to develop their thesis in favour of the Veda as the exclusive source of dharma. Veda, they
argue, is accessible to all. Consequently, there is no reason to suppose the existence of a being capable of seeing beyond the senses (ātindriyārthastra), as the accurate knower and direct instrument (sāksātkarana) of dharma and adharma. Dharma, as a cosmic and moral principle, is represented, on the one hand, in sacrifice (iṣṭā), pious liberality (pūrta), castes and stages of life (varṇāśrama), and on the other hand, in activities such as meditation (dhyāna). The former results in enjoyment (bhoga), the latter in liberation (mokṣa) or the highest good (śreyas).

In the third section of the Śāstraśātavātāsamuccaya, Haribhadra calls upon his co-religionists to answer the Mīmāṃsaka claim that it is not possible to prove the existence of an omniscient being on the basis of the valid means of cognition.

Regarding perception, the Jains argue that, regardless of how the Mīmāṃsakas define the term, the existence of an omniscient being cannot be unequivocally ruled out. If perception is defined as including all objects (sarvārthaviṣaya), it must necessarily include an omniscient being, and if it is defined as the opposite, that is, asarvārthaviṣaya, an omniscient being may still exist, even though he is not perceivable by the material senses. Furthermore, dharma, understood as prescriptive statements and the intrinsic characteristic of a person, is perceptible to the senses, since it exists as an object of knowledge (jñeya). The existence of an omniscient being may therefore be inferred from the perception of dharma, defined in this specific sense.

Such a being’s existence could also be confirmed on the basis of the Jain scriptures (āgama), since the idea of omniscience is a result of their prescriptive statements. Like perception, these [Jain] scriptures contain intrinsic validity (svataḥprāmāṇya), and are eternal like the Veda (śruti). Moreover, when one attains omniscience as a result of an immediate experience of dharma, and that experience is subsequently confirmed by other persons who have had the same experience, there is analogy. Finally, even on the basis of a scripture that deals with the transcendent (ātindriyatva), one may presume the existence of an omniscient being. Otherwise, there would be no hope for an unenlightened person (chadmastha) who, while incapable of experiencing the transcendent, still has confidence in the scripture (śāstra).

Having pronounced all means of valid cognition as incapable of disproving the existence of an omniscient being, the Jains continue their critique in the fourth and final part of Haribhadra’s Śāstraśātavātāsamuccaya by questioning the Veda as the source of dharma and knowledge. In their view, the Veda is not to be considered authoritative merely by virtue of its ancient heritage or claims of an unbroken tradition. Its succession may have been broken and its custodians narrow-minded (arvāgdarśin) and thus ignorant of dharma and unqualified to elucidate the transcendental subject matter of the Veda. In addition, there is no consensus regarding the meaning of Vedic (veda-) as opposed to mundane (laukika-) words (pada). This being the case, it would be theoretically possible to acquire ‘knowledge’ based on a wrong cognition (viparyaya).

The wise, among whom the Jains include themselves, thus raise doubts regarding which words in the Veda belong to which category. Couched in more Christian
terms, the doubt concerns whether the Bible is identical with the words of God or the words of God exist in the Bible. In support of the Buddhist logician, Dharmakīrti, the Jains suggest that the only way to resolve this problem is to consult someone who has experienced the area of life to which some of these words refer. An ordinary human being is wholly inexperienced in this regard and is consequently unqualified to know the Veda either by himself or from anyone else, since ordinary human beings are impeded by desire, attachment, etc.

Furthermore, the Veda does not explain itself. How then, wonder the Jains, does one acquire knowledge of the Veda. Again resorting to Dharmakīrti, Haribhadra points out that the phrase, \textit{agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāma}, ‘He who is desirous of heaven should present an oblation into the sacred fire’, could just as well mean that one should consume dog meat! If the Word of the Veda (\textit{śabda}) boasts a transcendental status and simultaneously purports to reveal its own meaning (\textit{arthaprakāśa}), this contradicts its claim of being eternal and unchanging. And even if it were capable of revealing its own meaning, it might still generate a false cognition. Consequently, a word cannot be understood and evaluated without paying attention to the convention (\textit{saṅketa}) that informs its meaning. It could be correct (in accordance with reality), incorrect or create confusion (\textit{saṅka}) due to a multiplicity of meanings, everyone being occupied with his own explanation (\textit{vyākhyā}).

Given this point of view, it is illogical to maintain, as do the Mīmāṃsakas, that an exposition (\textit{vyākhyā}), such as that of Jaimini, has the same ontological status as the Veda itself. Commentaries often contradict one another, and it is impossible to determine whether one particular exposition or \textit{vyākhyā} is correct or construed (\textit{sādhutvakaalpitātva}). Neither can the correctness of a particular exposition be established on the basis of confirmation by other means of valid cognition, such as perception, since Kumārila and his colleagues have declared these incapable of comprehending objects that lie beyond the reach of the senses. Therefore, Haribhadra and the Jains consider Jaimini’s elucidation of the Veda to be nothing more than a personal interpretation.

Furthermore say the Jains, logic dictates that the Veda could not be without some origin (\textit{apauruṣeya}), nor some organ of speech, and still be possible to comprehend. And yet if an organ of speech is admitted, it would necessarily have to be part of creation (\textit{laukika}) and not transcendent and beginningless. On the other hand, even assuming that the Veda somehow revealed itself without the necessity of an organ of speech, one could logically still doubt its words, since these may stem from some invisible author – possibly even a demon (\textit{piśācacakrtra}). Only someone who is able to directly perceive the transcendent could bring one’s doubt concerning the non-personal origin of the Veda to an end, according to the Jains. The world does not testify to its origin and the Vedic priests may all be ignorant, propagating false doctrines, like the Persians (\textit{pārsika}) who advocate mother-marriage (\textit{mātrvilvāha}).

In reality, only an omniscient being is capable of determining whether the Veda has an origin or not. Arguments such as that of not remembering an author have no weight as evidence. The fact that a text has an author does not necessarily
devaluate its status, neither does the occurrence of different recensions. Furthermore, the apparent efficacy of Vedic mantras cannot serve as proof that the Veda is uncreated. Playing on the name of Kumārila’s predecessor, Śabara, the Jains declare that even the words of a savage or śābara may have efficacy: The entire world might simply be misled.

The final argument propounded by Haribhadra draws on the opponent’s own scripture. According to the Jains, even the Veda refers to an all-knowing person (sarvavid): a great soul (mahāman) who has the capacity to see beyond the objects of the senses, and is thus singularly qualified to correctly understand the informative statements (arthavāda), etc., of the Veda. The Jains obviously consider their own omniscient being, the revealer of the one true ‘Āryaveda’, to be such a great soul. Thus Haribhadra concludes his fictive debate between Mīmāṃsā and Jainism by declaring that ‘It is in no way possible to decisively establish dharma and adharma other than from an all-inclusive doctrine (āgama) revealed (abhivyakta) by an omniscient being (sarvajña).’

Concluding remarks

The Jain–Mīmāṃsaka debate on omniscience, as delineated in the Śāstravārtīsamuccaya and Dikpradā of Haribhadra, stands as the culmination of a development that began more than a millenium earlier. In essence, it concerned the question of whether or not dharma was an object of perception. The denial of omniscience thus amounted to the denial of a direct, perceptual knowledge of dharma, whereas its acceptance allowed for the possibility that man could himself acquire knowledge of good and evil. The former position was held by Kumārila and the Mīmāṃsakas, the latter by Haribhadra and the Jains.

Both the Mīmāṃsakas and the Jains held that the source of all knowledge resided beyond the objects of the senses (atīndriya) and was identical to dharma. Furthermore, both believed that the human mind was a major source of distortion, incapable of directly experiencing dharma.

Haribhadra and the Jains therefore cherished the idea of omniscience conceived as an inherent faculty that enabled the human being to cognize everything, including that which was beyond the senses. Such a cognition was thought to take place in the Self (jīva), independent of the mind and the senses, and constituted, accordingly, a direct means of acquiring valid knowledge of dharma. The Mīmāṃsakas notion of perception as the apprehension of an existing object by the mind and senses was classified by the Jains, beginning with Umāsvāti, as sensory knowledge (mati) and put in the same category as scriptural knowledge (śrūta). Both were viewed as indirect means (parokṣa) of knowledge (pramāṇa), whereas direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) was said to occur through omniscience. Haribhadra and the Jains thus opposed the claim made by the Mīmāṃsakas that pratyakṣa disproved the existence of an omniscient being.

Kumārila and the Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, advocated Vedic revelation (śrūti) as the only means by which man could know right from wrong. Kumārila
was, however, not opposed to every type of omniscience: ‘If there is an omniscient [person] who knows everything through the six means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), how can he be refuted?’ An omniscient being whose omniscience was independent of the six means of knowing was, however, not conceivable. Omniscience as a cognitive faculty sui generis was accordingly rejected.

Faith – as either a secular and intellectual trust in the impersonal Veda and the efficacy of sacrifice (ṣraddhā), or a personal trust (bhakti) in the omniscient Jina and his words (āgama) – was a necessary condition in both Mīmāṃsā and Jainism. However, it was not considered instrumental in bringing about heavenly existence or liberation.

The question thus remained, was the source of knowledge or dharma revealed by direct personal experience, or was it revealed by itself and codified in the non-personal Veda? Was revelation personal or impersonal? Was it located within man or outside of him? Was it directly attainable through the non-activity (nivṛtti) of self-realization (ātmajñāna) or indirectly accessible through a variety of [ritual and intellectual] activities (pravṛtti)?

The debate over whether or not man was capable of having a direct experience of dharma, however, had more than philosophical consequences. It had serious political overtones as well, since the claim of directly experiencing dharma constituted a threat to the privileges of the priestly class who subsisted on the administration of the revealed word of the Vedas. This situation parallels in some measure the perceived threat of Christian and Sufi mystics by those who administered the Word of God in the Bible and Koran. Although in the Vedic tradition the killing of a brahmin was considered a mortal sin, legend has it that Kumārila, previously a Buddhist, launched a ‘holy war’ against the members of his former faith, including his now-rejected teacher, persecuting and even killing the ‘blasphemers’ for alleging that they had achieved a direct experience of dharma.

In addition to his debate with Kumārila on the possibility of omniscience, Haribhadra was involved in a second polemic concerning the exact definition of omniscience with fellow Jains, Buddhists and Sāmkhyites – each faction claiming their founder to be a superman (mahāpuruse) and true god (mahādeva).

The opposing positions held by Jainism and Mīmāṃsā on the question of omniscience was transmitted through the centuries by Indian doxographers, thus emphasizing the importance of the debate. This is evident in the thirteenth century Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Mādhava, whose description of Ārhatadarśana includes, for the sake of contrast, a resumé of the Mīmāṃsā criticism of an omniscient being.

Although we are unable to determine the degree to which Haribhadra’s ideas influenced the Mīmāṃsā tradition, legend has it that on his death-bed Kumārila conceded that, after all, the Jains had contributed some valuable insights.

Notes
1 See Neumann 1880, Hoffmann 1987 and Harnack 1916, respectively.
2 See, for example, Stenberg 1996; Marty and Appleby 1993.
4 On Jain attitudes towards the Sanskrit language, see Dundas 1996; on sociolinguistic attitudes in Jainism, see Deshpande 1993: 9ff.
5 In his article on the omniscience of Mahāvīra and the Buddha, Padmanabh S. Jaini (1974) concludes that from the Māndukya Upaniṣad onwards, the term sarvajñā was exclusively employed to describe the īśvara of philosophical systems (darśana) such as Yoga, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, as well as the Purānic trinity, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Siva. The term was also used metaphorically as a synonym for brahmajñā or ātmajñā, ‘the knower of the Self’. However, it appears that no passage in the entire Brāhmanical literature refers to human omniscience in the primary sense of the word. Jaini further notes that the term sarvajñā, like the terms jina and arhat, was adopted by the Buddhists from the Jains. According to Jaini (1977), not all souls were thought to be capable of reaching omniscience, since some lacked the appropriate inherent disposition. Apart from stray references in the Jain canonical scriptures (Schubring 1962: 202), the earliest systematic differentiation between souls that were capable of liberation (bhavya) and those that were not (abhavya) is found in Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthastūra (II.7). In most cases, however, these terms refer to someone, often a student, who is either qualified or unqualified for the Jain teaching, and do not indicate any lacking of inherent capacity. See, for example, Haribhadra’s Yogadrśitīsamuccaya (vv. 225–226) and Lokatattvavānirnaya (vv. 2–7).
6 On Kumārila (seventh century AD) and the Mīmāṃsā tradition, see Verpoorten 1987. According to Parpola (1981: 155), who subscribed to the view of Jacobi (1911), subsequent to Kumārila and Śaṅkara, the Mīmāṃsā school was divided into two mutually exclusive philosophies, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. However, the Jain as well as Buddhist traditions attest to an earlier division. In the sixth century Dvātīrīṃśikā of Siddhasena, one chapter, designated in the colophon as Vedavāda, is devoted to pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta philosophy. According to the Jain tradition, this same Dvātīrīṃśikā originally included a description of Mīmāṃsā as well. See Qvarnström (2003b). The earliest Buddhist text which distinguishes between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta as independent systematic philosophies appears to be Bhavya’s Madhyamakahrdayakārtikā and Tārakajñālā, which include separate chapters on (pre-Śaṅkara) Vedānta (VIII) and Mīmāṃsā (IX). See Qvarnström 1989; Kawasaki 1992.
7 For a summary of Kumārila’s arguments, see Verpoorten 1987: 22–37.
8 Ślokavārttika I.10. This argument is echoed in the ninth and tenth century doxographical work, the Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha, where it is said that Kumārila established the path of the Veda (vedamārga), which had been decimated by the Buddhists and other nihilists. In diametric opposition to this view, the tenth century Jain author Siddharṣi, in his Upamitiḥbhavaprāpācakhāta, declared that Mīmāṃsā was in no way a philosophical and system that it had even been predated by the Materialists. See Handiqui 1949: 225–226.
9 As observed by Jayatilleke (1963: 192) and Clooney (1990: 215, n. 64), the idea of the Veda as apauruṣeya most likely developed in response to the Buddhist claim of a human source of all knowledge. However, there were also strong, internal reasons for introducing the idea of apauruṣeya as well as the beginningless (anādi) and self-sufficient validity (svataḥprāmāṇya) of the Veda. See Bronkhorst 2001.
10 Tantravārttika, p. 124 (tr.).
11 See, for example, Teviḷḷasutta of the Dhīghanikāya and Uttarajjhayana (ch. 25).
12 See Verpoorten 1987: 23ff. As a result of the criticism leveled at Mīmāṃsā in the Pramaṇasamuccaya, Kumārila vehemently attacked Dignāga in his Ślokavārttika (Hattori 1968: 15–16, Iyengar 1927), and as a consequence of Dharmakīrti’s criticism, Kumārila composed the Brhāṭṭikā (Raja 1991: 109). The Brhāṭṭikā, which according to Frauwallner is the last work of Kumārila, composed c. AD 630, is only indirectly accessible through Śantaraksīṭa’s Tattvasamgraha (Fраuwallner 1962, Verpoorten 1987: 30).
For a summary of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience in the Ślokāvārttika, see D’sa 1980: 192–195.

13 Kumārila’s criticism of an omniscient being in the Ślokāvārttika and Brhattīkā, which is mainly directed against the Buddhists, also constitutes one of the few responses to Jain doctrines from Brāhmanical systematic theologians. The other principal response is found in the Brahmasūrabhāṣya of Śaṅkara. According to Pathak (1893, 1930), Kumārila attacked Samantabhadra (Āptānimāṃsā) and Akalaṅkā (Siddhiviniścaya) in his Ślokāvārttika. Akalaṅkā is then said to have been defended by his pupil Prabhācandra (Prameyakamalamārtanda), and by Vidyānanda (Aṣṭasahasrī). In his argumentation, however, Pathak presents no textual evidence in support of his thesis. On Akalaṅkā’s theory of omniscience, see Fujinaga 2000.

14 See, for example, the Āptānimāṃsā of Samantabhadra, and the Sammatitarka of Siddhasena Divākara, both from the fifth and sixth century AD. For Mahāyāna Buddhist texts dating from this period, see the Sarvajñatāsiddhi chapter of Mātṛceta’s Vāṃśārvavārṇastotra (Hartmann 1987), and the Sarvajñatāsiddhinīrdesa chapter of Bhavya’s Madhyamakahrdayākārīkā and Tarājvālā, though directed towards the Jain notion of omniscience (Kawasaki 1992). For further references, see Bühnemann 1980: vi–viii.

15 In this context, Dharmakīrti and his Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya was of particular importance, arguing for the possibility of a yogic perception or insight into dharma. See Steinkellner 1978: 126ff.; Bühnemann 1980: vii. For an elaborate discussion on the concept of dharma in Jainism, see Qvarnström (2004) scheduled to appear in a special issue of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, edited by Patrick Olivelle and Phyllis Granoff.

16 Ślokāvārttika II: 242f.
17 Tantravārttika, p. 104 (tr.).
18 On these three concepts, see Bronkhorst 2001.
19 See the Tattvasamgraha of Sāntaraksita (vv. 2848ff., 3128ff.) along with the commentary, Pañjikā, by Kamalaśīla. For the dates of Sāntaraksita, see Frauwallner 1933: 238–240; 1937: 65–74. Haribhadra refers in the auto-commentary on Śaṭṭarvārttāsamuccaya 296 to Sāntaraksita’s Tattvasamgraha 958 and 1083: yad uktam sākyamabuddhinā śāntaraksitena nāsaṭo bhāvakarṛtvam tadavasthāntaram na saḥ //. Bhattacharyya (ref. to in Winternitz 1983: 460, n. 1) was, however, wrong in identifying Haribhadra with one ācārya stūrī, alluded to in the Tattvasamgraha 124 and 126. The textual passage, which could refer to any Jain author, reads: na hetur astti vadan sahetukam nanu pratijñāṃ svayam eva sādh(h)ayet / athāpi hetuḥ praṇayālāso bhavet pratijñāyā kevalayāsa kim bhaved iti ācārvasūripādaiḥ.

20 See the Sarvajeñāsiddhi and Śaṭṭarvārttāsamuccaya of Haribhadra. Within the Digambara Jain tradition, the Siddhiviniścaya (ch. 8) of Akalaṅkā (eighth century) appears to be the first text denouncing Kumārila and his denial of human omniscience. Akalaṅkā does not, however, criticize the Mīmāṃsakas as extensively and systematically as does Haribhadra in the earlier mentioned works. Some scholars hold that Akalaṅkā was known to Haribhadra, basing their contention upon the following quotation from the latter’s Anekañtajayapatākā: akalankanyāyāmusāri cetoharaṃ vacaḥ (Kapadia 1947: 253). In my opinion, however, it is more likely that akalankā connotes ‘perfect logic’. Singh (1974: 144) notices, however, that Akalaṅkā in his Nyāyaviniścaya (p. 294) quotes from Haribhadra’s Yogabindu (v. 431).

21 See Vidyānanda’s Āptapārīkṣā and Aṣṭasahasrī, and Ratnakīrti’s Sarvajeñāsiddhi. Other Jain texts criticizing Kumārila and the Mīmāṃsakas are, for example, Siddharṣi’s Upanītibhavaprapāṇācakathi (tenth century), Prabhācandra’s Prameyakamalamārtanda (eleventh century), and Anantakīrti’s Brhat- and Laghusarvajeñāsiddhi (eleventh century).

98
23 There are some exceptions (even though they do not analyze the Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya and Sarva-vājañi-siḍdi of Haribhadra), for example, Pathak 1893, 1931; Solomon 1974; Singh 1974; Jaini 1974.
24 The Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya may safely be ascribed to Haribhadra, the author of the Anekāntajayapatakā, and thus belongs to the eighth century AD (Handiqui 1947: xI, 1–li, Qvarnström 1999). Two commentaries remain extant: the Śyādvādakalpalata, a voluminous commentary written by Yasovijaya, the scholarly seventeenth-century Śvetāmbara monk; and, the presumably much earlier Dikpradā, ascribed to Haribhadra himself. A close reading of the latter text, however, does not provide decisive internal evidence establishing that the Dikpradā and Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya were written by the same author. And the external evidence is similarly inconclusive. The Dikpradā, for example, is not mentioned in the Anekāntajayapatakā; nor does it contain Haribhadra’s blueprint, or viraha (Williams 1965). At this stage, it appears safest to leave open the question of the Dikpradā’s authorship in the hope that future research will uncover a definitive answer. Regarding the relationship between Haribhadra and Kumārila, the only representative of the Mīmāṃsā tradition referred to in the Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya is Jaimini (v. 612). The Dikpradā, however, mentions Kumārila in connection with a partial quote from the Ślokavārttika (II.95cd: tasmād ālokavad vede sarvasādhārane sati //) which occurs in the Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya (585ab) and then reappears in the Dikpradā. Another ‘echo’ from the Ślokavārttika is found in Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya 583cd: pramāṇapaścāvīrttyes tatrābhāvavpramāṇatā // Cf. Ślokavārttika IV, abhāvapa·pariccheda, v:1: pramāṇapaścāvakam yatra vasturūpe na jāyate / vastusattāvabodhārtham tatrābhāvavpramāṇatā // This verse is quoted in full by Haribhadra in his Saddarśanasamuccāya, v. 76. The paucity of references to Kumārila and/or his works in the Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya and Dikpradā may be accounted for as being characteristic of the doxographical genre or samuccāya, since the Astākaprakarana, Saddarśanasamuccāya and Lokatattvanirṇaya of Haribhadra display the same feature. Even in a late doxographical work, such as the thirteenth-century Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Madhava, the chapter describing Jainism (Ārhatadarśana) in relation to the teachings of the followers of Kumārila (nāyika), only contains a few quotations from the Ślokavārttika. Finally, Haribhadra’s reply to Kumārila’s critique may be viewed as a more general response, since Kumārila’s criticism of a sarva-vāja mainly was directed against Buddhist doctrine. From a chronological point of view, Haribhadra seems to have been a contemporary of Śantarākṣita, whose Tattvasamgraha (958 and 1083) is quoted in the Dikpradā ad Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya 296 (see note above). On the date of Haribhadra, see Qvarnström 1999. For manuscripts of the Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya and Dikpradā, see Velankar 1944: 383.
25 The debate on human omniscience versus scriptural revelation in the Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya is discussed in the section entitled ‘the discourse on liberation’ (mokṣavāda).
26 On Haribhadra, the doxographer, and his Buddhist and Jain precursors, see Qvarnström 1999.
27 Śastra-vārttāsa-muccāya (581–583) seems to have borrowed verses from the Sarvājañi-siḍdi (11–13).
28 Pramāṇa-vārttika III. 318.
29 Pramāṇa-vārttika III. 318cd–319ab.
30 Buddhist texts also compare practices found in the Veda with incestuous practices attributed to the Persians. See Halbfass (1983: 14, n. 68).
31 According to the Vasudevahindi (sixth century), which was known to Haribhadra, the Ārya Vedas were composed by Bharata, the first Jain ‘universal emperor’ of this world.
After a time, brāhmīns, such as Sulasā and Yājñavalkya, composed the Anārya Vedas. See Jain 1977: 12.
33 See Haribhadra’s Yogadrṣṭisamuccaya 101; Yogabindu 412; Shah 1967: 233. On Kumārilā’s refusal of supernatural perception or yogipratyakṣa, see Ślokavārttika IV: 26–28; Verpoorten 1987: 25f. According to Kumārila, Yoga texts belong to that category of traditional texts or smṛtis which, despite the incorporation of Vedic doctrines, should not be followed. See Tantravārttika, p. 165 (tr.).
34 Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.4; Ślokavārttika IV (pratyakṣasūtra).
35 Tattvārthasūtra I. 9–14.
37 Ślokavārttika II: 111cd (quoted from D’sa 1980: 193).
38 Ślokavārttika II: 112cd (D’sa 1980: 193).
40 See Haribhadra’s Yogadrṣṭisamuccaya 110.
41 On the concepts of śraddhā and bhakti, see Hara 1964.
42 Cf. the Yogaśāstra and Svopajnavṛtti II.12.
43 Tantravārttika, p. 236 (tr.).
44 Walker 1968: 571.
46 Mādhava’s summary of Mīmāṃsā in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha is based upon the Śabarabhāṣya (Verpoorten 1987: 10, n. 54). The chapter on Jainism (Ārhatadarśana) includes, in addition, several quotations from the Ślokavārttika (II: 117, etc.), and summarizes, according to Mādhava, the teaching of the followers of Kumārilā (tathā coktam tautātītaiḥ).
47 Cowell and Gough (1904: 84, n. 9).

Bibliography

**Primary sources**

Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra

Ed. with the Vṛtti of Vasunandin by Gajādharial Jain, Benares: Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā, 1914.

Āptaparīkṣā of Vidyānanda


Aṣṭakaprakaraṇa of Haribhadrasūri

The Aṣṭakaprakaraṇa with Abhayadeva’s Vṛtti and Jineśvara’s Vivṛtti. Sanskrit text publ. by M. Bhagubhai, Ahmedabad, 1911.

Aṣṭasahasrī of Vidyānanda

Āvaśyakacūrṇi of Jinadāsa
Ed. by Rishabhdeo Kesharimar. 2 Vols. Ratlam 1928, 1929.

Bṛhatśravajñāsiddhi of Anantakṛtī

Dīghanikāya

Dvātrimśikā of Siddhasena Divākara

Laghusarvajñāsiddhi of Anantakṛtī

Lokatattvanirṇaya of Haribhadra

Mīmāṃsā Sūtra of Jainī

Nyāyaviniścaya of Akalanka

Prameyakamalamārtanda of Prabhācandra
Şaddarşanasamuccaya of Haribhadrasūri
Ed. and tr. into English by Qvarnström 1999.

Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa of Siddhasena
Ed. with the the commentary of Abhayadevasūri by Sukhlāl Sanghāvi and Becardās Dosī. Ahmedabad, 1985.

Sarvadarṣanasamagraha of Sāyaṇa Mādhava
Ed. by V. S. Abhyankar, Poona: Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 51, 1951.

Sarvajñasiddhi of Haribhadrasūri
Sanskrit text along with the Hīṃsāṣṭaka, its Svopajña Avacūri and Aindrastuti. Publ. by R. K. Samstha, Rutlam, 1924.
Ed. by Muni Hemacandravijaya, Jaipur, 1963.

Sarvajñasiddhi of Ratnakṛtī

Śāstravārtāsamuccaya of Haribhadrasūri

Śāstravārtāsamuccaya and Dikpradā of Haribhadrasūri
Śāstravārtāsamuccaya by Śrī-Haribhadra-Sūri with his own Commentary named Dikpradā, Bombay: Nirmaya-Sagar Press, 1929.

Ślokavārttika of Kumārila

Syādvādakalpalatā of Yaśovijaya
Tantravārttika of Kumārila

Tattvārthaṣṭrā of Umāsvāti

Tattvasaṃgraha of Śántarakṣita
Ed. by D. Śastri, with the Commentary ‘Paṇḍijā’ of Kamalaśīla. 2 Vols., Varanasi Benares, 1982.

Triṣaṣṭiśālākāpuruṣacaritra of Hemacandra

Upamitibhavaprapāṇcakathā of Siddharṣi

Uttarajjhayaṇa (Uttarādhyaṇa)

Vasudevahinḍī of Saṅghadāṣagani

Yogabindu of Haribhadrasūri

Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya and Yogaviṃśika of Haribhadrasūri
Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra


Secondary sources


Gilson, Etienne. (1938) Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.


——. (2002) See *Yogāṣṭra*.


WHY MUST THERE BE AN OMNISCIENT IN JAINISM?

Sin Fujinaga

1. It is a well-known fact that the Jains deny the existence of God as a creator of this universe while the Hindus admit such existence. According to Jainism this universe has no beginning and no end, so no being has created it. On the other hand, the Jains are very eager to establish the existence of an omniscient person. Such a person is denied in the Hindu tradition. The Jain saviors or tīrthāṅkaras are sometimes called bhagavān, a Lord. This word does not indicate a creator but rather means a respected person with all-pervading knowledge. Generally speaking, the omniscience of the tīrthāṅkaras is such that they grasp each and every thing of the universe not only in the present time, but in the past and the future also. The view on the omniscience of tīrthāṅkaras, however, is not ubiquitous in the Jaina tradition. Kundakunda remarks, “From the practical point of view an omniscient Lord perceives and knows all, while from the real point of view he perceives and knows his own soul.”

Buddhism, another non-Hindu school of Indian philosophy, maintains that the founder Buddha is omniscient. In the Pāli canon, the Buddha is sometimes described with the word savvāṇu or sabbavīd, both of which mean omniscient. But he is also said to recognize only the religious truth of dharma, more precisely, the four noble truths, caturārthāsattva. This means that the omniscient Buddha does not need to know details of matters such as the number of insects in this world. Opposed to these two traditions, the Hindu schools do not admit any kind of omniscient person. Especially the Mīmāṃsakas fiercely attack the notion of omniscience because for them the (non-personal) Vēdas are the ultimate authority on things in this universe.

In the history of Indian philosophy, these three schools, that is, the Jains, the Buddhists, and the Mīmāṃsakas attack each other and proclaim their own views on omniscience. Historically speaking, a Jain philosopher, Samantabhadra who must have lived in the sixth century of CE, is the first person who tried to establish the existence of an omniscient person by using the method of inference (anumāna). From the Mīmāṃsaka side, Kumārila attacked Samantabhadra’s position in his Ślokavārtika, while the famous Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti
also criticized the notion of an omniscient person proclaimed by the Jain philosopher in his Pramāṇavārttika.4

Most of the books or papers which deal with Jain epistemology discuss omniscience at some length following the line of K. B. Pathak (1892, 1931) who must have been the first modern scholar to investigate the topic of omniscience in Jainism. Pathak showed that Kumārila attacked not only the Jain notion of omniscience but also that of the Buddhists. E. A. Solomon (1962) deals with omniscience not only in Jain literature but also in Hindu literature and Buddhist canons. Jaini (1974/2001) also discusses the omniscience of Mahāvīra and the Buddha. Singh (1974) is the only book in English whose main topic is omniscience in Jainism. But he does not refer to the reason why there must be an omniscient in Jainism. The second volume of Jain (1994) contains some discussion on the omniscient in Jainism as well as Buddhism. However, even in this book, we cannot find any argument about the necessity of the all-knowing person. Readers of this volume will find that Olle Qvarnström discusses how the Jain philosopher Haribhadra attacked Kumārila’s notion of omniscience.5

In this chapter we shall see how the Jains tried to show the possibility of an all-knowing person, and we shall discuss why the Jains are so eager to establish the omniscience of the savior on the basis of some Prākrit and Sanskrit treatises such as the Rājaprasyaḥ, and Āptamāṃsā.

2. Before discussing the attempts to prove the existence of the omniscience in Jainism, we shall have a brief view at Jain epistemology. The Jains admit the two kinds of valid method of knowledge (pramāṇa): pratyakṣa and parokṣa. The former means direct cognition or perception and the latter includes indirect or inference, scripture. In Jain epistemology the term pratyakṣa refers to the omniscience also because it grasps objects directly. It is also important to realize that in early times perception was categorized as a part of parokṣa while later Jain philosophers considered it as direct cognition. Samantabhadra uses the word pratyakṣa in two meanings: direct cognition including omniscience as well as perception.6

The Jain philosopher Samantabhadra tried to prove the existence of an omniscient person in his main work Āptamāṃsā, which means the examination of the reliable person. He first shows the possibility of complete annihilation of karmic matter:

In some person there must be a total destruction of the spiritual deficiencies and of the physical veilings (that act as the cause of these deficiencies), for there must be a case where such destruction is most complete of all; this is just as by an employment of appropriate means it is possible to make in a physical substance a total destruction of the extraneous as well as organic impurities which it had happened to accumulate.7

It must be noted in this verse that Samantabhadra does not discuss the possibility of destruction of all the karmas but rather of those that hinder the power of ecognition (ghātikarma).
In the next verse, he shows the possibility of the existence of an omniscient person by the following syllogism: “The objects that are minute, concealed or distant must be amenable to somebody’s perception, because they are amenable to inferential knowledge, similar to fire etc.”

What Samantabhadra intends in this verse seems to be as follows: we can infer the existence of fire on a remote mountain by seeing smoke from that mountain. At the same time, this fire is directly perceived by someone else, that is a person at that spot. This assumption can be applied to any object that we cannot see directly; a germ on the skin, a pebble in someone’s fist and so on. A germ is not perceived directly by us, but by inference we know that it exists somewhere: by perceiving pus from the wound we can know that there are germs while someone can perceive it directly through a microscope. A pebble in someone’s fist is perceptible for that person and the other person can infer the existence of it by perceiving the special form of the fist. It must be also admitted, for Samantabhadra, that all things in the universe are objects of inference. Thus, they are objects of perception, that is perceived by someone. This means that there must be somebody who can recognize all things. This is the omniscient person.

To formulate this argument:

Whatever exists in this universe must be object of perception (*pratijñā*).
Because (whatever exists in this universe must be object of inference.
And incomplete all) the object of inference must be perceived by someone (*hetu*). Like fire on a remote mountain (*drṣṭānta*).

In the strict sense, however, Samantabhadra’s argument does not establish the existence of an omniscient person. First, we must realize that all the things in this universe can be divided into two groups: that which can be perceived directly and that which cannot be perceived directly. Samantabhadra suggests only that some person may perceive that which we cannot perceive. Moreover, the person who perceives the fire is not always the same person who can perceive other things directly.

It should be noticed here that this argument does not match Samantabhadra’s final purpose. He intends to demonstrate that only the *ṭīrthaṅkara* is omniscient and not persons of other schools such as the Buddha in Buddhism. Therefore, Samantabhadra tries to prove his view by two sets of inference again:

And such an omniscient person are you alone (because your) utterance is neither in conflict with logic nor with the scripture.
For the proof of such an absence of the conflict, it is circumstance that your thoughts are never contradicted with what is well established.9

In the first syllogism Samantabhadra proclaims that only the Jain *ṭīrthaṅkara* is omniscient, he who has destroyed all hindrances and recognizes all the things in this universe. The reason for this is that he preaches in accordance with logic and the scriptures. The second syllogism shows why there is no conflict between
the preachings and logic or the scriptures. It is so, because what he preaches is not denied by what is commonly admitted as authentic.

With these verses, Samantabhadra has posited that only a Jain tīrthaṅkara can be possessed of omniscient knowledge in the sense of knowing all the things in the universe not only in the present but even in the past as well as in the future.\(^\text{10}\) As we have seen, his attempts were not successful because he only shows that all the things are objects of inference as well as those of perception but does not show that one and the same person can perceive all the objects. Even then it remains true that he introduced the method of inference into the discussion on the omniscience. Samantabhadra must be the first person to do so not only in Jainism but also in Indian philosophy because, to our knowledge, before him no one tried to establish the existence or non-existence of the all-knowing person.

Most Jain philosophers after Samantabhadra, both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, adopt the argument which Samantabhadra showed in his Ṣaṁśaya, for example, Akalanka (c.720–760 CE). In establishing the existence of the kevalin he fundamentally follows Samantabhadra. To enforce the latter’s arguments the former shows some concrete instances such as perfect knowledge of an astronomer. But what is new and more important is that he introduces the concept of ṣuniṣcitā-asambhavād-bādhaka-pramāṇa (SABP) as a reason to establish the existence of omniscience. The Sanskrit notion SABP means the well-known fact that “we have no valid methods of knowing to deny the existence of omniscience.”\(^\text{11}\)

Hemacandra (1088/9–1173), another philosophical giant of the Jain tradition, combines the traditional idea of sarvajña with that of Samantabhadra and Akalanka when he discusses the concept of omniscience in his Pramāṇamīṁśā. According to him: “That which is independent and supreme (i.e. omniscience) is the manifestation of the nature of ātman when all the veiling karmās are completely annihilated.”\(^\text{12}\)

In this definition of omniscience Hemacandra clearly mentions the relationship between omniscience and karma. When one destroys the veiling karmas completely, then the soul will have its innate nature in which omniscience is included. To prove the existence of omniscience, Hemacandra proposes two reasons: The possibility of the final end of the progressive development of knowledge, and the non-existence of any methods to deny it.\(^\text{13}\)

Here Hemacandra follows the line directed by Samantabhadra and Akalanka. But, he has elaborated the arguments on the existence of omniscience by checking SABP one by one.\(^\text{14}\)

Besides these three philosophers, many other Jain philosophers have attempted to prove the existence of omniscience. Vādidevasūrya (1087–1170) in the Śvetāmbara tradition and Dharmabhūṣāṇa (c.1358–1418) in the Digambara tradition are good examples of such philosophers.\(^\text{15}\) From Samantabhadra onwards, the history of Jain epistemology is, in a sense, the history of establishing the possibility of omniscience. Other schools in Indian philosophy were never concerned with this topic more avidly than the Jains.
Now, a question arises: why are the Jain philosophers so eager to establish the existence of the omniscient person who knows each and everything in this universe? Their enthusiasm, in my understanding, must have a close relationship with the concept of bhavya or the possibility of emancipation.  

3. Though the concept of bhavya occurs, as Prof. P. S. Jaini points out,\textsuperscript{16} even in the Jain āgamas, we shall focus on how Samantabhadra discusses this topic in relation with the idea of omniscience. The tenth chapter of Āptamāṁśā deals with the way to liberation or mokṣa. First Samantabhadra criticizes his opponent’s position:

If you maintain that the bondage necessarily results from even slight ignorance, then no one would not be omniscient because of infinite number of objects to be known. On the other hand, if you say that we can reach mokṣa even with slight knowledge, even then there must be the contradicted state (i.e., bondage) which resulted from massive ignorance.\textsuperscript{17}

In verse 98, Samantabhadra expresses his own position on this topic.

Ignorance causes a person to be bound when he or she is suffering from delusion. But, ignorance does not do so if the person is free from delusion. Moreover, one may reach mokṣa with slight knowledge if there is no influence of delusion. But, it is not so in the case of a person under its effect.\textsuperscript{18}

This means that to reach mokṣa we need not destroy all the karmas but what we have to do is to demolish mohanīya karmas. As Shah (1999: 87) clearly mentions, this opinion does not go with traditional Jain understanding of the relation between karma and mokṣa. In the traditional Jain theory, mokṣa means total annihilation of karma. A person with a slight knowledge has not yet destroyed his/her karma completely. Thus he / she must remain in saṁsāra. The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti attacks this theory proposed by Samantabhadra.\textsuperscript{19}

One may ask: why do we have different experiences such as attachments in this world? Are those experiences predestinated by a supreme God?\textsuperscript{20} To this Samantabhadra answers:

Occurrence of attachment and others is of various types owing to the variety of bondage by karma. And karma or bondage by karma occurs to jīva because of jīva’s own reasons.\textsuperscript{21}

Here, Samantabhadra clearly mentions the cause of our experiences and its variety. Someone may have attachment to something while another shows indifference to mundane matters or affairs. Such different attitudes originate from the different kinds of bondage which are caused by karmas. In its turn, karmas arise
due to a *jīva* itself. A certain *karma* occurs because of a certain modification which occurred in a *jīva* previously. There is a cause–effect relation in one and the same *jīva*. Fundamentally, any foreign causes which may affect one’s conditions cannot be supposed in Samantabhadra’s theory.

Now *mokṣa* itself, according to this theory, can be regarded as a result and naturally must have its cause. Then what is the fundamental or first cause of *mokṣa*? Samantabhadra explains:

> For you, Mahāvīra, there are two types of *jīvas*: pure ones and impure ones. These two capacities, purity and impurity, are just as cookability and non-cookability of beans. For their manifestation, purity has its beginning while impurity is beginningless. This nature of purity or impurity is not in the scope of logic.\(^\text{22}\)

According to this statement, Mahāvīra teaches us that *jīvas* can be classified into two categories: *śuddhi* or pure ones and *aśuddhi* or impure ones. Here, the words *śuddhi* and *aśuddhi* are synonyms for *bhavya* and *abhavya* respectively. ‘The pure ones’ are those who have the ability to reach the final liberation, and ‘the impure ones’ are those who are destined to remain in this mundane world forever. In other words, not all the *jīvas* can reach *mokṣa*.\(^\text{23}\) Samantabhadra compares these capacities of the soul with those of beans: some of them become soft and edible when they are stewed but others remain hard even when we stew them for a long time. It is interesting to point out the fact that we cannot distinguish an edible bean from a non-edible one by their appearance. At first, all the beans look the same to us, they must be hard before they are boiled. Once they are boiled, some beans will show their own nature and become soft while the others remain hard as before. In the same manner, we cannot know whether a person has the capacity to obtain *mokṣa* or not. Having undertaken austerities or *tapas* which heats us up, to someone its own nature will appear and he or she will be liberated. But, the others will stay in the chain of reincarnations and remain in this world to suffer pain. Things which remain in the same condition are beginningless while things which newly occur have a beginning. Therefore, Samantabhadra says “*sādy-anādī tayor vyaktī* (Their manifestation, purity has its beginning while impurity is beginningless).”

The most important point in Samantabhadra’s remarks mentioned above is that the purity or impurity of a person cannot be known through inference (*atarka-gocara*). No ordinary person is capable to tell that such and such person will be liberated in the future, and the others will not. One cannot know the possibility of liberation of a certain person even through inference. We cannot recognize by perception what cannot be inferred.\(^\text{24}\) This implies that the hallmark of liberation cannot be perceived. Then who can realize liberation? One possible answer to this question is this: only the omniscient person does. This omniscient one, however, must be that person who knows each and everything in this universe. The Buddha who, as mentioned earlier, realizes only the religious

---


\(^{23}\) Ibid., 90.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 91.
matters or dharmas would not tell us about our liberation in the future. Only the Jain omniscient who realizes all the matter in this world can do so.

4. As mentioned earlier, even in the Śvetāmbara āgamas the topic of the omniscience is often referred to. Among many references we find notions similar to Samantabhadra argument. The Rāyapaseṇṭya, the second upāṅga in Śvetāmbara āgamas, mainly consists of the dialogue between a Jain monk Kesī and a materialist king Pāesī. The former belongs to a school derived from Pārśvanātha25 and the latter is converted to Jainism at the end of the dialogue. First, the king Pāesī denies the existence of a soul or jīva, but through the elevated explanation of Kesī, the king inclines to the view that a soul exists and that it is different from a body or matter. Even then the king asks the monk to show the soul in real form like a fruit which we can see. To this, Kesī replies; “Oh, king Pāesī, we, persons with imperfect knowledge, cannot realize nor perceive things in the categories at all.”26 The ten categories are (1) principle of motion, (2) principle of stop, (3) space (4) a soul separated from the body, (5) atom, (6) voice, (7) smell, (8) wind, (9) if a person can be a jina or not, (10) if a person is able to annihilate all the miseries or pains.27 The last two alternatives refer to the possibility of one’s emancipation or mokṣa because a Jina will destroy all the karmas and the one who annihilates all the miseries or pains can reach the state of mokṣa.

In these passages the monk Kesī clearly mentions that we ordinary human beings cannot realize whether a person will get final beatitude or not. Then who does know it? Kesī continues; “Indeed, an araha or Jina to whom the supreme knowledge and vision have occurred and who is omniscient can clearly realize and perceive these things.”28 This means that the omniscient Jina or tīrthaṅkara can recognize whether a person can attain the emancipation or mokṣa. Thus in the Śvetāmbara tradition too the omniscient person or tīrthaṅkara is regarded as the only one that can tell who has the possibility of mokṣa or not.

The Rāyapaseṇṭya sutta in which the earlier discussion happens belongs to a new stratum in the history of Śvetāmbara āgamas.29 Even then it must have reached the present form before the sixth century. With these facts it will be concluded that at least in the sixth century Śvetāmbara Jains were of the opinion that only the omniscient one can know whether a certain person can reach mokṣa or not.

5. The final goal of all religious activities, at least in traditional Indian thoughts, is to reach mokṣa. The Jains, however, maintain that only the way showed by the Jain saviors can lead us to the final goal. We cannot reach the goal by performing sacrifice as some Hindu schools proclaim. On the way to the goal we must perform various kinds of austerities by fasting and so on. But, such austerities do not take everyone to mokṣa. As we have seen earlier, according to Jainism we cannot realize ourselves whether we have the possibility of mokṣa or not. If there is nothing to assure us of the possibility, then we do feel uneasy about pursuing our way. With the existence of a supreme being this uneasiness can be dispelled. Such a supreme being need not tell us of the possibilities of mokṣa and cannot know only religious matter, but must recognize everything in
this universe including the possibilities of all the jīvas. Thus, we can concentrate on wending our way to the final goal.

Notes

1 Jāṇadi passadi savvām vavahāraṇena kevali bhavagavam / kevalaṇāṇi jāṇadi passadi niyamena appānaṃ // (Niyamasāra v. 158).
2 See, for example, Jātaka p. 77.
3 The earliest mentioning of omniscience in Jain literature must be that found in Āyā I, 3, 4. Post-canonical philosophers such as Kundakunda, and Umāśvāti also refer to this topic. But they did not establish that fact by means of inference. After Samantabhadra, as we will see, many Jain philosophers discussed the existence of an omniscient person.
4 Pathak (1892) has established that Samantabhadra was prior to Kumārila. Dharmakīrti’s attack on Samantabhadra’s philosophy is discussed in Fujinaga 2000. The historical priority of Kumārila to Dharmakīrti is not clearly established. It is also extremely probable that these three philosophers were contemporary with each other.
5 Pathak (1892) has established that Samantabhadra was prior to Kumārila. Dharmakīrti’s attack on Samantabhadra’s philosophy is discussed in Fujinaga 2000. The historical priority of Kumārila to Dharmakīrti is not clearly established. It is also extremely probable that these three philosophers were contemporary with each other.
6 See Fujinaga 1999.
7 ĀM 4: dosāvaranayor hānir niḥśeṣā'ṣty atiśāyanāt / kvacid yathā svahetubhyo bahirantarmaλakṣayah // English translation is based on Shah (1999: 3).
9 ĀM 6: sa tvam evāṁ nirdoṣo yuktāṣṭāvārdhivāk / aviruddho yad īṣṭān te prasiddhenāna bādhyate // English translation is based on Shah (1999: 4). The Sanskrit text clearly shows that “you” in this verse refers to a single person. According to the Jain doctrine, however, there must be more than one omniscient person, at least 24 tīrthaṅkara. Thus, in a sense, Samantabhadra’s argument in this verse does not go with traditional doctrine of Jainism. It also must be noted that the two syllogisms in this verse have no example (dṛśṭānta).
10 Thus the Buddha cannot be an omniscient.
11 The topic of SABP has not been discussed thoroughly so far in spite of its importance in the history of Jaina epistemology. It is, however, too wide and deep to argue here, so we shall deal with this topic on another occasion.
12 PM S. XV: tat sarvāthāvaranvilaye catanasya svarūpāvirbhāvo mukhyam kevalam.
13 Cf. PM S. XVI, XVII: prajñātisayavāśrāntyādisiddhes tatsiddhiḥ, bādhakābhāvāc ca.
14 For the details of Hemacandra’s discussion on SABP, see PM §§ 59–63.
15 Vādideva discusses omniscience in his Pramāṇanayatattvālakā II–24–27 and auto-commentary on them while §§ 21–27 of Nyāyadīpikā show Dharmabhusanā’s position on omniscience.
17 ĀM 96: ajiñānācet dhuvero bandho jīveyāntyān na kevali / jīnānāsyāt Vimokṣaś ca ajiñānāt bahuto ‘nyathā // See also Shah (1999: 84).
18 ĀM 98: ajiñānān mohino bandho nājiñānād vītamohatāḥ / jīnānāstakā mokaś syād amohān mohino ‘nyathā // See also Shah (1999: 85).
19 For the attack of Dharmakīrti on Samantabhadra’s position, see Fujinaga (2000).
20 Cf. Astasahasrā on ĀM 99 (p. 267).
21 ĀM. 99abc: kāmādiprabhavāś citraḥ karmabandhānurūpataḥ / tac ca karma svahetubhyo . . . // Shah (1999: 85) understands that the word sva refers to karma. Cf. ĀM 4 in which the phrase svahetubhyas occurs in.
22 ĀM. 99d–100: te sūddhyāsuddhitāḥ / sūddhyāsuddhi punah śakti te pākyāpākyāsaktiḥvad/ sādyānāti tayor vyakti svabhāvo ‘tarkagocaraḥ //
23 Vṛti of Vasunandin on ĀM 99: ata eva na sarvesāṁ mokaśa.
24 In this context inference represents the whole parokṣa.
25 Kesī is called pāsāvvaccijjo (Rāyapaseṇīya sutta 7, p. 5) and refers to himself as
amhaṃ samanāṇam nīggaṃthānam . . . (do. 20, p. 18).
26 Rāyapaseṇīya sutta 30 (p. 33). eva khalu Paesi! dasaṭṭhāṇāṁ chaumatthe maṇusse
sabbhāvenām na jñāṇi na pāsai.
27 do. (p. 34). 9) ayāṁ jine bhavissai vā no bhavissai, 10) ayāṁ savvadukkhāṇaṁ antaṁ
karissai vā no vā. See also Sīhānāṅgasūtra, p. 337.
28 do. eyāni ceva uppannāṇadamsaṇadhare arahājīne kevālī savvabhāvenam jñāṇi pāsai.
29 For the position of the Rāyapaseṇīya sutta in the Jain āgamas, see Dixit (1971: 4).

Bibliography

Primary sources and abbreviations

ÅM = Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra with vṛtti of Vasunandin, ed. by G. Jain. Benares
(Saṅitāna Jaina Granthamālā) 7 1914.
Aṣṭasahasrī, of Vidyānanda on Aṣṭasati of Akalanka, ed. by Baṃsīdhar. Sholapur (Gandhī
Nāthaśarājī Jaina Granthamālā) 1914.
Aṣṭasati, of Akalanka, see Asahasrasrī.
Āyā = Acārāṅgasūtraṃ and Śūtrakṛtāṅgasūtram, ed. by Sāgārāṇanda, re-ed. by Muni
The Jātaka together with its commentary, ed. by V. Fausbøll. Vol. I. Oxford (Pali Text
Society) 1990.
Mimāṃsā Ślokavārttika, of Kumārila, ed. by D. D. Shastri. Varanasi (Prachyabharati
Series 10) 1978.
Niyamasāra, of Kundakunda, ed. and tr. by U. Jain. Lucknow (The Sacred Books of the
Jainas Vol. IX) 1931.
Nyāyādipīkā, of Dharmabhūṣanā, ed. by D. Jain. Delhi (Virasevamandira Granthamālā
no. 4) 1968.
PM = Pramāṇamīmāṃsa, of Hemacandra, ed. by Sukhlāl Sāṅghavī et al. Ahmedabad–
Calcutta (Śīṅghī Jaina Granthamālā 9) 1939.
Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, of Vādiveśasūri with auto-commentary Śyādvaḍaratnākara, ed.
Pramāṇavārttika, of Dharmakīrtī, ed. by Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi (Baudha Bharati
Series 3) 1968.
Sīhānāṅgasūtram and Saṃavāyāṅga Śūtram, ed. by Sāgārāṇanda, re-ed. by Muni

Secondary sources

(Beiträge zur Kenntnis südasiatischer Sprachen und Literaturen 8).
of Other Schools,” in N. K. Wagle and O. Qvarnström, eds, Approaches to Jaina Studies:
Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols. Toronto (University of Toronto: Centre for
South Asian Studies) pp. 131–137.
From the times of Aristotle, to whom the idea seemed so obvious and natural that he eventually failed to spare anywhere in his voluminous oeuvre even a single word of explanation on it, and of Alexander, his commentator, who was the first to point out its significance explicitly,\(^1\) the benefits of symbolic expressions in logic,\(^2\) or formal logic to be more precise, have not been questioned seriously by any sane student ever since. It has been unanimously determined that the predominant idea underlying the usage of symbols in logic lies in the desire, first, to make the student ‘aware, that the validity of the processes of analysis does not depend upon the interpretation of the symbols which are employed, but solely upon the laws of their combination’,\(^3\) and, secondly, to render ‘every logical proposition, whether categorical or hypothetical, capable of exact and rigorous expression’,\(^4\) not to mention a certain amount of intellectual gratification derived from ‘the symmetry of their analytical expression, harmony and consistency’,\(^5\) notwithstanding the simple fact that ‘in the beginning the use of letters is a mystery, which seems to have no purpose except mystification’.\(^6\) The distinct advantage of the first two requirements, that is the recognition of class and general notion as a universal point of reference and univocality in the use of names, that jointly enable us to arrive autonomously at specific universally applicable, contents- and context-independent ‘elementary laws of thought’\(^7\) and draw valid conclusions autonomously with reference to the contents of premises, was recognised relatively early by Alexander:

In the discipline [of logic], letters are used in order to make us aware, that conclusion does not depend on contents, but on [syllogistic] figures, on relation of premisses and on [syllogistic] modes, because it is not the
very contents that is important for syllogistic inference, but the arrangement itself. Accordingly, letters are employed [to represent] general notions and to show, that conclusion will always follow and from any assumption.8

Two additional considerations that are taken for granted and speak in favour of the method resting upon the employment of symbols in formal logic were added in one breath at the moment of formulating the first theory to represent formal logic with the help of symbolic means that remain at the disposal of algebra, the result of which is symbolic logic, or mathematical logic or logistic: the need for a necessary instrument, or methods, or ‘aids’ (or, to intimate the name of the ‘symbolic culprit’ anew, τὸ ὑφαίνον) to facilitate the progress of scientific discovery, on the one hand, and, on the other, the demand of the discipline of the intellect.9

Our list of benefits can be further extended with two more features, that is, that of concision and manageability as well as amenability to and capability of expressing abstract concepts absent from natural language.10 Every student of philosophic Sanskrit knows how indefinite or imprecise – and logically unsatisfactory – the conjunctions ca or vā (especially in negated sentences) in the natural language can be, how their meaning in certain contexts may overlap and how much intuitive their interpretation sometimes is. Conspicuous examples are furnished, for instance, by the problem of caṭuṣ-koṭi, wherein the first hemstitch of one of its formulations naîva svataḥ prasiddhir na parasparataḥ para-pramānair vā11 could theoretically be represented in a number of ways (p stands for svataḥ prasiddhir, q for parasparataḥ prasiddhir, and r for para-pramānair prasiddhir): (1) ~p∧~q∧r, (2) ~p∧~q∧~r, (4) ~p∧~q∧~r, (5) ~p∧(q∧~r) or (6) ~p∧(q∧r) etc., but it is the reader who intensionally interprets it not as an alternative (the usual meaning of vā) but as a disjunction (7) ~p∧~q∧~r. The inadequacy of, say, such ambiguous words as ‘and’ or ‘or’, or its equivalents, to express certain abstract relations, that are not present in the natural language but are easily definable with the help of truth tables (1110, 0111 and 0110) in the two-value logic and can be represented with symbols (p|q, p∧q, p∧q), is well-known.12

Having said that, could such a symbolic and formalised language have any drawback? Apart from the earlier-quoted remark uttered jokingly by Bertrand Russell, two crucial disadvantages can be seen in the way any formalised language, alongside symbols as its corollaries, operates ‘at the expense, where necessary, of brevity and facility of communication’.13

But there is one more to be mentioned, of extralogical consequence and of sociological import. However, before I come to speak of it, let us consider what actually happens when, say, Dharmakīrti avails himself of examples of proof formulas or of the fallacies of proof formula? Notoriously, Indian logicians did not use symbols in the proper sense. In which sense does he then use sentences that stand for proof formulas? While formulating an inference for others, does he refer to a particular situation or does he articulate general rules? The question
indeed seems rather trivial. A good example of a reasoning of universal denotation is the one provided by Dharmakīrti: ‘Thus is the formulation of the logical reason based on [essential] identity: whatever is existent, is without exception impermanent, for instance the pot – this is the simple (unqualified) formulation of the logical reason based on [essential] identity,’\(^\text{14}\) with the thesis and the logical reason having most broadly conceivable universal reference: sarvam anityam, sattvāt (‘everything is impermanent, because it is existent’).\(^\text{15}\) But we have countless instances when Dharmakīrti, and Indian logicians in general, draws inference with regard to a very particular situation (‘here, on this particular spot’) following a general rule of invariable concomitance, for example: ‘The formulation of the logical reason based on effect is [as follows]: wherever there is smoke, there is fire, for instance in the kitchen, etc. And there is smoke here, [* hence there is fire here]*\(^\text{16}\) where the implied thesis (or conclusion) *astihāgni* (‘there is fire here’) pertains to an individual case.\(^\text{17}\) But even then, in both earlier cases these formulations instantiate only some ideal patterns, or semi-symbolic formulas, even though no symbolic expressions occur in the formulations. That is clear from Dharmakīrti’s commentary itself, when the general rule is first stated and than instantiated, or applied to a particular case, for example:

If \(x\)-s are observed, \(y\) – characterised by (i.e. dependent on) these \((x\text{-}s)\) [previously] unobserved – is observed, and \([y]\) is not observed, even if one of \(x\)-s is absent, [then] \(y\) is the effect of \(x\); and [in this case] this [effect] is smoke.\(^\text{18}\)

Clearly, Dharmakīrti – and Indian logicians in general – does not use symbols; however, particular terms such as ghāṭa, ākāśa, paramāṇu, śabda, etc., stand for certain classes of objects, for example the class of material perceptible things (mūrta = pratyakṣādy-amupalabdha), the class of imperceptible things (amūrta), the class of produced things (krataka), etc. His formulations are ‘replaceable’, namely they stand for general symbols, and the actual contents of a proposition is rather secondary; being of exemplary, illustrative character, its meaning is hardly of any relevance. However, their meaning is not entirely irrelevant: such semi-variables, for example ghāṭa, that occur in proof formulas denote a particular class, for example either the class of material perceptible things (mūrta) or the class of produced things (krataka), and its particular denotation range is determined by the context. Thus, intensional logic possesses some indistinct aspects of extensionality.

A good exemplification of this is furnished by a comparison of two varieties of the fallacious example found in Śaṅkarasvāmin’s Nyāya-praveṣa (NP) and in Dharmakīrti’s Nyāya-bindu (NB). The former avails himself of one and the same sentence word for word (nityaḥ śabdo ‘mūrtatvāt paramāṇuvat) to exemplify two different kinds of drṣṭāntābhāsa, namely of sādhana-dharmāsiddha (of the sādharmya type) and sādhyāvyāvṛtta (of the vaidharmya type), the only difference being in stating the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) either in the positive

119
manner (yad amūrtam tan nityam drṣṭam – ‘whatever is imperceptible is experienced to be permanent’) or negative manner (yad anityam tan mūrtam drṣṭam – ‘whatever is impermanent is experienced to be perceptible’).

However, Dharmakīrti, in explicating two divisions of the fallacious example, namely sādhyā-vikala and sādhyāvyāvirekin, that correspond to Śankaravāmīn’s sādhana-dharmasiddha and sādhyāvyāvṛtta respectively, employs partly the same sentence, but changes the essential element in the reasoning: the statement of the object that serves as an example. The result is that we have two different examples that can be interchanged ([S1] karmavat and [V1] paramānuvat).

I have expressed earlier the conviction that the actual contents of a proposition is rather secondary instead of saying it is of no relevance, inasmuch as the contents of a proposition is indeed entirely irrelevant structurally to the way a proof formula is formulated (its role is to exemplify certain ontological and logical relations), but, on the other hand, it does play a certain role, since it conveys some ideas, being formulated with verbal means. I agree, all these remarks are perhaps not particularly original and are, at least intuitively, taken for granted by every student of Indian epistemology. Why, then, am I saying all this? To repeat my previous question: is there, thus, any advantage in using no symbols? Apparently there is, though it is not of logical nature, and I shall try to demonstrate this on the following pages.

As it is well-known to the student of Buddhist thought, in the third chapter of Nyāya-bindu we come across Dharmakīrti’s exposition of nine fallacies of the example based on similarity (sādharmya-drṣṭântabhāsa) as well as the complementary ninefold division of the fallacy of the example based on dissimilarity (vaidharmya-drṣṭântabhāsa). Further, within both ninefold divisions of fallacious examples we can observe that each of them can be naturally divided into three sub-classes of three structurally similar elements. Accordingly, the complete enumeration runs as follows:

[S] fallacious examples based on similarity (sādharmya-drṣṭântabhāsa):

[SA] lacking x:
[S1] the fallacious example lacking the probandum (sādhyā-vikala),
[S2] the fallacious example lacking the probans (sādhanā-vikala),
[S3] the fallacious example lacking both the probandum and the probans (sādhyā-sādhanā-vikala),

[SB] in which the property of x is doubtful:
[S4] the fallacious example in which the property of the probandum is doubtful (sandigdha-sādhyā-dharma),
[S5] the fallacious example in which the property of the probans is doubtful (sandigdha-sādhanā-dharma),
[S6] the fallacious example in which the property of the probandum and the probans is doubtful (sandigdha-sādhyā-sādhanā-dharma),
[SC] with positive concomitance characterised by x:
[S7] the fallacious example without positive concomitance (anavaya),
[S8] the fallacious example with unindicated positive concomitance (apradarśītānvaya),
[S9] the fallacious example with inverted positive concomitance (viparītānvaya);

[V] fallacious examples based on dissimilarity (vaidharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa):

[VA] lacking negative concomitance with x:
[V1] the fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probandum (sādhyāvyatirekin),
[V2] the fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probans (sādhana-vyatirekin),
[V3] the fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probandum and the probans (sādhya-sādhanāvyatirekin),

[VB] in which negative concomitance with x is doubtful:
[V4] the fallacious example in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful (sandigdha-sādhyā-vyatireka),
[V5] the fallacious example in which negative concomitance with the probans is doubtful (sandigdha-sādhana-vyatireka),
[V6] the fallacious example in which negative concomitance both with the probandum and with the probans is doubtful (sandigdha-sādhya-sādhanā-vyatireka),

[VC] with negative concomitance characterised by x:
[V7] the fallacious example without negative concomitance (avy-atireka),
[V8] the fallacious example with unindicated negative concomitance (apradarśīta-vyatireka),
[V9] the fallacious example with inverted negative concomitance (viparīta-vyatireka).

Noteworthy is the fact that Dharmakīrti’s typology, along with illustrations for each of the entries, is followed in each and every detail – with a few exceptions – in the classification found in Siddharṣigani’s Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti (NAV) – a Jaina epistemic treatise, the significance of which exceeds perhaps even the philosophic import of the Nyāyāvatāra aphorisms, despite the subservient function it was predestined to perform, being a commentary thereupon. The juxtaposition presented in the following two tables (Tables 6.1 and 6.2) will clearly show such a dependence. I have single-underlined phrases found in NB that are basically identical with NAV. I have double-underlined the portions that can be either reconstructed on the basis of NB or NBṬ or supplied from corresponding sections of NAV. I use a broken underline to mark synonymous (but not identical) expressions in NB and NAV.
Table 6.1 Śādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Variety of the fallacious example</th>
<th>Nyāya-bindu of Dharma-kārtti</th>
<th>Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti (on NA 24) of Siddhārṣigāni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[S1] sādhyā-vikāla</td>
<td>lacking the probandum</td>
<td>nityah śabdo 'mūrtatvāḥ, karmavat (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like action.</td>
<td>bhrāntam anumānam, pramāṇatvāḥ, pratyākṣavat. Inference is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like perception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[S2] sādhanā-vikāla</td>
<td>lacking the probans</td>
<td>nityah śabdo 'mūrtatvāḥ, paramānūvat (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like infinitesimal atom.</td>
<td>jāgrat-saṃvedanāṁ bhrāntāṁ, pramāṇatvāḥ, svapna-saṃvedanavat. The sensation of a person in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like the sensation in dream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[S3] sādhyā-sādhanā-vikāla</td>
<td>lacking both the probandum and the probans</td>
<td>nityah śabdo 'mūrtatvād, ghatavat (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like pot.</td>
<td>nāsti sarva-jñāḥ, pratyākṣādy-anupalabhātavād, ghatavat There is no omniscient person (sc. omniscient person is non-existent), because he is not comprehended through perception, etc., like a pot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[S4] sandigdha-sādhyā-dharma</td>
<td>in which the property of the probandum is doubtful</td>
<td>rāgādīmaṇā ayāṁ vacanād rathyā-puruṣavat (NB 3.125). This [particular person] is endowed with passion, because he speaks, like a person in the street.</td>
<td>vita-ṛāgo 'yāṁ, marana-dharmatvād, rathyā-puruṣavat. This [particular person] is dispassionate, because he is mortal, like a person in the street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[S5] sandigdha-sādhanā-dharma</td>
<td>in which the property of the probans is doubtful</td>
<td>marana-dharmāyaṁ puruṣo rāgādīmatvād, rathyā-puruṣavat (NB 3.125). This particular person is mortal, because he is endowed with passion, like a person in the street.</td>
<td>marana-dharmāyaṁ puruṣo, rāgādīmatvād, rathyā-puruṣavat. This particular person is mortal, because he is passionate, like a person in the street.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**[S6]** **sandigda-sādhya-sādhana-dharma** in which the property of the probandum and the probans is doubtful

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>asarva-jiño 'yaṁ rāgādīmatvād, rathyā-purusavat</th>
<th>This [particular person] is not omniscient, because he is endow with passion, like a person in the street.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**[S7]** **anavaya** without positive concomitance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[<em>rāgādimāṁ ayaṁ, vakṛtvād.]</em> yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādimāṁ, iṣṭa-puruṣaśavaṁ (NB 3.126).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

This particular person is endowed with passion, because he is a speaker (sc. talks), for instance whoever is a speaker is endowed with passion, like any selected person.

| iṣṭa-puruṣaśavaṁ. A particular person in question is dispassionate, because he is a speaker (sc. talks), like any selected person. |

**[S8]** **apradarśitānvaya** with unindicated positive concomitance

| anityah śabdah krtakatvād ghatavat (NB 3.126). |
| Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced, like pot. |

| anityah śabdah, krtakatvād, ghatavat. |

**[S9]** **viparitānvaya** with inverted positive concomitance

| [*Anityah śabdah, krtakatvād ,] yad anityam tat krtakam [*ghatavat* †](NB 3.127). |
| Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced; whatever is impermanent is produced, like pot. |

<p>| anityah śabdah, krtakatvād, yad anityam tat krtakam ghaṭāvat [Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced; whatever is impermanent is produced, like pot. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Variety</th>
<th>Nyāya-bindu</th>
<th>Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti (on NA 25) of Siddhārṣigani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[V1]</td>
<td>sādhyāvyatirekin</td>
<td><em>nityah śabdo 'mūrtatvāt,24</em> paramānuvat (NB 3.129)</td>
<td>bhṛantam anumānām, pramāṇatvāt; yat punar bhṛantam na bhavati na tat pramāṇāṁ, tad yathā svapna-jiñānam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lacking negative</td>
<td>[Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like infinitesimal atom]</td>
<td>Inference is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, whatever is not erroneous, however, is not a cognitive criterion, like cognition in dream nirvikalpakaṃ prayakṣam, pramāṇatvāt; yat punah savikalpakaṃ na tat pramāṇāṁ, tad yathāmūnānām</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>concomitance with the</td>
<td></td>
<td>Perception is non-conceptual, because it is a cognitive criterion, whatever is accompanied by a conceptualisation, however, is not a cognitive criterion, like inference nityānityāḥ śabdah, sattvāṁ; yah punar na nityānityāḥ sa na san, tad yathā ghatāḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>probandum</td>
<td></td>
<td>The speech element is [both] permanent and impermanent, because it is existent, whatever is not [both] permanent and impermanent, however, is not existent, like a pot asarva-jiñāḥ anāptāḥ vā kapilādayo, ārya-satya-catuṣṭāyapraṇāpyapādayatvāḥ; yah punah sarva-jiñāḥ āptāḥ vā śāy ārya-satya-catuṣṭāyaṃ prayapadat, tad yathā saudhādamhāḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lacking negative</td>
<td>Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>concomitance with the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>probans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[V3]</td>
<td>sādhyā-sādhanāvyatirekin</td>
<td><em>nityah śabdo 'mūrtatvāt,26</em> ākāśavat (NB 3.129).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lacking negative</td>
<td>Speech element is permanent, because it is imperceptible, like space</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>concomitance with the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>probandum and the probans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[V4]</td>
<td>sandigdha-sādhyā-vyatireka</td>
<td>asarva-jiñah kapilādayo 'nāptā vā, avidyamānā-sarva-jiñatāptatā-liṅga-bhūta-pramāṇātīśaya-sāsanatvāt; yah sarva-jiñā āpto vā sa jyotir-jiñānādikam pradīpasyān, yathā rṣabha-vardhānānādir itī (NB 3.130). Kapila and others are neither omniscient nor authoritative persons,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A particular person in question is untrustworthy, because he is endowed with passion, etc., like Rṣabha, Vasu and other Jinas (NB 3.131).

A particular person in question is not such whose statements could be trusted by a Brahmin learned in the three Vedas, because he is endowed with passion, etc., those whose statements can be trusted are not endowed with passion, etc., like Gautama and others, who are promulgators of Dharma-stra.

[Continued]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Variety</th>
<th>Nyāya-bindu</th>
<th>Nyāyāvatāravivrti (on NA 25) of Siddhārṣigāni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| [V7] | avyatireka  
without negative concomitance | avitara-go 'yam vaktrtvāt, yatrāvita-ragat vanmā
nāsti, sa vaktā, yathōpala-khandavyāh, iti (NB 3.133).  
This [person] is not dispassionate, because he is a speaker (sc. talks), [a person], in whom there is no dispassionateness, is a speaker (sc. talks), like a bit of stone. | is filled with compassion, offered bits of their own flesh to the abodes of compassion (sc. to hungry beings who deserved compassion), like Bodhisattvas.  
Avitara-go kaścid vivaśītah puruso, vakrttvā; yah punar vita-rāgo, na sa vaktā, yathōpala-khandah.  
A particular person in question is not dispassionate, because he is a speaker (sc. talks), whoever is dispassionate, however, is not a speaker (sc. does not talk), like a bit of stone. |
| [V8] | apradārśita-avyatireka  
with unindicated negative concomitance | anityah śabdah kṛtakatvād, ākāśavat (NB 3.134).  
Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced, like space | anityah śabdah kṛtakatvād, ākāśavat  
Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced, like space. |
| [V9] | viparīta-avyatireka  
with inverted negative concomitance | [* anityah śabdah, kṛtakatvād , yad akṛtakaṁ tan nityam bhavati, [*ākāśavat] 27] (NB 3.135).  
[Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced,] whatever is not produced is permanent, [like space.] | [* anityah śabdah, kṛtakatvād , yad akṛtakaṁ tan nityam bhavati, yathākāśam.  
Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced, whatever is not produced is permanent, like space. |
As far similarities in wording in both texts are concerned, the exceptions, that is, passages where Siddharṣigaṇi does not follow in his illustrations those of Dharmaṅkūṭi at all, can easily be seen in the tables: [S1] sādhyā-vikala-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa, [S2] sādhana-vikala-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa, [V1] sādhyāvyatirek-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa and [V2] sādhanāvyatirek-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa.

In some other cases Siddharṣigaṇi’s classification follows Dharmaṅkūṭi’s typology in general, but varies in wording so insignificantly that the differences can be altogether discarded. Thus [S7] in the ananvaya type of fallacious example and in Siddharṣigaṇi’s expression vivakṣitah puruṣah is tantamount to Dharmaṅkūṭi’s ayam. That is also the case in [V7] the avyatireka type of fallacious example (ayam = kaścid vivakṣitah puruṣah), whereas the invariable concomitance is expressed in quite a similar way, barring different position of the negative clause (yat ratified-rāgatvanā nāasti sa vaktā, yaḥ punar vittā-rāgo, na sa vaktā). In [V4] sandigdha-sādhyā-vyatireka-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa the second predicate anāptā vā is interchanged with the subject kapilādayaḥ; the verb forms upadīṣṭavān (Dharmaṅkūṭi) and pratyaṇptpadat (Siddharṣigaṇi) are identical in meaning, likewise the pronouns sa (Dharmaṅkūṭi) and asau (Siddharṣigaṇi); the significant difference being the logical reason, that is the realm of supernatural teaching in the invariable concomitance and the example respectively: avidyamāna-sarva-jñatāptatā-liṅga-bhūta-pramāṇātiṣaya-sāsanatvāt, jyotir-jñānādikam, vardhamānādīḥ (Dharmaṅkūṭi) and ārya-satya-catusṭayāpratyayitpadakatvāt, śauddhōdāmiḥ (Siddharṣigaṇi). In [V5] sandigdha-sādhana-vyatireka-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa the negation in the statement of the thesis is expressed either by the particle na (Dharmaṅkūṭi) or by the alpha-privativum a-ō (Siddharṣigaṇi), while the compounds grāhya-vacanāḥ (Dharmaṅkūṭi) and ă-deya-vākyāḥ (Siddharṣigaṇi) are identical in meaning; the only difference in the expression of the invariable concomitance is the number, namely plural ye…te (Dharmaṅkūṭi) and singular yah…sa (Siddharṣigaṇi); Siddharṣigaṇi does omit the phrase trayāvidā brāhmāṇena; the only significant difference being the example gautamādayo dharmaśastraṇām pranetāraḥ (Dharmaṅkūṭi) and sugataḥ (Siddharṣigaṇi). In [V9] the viparītta-vyatireka type the example is indicated either by the suffix ă-vat (Dharmaṅkūṭi) or by relative indeclinable yathā (Siddharṣigaṇi).

In two instances the similarities in Dharmaṅkūṭi’s and Siddharṣigaṇi’s formulations are partial, thus in [S3] sādhyā-sādhana-vikala-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa and in [S4] sandigdha-sādhyā-dharma-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa only the example is identical, namely ghaṭavat and rathyā-puruṣavat, respectively, and the compound element ă-rāgā-ō and pronoun ayam in [S4]. In [V3] sādhyā-sādhanāvyatireki-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa the subject of the thesis sābdah is the same, whereas the predicate nitya (or nitya-ō) partly overlaps. In [V6] sandigdha-sādhyā-sādhana-vyatireka-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa only the theses of Dharmaṅkūṭi and Siddharṣigaṇi are identical, the negations being expressed either by the alpha-privativum a-ō (Dharmaṅkūṭi) or by the particle na (Siddharṣigaṇi).

The large number of similarities or identical formulations alone is so ample that it leaves no doubt as regards the indebtedness of Siddharṣigaṇi to Dharmaṅkūṭi in this respect. That is the first point I wished to make: Dharmaṅkūṭi’s
typology has been practically accepted by NAV en bloc. A solitary case of parallelism in choosing illustrations of fallacious examples might be claimed to be nothing but coincidental, but the situation when Siddharṣigani’s choice of expressions in most cases coincides with that of Dharmakīrti and the eighteenfold division of drṣṭāntābhāṣā is identical in both cases, it can by no means be a matter of coincidence. Further, my thesis is corroborated additionally by the way Siddharṣigani makes the selection of three proof formulas that are not mentioned by Dharmakīrti in extenso but in a terse, incomplete form to be supplemented from the context of preceding sūtras, namely [S7], [S9] and [V9]. When we reconstrue the proof formulas to complete formulations (for details see respective notes 22, 23, 27), as intended by Dharmakīrti – that is, [S7] [*rāgādimāṇ ayām, vakṛtvād.,] yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādimāṇ, iṣṭa-puruṣavat, [S9] [*anityah śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvāt.,] yad anityāṁ tat kṛtakam [*ghaṭavat.,] [V9] [*anityah śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvāt.,] yad akṛtakam tan nityāṁ bhavatī, [*ākāśavat.,] – it turns out that they correspond virtually in every detail to the examples given by Siddharṣigani.

There is at least one more reason to believe that Siddharṣigani follows Dharmakīrti in his typology. Commenting upon [V4] he classifies the sandīgha-sādhya-vyatireka type as reducible, on extra-logical grounds, to be exact, to [V1] the sādhya-vyatirekin variety. The only reason for singling it out as a separate variety is the need to take into consideration the opinion of some people ‘lacking the recognition’ of certain substantial facts, to whom a particular case of a fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probandum ‘appears to be [the fallacious example] in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful’. As a commentator, he was obviously restrained by the contents of Siddhasena Mahāmati’s Nyāyāvatāra. However NA 25 may be similarly taken to enforce the acceptance of the whole [VA] class (namely [V1], [V2], [V3]) as well as only some types of the [VB] class (namely one or more out of [V4], [V5], [V6]), but not necessarily all of them. As the text stands, NA 25 does not urge one to distinguish separately the sandīgha-sādhya-vyatireka type.

Having examined the varieties of fallacious examples as illustrated by Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣigani, we can easily notice a couple of regularities. What is conspicuous is the almost complete absence of any similarity in the [A] sub-category of [S] and [V], namely in [SA] (i.e. [S1], [S2], [S3]) and in [VA] (i.e. [V1], [V2], [V3]). There is a lot of correspondence in the [B] sub-category – namely [SB] (i.e. [S4], [S5], [S6]) and [VB] (i.e. [V4], [V5], [V6]) – in the exposition of both authors, although the comparison betrays certain differences, whereas the [C] sub-category – namely [SC] (i.e. [S7], [S8], [S9]) and [VC] (i.e. [V7], [V8], [V9]) – is altogether identical in NB and in NAV.

The question what factors could account for this evident incongruity in treating Dharmakīrti’s sub-categories by Siddharṣigani, if there is any, arises. Why does Siddharṣigani quote certain Dharmakīrti’s reasonings in extenso, whereas he diverges from the Dharmakīrti’s formulations in other cases?

Examining the varieties [S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8] and [V9], Siddharṣigani enters into a polemical discussion with an opponent, nay, he openly disputes the
status of a separate fallacious example of the six types, attempting to prove them to be misconceived and faulty solely either due to the defects of the logical reason (hetu) or due to the incompetence of the speaker, but not because of their deficient nature being a separate and independent category of the fallacy of the example. The appropriate sections of NAV are introduced respectively as follows:

And now [a doubt is raised]: “Some [thinkers] have taught an additional triad of fallacies of the example, as well, namely [S7] [the fallacious example] without positive concomitance, [S8] [the fallacious example] with unindicated positive concomitance and [S9] [the fallacious example] with inverted positive concomitance.”\(^ {32} \)

and

Other [thinkers], inasmuch as they are [such kind of people] who speak without deliberation, have demonstrated three additional fallacies of the example, as well, namely: [V7] [the fallacious example] without negative concomitance, [V8] [the fallacious example] with unindicated negative concomitance and [V9] [the fallacious example] with inverted negative concomitance.\(^ {33} \)

In the light of what has been said on the foregoing pages there can be no doubt regarding the identity of the opponent, referred to by Siddharśigani as ‘others’ (paraih). To dispute the antagonistic standpoint, in this case Dharmakīrti’s tradition, the easiest way would be simply to cite either the rival thesis and the name of its advocate. General practice of philosophic discourse in India, however, has it that it was enough to hear even the incipit alone to identify Dharmakīrti as the adversary. On the other hand, to interpolate or alter in any other way the opponent’s statements was not advisable methodologically for a variety of reasons. A modified quotation might no longer be an unambiguous indication of its source and author. Moreover, in case of an interpolated excerpt the opponent could easily ward off possible criticism pointing out that what is actually being refuted is not his own thesis and the criticism is misdirected. These seem to be Siddharśigani’s motives to leave Dharmakīrti’s six faulty illustrations ([S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8], [V9]) in an unmodified form.

Having thus pointed out the target of his criticism, this decision did not compel Siddharśigani to preserve all the remaining original illustrations of Dharmakīrti intact. Still, he did refrain from introducing any changes to the illustrations taken over from NB in a few other cases, namely in the [B] sub-category of the sādharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa (i.e. [S4], [S5], [S6]).

These unmodified categories seem to be of considerably less interest for my purposes, whereas most of the remaining cases when Siddharśigani interpolates or modifies Dharmakīrti’s illustrations form a kind of a puzzle, bringing up the question what purpose he had in mind while taking liberties with the original instances of fallacious examples formulated by Dharmakīrti.
look at all remaining illustrations in question, namely the [A] sub-category of [S] and [V] (i.e. [S1], [S2], [S3], [V1], [V2], [V3]) as well as the [B] sub-category of [V] (i.e. [V4], [V5], [V6]), reveals that Siddarśigani’s selection of locutions was deliberate, and his decision was motivated by his sectarian bias, in most part against the Buddhist, the only case of his other than anti-Buddhist prejudice being [V3]. Altogether, one may group illustrations of fallacious example, the original reading of which was modified by Siddharśigani, under three headings:

1 Anti-Buddhist illustrations provoked by Dharmakīrti’s own sectarian anti-Jinistic bias ([V4], [V6]),
2 Anti-Buddhist illustrations not provoked by Dharmakīrti ([S1], [S2], [V1], [V2], [V5]) and
3 Doctrinal illustration without anti-Buddhist bias, endorsing a particular Jaina tenet ([S3]).

Startling as it is, there is not even a single case when Siddharśigani modified Dharmakīrti’s original illustration irrelevantly. There are no ‘doctrinally neutral’ changes: all alterations are prompted directly by Siddharśigani’s sectarian partiality or doctrinal conviction.

My main concern now will be rather to examine the doctrinal, motivational or sociological background of each of such illustrations, not so much their logical relevance or formal structure.

1 Anti-Buddhist illustrations provoked by Dharmakīrti’s own sectarian anti-Jinistic bias. As in the case of Dharmakīrti’s original illustrations, these are of insolent nature and do not aspire to establish any doctrinal thesis.

[V4] sandīgdha-sādhya-vyatireka. Dharmakīrti’s illustration of fallacious reasoning based on the fallacious example implicitly puts to doubt the omniscience and authority of Jaina Tīrthamkāras. In his illustration science of astronomy–astrology represents the distinguishing quality of cognition that should serve as ‘the mark of possessing the status of an omniscient or an authoritative person, [which] is not present’ (avidyamāna-sarva-jñatāptatā-liṅga-3). Accordingly, Kapila and many other thinkers did not teach astrology, as Jaina Tīrthamkāras did, hence they could not aspire to possess omniscience or authority. The doubtful element in this fallacious reasoning is whether teaching astrology necessarily entails omniscience and authority: one may be an expert in astrology without being omniscient or authoritative.34 Even though both the Buddhist and the Jainas would take the thesis (‘Kapila and others are neither omniscient nor authoritative persons’) to be true, the whole reasoning is claimed by Dharmakīrti to be fallacious, because the proof formula is faulty, insofar as the negative example – which should adduce a contrary example, that is of someone who is both omniscient

130
and authoritative (‘Rṣabha, Vardhamāna and other [Jinas]’) – is in his opinion fallacious, being doubtful. In this clandestine way Dharmakīrti discredits spiritual or/and intellectual accomplishments of Jaina Tīrthaṅkāras. In retaliation, Siddhārṣigāṇi employs the same procedure and questions the Buddha’s omniscience and authority, explaining that nothing bars the possibility that a charlatan may likewise teach the Four Noble Truths and deliberately deceive people at the same time, without being omniscient or authoritative. Siddhārṣigāṇi’s formulation of the doubt indicates that the Buddha was indeed neither omniscient nor authoritative.

[V6] sandīgdha-sādhya-sādhana-vyatireka. Kapila and the Sāṅkhya school remain the scapegoat of the thesis also in this variety of the fallacious example both in NB and NAV. As in the preceding case, Dharmakīrti chooses the Jainas as the whipping boy in his example. His unpronounced assumption, at least something which is liable to doubt, is whether the Tīrthaṅkāras are dispassionate and free of covetousness and greed. Since in this proof formula both probandum and probans are doubtful, Tīrthaṅkāras’ moral status is questioned in two ways. Not only their dispassionateness is disputed by the ‘doubtful probandum’ (in the correct vyatireka example this should be vīta-rāga), but also the logical reason imputes that the Tīrthaṅkāras are ‘endowed with covetousness and greed’ (parigrahāgraha-yoga). This is particularly offensive to Jainas, or to Digambaras as Dharmottara specifies, who would refrain even from wearing clothes in order to curb all desire for possessions and to manifest total lack of ‘covetousness and greed’. Siddhārṣigāṇi is quick to repay him tit for tat, and follows Dharmakīrti’s method in every detail. He chooses two doctrinal points regarding Bodhisattvas – a Buddhist parallel of Jaina Tīrthaṅkāras – that are as sensitive to the Buddhists as Tīrthaṅkāras’ dispassionateness and lack of possessions for the Jainas. To discredit the Buddhist ideal, he cites Bodhisattvas’ compassion as an instance of doubtful probans. As if it were not enough, Siddhārṣigāṇi adds a second logical reason (benevolence, dāna), which seems doubtful to him: ‘Bodhisattvas have offered bits of their own flesh to hungry people who deserved compassion’.

Siddhārṣigāṇi’s charge is repeated explicitly in the concluding part of his argument, where he expresses his doubt through the doubtful probans (‘[it is not known] whether the [Bodhisattvas] have offered bits of their own flesh to those deserving sympathy or not’), which follows the repetition of the doubtful probandum (‘it is not known whether those [Bodhisattvas] are endowed with passion, etc., or whether they are dispassionate’).

Therefore the two virtues of Bodhisattvas put to doubt are therefore compassion (karunā), the foundation of Buddhist ethics, and benevolence or charity (dāna), the first of the Perfections (paramītā). Siddhārṣigāṇi is accurate to link karunā to dāna,
following Buddhist tradition:

The sons of the Buddha have always renounced even their own life [sacrificing it] for [the sake of anyone] who wishes for what is beneficial. And there is no higher disposition than compassion. There is no fruit [more] welcome [than the one] desired. And precisely thanks to this benevolence [they] have elevated the whole humankind to the triple understanding, and furthermore, by acquiring knowledge, [they] established benevolence in the world, which has not known [it previously].

Clearly, not only is compassion (karuṇā) the prime motive for benevolence (dāna), but also the proper practice of benevolence connotes absolute lack of passion or attachment (rāga): ‘“That because of which [something] is given [is] benevolence.” Verily [that] is [benevolence]. [However, something] can also be given with passion etc., but this is not meant here.’

A noble person, who is dispassionate, as well as an ordinary man, who is passionate, can give offering in the temple. If a noble person, who is dispassionate, gives offering to other beings – with the exception of [the case when its results are] to be experienced in the present life – in that case the gift is for the sake of others, because this [offering brings] them benefit.

The three virtues – dispassionateness (vīta-rāga-tva) as the probandum (sādhyā), as well as compassion (karuṇā) and benevolence (dāna, the offering of bits of one’s own flesh being the proof of, and motivated by, one’s compassion) as the probans (sādhana) – are therefore related doctrinally and ethically. However, there is nothing that would compel one to enlist all of them together in an instance of a faulty reasoning. The use of double logical reason (karuṇā and dāna) is not enforced by the logical structure of the argument itself. On the contrary, it is rather surprising to find such an elaborate, compounded logical reason in the exposition of the fallacies of the example. Why did then Siddhārṣigaṇi avail himself of two logical reasons, both of which express doubts about two virtues of Bodhisattvas?

A possible answer would be to match the double logical reason (sādhana) employed by Dharmakīrti (parigraha and āgraḥa). Astounding as it may be, the fallacious example of the sandigda-sādhyā-sādha-sādha-vyatireka type is the only case when Dharmakīrti avails himself of a double logical reason, without any structural or logical need, and similarly the only case when Siddhārṣigaṇi’s classification has a double logical reason!

2 Anti-Buddhist illustrations not provoked by Dharmakīrti. In this category of sectarian-biased and doctrinally-bound illustrations, Siddhārṣigaṇi attempts to indirectly refute a particular Buddhist thesis.
sadhyavikala. In view of Jaina theory of multiplexity of reality (anekânta-vâda), sound could be said to be both permanent and impermanent, depending on the specific point of reference. However, from this perspective practically every assertoric statement could be problematic for the Jainas, therefore it would be difficult to take Dharmakirti’s instance of the faulty proof formula as something provocative. Nevertheless, in his own illustration of the faulty example, Siddharsigani indirectly disavows the Buddhist well-known doctrine of erroneousness of inference.\textsuperscript{40} It is the thesis (bhrântam anumânâtim) which conveys the criticism, whereas the example (perception as erroneous knowledge) was as unacceptable to the Buddhist as it was to the Jainas. The background for this faulty proof formula is apparently the discussion (NA V 5) of the idea of cognitive validity (prâmânya), which by definition entails non-erroneousness of our cognition; hence perception and inference have to be non-erroneous, if they are both cognitive criteria. In fact, the thesis of the defective proof formula in question (NA V 24.2 (p. 409): bhrântam anumânâtim, pramânatvât, pratyakṣavat) is antithetical to NA 5cd: ‘This [inference] is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception’ (tad abhrântam pramânatvât samaksavat).

sadhanavikala. Dharmakirti’s reasoning is almost identical to [S1], with the only exception of the ‘infinitesimal atom’ (paramânu) that replaces ‘action’ (karman) in [S1]. Similarly, there is nothing explicitly anti-Jinistic in Dharmakirti’s proof formula. Nevertheless, Siddharsigani takes this opportunity to criticise another Buddhist theory: the doctrine of illusory character of worldly appearance as the contents of consciousness (vijñâna-vâda). What we have here – except for the use of pramâna in place of the usual pratyaya – is one of many formulations of the so-called Dreaming Argument: ‘The sensation in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like the sensation in a dream’ (jâgrat-saṁvedanâṁ bhrântinâṁ, pramânatvât, svapna-saṁvedanavat). This argument is commonly ascribed to the Buddhist and we find references to it also in a number of non-Jinistic sources. In its typical formulation (with ‘pratyaya’ or ‘khyāti’ as the logical reason), the Dreaming Argument is refuted, for instance, by Kumārila,\textsuperscript{41} Uddyotakara,\textsuperscript{42} Śaṅkara\textsuperscript{43} and by Siddharsigani himself later on.\textsuperscript{44} It is important to note that, as it has been shown by Taber (1994: esp. 28–31), the so-called Dreaming Argument has never been expressed by the Buddhist thinkers in the form as it appears in anti-Buddhist works. In subsequent lines\textsuperscript{45} Siddharsigani employs a series of expressions that describe cognitive states (namely saṁvedana, pramâna, pratyaya) in the context of Dreaming Argument. It is an open question whether one may be justified to conclude that he saw no qualitative difference between these three expressions in this particular
context and therefore used them interchangeably as synonyms. In this particular case he seems to employ the term ‘pramāṇa’ (in the place of the logical reason) basically in the sense of prataya. In any standard formulation of the Dreaming Argument (*mithyā stambhādi-pratyayah pratayayatvāt, yathā svapnādi-pratyayah) the term prataya is used in the sense of a cognition the contents of which corresponds to the object represented in the cognition. In this manner, being factual and reliable, its meaning comes close to Siddharṣigaṇī’s use of ‘pramāṇa’. Accordingly, Siddharṣigaṇī’s illustration is a criticism, be it indirect, of the Buddhist idealist standpoint expressed in the Dreaming Argument.

[V1] sādhyāvyatirekin. The case is rather analogous, doctrinally speaking, to [S1] in the formulation of Siddharṣigaṇī, apart from ‘svapna-jñāna’ used as the negative example.

[V2] sadhanāvyatirekin. This illustration of fallacious example immediately invokes the famous Yogācāra-Sautrāntika thesis: ‘perception is free from conceptual construction’. Inference (anumāna), mentioned as the drṣṭānta of a conceptual mental event which is not a cognitive criterion, does not fulfil the definition of the proper negative example, being a pramāṇa itself, namely lacks negative concomitance with the probans. This particular illustration corroborates the Jaina claim that perception that is free from any conceptual construction could eventually be never experienced by any cogniser. That this illustration is not accidental can be seen from the fact Siddharṣigaṇī refutes the Buddhist thesis at length in NAV 4, cf., for example NAV 4.5 (p. 364): tan na kadācana kalpanāpoḍhatvam pratyakṣasya pramātur api pratīti-gocara-cāritām anubhavati. – ‘So, [to express it metaphorically], freedom from conceptual construction [in the case] of perception never experiences the phenomenon of [itself] turning into the domain of awareness of the cogniser whatsoever.’

[V5] sandīgha-sādhana-vyatireka. The contents of this particular instantiation in Dharmakīrti’s formulation is of much interest in itself. In the reasoning, the instantiation of the fallacious example are philosophers or law-makers of the Brahmanic tradition, like Gautama, Manu, etc. The doubtful element in this reasoning is whether these Brahmanic thinkers are reliable teachers:

Here the exemplification based on dissimilarity [can be formulated in the following manner]: ‘Those whose statements can be trusted, are not endowed with passion etc., like Gautama and others, who are promulgators of Dharma-sāstra.’ It is doubtful [here] whether the property of the probans, namely ‘being endowed with passion etc.’, does not occur in (is excluded from) Gautama and others.

In this manner, Dharmakīrti casts doubt on their dispassionateness and, thereby, intimates that Brahmanical philosophers or law-makers may be subject
to passions. The proof formula has the following structure:

1. \( rāgādimān \) (H) kaścit vivakṣitaḥ puruṣāḥ \( P \subset H \),

2. na trayāvidā brāhmaṇena grāhya-vacanāḥ (S) rāgādimān (H): \( H \subset S \),

   ergo: na trayāvidā brāhmaṇena grāhya-vacanāḥ (S) kaścit vivakṣitaḥ puruṣāḥ \( P \): \( P \subset S \).

The correct negative example \( (D) \) should be excluded from the probans/logical reason \( (sādhana-vyatireka: D \subset H') \) as well as excluded from the probandum/the property to be proved \( (sādhyā-vyatireka: D \subset S') \), namely \( (D \subset H') \cap (D \subset S') \).

One more condition is that in the negative formulation of the example \( (D \subset H') \) occurs is the contraposition of \( D \subset S' \), viz. \( S' \subset H' \subset P' \). Thus, \( D \subset S' \) would be the condition for \( D \subset H' \): ‘if a particular person \( d \) of the \( D \)-range \( (d \in D) \) is trustworthy \( (S \subset H) \), then this person is dispassionate \( (H') \)’. In other words, to distrust the dispassionateness of Gautama, Manu and other Brahmanic law-givers undermines one’s trust in their trustworthiness, and ipso facto the veracity and authority of the Brahmanic lore is undermined. This unspoken conclusion is openly expressed by Dharmottara in his commentary:\(^{51}\) it is unreasonable to rely on words of teachers of Brahmanical tradition, like Gautama, Manu, etc. At the same time, Dharmakīrti is claimed by Dharmottara\(^{52}\) to question the veracity of statements of other Brahmanic philosophers like Kapila, etc. This criticism has also its social dimension: such is the behaviour of most people who rely on the teaching contained in the works on dharma by Gautama, Manu, etc.

Dharmakīrti’s thesis refers to ‘a Brahmin learned in the three Vedas’ (trayāvidā brāhmaṇena), who is a follower and/or promulgator of the Brahmanic philosophical and religious tradition in everyday life and a local authority. The Brahmin’s scepticism regarding his own Brahmanic tradition, as expressed in Gautama-dharma-sūtra, Manu-smṛti etc., could undermine the tradition itself. The overall picture of the Brahmanical society relying on tradition would be, therefore, that neither proponents of the social-religious tradition (Gautama, Manu, etc.) nor preceptors of philosophical schools (e.g. Kapila) are a suitable source of reliable teaching for a true Brahmin. Dharmakīrti’s approach in the argument is therefore clearly anti-Brahmanical and could be a reflection of Buddhist-Brahmanic strife.

Last but not the least, that the opponents’ tradition, which one criticises, was at some point not too well-known is attested by Durveka Miśra, who erroneously identifies the Gautama in Dharmakīrti’s example with Gautama Aksāpāda: ‘Gautama’s other name is Aksāpāda, and he is the thinker who is the author of the Nyāya-sūtra.’\(^{53}\) Dharmakīrti himself was clear enough when he mentioned that Gautama is one of promulgators/authors of Law textbooks (gautamādayo dharma-śastrānāṁ pranetāraḥ), and this could by no means be Aksāpāda!

On his part, Siddharṣigaṇi leaves the basic structure of Dharmakīrti’s argument intact and replaces Dharmakīrti’s original example gautamādayo dharma-śastrā nāṁ pranetāraḥ with sugataḥ, the Buddha. Mutatis mutandis the Buddha’s dispassionateness becomes subject to doubt, and subsequently the whole Buddhist
teaching. What is missing from Siddharṣigaṇi’s formulation is ‘the Brahmin learned in the three Vedas’ (trayāvidā brāhmanena). This could have been a conscious decision to leave this phrase out: the implication would be that any teacher who is not dispassionate should not be trusted, be he a Hindu or Buddhist; and the truly dispassionate are the Jinas. Moreover, the main opponent for the Buddhist was Brahmanic tradition, whereas the Jainas had to protect their identity and distinctiveness not only against Brahmanic conversions but also against Buddhist influence. To confront this wider picture of the society from Jaina perspective, Siddharṣigaṇi apparently extended it by embracing the proponents of Buddhism and including them into the comprehensive framework of unreliable teachers whose dispassateness was doubtful.

3 Theses prompted by certain other doctrines that stand in opposition to Jaina tenets.

[S3] sādhya-sādhana-vikala. In case of Dharmakīrti, the reasoning is a mere repetition of [S1] and [S2], with a new example (‘pot’ excluded from both the probans ‘imperceptible’ and the probandum ‘impermanent’). Unlike Dharmakīrti, Siddharṣigaṇi takes this opportunity to corroborate indirectly a crucial dogma of the Jainas, namely the omniscience of the Jinas and the Arhants. From Siddharṣigaṇi’s contention that “[this example is fallacious] because, [firstly], a pot is existent and, [secondly], it is comprehended through perception, etc.” one could even venture to infer its antithesis, namely asti sarva-jñāh. An elaborate discussion of all implications of this reasoning, however, would not be relevant to the subject of the present chapter and would exceed its limits.

As it has been pointed out earlier, Siddharṣigaṇi rejects Dharmakīrti’s six sub-varieties of the fallacious examples (namely [S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8] and [V9]) as irrelevant and wrongly classified due to two reasons: they are either due to the defects of the logical reason (hetu) or due to the incompetence of the speaker. Dharmottara, whose influence on Siddharṣigaṇi is clear, was well aware that some fallacies of the example are in fact due to the ineptness of the speaker to communicate his thoughts properly. Commenting on the [S8] apradarśitānvaya category, in which positive concomitance is unindicated, he says:

Hence, the example has as its objective [the demonstration of] the positive concomitance; its object is not explicated by this [example]. And [the example] that is explicated [here as having as] its objective [the demonstration of] similarity [alone] is of no use, therefore this [alleged example] is – inasmuch as [it is] due to the defect of the speaker – the defect of the example, for the speaker has to demonstrate [his thesis] to the opponent in this [example]. Therefore, even though the circumstances are not defective, nevertheless, they are shown in a defective manner. Hence, [this example] in nothing but defective (sc. fallacious).
Similarly on [S9]:

Therefore also [S9] [the category] with inverted positive concomitance [is defective] because of the speaker’s mistake, not because of circumstances. And in [case of] inference for others one has to consider also the defect of the speaker,\(^{58}\)

on [V8]:

In this case [of] inference for others the meaning should be understood [directly] from the opponent’s [words]. Even if the [argument] is correct in itself, but is formulated incorrectly by the opponent, it [becomes] such (\textit{sc.} defective): as far as it is expressed, it is not correct, [and] as far as it is correct, it is not expressed. And [what is] expressed is the logical reason. Hence either the logical reason or the example [can be] defective because of the speaker’s mistake,\(^{59}\)

and on [V9]:

And accordingly, also [the category] with inverted negative concomitance is [is defective] because of the speaker’s mistake.\(^{60}\)

His proof that such varieties as [S8], [S9], [V8] and [V9] are varieties of the fallacious example was rather conversational: although there is a deficiency solely on the part of the speaker, nevertheless, they become fallacies of the example in case of inference for others (\textit{parārthānumāna}). As an ardent commentator, however, Dharmottara accepted Dharmakīrti’s typology \textit{en bloc}. Perhaps, it was his candid assertion that all these sub-types are due to various defects of the speaker that inspired Siddhārṣigaṇi. A separate question is whether Dharmakīrti himself was aware of the fact that some of his fallacious examples could rather be cases of the speaker’s incompetence alone?

What role was actually assigned to the example in the proof formula by both parties? Dharmakīrti admits that \textit{drśṭānta} is not an independent member of the proof formula:

The triple-formed logical reason has been discussed. This alone [can produce] the cognition of an object. Hence there is no separate member of the proof formula called example. That is why no separate definition of this [example] is given, because its meaning is implied [by definition of the logical reason].\(^{61}\)

Accordingly, the role of \textit{drśṭānta} is to additionally corroborate what the logical reason expresses.\(^{62}\) Fallacious examples ‘fail to demonstrate with certainty the general characteristic of the logical reason, viz. its presence in the homologue only, and [its] complete absence in the heterologue, and its individual characteristic’.\(^{63}\)
Dharmottara explains that the example is to demonstrate the sphere of application and validity of invariable concomitance:

The example is the province of a cognitive criterion that establishes the invariable concomitance. In order to demonstrate it, it is said: ‘like some other [object].’ It means that the example is some other [object] that is the property-possessor of the probandum.64

Indeed, in some cases, for example while offering the illustrations of the fallacious examples [S9] and [V9], Dharmakīrti in the end does not mention any illustration expressly! They have to be supplied from the preceding sūtras. Instead, he merely expresses the invariable concomitance ([S9]: yad anityaṁ tat kṛtakam, and [V9]: yad akṛtakam tan nityaṁ bhavati). Since, for all practical reasons, the invariable concomitance is employed as intrinsic to the example, this explains both the necessity of the example as an integral member of the proof formula and the fact that the example is not independent of the logical reason: the logical reason relies on the invariable concomitance, which is in turn expressed in the example.

Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s view contrasts with Siddhasena Mahāmati’s and Siddharṣigani’s position, who minimised the role of the example merely to ‘the recollection of the relation (sambandha-smaraṇa), [i.e. the invariable concomitance].’65 In their opinion the example was not supposed to prove anything nor to corroborate anything; its role was solely auxiliary, of conversational or instructive dimension.66 Their standpoint was based on a very intuitive and strongly context-bound assumption that there are three kinds of logical proof conceivable, depending on the conversational context.67 The most elementary and pragmatic, most context-dependant was a one-membered proof formula consisting of ‘a mere demonstration of the logical reason’ (hetu-pratipādana-mātrāṁ), provided both parties knew the thesis and remembered the invariable concomitance. That being the case, the pronouncement of an example was not necessary, because the disputants knew what they were talking about. Moreover, the invariable concomitance became intrinsic to the logical reason: the role to demonstrate the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) was assigned to the logical reason alone, not to the example. In this way, the example was no longer supposed to demonstrate anything, but simply to make us aware of the context of the argument.

This easily explains why Siddharṣigani disagrees to accept two of the earlier mentioned varieties ([S7]68 and [V7]69) as fallacious examples and, in the final result, he classifies them as erroneous cases, or wrongly classified cases of fallacious logical reasons. His opinions contradic that of Dharmottara, namely that the example should either demonstrate – or be, at least, directly related to demonstration of – the invariable concomitance.70 Four remaining sub-types (namely [S8], [S9], [V8] and [V9]) are taken by Siddharṣigani to be caused by the incompetence of the speaker.71 In his rebuttal of the Buddhist position, he avails himself of a quotation from Dharmakīrti in order to show inconsistencies in Dharmakīrti’s view.72
The shift in the importance and role of the example, which justifies Siddharṣigaṇi’s motives, was an important change in Indian logic for two reasons. First, we have here a case of ‘economical principle’, or the tendency to simplify the proof formula and get rid of all unnecessary elements. Second, this is an instance of a tendency to general formalisation, to decontextualise reasoning procedures, namely to make them universally binding. Earlier the example was an integral element of the proof formula with a specific role assigned to it, for example to substitute the universal variable $x$ in a general statement ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire, like in the kitchen etc.’ ($yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatrāṅginir, yathā mahānasādau$) with an individual constant $p$: ‘and there is smoke here’ ($tathā cātra dhūmaḥ$). Accordingly, any reasoning needed further empirical justification, and the premises were not enough. Here the reasoning becomes independent of its ‘external’, empirical exemplification, as long as we have two premises entailed by the logical reason: the explicit contents of the logical reason and the relation of vyāpti underlying the logical reason. The traditional proof formula (either three-membered or five-membered) of the general form:

$\begin{align*}
(1) \text{‘there is smoke here’: } & H(p), \\
(2) \text{‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire’: } & \forall x (H(x) \Rightarrow S(x)), \\
(3) \text{‘like in the kitchen’: } & \exists y (H(y) \Rightarrow S(y)),
\end{align*}$

ergo: ‘there is fire here’: $S(p)$

becomes:

either

(1’) ‘if there is smoke here, there is fire here’: $H(p) \Rightarrow S(p)$,

ergo: ‘there is fire here’: $S(p)$.

or

(1") ‘if there were no fire here, there would be no smoke here’: $\neg S(p) \Rightarrow \neg H(p)$,

ergo: ‘there is fire here’: $S(p)$.

Siddhārṣigaṇi gives an instance of this reasoning, for example

If the relation is, however, recollected [then the inference consists of only two members], as follows: ‘[1] There is fire here, [2] because it is explicable due to [the occurrence of] smoke’; [alternatively,] by [applying an example] based on dissimilarity, [one reasons in a negative way:] ‘[1] There is fire here, [2] because [the occurrence of] smoke would be otherwise inexplicable.’

The earlier is of course an enthymematical reasoning, with one premise unexpressed, either

(2’) ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire’: $\forall x (H(x) \Rightarrow S(x))$, 

139
or

\((2'')\) ‘wherever if there were no fire, there would be no smoke’: \(\forall x \rightarrow S(x) \Rightarrow \neg H(x)\).

This decrease of necessary members of the proof formula was in fact possible, thanks to the new way of defining the characteristic of the logical reason, namely ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (\(anyath\text{ā}mupapannatva, anyath\text{ā}mupapatti\)), which can be either formulated in the positive way (\(tath\text{ā}papatti\)) or (\(anyath\text{ā}mupapatti\)).

To recapitulate, there can be hardly any doubt that Dharmakīrti immensely contributed to Jaina typology of fallacies of the example (\(dr\text{śṭāntābhāsa}\)), at least in the case of Siddhasena Mahāmati and his commentator, Siddharṣigāni. A closer look at the instances of fallacious examples offered by Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣigāni reveals that Dharmakīrti inspired his rivals not only in the realm of strictly logical analysis (in our case: classification of fallacies), but also methodologically: how to attack one’s own opponents with arguments clad in harmless illustrations of faulty proof formulas, and to express doubts with regard to fundamental doctrines upheld by rival schools. Neither Dharmakīrti nor Siddharṣigāni were negligent when it came to the selection of exemplifications of the fallacious example. On the contrary, their most careful choice reveals considerable amount of prejudice against their rivals. In case of Siddharṣigāni, his biased position was provoked to a some degree by Dharmakīrti, whose method was discrediting the antagonist he conscientiously follows.

Furthermore, minor differences in Buddhist and Jaina classification of \(dr\text{śṭāntābhāsas}\), especially \([S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8]\) and \([V9]\), testifies to a different role assigned to the example and the invariable concomitance in the proof formula. This uncovers also an important tendency among Jaina logicians to simplify the structure of the proof formula and to free it from the need of empirical exemplification.

What is also important, the discussion shows that even such eminent thinkers as Dharmakīrti or Siddharṣigāni were not above sectarian prejudice and provocation. Being Human, they did not abstain from expressing such not entirely elevated emotions in a concealed way at every available opportunity.

Having said all this, let me come to my initial question: is there any other disadvantage, apart from occasional ‘expense of brevity and facility of communication’ mentioned already (p. 118), in having a symbolic and formalised language to describe the way we reason and draw inferences? Obviously, had Indian logicians used symbols and a applied formalised language of logic, decidedly less sources would have been left at our disposal to follow the development of certain ideas or to track down historical dependencies and intellectual influences among philosophers. And Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣigāni would not have had an additional tool, of extralogical nature, to censure their opponents.
Notes

* An abridged version of this paper first appeared in Balcerowicz (1999), from which Table 6.1 (p. 122) and Table 6.2 (p. 124) are reproduced with variations.
1 Łukasiewicz (1957: § 4).
2 Aristotle employed symbols only in the form of letters as variables that substituted proper names in a broader sense. The first to employ symbolic expressions – following the method of algebra – that represent logical constants, such as connectives, improper symbols (e.g. parentheses, brackets) etc., was Boole (1847).
3 The opening lines of the ‘Introduction’ in Boole (1847: 3).
4 Boole (1847: 6).
5 Boole (1847: 7).
6 Russell (1917: 51).
7 Boole (1847: 6).
8 Alex 53.28: ἐπὶ στοιχείων τὴν διδασκαλίαν ποιεῖται ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνδείξασθαι ἤμιν, ὅτι οὐ παρὰ τὴν ὑπὸ γίνεται τὰ συμπεράσματα άλλα παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν προτάσεως συμπλοκῆς καὶ τῶν τρόπων οὐ γάρ ὃτι ἢ ἢ λη, συνάγεται συλλογιστικῶς τόδε, άλλα ὃτι ἢ συζυγία τοιαύτη, τὰ οὐν στοιχεῖα τοῦ καθόλου καὶ ἢπι ἐπὶ παντός τοῦ ληφθέντος τοιούτου ἔσχατα τὸ συμπέρασμα δεικτικά ἔστιν.
9 Boole (1847: 9–10).
10 Most of these advantageous characteristics enumerated in the text are concurrent with the recapitulation of Bocheński (1954: 50): ‘Der Gebrauch von künstlichen Symbolen ist indessen zugleich mit dem Formalismus aufgekommen. Whitehead und Russell rechtfertigen ihn folgendermaßen. (1) In dem Wissenschaften allgemein, besonders aber in der Logik, braucht man Begriffe, die so abstrakt sind, daß man in der Umgangssprache keine entsprechenden Worte dafür findet. Man ist also zu Symbolbildungen genötigt. (2) Die Syntax der Umgangssprache ist zu wenig exakt, ihre Regeln lassen zu viele Ausnahmen zu, als daß man auf dem Gebiet der strengen Wissenschaft gut damit zu operieren vermöchte. Man könnte sich wohl zu helfen suchen, indem man die Worte der Umgangssprache beibehielte und nur die Regeln änderte, aber dann würden doch die Worte durch Assoziationen immer wieder die lockeren Regeln der Alltagssprache nahebringen, und es entstünde Verwirrung. Deshalb ist es besser, eine künstliche Sprache mit eigenen, streng syntaktischen Regeln aufzustellen. (3) Entscheidet man sich für den Gebrauch einer künstlichen Sprache, dann kann man ganz kurze Symbole wählen, etwa einzelne Buchstaben statt ganzer Worte; so werden die Sätze bedeutend kürzer als in der Umgangssprache und wesentlich leichter verständlich. (4) Schließlich sind die meisten Worte der Umgangssprache sehr vielseitig; so hat z. B. das Wort «ist» wenigstens ein Dutzend verschiedene Bedeutungen, die in der Analyse scharf auseinander gehalten werden müssen. Es ist also zweckmäßig, statt solcher Worte künstliche, aber eindeutige Symbole zu brauchen.’
11 ViVy 5: ‘The establishing [of a particular cognitive criterion can] by no means [be accomplished] by [the cognitive criterion] itself or by [cognitive criteria] mutually or by other [cognitive criteria].’
12 Bocheński (1980: § 3 (1)).
13 Church (1956: 2–3).
14 NB 3.9: tathā svabhāva-hetoh prayogah—yat sat tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭādir iti śuddhāsya svabhāva-hetoh prayogah.
15 Cf. NB aloc: yat sad iti sattvam anūdyā tat sarvam anityam iti anityatvam vidhiyate. sarvam-grahaṇam ca niyamārtham. sarvam anityam. na kiścin nānityam.

After existence has been called to mind [as something well known] by [words] ‘whatever is existent’, impermanence [of everything] is taught as something yet unknown (sc. to be proved) with [words] ‘that every thing is
impermanent’. And the use of [the word] ‘everything’ has the purpose of circumscription (reference): ‘everything is impermanent’, [viz.] ‘there is nothing that is not impermanent’.

Cf. PVSV 3.28: tathā hi yat kṛtaṁ tad anityam ity ukte ‘anarthāntara-bhāve vyaktam ayam asya svabhāvas…

16 NB 3.22: kārya-heṭho prayogah – yatra dhūmas tatrāgniḥ. yathā mahānasādau. asti cēha dhūma iti.

17 Cf. NB 2.18: kāryaṁ yathāgnir atra dhūmad iti; see also PVSV 3.28: tathā yatra dhūmas tatrāgniḥ iti ukte kāryaṁ dhūmo dahanasya.

18 PVSV 3.34: yeśam upalambhe tal-lakṣaṇām anupalabdhaṁ yad upalabhyate. tatraikābhāve ‘pi nāpalabhyate. tat tasya kāryaṁ tac ca dhūmo ‘sti.

19 NP 3.3.1 (=NP (1) 5.19–6.14):


21 Another way of looking at the typology of fallacious example could be the following table, where x is a variable (sādhya, sādhana, and the relation between them both, that is, anvaya and vyatireka) and ϕ is a function of x:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sādhya-ϕ</th>
<th>sādhana-ϕ</th>
<th>sādhya-ϕ-anvaya</th>
<th>sādhana-ϕ-vyatireka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x-vikala</td>
<td>[S1]</td>
<td>[S2]</td>
<td>[S3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x-vyatirekin</td>
<td>[V1]</td>
<td>[V2]</td>
<td>[V3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sandigdha-x-dharma</td>
<td>[S4]</td>
<td>[S5]</td>
<td>[S6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sandigdha-x-vyatireka</td>
<td>[V4]</td>
<td>[V5]</td>
<td>[V6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a-x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apradarśita-x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viparita-x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 This (rāgādīmāṇ ayaṁ vakṛtvād) is how the thesis and the logical reason should be reconstructed, first, in view of the explication of the positive concomitance in NB 3.126 itself (yathā yo vakta sa rāgādīmāṇ), and secondly in view of the NBT ad loc: yo vakṛtiī vakṛtvam anūdya sa rāgādīmāṇ iti rāgādmattvaṁ vihitam, wherein the gerund anūdya of anuvad is used in its conventional meaning of ‘having called something to mind [as well known]’ and the past passive participle vihita, a derivative of the verb vīrdhā, occurs in its well attested meaning ‘introduced as something new; taught as something yet unknown [sc. to be proved]’. Also DhPr ad loc. (vaktṛvasya heto rāgādmattvād sādhya pratiniyamah pratiniyatavam uktaṁ iti śesāḥ) expresses plainly the logical reason (hetu: vakṛtṛva) and the probandum (sādhya: rāgādmattva). The significance of the corresponding section of NAV that offers the formulation of the proof formula in extenso and tallies with our reconstructed version, should not be underestimated.
The formulation of the thesis and the logical reason (anityah śabdah, kṛtakatvāt...) alongside with the example (…ghatavat) are, obviously, to be supplied from the preceding aphorism NB 3.126. The statement yad anityam tat kṛtakam is the formulation of the invariable concomitance (anuvaya) referring to the proof formula in NB 3.126, which is incomplete, inasmuch as it lacks its explicit statement, being the fallacy of anavayava type. Cf. also NBT ad loc: yad anityam ity anityatvam anūdyā tat kṛtakam iti kṛtakatvam vihitam. This proof formula bears resemblance (barring the lack of negation in the thesis of sādhana-dharmāsiddha type of fallacious example, which is to be supplied further on in the viparitānsvaya type) to the one found in NP 3.3.1 (=NP (1) 5.19–6.14): tatra sādharmyena tāvad drṣṭāntābhāsah paṅca-prakārah, tad yathā: …[1] sādhanā-dharmāsiddho yathā: nityah śabdo ‘mūrtatvāt paramānuvat…. [5] viparitānsvaya yathā: yat kṛtakam tad anityam drṣṭam iti vaktavye yad anityam tad kṛtakam drṣṭam iti bravīti // (cf. n. 19). The reconstruction is independently confirmed by the reading found in the corresponding section of NAT.

The thesis and the logical reason (ṇityah śabdo ’mūrtatvāt) here as well as in the two following cases are to be supplied from the parallel aphorism of NB 3.124. Besides, the reconstruction is directly confirmed by NBT: nityatve śabdasya sādhye hetāv amūrtatve paramāṇu-vaidyarmya-drṣṭāntah sādhyāvayatirekā.

The formulation of the thesis and the logical reason (anityah śabdah, kṛtakatvāt…) alongside with the example (…ākāśavat) are, beyond doubt, to be supplied from the preceding aphorism: NB 3.134 states incomplete reasoning lacking the explicit formulation of the negative concomitance which NB 3.135 supplies, though in the reversed order. The proof formula formed correctly would run as follows: anityah śabdo, kṛtakatvāt, yad akṛtakam tan nityam bhavati, ākāśavat. This proof formula – with the correct formulation of the negative concomitance – occurs in NP 2.2 (=NP (2) 2.2=NP (1) 1.11 13): tad yathā: anitye śabde sādhye ghatādīr anityah sapakṣah // vipakṣo yatra sādhyām nāsti. yan nityam tad akṛtakam drṣṭam yathākāsām iti. The reconstruction is independently confirmed by the reading found in the corresponding section of NAT. Similarly to [S9], also this proof formula bears certain resemblance (barring the lack of negation in the predicate anitya) to the one found in NP 3.3.2 (=NP (1) 6.14 7.8): vaidyārmyanāpi drṣṭāntābhāsah paṅca-prakārah, tad yathā: …[1] sādhyāvāyvṛtto yathā: nityah śabdo ’mūrtatvāt paramānuvat…. [5] viparitā-vyatireko yathā: yad anityam tan mūrtam drṣṭam iti vaktavye yan mūrtam tad anityam drṣṭam iti bravīti // (cf. n. 19).

NAV 25.2 (p. 414), vide infra n. 35.

On the authorship of NA see Balcerowicz (2001b).

NA 25:

vaidyārmynātra drṣṭānta-doṣā nyāya-vid-īritāh / sādhyā-sādhanā-yugmānām anivṛtāś ca samāśayāt //

Defects of the example, here based on dissimilarity, have been proclaimed by the experts in logic [to arise] from non-exclusion of the probandum, of the probans and of their combination and from the [liability to] suspicion [regarding their presence].

One would naturally read anivṛteḥ and samāśayāt as dependent on the compound sādhyā-sādhanā-yugmānām. Theoretically speaking, however, the latter could be taken separately. NA 25 is not the only aphorism that is not conclusive. For instance NA 8:

dṛṣṭāścāyāhatad vākyāt paramārthābhādhiiyinaḥ / tattva-grāhitayotpannaṁ mānaṁ śabdaṁ prakāritam //

The cognitive criterion – arisen as grasping reality due to a [momentous] sentence, which is accepted as what is experienced, and which is not
contradicted [as well as] which communicates the ultimate truth – is declared [to be] the verbal knowledge,

differently construed by the commentators, for example. (1) NAV 8.1 (p. 380):

**dṛṣṭena** pramāṇāvālokoṭītenāstā pratiśādayisito 'vyāhato 'nirākṛtaḥ sāmarthyaś artho yasmin vākye tat-tathā (‘in which [momentous] sentence the meaning – due to its efficacy – is “accepted,” [i.e.,] desired to be demonstrated, as “what is experienced,” [i.e.,] as what is seen by [means of] a cognitive criterion, [and which is] “not contradicted,” [i.e.,] which is not revoked; that [momentous sentence] is such.’), and (2) NAṭ ad loc. (n. 340, p. 222):

**dṛṣṭenādityādi.** ayam bhinnādhikaraṇaṃ tri-pado bahu-vṛthiḥ yadi vēṣṭo 'vyāhato 'rtho yatra tad iṣṭāvyāhatāṃ vākyam, tadānu dṛṣṭena pramāṇa-nirnātenēstāvyāhatam iti tat-puruṣāḥ (‘This is either a bahu-vṛthi compound consisting of three words, which has a substance different [from its constituent elements]: “such a statement in which the meaning is accepted [and] not contradicted”; or it [may be understood as] a tat-puruṣa compound: “what is accepted [and] not contradicted by what is experienced, [viz.,] by what is determined through a cognitive criterion”.’).

32 NAV 24.3 (p. 411): nanu ca parair anyad api dṛṣṭāntābhāsa-trayam uktam, tad yathā-nanvayo 'pradarśitāntvayo viparītāntvayaś cēti.


34 NBṬ ad loc.:


35 NAV 25.2 (p. 414):


Here the example based on dissimilarity [can be formulated in the following manner]: ‘Whoever were either an omniscient or an authoritative person, however, he would teach the four noble truths, for instance: Śuddhodana’s son (sc. the Buddha).’ Or else, [one could say as well that] this is [the first variety of fallacious example] lacking negative concomitance with the proverband, because – inasmuch as the four noble truths characterised by the
suffering, [its] origin, the path [leading to its cessation and its] cessation are
subverted by cognitive criteria – an advocate of these [four noble truths] is
explicable [only] as a non-omniscient and a non-authoritative person.
Simply, [the above fallacious example] has been specified as such [an exam-
ple in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful]
because to [people] lacking the recognition of the efficacy of cognitive
criteria that revoke these [four noble truths] it appears as [the fallacious
example] in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful.
For it is as follows: even though
Fuddhodana’s son (the Buddha) taught the
four noble truths, nevertheless his omniscience and his authority are not
proved, because there is no proof that teaching the four noble truths is oth-
erwise inexplicable except together with these two, [i.e., omniscience and
authority], inasmuch as it is [equally] possible that a cunning person of an
adroit mind, who acts with an intention of cheating others, although he is
neither omniscient nor authoritative, can impart teaching of that kind.
Therefore, non-occurrence of the probandum characterised by non-omnis-
cience and by lack of authority is doubtful in [the case of] Siddhodana’s son
(the Buddha); hence [this instance is called an example] in which negative
concomitance with the probandum is doubtful.’

It is worth mentioning that, strangely enough, the typical sequence of the four noble
truths is here disturbed: Siddhasiṣṭi gar∗

36 NAV 25.2 (p. 415):

na vīta-rāgāḥ kapilādayah, karunāspadeśv apy akarunāparīta-cittatayā-
datta-nījaka-māṁsa-śakalatvād iti. atra vaidermya-drṣṭānto: ye punar vīta-
rāgās te karunāspadeśu karunā-parīta-cittatayā datta-nījaka-māṁsa-śakalās,
tad yathā-bodhi-sattvā ti. atra sādhya-sādhana-dharmayor bodhi-sattvēbhya
vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdhā: tat-pratipādaka-pramāṇa-vaikalyān na jāyate kīṁ te
rāgādimanta uṭa vīta-rāgāḥ; tathānuṃkeṣu kīṁ sva-piṣita-khandāni
dattavanto nēti vā. atāḥ sandigdha-sādhya-sādhana-vyatirekitvam iti.

‘Kapila and other [thinkers of his kind] are not dispassionate, because –
inasmuch as [their] consciousness is not filled with compassion – they have
not offered any bits of their own flesh even to the abodes of compassion (sc.
to hungry beings who deserved compassion).’ Here the example based on
dissimilarity [can be formulated in the following manner]: ‘Those, however,
who are dispassionate, inasmuch as their consciousness is filled with com-
passion, offered bits of their own flesh to the abodes of compassion (sc. to
hungry beings who deserved compassion), for instance: Bodhisattvas.’ Here
the non-occurrence of the properties of both the probandum and the probans
in the case of Bodhisattvas is doubtful. Because of lack of any cognitive cri-
terion that [could] demonstrate that (sc. that passions, etc., are excluded in
the case of Bodhisattvas), it is not known whether those [Bodhisattvas] are
endowed with passion, etc., or whether they are dispassionate; similarly, [it
is not known] whether they have offered bits of their own flesh to those wor-
thy of sympathy, or not. Hence, [this is the fallacious example] in which nega-
tive concomitance with [both] the probandum and the probans is doubtful.

37 MSA 16.36 (p. 105.24–27):

tyaktam buddha-sutaṁ svājīvitam api prāpyārthinaṁ sarvadā /
kāraṇāt paramo na ca pratikṛtīr nēṣṭāṁ phalam prārthitaṁ /
dānenaiva ca tena sarva-jananāḥ bodhi-traye rōpitā /
dānāṁ jīnāna-parigraheṇa ca punar loke ‘jīyāṁ sthōpitam //
38 AK 4.113a and AKBh ad loc. (p. 740.10 741.2): diyate yena tad danam, bhavati sma. rāgādibhir api diyate, na cātā tad iṣṭam.
40 Cf. NBṬ 1.5: bhṛāntaṁ hy anumāṇoṁ sva-pratibhāse ’narīthe ’ṛhādhyavasāyena pravṛttaṁ, and PV in II p. 24.6 7:
   de ma yin la der ḍzin phyir /
   / ’khrul kyan ’brel phyir tshad ma ņid //
   = (PVin II p. 25): atasmiṁs tad-graho* bhṛāntir api sambhandhataḥ pramāñ//
   [*Tib. tao-ghrahā?]
41 MŚV (Nirālambana-vāda) 23 (p. 159.7–8):
   stambhādi-pratyayō mithyā pratyayatvāt tathā hi yah /
   pratyayah sa mṛṣā dṛśṭaḥ svapnādi-pratyayo yathā //
   ‘The cognition of a column etc. is erroneous, because it is a cognition, for it
   is as follows: whatever is a cognition it is false, like the cognition in a dream.’
42 NV on NBh 4.2.34 (p. 489.8 9):
   ayam jaṅgrat-avasthāpalabdhānāṁ viśayānāṁ citta-vyatirekiṇām asattve
   hetuḥ khyātiḥ svapnavad iti na dṛṣṭaṁ sthāya-samavatā. This logical reason [to be provided] for [the thesis that] ‘things perceived in
   the state of wakefulness do not exist as [something] different from con-
   sciousness do not exist’ is ‘cognition’, like in a dream. – [This argument] is
   not [correct], because the example is in the same [predicament as] the
   probandum,
   which is the case of the fallacy of the logical reason (hetvābhāsa): the cited example
   is in need of proof as much as the thesis it is supposed to prove.
43 BSŚBh 2.2.5.29 (p. 476.2 3):
   yad utkram bāhyārthāpalāpinā svapnādivaj jaṅgara-gocarā api stambhādi-
   pratyayā vīnāvā bāhyenārthena bhaveyāḥ pratyayatvāvīśeṣād iti tad
   prativaktavyam. What has been said by [the Buddhist idealist] who denies [the existence of]
   external objects: ‘Like in a dream etc., also acts of cognition of a column etc.
   which have as their domain the waking state are possible solely without
   external thing, because there is no difference [as regards them being] acts of
   cognition.’ – this is [now] refuted.
44 The argument, in its typical wording, reoccurs later in NAV 29.8 (p. 437):
   nirālambanāṁ sarve pratyayāḥ, pratyayatvāḥ, svapna-pratyayavad. All acts of cognition are void of the objective substratum, because [they are] acts
   of cognition, like a cognition in dream.
45 For example NAV 24.2 (p. 410):
   svapna-saṁvedanāsya pramāṇatā-vaikalyāt tat-pratyanikā-jāgrat-pratyayōpa-
   nipāta-bādhitavād iti. ‘[This example is fallacious] because the sensation in dream is subverted – inas-
   much as it lacks the status of cognitive criterion – by the occurrence of the

146
cognition of a person in the waking state, which is opposite to this [sensation in dream].’

46 Cf., for example NAV 29.1 (p. 425): ।iya yad yatra pratibhāti, tad eva tad-gocaratayābhyupagantavyam.

47 As far as certain structural nuances are concerned, worth pointing out is the fact that Dharmakīrti employs not more than two different instances of reasoning to represent altogether four types of fallacious reasoning, namely he interleaches them as follows: [S1]=[V2] and [S2] = [V1]. Siddhārsigani uses various intermingled illustrations, in which certain ‘semi-variables’ overlap as follows: the proponentum is – with one exception – the same (i.e. sādhyā of [S1] = sādhyā of [S2] = sādhyā of [V1] = ‘bhrāntam’), the logical reason remains unchanged (i.e. hetu of [S1] = hetu of [S2] = hetu of [V1] = hetu of [V2] = ‘pramāṇatvāt’), pakṣa of [S1] = pakṣa of [V1] = drṣṭānta of [V2] (anumānam), pakṣa of [V2] = drṣṭānta of [S1] (pratyakṣam): drṣṭānta of [S2] = drṣṭānta of [V1] (svapna-saṇvedanam); sādhyā of [V2] ( = nirvikalpaka) has no match.

48 See for example PSV 1.3c-d: pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpodbhaṁ nāma-jāty-ādy-asanīyak-tam, and NB 4: tatra pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpodbham abhrāntam. Comp. also the definition found in NP 4.1 (= NP (I) 7.12-3), bearing striking similarity to the one of Diṅnāga, which fact was initially one of the reasons responsible for the wrong attribution of Sāṅkarasvāmin’s manual to Diṅnāga: tatra pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpodbham. yaj jñānam arthe rūpaṁdu nāma-jāty-ādi-kalpana-rahitam tad. See also NBT 1.4 (p. 47.1): bhrāntam hi anumānam svapratibhiśe 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt.

49 This is an addition to Dharmottara, cf. NBṬ ad loc.: gautama ādir yeśāṁ te tathōkta manv-ādayo dharsma-śastraṁ smṛtayasa teṣāṁ kartāraḥ...

50 NB 3.131: atra vaidharmyōdāharaṇam: ye grāhya-vacanā na te rāgādīmaptāh, tad yathā gautamadādayo dharsma-śastraṁ pranetāra iti. gautamādibhyo rāgādīmaptāsvya sādhana-dharmasya vyāvṛtitthi sandidgāh.

51 NBṬ ad NB 3.131:

gautamādibhyo rāgādīmaptāsvya sādhanaśya nivṛtthi sandidgāh. yady api te grāhya-vacanaṁ trāyīvidā‘ tathāpi kiṁ sarāgā uta vīta-rāgā iti sandeḥaḥ.

Even though those [thinkers like Gautama and others] are [such people] whose statements should be trusted by a [Brahmin] learned in the three Vedas, nevertheless there is a doubt whether [they are] passionate or dispassionate?

[‘See the critical apparatus in Dalsukhbhai Malvanía’s edition and the editor’s n. 7: ‘vidā tathāpi A.P.H.E.N.’; the main text reads: vidas tathāpi.]

52 NBṬ ad NB 3.131: vivākṣaṇa iti kapilādi dharmī.

53 DhPr. ad NB 3.131 (p. 247.20-21): gautamo kṣapādāpaya-nāmā nāyā-sūtrasvāpyā pranetā munih, manur iti smṛti-kāro munih.

54 NAV 24.2 (p. 410): ghataśasya saūtāt pratyaśaksādbhīr upalabdhatvāc ca.

55 [S7] and [V7] are ‘the defects of the logical reason alone’ (NAV 24.4: tadānanyavatvavāya-lakṣaṇo na drṣṭāntaṁ dosō, kiṁ tarhi hetor eva, and NAV 25.3: tasmād asidha-pratibhandhasya hetor evāyaṁ doso, na drṣṭāntasyētī). [S8], [S9], [V8] and [V9] ‘rise from the defects of the speaker’ (NAV 24.4: vakt-dosatvāt, and NAV 25.4: vakt-dosā-samathau).

NBT 3.126 (pp. 242.6–243.2): *ato 'nayārtha drṣṭāntas tad-arthaś cānena nōpapāttaḥ. sādharmyārthaś cōpapātto nirupayogā iti vaktī-dōṣād ayaṁ drṣṭānta-dōsaḥ. vaktīra hy atra paraḥ pratipādayitavyaḥ. tato yadi nāma na duṣṭaṁ vastu tathāpi vaktīr duṣṭaṁ darśitaṁ iti duṣṭaṁ eva.*

NBT 3.127 (p. 244.4-4): *tasmād viparitānvayo 'pi vaktur aparādhāt, na vastutaḥ. parārthānunāme ca vaktur api dosaś cintyata iti.*

NBT 3.134 (p. 250.3-5): *īha parārthānunāme parasmād arthāḥ pratipattavyāḥ. sa śuddho 'pi svato yadi parenāṣuddhaḥ khyāpyate sa tāvad yathā prakāśitaḥ tathā na yuktāḥ. yathā yuktas tathā na prakāśitaḥ. prakāśitāca hetuḥ. ato vaktur aparādhād api parārthānunāme hetur drṣṭōnto vā duṣṭaḥ syād iti.*

NBT 3.135 (p. 252.9-10): *tathā ca viparitā-vyatireko 'pi vaktur aparādhād duṣṭaṁ.*


See NB 3.122 (p. 235).

NB 3.122 (p. 235): *na ey ebhir drṣṭāntābhāsair hetoḥ sāmāṇya-laksanām sapakṣa eva sattvam vipakṣe ca sarvatrasattvam eva niścayena śakyaṁ darśayitaṁ viśeṣa-laksanām ca. tad arthāpattyāśāṁ nirāsa drṣṭāvyāḥ.*

NBT 3.38 (p. 188.2-3): *vyāpti-sādhana-paryāvāya pariṇātyo drṣṭāntāḥ. tam eva darśayitaṁ āha – yathāya iti. sādhya-dharmino 'nyo drṣṭaṁ ity arthaḥ.*

NA 18:

*sādhya-sādhana-vyāptir yatra niścayate-tarāṁ / sādharmyaṇa sa drṣṭantāḥ sambandha-smaranāṇam mataḥ //*

See NAV 18.1 (p. 398):

*ayaṁ cāvismṛta-pratibandhe prativādini na prayuktavya ity āha: sambandha-smaranāṇad iti, lyab-lope pāncaṁ, prāg-grhita-vismṛta-sambandha-smaranān adhikratya...grhite ca pratibandhe smaryamāne kevalaṁ hetur darśaniyaḥ, tāvatāvai bahubhūṣṭārtha-siddher drṣṭānto na vācyo, vaivyartyāt. yadā tu grhito 'pi vismṛtaḥ kathaṇcit sambandhas, tadā tat-smaranārthaṁ drṣṭaṁ kathyaṭe.*

Subsequently, [having in mind] that this [example] does not have to be pronounced for the disputer who has not forgotten the invariable connection, [the author] says: ‘because of the recollection of the relation,’ [wherein] the ablative is used in the place of the genitive, [i.e.,] having taken account of the recollection of the relation, which has been grasped previously and [have been afterwards] forgotten; this [example] is known as, [i.e.,] intended, by logicians, not in any other case. For when a [person] to be taught does not know the relation characterised by the property [on the part of the probans] of being inseparably connected with the probandum even now, then he should be made grasp the relation by [means of] a cognitive criterion, not merely by an example, for just by seeing [two things] together in some cases it is not proved that one [of them] does not occur without the other one in all cases, because [that would have] too far-reaching consequences. And if the invariable connection, which has been grasped [before], is being recollected, then simply the logical reason has to be shown; since an object which one wants to cognise is proved by that much only, an example does not have to be stated, because it is purposeless. But when the relation – even though it has been grasped [before] – has somehow been forgotten, then an example is mentioned with the purpose of its recollection, [i.e.,] in order to remind the opponent of the invariable concomitance.

The same remark applies to both kinds (positive and negative) of the example, cf. NAV 19.1 (p. 400): *yatra kvacid dṛṣṭānte sa vaidharmyaṇa bhavatīti-śabdena sambandha-smaranāṇad iti.*
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST–JAINA DISPUTE

67 NAV 20.1 (p. 401):


‘Experts in logic’, [i.e.,] specialists in logic, ‘have recognised’ [i.e.,] they know, that when this [invariable connection] has been proved, an exemplification by [adducing] an example is ineffective, inasmuch as the probandum is [already] proved by this [invariable concomitance]. And even though the definition of the remaining members [of a proof formula] characterised by application, conclusion and the five clearances have not been taught directly here in this treatise, inasmuch as this [treatise] aims at the advantage of [human] beings who delight in concise [form], nevertheless [respective definition] can be deduced by the learned from this very triad of the members of the proof formula demonstrated [above], because there are [eventually] three kinds of discourse as regards the [number of] members of the proof formula, viz. lower, intermediate and superior. Out of them, the lower one is a mere demonstration of the logical reason; the intermediate one is a proclamation of two or more [but not all] members of the proof formula; the superior [discourse] is the mention of complete ten members of the proof formula. Regarding these [varieties of the discourse], by the direct mention of the intermediate [discourse] here [in this treatise the author] indicates both the lower and the superior [varieties of the discourse] by implication, because their presence can be proved by cognitive criterion.

68 NAV 24.4 (p. 412):

yadi hi drṣṭānta-balena vyāpтиḥ sādhya-sādhahayoh pratipādyeta, tataḥ syād anavyaya drṣṭāntabhāṣah, sva-kāryakaranād, yaddā tu pūrva-pravṛtti-sambahdha-grāhī-pramāṇa-gocara-samarāṇa-sampādanārtham drṣṭāntōdāhṛtr iti sthitam, tadānmaṇaya-va-lakṣaṇo na drṣṭāntasya doṣah, kim tarhi hetor eva, pratibandyāpyāpi pramāṇenāpratīṣṭhitatvāt, pratibhandhābhāve cāyvayāśiddeḥ, na ca hetu-hadoso ‘pi drṣṭānte vācyo, ‘tiprasaṅgād iti.

For if the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans could be demonstrated by the force of an example, then [the example] without positive concomitance would be [indeed] a fallacy of the example, because it would not produce its effect, [namely it would not demonstrate the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans]. But when it is established that an exemplification by [adducing] an example serves the purpose of producing a recollection, whose domain is a cognitive criterion grasping the relation that has occurred before, then the characteristic of being without positive concomitance is not the defect of example, but of the logical reason itself, because the invariable connection has not been determined by cognitive criterion until now; and if there is no invariable connection, then positive concomitance is not proved [either]. And the defect of the logical reason should not be taught in [the case of] (sc. should not be blamed on) the example, because that would have too far-reaching consequences.
ayuktaś cāyaṁ vaktum, avyatirekātāḥ prativādṛṣṭe, yadi hi drṣṭānta-
balenaiva vyatirekāḥ prativādyeta, tadā tathā-vidha-sāmarthya-vikalasya
tad-ābhāsataḥ yuyeta, na cātād ati, prāk-pravṛttva-sambandha-grahan-
pravāna-pramāṇa-gocara-smarana-sampādan ārthaṁ drṣṭāntopādānāt. na
y ekatra yo yad-ābhaśe na drṣṭaḥ, sa tad-ābhāśe na bhavati pratibandha-
grāhiḥ-pramāṇa-vyatirekeṇa sidhyaty, atiprasaṅgat, tasmād asiddha-
pratibandhasya hetor evāyaṁ doṣo, na drṣṭāntasyeitä.

It is improper to say so, because if there were no negative concomitance, then
that would be the defect of the logical reason. For if negative concomitance
could be demonstrated by the force of the example alone, then [an example]
lacking the efficacy of this kind, [viz. incapable of demonstrating negative con-
comitance], would be justified as the fallacy of this [example], but that is not
the case, because the example is mentioned in order to produce a recollection
the domain of which is a cognitive criterion – disposed towards grasping the
relation [between the probandum, the probans and the logical reason] – that
occurred previously. For [the example] is not established without a cognitive
criterion that grasps the invariable connection [in the form]: ‘If [at least] in one
case, when y is absent, x is not seen, then x does not occur, when y is absent,’
because that would have far-reaching consequences. Therefore, that is the
defect of the logical reason, alone, whose invariable connection is not proved, not
[the defect] of the example.

70 NBṬ 3.8 (p. 188.2): vyāpti-sādhanasya pramāṇasya visayor drṣṭāntah.— ‘The logical
reason is the province of cognitive criterion that establishes the invariable concomi-

71 Re. [S8] and [S9], cf. NAV 24.4 (p. 412):

tathāpradarsitānvaya-vipārītānvayāv api na drṣṭāntābhāsataḥ svi-kuruto,
′nvayāpradarsanasya vipāryastānvaya-pradarsanasya ca vakr- dośatvāt,
tad-doṣa-dvarenāpī śṛdṇābhāsa-pratipādāt tad-iyatvā viśṛtyeta, vakṛ-
dośānām ānanyatāt.

Similarly, both [the example] with unindicated positive concomitance and
[the example] with inverted positive concomitance do not secure the status
of the fallacy of the logical reason, because not indicating positive concomi-
tance as well as indicating positive concomitance as inverted are the defects
[on the part] of the speaker. If the demonstration of fallacies of the logical
reason [were carried out] by taking into account the defects of this [speaker]
as well, the limited number of those [fallacies] would be shattered, because
defects of the speaker [can] be infinite.

Similarly, re. [V8] and [V9], see NAV 25.4 (p. 417): vyatirekāpradarsanāṁ viparīta-
yatireka-pradarsanāṁ ca na vastuno doṣaḥ, kiṁ tarhi vacana-kuśalatā-vikalasyāb-
hidhāyakasya.

72 PVŚV, p. 186.19 (= Gnoli: 18.11) on PV 3.27cd found in NAV 25.4 (p. 417):

kiṁ ca, yesāṁ bhavatām ado dhāranāṁ: yad uta svārthānumānā-kāle
svayaṁ hetu-darsana-mātrāt sādhyā-pratīṣṭha parārthānumānāvastre pi'
'hetu-pratipādanam eva kartavyam “viduṣāṁ vācyo hetur eva hi kevala’
iti-vacanāt teśaṁ “kṛtakātvaḥ” iti-ātā hetūpāpyāsenāva sisādhayaśita-
sādhyā-siddhe samasta-drṣṭāntābhāsa-varṇanam api pūrvāpara-vyāhata-
vacana-racanā-cātyayuṁ āvīr-bhāvayati. āsātāṁ tāvaḥ etau, drṣṭāntasya
sādhanāvavatatenānabhīvyapagamāt.
Furthermore, yours is that view – namely: inasmuch as, in the time of the inference for oneself, one knows the probandum himself merely by seeing the logical reason, also at the point of the inference for others, only the demonstration of the logical reason should be carried out – on account of the following utterance: ‘[ ] since for scholars simply the logical reason alone is to be stated’ [pronounced by you] whose description of all fallacies of the example, as well – inasmuch as the probandum intended to be proved can be proved by specifying the logical reason alone [in the form of] nothing more than: ‘because it is produced’ – demonstrates [your] aptitude for formulations in which antecedent and subsequent statements are contradicted [by each other]. Let us leave therefore these two [fallacious examples [V8] and [V9]] alone, because the example is not accepted as a part of the probans.

74 NA V 11.1: [sādhāryena:] agnir atra dhūmānapatteh; vaidhāryena: agnir atra, anyathā dhūmāmupatteh.
75 I discuss it at length in Balcerowicz (2003).
76 In Balcerowicz (2001a: esp. xii–xxx), I discuss Dharmakīrti’s influence on the NA at length.

Bibliography

AKBh = Vasubandhu: Abhidharma-kośa-bhāsya. See: AK.
Boole, George 1847 The Mathematical Analysis of Logic; Cambridge – London 1847.
DhPr = Durveka Miśra: Dharmottara-pradīpa [being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭṭākā, being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu], ed. by Pt Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1971.
NB = Dharmakīrti: Nyāya-bindu. See: DhPr.
NBh = Vatsyāyana: Nyāya-bhāṣya. See: NV.
NBT = Dharmottara: Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā; See: DhPr.


PVSV = Dharmakīrti: Pramāṇa-vārttika-svāpajña-vṛtti. See: PV (1).


Part III

ROLE MODELS FOR WOMEN AND FEMALE IDENTITY
Once the nun¹ Satī Rājīmatī was caught in the rain and took refuge in a cave. She took off her soaked clothing in order to dry it, not knowing that there was someone else in the cave with her. The monk Rathanemi was also in the cave and had seen her naked. When she realized he was there, she became frightened and tried to hide her body, but he had already succumbed to sensual desire and started to proposition her. She warned him to control himself and to maintain his practice of celibacy. Rathanemi did so and they both eventually achieved mokṣa (liberation).²

There are many such Jain narratives extolling the chastity of women; they are the satt-narratives, narratives about “virtuous women.” When I went to India to ascertain why there are more nuns than monks in the Jain religion I found that the value of female chastity was arguably the most important factor involved.³ I once talked about this ancient story of Satī Rājīmatī with the Gujarati Śvetāmbar Sādhvī (nun) Akṣayānanda Śrī Ji of the Mūrtipūjak Taṃ Gacch⁴ while I was studying with her and a group of nuns in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. According to her this cave incident, involving Satī Rajīmatī, indicates the need for monks and nuns to be kept separate.

“Men and women should remain separate because it is people’s nature to have lustful thoughts,” she said. “You cannot stray from the vow of celibacy. There are times when the other vows may not be followed, but not this vow.”

“In your religion (dharm), do monks and nuns remain separated?” I asked, knowing that this was common practice.

“Yes, they do not live together in one place, and if they sit in one hall, they sit separately.”

“And this is because it is difficult to remain strong in one’s practice of celibacy?”

“Yes,” she replied.⁵
Although there are differences between the Śvetāmbar and Digambar sects in this regard, the rules that limit and regulate Jain renouncers’ interactions with members of the opposite gender are so strict that most Jain monks and nuns live largely separate lives. This is not to claim that monks and nuns never meet with each other, but their contact is minimal, especially in the Śvetāmbar sect.⁶

Digambar monks and nuns have more contact with each other, but this contact is limited. For example, Digambar monks have studied under the nun-scholar Gaṇinī Jñānamatī Mātā Jī. One was living at her āśram for this purpose when I was studying with nuns there. Also, Zydenbos (1999: 295, 297) has reported that while Digambar monks and nuns previously followed the rule that they should travel separately, they now sometimes travel and stay in the same area together. Indeed, while I was conducting research I heard of Digambar nuns who traveled with an ācārya (male head of a Jain sect or sub-sect/group) in Madhya Pradesh. So while a few monks and nuns may travel together or stay in the same area, it seems that it is more common for Digambars to do so. However, when Digambar monks and nuns do travel together there are still rules by which they should abide and they therefore reside in separate buildings (Zydenbos 1999: 297). But simply traveling together, Zydenbos states, “inevitably draws ridicule from malicious non-Jaina onlookers,” which indicates the extent to which such contact is problematic in India in general. Celibacy is difficult and transgressing are considered egregious. Sādhvī Akṣayānanda Śrī Jī, who told me the story of Satī Rajīmatī, once said to me, “If the other vows are broken, they can be fixed, but not the vow of chastity.”

Although Jain nuns frequently opined that celibacy is much easier for women, there is still a general acknowledgement that completely abstaining from sex is not easy. This abstention means not having sex, not talking about sex, and not thinking about sex. It requires both internal and external maintenance. In the former case, renouncers must struggle to diminish and contain internal urges that are sometimes very strong (see Goonasekara 1986). In the latter case, rules help renouncers avoid compromising situations, a renouncer’s peers help him or her when struggling against such urges, the laity keep careful watch on renouncers, and if a renouncer willingly engages in sexual relations, he or she will face severe punishment and possible expulsion from his or her community of renouncers. Restrictions, watchfulness, and protection serve to separate renouncers from anyone of the opposite gender and therefore serve to guard against sexual transgressions. For women this is especially important considering the value of female chastity in Jainism in particular and in India in general. Jains therefore consider their communities of renouncers suitable for girls and women to join, and there are now four times more Jain nuns than monks.⁷

Hindu and Jain renunciation compared

Although the external factors related to chastity explained above do not in and of themselves account for the preponderance of nuns over monks in Jainism, without
these factors this majority could never have existed within the Indian cultural context in which female chastity is both highly valued and suspect. This becomes especially clear when comparing Hindu and Jain renunciation.

There are mainly two types of renunciations available for women in India, Hindu and Jain. While female renouncers predominate in Jainism, they are a marginal and small minority in Hinduism. Various scholars (note 8) have investigated this situation in Hinduism and their studies have focused on social proscriptions against women renouncing, women’s duty (śṛṅḍharmā) to marry and have children, women’s mandatory dependence on male family members, and women’s identification with samsāra (the world that renouncers want to escape) through giving birth.

However, more important for the purposes of this chapter, according to Young (1994: 73–74) and Clémentin-Ojha (1981: 256) there is a Hindu tendency to identify women as temptresses who would trap men in samsāra through sensual desires. The conjoining of women with sexuality in Indian culture was shown by community resistance to the Ramakrishna movement’s inauguration of an independent math (monastic establishment) for women in the 1960s. Wendy Sinclair-Brull (1997: 63) reported that this resistance was based on the idea “that women suffered from the inherent inability to be chaste, and that to allow them independence of action was therefore against the interest of society.” Khandalwal (2001: 171–172) also has described this Hindu resistance.

The idea that young people, especially young girls, should become ascetics in large numbers seemed so wrong as to be sinister. In contemporary Hindu society, female celibacy is a social and conceptual possibility in that women celibates are visible in society, but it seems that they are tolerated, even revered, only as long as they remain exceptions. If women, especially young presexual women, were to begin taking vows of celibacy in large numbers, I believe that the limits of society’s tolerance would be reached.

While it is precisely these women in Jainism (“young presexual women”) who are renouncing in large numbers, it is difficult for women to renounce in Hinduism because, although female chastity is highly valued in Hinduism, many Hindus also believe that women are overly sexual. There is a fear that the renouncer life, unconstrained by the limits of marriage, would unleash their supposedly overwhelming sexual urges. Jains also value female chastity, but many Jains believe men are more libidinous. Jain nuns sometimes adduced the satt-narratives to demonstrate how this is so, such as the story of Sātī Rajīmatī at the beginning of this article. Many even claimed that men’s difficulty in maintaining celibacy is the reason why there are more Jain nuns than monks. The female Hindu renouncers with whom Khandelwal (2001) talked also opined that women can maintain celibacy more easily, but apparently this is not enough to encourage more Hindu women to renounce. How many Hindus perceive Hindu renunciation and its relative lack of organization is a significant hindrance in this regard.
There is the perception among many people in India that Hindu renouncers can be as notorious as they are respected. Some Jains also assert that Jain renunciation is better than Hindu renunciation because of this. The lack of systematized and extensive rules and/or the organization needed to enforce those rules in many orders of Hindu renouncers are reasons why they are regarded with a wary and suspicious eye. Although there are occasional instances of sexual impropriety among Hindu renouncers, this perception or suspicion is generally unwarranted. Nevertheless, although very strong-minded women can become Hindu renouncers, despite orthodox proscriptions, they do so at a perceived risk because they enter a purportedly uncertain community of peers. More realistically, single women who are not connected to a family group are more likely to be sexually harassed or assaulted. Female Hindu renouncers are more vulnerable because there is less institutional organization to protect them.

There are significant exceptions to this, and notable ones are the highly organized Śrī Śarada Maths for female renouncers that originated from the male-run Ramakrishna Mission. Both these male and female maths are highly organized, strict, and protected. Furthermore, at the Śrī Śarada Math in Calcutta, I was told that they also deemed it important to keep male and female renouncers separate, and that their maths are run separately from the men’s maths. When I talked with Samnyāsini (renouncer) Viṣṇaufaṇāfriṇa Jī at the Śrī Śarada Math in Delhi about my research concerning why Jain nuns constitute the majority of Jain renouncers, she told me that the separation of male and female renouncers is the key. “In Buddhism there was no separation and so there were problems,” she asserted. In fact, monastic rules in early Indian Buddhism subordinated nuns to monks to such an extent that monks supervised nuns during certain rituals and other circumstances. Buddhist monks and nuns therefore had more contact with each other and arguably more opportunity to stray from their vows of celibacy (see note 34).

Considering the larger Indian milieu, it is somewhat surprising that Jain women and girls would be allowed to or encouraged to renounce as a part of their practice of chastity. Occasionally, I also heard comments from Śvetāmbar laity that some families even persuade their daughters to take initiation or raise them to become nuns, confident that Jain renunciation is a chaste institution. It was said that families did this because they were unable to pay dowries, but in my experience this is probably true of only a small number of Jains.

Although Jains generally perceive Jain renunciation as a chaste institution, there have been cases of sexual impropriety and laxity among Jain renouncers. For example, John Cort (2001: 43–46) has written about a Gujarati Mūrtipūjak reform movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that was created to eliminate Jain yatis because they did not conform to the renouncer conduct that is now relatively standard for all Jain sects and sub-sects. The systematized nature of most Jain renouncer organizations today allows for more control, including control in the area of sexual conduct, thereby providing a virtuous alternative to marriage for women. However, even more important are the relationships...
between renouncers and their peers as well as relationships between renouncers and the scrutinizing and protective Jain laity. This chapter contains discussions translated from Hindi which I had with various Śvetāmbar and Digambar nuns and monks in Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Gujarat about restrictions and protection related to chastity among Jain renouncers.

Field-research

During my research I travelled throughout North India to interview Jain nuns. Most of my interviews were done with Rajasthani and Gujarati Śvetāmbar nuns. Because I interviewed South Indian and Digambar nuns less often, my assertions’ relevance for them will have to be verified by further research. I also interviewed a few laypeople and monks. However, I could not talk with laymen or monks often or extensively because to do so would be considered unsuitable for a woman. I was most interested in talking with those women who were responsible for nuns’ preponderance in Jainism, those who became nuns themselves. My research methodology was largely that of discussions with these nuns, some of which are reproduced here.

In his 1959 article “Comparative Religion: Whither – and Why?” the Harvard scholar Wilfred Cantwell Smith claimed that it is essential that scholars understand the personal nature of religion. Like Smith, I contend that to understand the external manifestations of religion and culture it is vital to understand what they “mean to those that are involved” (p. 143). The most important part of my research concerned recording Jain nuns’ views about the beliefs, ideals, and stories they were explaining to me and recording their interpretations of the events they shared with me from their own life experiences. I was less interested in my perceptions of Jain nuns, and more interested in Jain nuns’ perceptions and what their religion meant to them. It was in these perceptions that the mystery of Jain nuns’ preponderance began to reveal itself to me. I let their opinions about their own majority in the Jain renouncer population guide my research. When a significant number of them emphasized the external regulation of renouncers’ celibacy as responsible for their preponderance, this became one of the focuses of my research. I asked the nuns who asserted this for further explanations, and also talked with other nuns about these issues. However, my emphasis on their perceptions does not negate my own. While some nuns thought that external regulations of celibacy were largely responsible for Jain nuns’ preponderance, I believe somewhat differently. In so far as this regulation influences Jains’ view of renunciation as a safe and chaste institution for girls and women to join, it was and is necessary for female renunciation to occur and is therefore a necessary condition for Jain nuns’ preponderance. However, this regulation did not in and of itself produce this preponderance (see Fohr 2001).

This chapter is less about “facts” or “reality” or what may or may not be “accurate” and more about the ideas and ideals held by Jain nuns concerning their
own religion, that is, about opinions presented to me during interviews. Without these ideas and ideals supporting female renunciation, it would not be as prevalent. If, similar to Hinduism, large numbers of women renouncing in Jainism were to be considered bad, wrong, “sinister,” or, more germane to this chapter, sexually suspicious or dangerous, there would be fewer if any Jain nuns. But on the contrary, during my interviews many of the nuns with whom I talked emphasized their chastity, almost always without my prompting.

**Chastity as defined by Jain nuns**

At this point I need to clarify what my Śvetāmbar and Digambar interviewees meant by “chastity.” Nuns explained that chastity in Jainism ranges from fidelity in marriage to complete celibacy in renunciation, with the former being a less complete form of the latter. Marital fidelity is primarily defined in terms of wives who should marry once and be sexually faithful to their husbands in body, speech, and mind. Male and female renouncers’ celibacy also refers to restraint in body, speech, and mind, but it allows for no sexuality whatsoever. Although it is extremely important for all renouncers (male and female) to remain chaste, most nuns claimed that chastity is much more important for laywomen than it is for laymen. For example, traditionally a widower may remarry while a widow should not. Indeed, in India in general, it is much more important for women to remain chaste than men. As nuns are both women and renouncers, it is not surprising that they would emphasize chastity in their lives. Although almost all Jain scholars have argued or assumed that the vow of non-violence is the most important vow that Jain renouncers adopt and that virtually all Jain practices stem from it, Jain nuns asserted the primacy of chastity instead.

The terms nuns used to signify chastity referred both to the chastity of wives and the chastity renouncers. There was no term that referred exclusively to one or the other. These terms included: sattva (“virtue” or “chastity”), śīla (“morality” or “virtuous nature or conduct”), cāritra (“character,” “virtue,” or “proper conduct”), and brahmacarya (“chastity” or “celibacy”). Most of these terms do not refer to chastity exclusively, but also encompass other behaviors or qualities that are considered religious and good. However, nuns used these words when they were specifically talking about chastity, and that is how I interpreted these words in the English translations of the discussions that follow. For my nun-collaborators, these words described their celibacy as the fulcrum of their ascetic identities, practices, and qualities.

**Discussions with Śvetāmbar nuns about the rules of celibacy**

Many nuns asserted that celibacy was the most important of their vows. Indeed, it has been given much attention in Jainism and was deemed important enough
to merit the development of strict monastic rules designed to support celibacy and guard against sexual impropriety, especially in the Śvetāmbar sect. There are many restrictions placed on renouncers in this regard, some are directly related to celibacy and some are indirectly related. Those in the latter category are mainly meant to affect the renunciation of worldly life and the body, but they also curtail renouncers’ attractiveness. For example, monks and nuns do not wear jewelry or apply scented oil, and they pull out their hair two to five times a year (keś-luñcan). However, Jain nuns emphasized rules that more directly regulate celibacy when they talked with me. These include rules that keep renouncers from meeting too often with the opposite gender, meeting them alone, or touching them. I include these discussions in the following paragraphs, as well as some background information about the groups of nuns with whom I studied.

In Ahmedabad, Gujarat I met with Śvetāmbar Mūrtipujak Tapañ Gacch Pravartini who had 125 nuns under her care. This Gujarati religious leader was seventy-eight years of age when I interviewed her, had taken initiation when she was fifteen, and was educated up to the fourth standard. When I visited her, there were ten nuns, who were mostly Gujarati, staying with her in Ahmedabad. Their ages ranged between thirty and eighty. The three older nuns (ages sixty-five and above) had taken initiation when they were in their mid-teens and the rest had taken initiation in their late teens and twenties. Only one nun had been married and then decided to renounce, and that was after her husband had become a monk. The older nuns were relatively uneducated before they renounced, while the other nuns were educated until the eleventh standard or had college degrees. This group of renouncers was unusual in two ways. First, none had siblings who had also become initiated. Second, two of the younger nuns told me that they had been very irreligious in their teens, but had been impressed by Jainism after meeting certain nuns in this group.

When I arrived I was directed to talk with Sādhvī Aḵṣayānanda Śrī Jī because of her erudition on Jain matters. She was forty-six when I interviewed her and had taken initiation when she was twenty-one years of age. She had four brothers and one sister and her family were Gujarati Jains living in Andhra Pradesh. Although she was only educated until the eleventh standard, she was famous for her memory and for being a very learned scholar. Jain renunciation is frequently an avenue for monks and nuns to increase their knowledge and education. She was certainly knowledgeable, but also taciturn and offered me almost no information for which I did not ask directly. She was also very strict in her ascetic conduct. Her erudition and punctilioussness were such that even Pravartini Lāvanya Śrī Jī regarded her as an authority and would consult her on various issues. After Sādhvī Aḵṣayānanda Śrī Jī talked with me about the story of Satī Rajīmati, she discussed some of the rules that restrict renouncers’ contact with the opposite gender.
“Men [generally] don’t come here [to the upāśray24]” she asserted. “And after sunset and before sunrise, they are not allowed to come.” […] “When you go out for alms (gocart) do women give you food?” I asked.

“Men do also, but they cannot touch us.” “Men cannot touch you?” “Men cannot touch us or anything that is touching us. And we don’t touch any male, whether child or adult. If there is no female doctor available and we need to see a male doctor, if he touches us, then we have to do some type of penance (paścāt).” “Like fasting?” I asked. “Yes,” she replied.25

The above restrictions are directly aimed at maintaining renouncers’ celibacy. However, when she referred to the proscription of touching between nuns and males, this is not a euphemism referring to sex only. These rules literally mean no physical contact with the opposite gender. Most monks and nuns may not even touch something that is being touched at the same time by someone of the opposite gender. If a man or boy needs to hand something to a nun, he usually hands it to a laywoman (if he is not a monk) to give to her, drops it into her hands, or places it on the floor in front of her. Nuns also do the same if they need to give something to a man or a boy. The same rules apply to monks and women or girls. Adherence to these rules was something I observed consistently throughout my research, with the exception of the Digambaras. Bīsapānṭhī Digambars26 renouncers allow members of the opposite gender touch their feet to acquire blessings and also to hand something to them directly. However, among Śvetāmbrars even small children are taught to abide by these restrictions and carefully observe them. I only witnessed one instance of a child who transgressed in this regard. This boy of three pounced into the lap of a nun and was then corrected by his embarrassed and consternated mother.

The middle-aged Sādhvī Niraṇjana Śrī Ji, from Chennai, talked with me about some other rules that separate monks and nuns when and if they meet. She was also in Ahmedabad with a group of seven other Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Kharatar Gacch nuns under the care of Sādhvī Manohar Śrī Ji. Most were Gujarati and Rajasthani. Some were related to each other, three had taken initiation together in Delhi, four had earned PhD’s, and one was a published author. Their ages ranged from the thirties to sixties and most had never been married. This group’s good-natured cheerfulness impressed me, and they were one of the groups of Jain nuns who asked if I might join them in renouncing. Sādhvī Niraṇjana Śrī Ji, from Chennai, was in her late thirties when I interviewed her. About rules concerning monks and nuns she told me that,

We meet during lectures and we also discuss religion. When we go to the temple and if the monks are senior to us then we go to pay our respects.27
We also ask them questions. We do things like this with them, but we don’t live with them in one place and we eat separately. We only go for their blessings (darśan). And we also go if we should ask them some question. But [not] if there is only one monk there alone... or if for some reason there is no other nun to go with us, then we go with a [lay]woman, but we do not go alone, this is a rule.28

Śvetāmbar laity also should not meet a renouncer of the opposite gender if that renouncer is alone, and a laywoman should bring at least one other woman with her when meeting with monks. In my experience, these rules are not as strict among Digambars.

Although most Jain nuns with whom I met restricted their interactions with men, Pravartini Lāvanya Šrī Ji’s group of Gujarati Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Tapā Gacch nuns was more careful than any other group I visited in India. In her group, the older nuns acted as a sort of a barrier between the younger nuns and the few laymen who might come for blessings, advice, or religious knowledge. One younger and educated nun, Sādhvī Bhāvanandī Šrī Ji, explained this to me in English. Her family was Gujarati and living in Mumbai. She was twenty-four when I interviewed her, and she had become a nun at the age of nineteen. What is remarkable about this nun is that she admitted to being irreligious as an adolescent and to “roaming about and seeing movies and such.” Only one other nun I met described her life before initiation in these terms and she was also in this group of nuns. Most of the time nuns described themselves as pious and religious before renouncing.29 After Sādhvī Bhāvanandī Šrī Ji encountered Sādhvī Akṣayānanda Šrī Ji in Mumbai, she decided to become a nun with Sādhvī Akṣayānanda Šrī Ji as her guru. This once rebellious youngster then sat beside me as a self-possessed nun and explained how the older nuns helped support younger nuns’ practice of celibacy.

If [men] want to come [to the upāśray], they first have to ask permission from the head nun. She is very strong, but we youngsters, our minds may become filthy. We may collapse and become attracted to them. Downfall can come from anyone’s side. If instead of you, an American man had come here, then only the elder nuns would have talked to him.30

The rules and practices enumerated above by Jain nuns are very straightforward in their function to ensure renouncers’ practice of celibacy by separating them from the opposite gender and limiting their interactions.31

Some nuns compared Jain rules with Hindu renunciation, claiming that these rules make Jain renunciation superior. While I was living in Jamshedpur, Bihar, the Rajasthani Śvetāmbar Sthānakavāsī Sādhvī Prītisudha Šrī Ji was the first nun to argue this with me. This nun’s mother had renounced and in turn inspired many of her female relatives (including her daughters, sisters, and nieces) to do so as well. As a result, all but two nuns were related in this group of
twelve, headed by Sađhvī Pṛitisudha Śrī Ji, and most were Rajasthani. These nuns’ ages were between twenty and seventy and most had never been married, having been initiated in their early teens, while a few of the older nuns had renounced as widows later in life. Comparing Hinduism and Jainism, Sađhvī Śrī Pṛitisudhā Ji averred,

Because there are many restrictions concerning this [the separation of monks and nuns], people think it is all right if their daughters become Jain nuns. Even the highest ācārya cannot enter where we stay in the evening. A nun’s brother cannot even enter to visit his sister. If one nun has a relationship with a man, then people will think that all nuns are bad. Therefore there need to be restrictions.32

According to this nun, parents do not want their daughters to be in a situation where their chastity could be compromised. She added that while communities of Jain renouncers have good reputations in this regard, communities of Hindu renouncers do not. This latter view is arguable, but she was not the only Jain nun to voice it, and this opinion is more or less widely held among Jains.

Conversations about Śvetāmbar and Digambar restrictions for nuns

All the regulations mentioned thus far apply to both monks and nuns, but there are other restrictions that apply only to nuns, especially among Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Tapā Gacch and Digambar renouncers.33 Some of these rules result in limiting nuns’ progress and status within Jain communities, as I will explain later. However, Nalini Balbir (1994: 122–123) has examined extra rules for nuns in the Śvetāmbar Chedasūtras and how they are related to maintaining nuns’ chastity; and my collaborators also told me that these rules were not created because of concerns about nuns’ status, but because of concerns about nuns’ celibacy.

I rarely talked with Jain monks, but the Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Kharatar Gacch nuns under the care of Sađhvī Manohar Śrī Ji informed me that a high ācārya was going to arrive at Koba nearby and encouraged me to interview him. He was Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Tapā Gacch Ācārya Śrī Padmasāgarsūrī Ji, and when I interviewed him we talked about these rules for nuns.

I approached him with trepidation because there happened to be no other woman around who could go with me while I interviewed him. Instead, a layman showed me into the upāśray and I sat down on the floor in front of him although there was no other monk with him. After another monk quickly came into the room to join us, as Jain rules prescribe, we started our short interview. When I asked him why there have been so many female Jain renouncers in comparison to other religions in South Asia, he told me that this is because women are given respect in Jainism, the only difference being that women have more restrictions in order to protect their chastity.
[... ] In the Hindu religion women are not respected in the same way they are in Jainism. Women are looked down upon. It is the same in the Vedic and Buddhist traditions. Buddha gave women a place in the [Buddhist] religion only after some time.\textsuperscript{34} But since the beginning, Mahāvīr established the four-fold community [of male and female renouncers and laity]. [Women] were given equal rights. There are some differences between male and female renouncers’ restrictions, because they are women, to protect their chastity (śīl rakṣāṅ). There are some limitations (maryādā) for their protection. In everything else, there are no differences.\textsuperscript{35}

Although all monks are technically superior to nuns in the Śvetāmbar renouncer hierarchy, most of the Śvetāmbar nuns I met did not consider themselves inferior to monks in status or spiritual abilities. Many asserted that monks and nuns have the same rights, that Jainism is not a male-dominated religion, and because of this Jain nuns have thrived. Furthermore, many Śvetāmbar nuns did not believe that the extra restrictions placed on nuns were related to spiritual inferiority in any way.

But what are these further restrictions that protect nuns’ chastity to which Ācārya Śrī Padmasāgarsūrī Jī alluded? In one of my many conversations with Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Tapā Gacch Sādhvī Vairāgya Pūrṇā Śrī Jī from Rajasthan, she discussed this issue of special rules for women’s protection with me in slightly more detail. This nun was part of a group of three Tapā Gacch Mūrtipūjak nuns with whom I spent most of my time while I was in Delhi. The group was headed by Sādhvī Kusum Prabhā Śrī Jī, who was chronically ill during my research and so, until she was well, they all had to remain in Delhi before resuming their itinerancy. At the time of my research her age was forty-one and she had taken initiation at the age of sixteen, when she had completed the tenth standard. She had never married and was the second child in her family, which lived in the small town Sojat in Rajasthan where they sold silk sarees. She had six sisters and two brothers, and two of her sisters had also taken initiation. Sādhvī Vairāgya Pūrṇā Śrī Jī was one of them. She was twenty-eight at the time of my research and had been eighteen years of age when she took initiation. She had an education similar to her sister’s and also had never married. The third nun in this group was Sādhvī Saṃyam Ratnā Śrī Jī who was also from Rajasthan where her parents had a cloth store. She had been married at the age of sixteen and widowed at eighteen. At the time of my research she was forty-two years of age and she had taken initiation when she was thirty-one. Although she was one of the wisest nuns I had encountered, she had little formal education. I visited these three nuns often and our interactions were usually less formal than those with other nuns.

During one of my conversations with Sādhvī Vairāgya Pūrṇā Śrī Jī, we talked about Tapā Gacch Mūrtipūjak nuns’ more restricted access to religious education in the past.
Monks used to be the scholars because they studied with laymen (śrāvak) scholars and professors. They studied with them,” she said. “These types of facilities were not available to nuns. This is why there were fewer nuns who were scholars. But it is not the same way now. Today, Guru Mahārāj has made these facilities available [to nuns].

We have already obtained every type of facility. [Nuns] have become scholars. They are reading every scripture (Āgami). They are catching up in every way concerning their studies.”

“So nuns did not have these facilities in the past?” I asked.

“The only reason was to protect our chastity (caritra),” she explained.

“We did not progress in order to protect our practice of celibacy (śīl-dharm).”

“I don’t understand (matalab?),” I said bluntly.

“They [nuns] remained by themselves. In former times women did not leave their houses, so similarly nuns were also not allowed to go out very much. They were not allowed to meet too many men. This was for their protection, for this reason.”

Protecting nuns’ chastity is also the reason behind another restriction followed among Tapā Gacch Mūrtipūjak Jains. Nuns are usually active at religious functions in all sects and sub-sects and, except in the Tapā Gacch, nuns frequently give sermons to both men and women. As other scholars have already noted, while nuns of this gacch are allowed to preach to women, they are restricted from preaching to groups of both men and women. This proscription was also designed to regulate nuns’ chastity by keeping them separate from men.

There is also a significant restriction applied to nuns and not monks in the Digambar sect. Nuns of this sect may not renounce clothing. Although this restriction limits female renouncers’ status in the Digambar sect, Digambar renouncers asserted that this is not its purpose. Furthermore, the Digambar hierarchy of monks and nuns complicates the issue of status. While in Śvetāmbar Jainism, all monks are technically higher in status than nuns, in Digambar Jainism status is more complex. The lowest in the Digambar hierarchy are brahmacārinīs (female) and brahmacārinīs (male). Their practices are the least difficult and some remain more or less in householder life despite taking vows of celibacy, but to become one is also often the first step for those who want to progress in the Digambar renouncer hierarchy. Above them are celibates of increasing asceticism including kṣullikās (female), kṣullaks (male), and ailaks (male); and then ārīkās (female) and naked munis (male). Monks have a higher status than nuns within each level of this Digambar hierarchy. So, for example, kṣullikās are lower in status than kṣullaks, but kṣullaks are lower in status than ārīkās. Although I identify all the celibates listed above as renouncers, Digambars consider only a muni to be a complete renouncer capable of achieving mokṣa because he renounces his clothing. Virtually all kṣullikās, kṣullaks,
ailaks, āryikās and some brahmacārinīs and brahmacārinś generally function as, and are respected as, renouncers in that they are unmarried and celibate and can still make significant progress towards mokṣa, but they are still officially only advanced laypeople. From this point of view, there are also officially no Digambar female renouncers, although certainly most Digambars consider at least āryikās to be nuns. While Śvetāmbar nuns claimed they were at least equal to monks, Digambar nuns did not make similar claims, despite the complexity of their hierarchy of renouncers. Instead, they explained to me that they would have to be reborn as men to become muniś before they could attain mokṣa.

While in Delhi, I met briefly with Digambar Muni Kamkumarānanda Ji from Karnataka and talked with him about this rule concerning nakedness. He had renounced householder life in 1988, after completing a degree in electrical engineering. He was initiated by Ācārya Śrī Kunthū Sāgar Ji Mahārāj as a naked muni in 1989, and he was thirty-three when I interviewed him in 1999. An author, his books included Universal Message of Jainism and Ten Universal Virtues, both written in English.

“A nun (āryikā) is a woman,” he began after I told him about my research. “Women’s status is not less then men’s status in Jainism. I will show you how this is so. For example, we monks practice religion. We practice self-control (saṃyām). We eat and drink water once in twenty-four hours. Āryikās also do what we do. Āryikās also only eat once a day, they also practice self-control, and they do not keep many clothes. They cannot be completely unclothed, this is the Indian tradition and culture, and it is also said that this is their moral restriction (maryādā). They cannot break with this moral restriction (maryādā). They are not attached [to this clothing], but they cannot give it up. From the point of view of society, they cannot give it up. For this reason she has [some, but] very little, property. She has a few sarees, two sarees, but there is no difference between them and us concerning our practice of austerities (tapascarya). [We] both practice the same austerities.”

“So the difference between muniś and āryikās is that āryikās wear clothing. Does this come from society or because āryikās are women?” I asked hoping for further elaboration.

“This is women’s maryādā,” he replied simply.

“What does maryādā mean?”

“Maryādā, in other words it is her culture (saṃskṛti). It is their morality (naitiktā). There is morality39 in this. For this reason women cannot remain naked. For this reason they have clothing.”

“Does this have to do with a woman’s body, or society, or women’s traditions? Where does this clothing-issue come from?” I asked, still hoping for a more detailed answer.
“They wear clothing because of morality – morality (naitiktā). And secondly they cannot remain without clothing, not only among themselves, but also among us. But men can remain without clothing.”
“This means that clothes are not necessary for men’s morality, but are necessary for women’s morality?”
“Yes, this is a fact (bāt).” He replied.

In the Digambar Jain religion, the rule that nuns cannot go without clothing, as the most advanced Digambar monks do, theoretically impedes women’s achievement of mokṣa because Digambars believe that one must renounce clothing in order to reach that state. This restriction also means that women cannot attain the highest status of full Digambar munis. However, this rule is deemed necessary for women’s morality. It would be immoral for a woman to travel around India naked. In other words, these rules in both the Śvetāmbar and Digambar sects, which have resulted in keeping nuns from having equal opportunities, were intended to protect women’s chastity by working within accepted cultural norms that demanded that women adhere to pardā restrictions (especially in Rajasthan) and remain fully clothed. These rules indicate the seriousness with which Jains view nuns’ chastity, and the extent to which Jains maintain it. Although no Digambars cited the story of Satī Rajīmatī to indicate what might happen if women renounced clothing, they could have easily done so. If a nun did renounce clothing, she would encounter a great deal of difficulty.

Conversations with Śvetāmbar nuns about protection

When Jain nuns and monks talked about issues concerning renouncers’ chastity they often used words such as raksan or sūrakṣā, both meaning protection, to describe how these rules “protect” their chastity. Chastity is considered to be something of great value, and therefore it should be kept safe, safe from one’s own urges and safe from the sexual aggression of others. Deo and Shāntā have already described evidence of this latter concern in the past, and this concern still exists today. Although there are misogynist strains of thought in Jain texts, in which women are primarily portrayed as temptresses, I found that most of the nuns with whom I talked believed differently. If anyone is more inclined toward sexual activity or misconduct, according to them, it is men. As stated previously, many nuns cited the popular Jain narratives about sattis, such as the story of Satī Rajīmatī, to support this assertion, arguing that the women of these stories must frequently protect their honor from ill-intentioned men. Although nuns acknowledged that all men and women have sexual urges and therefore renouncers must be careful, there is a more pervasive concern about women’s safety in Jainism. This includes the safety of nuns’ “virtue” against male sexual aggression.
Among Jain renouncers, it is children and women who are the most vulnerable to sexual aggression (or aggression of any sort). Nuns not only explained that their rules protect them from such aggression, but also emphasized that Jain communities provide security as well. Nuns are conscious of this need for protection. For example, one day when I went to visit the Mürtipîjak nuns of Kusum Prabhā Śrī Ji’s group we talked as usual for a little while. I then started to joke about how I liked the natural beauty products available in Delhi such as the Shahnaz Hussian facial packs. My life was such a contrast to theirs in this way and sometimes I joked about this with them. They, according to Jain regulations, pulled out their hair regularly, wore simple white clothing, and did not use beauty products or wear jewelry. So Sādhvī Kusum Prabhā Śrī Ji asked me why I bought these beauty products.

I continued to joke, “I should be beautiful, shouldn’t I?”

With this, the tone of the conversation became serious.

“You shouldn’t be too beautiful because some man might try to rape you.” Samyam Ratnā Śrī Ji asserted soberly.

I tried to keep the conversation light by joking that I always had my umbrella to defend myself. I usually carried a long umbrella with me wherever I went. It helped protect me from the sun, and occasionally from ill-mannered men as well.

But Sādhvī Samyam Ratnā Śrī Ji continued, “There was once a girl who went out at night. Two men from a taxi forced her into a car, injected her with drugs, and raped her for two days. She didn’t tell anyone until five months later and this was only because she complained about stomach pains. When her parents took her to the doctor, they found out she was pregnant. The police wouldn’t do anything unless they were bribed. Now they have gone to court.”

She paused and then continued, “Two days ago, two men grabbed a Sthānakavāśī nun when she went out for alms (gocarī). She started to scream and was rescued. The men are now in jail.”

Again she paused, looking at me with concern, “You shouldn’t give anyone your complete address so that you remain safe.”

This recent incident concerning the Sthānakavāśī nun had seriously hurt their usual good humor, and all three remained taciturn and morose for the rest of my visit that day.

Protection is also important for monks, especially Digambar munis who are usually protected by Jain laymen because they are occasionally attacked by non-Jains offended by their nakedness (Zydenbos 1999: 296). However, women are more vulnerable to aggression than men and so Jain nuns should never be alone. The most potentially dangerous time for nuns is during vihār (itinerancy). When they stay in a town or village, Jain renouncers usually stay in an area densely populated by Jains who protect them. But what happens when they travel across India by foot? Most Jain nuns must travel in groups since there is safety in numbers.
The only exception I heard about during my research was a Digambar āryikā who was traveling through Bihar with no other nuns or monks. No doubt Jain laity traveled with her to keep her safe.

Jain laypeople are assiduous in their care of renouncers, including female renouncers. Many lay Jains have near or distant female relatives who have joined orders of nuns, and their responsibility toward protecting nuns is encouraged by this. Furthermore, their care is so diligent that many laity would be offended at the notion that nuns experience any danger at all. It is also probably not a coincidence that the one sub-sect that is most systematically and uniformly concerned with taking care of its renouncers, the Terāpanthī sub-sect, has one of the highest ratios of nuns to monks, five to one. But the laypeople of all sects and sub-sects of Jainism are very watchful. Not only are they concerned that these renouncers practice what they preach, they are also concerned with their safety, sometimes paying bodyguards to travel with them.

While in Delhi I briefly met three Śvetāmbar Sthānakavāṣī Śādhvīs: Śādhvī Vimalā Śrī Ji (most senior) who was fifty-nine when I met her and had taken initiation when she was seventeen, Śādhvī Kṛpā Śrī Ji who was thirty-four and had taken initiation at the age of seventeen, and Śādhvī Nidhī Śrī Ji who was thirty-five and had taken initiation when she was nineteen. Śādhvī Nidhī Śrī Ji was from Bangalore and once had aspirations to become a doctor. After she encountered a Jain nun who asked her why she wanted to be a “doctor of the body” when she could be a “doctor of the soul,” she gradually decided to pursue the more spiritual of the two options. She was educated, extremely articulate, could speak English, and was an author. When I asked her about the dangers of vihār, she explained that there was no danger because Jain laypeople walk with them from village to village, escorting them.

If there is the least bit of danger, then people take care of so much that they walk with us themselves. They walk with us and take care of us. They don’t leave [us] until the people from the next village come. Then those people escort us. This is how Jain people take care of us when we go anywhere where there are no Jain households.

Gujarati Mūrtipūjak Tapā Gacch Śādhvī Nandiyāṣā Śrī Ji had a similar answer. She was fifty-two when I interviewed her and had taken initiation when she was twenty-two. Like Śādhvī Aksayāṇanda Śrī Ji, she also had a reputation for being extremely learned, but unlike Śādhvī Aksayāṇanda Śrī Ji, I only met her briefly while I was in Ahmedabad. When I asked her if they have any problems on vihār because they are women, she replied,

We are in a group, and whenever there is a necessity, the Jain society provides us with a guard. There is no problem. Some people usually
come with us and carry our extra materials and protect us. There are usually no problems.  

While some nuns argued that ascetic restrictions make it safe for women to renounce in Jainism, others argued that it is protection by Jain communities that does so. Gujarati Murtipjak Tapā Gacch Sādhvī Virapiyāsā Śrī Jī was one nun who asserted this. I met her briefly with Sādhvī Nandiyāsā Śrī Jī. She was sixteen years of age when she decided to take initiation after being inspired by the religious preaching of monks and nuns. When she told her family this, her parents sent her to college, saying that if she still did not want to marry afterwards, they would let her become a nun. She was between thirty and forty years of age when I interviewed her.

“In Jainism, Lord Mahāvīr has made arrangements for women. The Jain society takes care of us. The Jain society takes full responsibility for us. It is the entire Jain society’s responsibility to protect us.”

“So it is necessary to protect women.” I stated inquiringly.

“In other religions there is not as much [protection.]”

“So what you mean is that it is a little dangerous to take initiation in other religions.”

“There is no protection. There is no group. There is no education. It seems to me that these occur more in Jainism.”

**Conclusion**

Scholars have already noted that although more widows constituted Jain nuns’ populations in the past, this is not the case today. Now it is mostly unmarried girls who decide to become nuns. In either case, chastity is a factor in their initiations. In the past, when more child marriages took place, young widows were encouraged to renounce because they could not remarry (unlike their male counterparts) and they therefore needed to control their sexual feelings. Now that girls are married later in life, they are deciding to become nuns in their late teens and twenties because they must either marry or renounce at this time, otherwise their chastity will be called into question. Renunciation is considered a respectable and suitable institution for these Jain women because of strict rules and community watchfulness.

Some Jain nuns claimed that communities of Jain renouncers tend to be secure, secure in general and also secure from sexual advances and misconduct. Fastidious rules that limit contact with the opposite gender make it difficult to stray from the practice of celibacy. Watchfulness by fellow Jains, especially senior renouncers and laypeople, discourages any fall from grace on the part of renouncers themselves and any potential for sexual violence against nuns.
Some nuns even claimed that strict Jain regulations are responsible for nuns’ preponderance in Jainism. This does not seem to be the case as there are many other factors contributing to this, factors I have discussed elsewhere and alluded to earlier. However, if the rules of separation and community watchfulness did not exist in Jainism, there could never have been a female majority among Jain renouncers because it would not have been considered suitable or safe for girls and women to become nuns. In other words, while strict regulations are not a sufficient condition for nuns’ preponderance, they are a necessary condition. This includes the extra restrictions for nuns, because without them female renunciation would not have been considered respectable within extant Indian social norms. The fact that these restrictions are not as stringent in the less organized Digambar sect further bolsters this assertion because this is the only Jain group in which there are more monks than nuns. If Jains believed that compromising situations could occur in Jain renunciation, such as the one described in the story of Sati Rajimati and the monk Rathanemi at the beginning of this article, there most likely would not have been very many Jain nuns at all.

Acknowledgments

I thank John Cort, Peter Flügel, and Samuel Fohr for their valuable advice during various drafts of this article. My gratitude to the many renouncers with whom I studied including those mentioned in this article: Tapā Gacch Mūrtipūjak Ācārya Śrī Padmasāgarsūri Ji, Digambar Muni Kamkumarānanda Ji, Tapā Gacch Pravartini Lavanya Śrī Ji, Tapā Gacch Sādhvī Aksayānanda Śrī Ji, Tapā Gacch Śādhvī Bhāvanandī Śrī Ji, Kharatar Gacch Śādhvī Manohar Śrī Ji, Kharatar Gacch Śādhvī Nīrāṇjanā Śrī Ji, Tapā Gacch Śādhvī Kusum Prabhā Śrī Ji, Tapā Gacch Śādhvī Vairāgya Pūrṇā Śrī Ji, Tapā Gacch Śādhvī Samyam Ratnā Śrī Ji, Sthānakavāśi Śādhvī Śrī Prītimudha Ji, Sthānakavāsī Śādhvī Vimalā Śrī Ji, Sthānakavāsī Śādhvī Śrī Kṛpā Ji, Sthānakavāsī Śādhvī Śrī Nidhī Ji, Tapā Gacch Śādhvī Nandiyāśa Śrī Ji, Tapā Gacch Śādhvī Vīrapiyaśā Śrī Ji and Hindu Sāmnyāsīnī Vijñānaprāṇa Ji. I also thank my hardworking research assistant, Vandana Vora.

Notes

1 I use the term “nun” to refer to all of the following: sādhvīs (contemporary designation for a virtuous or chaste women, usually used in the Śvetāmbar sect to refer to female renouncers), samanīs (women who make an effort in renunciation, designation for a special type of female renouncer in the Terāpanthī sub-sect who, unlike full renouncers, may use transportation such as motor vehicles, trains, and planes), āryikās (venerable women, of the Digambara sect) (see Shāntā 1985: 56–58), kṣullikās (lesser renouncer women, of the Digambara sect), and brahmacārīnīs (women who practice celibacy, of the Digambara sect).

2 This story is from lecture twenty-two of the Śvetāmbar Uttarādhyanana Sūtra and is arguably the oldest existent Jain narrative about the importance of chastity, dating BCE (Alsdorf 1974). It is also a very well-known story in Jain communities.
This chapter only describes one way the value of female chastity is involved in Jain nun’s larger population, that is, the way restrictions regulating the celibacy of renouncers influence their numbers. Others concern perceptions about women as more naturally chaste, young widows being encouraged to renounce in the past, women’s choice of renunciation over marriage now that child marriages are less frequent, the connection between the fidelity of wives and the celibacy of renouncers (and the power they both produce), and the popular stories about “virtuous women” called satis. See Fohr (2001) and Kelting in this volume.

The Svetâmbar sect is divided into three sub-sects, the Sthânakavâsî, Terâpanthi, and Mûrtipujâk. The Mûrtipujâk sub-sect is also divided into smaller groups or sub-groups called gacchês. The largest of these are the Tapâ Gacch and Kharatar Gacch.

Conversation in Ahmedabad on February 2, 1999.

During his research among Svetâmbar Mûrtipujak Kharatar and Tapâ Gacch renouncers in Jaipur, Laidlaw (1995: 56) also found that “groups of monks and nuns operate separately and independently. They hardly ever meet.”

This estimate is from Flügel’s statistics (Chapter 12 this volume) that are largely derived from the Samagra Jain Caturmâs Sûtî, edited by Bâbulâl Jain. In 1999 there were 154 monks and 557 nuns in the Svetâmbar Terâpanthi sub-sect, 533 monks and 2,690 nuns in the Svetâmbar Sthânakavâsî sub-sect, 1,489 monks and 5,354 nuns in the Svetâmbar Mûrtipujâk sub-sect (most within the Tapâ Gacch), and 610 monks and 350 nuns in the Digambar sect. In 1999 there was a total of 2,786 monks and 8,951 nuns. There seems to have been a very marked and recent increase in the number of Sthânakavâsî and Mûrtipujâk nuns in particular (see Table 12.10: Flügel Chapter 12 this volume).

While most Svetâmbar renouncers are women, there are twice as many monks than nuns in the Digambar sect, according to these statistics. Nevertheless, the relatively small ratio of Digambar monks to nuns is still unusual within Indian culture. If ailâks (male), ksullâks (male), and ksullikâs (female) are taken into account the ratio of male to female renouncers is five to four (see Table 12.8: Flügel Chapter 12 this volume). If brahmacârîns (male) and brahmacârînis (female) are also factored in, the Digambar ratio of monks to nuns would be even smaller or would demonstrate a majority of Digambar nuns as well, but further research is needed to verify this. For example Flügel (Chapter 12 this volume) points out that in 1999 Digambar Acârya Vidyâsâgar had 150 brahmacârîjis and only 50 brahmacârîns under his care.

For example, Denton 1991; King 1984; Leslie 1983; Clémentin-Ojha 1981; Young 1994. See also Babb 1986: 97–154 for descriptions of different groups of Hindu renouncers, including an exceptional group in which there are more female than male renouncers. See Khandelwal 1997; Olivelle 1995; and Kane 1941–1974: vol. 2, part 1 for textual information about women’s position in renunciation.

Weinberger-Thomas (1999: 149) notes how Indian notions concerning the danger of women’s sexuality resembled the old “Western fantasy of India” in which Indians had an “immoderate appetite for sensual pleasure (most highly pronounced in women).” Apparently, some Westerners also were ready to believe that Indian women were lustful. This raises interesting questions about who believes what about women and why. The colonial stereotype about Indian women, described by Weinberger-Thomas, is now applied to Western women by Indians.


See Khandelwal (1997: 88–92). She states on page 90 about renouncers in Haridwar, “Local wisdom has it that women [renouncers] must protect themselves not only from violence perpetrated by strangers but also from the sexual advances of their own gurus and peers.” See also Harlan (1992: 216–217) who discusses some related reasons why Hindus do not think renunciation is suitable for women; and Narayan (1989) for suspicion concerning Hindu ascetics.
14 As Gutschow (2001: 57) has so elegantly put it, “To treat the monastic vocation as an economic solution to the problem of feeding one’s children is to reduce social actors to a Parsonian rationality which neglects affective and irrational aspects of human nature and fortune.” This also pertains to dowry issues.
15 See Cort (1999: 47, 53–54). Some sects and sub-sects are more systematized than others.
16 I am grateful to have received a Fulbright-Hays (DDRA) fellowship to conduct research in India from March 1998 to March 1999. I would also like to thank the University of Virginia and its benefactors for supporting my studies, research, and writing with the following grants: Ann Francis Stead Fellowship, Mrs Charles A. Bryant Fellowship, Commonwealth Fellowship, Foreign Language Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowships. I am also grateful to the American Institute of Indian Studies (AIIS) for their Language Fellowship for Hindi language training in India.
18 See Khandelwal (2001) about brahmacarya as not just celibacy, but also as controlling all passions and living a life of religious restraint on many levels.
20 Flügel (Chapter 12 this volume) points out that Digambars are less systematized in this way.
21 This practice of pulling hair out by the roots has various functions in Jainism. First, it detracts from renouncers’ attractiveness. Second, it is also a form of austerity (tapasya). Third, it is done in emulation of Lord Mahāvīr who pulled his hair out when he decided to renounce householder life.
22 For further recent scholarship about these rules see Vallely (2002: 105) and Flügel (2003).
23 A pravartin functions like the ācārya towards the nuns under her care, she is the head of the nuns in her gacch.
24 Temporary place of residence in which traveling groups of Jain renouncers may stay for long or short periods of time.
25 Conversation in Ahmedabad on February 24, 1999.
26 There are three types of Digambars: Bīsapanthī, Terāpanthī, and Tāraṇapanthī. The first two types use statues in worship, while the last use scriptures. Among the Bīsapanthī, there are no restrictions against women touching male gurus’ feet or male Jinas’ (founders of the Jain religion) feet in temples. Women may also perform abhiseka worship (anointing of Jain images) in temples. There are no restrictions concerning green vegetables. Among the Terāpanthī, women are restricted from touching male gurus’ feet and Jinas’ feet. Women cannot perform abhiseka and the intake of green vegetables is restricted during certain times of the month. (Conversation with Digambar Āryikā Candaṇāmati Mātā Ji in Hastinapur on January 1, 1999.)
27 Note that Sādhvī Niraṇjānā Śrī Ji says that “if” the monks are senior, nuns pay respects to them. This indicates that Śvetāmbar rules that prescribe all nuns pay respects to all monks, no matter their seniority, are not always practiced. This may be especially true in the Kharatar Gacch in which there is a shortage of monks.
29 This may be different for monks. As John Cort has pointed out to me, the irreligious and profligate becoming religious is “a standard trope of religious conversion the world around” (personal communication, September 9, 2002). It is not, however, for Jain nuns.
30 Conversation in Ahmedabad on February 27, 1999.
31 Rules separating men and women are also observed in lay life and can be seen during Jain functions and lectures, during which men and women sit separately. James
Laidlaw (1995: 207) describes an interesting instance of rules separating the sexes during a lay gathering for pratikrama (rite of karmic purification). Usually laywomen and laymen perform this ritual separately and “even in separate buildings.” However, Laidlaw observed one family’s observance of this ritual together. The men and women of the family sat opposite each other in a circle and married couples sat where a man and a woman had to sit by each other at either end. The older of these couples could be closer together than the younger. The elderly woman who led the rite kept her face covered entirely and the younger women partially during the pratikrama and almost no eye contact took place between the men and women. When something needed to be handed to someone of the opposite gender, the rules for handing things to the opposite gendered renouncer were observed.

Ácārya Śrī Padmasāgarsūrya Ji is referring here to a story told in various Buddhist texts including the Vinayapitaka, Cullavagga (10.1–3), in which Mahāpajāpatī (the Buddha’s foster mother and aunt) and 500 women asked the Buddha for ordination. They asked and were refused by him three times. However, they were determined and so shaved their heads and wore monks’ robes. After the monk Ānanda finally interceded on their behalf and the Buddha also refused him three times, Ānanda inquired as to whether women are indeed capable of reaching enlightenment. The Buddha answered affirmatively and finally relented to the women’s wishes to be initiated, but only upon the condition that they accept eight rules subordinating nuns to monks. The Buddha also warned that the Buddhist religion would now last only 500 years instead of 1,000. The eight rules are as follows:

1. Any nun, no matter how long she has been in the order, must honor all monks, even the rudest of novices.
2. Nuns should not reside in any place during the annual rainy-season retreat where monks are not available to supervise them.
3. Monks determine the dates for biweekly assemblies.
4. At the end of the rainy season retreat when the nuns and monks invite criticism from their own communities, nuns must also invite criticism from the monks.
5. Monks must share in determining and supervising penance for nuns.
6. Monks must share in the ordination of nuns.
7. Nuns must never reprove monks.
8. Nuns must never criticize monks officially.


Her guru is known for these reforms. For example, in The Life and Work of Acharya Sri Vijaya Vallabh Suriswarji, Jhabak states,

Pujna Acharya laid great stress on girls’ education and opened many schools for girls. He also permitted and encouraged the sadhvis (nuns) for delivering discourses. Even today his sishyas (sadhvis) are preaching the teachings of Lord Mahavir in all parts of India.

(Jhabak, The Life and Work of Acharya Sri Vijaya Vallabh Suriswarji, 13)
that nuns remain clothed does not really limit their spiritual progress in a significant way in this age. When they reincarnate, just as monks will, they will reincarnate as men.

42 *Pardā* restricts women’s behavior as a way to regulate their chastity while living with their in-laws after marriage. These restrictions mean that women cannot leave the home often, cannot travel alone, and must cover their heads when in the presence of men.

43 Not only do nuns protect each other, there is some evidence that monks were expected to guard the nuns. A young monk well versed in the act of fighting was allowed to punish an intruder by disguising as a nun. In certain cases even brother-monks had to protect their sister-nuns with the permission of the ācārya and the *pravartinīs*.

(N. Shānta 1997: 197, n. 175, citing Deo 1956)

At first glance this situation seems to contradict the rules separating monks and nuns. However, the spirit behind the rules, to keep renouncers chaste, is still being preserved.

44 See Śvetāmbar Sūtras Śātraktāṅga (1.4), Uṭtarādhyamanā (32.13–16). See also similar images in Digambar texts in Jaini (1991) and Ryan (1988).

45 For information about *sattis* see Shānta (1985, 1997); Kelting (2001, Chapter 8 this volume); and Fohr (2001).

46 Conversation in Delhi on October 5, 1999.

47 See Flügel (Chapter 12 this volume) about organization being related to populations of renouncers.

48 Personal communication with Peter Flügel.

49 Conversation in Delhi on October 20, 1998.

50 Conversation in Ahmedabad on February 21, 1999.

51 Conversation in Ahmedabad on February 21, 1999.


54 However, the other factors mentioned in this article, such as the Digambar belief that women are unable to reach liberation in a female body and their purported spiritual inferiority, probably also discouraged more women from renouncing in the Digambar sect.

**Bibliography**


Jains venerate virtuous women (sattis) who are virtuous and who, through their virtue, protect, promote, or merely uphold Jain values and the Jain religion. Jains narrate the lives of sattis both individually and in the context of Jain Universal Histories (such as the Śvetāmbar Trisāṣṭilakāpuruṣacaritra of Hemacandra and the Digambar Ādipurāṇa of Jinasena) and some of these sattis are named in early Jain texts like the Śvetāmbar Kalpa Sūtra. Śvetāmbar Jains also list sattis (often sixteen of the following names: Brāhmī, Sundarī, Čandambilā, Rājīmatī, Draupadī, Kauśalyā, Mṛgāvatī, Sulasā, Sītā, Subhadra, Śivā, Kuntī, Śilavatī, Damayantī, Puṣpacūlā, Prabhāvatī, and Padmāvatī) who stand in for the greater totality of sattis. They also have more inclusive lists which extend the title satti to an unbounded number of women. Satti lists, through their fluidity and their inclusivity, serve as representatives of the totality of women’s virtue and as such are efficacious primarily by creating auspiciousness but also by reducing karma. While sattis are revered in all Jain sects, this discussion is centered on the ways that Śvetāmbar Mūrtipujak Tapā Gacch Jains have constructed the idea of collectivities of sattis. At present there are five gacchis (mendicant lineages) of Śvetāmbar Mūrtipujak Jain mendicants: Tapā, Añcal, Khartar, Paican, and Tristuti. Between 85 and 90 percent of the Śvetāmbar Mūrtipujak mendicants belong to the Tapā Gacch, which was formed in the thirteenth century CE, when the mendicant Jagaccandraśūri left the mainstream Vaṭa Gacch as a response to mendicant laxity. The Jains with whom I conduct my research in Maharashtra identify themselves with Tapā Gacch mendicants, and when they perform rituals where the liturgies vary from gacch to gacch, they likewise choose those associated with the Tapā Gacch.

To examine the Tapā Gacch Jain conception of sattis, we can look at the ways in which these Jains frame the multiplicity and/or collectivity of sattis through their presence in recitations of lists of the names of the sattis. Four short texts were chosen for discussion in this chapter because they were the most commonly found satti lists and were used in ritual performances. They are the Brāhmī
Candanbālikā (BC), the Sol Satt no Chand (The Verses of the Sixteen Sattis; SSC), the Bharahesara ni Sajjhāy (The Instruction on Lord Bharat; BS), and the Satā Satt ni Sajjhāy (The Instruction on the True and Virtuous Men and Women, SSS). Here it is important to distinguish between ritual texts (those intended for performance) and ritual instructions (those which guide performance) (Bruhn 1981: 21). The four texts discussed hereafter are ritual texts intended for performance. I include short glosses which serve to give an interpretation to these texts as well; these commentarial glosses should be understood as a kind of ritual instruction informing the performer of the efficacy and meaning of the texts.

The texts discussed in this chapter are each linked to laity by practices drawn from mendicant praxis, such as the pratikramaṇ (ritual repentance and expiation of sin) and blessings bestowed by the recitation of māṅgalik (holy verses). Further, these texts are neither restricted to the monks nor relegated to the laity. The uses and interpretations of these lists of sattis matter because they are embedded within texts shared by all members of the four-fold congregation suggesting that these sattis names have an efficacy of their own and are significant beyond the standard explanation of sattis being merely good role models for laywomen. One can think of the lists of sattis as falling into three patterns of use or understanding: (1) the totality of individual narratives as a corpus of ritual texts for lay practices; (2) the unbounded collectivity of women’s virtue which permits Jain women’s identification with sattis as a model for linking them and their practices with sattis and the virtues of sattis; and (3) name lists as mantras whose recitation is efficacious. The first pattern, which is not central to our discussion here, will be briefly treated in the following lines and the latter two will be addressed in greater detail in their turn. The first pattern in the use of sattis collectivities manifests in the annual calendar of rituals (holidays, ceremonies, and fasts) in which satt narratives are recited; on these occasions women recite or read narratives individually. The idea of a group or the totality of sattis is distinctly missing in these ritual texts: There is no sense of interchangeability and the satti invoked in narrative is the one whose narrative and name is efficacious in that context. Though I am not focussing on this kind of telling of satt narratives here, it is important to note that most of the time among contemporary Tapā Gacch lay Jains sattis are invoked as individuals through the telling of particular narratives and not in the form of a group or of the totality of sattis. However, one can think of the collection of these individual narratives as forming (with one or two narratives of great men such as Śreyāms) a corpus of Jain ritual texts (kathā) associated predominantly with fasting.

The bulk of the chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines the discourse of sattis and the ways satti discourse manifests itself in the Jain tradition. The second addresses the history, context and the text of each of the four lists discussed in this chapter. Third, the lists are analyzed for the ways in which variation in the content of the lists indicates an unbounded totality of virtue and how this unbounded ideal allows for Jains to see Jain laywomen and nuns in connection with sattis; in essence, this is the second pattern of use. The fourth analyzes the
third pattern of use for satt lists as mantric, more generally articulating the ways in which the recitation of the satts names is efficacious in karma reduction (as part of the pratikraman) and as māṅgalik (auspicious verses especially propitious for the start of any religious practice).

Satīs and the Jain tradition

There has been much scholarship dedicated to defining the term “satī” and outlining its use in Hindu sociopolitical and religious contexts. There is an important distinction drawn between the Hindu religious use of the term “satī” which refers to a virtuous woman and the British use of the term “suttee” to refer to the act of a widow dying on her husband’s funeral pyre an act called “going with” (or sahagamā) in the Hindu context. The satī of the Hindu context is one who fulfills utterly her role as a dedicated wife (pativrata) and whose dedication to her husband extends to her own acts of self-sacrifice, though not necessarily through death (Harlan 1992: 118–133, 172–181, Weinberger-Thomas 1999: 28–34). A satī in the Hindu context always articulates her virtue through her dedication to her husband and her chastity. However, in the Hindu context the intention to die before or with one’s husband is key to attaining the virtue that makes one a satī. A satī who succeeds in her total self-sacrifice by dying with her husband can reach the highest level of virtue attainable for a Hindu woman, that is, to be a satīmaṭā who serves as a protector deity for her family and others.

Jains likewise participate in the language of the chaste, dedicated, and self-denying wife who protects her husband and her husband’s family. Many contemporary Jain women, like their Hindu counterparts, are very concerned with protecting their status as auspiciously married women (saubhāgyavatī) and perform fasts and other rituals specifically with the intent of protecting their husband and children. These rituals include the recitation and study of particular satī narratives or of texts which have satī narratives embedded in them. Jain satī narratives often center around the protagonist’s chastity and protection of husband, but I found elsewhere that the language of virtue in these narratives can also be linked to the renunciation of family (Kelting 2003). The Jain use of the term always carries with it the language of virtue often articulated through the language of chastity or celibacy but without the idealization or potential of self-sacrifice; rather, Jains see the highest potential for women in renunciation rather than self-sacrifice for husband and family.

Jain satī lists share several names and narratives found (with some subtle and some not so subtle variations) in Hindu narratives of virtuous women – an important indicator of the shared discourse of women’s virtue between these two traditions. However, the particular status of these narratives in the Jain corpus suggest the ways that Jains articulate the superiority of their models for women’s virtue. The narratives of satīs who are also found in Hindu narratives are the less commonly told stories (except that of Damayantī) and they are also often (like
Kuntī who lives on after the self-immolation of Madrī who is not a satt for Jains) articulated against the Hindu model of the satt who dies with her husband (sahagamani). Because so many of the Jain satti narratives end with the satt taking ordination (dikṣā) as a Jain nun, we can see the more than just implicit juxtaposition of taking dikṣā against the sinful (here, to Jains) path of self-immolation. This balance is particularly problematic because at some point each of these women either has to die without renouncing, renounce her husband, or be a widow who then renounces. These choices illustrate the difficult balance of the competing models – the nun and the dedicated wife – of women’s virtue for Jains. Though Somani (1982: 79–80) found inscriptional evidence that in Rajasthan there were Jain women who performed the rite of sahagaman as late as the nineteenth century, this is clearly not the norm and there does not seem to be any evidence of this as a contemporary practice. The Jain counter rhetoric is powerful enough that many women I interviewed insisted that I be clear that Jain sattis are truly virtuous and therefore would not commit such an act of violence and a disruption of the living out of their karma.

In the Śvetāmbar Jain lay context, where any woman can potentially become a celibate nun, chastity can be understood as fidelity to one’s husband and a general limitation on sensual attachments while performing one’s duties of taking care of and producing children (usually sons) for one’s husband’s lineage. I found that laywomen would customarily speak of a satti’s virtues in speaking of her as steadfast, dedicated to her husband and her religion, and generally morally good, of which chastity is a part. Though Hindu women, Jain nuns, and Jain laywomen might not agree in their priorities in telling satti narratives (stressing self-sacrifice, celibacy and chastity and piety in turn), they all share the definition of a satt as a virtuous woman who demonstrates steadfast moral strength in the face of profound challenges, especially to her chastity.

The variations in the content in the corpus of satti narratives and in the lists of their names suggest that multiple kinds of virtue can be included (the term “satt” is understood to be multivocal and multivalent) and that there is an interchangeability within the lists (in a sense, the narratives behind them do not matter). Although the lists discussed hereafter do not include these narratives (though the SSC has abbreviated narratives), it is useful for our discussion to briefly show how variation in the satti narratives is the norm. Here are two encapsulated satti narratives:

Candanbālā was a princess who is sold into slavery to a merchant. The merchant’s wife becomes jealous of Candanbālā’s beauty so she has Candanbālā’s hair shaved off, chains her hands and feet, and leaves her in a hut with no food. Meanwhile Mahāvīr had taken a vow five months and twenty-five days earlier that he would only break his fast if the food were offered by a princess now a slave with her head shaved, in chains, chanting the Navkār mantra, sorting black lentils, and crying. When he sees Candanbālā she fulfills all of the details of his vow but she is not
crying. When he keeps walking she begins to cry and he comes back and accepts her alms. Once she gives Mahāvīr his alms her chains break and her hair instantly grows back. Candanbāḷā then vows to become a nun at Mahāvīr’s hand and the whole village converts to Jainism. Later after her dikṣā (initiation), Candanbāḷā leads the community of nuns.

Rājīmatī is engaged to Nemināth. On his way to their wedding he hears the sound of crying. He asks what the sound is and when he is told it is the cries of all the animals to be slaughtered for his wedding feast, he decides not to marry but to become a Jain monk instead. Rājīmatī then goes to ask for dikṣā from Nemināth and she becomes a nun. Later when Nemināth’s brother tries to sexually assault Rājīmatī, she gives him a sermon that convinces him to become a monk.

Even in just these two capsule narratives we can see variations from the bulk of satt narratives. Candanbāḷā’s narrative is centered around her miraculous interaction with Mahāvīr while Rājīmatī’s includes her dikṣā and events that follow it. Most of the satts marry, have children and later become Jain nuns. Right away, however, significant exceptions surface. Candanbāḷā never marries, Rājīmatī is nearly married, Damayantī though married has no children, Sulasā never renounces and, in fact, leads the lay community, and Sitā has children and never renounces. Among the satts who take dikṣā (initiation) into Jain mendicancy, there are those satts, such as Rājīmatī, for whom dikṣā is central and whose narratives include significant incidents after their dikṣā and those satts, like Draupadi, for whom dikṣā appears almost like an afterthought or the inevitable conclusion of the “ideal life.” These variations suggest most powerfully the idea that perfect virtue can be demonstrated by a variety of women’s lives. While being a mendicant is understood to have a higher religious status than a layperson and marriage is assumed for all laity, in the satt narratives neither marrying, nor bearing children, nor becoming a nun are the singular templates for female virtue. Similarly, as part of the Diwāḷi festival, most Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Jains write a benediction on the first page of new account books (Cort 2001a; Kelting 2001; Laidlaw 1995). Laidlaw calls this a “shopping list, as it were, of worldly virtues” (1995: 380). This list includes married men who renounce, unmarried men who renounce, married men who do not renounce and a king; the list suggests a totality of men’s virtues in a way reminiscent of the satt lists. However, the list of virtuous men varies across a good many more paradigms than just marriage and renunciation as they lead public lives in which other forms of virtue (leadership, wealth, donation) also obtain while the satts share virtues centering only on house-holding and renunciation.

The texts

This article looks at four texts listing the names of satts which I am calling satt lists. The BC is simply a list of satt names and a short comment on their efficacy.
The SSC includes a short verse for each name listed. Two of the texts, the BS and the SSS, are lists of sattis alongside lists of great men (mahāpuruṣa). All four texts discussed are linked with Tāpā Gacch practices and found in popular, larger compilation texts clearly identified with the Tāpā Gacch, such as Bhakti Bhāvanā, Śrī Jina Sajjhāy Mālā, Śrī Pañca Pratikramaṇa Sūtra, Śrī Sudhāras Stavan Saṅgrah, and Śrī Taparatna Mahodadhi. Two texts, the SSC and the SSS, have named authors who are Tāpā Gacch mendicants. The two unsigned texts, the BC and the BS, are found in Tāpā Gacch texts but without identifiable authors and there is some difficulty in their dating. At best one can say that all these texts date from at the latest the fifteenth to the early eighteenth century but the BC and the BS may be even older. The history of these texts remains for the most part unstudied because scholarship has not focused on these kinds of devotional and ritual literature in the Jain tradition. Each of the four texts is given in the following pages in full along with information about the history and context of each text. This will establish a foundation for the discussion of the idea of collective virtue and satti list efficacy that follow.

**Brāhmī, Candanbālikā**

The BC (sometimes titled: “Soḷ Satti ni Stuti,” – Praises of the Sixteen Sattis) is little more than a list of names:

Brāhmī, Candanbālikā, Bhagavatī Rājimātī, Draupadi, Kauśalyā and Mrgāvatī and Sulasā, Sītā, Subhadrā, Śivā; Kuntī, Śilavatī, Nalah’s Damayantī, Cūlā, and Prabhavatī, Padmavatī and Sundari. May this auspiciousness be performed everyday.\(^{10}\)

*(Jina Śāsananāṁ Śrāmaṇiratno 1994: 121)*

In *Jina Śāsananāṁ Śrāmaṇiratno*, the BC is called the “earliest remembrance” (*prātaḥsmaran* of the sixteen sattis, suggesting its place as the root text, at least, for the idea of the sixteen sattis.\(^{11}\) If we can take that “prātaḥsmaran” as authoritative, then we can establish that the BC predates the SSC which was written by the monk Udayratna and which appears to be based on it. That said, one cannot totally rule out yet earlier unattributed precursors to either text though none have, to my knowledge, been encountered.

**Soḷ Satī no Chand**

Udayratna who wrote the SSC sometime between 1692 and 1743\(^{12}\) is credited with writing several devotional pieces, often using the *chand* form. The *chand* form itself is a devotional metrical verse form commonly used by Jain writers.\(^{13}\) Most ritual manuals include a number of *chands* as part of their collection of devotional literature for use by the laity and many include Udayratna’s better studied work: *Śrī Śankheśvar Pārśvanāth no Chand* (the Verses of the Auspicious
Śankheśvar Pārśvanāth). The SSC and other chands are often memorized by mendicants (and occasionally by lay Jains) as a devotional practice. The SSC is found in hymnbooks, such as the ubiquitous Śrī Sudhāras Stavan Saṅgrah (The Collection of Nectar-like Hymns) and popular lay manuals, such as Bhakti Bhāvanā (Devotional Sentiments).

The SSC is a seventeen couplet devotional poem which tells in almost cryptic condensation the narratives of the sixteen sātīs. The first and last couplets frame the chand and its power as a māṅgalik (auspicious prayer). The middle fifteen tell, in condensed form, the key narratives associated with each of the sātīs named.

Praises to Ādināth, the first Jina, make our prayers fruitful. At sunrise, create auspiciousness, and repeat the sixteen sātīs’ names (1).

The young girl beneficial to the whole world, Brāhmī was Bharat’s sister. The soul living in every sound and letter, she is the greatest of the sixteen sātīs (2).

Bāhubalī’s sister, the crown jewel of the sātīs, Rṣabhā’s daughter is named Sundarī.

Her beauty was matchless in the three worlds and her good qualities, unparalleled (3).

Candanbālā was a chaste and pious laywoman since childhood. Mahāvīr finally found her winnowing lentils, she who would fulfill his omniscient vow (4).

Ugrasena’s daughter, faithful as the North Star, was Rājīmatī, the beloved of Nemināth. Conquering the lust of youth, she showed a restraint difficult even for the gods (5).

The five great Indian Pāṇḍavas’ wife, Draupādī praised god. She received one hundred and eight lengths of cloth and from this we know the chastity in her heart (6).

King Daśarath’s matchless queen, Kauśalyā, that moon flower, Chaste, excellent mother of Rām, upheld the family’s tradition of merit (7).

In Kauśāmbī, there was a king named Śatānik who had a splendid reign. The housewife of his home was Mṛgāvatī sātī. Her fame resounded in God’s temple (8).

Sulasā was truly chaste and without flaw, charming but without the poison of sensuality, Seeing her crown, sin vanishes; Saying her name, one is joyful (9).

Thus too was the sweetheart of Rām, Janak’s daughter Sitā sātī. All the world knows that when she undertook her test, she cooled the fire with her chastity (10).

With a sieve tied to a weak thread, she drew water from the well. That stain-removing sātī, Subhadrā, opened the doors of Campā city (11).

Śivapad’s village’s Śivā is worshiped by men and gods, her virtue unbroken. Her name makes one pure, which is that name’s secret talent (12).
In Hastināpur, Pāṇḍu’s sweetheart, was Kuntī. She was the mother of the Pāṇḍavas, the sister of the ten Daśār’s and a lotus-like dedicated wife (13)

Śilavatī is the name of she who upheld her virtuous vows, offer her praises and benefit in three ways:

Recite her name, receive darśan, and destroy sinful acts (14).

In Niṣidhā city, Nalāḥ’s wish fulfiller, Damayantī, was his wife.
Troubled, she protected her chastity, illuminating the three worlds (15).

Unconquered by Kamdev, Puspaculā and Prabhāvatī are revered by all the world.

Famous in all the universe, granter of wishes, the sixteenth of the sattis is Padmāvatī (16).

Victoriously recite the couplets from the scriptures, Udayratna gives this evidence.

Recited by men at dawn, those who listen gain joy and prosperity (17).

(Sṛṭ Sudhāras Stavan Saṅgrah, No date: 87–90)

The BC and the SSC are the most commonly reproduced and named texts focussing on the sixteen sattis. In both cases, the names included are the same (in fact, the same seventeen names are included in both which will be discussed in the following lines) suggesting a relationship between the texts.

**Bharahesara ni sajjhāy**

The BS is a thirteen verse sajjhāy (instruction) which is recited as part of the Tapā Gacch morning Pratikramaṇ (Rāta Pratikramana). It has no signed author and is as of yet undated. Even if the Tapā Gacch Pratikramaṇ texts were to be dated, the individual pieces of the Pratikramaṇ could not be clearly determined from the dating of what are compilations. However, the BS must predate its commentary, the Śṛṭ Bharateśvara Bāhubalī Vṛttiḥ (The Auspicious Commentary Lord Bharat and Bāhubalī = BBV), which is dated to 1453 CE. The pratikramaṇ rite, a ritual repentance and expiation of sins, is ranked as one of the obligatory actions (āvaśyaka) of mendicants and also lay Jains. In each of the pratikramaṇ rituals (morning, evening, fortnightly, thrice-yearly, and annual) a sajjhāy is recited but it is only in the morning Pratikramaṇ that the sajjhāy text is fixed as a particular sajjhāy. The term “sajjhāy” means “instruction” or “study.” However, the texts called sajjhāys are usually devotional prayers and most are verse-narratives in form. Most of the other sajjhāys in the commonly used Śṛṭ Jain Sajjhāy Māḷā are dedicated to particular “virtuous individuals” and present narratives in verse form. In this the BS (and the SSS discussed hereafter) are somewhat unusual in their lack of narrative or even imagery. The morning pratikramaṇ is performed by all mendicants, by especially pious lay Jains, and as a part of all Jain fasts. The BS is the most widely performed and well known text discussed in this article.
The BS begins with a list of virtuous men (*mahāpuruṣa*), which is followed by a list of women referred to as *sattis* at the close of the text.

Bharat, Bāhubalī, Abhaykumār, and Daṇḍanakumār; Śrīyak, Arnikāputra. Atimukta, and Nāgadatta (1).

Metāryamuni, Sthūlabhadra, Vajraśi, Nandiśeṇa, Sinhgiṛi; Kṛtapunyā and Sukośalmuni, Puṇḍariksvāmī, Keśikumār, Karakaṇḍu (2).

Halla, Vihalla, Sudarśana, Sālmuni, Mahāsālmuni, Śālibhadra; Bhdrabāhu, Daśāṃbhodra, Prasannacandra and Yaśobhadrasūri (3).

Jambusvāmī, Vankacūlā, Gajasukumāl, Avantisukumāl; Dhanna, Ilācīputra, Cilātīputra and Yugbāhumuni (4).

Āryamahāgīri, Ārarakṣītsūri, Āryasahastisūri, Udāyi, Manak; Kālikācārya, Śamba, Pradhyumna, and Muldeva (5).

Prabhava, Viṣṇukumār, Ārdraṃkumār, and Drdhaprahārī; Śreyamī and Kṛgdu, Śayyambhava and Meghakumār (6).

And also other noble men with knowledge and a multitude of like virtues. Through remembering their names one can destroy the bonds of sin (7).

Sulasā, Candanbālā, Manoramā, Madanrekhā, Damayanti; Narmadasundarā, Sītā, Nandā, Bhadrā, and Subhadrā (8).

Rājīmatī, Rṣidatta, Padmāvatī, Anjanā, Śrīdevi; Jyeṣṭhā, Sujeṣṭhā, Mṛgāvatī, Prabhāvatī, Cellnādevī (9).

Brāhmī, Sundarī, Rukmaṇī, Revati, Kuntī, Śivā, and Jayanti; Devaki, Draupadi, Dhāraṇī, Kalāvati and Puśpacūla (10),

Padmāvatī, and Gaurī, Gāndhārī, Lakṣmanā and Susīmā; Jambuvatī, Rukmaṇī-Kṛṣṇa’s queens (11).

Yakṣā and Yakṣadattā, Bhutā, and, also certainly, Bhutadattā; Senā, Venā, Renā-the sisters of Sthūlabhadra (12),

And all the other important *sattis* who upheld their stainless virtue alongside their victorious acts.

Still today their fame resounds like a drum throughout the three worlds (13).\(^{18}\)

*(Śrī Paṃcā Pratikramaṇa Sūtra, No date: 20–21)*

This text should be understood within the context of the *Pratikramaṇa* texts as a whole which include a number of lists, among them the *Logasa Sūtra* (or *Caturviṃsāti Stava*) – a list of the twenty-four Jinas – the *Sāt Lakh Sūtra* (the *Sūtra* of the Seven Hundred Thousand) – a list of the kinds of beings whose injury one is confessing – and the *Tirtha Vandanā* (Obeiscances to the Pilgrimage Places) – a list of the main pilgrimage sites for Śvetāmbar Mūrtipījak Jains. Laidlaw (1995: 211–213) discusses various lists in the Khartar Gacch *pratikramaṇa* and suggests that the *Sāt Lakh Sūtra*, the list of eighteen sins (*aḍhār pāp*), the list of all the ways one might infringe of law vows (*vandittu*), and other lists are an attempt at including all the possibilities which the *pratikramaṇa* should address. The BS has the names listed and an open-ended inclusion of all the other
similarly virtuous humans not named. We can see this *sajjhāy* as a totality of human virtues expressed through a list of names of virtuous people.

**Satā Satī nī sajjhāy**

The relatively common *sajjhāy* collection *Śrī Jain Sajjhāy Mālā* includes another *sajjhāy* very similar to the BS. The SSS, attributed to the Tapā Gacch mendicant Jñānvimalūri (1645/6–1713/4 C.E.)\(^{19}\) includes a list of virtuous men and women in a list that is clearly based on the BS or the BBV. Jñānvimalūri wrote several commentaries and narratives in Sanskrit and several long *rāsa* (verse narrative) texts in Gujarati such as *Āsokandararohinti Rās*, as well as a number of other *sajjhāyas* in Gujarati dedicated to individual virtuous men and women (Koṭhārī and Sāh 1993: 230–235).

Every morning revere their names, those pillars of Jainism, Bharat, Bāhubali; Abhayakumār and Dhaḍhaṇo, Śrīyak and Kṛtapunya (1).

Arṇikāputra and Atimukta, Nāgadaṭṭha, Sthūlibhadra;
Vajravāmī, Nandiśeṇa, Dhammā and Śālibhadra (2).

Simhagiri, Kṛiti, Sukośalmuni, Karakaṇḍu, Puṇḍarikvāmī;
Hallā, Vihalla, Sudarśan, Śāl and Mahāśāl (3).

Gajasukumār, Jambūprabhu, Keśi, Avanṭīsukumāl;
Daśāṁbhadra, Yaśobhadraji, Īlāci, Cilāṭṭaputra, Sālmuni (4).

Yugbāhu, Udāi, Manakmuni, Āryarakṣitsūri, Āryamahāgirī;
Āryasuhastisūri, Prabhav, and also, Śāmba, Pradhyumna-those munis (5).

Those munis: Muldev, Kālikācārya, Viṣṇukumār, Śreyams;
Āṛdrakumār, Drḍhaprahār and also those munis, Kurgaṇḍu, Meghakumār (6).

Sayambhav, Prasannacandrajī, Mahāsāl, Vankacūla;
Take these true names, as though they were a beautiful lineage (7).

Sulasā, Candaṇbālikā, Maṇorāmā Maṇḍrakṛhā;
Kuntī, Narmadāṣundarī, Brāhmi, Sundārī-those storehouses of virtue (8).

Damayantīsattā, Revati, Sīvā, Jayantī, Nandā;
Devakī, Draupadī, Dhārīṇī, Śrīdevī, Subhadra, Bhadrā (9).

Rṣidattā, Rājimāti, Padmāvatī, Prabhāvatī, say them;
Anjanā and Kāḷavatī, Puṣpacūla, listen with your heart (10).

Gaurī, Gāndhārī, Lakṣamaṇā, Jambūvatī, Satyābhāmā;
Padmā, Susīmā, Rūkamini-those are the eight wives of Kṛṣṇa (11).

Jyeṣṭhā, Suṣjeṣṭhā, Mrgāvatī, Cellaṇā, Padmā, and Queen Prabhā;
The seven sisters of Sthūlibhadra, the source of intellectual virtue (12).

Yakṣā, Yakṣadattā, and also, Bhūtā and Bhutadattā;
Senā, Venā, Renā, these majestic young women are named (13).

And all those mahāsattās, victorious in the three worlds;
Today even, their fame still resounds like a drum (14).

Śīlavantī, Sursundarī, Kauṣalyā, and Sumitrā;
These purest of Jain people, they are known as those given by god (15).
Cooling sin and worldly troubles, indeed, these names make a garland of auspiciousness;
Jñānvimal attained these virtues, recognize their wondrous greatness (16).

(Śrī Jain Sajjhāy Māḷā (Sacitra) 1968: 18–20)

Here the satt list differs from the BS in its ordering of the names, by the inclusion of additional names of sattis and exclusion of two men’s names. In the section of virtuous women it includes all the women from the BS and then adds four more: Śīlavatī, Sursundarī, Kauśalyā, and Sumitrā. The first two sattis, Śīlavatī and Sursundarī, are the heroines of commonly told narratives and Śīlavatī is also often included in the sixteen satt lists. Kauśalyā is always included in the list of sixteen sattis. Sumitrā does not appear in any other satt list I have found leading me to suspect that her narrative had been popular at the time that the SSS was written. The inclusion of these names suggests that the author of the SSS felt that the list in the BS was not complete without the addition of these four names. The SSS may draw its additional satt names from the BBV which expands slightly on the list included in the BBV’s root text, the BS.

Satī lists as a totality of virtue

The four satt lists display both a fluidity and an inclusivity within their collectivities of sattis. This combination of fluidity and inclusivity suggests that satt lists serve as a representation of the totality of virtue as well as the collectivity of virtuous women. When juxtaposed with collectivities of virtuous men, satt lists illuminate the gendered implications of virtue. The linking of sattis and great men (mahāpurūṣa) in the BS and the SSS represents a totality of human virtue. However, the term satt as the only the available term for virtuous women subsumes a wide variety of women by identifying them by their chastity and piety (virtues available to all women) while lists of great men display a wider variety of virtues but a narrower scope of who can have these virtues (designated by bounded categories). This single unbounded term, satt, allows a flexibility to extend the designation to other women as they are identified as virtuous.

Fluidity within satī lists

The list of the sixteen sattis is not stable. This instability may arise partly because both root texts: the BC and the SSC, include the names of seventeen sattis in spite of the common titles for these lists referring to sixteen sattis. They are: Brāhmaṇī, Sundarī, Caṇḍanbālā, Rājimati, Draupadī, Kauśalya, Mrgavati, Sulasā, Sitā, Subhadrā, Śivā, Kuntī, Śīlavatī, Damayantī, Puṣpacūla, Prabhāvatī, and Padmāvatī. Both lists are identical but for the placement of Sundarī who is in the last position in the BC while the SSC has her name in the second position (where most Jains named her when they attempted to list the sixteen sattis for me). In an effort to make the lists conform to the number sixteen, contemporary list
makers – published authors, contemporary renouncers and laywomen with whom I spoke – had to decide which of these seventeen names to omit. Most commonly Śīlavatī was omitted, owing probably to the fact that the name can understood to be a generic term (one who is chaste) that might be read as an adjective for another satī. 23 However, since Śīlavatī has her own verse in the SSC, there is no question that the author Udayratna, saw Śīlavatī as a name of a satī rather than as an adjective. During Paryuṣan 2001 in Pune there was a huge parade in the old city of men and women who had performed major fasts during the festival. The parade was designed around a series of sixteen floats bearing the names of the sixteen satīs. The list of the sixteen satīs for the parade floats varied from the root texts’ lists given earlier by omitting Draupadī and Puspacūlā. The parade planners retained Śīlavatī and, interestingly, inserted Mayaśundarī, who did not appear in any other lists of the sixteen satīs I found. 24 With the exception of the parade floats, whose order may well have reflected the exigencies of Pune traffic, 25 the order of the sixteen satīs in other contexts tend to match either the BC or the SSC closely, suggesting a direct connection between these reconstructions of the sixteen satīs and the root texts. These choices indicate a degree of familiarity with the root text, but it is clear that the number sixteen has a kind of totemic significance that outweighs a careful reproduction of exactly which sixteen. The fact of variability within the lives of these satīs as indicated in our earlier discussion, the significance of the idea of sixteen, and the fluidity of the lists of sixteen suggest that the “sixteen satīs” stands in as a collectivity of virtue. In the case of the variations within the sixteen there is a strong sense of interchangeability which becomes even more significant when one compares this idea of the collectivity of the satīs with the longer and more inclusive lists.

The BBV, also called the Kathākoś (Collection of Stories), composed by Śubhaśilagani in 1453 is a commentary on the BS and serves presently as an important source for narratives about ideal Jains. It was included in a proposed curriculum at the 1988 Conference of Tapa Gacch monks in Ahmedabad, in which the monks in their third year of a seven-year program would study either this text or the Pañcatantra (Cort 2001b: 335). Both collections of edifying narratives can serve as sources for the use of narratives for giving sermons. Further, the BBV is one of only two narrative texts that a Tapa Gacch monk is enjoined to study first in this curriculum (Cort 2001b: 339). It includes the narratives of each of the great men and virtuous women who are listed in the root text, the BS. In addition to the men and women listed in the root text, it has ten more virtuous men 26 and five more satīs: Śīlavatī, Nandyantī, Rohinī, Ratisundarī, and Śrīmatī. It could be that the narrative collection seemed incomplete to Śubhaśilagani without the narratives of these very popular satīs. Whatever his motives, his departure from the list in the root text may well have set a precedent of fluidity in these lists of virtuous Jains which was subsequently continued by the authors of the SSS and later lists and collections.

Śubhaśilagani’s is not the only commentary of the BS, though it is the most substantial, the Śrī Pañca Pratikraman śūtro Vivecan Sahit (The Five Pratikramans with Commentary) is an extended commentary on the Pañca
Pratikrama Sūtra. The longest and most detailed section is the gloss on the BS. Here, as in the BBV, a narrative is given for each of the virtuous Jains named in the root text. Owing to its inclusion of the same five sattī names added in the BBV, the list of sattīs’ narratives in the Śrī Pañca Pratikrama Sutro Vivecan Sahit is clearly based on the BBV. In addition to the fifty-three men, there is a second grouping of twelve narratives of men under the heading: “Beyond these, some additional stories.” The additional five sattīs are under a heading: “Because of their popularity, five more sattīs.” It is not impossible that the “popularity” referred to in the heading derives from a widespread, early adoption of the BBV commentary in mendicant instruction or study and the subsequent broadcast – through mendicant sermons and writings – to the greater community of precisely those stories.

Gender and categories of virtue

As alluded to earlier with the Divāti book inscriptions, the collectivity of sattīs might be profitably compared to the collectivities of virtuous men. The BS begins with a list of fifty-three great men (mahāpuruṣa), followed by a list of forty-seven sattīs. These fifty-three men are great men of whom some became monks. This list, in turn, can be seen in light of another collectivity of great men, the sixty-three illustrious men (śalākāpuruṣa) of Mahāpurāṇa narrative collections such as the ninth-century Digambar scholar-monk Jinasena’s Adipurāṇa and twelfth-century scholar-monk Hemacandra’s Trisāṭiśalākāpuruṣaśacaritra. Each of the categories of men included in the sixty-three has its unique relationship to Jain values and to the various life paths which may or may not lead to achieving liberation from rebirth: twenty-four Jinas (Jain teacher-saints responsible for revitalizing the faith in this era who achieve liberation as arhats), twelve cakravartins (universal rulers who attain liberation as siddhas), nine baladevas (devout laymen who attain liberation), nine vāsudevas (half-cakravartins and ideal Jain kings who spend a lifetime in hell for killing enemies before attaining liberation), and nine pratīvāsudevas (powerful Jain leaders who abuse their powers, are killed by the vāsudevas and are reborn in hell). Each of these categories is linked to each other by their placement in the narratives of the Jinas themselves, while the category designations themselves serve as a link between great men of different narratives. Here, like the sattīs, there are both monks and laymen but in contrast to the sattīs, these categories include the Jinas and cakravartins both of whom have a special identity at birth arising out of past karma; and those destined for at least one lifetime in hell.

The fifty-three men in the BS are mostly monks and none are going to hell, which is a closer counterpoint to the sattīs. After the list of these great men, the BS includes a gloss commenting on men’s virtue: “And also other noble men with knowledge and a multitude of like virtues” (BS, 7). This brief is followed by a listing of the names of the forty-seven sattīs followed by an explanation of their greatness: “And all the other important sattīs who upheld their stainless virtue alongside their victorious acts” (BS, 13). The BS suggests that the virtues of great
Jains are divided along gender lines; recall, that the list of men ends with a statement of their virtue based on their knowledge and good qualities, while the women’s list ends with a separate statement of women’s virtue focused on their “stainless virtue” (read chastity) and great acts worthy of remembering.  

In the second most common text containing the morning Pratikramaṇa, the Jain Prakāśan Mandir’s Gujarāti edition of Śrī Devaśta-Rāta Pratikramaṇ Śūtra (The Auspicious Śūtra of the Evening and Morning Pratikramaṇa), the gloss following the BS claims: “In this instruction, the names of excellent men and women who are chaste, great patrons (of Jainism) and ascetics are listed. From remembering their names every morning, auspiciousness arises and sorrow is driven away” (Śrī Devaśta-Rāta Pratikramaṇ Śūtra, No date: 76). The qualities of men and women are the same: chastity, religious generosity, and asceticism. The volume Śrī Pañca pratikramaṇ Sārth (The True Meaning of the Five Pratikramaṇa; a text which gives both the text of the five Pratikramaṇa and the meaning in Gujarāti of each section) also provides a short gloss on the significance of each section in more general terms. Of the BS it writes: “In this instruction, excellent and truly virtuous men and virtuous women who protected themselves with their virtue and steadfastness, are remembered together with the pronunciation of their names.” (Śrī Pañca pratikramaṇ Sārth, 1995–1996: 172). These men are virtuous because among other virtues shared with the sattis of virtue and steadfastness, they display a kind of virtue (sattva) often associated with sattis.

The texts discussed earlier (especially the BS) could be seen to include the totality of virtue as expressed by the great man and the satti. Every Jain woman and man, nun and monk I spoke to made it clear that there were more sattis than those listed in the sixteen satti prayers. When I asked whether there were more than the Pratikramaṇ list, they once again stressed that there were even more than the longer list. The idea of the totality of sattis is necessarily greater than the known list. There are no limits on the number of sattis; as there are with the twenty-four Jinas, the twelve cakravartins, and so forth. Of course there are virtuous men who are not in these categories of illustrious men (śalākāpuruṣa), such as most of those great men (mahāpuruṣa) in the BS. Men’s virtues are multiple but not unbounded. For instance both terms – illustrious men (śalāka-puruṣa) and great men (mahāpuruṣa) – represented closed groups. Great monks in recent history are referred to as glorifiers of the faith (prabhāvaka) rather than using these other existing terms whereas the term satti encompasses mythological women as well as modern and contemporary Jain nuns. Great laymen of known history are called by yet another term, great layman (mahāsrāvaka). In other words, this sense of virtue – that is defined by an unbounded list of virtuous women – seems specifically to do with women more than it does with men. Clearly the list of sattis is destined to never be finished. Laidlaw (1995: 213) suggests in his discussion of the lists of forbidden foods, that the additions to the lists and the litany of names serves precisely to indicate that the list is unbounded, even endless and that it would be nearly impossible to avoid all these foods. The unbounded lists of sattis share the idea of the potential endlessness, but here
by their focus on virtue suggest the multiplicity of potential rather than impossibility.

Further virtuous women bear a single taxonomy as sattīs. Regardless of their narrative, marital status, status as a renouncer, nature of death, or nature of their relationship to Jinas, virtuous women all can be subsumed under the single category of sattī: in contrast to the multiple categories of virtuous men. There is one significant subcategory within the totality of women – the mothers of the Jinas – which is sometimes marked off in texts as separate and whose narratives are often not given in texts collecting sattī narratives. Perhaps they are not included as sattīs because they achieve their status through a divine blessing (as the conception of the Jinas is articulated) whereas the sattīs gain their status through their own efforts.33 For our purposes, we see that the idea of women’s virtue (rather than status) is framed as relatively uniform. In addition, sattīs are never consigned to hell as are the vāsudevas and prativāsudevas; there is, then, no category for women who do not clearly uphold Jain values while upholding social values.34 Women have the “advantage,” one supposes, of never being compromised by the demands of kingship. Of course, a parallel is that neither do they have available widely varying avenues of becoming illustrious, nor does upholding mere social values quite qualify them for inclusion in lists. Women’s consolation lies in the unboundedness of the lists; though it is difficult – indeed, close to impossible – to achieve the necessary virtue, the ellipses at the lists’ end is perhaps an invitation to make the attempt.

Inclusivity and sattī lists

Śvetāmbar Jain women identify with sattīs and their narratives in generalized ways, supporting their own religiosity which suggest ways of including yet more women – here, contemporary Jain women – under the rubric of the term, sattī. Fohr found nuns identifying other nuns as sattīs and mahāsattīs (though she did not attribute this practice to Tapā Gacch nuns). Nuns in the Sthānakavāsī tradition are all called “Mahāsattīs,” which, on one hand, diminishes the extraordinary claims on virtue of the sattīs; on the other hand, it simultaneously suggests that these great sattīs are among us now in the form of all nuns. Fohr (2001: 133–136, 150–156) gives several examples of the use of the term “sattī” for contemporary known nuns drawn from the Śvetāmbar Terāpanthī and Sthānakavāsī communities. While Tapā Gacch nuns did not explicitly name other nuns as sattīs, they did see the sattī narratives as having a direct connection to and effect on their own lives as nuns today (Fohr 2001: 142–143). One popular collection, Jina Śasananām Śrāmaniratno (The Gemlike, Virtuous Women who Protect the Religion of the Jinas), includes a mixture of the mothers of the Jinas, sattīs, and great Jain nuns (mythological, historical, and contemporary). The narratives are organized by the time (mytho-historically like the Mahāpurāṇās) in which the women lived: those women who lived in the times from Ādināth to Parśvanāth, those who lived in the time of Mahāvīr, then early great nuns, then later great
nuns divided by order first, and then within the Tapā Gacch divided by mendicant groupings (parivār). This text clearly intends to link the lives of contemporary Tapā Gacch nuns with the lives of the great women in Jain mytho-history by including these contemporary nuns’ lives in a list that suggests a lineage devolving from the narratives being told in a Mahāpurāṇa format. In Jina Śāsananāṃ Śrāmantratno the extension of the lists to include contemporary Jain nuns suggests that the list of sattis can be ever-expanding.

No Tapā Gacch laywomen I knew referred to other laywomen or nuns as sattis; laywomen did speak of women as virtuous but without using the term “satti.” And yet, despite the extreme popularity of narratives of sattis who never married and whose dikṣās are central – Candanbālā and Rājīmati – laywomen with whom I spoke understood the satti narratives as evidence of the actual existence of heroic wives whose virtue was extraordinary and sometimes even perfect. Laywomen were identified with sattis, but in less explicit ways. The fasts associated with the satti narratives are generally seen as women’s fasts and the public performance of these fasts is clearly connected to the display of the virtues of Jain laywomen (Kelting 2001: 48–53, 2006). Interestingly, great and virtuous men whose narratives center around fasting do not in turn become icons for male fasting behavior in the ways that these sattis do for Jain women. When I mentioned that great and virtuous men were not comparable to sattis as role models for lay practice in front of an audience of lay Jains, several men named men they considered comparable to these sattis, but these were all monks and were not associated with lay praxis. (Interestingly, not one Jain suggested Śrīyamś – the only really comparable mahāpuruṣa – though I suspect in India where the fast associated with Śrīyamś (Varṣī Tap) is more commonly performed his name might have been mentioned.) When Jain laymen are ritually linked to great men of the Jain tradition, they are usually linked to the kings Kumārpāl and Śrīpāl both of whom would be categorized as great laymen, mahāśrāvak.

The floats at the 2001 Paryuṣaṃ parade are but one example of a displayed identification between contemporary laywomen and the mythological sattis. Each float in the parade was the vehicle for a Jain layperson who had completed a substantial fast during the Paryuṣaṃ season. In 2001, there were quite a few young unmarried men and women who had chosen to perform the eight-day fast during Paryuṣaṃ and who rode in decorated automobiles, trucks, and horse- and ox-pulled carts in the parade with signs proclaiming the length and kind of fast they had completed. However, the sixteen satti floats all carried married women who had presumably performed substantial fasts (probably the eight or nine-day Paryuṣaṃ full fast). While the floats of all the other fasters listed the specifics of their fasts, the “sattis” here were not even identified as fasters and there were no details to justify their position in the parade. In a sense, these married women were assumed to be virtuous (probable fasters), but did not need to display their credentials. The link between these sattis and married laywomen was clear in the minds of the parade organizers and was considered an obvious connection by all the women I interviewed at the parade and afterwards. Satti lists
are fluid and unbounded suggesting a totality of virtue unbounded by the particulars of identities.

**Efficacy of satī lists**

The term *satī* and the *satī* lists serve as an invocation of the power of the *satīs’* collective virtue. Each of these *satī* lists can be understood as mantric because their recitation has purifying powers or creates auspiciousness (*māngalik*). The texts themselves and their commentaries suggest that these lists have their own efficacy. This is by no means unique to these texts (it is true of all *mantras*), but it suggests that they should be examined by themselves within their textual and performative contexts. In three texts (the BC, the SSC, and the BS) the names are the sole focus of this efficacy rather than the narratives which may serve to justify the inclusion of each of these names in these lists. Even in the more narrative SSC, the cryptic nature of the narratives makes the text only slightly more than a list. Likewise, in the SSC, the text itself declares that the names themselves have power. In several verses of the SSC, various powers are attributed to saying the names of the *satīs* “Saying her name, one is joyful” (SSC, 9), “Her name makes one pure, which is that name’s secret talent” (SSC, 12), and “Recite her name, receive *darśan*, and destroy sinful acts” (SSC, 14). The frame of SSC sets the *satīs* as a group in a context where their names function as a mantra whose efficacy can be tapped by merely reciting the prayer:

Victoriously recite the couplets from the scriptures, Udayratna gives this evidence.
Recited by men at dawn, those who listen have joy and prosperity (17).

(*Śrī Sudhāras Stavan Saṅghraha*, No date: 90)

Ultimately even those who merely listen to these names gain “joy and prosperity.” These *satīs* names, like the presence of women or women’s singing at auspicious events like weddings (Henry 1988), create the necessary auspiciousness and well-being for the event which follows. This link between the recitation of the *satīs* names and the state of well-being may indicate one way these women get linked to the lives of laywomen whose concerns often center around the well-being of their family. These *satīs* names, according to the SSS: “make a garland of auspiciousness” (SSS, 16) and thus encircle the event with the auspiciousness of their collective virtue. These *satī* lists serve in mantric ways to reduce karma (reducing pāp) and to create auspiciousness.

**Satī lists and the reduction of karma**

In the SSC, there are several times when particular *satīs* and their names are said to be able to decrease one’s sin (pāp), purify, or in other ways decrease one’s karma. Having *darśan* of the *satī* leads to a decrease in sin: “Seeing her crown,
sin vanishes” (SSC, 9) and “Recite her name, receive darśan, and destroy sinful acts” (SSC, 14). In other verses, the language is more oblique but the implication is that these sattis will also remove sin: “That stain-removing sattī, Subhadrā” (SSC, 11) and “Her name makes one pure, which is that name’s secret talent (SSC, 12). The suggestions that these sattis names may decrease sin is claimed in other satt lists as well.

After the list of the sattis’ names, the SSS ends with the following couplet: “Cooling sin and worldly troubles, indeed, these names make a garland of auspiciousness; Jñānvimal attained these virtues, recognize their wondrous greatness” (SSS, 16). The satt’s names have several powers here. Their names will cool – a Jain trope for diminishing passion and its ensuing karma – sin and worldly troubles. There are two basic ways that Jains can decrease their karma: one, by blocking the influx (samvara) of karma through inaction and diminishing the passion which binds karma; and two, by removing karma that has already bound (nirjarā) through asceticism and the performance of the pratikrama. Jains often use the metaphor of “cooling” to indicate a decrease in the passions that lead to the binding of karma. Thus these names which cool “sin and worldly troubles” lead to decrease in karma by stopping the influx of karma while the presence of these same names in the BS as part of the pratikrama suggests that they are also effective in the removal or destruction of one’s bound karma. Once again in the SSS, we see the ways in which these lists serve with the karmic effect of decreasing “sin” echoing the ritual use of the BS as part of the morning pratikrama.

The fixed position of the BS in the morning Pratikramaṇ text contrasts with the other pratikramaṇ performances where the sajjhāy are chosen according to the date of the performance. For example, there are particular sajjhāys enjoined for during the ritual observances of Paryuṣan, Divālī, at the Samvatsarī, and other significant dates on the Jain calendar. In the evening pratikramaṇ ritual, the sajjhāy can vary from day to day at the appropriate (for the date) choice of those performing the ritual. These various sajjhāys are often recited from sajjhāy collections (such as the Śrī Jain Sajjhāy Mālā) because particular sajjhāys are not included in the other printed Pratikramaṇ texts. This allows a certain possibility of variation in choice among multiple contextually acceptable sajjhāys for that day. However, the BS is the fixed sajjhāy for the morning pratikramaṇ; it is printed in the morning Pratikraman text and cannot have another sajjhāy substituted. This indicates that it is necessary for the efficacy of the pratikramaṇ itself.

In the many editions of the Pratikramaṇ texts which include the morning pratikramaṇ, there are often glosses explaining the significance of each section to the Jain who is performing the pratikramaṇ rite. The most commonly owned Pratikramaṇ collection among Jains I researched was the Jain Prakāśan Mandir’s Gujarāṭī edition of the Śrī Pañca Pratikramaṇa Sūtra (The Auspicious Sūtra of the Five Pratikramans). After the BS, this edition includes the gloss: “In this instruction are great men (mahāpurusas) possessing many good qualities, and from merely taking their names the bonds of sin are broken and one is given true
The benefits here – freeing the reciter from sin and giving true joy – are in addition to the overall benefits of the expiation of sin that one gets by performing the pratikramaṇ ritual.

**Satī lists as māṅgalik**

The māṅgalik is a blessing, not a petition (Shāntā 1997: 256). It has the effect of creating auspiciousness. According to Jaini (2000: 237), Jain māṅgala serve to remove impurities and to bring happiness. One can see the māṅgalik texts as holy verses whose recitation both create auspiciousness in this world and celebrate that which is holy – in the Jain context, those things which lead to liberation (Cort 2001a: 194). Māṅgalik texts are particularly important for demarcating ritual time and serve to frame ritual actions. They are recited at the start and end of ritual performances – for example, daily worship, congregational liturgies, and mendicant’s sermons. On the first day of the Jain New Year at Divālī, the Jains in the congregation where I conduct my primary research went to hear the recitation of what they call the “Māṅgalik.” Every year that includes the Navkār Mantra, the Bhaktāmar Stotra, and also the Gautam Svāmī no Rās. These were considered particularly good texts to hear at the start of the new year. Cort (2001a: 172) describes Svetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Jains in Gujarat going to hear the Navasmaran (The Nine Remembrances, of which the Navkār Mantra is the first and the Bhaktāmar Stotra the seventh) on the first day of the new year; one year, Cort notes, the Gautam Svāmī no Rās was also recited. These show a clear similarity in the ways that māṅgalik texts are categorized in this ritual context to demarcate and make auspicious the start of the new year.

In Bhakti Bhāvanā, a popular lay manual, both the BC and the SSC are inserted under the heading: “māṅgalik kāvyā” (auspicious poems appropriate for the start of things) with other texts, such as the Navkār Mantra and several longer prayers (chand). The SSC is located in the ritual manual, Śrī Sajjan Sannitra Yane Ekādaś Mahānīdhi with other key māṅgalik texts in a section called “mangala praveśakā” (auspicious beginnings). In the Śrī Sudhāras Stavān Saṅgrah, the SSC is located in a short section with four other māṅgalik texts including the Gautam Svāmī nī Chand. Its proximity to the Gautam Svāmī nī Chand and other texts categorized as māṅgalik texts highlights the connection of all these texts to those texts more commonly thought of as māṅgalik, such as the Navasmaran.

This categorization of these texts as māṅgalik may arise in part out of the claims they themselves make that they create auspiciousness. In the BC, it admonishes one to recite the sati’s names: “May this auspiciousness be performed everyday” (Jīna Śāsananām Śrāmanratno 1994: 121). The SSS, likewise, declares itself māṅgalik and also suggests that it be recited in the morning: “Every morning revere their names, those pillars of Jainism” (SSS, 1) and “indeed, these names make a garland of auspiciousness” (SSS, 16). The text of the SSC itself suggests its use as a māṅgalik: “At sunrise, create auspiciousness, and repeat the sixteen
sātis’ names” (SSC, 1). All three texts include these statements within their own text indicating their potential use, and both the SSS and SSC suggest that they should be recited in the morning which contributes to their identities as māṅgalik.

That the BC serves as a māṅgalik is furthered by lay manuals in which monks instruct the laity in proper praxis, such as Sāmāyik written by the Tapā Gacch monk Hariśbhadrācārya who writes that the sixteen sātis’ names should be recited by all Jains every morning (Sāmāyik No date: 22). Svetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Jain nuns recite the names of the sixteen sātis as part of their early morning devotions (Fohr 2001: 19, Shāntā 1997: 256). Shāntā (1997: 257) also wrote that many lay Jains recite the BC everyday. The use of the BC as a way to start the day and to thereby make the entire day auspicious links this text to other māṅgalik texts. Likewise, the SSC is used as a māṅgalik. Stevenson (1987: 67), describing Śvetāmbar Jain practice in the early twentieth century, writes that “Sulasā is considered the highest type of the purely domestic woman, the faithful wife or sattī, and the Gujarātī Jaina women sing the following verse about her in the hymn of praise to the sixteen faithful wives which they chant every morning when they get up.” Stevenson proceeds to translate the Sulasā verse from the SSC. Though the SSC does not appear to be a widely recited text at present, according to the Tapā Gacch nun, Divyaprabhāṣārī, the SSC can be recited as a māṅgalik to start a sermon (as long as the Navkār Mantra is recited first) and would be particularly appropriate if the subject of the sermon were a sattī narrative. Likewise, the SSC was, not surprisingly, included as a frontispiece of Dhami’s Soḷ Mahasatto; here the text both serves as a māṅgalik to start the book and also as a frame for understanding the significance of the book itself. The SSC and the BC were clearly connected with the morning while the SSC also creates the necessary auspiciousness for lengthier reflections on the sātis. All three texts, the BC, the SSC, and the SSS, claim their status as māṅgalik and their performances as morning recitations reifies these claims.

Even the BS clearly has its own powers separate from the karma reduction of the Pratikramaṇa. One gloss of the BS claims that: “from merely taking their names the bonds of sin are broken and one is given true joy” (Śrī Pañca Pratikramaṇa Sūtra No date: 20) while another claims: “From remembering their names every morning, auspiciousness arises and sorrow is driven away” (Śrī Devasta-Rāta Pratikramaṇa Sūtro, No date: 76). Not only is this text capable of driving away sorrow (perhaps the other side of the coin of giving true joy) but it also creates auspiciousness. Like the list of the sixteen sattīs that the mendicants recite each morning, this text serves as a māṅgalik – a creator of auspiciousness. In its ritual context, the placement of the list of sattī names (along with those of the virtuous men) found in the BS in the morning Pratikramaṇ text suggests that this text’s efficacy may be – at least in part – to serve as a māṅgalik blessing to the first ritual of the day and to the day as a whole. This serves as another context of the use of the sattī’s names – here the larger sense – to frame the entire day as auspicious.
Concluding thoughts

Satī lists are effective as māṅgalik and in karma reduction. They are efficacious because the lists serve as a mantric representation of all virtue (especially women’s virtue). Drawing on Jain articulations of virtue through the discourse of satīs, these texts articulate a totality of virtue. The ideas of the collectivity of satīs and the ways in which that collectivity is understood to be unbounded – in a sense infinite – contrasts with the bounded categories of virtuous men especially the strongly numeric lists of the sixty three illustrious men of the Jain Mahāpurāṇa literature. The lists then posit the possibility that all kinds of women can attain perfection worthy of veneration. That the satī lists are efficacious suggests that women’s virtues – here metonymically represented by the satīs names – have profound religious power. The rhetorical uses and efficaciousness of personifications of women’s virtue makes real the Śvetāmbar women’s claims to religious potential in the Jain religious discourse.

Acknowledgments

My thanks to Peter Flügel, who organized the Annual Jain Workshop at sons, for inviting me to present a paper and to all the participants in the workshop for their helpful suggestions and questions about this paper particularly Nalini Balbir, John Cort, Paul Dundas, Peter Flügel, Josephine Reynell, and Kristi Wiley – and also to Steven Runge.

Notes

1 Fohr (2001: 80) writes that the idea of the sixteen satīs is found only among the Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak and Sthānakavāsī Jains. The Digambar and Śvetāmbar Terāpanth Jains did not give a number to the totality of satīs.
3 The Tapā Gacch samudāyās – the subdivisions of a gacch – share their rituals and texts (vidhi). Thus there is but one pratikramaṇa vidhi for the Tapā Gacch as a whole. In addition, Tapā Gacch monks can move from one samudāy to another. There is also more structural emphasis put on the parivār – the group of mendicants under a single monk (John Cort, personal correspondence). A look at the texts of the other Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Gacchs and other Jain sects would be instructive especially in questions of how the efficacy of women’s names varies from Jain community to community. The larger project of which this chapter is a piece will include such comparative work.
4 These recitations may either be part of the rituals associated with a particular holiday – such as Rājimati’s narrative in the Nemināth narrative recitation during the pratikramaṇ on the day of Nemināth’s liberation (the dark fifth of the Gujarati month Śrāvan) – or they may be part of the acts associated with a particular fast – as are the narratives of Candanbālā during the Candanbālā fast (Śrī Arādhānā Tathā Tapavidhi 1984; Śrī Taporatna Mahodadhi 1989).
5 For more information on the scholarly discussions about satīs in the Hindu context, see for instance Harlan 1992; Hawley 1994; Mani 1998; Rajan 1993; Weinberger-Thomas 1999.
6 I use the term “Hindu” here to refer to Hindus who are in the linguistic ethnic communities who revere satīs. These communities are predominantly in western India (Gujarat and Rajasthan) and among those who have migrated from these regions to other areas of India and the world. These linguistic ethnic groups are the same linguistic ethnic groups which are dominant among Śvetāmbara Jains making this comparison particularly fruitful.

7 I have found this model of the auspicious wife who transfers her merit to male relatives to be widespread in the Jain community. Other scholars have found that the ideals of the auspicious wife performing rituals for her family’s wellbeing is common (Cort 2001a: 140–141, 191–192; Reynell 1991: 62–64; and, to a lesser extent, Laidlaw 1995: 355–357).

8 Fohr (2001: 113–116) illustrates the ways that Jain nuns frame the lives of the satīs primarily in terms of celibacy (brahmacarya) rather than the more domestic but related virtue of chastity (śīl) while suggestively showing these virtues on a continuum marked by greater similarity than difference.

9 Draupādi’s narrative is virtually identical to the Mahābhārata in its basic story but in the end Draupādi becomes a Jina nun. When discussing the BS, Shah (in a text I have chosen to read as a primary source) clearly identifies several satīs as laywomen despite their subsequent dīksās suggesting that their dīksās are not part of (or at least not central to) their common narratives. Shah writes: “Laymen: Karkandu, Sudarsan Sheth, Vankacal, Salībhadrā, Dhanyakumar, Abhaykumar, Ilaciputra, Nandisena… Laywomen: Sulasā, Revati Manorma, Damyantī, Sīta, Nanda, Bhadra, Risidatta, Padmavati, Anjana, Sridevi, Jyestha, Prabhavati, Cēlana, Rukhminī, Kunti, Devaki, Dropadi, Dhārani, Kalavati” (Shah 1998, Vol. I: 62).

10 brāhmī candanālikā hagavati rājmati draupadi; kauśālā ca mrgāvati ca sulasā sitā subhadrā śīvā / kuntī śīlavati nalasyā dayitā cilā prabhāvatvapi; padmāvatvapi ca sundari kurvantu no maṣgalam // Jīna Śāsanām Śrāmaṇīrata (1994: 121).

My translation.

11 Digambar Jains also venerate satīs through a recited list including Brāhmi, Sundari, Rājimati, Kunti, Draupadi, Sītā, Subhadrā, Candanā, and others (Shāntī 1997: 257 refers us to Jñānamatī 1976: 68–74).

12 These dates (vs 1749–1799) refer to a Jain monk Udayratna who wrote several similar genre devotional pieces including chāndas. For more about Udayratna, see, Jayantvijay 1998; Krause 1999: 299–307; and Patel 1993: 317–324. I am deeply indebted to John Cort for supplying me with these resources and specifics which led me to this provisional date.

13 Chandās have a simple poetic meter determined by an even count of syllables without attention to the weight or length of the syllables (Tulpule 1979: 450).

14 ādīnāth ādi jinavar vandi, saphal manorath kiṣye e; prabhāte uthi māṅgālik kāme soḷ satīnām nāṁ lījye e. 1. bālakumārī jagahitakārī brāhmī bhāratī bāhenaḍī e. ghat ghat vīyāpak aṅkar rāpe, soḷ satīmāmhe je vadi e. 2. bāhubal bhagīnī saṭī śiromanī, sundari nāṁ rṣabhasūṭā e, svārīpi tribhuvamāmhe jeh anupam guṇajuttā e. 3. candanālā bālapaṇāthī śīlavantī śuddh śrāvikā e; adadā bākule vīr pratīlaḥbhī, keval lahi vrat bāvikā e. 4. ugrasen dhūnā dhārṇī nandītī, rājimati nemavallabhā e; jobanaveśe kāme jītyo, samyam lai devdullabhā e. 5. paṇca bhāratārī pāṇav nārī, drupadataya vakhānye e; ekso āthe cīr pārāṇā, śīval mahīmā tas jānye e. 6. dāsaraḥ nrpānī rāṇi nṛpām, kauśāḷyā phulacandrīkā e; śīval salūṇī rām jāneta, punyatāna paranālikā e. 7. kauśāṃbikī thame satānīk nāme rājya kare rājyo e; tas ghar grhīṇī mrgāvati satī, sur bhavane jāī gājīyo e. 8. sulasā sācī śiyale na kācī, rācī naht visāyārāse e; mukhādum jotām pāṇ pālāye, nām letām man ullāse e. 9. ām rāghuvamāṇī tehanī kāmī, janakasūṭā sītā satī e; jag sathu jāne dhū kārantā anal sītal thayo śīyalīthī e. 10. kace tāntane cālaṇī bāndhī kuvāthakti jal kādhyāyē e. kalan kūtāravā satī
subhrāde, campā bār ughanidhyum e. 11. surnar vandit śiyal akhandit, śivā śivpādāmīni e. jehane nāme nirman thate, balihāri tās nāmane e. 12. hastināpura pāndurānyaunt kuntā nāme kāmīnī e; pāndav mātā dāse dāśāranī, bhen pativratā padmīni e. 13. śivlattā nāme śilavrat-dhārinti, trividhe tehane vandīye e, nām jantapa pātak jaye, dāriśan durit nikanđe e. 14. nisīdhā nagarī nālah nārīndante, damayanī tās gehinī; sankaț padatām śiyalaj rākhyum, tribhūvan kirti jehāntyā. 15. anang ajitā jagajanaṇījītā puspacīlā nā prabhāvavāt e; viśvaviḥyātā, kāmīḍātā, solamti satī padmāvāt e. 16. vire bākhī śāstre sākhet, “udayaratna” bākhē mudā e; vahāṇam vātvām jē nar bhaṇāyē, te laheśe sukh pampāda e. 17. (Śrī Sudhārās Stavan Śangrāh, No date: 87–90) My translation.

15 The name of the Rāja Pratikramaṇ indicates that this is the morning repentance and expiation of sins and errors committed during the night.

16 To my knowledge, there have been no systematic studies of Tapā Gacch Pratikramaṇ and few about pratikramaṇ. Flügel (1994: 510–535) writes of the structure and performance of the Terāpantī pratiṇāmaṇ and Laidlaw (1995) of the performance of the Khatar Gacch pratiṇāmaṇ. In terms of early dating, Caillat writes that the independent pratiṇāmaṇ was not a part of the earliest texts on Jain mendicant atonement (Caillat 1975: 139). More research on the development of the pratiṇāmaṇ text and the history of the ritual would be extremely useful.

17 Pratikramaṇ is performed by Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Jains minimally on the Samvatsārāī day (bright fourth (Tapā Gacch) or fifth (other gacch) of the month Bhāḍrapad on the Gujarati calendar). Pious Jains are enjoined to perform pratikramaṇ on the three days which divide the year into three seasons (the bright fourteenth days of the months of Kārtāk, Fāgrun, and Aśāḍh on the Gujarati calendar), as well as fortnightly on the fourteenth day of each waxing and waning moon. There are also morning and evening pratikramaṇ rites, which are performed daily by all mendicants as well as by some of the most devout laywomen; and these are also performed as part of the fasts that most lay Jains occasionally undertake.


19 This date, vs 1702–1770, is drawn from Kothārī and Sāh (1993: 230–234).

20 suprabhātī nīta vandīye, bharaṭ bāhūbaḷī thambhā re, abhayakumārī ne dhāḍhano, sirio ne kayavanno re. // 1 // arniṅkāputra ne ātmato, nāgadatta sthilibhadra re; vayaras-vāmī nandīṣeṇā, dhanno ne sālībhadra re. // 2 // simhагirī krtī sukoṣālo, karakandu pūndarikōre; halla vihalla sudarasan, sāl ane mahāśāl re. // 3 // gayasukumār jambā prabhū, keśī vantisukumālo re; dasārānahadra jasabhadrajeti, iḷātī cilāti putra sālo re. // 4 // bāhu udāi manak muni, āryarājkītī āryagirīśo re; ārya suhaṣṭ prabhav vātī, sāṃb
pradhyumna muniṣo re. // 5 // muldev kālīk sūrī, viṣṇukumār śreyamśo re; ādrak drdha prabhā vaṭi, kurgadu meh muniṣo re. // 6 // sayambhav prasannacandrajī, mahāsāl kankacūlo re; eha satā nām lījye, jin hoy sundar kulo re. // 7 // sulasā candanbālīkā, manoramā mayānrehā re; kuntī, narmadā sundari, brāhmī sundari guṇaṃghē re. // 8 // damayantī satī revatī, sīvā jayantī nandā re; devakī draupadī dhārīnī, śridevi subhadra bhadṛā re. // 9 // rṣidattā rājīmatī, padmāvatī prabhāvatī kaḥiye re; anjanā ne kaḷāvatī, pusphacūla mān laḥiye re. // 10 // gaurī gāndhārī lakaḥmaṇā, jambuvaṭi satyābhāṇā re; padmā susmā rukamīnī, e āṣa harini rāmā re. // 11 // jyeṣṭhā sujyeṣṭhā mṛgāvati, cellānā padmāprabhā rāṇī re; bāhenī sāt sthūlḥhadranī, buddhi mahāguṇ khāṇī re. // 12 // jaksā jakṣa dinnā vaṭi, bhaiyā ne bhāyadinnā re; senā venā kahi, e sakoḍālanī kannā re. // 13 // ityādik je mahā satī, tribhuvanamāṃhi viraje re; āj lage paṇ jehano, jas padah jag gaje re. // 14 // śilavanti sur sundari, kauśalyā ne sunitrā re; devdāṭdik jāṇīye, savi jinjanātī pavītṛa re. // 15 // durit upadras upasame, hoe masagalamālā re; jīnāvimal gun sampadā, pammī suviśālā re. // 16 // (Śrī Jain Sajjhāy Mājā (Sacitra) 1968: 18–20). My translation.

21 This list of men excludes Bhadrabahu and Metārāmūni.
22 Because Brāhmī and Sundari are narratively linked as the sisters of the heroic brothers Bharat and Bāhubali, it makes sense that most would link them in their lists.
23 Shāntā (1997: 257) gives a translation of the BC in which she too decides to omit Śilavatī and does not give it as an adjective either. It is not clear from her text whether the omission arose out of the interpretation of the nuns with whom she spoke or was a decision made during her translation. When Divyaprabhāśārī listed the sixteen satīs for me and a group of Jain laywomen, it was clear she was working from the “Brāhmī Candanbālikā.” Her only variation from that list was the placement of the term Bhagavatī (which is never used as a name for a Jain satī in any text) in the position normally held by the name Rājīmatī; in that text Rājīmatī’s name is proceeded by the word Bhagavatī which again might explain the variation.
24 Mayānāsundari is the heroine of the popular Śrī Śrīpāla Rājā no Rāso. She is often given the title of satī but she does not appear in any published or recited lists I have found.
25 The floats in the 2001 Pāravyaṇa Parade in Pune: Candanbālā, Rājīmatī, Brāhmī, Kuśālyā, Mayānāsundari, Mṛgāvati, Sulasā, Śīyalavatī, Sītā, Subhadra, Prabhāvatī, Śivā, Damayantī, Padmāvatī, Kuṇṭa [sic], and Sundari.
26 These ten virtuous men are Skandakumār, Skandasūri, Harikeśalāḷ, Dhanadev, Dhanamitra, Uttamcarittrakumār, Kuśmankarmuni, Kuśllak, Kṛpaṇa, and Aṣāḍhabhuti.
27 These twelve virtuous men are Skandakumār, Skandacārya, Harikeśibal muni, Dhanadev, Dhanamitra, Uttamcarittrakumār, Kuśmankarmuni, Be Kuśllakmuni, Kuśllakmuni and Sulocanā, Kṛpaṇa, and Aṣāḍhabhuti.
28 Bharat and Bāhubali are the only names included in both the BS list of fifty-three and the sixty-three illustrious men of the Jain Mahāpurāṇas.
29 Jains conceptualize time as a cycle of descending (avasarpinī) and ascending (utsarpinī) periods each divided into six sections. Each cycle of time includes the complete dying out of the Jain tradition and is believed to include the lives and teachings of twenty-four Jinas who then reintroduce and revitalize the religion (Dundas 2002: 20).
30 These two groups have a kind of separate but equal status in this text. Of course, the satīs are considered equal to great Jain men but not to the list of the sixty-three illustrious men discussed earlier when discussing the Jain Mahāpurāṇas.
31 bharaheṣar – ā sajjhāyāṃ brahmaçārī, dāneśvarī, one tapasvī uttam purusoro ane strōṇā nāmo gāṇavā che. savāre yād karavāthī māṣgalik śāy che ane dukh jatuṃ rahe che (Śrī Devasī-Rāṭī Prafikramān Śāṭro, No date: 76). My translation.
33 The mothers of the Jinas are central to the tellings of the Jina narratives (*Jinacaritra*) and yet these women do not get included in the category of *satis*; similarly the Jina’s fathers are also not included in either the lists of the sixty-three illustrious men nor the fifty-three great men. It isn’t clear yet why they are not included. There is clear evidence that these women are seen as virtuous and achieve spiritual liberation (*mokṣa*) and that a *sati* can be married and have children. This bears considerable further exploration which I intend to pursue in the future.

34 Thus the queens of great kings must be framed either as *satis* or are glossed as just so-and-so’s wife. There is no category for the great queen who misuses her power or who is linked to violence or other sins through her performance of her duties as queen. One of the few that a woman can be excluded from the *sati* lists is to be one who performed the ritual act of self-immolation on the funeral pyre of one’s dead husband – the paradigmatic act of the Hindu *sati*. This specific exclusion raises the question of whether the Jain *sati* lists are designed explicitly to exclude Hindu *satis*. In addition, Jain philosophical texts argue that women are not capable of going to the lowest hell but they are certainly capable of going to all the other hells in the Jain cosmology (Dundas 2002: 57).

35 Here the stories of the great men are included only insofar as they are necessary to make sense of the women’s narratives – a strategy common in the *sati* narrative collections.

36 While we have seen that the model of the forty-seven *satis* is available to these women and to the parade organizers, it is the sixteen *satis* which dominates – perhaps the idea of organizing forty-seven floats seemed overly daunting. The young men in the parade are not themselves linked to any of the fifty-three virtuous men listed in the *Pratikrama* text despite the role many of these virtuous men have in modeling laymen’s practice and the fact that many of those men listed are known for their fasting. It may be that these young men were unmarried and therefore do not make a nice fit with the predominant image available of the married layman patron of Jainism. When Jain laymen are ritually linked to great men of the Jain tradition, they are usually linked to the kings Kumārpāl and Śrīpāl.

37 All these women were proudly displaying their *maṅgal sutta* – a gold chain with a pendant and black beads – which in Maharashtra (and increasingly Gujarat and Rajasthan) is a characteristic marker of a woman’s status as a married woman whose husband is alive and is therefore particularly auspicious. This necklace is understood to mark the auspicious wife among all the Jain women (and in fact everyone I met Jain or not, male and female) in Maharashtra and increasingly among people I met in Gujarat and Rajasthan.

38 ए साध्यायतम जे महापूर्वशो अनेक सद्गुणसंपन्ना विद्या आने येन नम मृत्र लेवाठी जा पापबंधन तुती जाय चे ते अन्न सुख आपो (*Śri Paṅca Pratikramaṇa Sūtra* No date: 20). My translation.

39 The Navasmaran (also called the *Mahāmāṅgalik Navasmaran*) are *Navkār Mantra*, *Uvasaggharam Stavanam*, *Śāntikaram Stavanam*, *Tiyapahutta Stotram*, *Nami Uj Stotram*, *Śri Ajitāśانتi Stavanam*, *Bhaktar Stotram*, *Śri Kalyāṇamandir Stotram*, and *Śri Bhračchānti Stotram* (Moḍi Śānti).

40 Perhaps recitation of this text has decreased in popularity in recent times or perhaps it is associated with particular communities in Gujarat. Like the BC, I did not in my research find any laywomen who knew this text by heart though most knew it was published in the *Śri Sudhāras Stavan Saṅgrah*. It may be that hymn singing has superceded the individual daily recitation of these particular texts.

41 In my experience, the *Navkār Mantra* was recited at the start of all *māṅgalik* recitations, sermons, and, in fact, all other rituals.
Bibliography

Primary sources


Bhakti Bhāvanā. Ed. by Pannya Vajrasenavijayji Gaṇi, Amdāvād: Bhadranark Prakāshan, No date.


Sāmāyik. Muni Harishchandra Vijayji, Bombay: Navjivan Granthmala Trust, No date.


Śrī Devasta-Rāta Pratikrama Śūtra (Gujarāṭī Bhāvārth Tathā Ģupatogy Viṣayo Sāthe), Amadāvād: Jain Prakāsan Mandir, No date.

Śrī Jain Saḍjhay Māḷā (Sacitra), Amdāvād: Jaśavantlāl Girdharlāl Śāh, Samvat 2525 (1968).


Śrī Paṇcika Pratikrama Śūtra (Gujarati edition). Amadāvād: Jain Prakāsan Mandir, no date.


Śrī Saïjan Saṃmitra yāne Ekādaś Mahāṇidhi. Ed. by Poṣatlāl Kēśāvālī Jhaverī. [Surat?] Śrī Pravacan Pujak Sabhā: No Date.


Śrī Sudhārās Stavan Saṅgrah, Amadāvād: Śrī Jain Prakāsan Mandir, No date.


Secondary sources


RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND THE
CREATION OF PERSONHOOD
AMONG ŚVETĀMBAR
MŪRTIPŪJAK JAIN WOMEN
IN JAIPUR

Josephine Reynell

Using the fast of akṣay nidhi as a case study, this chapter suggests that Jain religious beliefs and practices contribute to the creation of female personhood and strengthens and supports a woman’s sense of self, helping her to deal with specific pressures arising from gender and kinship roles within her husband’s family.

In his perceptive study of personhood in Tamilnadu, Mattison Mines (1994: 206) asserts that, ‘if others have too much control over who a person is, so that person’s sense of agency is tightly controlled the person suffers psychologically,’ noting earlier that whilst there is a tendency in Indian society for group interests to be put before individual interests, ‘Indians too must meet their psychological need for separation’ (ibid.: 17).

This observation raises important questions about women whose recognition as persons, amongst both Jain and the encompassing Hindu communities, is intimately bound up with their performance of sevā or service to others. Does female personhood among the Jains incorporate a sense of the individual self? And if so, to what extent can women retain a sense of self and agency as separate from others given the constraints on their speech, movement and activities both before but more particularly after marriage?

I would like to make a preliminary exploration of this issue by focusing on religious practice, and re-analysing my previous material (Reynell 1985, 1987a) on Jain women and fasting.¹ This earlier work focused on the way in which female religious practice was an integral part of the social, economic and prestige structure of the Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak² Jain trading community in the old city of Jaipur. Re-reading my field notes of 20 years, from a more experienced perspective enriched by considerable changes in my own life cycle, encouraged
CREATING PERSONHOOD AMONG JAIN WOMEN

me to explore how religious practice might contribute to the complex creation of female personhood over time. James Laidlaw’s observation that Jain doctrine focuses upon the individual human soul (1995: 16–17) is particularly relevant to my argument. To what extent might Jain women’s religious belief and practice offer lay women opportunities to imagine, reflect upon and experience a sense of the inner self and individuality? At the same time to what extent does the public enactment of kinship roles within various religious arenas contribute to a woman’s reputation as a person worthy of respect, in turn strengthening a woman’s conception of herself? This chapter therefore looks at the reciprocal interaction between two aspects of personhood – the inwardly experienced self and the outwardly visible person.

As a cautionary note I should point out that whilst the re-analysis of data is always a fruitful exercise, I did not specifically investigate personhood when doing my fieldwork and so do not have on record emic categories concerning personhood and self amongst the Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Jains in Jaipur. In fact such categories may well vary between different sects and individuals. Thus the chapter is an outsider’s analytical perspective and represents an initial attempt to raise some preliminary questions which require further investigation both through textual analysis and ethnographic fieldwork.

My material is drawn from the Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Khartar Gacch Jains living within the Jauhrī Bāzār area of the old city of Jaipur, Rajasthan. So when I refer to ‘the Jains’ it is specifically to this community. Whilst I hope that my conclusions have general applicability, the rich body of research undertaken on Jains in India in the past 20 years clearly indicates that they are by no means a homogeneous community. There is considerable regional variation both in religious practice as well as in caste membership and more generally in the social and economic structure of the Jain population.

**Approaches to personhood within anthropological theory**

Anthropological perspectives use the etic category of human personhood to investigate how individual biological humans are conceptualised as, and become, social beings. To this end much anthropological work has focused upon formal and informal roles and institutionalised offices as a way of investigating the various capacities in which the embodied human being is expected to act within a social group, and is given recognition within these groups as a socially defined person, with associated rights, responsibilities and powers *vis à vis* other persons. An important theme in the literature both cross-culturally and in the Indian context is how reciprocal interaction itself within relationships is crucial to the constitution of persons. Such relationships are created through ascribed or achieved membership in both formal and informal groups which range from kin and neighbourhood networks, to groups defined by gender, caste, class, employment, religion, locality, region and nationality.
The self as an aspect of personhood

The emphasis on personhood as externally perceived and awarded by others in the networks to which a human being is a member, is only part of the story. Steven Lukes (1985: 287) wisely cautions against studies of personhood which focus too exclusively on external roles and statuses, thereby neglecting the complex way in which individual selves and social roles are entwined. Crucial to the gradual attainment and constitution of personhood is the actors’ self recognition and reflection upon both themselves and the ways in which they as human beings are able to exercise choice in enacting and constituting themselves as persons. In other words, the category of personhood encompasses notions of the self and individuality, and it is worth emphasising that while one ends up defining the self, the individual and the person separately for analytical purposes, it is essential to recognise that these categories are mutually interdependent.

In his perceptive examination of selfhood, Anthony Cohen (1994: 2) defines the self as the universal capacity of the human being ‘to reflect on his or her own behaviour – that is to be self-conscious’.7 Expanding on this, I suggest that the self can be conceptualised as the aspect of mind that recognises and reflects back upon its embodied existence. Self is clearly to do with introspection and a sense of ‘I’ as a separate being. It is rooted in the psychic processes of cognition and perception and incorporates those intangible aspects of being human, including thoughts, emotions, desires, opinions and beliefs, together with a moral conscience which can also include a notion of the soul. Central to the constitution of the self is an awareness and understanding of the place that the ‘I’ has vis à vis other embodied selves. So that whilst a sense of self is shaped both by social classification and interaction with others it is equally importantly shaped by self-reflection upon such interactions, and can be revealed in self narratives through which human beings reflect upon choices and strategies of self representation and action which serve to distinguish themselves from others and through which they make sense of their actions in respect to others (Mines 1994: 149–186).

The individual and the self

Cohen (1994: 168) argues that the self is inextricably linked to the individual, suggesting that it is the self’s perception of society which initiates behaviour distinguishing one human being from another and which therefore defines persons as individuals. He is careful however to qualify his analysis by making the important and often neglected distinction between individual, individuality and individualism. He contrasts individualism or ‘a dogmatic posture which privileges the individual over society’ to individuality, that is ‘the perception of an individual’s distinctiveness’ which he suggests is a property of selfhood.
CREATING PERSONHOOD AMONG JAIN WOMEN

Concepts of the self and the individual in Indian anthropology

These distinctions are important because the question as to whether cross-cultural notions of the person incorporate a notion of the individual, and therefore by implication a clear and bounded sense of self, has been a source of debate both in anthropology in general and most particularly in Indian anthropology. Louis Dumont’s well-known argument that Indian concepts of the person do not include a notion of the individual, stems from his assertion that Indian values give paramount importance to the interests of the collective group (which can range from the household, extended family to castes or religious communities) rather than to the interests of the respective collectivity’s constituent members. In his view ‘the perception of ourselves as individuals is not innate but learned’ and in societies such as India where humans are valued as part of a collective then the individual as a category is not recognised (Dumont 1980: 8–9). Subsequent theorists have expanded on this idea, most notably McKim Marriott and Ronald Inden (1977), who have emphasised the apparent fluidity of personal boundaries in India whereby people are believed to affect the bodily substance and inner physical and spiritual essence of others through interpersonal transactions such as touching and sharing food. They question whether Indians have a clear notion of the person as an individual bounded entity as compared to north Americans and Europeans, single persons are not ultimately individual units; instead persons are “dividuals,” or unique composites of diverse subtle and gross substances derived ultimately from one source; they are also divisible into separate particles that may be shared or exchanged with others. (Ibid.: 232)

McKim Marriott (1989: 17–19) later suggests that whilst the Western social science model posits persons as self-reflexive, self-sufficient and in possession of a clear individual identity, the Indian model presents a picture of persons as non-reflexive, divisible ‘dividuals’ with no individual identity.

What Marriott and Inden (1977) arguably do is to present a model of the person at the molecular level and indeed suggest their view is an ‘indigenous scientific view of flowing substance and striving persons’ (ibid.: 233). Certainly they have highlighted an important component of Indian concepts of personhood within the context of inter- and intra-caste relationships, in which, as Louis Dumont has pointed out, the emphasis is placed on how the identity and status of the group is dependent on the carefully regulated interactions of human beings within and between groups. Yet, ethnographic data suggests that this is not the whole picture and that in actual relationships and day to day interactions, people’s sense of self and individuality is recognised and plays an important part in people’s overall conceptions of themselves as persons. Mattison Mines (1994: 212) suggests, on the basis of his own fieldwork in southern India, that Indian concepts of the person incorporate both ‘dividual’ and individual identity. Cecilia Busby’s
(1997: 274) work, also in south India, questions the notion of ‘dividuality’, suggesting that whilst people’s boundaries may be permeable, Indians perceive themselves as existing as persons in their own right and have a sense of internal wholeness. Similarly, Sarah Lamb’s (2000: 39–40) ethnography on gender and ageing in a Bengali village challenges what she sees as an ethnocentric bias in Marriott’s perspective, suggesting that whilst personhood is created through shared relationships with others, this does not preclude ‘a clear sense of a differentiable self’.

My own fieldwork among Jain women revealed certainly a belief that the qualities of one human being could be affected by close interpersonal transactions with others. But at the same time women were very aware of themselves and those around them as possessing physical and psychological attributes which distinguished them as individual selves with specific interests, preferences and opinions – a perspective supported by Jain doctrines as we shall see shortly.

Jain doctrine and lay belief: notions of the soul, religious activity and the constitution of the self

Religious identity is not always a key factor in a human being’s conceptualisation of him or herself and others as persons. But as James Laidlaw (1995: 151, 391–392) observes, Jain religious practice serves to create the individual’s religious self and I would say that amongst the majority of Jain families living within the Jauhr Bazaar area of Jaipur, religious belief and practice was significant in the constitution of both community identity, selfhood and personhood.

Jain doctrine emphasises how central the soul is to all sentient beings and especially to Jain concepts of the human being. What is particularly significant is the belief that when the soul is born within a human body it becomes a part of the self. Walther Schubring’s interpretation of Jain doctrine indicates how the canonical texts distinguish between the jīva and the āyā. Schubring translates jīva as the soul which bears life, emphasising its property as the carrier of sentience or the life force (1962: 152). Similarly Paul Dundas (1992: 80) suggests that whilst jīva is often translated as soul, a more accurate translation would be ‘life monad’. Indeed he points out that jīva as a concept is not found in the early texts, such as the Ācārāṅga Sūtra, which only mention the āyā (ibid.: 38). Āyā is the Prakrit equivalent of ātman in Sanskrit and has a complex set of meanings. In the Upaniṣads, ātman can signify both that element which continues through different rebirths, namely the soul, and those attributes particular to each individual, namely the ego or self. Paul Dundas suggests that āyā in the earliest Jain texts takes on this Upaniṣadic meaning (Dundas: personal communication). Schubring points out that often the dividing line between jīva and āyā is not always clear but suggests that āyā refers to ‘I’ particularly when used in the context of an individual human beings’ cognition, passion and activity. What this implies is that when the soul is embodied due to karmic influence it forms a key component of the self. As Schubring (1962: 153) points out, doctrinally it is the āyā (ātman) which is the
carrier of passions, cognitions and intentions initiating actions. These passions
and actions in turn shape specific personalities, thereby constituting the self
within each human being and making each human being a unique individual in
the Jain view (providing a clear counter-example to the views of Dumont and
Marriott discussed earlier). In this context Schubring places particular emphasis
on the causative role that karma plays in creating heterogeneity within human
beings. Within Jain doctrine, after the first century BCE karma takes on a rather
concrete form and is conceived of as particles of matter adhering to the soul,
drawn there by passions (kaśāya) which range from anger, pride and greed, to
love and enjoyment of comfort (ibid.: 292–293, also Dundas 1994: 83–84).
Schubring draws attention to the way in which Jain doctrine actually specifies
how individuality is created through a particular kind of karma, namely nāma
karma. In addition, by influencing the family into which one is born, karma is
also perceived to be responsible for the more outwardly visible aspects of
personhood such as family status and caste identity (ibid.: 176 and 181).

Two key points emerge from this. First, the embodied soul is perceived to lie at
the heart of the self and second, karma attached to the soul is believed to be
responsible for the particular constitution and individuality of the self, which in
turn shapes the individuality of each person.

Although the doctrines clearly define the person in terms of the self, individu-
ality and social standing, the overriding emphasis of course is on the cessation of
the person through the attainment of mokṣa or spiritual liberation, achieved when
karmic influx is stopped and the consequences of existing karmic matter played
out. At this point the soul is separated from the self or ‘I’, which is believed to dis-
solve together with other aspects of personhood such as social ties and statuses.

Conversely, from a lay person’s perspective, the constitution of human beings
as persons is an essential aspect of each human’s ability to negotiate daily life.
Both the women and men with whom I worked were familiar with the doctrine
that mokṣa is not possible in the present age and they placed greater emphasis on
trying to live life in such a way that good karma is accumulated, ensuring that
future rebirths were in an environment conducive to religious practice and grad-
ual worldly disengagement.9 Nevertheless the purification of the soul was con-
ceived to be a necessary focus of religious activity. Whilst the totality of Jain
doctrine is complex, my discussions with, and observations of, practising Jains,
and particularly women, indicated that certain doctrines and ritual practices
pertaining to the nature of the soul and human life were well understood and pro-
foundly influenced how people behaved and how they perceived themselves and
others as persons. In particular, the belief that it is the three jewels (tri ratna) of
right faith (samyak darśana), right knowledge (samyak jñāna) and right conduct
(samyak cāritra) which enable the soul to begin its journey towards liberation, is
central to the way in which ordinary people make sense of their place within the
universe. This complex philosophy is succinctly embodied in symbolic offerings
of rice created during the daily temple worshipping rituals,10 indicating how these
ideas are very much a part of people’s worldview. Women repeatedly emphasised
that their embodied soul, for which they used the word *ātman*, was the catalyst for intentions and thoughts which then influenced actions. In other words, religious beliefs have a very real influence on Jain women’s conception of selfhood and personhood. This conception sees the soul as shaping the self and constituting the source of agency behind behaviour, which in turn defines women as social persons within the family and the wider community.

A young, unmarried Jain woman illustrated this perceived link between religious practice, the self and the socially interactive person with a comment on tricky relationships within her extended family. She explained that she and her parents found it very difficult to get along with her father’s brother’s wife whom she described as quarrelsome and abrasive. In explanation she suggested that her aunt’s difficult character was exacerbated by a lack of interest in religion and religious activity. As James Laidlaw (1995) points out in the conclusion to his rich ethnography on Śvetāmbar Jains in Jaipur,

> Ideas and practices which must have been formed in the context of speculation about the individual soul in a cosmic, natural, and spiritual context, and which continue to be treated as such in explicit philosophical reflection and religious teaching, plainly figure prominently when one looks at what it is for a Jain to be a member of a social collectivity. Thus imagery and practice which looks at first sight – and also is – resolutely world renouncing, plays a central part in living a life in a socially complex, status divided, and in many ways intensely competitive world.

(Ibid.: 393)

Finally one should not underestimate the specifically Śvetāmbar Jain belief that female birth is no bar to the attainment of spiritual liberation or *moksa*. This was clearly of profound importance to women’s concept of their inner selfhood and encompassing personhood. The way in which women consistently reminded me of this during my fieldwork indicated the central role played by such a belief, not only in building a sense of spiritual authority and thereby their self-confidence, but in offsetting more negative images of women in some of the religious texts.

**Gender personhood and the self**

Now how might gender as a principle of social organisation interact with religious beliefs in the construction of the self? The importance of developing and shaping the self is expressed within both the Jain and the encompassing Hindu context, by the notion of *samskāras*. Jain women explained that *samskāras* are the characteristics and dispositions with which a person is born and which are shaped by actions in his or her previous births. These dispositions are believed to affect that individual’s behaviour and particular way of interacting in the world. In his analysis of childhood and society in India, Sudhir Kakar (1981: 48–49) suggests
that the power of these innate samskāras can be sufficient to resist attempts by the individual to change. However, the Jain women with whom I talked expressed a different view. They frequently asserted that within a child, whether girl or boy, these samskāras are not fixed in form but can be moulded and encouraged to develop in a certain way by those people intimately involved in the child’s upbringing. They clearly explained that positive dispositions can be supported and negative dispositions with which the child might be born can be encouraged to recede given the right moral guidance, in accordance with Jain principles.

And this is where Jain concepts of gender are important. Although child psychologists and anthropologists would agree that socialisation and personality development is a product of an individual’s interaction with all members of a household, the Jain men and women with whom I talked had very clear and gendered models as to the respective responsibilities of family members. Fathers were accorded a more disciplinarian role. They were seen as responsible for overseeing the child’s interaction with the world outside the home. This might involve a range of interactions from choice of schools, permission to go shopping or to the cinema and with whom, to teaching their sons’ good money management as part of their apprenticeship to the family business, and finally for overseeing marriage negotiations.

In contrast mothers were unanimously accorded responsibility for influencing the development of the self, whereby through example and precept, the child absorbs Jain values and thereby develops a moral conscience, and a sense of internal responsibility and awareness of how to act in the world in accordance with Jain principles. This view immediately highlights the importance of religious values in shaping the self. Equally importantly it emphasises the heavy obligations placed upon women to put the interests of their family members at the centre of their lives, to fulfil their duty of sevā or service to others. All Jain women I spoke to were unanimous that sevā was an essential aspect of Jain adult womanhood, revealing a source of tension at the heart of women’s lives, namely how a woman fulfils the multifarious demands placed upon her without being overwhelmed and losing her own sense of her selfhood and individuality. A closer understanding of the range of obligations is gained by an examination of a Jain woman’s place within the kinship system and how her ascribed kinship roles define expectations concerning her behaviour at particular points in her life.

**Personhood and kinship**

Constitutive of female personhood are the complex range of externally manifest social relationships and roles which individual women are both born into and take on as they progress through the life cycle. Alina Wong’s (1992: 163) observations that for Singaporean women ‘the family lifecycle is the central axis of their life organisation’ holds true of women (and indeed men) in many societies, and is certainly true of women from the conservative, middle-class community of Jains with whom I did my fieldwork during 1982–1984.
The development of selfhood within the female person: the context of caste and patrilineal kinship

A Jain woman’s kinship roles as a daughter, and then as daughter-in-law and wife define her as a person and have a crucial impact on her sense of self. Jain kinship and marriage in Rajasthan, and Jaipur in particular, shares most of the features found amongst other high caste Hindu communities in northern India. Inheritance of property and kingroup identity is patrilineal and residence after marriage is patrivirilocal. Within parameters set by caste endogamy, marriage amongst the Osvāl and Śrīmāl Khartar Gacch Jaipur Jains operates within the idiom of hypergamy.12

The demands of the patrilineal kinship system weigh particularly heavily on women and there are two important implications. First, in all patrilineal systems paternity is an issue, but it is particularly acute in societies made up of hierarchically ranked endogamous groups.13 Amongst both the Jains in Jaipur, and other high caste north Indian groups, caste membership is conceptualised in physical terms as passing from father to children through shared blood. The key issue therefore is the control of female sexuality and it is here that externally observable religious practice plays an extremely important role in publicly demonstrating sexual morality and contributing to a woman’s reputation as a person worthy of respect. This then has implications for the arrangement of marriages and family social and economic status.14

Prior to puberty a girl’s social and moral reputation are incorporated within that of her mother. Her approaching adulthood with the onset of puberty marks the gradual separation from her natal family, and particularly her mother, a separation finalised by marriage and which defines her as an adult person in her own right. Thus the post pubertal gradual assumption of visible religious activities serve as symbolic markers of this separation and represent the development of a girl’s individual morality and social reputation. In Jaipur, girls are expected to visit the temple regularly, attend preachings in cātmās and undertake short fasts once a month. Similarly, Whitney Kelting (2000: 173) points out that joining a stavan singing group marks the approaching adulthood of adolescent girls and is a public expression of piety, marking them out as good potential brides. This pattern of observable piety must continue after marriage, and goes hand in hand with strict pardā restrictions.

Indeed such public expressions of morality can refashion and safeguard the reputation of young women whose actions have challenged accepted norms. This was demonstrated by the case of Sushila who came from a well-respected jeweller’s family. Their fortunes had declined somewhat and their beautiful havelī, located down a narrow alley, was showing signs of dilapidation. Sushila, a vivacious 20-year-old, shared her mother’s graceful deportment but did not share her mother’s interest in religion. When I first met her she laughingly told me that she was considered a ‘very fast girl’ due to her love of frequenting the bāzār and cinema halls (chaperoned by her brothers of course). Some two years later I was
struck by the fact that she was visiting the temple daily and had begun to observe food restrictions. These changes had followed her attendance at a religious camp for young people. Her mother had apparently given instructions to her father not to bring her home until she had completed the camp, lamenting that ‘she knows so little about religion’. A year later she was married.

The second implication of the patrilineal kinship system concerns a woman’s sense of self, particularly in terms of her emotional development. It is to do with the emotional isolation and the deep division of loyalty a woman experiences after marriage between her natal family (with whom she has enduring roles as a daughter, sister and sister-in-law to her brothers’ wives, as well as aunt to her brothers’ children), and her affinal family, to whom she moves after marriage, with whom she has to build ties of affection and within which her roles as wife, mother, mother-in-law and grandmother are paramount.

Emotional and social vulnerability after marriage

I had numerous discussions with both Jain mothers and fathers about rearing daughters and from their point of view one of the main consequences of patrilin-eal kinship, caste linked status and patrivirilocal residence after marriage was female vulnerability. They were not merely referring to her potential vulnerability to male advances prior to and after marriage which might threaten family status, but were concerned with the emotional vulnerability of daughters caused by transferral to a household where they have no close relationships with any member, where they are required to deferentially adjust to the husband’s extended family and are the object of intense scrutiny and potential criticism. For instance Jain women frequently pointed out to me that misfortunes in the family were often blamed on new daughters-in-law – a classic illustration of Mary Douglas’s (1966: 102) argument that notions of mystical danger adhere to people who are perceived to occupy an ambiguous position within the dominant structure of power. Leela Dube (2001: 229) suggests that socialising a girl for an unknown and unfamiliar setting leads to tentativeness, inhibiting the development of self-confidence and initiative.

I observed that within the safety and emotional security of their natal home, girls in their late teens, who in Jaipur had usually been educated up to degree level, were in fact confident and outspoken. This self-assured demeanour changed after marriage, which is clearly a traumatic transition for a young woman, whereby the relatively relaxed communication between her mother, brothers and father and a certain autonomy as to how she spends her time within the home are replaced by restricted and hierarchical relationships within her new affinal family.

The lesser autonomy of a young daughter-in-law was forcefully brought home to me after returning with a young unmarried friend from a jolly but rather hot and tiring pūjā. No sooner had we collapsed exhausted onto the soft cushions within the cool sitting room of the havelī when, to my discomfort, my friend sharply ordered her newly married sister-in-law, who was several years her senior,
and as exhausted as we were, to go and make tea – a request which was silently and immediately complied with. Indeed Dumont’s suggestions that the individual is subsumed by the requirements of the collectivity would seem to be most applicable to women as young daughters-in-law.

The situation is very different for boys and young men as they do not have to leave home on marriage but instead remain within the supportive environment of their parents home. Their efforts to become financially viable, within a competitive business environment, are supported by their father and possibly their brothers and father’s brothers. Any stress that accompanies this transition from teenage boy to adult man is alleviated by the fact that a young man remains within an emotionally familiar environment. This is not to say that relationships within the joint family are always harmonious. They are not. But I would argue that potential conflict between brothers, surfaces later on in the male life cycle, often when the influence of the father wanes with age and retirement.16

Religious activity and the maturation of the self in the context of marriage

There is clearly a very real question as to what extent a woman’s sense of self remains intact after marriage, particularly in the early years when her workload is most onerous and when the pressure to prove her loyalty and respectability are greatest, resulting in significant restrictions on her movement and means of communication both within and outside the home? In this context does religious practice have any significance? Are the religious activities which mothers encourage their daughters to embark upon at the onset of puberty merely a means whereby an adolescent girl begins to create her separate identity as an adult Jain woman of good reputation? Or are they also a means whereby a young newly married woman, placed in a socially and emotionally vulnerable situation, can strengthen her sense of selfhood, and define herself as a person worthy of respect, which in turn helps her to internally negotiate the pressures, demands and conflicting loyalties which go hand in hand with her roles as wife, daughter-in-law, mother and daughter.

The religious stories with which the women were all conversant certainly suggest that religious activity has a role to play in that it contributes to the gradual maturation of the self in situations of adversity and in so doing offers the means for potential transformation from a self beleaguered by external pressures to a self confident of its own psychic integrity. The story literature is rich and in contradistinction to much of the other religious literature,17 usually portrays women, in an extremely positive light. Such stories often involve unmarried or young married women, significantly women at a stage in their lives where their sense of self and their status as persons is most undermined. These stories implicitly suggest that such categories of women can seek a solution to their predicament through deep religious beliefs and practices (based upon the Jain principles of right view, right knowledge and right action), which nourish and build clear
bounded selves imbued with a sense of moral rectitude and strength which then enables them to successfully face up to and conquer emotional and social adversity. What is of crucial importance is that their success is not merely limited to worldly existence. The strength of their selfhood, which is portrayed as a combination of both emotional maturity and firm spiritual knowledge grounded in Jain principles, enables them to steadfastly follow a religious path, which leads ultimately to spiritual enlightenment. The stories therefore embody a vision of overcoming worldly difficulties at a number of levels. This vision I argue contributes to a gradual development of self confidence and moral authority within those women for whom religious practice is a regular aspect of their lives.

Religious practice and the demarcation of space and time apart from the household

For a young Jain wife the experience of physically and emotionally transcending tensions arising from the myriad ties of daily household and kin obligations, begins in a small way through the daily visits to the temple, which after marriage are expected to become a regular part of a woman’s daily routine, if they are not so already. For a newly married woman such visits have particular significance in that they constitute one of the few occasions when she can leave the confines of her affinal home and legitimately turn her attention inwards to herself. The cool space enclosed within temple walls is strikingly different to the hot, noisy bustle of everyday life outside. The white marble walls and dignified statues of the tīrthaṅkars, the air heavy with incense and punctuated with sounds of murmured ritual incantations combine to clearly demarcate a sacred and otherworldly space. The focus of temple worship are the tīrthaṅkars, clear symbols of the spiritual path to liberation or mokṣa mārga and the spiritual journey of each individual soul. Thus the temple visits whilst publicly representing a woman as a good Jain wife, at the same time physically and symbolically separate her from her husband’s household and attendant responsibilities where her own needs and interests are low on the list of priorities. Virtually all women told me that these daily temple visits gave them a feeling of peace as well as respite from activity and tensions within their households. Women are able to extend this experience later on in married life by practicing the 48 minute meditation practice of sāmāyik, after rising in the morning. The importance of sāmāyik within Jain practice as a means whereby lay practitioners can detach their consciousness from the outside world is highlighted by Padmanabh Jaini (1979: 226) who suggests that, ‘This sublime experience will sustain him even when he returns to his family and to the bustle of everyday life, drawing him again and again to the inner refuge he has discovered’. After 10 years of marriage, the majority of women I knew practised sāmāyik and they echoed Jaini’s observations, emphasising how important to them that small period of silence was as a source of peace and reflection. In front of the household shrine, sitting on their ‘mat’, fingering their mālās (rosaries), they created through this ritual an external and internal space for
themselves. Many women told me how sāmāyik enabled them to ‘take their mind off worldly matters’ or ‘released any mental tension’ – a form of detachment which, they felt, gave them greater emotional strength to re-enter and effectively manage the intricate web of emotions and obligations within the household of which they were a part.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Religious practice and the fashioning of personal and family identity}

These contemplative ritual practices are an important counterbalance to a woman’s other religious duties, which emphasise much more emphatically her responsibilities to her affinal kin group. For a young wife these responsibilities are enacted through food preparation. After marriage the new wife assumes responsibility for cooking food for her affinal family under the watchful tutelage of her mother-in-law. This is perceived as a religious act entailing careful adherence to Jain principles to ensure no violence is committed to microscopic beings.\textsuperscript{19} Cooking recreates on a daily basis the identity of a woman as a Jain wife whose inner self has a religious integrity which encourages behaviour enabling her to be viewed as a person worthy of respect. At the same time her food preparation reinforces the identity of household members as Jains – so crucial for the Śvetāmbar Jains of the Jauhrī Bazār who are essentially a community of jewellery and cloth merchants where Jain religious identity demarcates the boundaries of an economic resources group within which informal credit networks, based on trust, operate.\textsuperscript{20} As Marcus Banks (1992) notes, ‘Food has an overriding importance to the Jains, being a constant diacritical marker of their otherness and the Jains have an elaborate schema of how, when, where and what to eat’ (ibid.: 97). Once children are born, integrating a young woman more fully into her affinal family, food preparation is a potent symbol of her role as mother as it constitutes a central part of the process of socialising children, developing their sense of self by nurturing a moral conscience and an internal understanding as to where they as human beings fit into the social world within and beyond the household. James Laidlaw (1995) notes, the role played by food practices in the constitution of selfhood. ‘Dietary practice… is actually the way young Jains learn about ahiṃsā, the way they come to think about their distinctiveness as Jains, and the most routine medium through which that distinctiveness is made part of the self’ (ibid.: 166).

\textit{The life cycle and increasing authority: respected behaviour, age and kinship}

Clearly, younger wives play an important role in fashioning Jain identity and the symbolic purity of themselves and their close kin through meticulous and time consuming cooking processes. At this stage of a laywoman’s life caring for the family on both a physical, spiritual and symbolic level is accomplished through
physical activity whose religious aspect gives a sense of personal fulfilment. Careful attention to these duties proves her loyalty to her affinal family, which in turn enables relationships of trust and intimacy to build up between herself and them. The resultant self-confidence is further bolstered by changes in the dynamics of power within the patrilineal family as her children grow older and new sisters-in-law are incorporated into the extended family. Household work can be shared or delegated to other women. Age and a more solid incorporation into her husband’s family leads to an increasing relaxation of pardā restrictions enabling a woman to go outside the house more often to visit kin or go to the temple. Clearly, therefore, a woman’s authority, power and therefore agency as a social person is contingent upon her sense of self, her behaviour, and the constitution and dynamics of the network of social relationships within her husband’s household.

As physical tasks of looking after the family become lighter, so a woman assumes greater responsibility for caring for her family on a cosmic level. At the same time this gives her the opportunity to build upon and consolidate her sense of self through more concentrated and individual religious practice, and in Jaipur this is where extended fasting plays an increasingly important role.

In Jaipur, women drew my attention to fasting as an important practice. They were proud to talk about the fasts they had done which they viewed as an important part of their religious year. Whilst recognising that the importance of female group fasting seems to vary between regions, and possibly by sect, and even within Jaipur one cannot assume that fasting is important for all women – as James Laidlaw (1995: 152) points out, religious practices between families and individual practitioners are very varied, I nevertheless suggest that for many of the Jaipur women who have been married for at least 10 years, fasting is one of the ways through which female personhood, and particularly a sense of self, can be further developed. I would now like to explore how this might be the case.

**Fasting, sevā and selves**

Taps or austerities embody one of Jainism’s central concepts, namely non-attachment, in two key ways. First, they are intended to detach the performer from some aspect of daily human life and second they are literally believed to produce internal, spiritual heat which literally burns away the particles of karma binding the soul to earthly existence. Fasting is one kind of austerity and it is worth emphasising that fasting within the Jain context does not necessarily involve total denial of food implied by the English gloss of the word tap. Rather Jain fasts encourage the practitioner to think about and work to decrease attachment to the material world by challenging patterns of meals and types of food, thereby focusing on the varied ways in which a human being is attached to earthly existence through food. In Jaipur the āyambil fasts, which omit the use of oils, spices and salts together with fruit and vegetables, enact detachment to taste. Ekāsana, enjoining the practitioner to eat only once a day, separates the practitioner from the usual three meals a day plus snacks which help to structure daily life. It is only
the *upavās* fasts which prohibit food altogether, and although there are fasts which involve performing *upavās* for a succession of days, there are equally fasts such as *varṣītap*,\textsuperscript{23} whereby one day of *upavās* is alternated with one day of normal eating for the duration of year.

A woman’s fasts are ritualised activities carried out within both the home and the sacred spaces outside the home whereby on one level a woman creates and demonstrates her personhood through enacting her roles of wife and mother. First, she represents family morality and creates a good reputation essential in marriage negotiations for daughters. Second, religious activities are believed to attract good *karma*\textsuperscript{24} and *punya* which bring worldly good fortune to the doer and those who share their lives, as well as positively affecting the inner soul of the doer. Within a patrilineal, patriarchal system a woman’s good fortune is intimately connected with that of her husband and children and in this way a wife’s and mother’s religious activities are believed to benefit her family.\textsuperscript{25}

To this extent Jain women are little different from their high caste Hindu counterparts who are subject to the encompassing ideology of *śrīdharmā* and the *pativrata* or virtuous wife. This portrays married women, and most particularly mothers, as symbols of auspiciousness and purity through whose religious work the health and happiness of the family is assured.\textsuperscript{26} Mary McGee (1996: 155) highlights the centrality of the concept of *saubhāgya* as ‘the virtue of well-being derived from having a living husband’. Although inherent in women, it nevertheless needs to be nurtured through the conscientious performance of household tasks, service to family members but most particularly to the husband and the performance of religious duties, particularly fasts.

Married women, as vessels of *saubhāgya*, are constantly dispensing and replenishing their *saubhāgya* through benedictions and observance of *vrats*, bringing good fortune and well being to all whom they come in contact...Simply put, a married woman who uses her *saubhāgya* in such creative ways is a transformer of destiny...In the Hindu context, she is a virtuous wife, and such deeds are her dharma, no more and no less. (Ibid.: 165)

Whilst this holds true for Jain women, the doctrinal emphasis on the liberation of the soul, symbolised by the ubiquitous *tīrthāṅkar* images in the temples, encourages Jain women to view fasts in a different way. Thus at another level I suggest the fasts contribute most decidedly to a woman’s internal sense of individual selfhood. Jain women made it very clear to me that whilst they celebrated their relationships with their families, and particularly their husband and children, and interpreted their duties as wives and mothers as valid aspects of religious activity, they did not perceive fasts as solely oriented to their family’s well-being. The *mokṣa mārga* ideology with its concept of the soul’s journey to liberation was a crucial aspect not merely of women’s understanding of the social world in which they were embedded but most significantly of their conception of their place.
CREATING PERSONHOOD AMONG JAIN WOMEN

within the wider universe. Their discussions about why they fasted and how they benefitted always included the sense of inner peace it enabled them to access, the way in which they believed their actions contributed to the purification of their soul and its journey to liberation, however many rebirths that might take. In other words their fasting rituals enabled them legitimately to put themselves in the foreground – not only as selves that were identified with kinship roles but also as selves who had as part of their identity independent souls whose existence and development were not limited by the timeframe of one lifecycle.

Thus the religious Jain laywoman may be less psychically constrained by the demanding expectations linked to her roles than one might expect. Compared to nuns of course, a laywoman’s religious practice cannot offer the same degree of transcendence from the obligations inherent in kinship and gender roles. Anne Vallely’s (2002) research amongst Terāpanthi female ascetics offers fascinating comparisons and she observes that for such women

The idiom of renunciation is unequivocally and unabashedly soul-centred, and nuns can avail of it every bit as easily as monks. Female asceticism represents a continuation of female virtues of chastity and restraint but significantly, it also represents a renunciation of strādharma (gender duty).

(Ibid.: 240)

For laywomen, religious practice makes space for a sense of self and individuality within the framework of strādharma rather than beyond it, equipping women with the fortitude to intellectually and emotionally cope with the difficulties thrown up by the structures of power embedded in the relations of gender and kinship encompassing women’s worldly life (saṁsāra).

The fast of akṣay nidhi and the personhood of women

I would like to explore some of these points by looking in detail at akṣay nidhi tap, which I witnessed in 1982, 1983 and 1984 in Jaipur.27 This is a rather unusual fast in that unlike many fasts, it does not seem at first sight to be linked to specifically female interests. The associated story does not incorporate female heroines and the focus appears to be on worldly wealth and Jain identity. A careful analysis, however, reveals a rich web of meanings, intimately connected to the multi-layered personhood of women. The fast not only symbolises women’s role in creating Jain identity, but encapsulates women’s multiple kinship roles. At the same time it offers women the space and creative means to nurture their sense of self and gain respite from the restrictions imposed through gender and kinship.

Whilst I was in Jaipur, the akṣay nidhi tap coincided with paryuṣan and was performed eight days prior to and the eight days during paryuṣan. It began in 1982 and was repeated for four consecutive years in accordance with instructions
laid out in the booklet especially published to accompany the fast, which also claimed that the fast dated back to the time of Mahāvīra and was a fast that he encouraged followers to perform.\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{Community identity}

At its most inclusive the fast is very much concerned with the various levels of Jain segmentary community identity, making its performance by women particularly significant in that they play a crucial role in creating and recreating Jain identity in time and space through their roles as wives, mothers and mothers-in-law. Names of the women who planned to do it were read out in the preachings. The publication of a booklet, the \textit{Akṣay Nidhi Tap Vidhi}, to accompany the fast was paid for by a prominent Jaipur Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak jeweller whilst the wife of another prominent jeweller bid Rs. 3001 for the honour of leading the procession – an action which highlighted the role of the jewellery traders in Jaipur in maintaining and continuing Jain religious institutions. The fast was performed only by Khartar Gacch women on the encouragement of the monk, Muni Sāgar ji, resident in the Khartar Gacch upāśray for cāturmās in 1982.\textsuperscript{29} The procession at the end of the fast included all five Mūrtipūjak temples in the old city run both by Khartar Gacch as well as Tapā Gacch.\textsuperscript{30} As such it made both a public statement about the piety of Khartar Gacch as compared to other gacch communities whilst at the same time transcending gacch identity and representing the whole Mūrtipūjak community in Jaipur through the inclusion of these temples.

The story associated with the fast takes the theme of community identity one step further by focusing on the identity of Jains as a religious group within the wider context of caste hierarchy within Rajasthan. It concerns a king, named Puruṣottam, who loses his wealth and kingly position due to unspecified calamities. Whilst working as a servant in another king’s palace, he meets a Jain ascetic and is subsequently converted to Jainism. The Jain ascetic advises him to do the fast of \textit{akṣay nidhi} to regain his wealth. This brings immediate results as on completing the fast he is promoted to minister in charge of the king’s trade – a clear metaphorical reference to the association of Jains with the trading castes.\textsuperscript{31} Subsequently, he embarks on a trading expedition to another kingdom but his ship is caught in a storm and all except him are drowned. Carried to the shore by a crocodile, he finds that the kingdom is facing a dilemma because their ruler had died heirless. To select a new king, the populace decide to let loose an elephant with a young woman riding on its back, the custom being that the man to whom the elephant points his trunk should be made king. As a consequence of performing \textit{akṣay nidhi}, the elephant points its trunk at Puruṣottam and in this way he regains his wealth and kingship – but with one major difference – as a Jain king.

The story I was given\textsuperscript{32} is reminiscent of the conversion stories discussed at length by Lawrence Babb (1996), whereby kings convert to Jainism under the influence of Jain ascetics. He points out how such stories are to do with the Jain
Creating Personhood Among Jain Women

claims to a particular kind of caste identity, contesting their attributed status as traders or vaśyas, and claiming a status equal or superior to the ruling Rajput community. Such stories claim a non-violent royal identity achieved through conversion by ascetics – contrasting Jain kings with the meat eating and alcohol drinking identity of Rajput rulers – a diet which, according to Jain principles, makes them spiritually inferior (Babb 1996: 161–169). The story may also reflect a competitive demarcation of Jain religious identity vis à vis Hindu religious identity in that Puruṣottam is one of the names given to the god Viṣṇu (Gupta 2000: 394).

Unlike many of the stories attached to fasts women do, it did not include women as central characters. Yet the inclusion of a woman riding on the back of the elephant, a pan-Indian symbol of both fertility and royal authority (Kinsley 1997: 225), implicitly indicates that the woman directs the elephant’s choice. This suggests that the fast combined with female spiritual wisdom, restores Puruṣottam’s fortune, an oblique reference to women’s perceived role as guardians of Jain identity, morality and good fortune. The story and procession makes visible women’s central role as persons responsible for maintaining community identity. The result-ant inner authority and confidence seemed very evident to all who watched their smiling and unveiled faces as they went on a procession through town after the fast. Indeed the fast makes publicly manifest female social power enacted through roles as wives, mothers, grandmothers and aunts, which is otherwise hidden behind the walls of the home, and the invisibility imposed by pardā restrictions.

In addition the timing of the fast helped to reinforce the emphasis on a community identity beyond that of individual gacch allegiance. I was told that the fast could be performed at other times of the year but the resident monk in 1982 decided to make the fast lead up to and coincide with paryuṣan celebrations. This is significant as 8 days of paryuṣan are the only time in the year when all the Śvetāmbar Jains in the old city, women, men, young and old make an effort to take on board religious observances in terms of food restrictions, fasting, confession and temple going. The public nature of many of the celebrations, such as the processions, the loud well attended pūjas, and the many well dressed Jains on the streets at night visiting the five temples to worship, clearly makes this festival a statement of community identity vis à vis the wider society.

Fasting and detachment from the household through the restructuring of time and space: the case of Mrs Bhaṇḍārī

The fast significantly restructuring the practitioners’ day as the following case of Mrs Bhaṇḍārī shows, encouraging women to turn their attention inwards and away from their home and family. Mrs Bhaṇḍārī was a 38-year-old woman, from the Osvāl caste, whose husband ran a jewellery business. She was typical of many of the women I worked with in that religious belief and practice structured much of her life. She explained to me how she tried to live her life according to the five great vows of Jainism (pañc mahāvrat). To illustrate this she related how once she
had performed five \textit{upavās} fasts as penance for killing a ladybird whilst cleaning vegetables. On the advice of a nun she had vowed to follow the fourteen principles (\textit{chaudah niyam}) daily and had also taken a vow to give up \textit{rasgūllas}, a particularly delicious sweetmeat, for life. She ate no roots at all and no green vegetables or fruit on the eighth and fourteenth auspicious days (\textit{titthi}) of each lunar fortnight or during \textit{pariyuṣan}. She ate before sunset and drank nothing after sunset. She saw her religious practice as a way of life which began in early childhood when she did her first \textit{upavās} at the age of 7. She explained her commitment to religion as due to good \textit{karma} accumulated in a previous birth, implicitly linking soul, self and personhood. She was a confident and outspoken woman and made her own decisions as to how she should put her beliefs in to practice, stating that ‘a husband should never interfere in a wife’s practice’. Her religious beliefs and practices had clearly contributed to her strong sense of self and individuality, in addition to which she was mistress of her own home as her mother-in-law was dead. Significantly she had frequent contact with her natal family, including her parents and her brothers (also jewellers), who lived close by. In fact she was performing \textit{aksiṣay nidhi tap} with two of her brother’s wives.

She had two sons, one aged 20 years and one aged 11 years, and a daughter of 17 years. She, her husband and children lived as a nuclear family on the second floor of a three storey \textit{havelī}, but her husband’s brother (also a jeweller) lived one floor below and her husband’s brother’s wife helped cook and look after Mrs Bhaṇḍārī’s husband and children whilst she performed \textit{aksiṣay nidhi tap}. This help was absolutely essential as the fast took Mrs Bhaṇḍārī out of the house for most of the day. Prior to embarking on the fast she had received permission from her husband to do it and had taken a vow of celibacy to last for the duration of the fast.

On each day of the fast she took bath after rising and then performed \textit{samāyik} and \textit{pratikraman} before visiting the temple prior to attending the preachings. After the preachings, which included encouragement to those performing the \textit{aksiṣay nidhi tap}, she would make her way to the shrine in the \textit{upāśray}, along with over one hundred other women doing the fast. In pride of place on the shrine was displayed a silver \textit{Naupad Siddha Cakra Yāntra}, symbolising both essential qualities required to begin the path to spiritual enlightenment as well as the five key categories of renunciant, namely, ascetics, religious teachers, leaders of ascetic orders, liberated souls and \textit{tirthaṅkars} (pañc parameśthin). In front of this shrine a large metal pot was placed (called \textit{a kumbha} or \textit{kalaśa} in the fasting booklet) and as many smaller pots with coconuts balanced on the top as there were fasting women. Mrs Bhaṇḍārī, along with the other women had her own small table on which she daily made twenty-one rice \textit{svāstikas} and placed offerings of fruit and sweets. She collected her pot from the shrine, removed the coconut which she had covered with an orange cloth, in order to place within the pot additional offerings of money, rice and almonds. She also placed money, rice and almonds within the large metal pot on the central shrine table. By the end of the sixteen days all the pots were full. After making her offerings she joined the other women in hymn
singing which lasted until lunch time at which point she accompanied all the women across the road to the dharma šalā where everyone partook of a substantial and convivial ekāsana meal, specially cooked for them by temple servants. Mrs Bhanḍārī then returned home for a short rest before returning to the dharma šalā for the scheduled afternoon pūjās, which were well attended by the wider community, particularly the women and children. She followed this by evening pratikramaṇa and a final visit to the temple for darśan before returning home.

**Persons of women: kinship as represented through the fast**

The symbolism included within the fasting rituals represents both the individual souls and selves of women as well as the kinship roles which constitute their externally perceived personhood. The different layers of meaning encapsulated in the name akṣay nidhi indicate how this might be so and well illustrate John Cort’s thesis that the values of the mokṣa marga ideology, focusing on the soul, and the values of well-being, focusing on life in the world, are intricately interconnected. As one woman carefully explained to me, ‘akṣay’ means ‘that which can never be destroyed’ and ‘nidhi’ refers to wealth, fund or treasure. The book given to all the women performing the fast said that practitioners of akṣay nidhi tap acquire knowledge and a noble character, thereby implying that the indestructible wealth is that of spiritual qualities gained, as the story implies, through adherence to Jainism. Mrs Bhanḍārī supported this view telling me that she believed it contributed to the purification of her soul.

However, other women took the story more literally. For example, Vebhobāi, a woman in her mid-thirties from the Khartar Gacch Śrīmāl caste, who performed the fast, explained to me, ‘People do this tap so they get wealth in the next birth enabling them to do charitable religious work’.35 Certainly at one level the symbolism of the fast seems to support the values of worldly well-being and appears to highlight the married woman’s perceived role as the cosmic guardian of family health, wealth and happiness. The pot is a particularly interesting focal symbol. Referred to in the fasting booklet as kumbha, or sometimes as kalaśa, it is significantly one of the eight auspicious symbols (aṣṭamaṅgal) in both Jainism and Hinduism and as such is common in both Jain and Hindu ritual. On the afternoon of the first day of the fast in 1982, a naupad pūjā, celebrating the soul’s path to liberation, was held in the upāśray. Included in the shrine were the coconut topped steel pots, which people explained represented the women who were performing the akṣay nidhi fast. Indeed, the symbolic linkage of women and pots is suggested by the fact that the water pot is a symbol for the female tīrthāṅkar Mallināth. The women who performed the fast clearly identified the pots with womanhood by telling me that the sight of a woman with a pot on her head is a very auspicious sight.36 They did not elaborate on this but it is relevant to note that in Hinduism the kumbha specifically stands for the power of the mother goddess who is the source of fertility and the creative energy of the universe. In addition,
it is commonly used to symbolise the household goddesses (Dallapiccola 2002: 120), believed to protect the family and ensure good fortune.37

People explained that the pot and coconut together were symbols of pious religious work as they were śubh čiz (good things) and mangalik čiz (auspicious things). John Cort points out that both these terms can refer to the values of worldly well-being and that within a ritual context the coconut specifically is a symbol of fertility and success all over India.38 The coconut is an important symbol in both Hindu and Jain rituals and the cloth covered coconut in the pot, carried on a woman’s head features in a variety of Jain religious contexts. For example I saw these used during a pilgrimage as well as in a statue installation ceremony. In the context of aksąy nidhi tap the covering of bright red, orange and yellow cloths, fringed with silver seemed to reinforce the meaning of fertility as such cloths were reminiscent of the sarts worn by women for marriage or other festive occasions – the colour of which represent fertility and auspiciousness. This theme is reinforced by the pots filled to the top with offerings by the end of the fast. The booklet emphasises that by the last day the pots should be full, suggesting a link with the full pot or pūrna kalaśa in Hinduism as the symbol of good fortune, plenty, fertility and the life force (Saletore 1982: 645, 796 and Dallapiccola 2002: 159).

So there is a strong case for suggesting that at one level the pots signify a woman’s procreative and nurturing role within the patrilineal family as wife and mother together with the responsibility she is believed to bear for her family’s physical and spiritual well-being through the merit she accumulates as a consequence of her religious work. The fast therefore defines female personhood in terms of their kinship roles and obligations to the wider community:

**The focus on selfhood through aksąy nidhi**

The following narrative, provided by one woman in her late forties, Mrs Nahāta, indicates however that this is far from the whole story and points beautifully to the way in which some women read the pot and coconut as representative of their individual soul and that soul’s journey towards enlightenment:

In the beginning the husk and the coconut are joined together. As time passes the inner part gets separated from the husk. We should be like the coconut fruit – while living in the material world we should not be stuck and attached to material things but must remain separate.

Other women carefully told me that the pot represented the soul and that the inner white fruit of the coconut represented the ideal pure state of the soul when freed from karma. These interpretations support John Cort’s (2001: 194) analysis of the pot or kalaśa as representing increase and fertility not only at the level of worldly life but also at the level of the soul. He explains that increase in the context of the soul signifies spiritual development whereby detachment is cultivated and
freedom from rebirth ultimately achieved. The white rice placed daily into the pots by the women holds similar meanings. Women and men told me that white rice, devoid of its husk, is unable to re-grow, and in this way white rice symbolizes the soul devoid of karma and therefore freed from rebirth in this world.

The other items – almonds and money placed inside the pot daily – reinforced such meanings. Almonds as luxury food and money were explained as symbolic of worldly pleasures being renounced. In this way the pot represents the embodied pure and fully spiritual soul to which all religious and renunciatory activity is believed to lead in the end. Similarly, I was informed that the offerings of sweets and fruits symbolise the stage of vītarāga, when the soul is free of desires for pleasing things. The timing of the fast during paryuṣan – the most important Jain festival of the year when values of renunciation and spiritual liberation are brought to the fore – certainly emphasised the orientation of all religious activity towards the individual soul.

Mrs Jārchur, the woman who led the procession at the end of the fast, reinforced this view. According to her, ‘Religious work brings peace to the soul. This fast does not help husbands. To do ṛṣay nidhi tap for your husband is futile. The fast is for the good of your own soul’.

This interpretation was supported by Asha, one of the small number of unmarried young women who performed the fast. Now one could read their performance in terms of action oriented towards good karma and attracting a good husband and healthy children. But the example of Asha suggests this is too simplistic. Asha was a 20-year-old girl who had completed her university degree. She was quite a shy, soft-spoken woman who, since leaving university, increasingly made religious activity a central part of her life. Her beliefs linked both her potential kinship roles as an adult woman as well as her conception of herself as embodying an independent soul. Thus she supported her mother’s belief that ‘through religious activity a woman makes a heaven of her home’. At the same time she emphasised the importance of sincerity behind any religious activity and discussed the way in which she felt religious activity shaped her individual character so that she would have the ability to face any adversity with equanimity. In this way she felt her soul was purified. Significantly, she had participated in a group performance of the three-day Candaṇḍāla upavās, which re-enacts a fast performed by a woman who became one of the first nuns under the tīrthankar Mahāvīra. Her performance of ṛṣay nidhi tap was therefore part of an ongoing process in her shaping of a sincerely felt religious identity which she perceived as the core of her sense of self. Certainly she radiated a calm and quiet self assurance.

**Concluding remarks: the pot as a symbol of the self within the person**

In pulling all these ideas and interpretations together, I think it is important to emphasise that the fast and its symbolism does not merely represent all these values in the abstract. Each pot is tended by a particular woman, and as I have
argued earlier can be seen as representative of that woman. The various interpretations of the symbolism point to the pots as potent representations of women as persons. On one level each pot represents the aspect of a woman’s personhood created through interaction with kin and her interpretation of her ascribed roles as mother, wife and nurturer. Through the fast a woman displays the fulfilment of her social responsibilities both within the community and within her household where her spiritual power enables her to mediate between the spiritual and the material realms, safeguarding the health and good fortune of family members. Her moral authority is publicly demonstrated, and through this demonstration she is publicly judged as a good Jain woman who through her fulfilment of sevā is judged as worthy of respect. In the process not only is her status as a person elevated but so is that of her affinal family in which she is daughter-in-law, wife, mother and mother-in-law, as well as her natal family which she represents as daughter and sister. So at this level one could argue that women encapsulate Dumont’s notion of Indian personhood whereby the individual is subsumed within and works for the interest of the group.

Yet at the same time the structure and symbolism of the fast challenges Dumont’s view of personhood as well as Marriott’s view of the Indian ‘dividual’. The fast detaches the female practitioner from the collectivity of family and community. The husband’s permission for his wife to do the fast, legitimately absolves her from conjugal demands and worldly tasks of cooking, cleaning and childcare. The shrine within the upāśray, where she spends the morning praying and singing hymns constitutes a sacred space, which further separates her both actually and symbolically from the household. The communal ekāsana meal cooked by temple servants and eaten by all the fasting women in the upāśray serves further to underline this symbolic separation. In particular the vow of celibacy, undertaken before all fasts, is a particularly potent form of actual and ritualised separation of a woman from her husband. La Fontaine’s (1992: 103) observations that gendered activities can temporarily cut across principles which link men and women as husbands and wives are pertinent here. This detachment is most graphically symbolised by the individual pot and coconut which stand in contra-distinction to the large communal pot to which all contribute offerings and which arguably symbolises the community. Each small pot represents in solid form a woman’s individual selfhood, self-discipline and independent spiritual existence over which she alone gains increasing autonomy both with age and increased religious activity.

In many ways the fasts are similar to rites of passage. The vow of celibacy and husband’s permission constitutes the stage of separation, the fast itself comprises the transitional stage and the procession, formal parnā or fast breaking and celebratory feast symbolically re-emphasises her links with kin, therefore re-incorporating the woman back into daily mundane life. But as with all rituals, the re-incorporated woman is transformed in a subtle way. As Laidlaw and Humphrey (1994: 227–230) point out, participating in rituals is a creative act which not only makes a public statement about the person involved but also works
on the emotions. This, as Lawrence Babb (1996: 15) perceptively notes, gives rise
to feelings which continue beyond the ritual thereby contributing to the
worshipper’s personal and social identity.

It is the nature of this identity that is so significant. Religious activity and
belief enables participating women to nurture and build upon their sense of
individual selfhood in that the ritualised techniques of separation together with
the symbolic meanings held by the ritual objects, direct women’s attention to what
lies at the very heart of Jainsim, namely the journey of the embodied soul or ātman
towards eventual liberation. In the words of the Aksay Niddhi Tap Vidhi
(1982: 1), all forms of tapasyā or ascetic practice, including fasting, lead to the
purity of the soul (ātma śuddha) and self reflection within the soul (ātma cintan).
Belief in the karmic distinctiveness of each soul, which in turn is believed to fash-
ion each human being’s consciousness of self and agency, contributes to a
woman’s reflexive awareness of individual selfhood separate from her existence
as a being linked to others through ties of affection and obligation defined by the
framework of kinship and religious community. Contemplative techniques incor-
porated into the fasting rituals give women the opportunity to reflect on inner
selves which incorporate their individual souls engaged in a unique journey to
spiritual liberation – a journey not circumscribed by one lifetime. Whilst the
widely voiced belief that a woman’s morally directed behaviour and religious
activity can affect the worldly fortune of close family members supports
Marriott’s theories of Indians and ‘individual’ persons, the belief that the soul of
each human being can only be affected by that human being’s own actions,
defines women as separate selves with their own individuality. Whatever other
aspects of her life are influenced or curtailed by kin, she and she alone can
influence the progression of her soul – which constitutes the very heart of her
sense of self.

The Jain material is thus a clear illustration of Lukes and Cohen’s suggestion
that notions of the self are inextricable components of the total person. It further
highlights how religious beliefs are crucial to understanding the ways in which
people conceive of the self within the person cross-culturally. The self conscious-
ness which Cohen emphasises as central to human conceptualisations of the self
is particularly developed in Jain belief. This in turn fosters the development of
clearly defined concepts of selfhood within both Jain men and women but which
has particularly important implications for women given their position within the
power structures inherent in the systems of caste and kinship.

In general therefore, the complex of fasting rituals, continue and amplify a
process gently initiated in childhood and increasingly consolidated after mar-
riage. Fasting, and particularly the longer more complex fasts, carve out a potent
symbolic and sacred space for women, similar to that mentioned earlier as created
through sāmāyik and temple visiting, a space within which they can reflect and
nurture their inner self. As a new wife in a testing and unfamiliar environment the
daily contemplative rituals enable a woman to create within her life small areas
of sacred space and time. Within this sacred time, carved carefully out of a day
filled with household activity, she is enabled to contemplate the rich religious imagery encapsulating complex Jain philosophical ideas.

This in turn allows her to locate herself as a conscious being within the universe – a vision which both enriches her perception of the world and enables her to see beyond and to negotiate her way through the social obligations which frame her life. Undeniably therefore within this particular Jain community, religious belief and practice combine uniquely with kinship roles, age and household developmental cycles, contributing on the one hand to the social construction of female personhood over time, and on the other hand to the construction of the self within the person through nurturing a sense of spiritual fulfilment and self-realisation, enabling a woman to imaginatively orient herself to cosmic as well as social time and space.

Notes

1 This re-analysis was partly inspired by Whitney Kelting’s (2001) sensitive ethnography on female religious practice in Maharashtra. Anne Vallely’s (2002) ethnography on Terāpanthī Jain nuns provides an important comparison to the material on laywomen.

2 Note on transliteration: I have transliterated most Hindi words which are used in a wide variety of contexts to include the silent inherent ‘a’. I have not included the inherent ‘a’ for words used specifically in a Jain context, such as Śvetāmbar, so as to indicate the specific pronunciation of such words by Jaipur Jains.

3 Subsequent to my own fieldwork, considerable research has been undertaken on the Śvetāmbar Jains residing in the Jauhrī Bāzār, Jaipur. See in particular Laidlaw 1995 and Babb 1996.


5 See in particular Strathern 1988.


7 I am in agreement with Cohen’s (1994: 5) criticism of social theorists who question whether a concept of self exists cross-culturally.

8 See Lamb 2000: 27–41, for a useful review of these arguments.

9 A lighthearted example of this view was revealed by many Jain womens’ attempts to understand how I had got the resources plus permission from my family to travel alone so far from home. They generously concluded that the accumulation of beneficial karma had given me the opportunity to learn about the Jain religion, in their view the essential starting point to eventual spiritual liberation.

10 Women shape the offering of dried rice into the four armed svāstika, which they explained as symbolic of the four kinds of birth a soul may take, placing above this three dots representing the three jewels, above which a half moon shape is fashioned representing the abode of the siddhas or liberated souls.

11 The word sanskāras is also used to denote life cycle rituals which mark changes in social status and which therefore contribute to constituting the externally perceived person.

12 This is not to assume that among other Jain communities hypergamous marriage is always the norm.

13 Amongst the relatively wealthy Jauhrī Bāzār Jains, notions of status and hierarchy played a key role in the organization of arranged marriages. In the absence of sufficient wealth, family reputation represented by female honour was particularly crucial in securing a good match.
15 See Sherry Fohr’s article in this volume which deals with the intersection of parental concerns about female sexual vulnerability and nunhood.
16 Men of course face different pressures. They are expected to work hard once they have left school, in joining their father in the family business or initiating a career of their own. Parents looking for potential grooms will pay particular attention to this, taking care not to marry their daughter to a young man whom they consider lazy and therefore who might not be able to provide economic stability for their daughter and future grandchildren. Moreover, a young man’s status within the male community will depend on the business connections he makes and his reputation as hard-working and trustworthy. The moral reputation of his family, particularly that of his mother will reflect well on his own reputation, which is further bolstered by a modicum of visible religious activity. Men are not expected, in their young years or prior to retirement, to spend a large amount of time on religious activity – as it is considered that it would detract them from their economic responsibilities. However, daily temple visiting for darshan is a minimum requirement to retain a reputation as a man of sound character both in business and as a potential groom in marriage negotiations.
17 As I have argued in a previous paper (Reynell 1987: 33–57), Svetāmbar Jain ideology has not been immune to the ambiguous attitudes inherent within the encompassing North Indian patrilineal kinship and caste system, whereby control over identity, status and resources is vested in the control of female sexuality. Hence the positive valuations given to women in the religious literature are to some degree offset by contradictory statements associating women with sensual pleasure, lust and deceit (see for example the Sātrākraṭṭāngā Śūtra, 271–275 or Hemacandra’s Trīṣaṭīśīlākāpūrusacaritra, Vol I: 35, Vol VI: 26). But this is precisely where the story literature is so important. Most of the women I worked with were not familiar with the canonical texts, with the exception of the Kalpa Śūtra, which is read out loud during paryuṣan. They were far more familiar with the story literature portraying positive images of womanhood. Whitney Kelting (2001: 23–32) also found this to be the case amongst the Svetāmbar Jain women with whom she worked in Maharashtra, where she highlighted an area of female religious expertise that has received little attention, namely the crucial role of hymn singing and the collection of hymns for performance plays in conveying positive images of women.
18 In a similar vein Sarah Lamb (2000: 141) notes that Bengali villagers view techniques of detachment as a means not to renounce the world but to help deal with the intense emotional attachments which are a part of worldly life.
19 Marie-Claude Mahias’ (1985) meticulous ethnography on a community of Digambar Jains in Delhi clearly illustrates the central role food plays as a religious symbol among the Jains.
20 This is not to say that such a resource group is continually activated or that members are always co-operative. As Peter Flügel (1995–1996: 163) points out, economic relationships within the religious community may often be antagonistic and competitive.
21 Whitney Kelting (2001: 44) suggests it is less important among the Svetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Tāpā Gacch Jains in the Maharashtrian town of Pune.
22 Jain women explained that it is not considered appropriate for newly married women to undertake fasts entailing denial of food for long periods and on a regular basis as it would interfere with the heavy housework expected of her within the joint family. Similarly, whilst it was not mentioned explicitly, extended fasting might affect a newly married woman’s fertility and ability to breastfeed. In this sense fasting goes against the interests of the joint family and there can be a tension between a woman’s desire to engage in religious activity and the interests of her family.
23 This fast celebrates the origins of Jainism and is performed in memory of the first tīrthankar, Rśabha. See reference in Hemacandra’s Trīṣaṭīśīlākāpūrusacaritra, Vol. I: 177.
24 This chapter does not intend to deal with theories of *karma* in detail. One of the key points is that *karma* affects both the future thought patterns of the mind, future actions enacted through the body inhabited by the soul and the future worldly fortunes of that soul, including its next rebirth. *Karma* is believed to have both spiritual and worldly repercussions. Fruits of good *karma* lead to the purification of the soul and increased worldly good fortune whilst bad *karma* hinders spiritual growth and encourages misfortune. Theories of *karma* are therefore intimately implicated in what John Cort (2001) has identified as the two interwoven sets of beliefs influencing Jain practice, namely the ideology of *mokṣa mārga* and the path of well-being.

25 See Reynell (1985: 126–140), for a more detailed discussion of this.


27 This is a good example of how specific religious practice can be to one region. Whilst *aksay nidhi* was important in Jaipur as a group fast, Whitney Kelting (2001: 44) notes that in Pune, Maharashtra, it had nowhere near the same significance.


29 Although the accompanying booklet states that men can perform *aksay nidhi tap*, and the associated story centres on male performance, no men joined in the particular fast that I witnessed.

30 These temples were located within the half square mile of the Jauhr Bazaar area between Haldiyon kā rāsta and Kundigaron ke Bhairu kā rāsta. One was managed by the Khartar Gacch Osval caste and another by the Khartar Gacch Śrīmāl caste. The Tapā Gacch Osvals ran three more, one of which I was told was privately owned by a family living in Agra.

31 Whilst Jains are popularly associated with trade, and indeed the Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Tapā and Khartar Gacch Jains, with whom I worked, belonging to the Osval and Śrīmāl castes, were largely jewellery and cloth merchants, this is not invariably the case. Much of the Digambar community in Jaipur is associated with government administration. To give another example, Marcus Banks (1992: 46–49, 59, 70–74) points out that in Gujarat a proportion of the Jain population are agriculturalists.

32 I am relying on oral versions of the story told to me by women who participated in the fast, together with that given in the accompanying booklet.

33 See also discussion in Maya Unnithan-Kumar’s (1997: chapter 2) book on how various caste communities in Rajasthan construct their identity in relation to Rajput dominance.

34 None of the women were able to tell me the significance of the number 21.

35 This statement reflects John Cort’s (2001: 201) conclusion that the path of well-being is a valid religious goal for Mūrtipūjak Jains in that without the wealth produced by the Jain laity, Jain institutions and ascetic community would not survive.

36 Indeed, at the 5th Jain workshop held at SOAS on 13th June 2003, I was informed by one Jain participant that men are never allowed to hold the *kalaśa* in religious ceremonies – again clearly identifying pots as a female symbol.

37 Babb notes that the pot can represent the ‘physical locus of the deity’ (1975: 280). I am told that in *Dūrga pūja* the pot is a focal symbol standing for the self replenishing creative energy of nature (S. Dasgupta, research student, SOAS: personal communication).


39 The story associated with the fast and focusing on Puruṣottam may also suggest this meaning. Thomas Mooren (1997: 18–25) suggests that in Sanskrit *puruṣa* can mean the universal soul and is linked to the concept of *ātman* or self and Brahman or universal consciousness.

40 A version of the Candaṭṭālā story can be found in Hemacandra’s *Triṣaṭiṭālakāpuruṣacakirita*, Vol. VI: 112–119.
Bibliography

Primary sources

Trīṣaṭṭiśalākāpurṇaṅcaritra of Ācārya Hemacandra. (1931) Translated by H. M. Johnson.

Secondary sources


236
Part IV

SECTARIAN MOVEMENTS
RETHINKING RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

A perspective on the followers of Śrīmad Rājacandra

Emma Salter

Introduction

Śrīmad Rājacandra (1867–1901 CE) was a Jain saint from Gujarat.¹ He preached that the true path to mokṣa (spiritual liberation) begins with experiential knowledge of one’s own soul, which he described as self-realisation (samyak darśana).² In this respect his message is emphatically soteriological. He taught that the most effective way to experience self-realisation is guru bhakti (devotion to an authoritative religious preceptor). Śrīmad Rājacandra was also a staunch anti-sectarian.

Today Śrīmad Rājacandra has a dynamic following that extends beyond India into the Jain diaspora communities of East Africa, Europe and North America. The vast majority of his devotees are Jains, although some are Vaiṣṇavas, who originate from Gujarat. A broad range of economic backgrounds is represented in Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following, although baniyā (business) is the predominant class. The exact number of followers is impossible to determine, but an educated guess would be in the region of 20,000. There is no mendicant presence within Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following and almost all its gurus, including Śrīmad Rājacandra himself, have been laypeople. It is to these lay preceptors, instead of to mendicants, that Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers turn for authoritative spiritual guidance. It is for these reasons that Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following can be described as a lay movement within Jainism.

This chapter discusses the influence of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s lay status and his teaching about self-realisation and guru bhakti on the development of his following as a lay movement. It also offers some background information about Śrīmad Rājacandra and the organisation of his following.³ Where possible, the method throughout this essay is phenomenological. This means that I have tried to represent the beliefs and practices of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers from the
perspective of the practitioners themselves. To help orientate the reader the chapter begins with a brief outline of the movement’s organisational structure.

The structure of the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement in outline

The organisational structure of the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement is complex. Contrary to Terāpanthī Jainism, for instance, which has a single ācārya at its head, the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement has a multifarious organisational structure. It has no central, authoritative spiritual council or administrative body to which all of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers are accountable. Some followers practice their religion independently, but many are organised into a collection of self-contained communities that are autonomous in terms of their management (usually by a board of trustees), finance and to whom they turn for religious authority. Some communities of followers venerate only Śrīmad Rājacandra, whereas in other communities a living guru who teaches in Śrīmad Rājacandra’s name is venerated alongside Śrīmad Rājacandra. All Jains who are Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers, regardless of whether or not they are disciples of a living guru, also venerate the Jinas to whom they offer appropriate ritual attention. Relations between the different communities of followers are co-operative and representatives from each come together at important events, for example the inauguration of a new temple dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra. Even though each community of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers is separate, they unite to form a discrete movement within modern Jainism because they share the same religious ideology, which is expressed through devotion to Śrīmad Rājacandra and the acceptance of his teachings. This has led to a similarity of religious practice amongst the separate communities, which includes the use of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s writings in devotional practices, the veneration of his image and the prominence of guru bhakti.

There have been many gurus associated with the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement throughout the course of its history. This is one factor that has given rise to its multifaceted organisational structure. Some gurus continue spiritual lineages that serve existing communities of followers; others form new, independent communities. In 2002 three communities of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers looked to the religious authority of a living guru or gurus. Each of these communities continues to be based at an āśram dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra, all in Gujarat where most āśrams dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra are located.

- The Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśram, Dharampur in South Gujarat. Established in 2001 by Param Pujya Śrī Rakeshbhai Jhaveri (born 1966). In 2002 the site was still under construction, but could accommodate up to a 100 of Śrī Rakeshbhai’s disciples on a temporary basis, visits usually lasting up to two weeks. It is anticipated that in the future many disciples will chose to live permanently at the āśram. The majority of Śrī Rakeshbhai’s disciples live in Mumbai where his fortnightly lectures attract an audience in the region of 3,000. His disciples
also live in other parts of India (Gujarat, Bangalore Chennai and Calcutta) as well as in Europe (Antwerp and Britain), Nairobi and North America.

• The Śrīmad Rājacandra Adhyātmik Sādhanā Kendra, Koba (near Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar). Established in 1975 by Param Pūjya Śrī Ātmanandji (born 1931). Śrī Ātmanandji has approximately 1,000 disciples, of whom approximately 60 live permanently at the aśram, as does Śrī Ātmanandji. With the addition of visitors and temporary residents the population at the aśram is usually between 80 and 100. This increases to well over 1000 during special festivals and events such as Divālti and Paryuṣan and the aśram’s annual śibir (religious camp). The majority of Śrī Ātmanandji’s disciples live in Gujarat, but like to Śrī Rakeshbhāī, his following also extends to other parts of India and to Britain, East Africa and North America.

• The Rāj Sanbhāg Satsaṅg Mandal at Sayla near Rajkot and Ahmedabad. Established in 1976 by Param Pūjya Śrī Lādakcandbhāī Mānekand Vorā (1903–1977). Since Śrī Lādakcandbhāī’s death this community has had two concurrent gurus, Param Pūjya Śrī Nālinbhāī Koṭhārī (born 1943) and Adarniya Śrīmatī Sadguṇādben Sāh (born 1928). Śrīmatī Sadguṇādben, who is now elderly, spends most of her time in Mumbai, whilst her counterpart is the more regular spiritual presence at Sayla. These gurus have approximately 2,000 disciples, approximately forty of whom live permanently at Sayla. As with Koba, visitors and temporary residents swell the population, which further increases during festivals and special events. Again, although most of these two guru’s disciples live in Gujarat they also have a substantial following elsewhere in India, and in Britain, East Africa and North America.

Many thriving aśrams dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra do not look to a living guru for religious authority. The largest aśram of this type, and one of the most industrious in the movement, is the Śrīmad Rājacandra Aśram at Agas. It was established in 1920 by Śrī Māhārāj Lallūjī Svāmī (1854–1936), who was one of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s closest disciples. Approximately 300 of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers live permanently at this aśram. Accommodation is available for a further 600 followers to stay temporarily, while during festival times the number increases to 2500.

Each community of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers that I approached during my field research reported a steady rise in membership. This is reflected in the expansion of some sites. When it is complete, the aśram at Dharampur will cover 220 acres. The aśrams now situated at Koba and Sayla relocated to their current sites, Koba in 1982 and Sayla in 1985, because they had outgrown their existing locations. A prayer hall that can accommodate 5,000 worshippers has recently been constructed at Agas aśram. This aśram is also being expanded and its facilities are being improved to meet the needs of its growing population.

As well as aśrams, there are independent mandirs (temples) dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra’s veneration, mainly in Gujarat and Mumbai. For example, in February 2002 a third mandir in Rajkot dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra was
inaugurated (see figure 10.2). The majority of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s devotees also have domestic shrines in their homes.

How Śrīmad Rājacandra’s lay status has influenced the development of his following

Śrīmad Rājacandra

Lakṣmīnandan Mehta (Śrīmad Rājacandra) was born in November 1867 at Vavania, a port town in Saurashtra (also Kathiavad) on the north coastal peninsular of Gujarat.6 His parents, who were of the Daśā Śrīmālī caste, changed his name to Raichand (Rāychand) when he was four years old. He was attributed the honorific title ‘Śrīmad’ posthumously by his disciples.

Biographies about Śrīmad Rājacandra describe him as intellectually precocious, and emotionally and spiritually mature beyond his years. In his teens he earned a degree of celebrity by giving public performances of extraordinary feats of memory and concentration, such as attending simultaneously to 100 different activities. His profound interest in religion began early in his childhood. As a young boy he was initiated as a devotee into the Krṣṇa bhakti tradition favoured by his father and paternal grandfather, but by the time he turned sixteen he had
become fully committed to his mother’s religion, Jainism. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s mother was a Sthānakvāsi Jain, but as a statement of the anti-sectarian beliefs that Śrīmad Rājacandra held throughout his adult life he never associated himself with a specific Jain denomination. This has caused some confusion amongst scholars. For example, Glasenapp and Titze⁷ associate him with Sthānakvāsi Jainism, Banks and Laidlaw⁸ refer to him simply as a Jain layman from Gujarat and Dundas⁹ associates him with Digambar Jainism.

Śrīmad Rājacandra married when he was twenty and fathered four children, one of whom died in infancy. He claimed that he became a husband and father to satisfy his parents’ wishes and that he would have preferred to have remained unmarried. About the same time as his marriage Śrīmad Rājacandra went into business with his uncle-in-law trading precious stones. His biographies describe him as an honest, skilful businessman and the business prospered. Throughout this period he spent whatever time he could in religious retreat. When he was thirty he retired from business altogether, at the same time relinquishing his obligations as a householder. Having left professional and domestic life he headed for remote places, such as Idar in Gujarat, where he could concentrate on his spiritual development without distraction.

By this time Śrīmad Rājacandra was well-known within Saurashtran communities and amongst his business associates as a religious teacher who attracted crowds of interested listeners to his discourses. He had also gathered a number of close disciples, including a core of Sthānakvāsi munis (male mendicants) who were based at Khambhat in Gujarat, of whom Lallūjī Svāmī was the most senior. Despite Śrīmad Rājacandra’s lay status his disciples were in no doubt of his religious authority, which they believed was proven by the austere and ascetic lifestyle he was now living, by his extensive scriptural knowledge and, most importantly, by what they accepted as the purity of his soul. Nevertheless, his muni disciples were keen for him to initiate as a mendicant and so ‘legitimise’ their relationship with him. Śrīmad Rājacandra too was eager to take dikṣā (mendicant initiation) for which he now believed he was spiritually prepared, but his mother was reluctant to give her son the permission he required to take dikṣā because of her concern for his frail health. Throughout his adult life Śrīmad Rājacandra suffered a chronic digestive complaint. His mother finally gave her permission for his initiation on the condition that he must first recover from his current bout of illness. Śrīmad Rājacandra never did recover. He was under the medical supervision of doctors when he died at Rajkot, in April 1901, aged thirty four.

Śrīmad Rājacandra’s current devotees have access to his image and teachings through photographs of him and through an anthology of his writings (in Gujarati). The anthology, which was collated towards the end of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s life by one of his close disciples, Ambalālībhā Lālcand (1869–1904), contains his philosophical and poetic writings, transcriptions of some of his discourses, as well as approximately 800 letters written to his disciples and followers. It is titled Śrīmad Rājacandra and is published by the Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśram at Agas. Many of
Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers own a copy of Śrīmad Rājacandra, which they revere as scripture. Some of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s writings have also been published independently, including his most celebrated text, the Ātma Siddhi (AS), which he composed in 1896. Shortly before his death Śrīmad Rājacandra posed for two studio photographs each of which depict him in a meditative posture (one standing and one sitting). They reveal how tragically emaciated he had become. His skeletal frame and early death have prompted some scholars and devotees to mistakenly assume that he purposefully cultivated his emaciated physique through fasting, ultimately leading to sallekhanā (ritual death by fasting). Copies of these photographs are displayed wherever Śrīmad Rājacandra is venerated (see figure 10.1). Images of him fashioned in marble or metal and modelled on these photographs are also displayed at many, but not all, sites dedicated to his veneration.

Śrīmad Rājacandra’s lay status, coupled with the criticisms he levied against what he considered to be poor levels of spirituality amongst mendicants, has led to another misconception amongst scholars and opponents of Śrīmad Rājacandra, that he rejected mendicancy outright. Śrīmad Rājacandra was dismayed at institutional Jainism for falling short of its own values, but he did not censure mendicancy in principle. For example, he did not encourage his muni disciples to reject their mendicant status (an element of diplomacy may also have been in play here) and his teachings do not deviate from Jain doctrine that states only mendicants can attain mokṣa. His followers believe that Śrīmad Rājacandra will take mendicant initiation before his final liberation, although not in this world. As far as his current incarnation is concerned, some followers believe him to be enjoying his penultimate incarnation as a divine-being in the celestial realms of devlok before reaching his final incarnation as a mendicant in Mahāvīrdeha, a geographical location in the middle realm of the cosmos from where liberation may be achieved. Others believe he is already experiencing his final incarnation as a mendicant in Mahāvīrdeha.

**Religious authority and the spiritual hierarchy in Jainism**

Despite his personal aspiration towards mendicancy, the fact that Śrīmad Rājacandra actually remained a layman throughout his life has had a significant influence on his following’s development as a lay movement. In most forms of Jainism, mendicants have religious authority over the laity, who regard them not only as religious experts, but also as sacred and worthy of veneration. Babb describes the veneration of ascetics as central to Jain ritual culture. As a layman Śrīmad Rājacandra lacked the authority, according to Jain tradition, to initiate his own disciples and establish a new mendicant lineage. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers are unofficially barred from aspiring to mendicancy because initiation would place them, technically at least, higher than Śrīmad Rājacandra the spiritual hierarchy of Jainism. Likewise, it is contrary to this spiritual hierarchy for a layman to be the object of a mendicant’s veneration. When I asked Śrī Rakeshbhai why he had not taken dīkṣā, despite having attained self-realisation, he made the
following comments;

The problem is they [initiated mendicants] will not let me worship Śrīmad Rājacandra because he was not a sādhu [muni]. A sādhu cannot worship a householder. They are not prepared to believe that Śrīmad was a highly elevated soul. They consider him as a good disciple of Mahāvir, but sādhus believe themselves to be higher than him, so if you just wear their dress you are higher than Śrīmad Rājacandra and I am not prepared to believe that. So that [dīksā] is not possible for us. A sādhu cannot bow to a householder and to them he is only a householder because they only see the external.\footnote{This guru felt mendicant initiation was closed to him because it would conflict with his veneration of Śrīmad Rājacandra. This was unacceptable to him because, just like the other devotees of Śrīmad Rājacandra, he too worships Śrīmad Rājacandra as his divine guru. Śrī Rakeśbhāī offered further reasons for not initiating as a mendicant. Not least were the responsibility he felt towards his disciples and the sectarian boundaries that he felt mendicancy may impose upon him.

The restrictions on mendicancy that Śrīmad Rājacandra’s lay status places over his followers are linked to the spiritual hierarchy in Jainism that gives mendicants religious authority over the laity. For those Jains who do not accept Śrīmad Rājacandra, his lay status is one criterion that denies him religious authority. Yet according to Śrīmad Rājacandra himself and to his disciples (past and present), his religious authority was in no way diminished by his lay status. This is because he stipulated that religious authority is not an automatic consequence of initiation into mendicancy, but is only verified by self-realisation, a high level of which he claimed to have achieved.}

How Śrīmad Rājacandra’s interpretation of self-realisation has influenced the development of his following

Śrīmad Rājacandra defines self-realisation as an internal or spiritual state; specifically as the experience of one’s own soul as a phenomenon independent from one’s physical body or empirical senses.\footnote{Karma is attracted to the soul by kaśāya (passion), which is the stimulus behind any mental, physical or verbal activity. Kaśāya is motivated by rāga (attachment by attraction to a person, thing or event) and dveṣa (attachment by aversion to a person, thing or event). Karma that has adhered to the soul eventually ‘ripens’ and falls away, having produced its effect. This may be mental, physical or verbal action, usually reflective of the activity by which it was attracted originally. The soul responds to the events produced by karma with rāga or dveṣa, the result of which is the stimulation of the soul until it produces a karmic state.} The self-realised aspirant (of liberation) has removed and suppressed sufficient karma to experience the soul in its pure state, if even for only a moment. Karma are the minute particles of matter that pervade the entire cosmos, which adhere to the soul obscuring it from its true nature. Karma is attracted to the soul by kaśāya (passion), which is the stimulus behind any mental, physical or verbal activity. Kaśāya is motivated by rāga (attachment by attraction to a person, thing or event) and dveṣa (attachment by aversion to a person, thing or event). Karma that has adhered to the soul eventually ‘ripens’ and falls away, having produced its effect. This may be mental, physical or verbal action, usually reflective of the activity by which it was attracted originally. The soul responds to the events produced by karma with rāga or dveṣa,
which in turn stimulates *kaśāya* to attract more *karma* to the soul, and so the cycle continues. Liberation occurs when the soul is freed from all *karma*, enabling it to exist in its pure state. Such a state of ontological perfection is achieved by acquiring the passionless state of *vitarāga* (without *rāga*) through non-attachment to *rāga*, *dveṣa* and, consequently, *kaśāya*. *Arhats* are souls that have attained *vitarāga* and are free from all deluding *karmas*. Upon the death of the physical body the *arhat* attains *mokṣa* and becomes a *siddha* (a liberated soul). Jinas are *arhats* who are also preceptors.

Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers’ religious practice focuses, in part, on reducing the soul’s output of *kaśāya* by psychological non-attachment to *rāga* and *dveṣa*. This is attempted through cultivating a sense of detachment from life’s events by understanding them to be no more than the cause and effect of *karma*. One follower explained this in terms of an actor trying to convince an audience of the reality of the character portrayed. No matter how convincing the performance, the actor never forgets her own identity. The actor represents the soul that should always remain aware of its own nature despite having to work through the scenes that *karma* lays before it. Psychological non-attachment is a means of renouncing whilst continuing to live in the world as a householder. It does not, however, relinquish personal responsibility. Jain teachings about *ahimsā* (non-violence) mean that an aspirant’s responsibility for her or his own salvation includes an ethical responsibility towards others. Non self-realised aspirants aspire to their first

---

**Figure 10.2** A metal image of Śrīmad Rājacandra is processed during the inauguration of a new temple, Rājkoṭ 2002. Photograph by the author.
experience of self-realisation, whilst self-realised aspirants aspire to increase the frequency, duration and intensity of their soul experiences by discharging more \textit{karma} from their soul. By the same token, if an aspirant’s religious efforts decline, self-realisation will diminish as more \textit{karma} is allowed to accrue.

The daily programme at Koba is typical of the specific types of religious practice performed by Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers. It begins at 5.30 a.m. with congregational \textit{bhakti} dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra, followed at 8.45 a.m. with \textit{pūjā} dedicated in rotation to each of the Jinas. At 10 a.m. Śrī Ātmānandāji, or if he is unavailable a senior disciple, gives \textit{svādhyāya} (religious lecture) for about one hour. Group readings of Jain scripture begin at 4 p.m. followed by meditation at 4.45 p.m. After dinner, at 6 p.m., Śrī Ātmānandāji and his disciples take an evening walk, which allows disciples the opportunity for more informal discussion with their \textit{guru}. Ā\textit{ratt} (ritual veneration of the Jinas) takes place in the āśram’s temple at 7.15 p.m. followed by a meditation session. Congregational \textit{bhakti} dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra begins at 8.15 p.m. and lasts for at least one hour, but often much longer. The emphasis given to different types of religious practice vary between different communities of followers. For example, followers at Sayla emphasise meditation, whereas at Agas more emphasis is given to congregational \textit{bhakti}.

For Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers self-realisation is a religious experience that results in experiential knowledge. This is part of the reason why, within the ideological framework of the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement, self-realisation is the essential criterion for religious authority. Followers believe experiential knowledge to be immune to misinterpretation and hence superior to intellectual knowledge imbibed by book learning or attendance at lectures. Experiential knowledge is absolute, and therefore universal truth. To express the concept of universal truth followers recite the axiom that one non self-realised person may have a 1,000 different opinions, while a 1,000 self-realised people will all hold the same opinion because that view, arising from self-realisation, is absolute truth. So, an aspirant’s theoretical understanding of Jain doctrine gleaned by intellectual study is transformed and confirmed by the unequivocal experiential knowledge of self-realisation.\textsuperscript{17} The religious authority of a self-realised person is further secured by the high level of spiritual purity she or he must have attained to have experienced self-realisation. This in turn endorses the efficacy of her or his religious practice. The establishment of self-realisation as the main criterion for religious authority has shaped the development of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following as a lay movement in two main ways. It allows lay \textit{gurus} religious authority without the need for mendicant initiation and it has evoked a profound anti-sectarian ethic amongst Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers.

\textbf{Self-realisation and guru lineage}

Religious authority is traditionally verified in Jainism, particularly Śvetāmbar Jainism, by a secure lineage passed between the \textit{guru}, who is a mendicant, and
the disciple upon initiation into mendicancy. Guru lineage in the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement originates with Śrīmad Rājacandra’s claim to have been Mahāvīr’s disciple during a previous incarnation. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s lineal connection with Mahāvīr establishes a guru–disciple lineage of the highest quality because it links him with the pure source of a Jina’s teachings whilst by-passing the diluting effects of a lineal chain. It is a further indication to his followers of the ‘pure’, pre-sectarian form of Jainism they believe he preached. A tradition of guru lineage is found in some, but not all, communities of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers. The community at Sayla āśram traces its spiritual heritage back to Śrīmad Rājacandra via one of his immediate disciples, Sobhagbhaī of Sayla (1823–1897), through a guru lineage that is still active. The guru lineage at Agas originated with Śrīmad Rājacandra and passed via Śrī Lallūjī Svāmī to Śrī Brahmacārījī Govardhandās (1889–1954), who was Lallūjī Svāmī’s foremost disciple, but then ceased when Śrī Brahmacārījī was unable to locate anyone of sufficient spiritual calibre to continue the lineage.

Guru lineage overcomes the disciple’s obvious problem of identifying a self-realised guru. Yet despite the tradition of guru lineage in some communities, the essential qualification of an authoritative guru within the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement always remains self-realisation. This means that an authoritative lineal connection alone is not sufficient to qualify as a guru within the movement, moreover as such a connection is not necessary to qualify as a guru. For example, devotees do not prioritise Śrīmad Rājacandra’s connection with Mahāvīr over his self-realised state; in fact it was barely raised during the course of my various interviews with his followers. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s connection with Mahāvīr, and his memory of this past-life, is a further endorsement of his religious authority that is already secured by his self-realised state. The guru based at the āśram at Koba, Śrī Ātmānandjī, claims no lineal connection to Śrīmad Rājacandra. The acceptance of his religious authority by his disciples is located in their belief that he is self-realised.

The belief that self-realisation is the only legitimate source of religious authority has dispensed with guru lineage as the only means of authenticating religious authority. The association of religious authority with self-realisation above guru lineage has enabled independent gurus who have no lineal connection with Śrīmad Rājacandra or any other authoritative source to emerge spontaneously; their religious authority being verified by their self-realised status of which their disciples are convinced. It is this belief in the absolute authority of self-realisation that has enabled spiritually qualified lay gurus to emerge.

**Self-realisation and sectarianism**

Sectarian difference is an anathema to the absolute truth that self-realisation is thought to represent. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s refusal to endorse sectarianism by association with any particular denomination of Jainism or mendicant lineage gave rise to his religious independence. This means that the organisational structure of the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement has not been constrained by conformity
to an existing model. Under no circumstances do followers regard themselves as another Jain sect. A practical expression of anti-sectarian values within the movement is seen in followers’ freedom to worship in Digambar or Śvetāmbar temples, in the belief that the act of worship is more important than the appearance of the image. In support of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s teachings against sectarianism Śrī Lallājī Svāmī arranged for the construction of a Digambar and a Śvetāmbar temple at the āśram at Agas, both of which continue to be used by devotees today. Anti-sectarianism is another obstacle to followers’ initiation into mendicancy, as this would inevitably imply sectarian affiliation.

The anti-sectarian value Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers hold so strongly translates into a general attitude of scepticism towards mendicants. This is because mendicants are sometimes perceived as representatives of sectarian Jainism and because sectarianism places mendicants’ religious authority under scrutiny. If all mendicants self-realised (according to Śrīmad Rājacandra’s interpretation of it) then there would be no sectarian division because all would be like-minded. Sectarianism therefore casts doubt over the mandatory claim to religious authority that most denominations of Jainism attribute to all mendicants. This means that Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers cannot depend on the outward appearance of mendicancy as an indisputable guarantee of religious authority. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s concern that ‘self-realisation’ had become a term coincidental with dīksā, rather than a genuine spiritual attribute of individual mendicants, is expressed clearly by the distinction he makes between ‘false’ non self-realised gurus and ‘true’ self-realised gurus. It should be stressed however, that Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers do not impose their anti-sectarian values against individual mendicants, who are shown appropriate respect when encountered. One senior disciple associated with Sayla āśram said that just as it cannot be assumed that all mendicants are self-realised, it may also be assumed that some mendicants have attained self-realisation. During my field-study I became aware of a certain amount of interaction between Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers and mendicants. For example, during my visits to Koba and Sayla small groups of sādhvīs were spending a few days at these āśrams. I was also told that a Digambar mendicant had consecrated the ground at the site of the Dharampur āśram. Photographs showed that four or five mendicants (I could not be certain of the exact number) were present at this āśram’s opening ceremony. A number of mendicants have written commentaries on Śrīmad Rājacandra’s literature, including Sādhvī Tārvlatabāi Māhāsatijī, whose book, I Am Soul, is translated into English from Gujarati.

Despite these pockets of interaction between mendicants and Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following, the association of religious authority with self-realisation, combined with an inherent scepticism of anything sectarian, has firmly established Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following as a lay movement in which religious authority is held by spiritually qualified – that is, self-realised – laypeople. This shift in religious authority is made evident by the fact that, with two exceptions, all of the gurus throughout the history of the movement have been laypeople,
including Śrīmad Rājacandra himself. The two mendicant gurus in the history of the movement are Śrī Lallūjī Svāmī and Śrī Sahāj Ānandjī (who died 1970). The latter established an āśram dedicated to Śrīmad Rājacandra at Hampi, South India, in 1960. Both initiated as Sthānakkvāśī mendicants, Lallūjī Svāmī in Gujarat, Sahāj Ānandjī in Rajasthan, before learning about Śrīmad Rājacandra. Neither muni actually relinquished his mendicant status when he became Śrīmad Rājacandra’s devotee, but both estranged themselves from their respective orders and were effectively ex-communicated from them by their fellow mendicants. Neither muni initiated any of his own disciples to establish a mendicant lineage within the Śrīmad Rājacandra tradition. This is particularly significant in the case of Lallūjī Svāmī because he was the only one of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s immediate disciples to have survived Śrīmad Rājacandra long enough to gather his own substantial and enduring following of disciples.

Followers’ scepticism of mendicant authority is not reflected in their attitude towards mendicancy as an institution. Like most Jains, Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers hold the mendicant ideal as sacrosanct, but to their minds Śrīmad Rājacandra’s interpretation of self-realisation has raised – or, more accurately, reinstated – the standard of spirituality expected from mendicants. For example, when I asked Śrī Ātmānandjī why he had not taken dīkṣā even though he had attained self-realisation, he responded that he felt his level of spiritual purification was not yet high enough to warrant mendicant initiation and that his physical constitution was not hardy enough to survive the severity of ascetic life. This open and honest response from a guru who took lay vows from a Digambar muni in 1984, and whose life is dedicated to austerity and religious practice, illustrates the high regard with which he, and consequently his disciples, hold mendicancy. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers regard self-realisation as an essential prerequisite for initiation into mendicancy because only self-realised people are thought to have the spiritual purity and strength necessary to fulfil the rigours of a mendicant lifestyle, and to qualify for the religious authority with which it is associated. They refuse to devalue mendicancy by attempting to follow the mendicant path before they are spiritually prepared for it and this belief alone prohibits the majority of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers from taking mendicant initiation.

The shift in religious authority from mendicants to spiritually qualified laypeople that is observed in the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement is an expression of reform motivated by concern about mendicants’ ability to uphold the mendicant ideal. A usual response in Jainism to accusations of mendicants straying from the ‘true’ path is the establishment of a new mendicant lineage that ‘properly’ reflects (according to the reformer) Mahāvīr’s teachings. For example, the Śvetāmbar Khartar Gacch was established by the renowned ascetic, Jineśvarsūri (eleventh century), in protest against the growing trend of Caityavāśī (temple-dwelling) mendicants. Cort describes how, otherwise straight lines of lineal descent, branch when the authority of the paṭṭadhāras (‘holders (dhāra) of the seat (paṭṭa) of authority’) is successfully challenged by another ascetic. Instead of instigating
a ‘pure’ mendicant lineage, the method of reform adopted by Śrīmad Rājakandra’s following has been to protect the mendicant ideal by elevating it to a level of spiritual purity that most souls may only aspire to in the current era. Hence ‘true’ mendicants become so difficult to locate that the next best alternative is to venerate a lay guru whose spiritual purity is assured.

The Śrīmad Rājakandra movement seems to be challenging the identity of a ‘genuine’ mendicant. For example, some followers were perturbed by my questioning about Śrīmad Rājakandra’s lay status. They described him as a true muni because, ‘he is a muni on the inside’ (a reference to his spiritual purity), irrespective of his lay status. In his study of Jainism in Jaipur, Babb shows that, ‘ascetics emerge as the only beings truly worthy of worship’ in part because their renounced lifestyles, ‘exemplify the path to liberation’.27 As ascetics they share the same qualities as the Jinas, only not to the same extent. In the Śrīmad Rājakandra movement gurus are venerated because they are believed to be self-realised. They have the same quality of knowledge as the Jinas, only not to the same extent. So, whereas in the Jainism of Babb’s study the object of veneration is asceticism, in the Śrīmad Rājakandra movement spiritual knowledge is the object of veneration. Asceticism has not been dispensed with entirely, but asceticism alone, without the experiential spiritual knowledge of self-realisation, is not worthy of worship.

Self-realisation and liberation

Scholars and Jains who are not followers of Śrīmad Rājakandra sometimes think that Śrīmad Rājakandra’s teachings about self-realisation are actually a reference to liberation.28 The confusion is most likely due to Śrīmad Rājakandra’s particular interpretation of self-realisation as a state of soul purity, knowledge and religious authority, but may also be exacerbated by the fact that the community of Śrīmad Rājakandra’s followers based at Agas āśram believe he attained the thirteenth guṇasthāna (fourteen stages of soul purity leading to mokṣa), which is equivalent to an embodied state of omniscience. This community believe Śrīmad Rājakandra is currently incarnated as a mendicant in Mahāvīr, his final incarnation prior to attaining mokṣa. To indicate that he is still embodied and yet to attain mokṣa, his image is daubed with sandalwood paste on the two big toes and the forehead only during pūjā because it does not warrant all thirteen marks on nine parts of the body that is customarily applied on Jina images.29 The claim that Śrīmad Rājakandra attained omniscience is controversial because it runs counter to traditional Jain doctrine which states that Mahāvīr’s disciple, Jambū, was the last omniscient person in this cosmic region. Śrīmad Rājakandra never professed openly that he was omniscient, although he did claim to have attained a high level of self-realisation. Conviction in his omniscience is based, in part, on a brief diary entry discovered after his death in which – followers at Agas interpret – Śrīmad Rājakandra equates himself spiritually with Mahāvīr.30 This private note was not included in the first published edition of Śrīmad Rājakandra because devotees
recognised it as controversial. It was Śrī Lallūjī Svāmī who insisted on its inclusion in later editions of the anthology. Not all of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers believe him to have been omniscient. Most followers with whom I spoke believe he attained somewhere around the sixth or seventh gunasthāna, which they agree is remarkably high for the current era.31

Attitudes towards the possibility of achieving self-realisation in current times also differ within Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following. Some followers believe that self-realisation is no longer possible in this part of the cosmos and that Śrīmad Rājacandra was the last person to have attained it. Followers holding this belief venerate only Śrīmad Rājacandra and do not turn to any other guru who teaches in his name. For this reason they are unlikely to be associated with an āśram based community. Followers who are also disciples of a living guru believe their own guru to be self-realised, so obviously accept self-realisation to be possible in the current era. Of the three communities mentioned who look to a living guru for religious authority, followers based at Sayla āśram claim to have twelve self-realised people amongst its membership, in addition to their gurus.32 For this group of followers then, self-realisation is very much a realisable goal. When I asked Śrī Rakeśbhārī and Śrī Ātmanandjī if they anticipate that any of their own disciples will attain self-realisation within their lifetimes, they both responded in hopeful terms, but cautioned that nothing was certain. The community based at Agas āśram has a different outlook again. Followers here believe that the likelihood of attaining self-realisation has become extremely remote, if not impossible, since the death of Śrī Brahmacārījī. It is not surprising then, that this community regard claims of self-realisation made by some of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s other followers with a degree of scepticism.

**Self-realisation and soteriology**

Within the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement self-realisation is crucial to an aspirant’s spiritual progression.33 It is the vital first step onto the mokṣa mārga (the path of liberation) and indicates that mokṣa is guaranteed, perhaps within fifteen life spans.34 The first experience of self-realisation means that the aspirant has achieved a high level of soul purity, but is still a long way from the ultimate purity of liberation. Nevertheless, through self-realisation liberation becomes a relatively imminent goal – no longer so remote as to be virtually impossible, but now achievable within a discernible number of life-spans following self-realisation. Followers who consider self-realisation unlikely in their current lifetimes anticipate that veneration of Śrīmad Rājacandra will soon result in their reincarnation in a cosmic region more favourable to its attainment. So, even for these followers the relative imminence of self-realisation leading to liberation is not precluded. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s interpretation of self-realisation, and his emphasis on it in his teachings, has therefore dispensed with the need for mendicant supervision, whilst at the same time it has prioritised soteriology sharply within the minds of his followers. For this reason self-realisation is at the heart of their religious
beliefs and its attainment is the primary motivating factor in their religious practices.  

Many followers spoke of their conviction in the soteriological efficacy of their religious beliefs and practices inspired by Śrīmad Rājācandra’s teachings. Some followers spoke of ‘physically sensing’ the increase in their soul purity, which they described in terms of decreasing worldly attachment and increase in bhāv (sentiment) during their devotional practices. Followers also expressed an intellectual satisfaction in the soteriological justification for their religious efforts. The comments of one devotee were typical. This gentleman, in his early sixties, resides in North America, but for the past few years he and his wife have been staying at Koba āśram for about six months annually. He explained that he was brought up in India in a traditional Śvetāmbar Jain family that was meticulous in its observance of Jain rituals and customs. Much to his family’s dismay, as an adult he turned to follow Śrīmad Rājācandra. He felt that his study of Śrīmad Rājācandra’s teachings awakened him fully, for the first time, to the soteriological purpose of Jain religious practice. This not only encouraged him in his veneration of Śrīmad Rājācandra and of his living guru, but also revitalised his general commitment to religious practice. For example, he now performed pājā to the Jinas daily instead of occasionally as he had before following Śrīmad Rājācandra, and he now adhered fastidiously to Jain dietary restrictions such as avoiding root vegetables and not eating after sunset or until forty-eight minutes after sunrise. In his comments this devotee made a distinction between religious practice based on an intellectual understanding of its meaning and effect, and ‘empty’ religious practice that may help to perpetuate a community’s religious identity, but that does not assist the practitioner towards liberation.

**Guru bhakti**

**Different types of guru**

In the Ātma Siddhi Śrīmad Rājācandra explains that the most certain means of achieving self-realisation in the current age is guru bhakti. This emphasis on guru bhakti in Śrīmad Rājācandra’s teachings has encouraged and sustained the emergence of gurus throughout the history of the movement. In its broadest sense ‘bhakti’ means ‘devotion’. As almost any act of a pious disciple can be interpreted as an expression of devotion, the meanings and applications of bhakti are far-reaching. Śrīmad Rājācandra stresses that only a ‘true’ (self-realised) guru has the spiritual purity, knowledge and experience necessary to guide his or her disciples successfully towards their own goal of self-realisation. Misguided devotion to a ‘false’ guru can only result in spiritual devastation. Śrīmad Rājācandra is venerated by all his devotees as a true guru of the highest order, so the necessity of further gurus within the movement is brought into question. Devotees who choose to venerate a living guru alongside Śrīmad Rājācandra (e.g. the communities based at Dharampur, Koba and Sayla) justify their decision.
by reference to his teaching that a *pratyakṣa* (directly perceptible) *guru* is of greater benefit to an aspirant’s spiritual progression than a *parokṣa* (not directly perceptible) *guru.* These devotees regard Śrīmad Rājacandra and the Jinas as *parokṣa gurus.* Whilst this does not lessen their devotion to them, they also believe in the benefits of venerating a living *guru.* Devotees who do not accept the authority of current *gurus,* and who choose to venerate only Śrīmad Rājacandra (e.g. the community based at Agas), heed Śrīmad Rājacandra’s warning against the veneration of false *gurus* and emphasise the difficulty a non self-realised aspirant has in discerning a ‘true’ from a ‘false’ *guru.* In practice a devotee’s decision about whether or not to submit to a living *guru* may be influenced by a number of factors, including familial or other connections with a particular āśram or *guru,* or by an informed decision based on a personal study of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s teachings.

**Advantages of a lay guru**

When the major objective of religious practice is soteriological, as it is for Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers, and the principal event of religious practice is devotion to a ‘true’ *guru,* it is essential for a disciple to be utterly convinced of her or his *guru’s* self-realised status and hence religious authority. To benefit fully from a *guru’s* religious guidance a disciple must submit utterly to her or his *guru,* this can only occur when a disciple is convinced that the *guru* is self-realised. Followers’ belief in Śrīmad Rājacandra’s self-realised status, and therefore the authority of his teachings, is an obvious condition of their commitment to him as an authentic *guru* and saviour. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers who are disciples of a living *guru* also have to be assured of this *guru’s* self-realised status. Some disciples with whom I spoke described their commitment to their *guru* as instantaneous. Others observed their *guru’s* demeanour, religious knowledge and religious instructions over a sustained period of contact until they were satisfied that the *guru* was truly self-realised. This could take anything from a few weeks to several years.

The opportunity to assess a *guru’s* spiritual credentials gives preference to the lay *guru* in an age when, as Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers believe, religious authority cannot be assured by mendicancy alone. This is because the peripatetic lifestyle of mendicants means their contact with individual lay disciples is sporadic, even though mendicant contact with the laity in general is constant because mendicants depend on lay Jains for all of their material needs. During the four months of the rainy season (July/August to November/December) mendicants are required to remain in one place because to travel would risk causing *hīṃsā* (violence) to insects and water-bodies prevalent during the season. Babb describes this period as an opportunity to reinforce lay and mendicant bonds. Indeed, it is during this season that many Jain festivals occur, including *Paryuṣan,* the most important festival in the Jain year, which requires participation by mendicant and lay Jains. However, Babb also observes that popular mendicants may
be ‘booked’ by different lay communities years in advance, so there is no guarantee that a particular mendicant will return to the same town the following year. So, although mendicants have continual interaction with lay communities in general, their peripatetic lifestyles are a barrier to the type of sustained, personal contact a disciple may have with a lay guru. Outside of the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement, mendicants’ peripatetic lifestyles do not deter lay Jains venerating a particularly beloved mendicant. Laidlaw gives the example of a senior Sthānakuśā ācārya Hastimal-ji Mahārāj Sāhab (died 1991), who attracted a vast lay following.

Within the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement, a disciple’s submission to their chosen guru is a matter of personal conviction. At Dharampur and Koba it is not marked by a formal ceremony, at Sayla disciples undergo a brief exchange with their guru (the precise details of which should not be revealed to the uninitiated). Once a disciple has submitted to a guru, the guru becomes the disciple’s constant and personal religious preceptor who is always available and willing to resolve any spiritual difficulties. The guru provides religious instructions tailored to each individual disciple’s specific spiritual requirements and monitors each disciple’s spiritual progress. This is achieved primarily by the disciple maintaining contact with her or his guru through personal meetings, letters, e-mail and telephone conversations. Some communities also have more structured monitoring procedures in place. For example, disciples of Śrī Rakeshāī keep diaries of their personal spiritual progress, based on their feelings of worldly attachment and non-attachment, which their guru may ask to see at any time. Every fortnight these disciples attend groups, arranged by geographic location and age and facilitated by senior disciples, to study scripture prescribed by their guru, on which they are tested regularly and their progress reported back to their guru.

Cort and Laidlaw both point out that, although there are many instances in Jainism of mendicants performing roles similar to that of a personal preceptor, the implication of personal attachment inferred by guru–disciple relationships means that they cannot be overtly recognised. Lay Jains are supposed to venerate all mendicants equally as embodiments of the religious ideal. Cort writes that the layperson’s performance of guru-vandan to a mendicant (any mendicant) ‘is not a personalized ritual in which the specific personality of either worshiper or worshiped has any significance’. Vows undertaken by mendicants to renounce ownership and attachment restrict a guru–disciple relationship not only in terms of the physical distance imposed between the mendicant and the disciple, but also in terms of the psychological distance that the disciple and the mendicant are supposed to maintain. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s teaching about guru bhakti encourages his followers’ attachment to a guru, indeed a disciple should be devoted to only one guru (Sayla is an exception to this). Part of the soteriological rational for this is that a disciple’s devotional attachment to her or his guru focuses the disciple’s mind on the guru’s spiritual purity, which the disciple attempts to emulate, and distracts the disciple from reacting to worldly situations with rāga and dvesa. Psychological renunciation of one’s guru occurs only when a disciple has attained
a high level of spiritual purity. A mendicant’s liberty to communicate with disciples regularly or to manage large groups of disciples are also theoretically restricted by their vows of renunciation. By placing religious authority with lay gurus Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers experience purposeful guidance towards liberation that is monitored by a guru whose religious authority is believed to be indisputable, with whom disciples can have a sustained, interactive relationship and who is a permanent source of religious instruction and inspiration.

The benefits of a guru unencumbered by mendicant vows are especially significant to Jains living outside India. Mendicants are only allowed to travel by foot, which prohibits them from visiting diaspora Jain communities. Banks describes how Jains in Leicester, UK during the 1980s began to re-negotiate patterns of social order and religious authority in the absence of mendicant supervision. He comments how some of the Jains he met lamented that the lack of mendicant presence meant that ‘proper’ Jainism could not be practised outside India. As a Jain movement whose authoritative gurus are not governed by the same travel restrictions as mendicants, the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement is particularly successful amongst diaspora Jain communities. This essay has already shown that there are groups of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers in East Africa, Europe and North America, and the movement may well be even more widespread.

The three gurus referred to in this chapter make regular visits to their communities of disciples who live abroad. Foreign visits help to maintain the buoyancy of guru–disciple relationships and so fulfil an important spiritual need for Śrīmad Rājacandra’s growing following outside of India. Visits also raise the profile of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s teachings, and of Jainism in general, amongst the broader diaspora Jain community. Another effect has been to re-establish the links second and third generation diaspora Jains have with their Gujarati origins. The fact that lay gurus are not peripatetic like mendicants makes it convenient for disciples to travel to India to spend time with their guru. Very many disciples who live outside of India visit their guru’s āśram annually, often spending anything up to six months of the year there. For the rest of the time, the lay guru is more easily contacted by letter, phone or email than the wandering mendicant. It was not Śrīmad Rājacandra’s intention to promulgate Jainism outside of India. In fact, as a young man he refused an invitation to visit London on the grounds that it may hinder his spiritual progression. Nevertheless, the particular qualities the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement has to offer as a lay movement means that it has transferred well to diaspora communities and represents a form of Jainism that has adapted to address the changing needs of Jains in the modern world.

Some concluding observations

The refusal of the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement to accept mendicant authority is not representative of contemporary Jainism. In fact it is this that sets it apart from most other forms of Jainism and is one of the principal criticisms levied against it by Śrīmad Rājacandra’s opponents. Nevertheless, Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following
is just one of a number of modern Jain movements to have either rejected mendicancy or to have moderated mendicant regulations, particularly with respect to travel restrictions. For example, the Terāpanthi leader Ācārya Mahāprajñā (born 1920) introduced an interim mendicant level to the Terāpanthi branch of Jainism, during which ‘semi-mendicants’ (saman, male mendicants and samanī, female mendicants) are permitted to travel abroad to spread the message of Jainism.49 Kāņjī Svāmī (1898–1980), who is the spiritual figurehead of the Kāņjī Svāmī Panth, and Śrī Citrabhānu (born 1922), who has an extensive following in North America, were both initiated mendicants who came to reject their mendicant status, yet each continued to gather a substantial and enduring following of disciples.50 The Akram Vijñān movement, inspired by a householder and businessman from Gujarat, Ambalāl Mūljībhāī Paṭel (1908–1988), dispenses with the need for asceticism and mendicancy by claiming to offer followers direct access to enlightenment through the grace of the Jīna Simandhar. Those Jains who subscribe to the Akram Vijñān movement believe that Simandhar’s grace was channelled through the mediumship of Ambalāl Mūljībhāī Paṭel and, following his death, through the mediumship of two nominated disciples, Kanu Paṭel and Nirubahen Amīn.

This chapter has shown that Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following developed as a lay movement in response to Śrīmad Rājacandra’s own lay status, his interpretation of self-realisation and his teachings about guru bhakti as a means of attaining it. Śrīmad Rājacandra’s interpretation of self-realisation as a religious experience and the essential criterion for religious authority endorses the religious authority of lay gurus, while mendicant religious authority is put into dispute by the shadow of sectarianism. Religious authority validated by self-realisation, rather than through an authoritative lineal connection, has allowed for a random pattern of gurus to emerge. The soteriological implications of self-realisation has refocused the soteriological objective of Jainism as a lay concern, rather than the exclusive concern of mendicants, and is a principal motivator for lay religious practice in the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement.

The continued increase in Śrīmad Rājacandra’s following, a century after his death, suggests that his teachings address particular needs amongst those Jains who choose to accept them. A point emphasised by the fact that, because Śrīmad Rājacandra was not associated with an existing Jain sect, his followers, particularly the first generation, must have taken a deliberate turn towards him. From an ethical viewpoint the attraction seems to be the stand that Śrīmad Rājacandra’s teachings take against sectarianism and what is perceived to be an inadequate level of mendicant spiritual purity. From a practical viewpoint followers seem to be satisfied spiritually by the soteriological emphasis in Śrīmad Rājacandra’s teachings and, for some, the intimate and interactive relationship that can be struck with a lay guru.

Notes

1 All the dates given in this chapter are CE. Information about the values, beliefs and practices of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s followers presented in this essay is drawn from the
findings of field research in Gujarat, Mumbai and London conducted as part of my doctoral research during 1998–2002.

2 Srimad Rajacandra’s followers always used the term ‘self-realisation’ when discussing their religious beliefs with me, and with each other, in English.

3 Some of the themes discussed in this chapter are presented in Salter 2001.

4 For a discussion about the organisational structure of the Srimad Rajacandra movement see Salter 2001.

5 For an excellent account of Terapanthi Jainism see Vallely 2003.

6 Details of Srimad Rajacandra’s life are taken from a number of short, devotional biographies (Desai 2000, Govardhandas 1991, Mehta 1999, and Mehta and Sheth 1971).


9 Dundas 2002: 266.

10 The Atma Siddhi [AS] has been translated into various Indian languages and into English. The most useful English translation to date, cited throughout this chapter, is by D. C. Mehta (1978), which is available online at www.atmasiddhi.com.


13 See Cort 2001, chapter four, for a comprehensive account of mendicants’ daily routine and their interaction with the laity.

14 Babb 1996, especially chapters one and three.


17 Srimad Rajacandra did not negate scriptural study or intellectual learning. For most followers this is an integral aspect of their religious practice because intellectual understanding is an essential precursor to the attainment of self-realisation.

18 For example see Cort 1995: 480–481.

19 Govardhandas 1991: 15, 150, 157. Srimad Rajacandra is not the only figure in Jainism to claim a lineal connection with a Tirthankar during a previous life. Kanjii Svami’s followers believe that, in a prior incarnation as a prince, Kajit Svami (1898–1980) was present at the samavasara (holy assembly) of the Jina Simandhar, one of twenty Tirthankars who is currently preaching in Mahavideha. Dundas 2002: 265–271.

20 I use the term ‘movement’ to describe Srimad Rajacandra’s following collectively. Some followers who I encountered found this term offensive because they felt it had sectarian connotations, although most followers accepted my intended use of the term as a passive literary device.

21 ‘Knowledge of self, equanimity (i.e. equanious feeling at pairs, such as friend or foe, pain or pleasure), worldly living due to the operation of past karmas, unique speech (i.e. speech full of theories never heard before and marked with truth and inner conviction), knowledge of true scriptures – these are the qualities worthy of a true guru’ [AS] 10.


26 Cort 1995: 481.


28 For example, Laidlaw 1995: 235.
There is no consensus on the appropriate treatment of Śrīmad Rājacandra’s image within the Śrīmad Rājacandra movement. Not all sites advocate dravya pūjā (pūjā with substances) towards it.


Jains believe this part of the cosmos is currently in the Kāli Yuga, an era of corruption during which spiritual progression is difficult to achieve.


‘Without knowing the real nature of self, I suffered infinite misery. I bow to the adored holy true Guru, who disclosed that self to me.’ AS 1.

Similar claims were made to Babb during his research on Śvetāmbar Jainism. He was told, ‘if you possess right belief for as little time as a grain of rice can be balanced on the tip of a horn of a cow, you will obtain liberation sooner or later’ (Babb 1996: 36).

Ethnographic research indicates that a preoccupation with liberation is not commonplace amongst Jain laity. See, for example, Babb 1996: 24.


‘He who serves the feet of the true Guru giving up his own wrong beliefs, achieves the highest ideal and attains the real nature of self.’ AS 9.

‘If the untrue Guru takes any disadvantage of such reverence, he sinks into the ocean of embodied existence by being bound with the intense deluding Karmas.’ AS 21.

‘The obligation of the present true Guru [pratyakṣa sadguru] is greater than that of the non-present Jina. Unless one becomes aware of this, self-contemplation does not start.’ AS 11.

Babb describes mendicants as public figures who are, ‘in the centre of a more or less constant hubbub’ (Babb 1996: 52).


Cort 2001: 114–117.


At the time of my visit during October 2001 the prescribed reading was Śrī Rakeshbhai’s commentary on Śrīmad Rājacandra’s the Ātma Siddhi, for which he was awarded a doctorate by Mumbai University.


Ibid. 2001: 112.

Gurus experience no feelings of attachment towards their disciples, but maintain a state of equanimity which is a condition of their self-realised status.


See Flügel 2003. He explains that a schism occurred in the movement soon after Ambalāl Muljībhāī Patēl’s death because followers tended to accept the authority of either Kanu Patēl or Nīrubhān Amīn to the exclusion of the other.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Secondary sources


A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY DIGAMBAR JAIN MYSTIC AND HIS FOLLOWERS*

Tāraṇ Tāraṇ Svāmī and the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth

John E. Cort

For many years, scholarship on the Jains paid too little attention to the historical, social and geographical contexts within which “Jainism” has always been embedded. At best one might find a general discussion of the philosophical differences between the broad groupings of Śvetāmbar and Digambar. These two “sects,” however, have never been unified social groups, and one looked in vain for substantial discussion of the actual sectarian divisions that defined Jain society. In recent years there has been a sea change in this situation, as detailed studies have been published on sectarian groups among the Śvetāmbar such as the Kharatara Gaccha, Tapā Gaccha, Añcala (Acala) Gaccha, Kaṭuṇā Gaccha, Loṅkā Gaccha, Sthānakavāsī, and Terāpanthīs. But to date there has been little attention to the sectarian divisions among the Digambar. There are two areas in which such studies are needed. One involves a clearer understanding of the cultural and ritual differences between the northern Digambar communities of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and northern Maharashtra on the one hand, and the southern Digambar communities of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and southern Maharashtra on the other. The other area involves a clearer understanding of the history, and differences of ideology, ritual, and social organization among the three older sectarian divisions in northern and central India, the Bīṣ Panth, Terā Panth, and Tāraṇ Śvāmī Panth, as well as the twentieth and twenty-first century followers of Kāṇḍī Śvāmī and Śrīmad Rājendra. In this chapter I essay a beginning at addressing a part of the second lacuna, with an outline of some of the features of the Tāraṇ Śvāmī Panth (also called the Tāraṇ Panth and Tāraṇ Samāj) of Bundelkhand in central India.

The Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth and its founder Tāraṇ Svāmī are among the least-studied aspects of Jainism. Padmanabh S. Jaini (1979: 310, n. 59) had to relegate them to a brief footnote in The Jaina Path of Purification, and Paul Dundas had to leave them out altogether in the first edition of his otherwise inclusive The Jains.
The situation in Indian-language surveys of the Jains is hardly better. Little is found aside from brief references to Tāraṇ Śvāmī’s living in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the eschewing of image-worship by his followers, and the inclusion among his immediate followers of both Muslims and people from low castes.

In December of 1999 I undertook fieldwork among the Tāraṇ Śvāmī Panth in Madhya Pradesh as part of a larger on-going research project on Jain attitudes, practices, and discourses concerning images. This fieldwork has been complemented by subsequent textual research on some of the fourteen texts attributed to Tāraṇ Śvāmī and also twentieth century literature by members of the Panth. In this essay I present an introductory survey of (1) what is known of Tāraṇ Śvāmī himself, as well as five different frames for understanding him found in the community; (2) the fourteen texts attributed to him; (3) the community of his followers; (4) the ritual culture of the contemporary Tāraṇ Śvāmī Panth; and (5) the most famous person born in the Panth, Rajneesh.

Sources for the life of Tāraṇ Śvāmī

For information on Tāraṇ Śvāmī we are indebted to the Digambar Terā Panth scholar Paṇḍit Phūlcandra Siddhānta Śāstri (1985b), whose 1933 study has not been surpassed as a judicious and scholarly biography. Phūlcandra (ibid.: 96) argued that his full name, as used in the texts attributed to him, was Jin Tāraṇ Taran, meaning “Jina Deliverer Deliverance.” Phūlcandra speculated that this name, indicative of an understanding of the man as both liberated himself and capable of aiding others in their liberation, was given by later redactors of the texts. The Thikānesāra texts (see below) refer to him simply as Śvāmīji, “Reverend Master.” He has always been more commonly referred to as Tāraṇ Śvāmī. We have no record of his birth name.

Only one of the compositions attributed to Tāraṇ Śvāmī contains any information about his life. The Chadmastha Vāṇī records that his death was on a Saturday, the seventh day of the dark half of the month of Jeṭha (May–June) in the year Vikram 1572, which corresponds to May 5, 1515 CE. Other information comes from two texts. One is a set of overlapping manuscripts known as Thikānesāra (“The essence of what is authentic”) found in various Tāraṇ Panth collections in central India. Phūlcandra had access to three of these, copied in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The other is a short text known as the Nirvāṇa Huṇḍī (“The promissory note of liberation”). Neither of these has yet been published, although I was informed that there are plans to do so. From these texts Phūlcandra calculated that Tāraṇ Śvāmī was born on Thursday, the seventh day of the bright half of the month of Agahan (November–December) in the year Vikram 1505, which corresponds to December 2, 1448. We learn that his mother’s name was Viṣṇusirī or Viṣṇu Śrī, and his father’s Gaṅghā Sāha. He was born into the Parvār caste, in the Vāsalla gotra (clan) and Gaṅghā mūr (lineage). Further, we learn that he was born in a village called Puspāvati. Most authors, as well as the community itself, have taken this to be the contemporary village Bilharī near Kaṭnī in Jabalpur district.
The only other textual information comes from another passage in the Chadnastha Vâñâ, which Phûlcandra (1985b: 401) rightly termed abstruse (gûrîh), and for the meaning of which Nâthûrâm Premî (1912–1913: 294) wrote that we depend on what the Târan Panth infers it to mean. The standard interpretation of the passage is that Târan Svâmî began his studies at age eleven, and continued for ten years. He then spent nine years in various spiritual exercises before taking the lay vows (vrata) and becoming a celibate (brahmacârî) at age thirty. At age sixty he became a monk (muni), and then he died six-and-a-half years later.\footnote{Phûlcandra (1985b: 399–401) then extrapolated from this thin foundation, using scholarly sources on the history of the medieval central Indian Digambar community and the oral tradition of the Târan Panth to reconstruct a biography for Târan Svâmî. Phûlcandra speculated that when Târan Svâmî was five years old, his father took him to Târan’s mother’s brother’s village of Gaûrulâ (also spelled Garhaulâ). There he was given to Bhaṭṭârak Devendrakârti, who occupied the Canderî seat, and was caste guru of the Parvâr caste.\footnote{Devendrakârti was favorably impressed by certain bodily signs of the boy. Târan Svâmî began his studies under Devendrakârti. His fellow student was Śrutakârti, author of a Harivamśa Purâṇa in 1495 CE.\footnote{Târan Svâmî left his studies at the age of twenty-one, and went to Semarkherî, near Siroñî in Vidisha (Vidiśâ) district, where his mother’s brother lived. He spent nine years in the area, often meditating in the caves in the nearby hills. At the age of thirty, having overcome the three spiritual obstacles of spiritual ignorance (mithyâta), illusion (mâyâ), and seeking worldly gain through spiritual practices (nidâna),\footnote{he took the vows (vrata) of a celibate (brahmacârî) and thereby became a formal renouncer. The Digambar practice of becoming a renouncer through the formal taking of the vow of celibacy has been little remarked in scholarship on the Jains. While such a person is still technically a layperson, since Digambars hold that only the naked muni is a true monk, the brahmacârî, like the more advanced ksûlaka and ailaka, is functionally removed from the lay estate, and follows the practice of observing the rainy-season retreat (câturmâsa). Full-fledged munîs were rare if not nonexistent for many centuries, especially in the Digambar communities of central India, and so these non-monastic renouncers played an important role in maintaining the ideals of renunciation. Phûlcandra (1992: 216–234) has listed forty-nine brahmacâris from the Parvâr caste in central India in the twentieth century. The importance of the brahmacârî institution is clearly seen in an article by Johrâpurkar (1964b), in which he discussed the sixteenth-century Saṅghâṣṭaka of Brahma Jñânaśâgara. In contrast to the usual depiction of the Jain community (saṅgha) as being fourfold (monks, nuns, laymen, laywomen), Jñânaśâgara describes the Jain community as being sixfold: srâvaka (laymen), srâvikâ (laywomen), paṇḍita (lay male intellectuals and ritualists, also known as pânde), vratî (male celibates), âryikâ (female celibates), and bhaṭṭâraka (male pontiffs). The absence of naked monks (muni) from this list is striking; they have been replaced by lay celibates.\footnote{Târan Svâmî remained a brahmacârî for thirty years, and continued his spiritual and ascetic practices. At the age of sixty he went to the next stage by...}}}}
becoming a full-fledged *muni*. Unlike the Śvetāmbar tradition, in which it is essential to be initiated into monkhood by another monk, the custom in the medieval Digambar tradition was for a spiritually-inclined man toward the end of his life on his own to renounce all clothing and undertake monastic practice. Tāraṇ Śvāmī remained a monk for the final six-and-a-half years of his life.

Phūlcandra was not the only author to sketch a biography of Tāraṇ Śvāmī. The first extensive notice of Tāraṇ Śvāmī and the Tāraṇ Panth was in a multi-part article published by the Digambar scholar Nāthūrām Premī in 1912 and 1913 in *Jain Hitaiṣṭa*, an important Hindi journal published from Bombay. Premī based his study on what he learned from his acquaintances in the Tāraṇ Panth, and his study of the very few texts and publications available to him. Premī (1912–1913: 295–297) gave one version of Tāraṇ Śvāmī’s life based upon oral tradition (*kimvadānī*) of other Digambar Jains in Bundelkhand, and another based upon the story contained in an unnamed “old book” given to him by a member of the Tāraṇ Panth (ibid.: 200–206). The first version presented much of Tāraṇ Śvāmī’s life, especially his opposition to image-worship, his practice of magic (*jāḍätāra*), and his Muslim followers, in an unfavorable light. This version, given in the first installment of Premī’s article, upset some of its Tāraṇ Panth readers so much that at the end of the second installment Premī said that he had been criticized and even threatened by some members of the Tāraṇ Panth, and he asked them not to criticize his essay until it was published in its entirety (ibid.: 557–558). The second version also appears to be based largely on oral tradition. It presents Tāraṇ Śvāmī within Jain cosmology as a Jina-to-be who overcame attempts to assassinate him due to his opposition to image-worship. This second version places his birth at Pohapāvatī (Puspāvatī), a village near Delhi, where his father was in the court of an unnamed Muslim king (*bādsāh*). Premī pointed out that the historical lack of Parvārs in the Delhi area and the absence of a name for the king make this version unlikely, but otherwise did not attempt a more scholarly reconstruction of Tāraṇ Śvāmī’s life.

A third biographical study was essayed by the Digambar scholar Brahmacārī Śītalprāṣād (also spelled Śītalprāṣād) in the introduction to his 1932 rendition of Tāraṇ Śvāmī’s *Śrāvakācāra* into modern Hindi. Śītalprāṣād’s brief biography was based on Premī’s article and oral traditions he gathered among members of the Tāraṇ Panth in Sāgar. According to Śītalprāṣād (1992: 12–14), Tāraṇ Śvāmī’s birth village of Puspāvatī is also known as Peśāvar, a village near Delhi. His father was a wealthy merchant who was in the service of the Lodhī kings. For some unknown reason his father moved to Garaulā, a village in Sagar (Sāgar) district. There a Digambar *muni* saw the boy, and said that from his bodily signs it was clear that he should study the scriptures. His father shifted the family yet again, this time to Semarkherī, where he went into business, and the boy began his studies. From a young age he was motivated by worldly aversion (*vairāgya*), and so never married. He remained at home for many years, observing the lay vows and spending time meditating in nearby forests. He eventually left home, and either remained a *brahmačārī* or became a *muni*. He settled in the village of
Malhārgarh (in present-day Guna [Gunā] district), whence he travelled and preached, and converted 553,319 people to Jainism. His chief disciples came from a wide range of caste and religious backgrounds.14

**Biographical frames**

Any biography is a historical narrative, and as such is framed as much by the contemporary concerns of the author as it is by the concerns of the subject’s time. This is clearly the case with the biographies of Tāraṇ Svāmī. In particular, we can discern five frames within which the biography of Tāraṇ Svāmī has been contextualized: as Digambar mystic, as Digambar ritual reformer, as trans-sectarian iconoclastic sant poet, as miracle-worker, and as Jina-to-be.

*Tāraṇ Svāmī as Digambar mystic*

In his study of the Śrāvakācāra, Brahmacārī Sītalprāśād (1992: 11–12) wrote that Tāraṇ Svāmī’s texts show a familiarity with the earlier writings of Umāsvāti and especially Kundakunda. Sītalprāśād proceeded here, and in the discussions of other texts of Tāraṇ Svāmī he translated into Hindi, to read Tāraṇ Svāmī through the interpretive lens of Kundakunda’s dialectic of niṣcaya naya and vyavahāra naya, or absolute and relative perspectives on reality, and the broader Digambar mystical tradition. In brief, this tradition emphasizes inward spiritual experience over outer ritual form, while never outright rejecting the latter. Kundakunda argued that from the absolute perspective (niṣcaya naya), only soul (jīva) exists, and the spiritual goal therefore is direct knowledge (jñāna) of the soul through meditation.15

It is this tradition that provided Sītalprāśād a framework for understanding the oftentimes abstruse writings of Tāraṇ Svāmī. For example, Sītalprāśād wrote of the Jñāna Samuccaya Sāra, “In [this text] there is much useful discussion of the primacy of the niṣcaya naya or spiritual knowledge (adhyātma jñāna)” (p. 7). In his introduction to the Tribhanga Sāra he wrote, “In [this text] are given the means of the niṣcaya path to liberation (mokṣamārg), which is very beneficial. . . . Everything that Śrī Tāraṇ Svāmī says is in accordance with the ancient Jain teachings. . . . Svāmī was a renouncer, and the spiritual intellectual of the Jain teachings of his time” (p. 9). Of the Mamala Pāhuḍa he wrote, “The author of the Mamala Pāhuḍa, Śrī Jin Tāraṇ Taran Svāmī, had a deep knowledge of the Jain teachings, and was a great soul who loved the essence of spirituality (adhyātma-ras ke prem)” (p. 9).

Sītalprāśād’s framing of Tāraṇ Svāmī within the Digambar adhyātma or mystical tradition is not at all surprising, since all of Sītalprāśād’s other writings evince a deep and abiding interest in this subject. Sītalprāśād was born in an Agravāl family in Lucknow in 1879. After his education in Sanskrit, English, and Jain doctrine, he worked as a jeweller in Calcutta and then as a government bureaucrat in Lucknow. He received a great spiritual shock when his wife, mother and
JOHN E. CORT

younger brother all died within an eight day span in a virulent outbreak of the plague in 1909. He devoted the remainder of his life to Jain social work and to the study of the Digambar mystical tradition. He suffered another shock when his young fellow student Lālā Anantlāl also died, and so he went to Solāpur and there took the brahmačārya vow from Ailak Pannālāl in 1910. Over the next several decades he produced Hindi paraphrases (ṭīkā) on the Niyamasāra, Pañcāśīstikāyasāra, Pravacanasāra, and Samayasāra of Kundakunda, the Samayasāra Kalaśa of Amṛtacandra, the Yogasāra of Yogīndu, and the Svayambhū Stotra of Samantabhadra. He also wrote a study of Pañcit Ṭoḍarmal’s Mokṣamārga Prakāśaka, and independent works with titles such as Adhyātmik Nivedan, Adhyātma Jiñān, Adhyātmik Sopān, and Niścay Dharm kā Manan. He died in Lucknow in 1942.16

When Sītalprasād came to work on the texts of Tāraṇ Svāmī in the late 1920s, after two decades of study and writing on the Digambar mystical tradition, it was only natural that he located Tāraṇ Svāmī within that tradition. Mathurāprasād Samaiyā of the Tāraṇ Panth requested Sītalprasād to come to Sāgar for his rainy-season retreat in 1932 to work on the texts. Mathurāprasād had first taken manuscripts of some of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s texts to Ganeśprasād Varnī (1874–1961). Varnī was one of the great Digambar intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century, and the man largely responsible for the current Digambar paṇḍit tradition of central India.17 He was unable to make sense of the manuscripts. At this time there were also voices in the Terā Panth community of Bundelkhand that argued that since the texts were unintelligible, and the Tāraṇ Panth did not worship Jina images, the Panth in fact was not Jain at all. Mathurāprasād then turned to Sītalprasād, interested him in the manuscripts, and promised full support for his studies of them. That first year he worked from several manuscripts of the Śrāvakācāra to compile an edition and Hindi commentary. He devoted every rainy-season retreat for the next six years to continuing this work, and in the end prepared editions and Hindi versions of nine of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s fourteen texts.18 It is in the context of Terā Panth skepticism of the authenticity of the Tāraṇ Svāmī tradition that we must understand Sītalprasād’s repeated assertions that Tāraṇ Svāmī’s writings are in full accord with the orthodox Jain doctrine (siddhānt). Sītalprasād’s editions and translations were published by the office of the Digambar magazine Jain Mitra (of which Sītalprasād was editor from 1909 to 1929) in Surat, with the publication costs met by a Tāraṇ Panth patron from Āgāsaud. Sītalprasād did not see some of the oldest extant manuscripts, nor did he use more than two or three manuscripts for any one text, so the editions he prepared are by no means fully critical editions; but they remain the most scholarly editions to date. It was on the basis of these versions that subsequent Tāraṇ Panth authors such as Kavi Amrtlāl Caṅcal, Brahmaṇcari Jayaśāgar, and Paṇḍit Campālāl produced their works. The other five texts remained unedited until 1990–1991, when Brahmaṇcari Jayaśāgar spent two rainy-season retreats in Sāgar to prepare editions of them, although these are by no means as careful or scholarly as those prepared by Sītalprasād.19

268
In addition to recruiting Śītalprāśād, the Tāraṇ Svāmī community also enlisted the Terā Panth scholar Paṇḍit Phūlcandra Siddhānta Sastṛī to write an introduction to the second of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s texts edited by Śītalprāśād, the Jñāna Samuccaya Sāra, published in 1933. Phūlcandra (1901–1991) was from a village near Lalitpur, a district of current Uttar Pradesh within the Bundelkhand cultural area. He was a protege of Gaṇeṣprasād Varnī, and for four years in the early thirties taught in a Digambar religious school in Bīnā. He was also a social activist in both the Digambar community and the Indian National Congress. He later edited a number of important Digambar philosophical texts. Like Śītalprāśād, Phūlcandra was also attracted to the Digambar mystical tradition, and later to the teachings of the neo-Digambar Kāṇjī Svāmī, who was one of the main propagators of the teachings of Kundakunda in the twentieth century. At the request of leaders of the Tāraṇ Svāmī community, he also edited a collection of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s writings entitled Tāraṇ Tāraṇ Jīnvāṇī Saṅgrah.20 Phūlcandra’s positive evaluation of Tāraṇ Svāmī as being firmly within the mainstream Digambar tradition was also of great importance in the acceptance of the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth by other Digambars, as was Phūlcandra’s social work to reduce tensions between the Samaiyā caste, whose members were in the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth, and his own Parvār caste, whose members were in the Terā Panth.21

Śītalprāśād’s location of Tāraṇ Svāmī within the Digambar mystical tradition was quickly picked up by Tāraṇ Panth intellectuals, and continues to be a dominant interpretation among many members of the Panth today. For example, in the course of a debate with members of the Terā Panth on image worship, the Tāraṇ Panth intellectual Campālā Jain explicitly equated Kundakunda and Tāraṇ Svāmī, saying, “The Tāraṇ Panth is confirmed by every single word of Kundakunda” (C. Jain 1941: 14–15).

The Surat editions of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s works came to the attention of Kāṇjī Svāmī (1889–1980), the neo-Digambar ex-monk who tirelessly propogated a radically niścaya interpretation of Kundakunda’s teachings. On three separate occasions in the mid-1960s he delivered eight-day series of lectures on Tāraṇ Svāmī’s works, first in Sāgar in 1964, and later at his center in Songadh in Gujarat. These were published in three volumes, each entitled Aṣṭ Pravacan (“Eight Lectures”).22 In 1964 he delivered a sermon on Tāraṇ Svāmī’s Śrāvakācāra at Songadh on the occasion of the dedication of a building there that was donated by an important member of the Tāraṇ Panth from Sāgar (Kāṇjī Svāmī 1965). He then came to the annual fair at the main Tāraṇ Panth pilgrimage center of Nisajī early in 1965. Kāṇjī Svāmī’s confirmation of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s place in the Digambar mystical tradition has been repeated by many subsequent Tāraṇ Panth authors. It has also been repeated by the intellectual leader of the Jaipur branch of the Kāṇjī Svāmī Panth, Hukamcand Bhārīl (1985). He was invited to come to Sāgar in the early 1980s to deliver a week of lectures, and he chose as his theme to interpret four verses from Tāraṇ Svāmī’s Jñāna Samuccaya Sāra as expressions of Kundakunda’s focus on the soul from the niścaya perspective.

The framing of Tāraṇ Svāmī within the Digambar mystical tradition also fits with the influence of Terā Panth scholars on the interpretation of Tāraṇ Svāmī.
The Terā Panth in its disputes with the Bīs Panth has claimed to represent the original Digambar (and therefore Jain) teachings as found in the writings of Kundakunda and then later brought into Hindi by Banārsīdās and Tōdarmal. It is important to remember that Sītalprasad was a Terā Panth intellectual. Phūlcandra was also a staunch Terā Panth scholar, who in one essay argued at length that the Terā Panth, far from being a creation of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century north India, was the original Digambar tradition (Phūlcandra 1985d). Contemporary Jains in Bundelkhand who are not of the Tāraṇ Panth are exclusively of the Terā Panth, and so there has been extensive influence of the latter on the former. Furthermore, in recent years Terā Panth intellectuals have in various ways included the Tāraṇ Svāmī within their vision of the Digambar tradition. For example, an adhyātma-oriented Terā Panth monthly magazine entitled Adhyātma Parv Patrikā, published from Jhānsī, in a portion of Uttar Pradesh within the Bundelkhand cultural area, published a special issue devoted to Tāraṇ Svāmī as an adhyātma-yogī in June–July 1999, with articles with titles such as “Tāraṇ Svāmī, the expert on Adhyātma” (N. K. Jain 1999).

**Tāraṇ Svāmī as Digambar ritual reformer**

A second framework for understanding Tāraṇ Svāmī is as a ritual reformer (sudhārak). This comes in large part from the Terā Panth intellectual ethos. The Terā Panth developed in conscious opposition to the ecclesiastical and ritual authority of the domesticated pontiffs known as bhattāraks. Even though Phūlcandra posited that Tāraṇ Svāmī studied under a bhattārak for ten years, most contemporary members of the Tāraṇ Panth aver that Tāraṇ Svāmī was staunchly opposed to the bhattāraks. For example, Kapūrcand Samaiyā, one of the leading contemporary Tāraṇ Panth intellectuals, has written of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s time,

> The bhattārak institution had spread in Digambar Jain society. This area was under the authority of the Canderī seat. The bhattāraks had assumed king-like powers, and so they had great authority over society. Due to their position and power, their conduct became lax. They began to consecrate and worship images of gods and goddesses such as Padmāvatī and Kṣetrapāl along with the images of the Tīrthankaras. They began to do incantations with jantra-tantra-mantra. Due to them much false belief came into Jain philosophy. The chief foundation of Jain philosophy in true knowledge and conduct was replaced by an emphasis on external rituals, and conduct was aimed at worldly prestige. But it was a time of religious revolution, and Jin Tāraṇ Taraṇ lived in this revolutionary time.

(K. Samaiyā 1977: 1–2)

A little further on, Samaiyā wrote, “The Jain society of that time emphasized external ritualism, ostentation and obedience to convention instead of Jain
principles. The people had fallen into the clutches of the common bhattāraks” (ibid.: 3). Tāraṇ Svāmī is said to have rejected this emphasis on rituals and the authority of the bhattāraks, and instead to have emphasized the study of the mystical texts of Kundakunda and Yogindu. He wrote his own texts based on the teachings of these mystical authors, and engaged in meditation and other spiritual exercises for the purposes of strengthening his right faith and purifying his soul. In addition, he toured central India preaching to Jains and non-Jains alike, awakening them to the spiritual truths of the Jain tradition.

*Tāraṇ Svāmī as iconoclastic sant*

This portrayal of Tāraṇ Svāmī as a reformer blends into a third frame for understanding him, that of Tāraṇ Svāmī as a Jain representative of the iconoclastic sant tradition. This is based upon a broader interpretation, found in the writings of many twentieth-century Indian authors, of the medieval sant poets as engaged in criticism of both the social hierarchies and elaborate rituals of established religions. Thus the Tāraṇ Panth poet Amṛtlāl wrote,

The sixteenth century was a century of revolution, not just in India, but the whole world. The party of sants, consisting of men such as Dādū, Kabīr, Nānak, Raidās, Malūkdās, Phalṭūdās, Lokā Śāh, and Martin Luther, came onto the stage of the confusion of the world of the time. They cut away at the disorders that had gradually grown up in religion. Sant Tāraṇ was one of these sants.

(Amṛtlāl 1957: n.p.)

Later in the same pamphlet, Amṛtlāl added Svāmī Dayānand Sarasvatī, the founder of the Ārya Samāj, to this list. Another author writing in a similar vein added the Sufi saints (Gulābcandra 1940 [1974: 8]). In particular, these reforming sants are all understood to have emphasized spiritual practices that aimed at inner mystical realization, and to have criticized elaborate outer rituals, especially those involving the worship of images.

This portrait of Tāraṇ Svāmī as opposed to the worship of images of even the Jinas has become the most widely known in scholarship on the Jains. To cite just four examples, all of them from standard treatments of the Jains, Helmut von Glasenapp (1925: 357) wrote of the iconoclasm of the Panth (“sie sind bilderfeindlich”), Vilas A. Sangave (1980: 53) mentioned its “hatred of idol-worship,” Kailāscandra Śastrī (1985: 316) wrote that the Panth opposes image-worship (“yah panth mūrtipūjā kā virodhī hai”), and Hirālāl Jain (1962: 46) wrote that Tāraṇ Svāmī composed texts that forbade image-worship (“tāraṇ svāmī dvārā mūrtī pūjā nisedhak granth kī sthāpnā hui”).

Sangave went so far as to suggest that Tāraṇ Svāmī might have been influenced in his iconoclasm directly either by the teachings of Loṅkā Śāh or Islam. His
argument concerning Loṅkā Śāh appears to have come from Nāthūrām Premī, who wrote,

When we see that the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth was founded some fifty or sixty years after the Dhūndhiyā Panth, and in both there was the condemnation of image-worship, then it is not baseless to infer that Tāraṇ Svāmī was influenced by Loṅkā Śāh in the founding of his own Panth. The sad state of the lax conduct of the Digambar bhāṭṭārāks was just like that of the Śvetāmbar yatis [domesticated monks], and he must have considered how to free the laity from their clutches. He must have seen the example of the new contemporaneous tradition of Loṅkā Śāh, and from the success of its teachings have decided to start on a similar path.

(Premī 1912–1913: 555)

I find the argument that Tāraṇ Svāmī was influenced by Loṅkā Śāh highly unlikely. The two figures were more or less contemporaneous (Loṅkā’s dates are not all that much earlier than Tāraṇ Svāmī’s; see Dundas 2002: 246–251, Flügel 2000: 46–50), and it is difficult to see how the highly controversial teachings against the cult of images could have spread so quickly from the small Śvetāmbar circle around Loṅkā in Ahmedabad to an equally small circle on the margins of Digambar society in Bundelkhand. Further, Premī has mistakenly conflated the teachings of Loṅkā Śāh and his immediate successors with the later Dhūndhiyā or Śthānakvāsī tradition, which emerged from the Loṅkā Gacch only in the mid-seventeenth century, well after Tāraṇ Svāmī (Dundas 2002: 251–254, Flügel 2000: 58–79).

The argument for Muslim influence is also weak. While it is true that there were Muslims among Tāraṇ Svāmī’s immediate followers, the suggestion of direct Muslim influences on Tāraṇ Svāmī – a claim similar to that made by many authors about Loṅkā as well – remains highly speculative at best. Premī (1912–1913: 33–34) advanced a slightly different argument. He said that rather than directly incorporating Muslim practices and theologies, Tāraṇ Svāmī (as well as the other sant reformers of Hinduism) changed earlier traditions to emphasize spiritual teachings instead of ritual and social practices, as a means of combatting Muslim influence. In other words, we see the influence of Islam posited to account for changes both in imitation of and opposition to Muslim practices. But neither argument is based on anything more concrete than a common de-emphasis on image-worship and privileging of interior spiritual practice.

I find a much more likely explanation of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s indifference to image-worship – and it was indifference more than opposition, aniconism more than iconoclasm – to be his reading of Kundakunda and other authors in the Digambar mystical tradition. There is scant reference to image-worship in these earlier texts, and none at all in most of them. It is easy for an independent-minded reader of these texts to come away with the conclusion that they do not lend any support to the cult of images. Tāraṇ Svāmī would not be alone in such a reading, as the
initial exposure to Kundakunda’s *Samayasāra* had precisely this effect upon Banārsidās in Agra a little over a century later. Such aniconic responses to the reading of Kundakunda and the Digambar mystical tradition have continued to surface periodically in the Digambar tradition, especially within the Terā Panth which eschews the worship of unliberated Jain deities such as Kṣetrapāl and Padmāvātī, and critiques the use of flowers and liquids in the worship of the Jinas.24 I think this is a much more plausible explanation for Tāraṇ Svāmī’s indifference to image-worship.25

These biographical narratives, of Tāraṇ Svāmī as traditional Digambar mystic, as anti- *bhaṭṭārak* reformer, and as a Jain representative of the broader *sant* tradition, all appear to have developed in the twentieth century. On the one hand they are intended to establish the orthodoxy of Tāraṇ Svāmī, and therefore the Jain-ness of the Tāraṇ Panth. In this the narratives have been successful, as Tāraṇ Panth Jains today are represented at the highest level of local Bundelkhand Terā Panth organizations and regional north Indian Digambar organizations. I have never heard any contemporary Jain argue that Tāraṇ Svāmī and the Tāraṇ Panth are not Jain. On the other hand, these narratives give evidence of modernizing tendencies within the larger Jain tradition, as Jain history is tied to larger, global narratives of religious reform, inner spirituality, and rationality.

*Tāraṇ Svāmī as miracle worker*

These narratives have displaced an earlier understanding of Tāraṇ Svāmī as a charismatic wonder-working holy man, who was worshiped by his followers. The best known of these stories concerns the efforts of his opponents to drown him in the Betwa (Betvā) River at Malhārgarh.

I was told a brief version of this story when I visited Malhārgarh, and was taken by my hosts to see the three stone platforms in the river that are the tangible reminders of the story. In the words of K. Samaiyā (1977: 4), “Egoistic people were opposed to Tāraṇ Svāmī. It is said… that one time he was thrown in the Betwa River in an attempt to kill him, but that his lifespan was not yet complete, and so he was saved in a miraculous (*camatkārik*) manner. As a result of this incident he developed a sense of alienation from the world (*virakti*), and began to engage in spiritual practices in the forests on the banks of the Betwa.”

A fuller version is found in a 1948 article by Jñāncandra Jain:

His teachings were not looked upon favorably by his narrow-minded contemporaries. They tried to dissuade him in various ways, and also put pressure on him to stop his preaching. When he refused to cease, they tried to kill him. There was dense forest on the banks of the Betwa River around Malhārgarh. Tāraṇ Svāmī was living in this forest, because it was a good place to perform meditation (*sāmāyik* and *dhyān*). There was a boatman there named Cidānand Caudhrī. It is said that he sat Tāraṇ Svāmī in his boat, took him to the deepest part of the river, and threw
him in. He did this three times, but each time at that very spot Tāraṇ Svāmī was able to sit on a stone platform. When he saw this miracle, Cidānanda realized that Tāraṇ Svāmī must be a holy man (mahātmā). He came to regret what he had done, and became a disciple of Tāraṇ Svāmī. These stone platforms are still in the Betwa River, and members of the Tāraṇ Panth believe them to be holy (pavitra). Every year thousands of pilgrims come for darśan of the platforms, and they bow to Tāraṇ Svāmī.

(J. Jain 1948: 34)

A third telling (R. Samaiyā 1989: 8–9) says that the person who requested the boatman to kill Tāraṇ Svāmī was none other than his own mother’s brother, who was angered at Tāraṇ Svāmī’s rejection of image-worship. The story of the attempted drowning is tied to an earlier attempt by his maternal uncle to poison him that also failed (Jaysāgar 1990: 55, R. Samaiyā 1977: 8).

Two sources that dwell on Tāraṇ Svāmī as miracle-working holyman refer to the powers he had derived from his practice of mantras (Jaysāgar 1990: 56, R. Samaiyā 1989: 8). From this practice he had obtained extraordinary powers (siddhi), such as the ability to travel from Malhārgarh to Semarkheři in a matter of minutes. He used these powers to rescue a Digambar monk in Gaṛaula from unspecified harassment (saṅkat). He went to fairs and used his magic (camatkār) to convert people to his teachings. In particular, he used his magical powers to suspend his texts in the air, and then would bring them back down to earth at fairs.

This latter story is an old one, for it is at the center of the only brief nineteenth-century account of Tāraṇ Svāmī in English. Writing in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland in 1827, Major James Delamaine says of Tāraṇ Svāmī (or Tāraṇ Paṇḍit, as he calls him), “He was acquainted with the art of Indrajāla (juggling), by which he sent up papers to the sky. He then collected the multitude, and a book appeared to descend to him from heaven in their presence. He then read and explained it to them, teaching that they should worship no images at all” (Delamaine 1827: 415).

This association of Tāraṇ Svāmī with jugglers (nat) emerges elsewhere in the literature. Nāthaṭūram Premī, for example, wrote that one of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s chief disciples was a juggler (nat), and that Tāraṇ Svāmī successfully competed with jugglers and magicians (jādūgar) for the patronage of a local king (Premī 1912–1913: 295). In discussing Tāraṇ Svāmī’s death, Premī wrote that one of the three death rites performed for him was the “keeping of a plate” (thāli rakhnā) in accordance with the tradition of the jugglers (nat) (ibid.: 296–297).

Another miracle story concerns Tāraṇ Svāmī as a young child, when his father was in the employment of the king. His father had brought some paper records home with him. They were destroyed in a fire, and he was understandably worried about the king’s response. The young Tāraṇ Svāmī saw his father’s anxiety, and magically restored the papers (K. Jain 1941: 3–4, Premī 1912–1913: 200, R. Samaiyā 1989: 7).
Yet another miracle accounts for the shrine at Semarkheñ, where he is said to have spent many years engaged in spiritual practices. At that time he was living in a cave. The area was also infested with thieves (pīṇḍārā, ṭhag). Tārāṇ Svāmī happened to meet a caravan of gypsies (baṇjārā), who were leading camels loaded with sugar to sell in a nearby city. He asked them what they were carrying, but they took him for a thief dressed in sādhu's clothes, and so they said that the bags contained only salt. Later, when they came to a river and were crossing it, one of the bags broke, and they saw that it did indeed contain salt. They opened the other bags, and found that all the sugar had turned to less valuable salt. The gypsies returned to Tārāṇ Svāmī and asked his forgiveness for lying to him. In return, he turned the salt back into sugar, which they took to the city and sold. When they returned they built a temple at Semarkheñ, where a pillar erected by them is still standing (R. Samaiyā 1989: 9).

Among Tārāṇ Svāmī's disciples are said to have been a number of Muslims, and a miracle story about his death involves them (Jaysāgar 1990: 55–56). Lukmān Śāh and 500 fellow Muslims were with Tārāṇ Svāmī at the time of his death. They wanted to perform the death rites in the Muslim manner and bury the corpse, but the Jain followers of Tārāṇ Svāmī did not give permission, as they wanted to perform the Jain death rites and cremate the corpse. As a result, the rites were performed according to both the Muslim and Jain traditions, although it not clear to me exactly how this could be done.  

Brahmacārī Jaysāgar said that he heard this story from two Muslim watchmen at Nisañjī, Pīr Khām and his father, indicating that there might well have been a local Muslim tradition of veneration of Tārāṇ Svāmī's memorial as that of a Muslim holy man. Jaysāgar reported that Lukmān Śāh also died at Nisañjī, where there is a memorial shrine to him, near the memorial of another Muslim disciple, Rūiyā Rama. Jaysāgar added that there used to be many more memorials to disciples of Tārāṇ Svāmī in the area around Nisañjī, but they have been destroyed by Jains who believe that such memorials are counter to correct Jain faith. This conscious distancing of the cult of Tārāṇ Svāmī from Muslim influences is nothing new. Jaysāgar (1990: 59) wrote that the worship at the memorial of Rūiyā Rama was an integral part of the annual fair at Nisañjī, but that it was discontinued sometime after 1816.

In addition to gypsies and Muslims, Tārāṇ Svāmī has also been worshiped by local Hindus in a wonder-working context. Outside the old gate to the shrine at Nisañjī stands a large platform with two small memorial stones. When I visited Nisañjī they were both smeared with red paste, indicating their active worship as local protector deities. There was also evidence that they had been worshipped with incense, lamps, and coconuts. I was told that these are the memorials of two Bundelā Rājpūt brothers. They were local lords (ṭhākur) who were disciples of Tārāṇ Svāmī and had protected him during the time of his oppression. My informants denied that they were worshiped by members of the Tārāṇ Panth, saying that only local Hindus worshiped them. But the ṭhākurs used to be more integrally connected with the worship of Tārāṇ Svāmī. Jaysāgar (1990: 57) reported that
fifty years earlier he had heard the belief expressed that the two brothers had become vyantar devṣ, who would occasionally come and perform ārati and sing bhajans at a small shrine near the banks of the Betwa where Tāraṇ Svāmī is said to have sat in meditation.

This understanding of Tāraṇ Svāmī as a miracle-working holyman, whose charisma extended both to his own memorial shrine after his death, and to the memorial shrines of many of his immediate disciples, is in little evidence today. The story of his miraculous rescue from drowning is still well known, as it is physically maintained by the presence of the three platforms in the river. But the physical presence of the shrine of the two Bundel Rājpūts has not prevented their cult becoming somewhat separate from that of Tāraṇ Svāmī, and Jaysāgar said that the memorial shrines of many other disciples have been destroyed. Writing in 1990, Jaysāgar indicated his partial disapproval of the understanding of Tāraṇ Svāmī as a miracle-worker by relegating it to oral tradition (kimvadanti). But the clearest evidence of the contemporary rejection of this understanding of Tāraṇ Svāmī is found in my copy of Rādhelāl Samaiyā’s book, my other principal source for these stories. I was given this book, from among a large collection of books in the temple in Sāgar, by a man who felt that it would be valuable in my research. But he didn’t look in this particular copy before he gave it to me. The portion of the book in which the author relates the miracle stories, and which is entitled “Sant Tāraṇ Taraṇ and His Miracles [camatkār],” has been heavily crossed out by pen, and someone has written across the top of each page, “This is not a proven account” (yah pramāṇit vivaraṇ nahi [sic] hai).

Tāraṇ Svāmī as future Jina

There is a fifth understanding of Tāraṇ Svāmī that I have encountered only in written works. Nāthūrām Premī gave an extensive summary of a biography of Tāraṇ Svāmī found in an old book given to him by a member of the Tāraṇ Panth, which he said represented the contemporary beliefs (māntā) of the Panth. According to this biography, the soul that became Tāraṇ Svāmī was a tribal (Bhīl) king in a previous life. He came under the spiritual influence of a Jain monk, and took a vow not to eat meat. The fruition of this vow was that he was reborn during the time of Mahāvīra as King Śreniṅa. According to all the Digambar traditions, Śreniṅa’s soul is currently residing in a hell, but is destined eventually to be born as Padmanābha, the first Jina of the coming era, because of his earlier connection with Mahāvīra. The Tāraṇ Panth version of the story, however, greatly shortens Śreniṅa’s stay in hell to only 1,750 years, whereas standard Digambar cosmology avers that the minimum lifespan of a hell-being is 10,000 years (Premī 1912–1913: 535). The soul was reborn as Ācārya Bhadrabāhu, one of the leaders of the Jain monastic community in the early years after Mahāvīra, and lived for 99 years. The soul was again reborn as the great philosopher and mystic Kundakunda, as whom he lived for another 84 years before being reborn as Tāraṇ Svāmī. The soul currently resides in the heaven known as Sarvārthasiddhi; after
living there as a god for 84 million years, it will be born as Padmanābha (ibid.: 198–199).  

This framework for understanding Tāraṇ Svāmī clearly gives him an almost Jina-like status, while at the same time avoiding the heresy of declaring him actually to be a Jina by locating his attainment of enlightenment in an orthodox future. The inclusion of Kundakunda into this narrative is also noteworthy. Kundakunda is almost universally considered to be the intellectual lodestar of the Digambar tradition, and the Mūla Saṅgha, the monastic lineage that considers itself to be the “original” and “true” lineage, also calls itself the “lineage of Kundakunda” (Kundakunda Anvaya). Claiming that Tāraṇ Svāmī is indeed none other than Kundakunda reborn is to claim total orthodoxy for him.

Premī described another way in which Tāraṇ Svāmī is considered to be even greater than the Jinas:

The members of the Tāraṇ Panth also believe that there have been other reformers just like Tāraṇ Svāmī, and that there will be more in the future. In between religion becomes extinct, because Tāran or Tārakal is absent. After there have been 149 sets of twenty-four Jinas comes the time of separation (virahiyā kāl), also known as the time of shortcomings ( الهند kāl). Then a Tārakal or Tāran is born, and all the forgetful beings find the way.

(Ibid.: 299)

I have not encountered this cosmic understanding of Tāraṇ Svāmī as a sort of “super-Jina” anywhere other than this one Tāraṇ Panth source paraphrased by Premī. Nor did my informants present an understanding of Tāraṇ Svāmī as a miracle worker. I should add that all of my informants among the Tāraṇ Panth were recommended to me as knowledgeable intellectuals, and so there is an inevitable intellectualist bias in their portrayal of Tāraṇ Svāmī and his teachings. But it is also clearly evident that the interpretive frames for understanding Tāraṇ Svāmī have changed over the past century.

Tāraṇ Svāmī’s writings

Tāraṇ Svāmī is credited with authoring fourteen texts. Some scholars have expressed doubts about his authorship of two of them, the Chadmastha Vāṇī and the Nāma Mālā, the former because it includes a reference to his death, and the latter because it includes the names of many of his disciples. In discussions of his writings one frequently sees a division of them into five systems (mata, mati). Phūlcandra (1985b: 387) wrote that this categorization is found in a manuscript of the Thikānesāra now in the collection of the Tāraṇ Panth temple in Khurāi, which was copied in the late nineteenth-century by one Tīkārām of Kundā, although it is evidently not found in another manuscript of this text copied by the
same man and now in the collection at Nisaṅjī. The five categories of texts are as follows:

Vicāra mata (Reflections)
- Mālārohaṇa (“Garland offering”)
- Pandita Pūjā (“Wise worship”)
- Kamala Battist (“Lotus thirty-two [verses]”)

Ācāra mata (Conduct)
- Śrāvakācāra (“Lay conduct”)

Sāra mata (Essential teachings)
- Jñāna Samuccaya Sāra (“Collected essence of knowledge”)
- Tribhaṅga Sāra (“Essence in triads”)
- Upadeśa Śuddha Sāra (“Pure essence of the teachings”)

Mamala mata (Spiritual purity)
- Mamala Pāhuḍa (“Handbook on purity”)
- Caubtsa Thāṇa (“Twenty-four topics”)

Kevala mata (Enlightenment)
- Chadmaṣṭha Vāṇī (“Sayings of the unliberated”)
- Nāma Mālā (“Garland of names”)
- Khāṭikā Viśeṣa (“Special uprooter”)
- Siddha Subhāva (“Nature of the perfected soul”)
- Sunna Subhāva (“Nature of emptiness”)

The three texts in the vicāra mata are thirty-two verse compositions that have been translated into Hindi more than any other of Tārāṇ Svāmī’s texts, and are the best-known to members of the Tārāṇ Panth. K. Samaiyā (1977: 18) said that right faith (samyag-darśana) is emphasized in the Mālārohaṇa, right knowledge (samyag-jñāna) in the Pandita Pūjā, and right conduct (samyak-caritra) in the Kamala Battist. According to tradition, Tārāṇ Svāmī composed the Mālārohaṇa for the wedding of one of his followers, either a Rājpūt or the daughter of one Padmakamal (Phulcandra 1985b: 386). It is read at weddings in the Tārāṇ Panth. Premī (1912–1913: 301–302) says that during the autumnal observance of Daśalakṣaṇa, people gather in the temple to recite the Pandita Pūjā and Mamalapahuḍa during the day and the Mālārohaṇa and Kamala Battist during the evening. Some members of the Panth recite one or more of these texts daily.

The other texts are less well-known, although they are the subject of study by contemporary Tārāṇ Panth intellectuals. The Śrāvakācāra in 462 verses lays out the basics of Jain lay conduct. It was most likely collated from earlier Digambar śrāvakācāra texts, as it does not differ from them to any significant degree.34

The Jñāna Samuccaya Sāra consists of 908 verses, and the Upadeśa Śuddha Sāra of 588 verses. Between them they cover much of the basics of Digambar philosophy and metaphysics. The Jñāna Samuccaya Sāra discusses correct knowledge, faith, conduct, and scripture; the stages of lay spirituality (pratimā) and the lay vows (anuvrata); the virtues (guna) and vows (vrata) of a true monk; the seven verities of
Jain philosophy; the six substances (*dravya*); and the four types of meditation (*dhyāna*). The *Upadesa Śuddha Sāra* covers various aspects of the correct path to liberation and faults that lead one astray from that path. The *Tribhanga Sāra* is a text of seventy-one verses that discusses various topics in groups of three, detailing which triads to follow and which to renounce. All three of these texts, along with the *Śrāvakacāra*, are very close to the mainstream Digambar philosophical tradition.

The *Mamala Pāhuda* is a large collection of songs, consisting of over 3,200 verses. The *Caubisa Ṭhānā* in roughly twenty pages of mixed verse and prose provides twenty-four spiritual topics on which the person desiring liberation should meditate.

The *Chadmastha Vāṇī* and *Nāma Mālā* are short prose texts, each about nine pages long in their printed versions, that provide cryptic information about Tāraṇ Svāmī and his disciples, as well as a range of other subjects. Premī (1912–1913: 302) said that the *Chadmastha Vāṇī* is recited for five days after Diśali. The *Khāṭikā Viśeṣa* is a short text of mixed prose and verse that discusses the process of wearing away karma in the context of the upward and downward cycles of time. The *Siddha Subhāva* and *Sunna Subhāva* are very short prose works, the first describing purification of the soul, and the latter the different ways in which one should be empty of false senses of self.35

**Tāraṇ Svāmī’s teachings**

These texts, like much mystical literature the world over, are difficult to understand, and so are open to much interpretation. In general, Tāraṇ Svāmī affirms that by means of insight (*darśana*), purity (*śuddhatā*), knowledge (*jñāna*), and the cultivation of the correct inner spiritual orientation (*bhāva*), one will realize that one’s soul (*ātmā*) in fact is the liberated supreme soul (*paramātmā*), and thus overcome the bonds of karma. His writings are full of terms quite commonly found in other Jain writings, such as knowledge (*jñāna*), verity (*tattva*), pure (*śuddha*), faith (*darśana*), intention or sentiment (*bhāva*), innate character (*svabhāva*), and wrong faith (*mithyātva*), but in the absence of good grammar the relationships among concepts are often unclear.

The most widely-known facet of the Tāraṇ Panth is its eschewing of the worship of images of the Jinas. But, as I will discuss further, there is no explicit mention of this in any of the texts attributed to Tāraṇ Svāmī.

The fact that Gaṇeśprāsād Varnā, one of the foundational figures of the modern north Indian Digambar intellectual tradition, is said to have been unable to make sense of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s writings is significant. Tāraṇ Svāmī did not write in any one language, but mixed Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhramsa and Bundelkhandi Hindi together, often in the same verse or sentence. It is quite clear that he was not trained in grammar (and for this reason I doubt the story that he studied for ten years under a *bhaṭṭaraka*). He evidently had read texts by Kundakunda, Yogindu, Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra, and other orthodox Digambar authors, for in many places his texts read like paraphrases of these authors, except they are paraphrases
by someone who did not understand the grammatical details of the languages he had read. Those who are more favorably inclined toward his writings term his use of language “unique” (svatantra). This estimation is perhaps best expressed by Phûlcandra (1985b: 401), who wrote, “The language is unique. He never composed according to the limitations of any single language and grammar. He expressed himself in whichever language a spiritual experience arose in his heart.” Premî (1912–1913: 7) described Tāraṇ Svāmî’s prose as undeclined (asambaddh), unclear (aspaṣṭ), and unusual (alaukik). Those less favorably inclined toward his writings use harsher language to characterize them, such as the Śvetāmbar monk Buddhisāgarsūri (1917: 341), who said that Tāraṇ Svāmî’s texts “are in a strange (adbhuṭ) language.” The most negative evaluation comes from Lāl Bahādur Śastri, a professional Digambar disputant with the Ambālā-based Śastrāth Saṅgh who engaged several Tāraṇ Panth authors in a written debate on the appropriateness of image-worship in the early 1940s. Lāl Bahādur (1941: ka) said simply, “He was not especially learned, as is clear from reading his fourteen texts.” Published versions of the texts show wide variation in spellings, and as Phûlcandra (1978: 72) notes, it is obvious that many changes have been introduced into the manuscripts by both the copists and their patrons, and so there is a need for a thorough study of the extant manuscripts. This work has not been undertaken to date.36 Nor has the Tāraṇ Panth produced any notable intellectuals in the intervening five centuries since Tāraṇ Svāmî, so there are no known commentaries on any of the texts to aid one in interpreting the difficult language.37

The Tāraṇ Svāmî Panth

As a result of this lack of a Tāraṇ Panth literary tradition, the history between the death of Tāraṇ Svāmî and the early twentieth century is largely a blank. The Nāma Māḷā contains some 2,000 names, but the significance of these is not fully clear. In his edition and Hindi version of this text Jaysāgar constructed an elaborate spiritual genealogy, but does not indicate on what basis he did so. Certainly both oral tradition and the cultic memory enshrined in the tombs at Nisaţţī have intersected with the Nāma Māḷā.

According to the community’s own tradition, Tāraṇ Svāmî had disciples from a wide range of social backgrounds. Some of them were Jains, including some female renouncers (āryikā, ārjikā), among whom Kamalāśri Ārjikā was the most prominent.38 Many sources have said that his other chief disciple was a Muslim named Ruiyā ṇin or Ruiyā Ramaṇ, who is mentioned at the beginning of the Nāma Māḷā.39 A. H. Nizami (1980: 309) wrote that Ruiyā ṇin was a cotton-carder by trade. Premî (1912–1913: 205) mentioned another cotton-carder named Behanā. He also mentions a juggler (nat), whose tomb is at Nisaţţī (ibid.: 6). Sitalprasad (1992: 13) listed five chief disciples. Lakṣmāṇ Pāṇḍe by his title was possibly a disciple of a regional bhāttārak. Cidānand Caudhrī was the boatman mentioned earlier. The third was Paramānand Vilāsī. The last two clearly have Muslim names: Sulpa Sāh Telī (an oil-presser by trade) and Lukmān Sāh Musalmān. There is a
local tradition in Cauñaí or Când, a village in Chhindwara (Chindvārā) district, of veneration of one Himāu Pāṇḍe (also spelled Himānyu and Humāyūn), who was an influential disciple of Tārān Svāmī. His followers built a memorial to him on the banks of the Kulbahara (Kulbaharā) River. But the worship of Himāu has been criticized by many other members of the Panth.40 Earlier I mentioned the two local Bundelā Rājpūts at Nisaįji who protected him from his iconophilic opponents. Earlier I had also discussed the story of the gypsies who built a shrine to Tārān Svāmī at Semarkheṛī in response to one of his miracles. What is clear from this scanty evidence is that he was a charismatic spiritual teacher, who attracted disciples from a wide range of contemporary society, and perhaps had more followers from non-Jain backgrounds than from Jain backgrounds. This could also help account for the stories of opposition to him on the part of the local Jains.

None of these followers wrote anything that we know of (although it is possible that the Chadmūṣṭha Vāṇi and Nāma Mālā were composed by one or more of them), nor have there been any texts composed from within the Tārān Panth in the intervening centuries. We do know that his manuscripts were copied in various places, evincing some degree of on-going intellectual activity. There is also the material evidence embedded in the many temples (caityālay) throughout Bundelkhand, as well as at the principal pilgrimage places of the Panth, but with the exception of Nisaįji, which I will discuss further, there has been no research on them. Nor has there been an adequate survey of manuscripts in the temple collections. It might be possible to reconstruct a partial history of the Panth in the centuries between the death of Tārān Svāmī and the emergence of modern records in the first half of the twentieth century, but to date no one has attempted this.

What we do know is that members of the Tārān Panth today are found in six merchant castes in Bundelkhand.41 According to informants, three of these – Samaiyā, Dosakhe and Gulālāre – were converts from image-worshiping Jain communities, and the other three – Aseṭhi, Ayodhyāvāśi and Čārnagar – were converts from Vaiśṇav Hindu communities. All of these castes are distinctly Bundelkhandi in language and custom, indicating that the Tārān Panth has long (if not always) been restricted to Bundelkhand.

The Samaiyā and Dosakhe both appear to have formerly been part of the Parvār caste, one of the largest merchant castes of Bundelkhand.42 Many members of the Gulālāre have migrated to northwestern Maharashatra.43 The Aseṭhi caste is still predominantly Vaiśṇav, with a small number in the Tārān Panth.44 The Ayodhyāvāśi, as its name indicates, is a caste that claims its origin to have been the area around Ayodhyā in eastern Uttar Pradesh.45 It is also predominantly Vaiśṇav, with a small percentage in the Tārān Panth. According to Jaysāgar (1990: 37), members of the Tārān Panth from this caste view the Tārān Svāmī temple in the village of Naṭeran in Vidisha (Vidiṣā) district to be a special pilgrimage shrine. The Čārnagar caste also consists mostly of Vaiśṇavas, with a smaller number of members of the Tārān Panth.46 These castes practiced religious rituals together, but exchanged neither daughters nor cooked food until a decision was taken at the annual fair at Nisaįji
in 1927 to begin such exchanges (S. Jain 1984: 32). Nowadays there is also fairly extensive intermarriage with Terā Panth Digambars in similar castes.

I was told estimates of the total population of the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth that ranged between 20,000 and 100,000. One author (R. Samaiyā 1989: 39–62) has presented a district-by-district chart of where there are Tāraṇ Panth households and temples. He lists 131 temples and a little under 20,000 people, located mostly in the areas of Madhya Pradesh, southern Uttar Pradesh and northwest Maharashtra that comprise the area of Bundelkhand. The center of the Tāraṇ Panth area comprises the districts of Vidisha (Vidiśā), Damoh, Sagar (Sāgar), Jabalpur, Raisen (Rāysen), and Hoshangabad (Hoṣangābād) in Madhya Pradesh.

There is little information about the organization of religious professionals within the Panth before modern times. Informants told me that formerly resident ritual functionaries known as bhājī (“respected brother”) or pānde (equivalent to pandīt, and referring to any learned person) were connected with each temple. They delivered sermons and ritualized readings of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s texts. I surmise that some of them also functioned as manuscript copists and maintained the Tāraṇ Panth intellectual culture. Leadership of the Panth was under wealthy and respected lay merchants, who were also responsible for funding the annual pilgrimages to Nisaśī (see later). Rādhelāl Samaiyā (1989: 17–26) gives brief biographical details of seven twentieth-century brahmācāris (m) and four brahmācārīnīs (f) in the Panth. It is unclear to me whether this is a relatively recent tradition of semi-renouncers, or if within the Panth, in common with the broader Digambar ritual culture of central India, there have always been a few men and women who took the vows of lay celibates, and we simply have no records of them. Samaiyā also includes one muni and one ksullak who were born in the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth; informants told me that they are now simply part of the common Digambar mendicant community, which has intentionally eschewed any formal affiliation with the lay division into different pathṣ. They are not Tāraṇ Panth monks. Finally, Samaiyā lists forty pandīts from the past century. But this title is often applied to anyone with a literary or intellectual bent, and does not indicate either any formal educational qualifications or any formal ritual role.

Pilgrimage shrines

There are four pilgrimage shrines for the Tāraṇ Panth, although only three of them are the sites of annual fairs, and only one of them has any great antiquity.47 The most important is on the banks of the Betwa River near the village of Malhārgaṛh in Guna district. It is known simply as Nisaśī, “Honored memorial.” It was here that Tāraṇ Svāmī spent his final years with his disciples, and where his last rites were performed. There are also memorials (samādhi) of many of his disciples. I will return to it later.

Semarkheṛi, near Siroñj in Vidisha District, is where Tāraṇ Svāmī is said to have engaged in various spiritual practices and formally to have renounced the world. It is also where the Bañjārās erected a shrine to him. The annual fair (melā) is held there on Vasant Bright Fifth, a day widely celebrated throughout north India as
Spring Fifth. In addition to a temple and various buildings for pilgrims at the shrine itself, nearby are also some caves in which Tāraṇ Svāmī is said to have meditated. This is the oldest pilgrimage shrine in the Panth after Nisaṭīj, and there are records of the patrons of the annual fairs going back to 1881 (R. Samaīyā 1989: 12).

Sūkhā, near Pathariyā village in Damoh District, is where he preached. The annual fair here is known as Tāraṇ Jayantī; the use of this name, which has come to be used by the Indian government for the birth days of the “founders” of all religious communities, indicates that the fair is of fairly recent origin. That the fair is a recent development is also indicated by Sītalprasād (1992: 17), for, writing in 1932, he described annual fairs only at Semarkheṛi and Nisaṭīj. A decade later, Kālurām Jain (1941: 18–19) also described just Semarkheṛi and Nisaṭīj as pilgrimage shrines in the Panth. He added that he had heard of a dilapidated memorial in Damoh District; obviously this was the site of at most a local Tāraṇ Panth fair in his time. The fair at Sukhā is on Agahan Bright Seventh, in November–December. This site was relatively neglected by the community for many years, but extensive constructions began in 1938, after a leading layman from Sāgar bought the land from a local Muslim.

The fourth pilgrimage site is in the village of Bilharī, near Kaṭnī in Jabalpur district. According to the tradition of the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth, this is the village formerly known as Puṣpāvatī where Tāraṇ Svāmī was born. This has only recently become a pilgrimage goal for the community, after the site was purchased from its non-Jain owners. The construction there has all been undertaken in the past few decades, largely under the direction of important laymen from Sāgar and Jabalpur. There is as of yet no annual fair at Bilharī.

Before turning to Nisaṭīj, I should mention two other sites that are important to some members of the Panth but are not dedicated to Tāraṇ Svāmī himself. The village of Cānd in Chhindwara district is the site of the memorial (samādhī) of Himāḷ Pānde, one of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s chief disciples. It was also neglected for many years, but recently local members of the Panth have begun to develop the site, and there is an annual fair on Jēṭh Dark Sixth, known as Samādhī Sixth, the anniversary of Himāḷ Pānde’s death. There was just a simple platform here, but a larger temple has recently been built. At Gaṛaula (or Garhaulā), near Tīndu in Damoh district, where Tāraṇ Svāmī is said to have lived for a few years as a child in his mother’s brother’s home, there is also a large platform.

By far the most important pilgrimage shrine is Nisaṭīj. 48 The annual fair here is held for three days from Phāg Bright Fifth in February–March, and is known as Phāg Phūlnā (“Phāg flowering”). Jaysāgar (1990: 59) records that until the early nineteenth century there was an annual fair at Nisaṭīj in honor of one of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s disciples, the Muslim Ruiyā Ramaṇ or Ruiyā Jin, but that the fair was discontinued. This has also been where many members of the Tāraṇ Panth come to have the first tonsure (mundan) of their children performed.

The main building is a three-storied structure of stone windows and arched canopies, in a style K. D. Bajpai (1975: 354) has termed “late medieval Rajput.” (Figure 11.1) In conception it is a grandiose funerary monument, in which
the normally smaller style of a memorial canopy has been expanded into a tall tower. The shrine itself is very simple. There is a small canopied marble altar, on which is a pile of printed books. Behind this altar, inside a small walled enclosure, is an older stone altar, which is said to be the original one.

Figure 11.1 Central shrine at Nisajī. Photograph by the author, December 11, 1999.
Phūlcandra (1985c) has traced the history of the site in an important essay. At first there was just a simple chattrī, a canopied memorial platform at the site of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s samādhi, where he was cremated. This served as an altar. About 350 years ago a devotee, whose descendants subsequently lived in Sirpur in Khandesh (modern Dhule District, Maharashtra), arranged for a more ornate chattrī with four pillars. In 1817 the annual fair was sponsored by a merchant from Nāgpur named Tārācand Mallūsāv. Among those who accompanied him to Nisaījī was a woman named Kesarī. As part of her devotions she circumambulated the main shrine, and then prostrated herself on the ground. She died when her forehead touched the ground. In commemoration of this holy death her family built the current twelve-doored pavilion that obscures the older altar. The current six-pillared altar presumably dates from that renovation. Also around this time Mallūsāv built the current tall superstructure, as well the eastern gate to the complex. This superstructure has become emblematic of Nisaījī, and is the model for some Tāraṇ Panth temples elsewhere. The last third of the nineteenth century saw extensive construction of additional buildings at Nisaījī by pilgrims from throughout central India. On February 22, 1903 Mahārāo Mādhorāo Śinghiyā, the king of Gwalior, in which princely state Nisaījī was located, visited the shrine, accompanied by an important Tāraṇ Panth layman from Khuraī. In commemoration of the visit the king donated the land surrounding the shrine to the Tāraṇ Panth. Subsequent construction of buildings on the site has been done with stones quarried from this land.

The archives at the shrine also list the names of those who sponsored the annual fairs, starting with Mallūsāv from Nāgpur in 1817. Other patrons have come from Bāndā, Sāgar, Hośāṅgābād, Āgāsaud, and Timarnī, all towns in the Bundelkhand heartland of the Tāraṇ Samāj. After 1933 the organization of the annual fair has become a community undertaking.

For such an important Tāraṇ Svāmī pilgrimage site, there is very little to see, since the Panth resists the installation of any images, the veneration of any of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s disciples, and even the painting of imaginative reconstructions of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s life. The tall gateway is relatively recent, built after people started arriving at Nisaījī mostly by car and bus, via the round-about road from Bīnā and the nearby town of Āgāsaud. There is an older, simpler gateway facing the Betwa River about a mile away, dating from when pilgrims travelled from Bīnā and Āgāsaud by the direct route on bullock carts and crossed the river by ferry. By the Betwa are a set of recently built stone steps leading down the bank to the river. A small building built in 1945 covers a canopied stone seat on which Tāraṇ Svāmī sat in meditation. In the middle of the Betwa are the three small stone platforms that arose spontaneously in response to the attempts to drown him.

**Temples**

The temples of the Panth are all called by the elevated Sanskrit term caityālay. From the outside they are not readily distinguishable from Terā Panth Digambar
temples of Bundelkhand. This should not surprise us, for temples in India are often identifiable more by regional style than sectarian orientation.

The layout of a caityālay is fairly simple. The importance of sermons is indicated by the large open spaces within the temple. The emphasis on a more intellectual, less sensory style of religiosity is also indicated by the lack of much visual ornamentation in the temple. What ornamentation there is tends to be found on the altars, which are often of gilt marble, in a style reminiscent of a royal cenotaph (Figure 11.2). The symbolism in the ornamentation on the altars, however, is indicative of a generalized auspiciousness, and in no way betokens any specifically Tāraṇ Svāmī message. Thus one finds representations of figures such as guards, flywhisk-bearers, svastikas, full pots, elephants, and divine musicians. Many temples have three altars, symbolizing the threefold focus in Digambar ritual on god, teacher, and religion (dev, guru, and dharm).

The most striking aspect of a Tāraṇ Panth caityālay is the obvious absence of any images. One story (R. Samaiyā 1989: 8) recounts that Tāraṇ Svāmī’s father regularly performed image-worship in the temple, and asked the 11 year-old boy to perform it in his stead when he left town on a business trip. The boy took food to the temple to offer it to the image, and asked the image to eat it. Later, when he returned to the temple and saw that the food was uneaten, he assumed that the image wanted to bathe before eating, and so took the image to a nearby river and immersed it. The boy implored the image to re-emerge from the water, but it did not. He therefore decided that the image was not god, but just inert stone, and so left it in the river. From then on he engaged in meditation rather than image-worship.

This story is also told by Premī (1912–1913: 201–202); but in that version it led directly to his father, another merchant in the village, and a kṣullak plotting to kill the boy for his insult of the image. Elsewhere Premī (ibid.: 295) tells a third version derived from the oral tradition of Bundelkhand opponents of the Tāraṇ Panth. When the father had the son perform worship in his stead, the boy ate the food that had been offered to the image. In Jain ritual ideology such food is nirmālya, “not to be eaten,” and to do so is a karmically wrong action. The father expelled his son from his home. The boy replied that he saw no fault in eating such food, and as a result started his own religious path.

The story of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s opponents attempting to drown him in the Betwa River is in some accounts also tied to his reputed iconoclasm. According to this telling, it was specifically his teaching that the worship of images was unnecessary, and even a sign of ignorance, that led to their attempts to kill him.

A reading of the texts credited to Tāraṇ Svāmī, however, does not find any clear denunciation of image-worship. The closest to this comes in his Śrāvakācārā, “Manual of Lay Conduct,” verses 307–311. In the context of discussing the six standard lay rituals (karma), Tāraṇ Svāmī says that only a person who has wrong faith worships a god in the temple. Such a person wanders in the suffering
of infinite rebirth, and calls as “god” that which is not god:

The layman (śrāvaka) who does not maintain the lay vows (vratas) should practice the six rituals (karmas). The six rituals are twofold; they are seen as pure (śuddha) and impure (aśuddha).
The faithful soul knows and always practices the pure six rituals. The unfaithful soul practices the impure six rituals. Of this there is no doubt. That which is impure (āsuddha) is called impure (āsuci). The impure leads to that which is impermanent. The pure [leads one] on the path to liberation, [whereas] the impure leads to a bad rebirth. He is called impure (āsuddha) who knows the god in the temple. He wanders in infinite places, and calls what is not god as “god.”

There is wrong faith (mithyā), illusion (māyā), and foolishness (mūḍha drṣṭi) in the person who worships as god that which is not god. Such a person is wholly involved in worldly affairs and worships with wrong faith.53

This is certainly not a sweeping critique of image worship. While this passage is understood to criticize image worship, it can equally well refer to other forms of spiritually ignorant religious practice. The Śrāvakācāra passage is no more explicitly iconoclastic than any of a number of passages in texts of the Digambar mystical tradition that emphasize the centrality of meditation and other mental practices over external rituals. For example, the Digambar poet Yogāndu writes in his Yogasāra (a text that has never, to the best of my knowledge, been interpreted as advocating iconoclasm), “O fool! God is not in the temple, nor in stone nor in plaster nor in pictures!”54 Furthermore, there is a description in one of the Thikānesār manuscripts of the fifty-two temples containing eternal bejewelled Jina images on the continent of Nandiśvara Dvīpa, where the gods come to worship the images during three annual eight-day festivals, a description that would appear to discount any ideological rejection of image worship.55

Rituals

The orthodox order of service (paddhati) in a Tāraṇ Panth temple was organized in the mid-twentieth century by Jaysāgar; informants told me that he compiled it from his study of earlier, otherwise unspecified texts. The basic temple rite itself is very simple. The person enters the temple, and first bows to the altar (vedt) as a form of homage to the scripture. On the altar rest copies of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s texts, as well as other standard Digambar philosophical and mystical texts. Some people circumambulate the altar three times, and/or prostrate to it.

Standing in front of the altar, the person then recites three of Tāraṇ Svāmī’s verses, known as Tatva Pāth, “Recitation of the Principles,” or Tatva Maṅgal, “The Auspicious Principles.” They are recited as a blessing (maṅgalacarana), and consist of veneration of the true god, teacher, and religion (dev, guru, and dharm). The verses are taken from his Mamala Pāhuda, verses 1, 28, and 63. These are the first verses of three hymns in this collection, known as Deva Dipta (“Light of God”), Guru Dipta (“Light of the Teacher”), and Dharma Dipta (“Light of Dharma”).56

It is the verity consisting of joy and bliss, its innate nature is consciousness.
The supreme verity has attained the unchanging state so I bow to that which has perfection as its innate nature.

The guru teaches about the hidden form (soul), along with the hidden knowledge.

The monk is capable of saving (others) and saving (himself), he wards off the world of rebirth.

The dharma enunciated by the Jina is the meaning of the three meanings conjoined. Mind it, for it destroys the fears of faithful souls. This is the pure knowledge of liberation.

This is followed by the signing of one or more hymns (bhajan, stuti).

If there is a sermon (dharmopdeś), then the assembled worshipers sit to listen to it. In many cases the sermon might be delivered by a local intellectual who is connected with the temple, known as bhājjī or pānde. On some occasions the temple managing committee will pay a pandit from elsewhere to come and deliver a series of sermons. Such a visiting pandit need not be a follower of Tārāṇ Svāmī himself, and the subject matter of the sermon is often drawn from the broader Digambar tradition. When I visited Sāgar, a visiting Terā Panth pandit was delivering a series of sermons based on Tārāṇ Svāmī's Pañḍita Pūjā and a standard textbook on Digambar philosophy edited by Kailāścandra Śāstrī entitled Jain Siddhānt Praveṣikā (“Introduction to Jain Doctrine”).

At the conclusion of the sermon, everyone stands and recites a hymn known as Abalabalī (“The Power of the Weak”). Some ritual manuals also recommend that the worshiper here recite the three aśīrvāds, “blessings,” which I give later. The Abalabalī is also recited as a maṅgalācaraṇ. Jaysāgar wrote that the verses were recited everywhere in the Tārāṇ Panth at the end of sermons (śāstra sabhā), but that they were recited incorrectly because their meaning was obscure, and so he edited and translated the text (Jayseen 1939a: 19–20). The first five verses are attributed to Tārāṇ Svāmī, but, to the best of my knowledge, are not found in any of the fourteen texts. The next six verses are drawn from the Darśāna Pāhuda, Cāritra Pāhuda, Bodha Pāhuda, and Mokṣa Pāhuda, texts attributed by the tradition to Kundakunda. The twelfth verse is, according to Jaysāgar, verse 31 of the Mamala Pāhuda, but does not appear in Sitalprasād’s edition. The final verse is from the Rayaṇasāra, another text attributed to Kundakunda. The thirteen verses describe the nature of liberation.

Hail to you Jina. Through your firm lotus-like speech you give power to the weak.

My mind is consciousness delighting in the happiness of pure pleasure.

Hail savior (of others) and saver (of oneself). Praise to your saving doctrine, knowledge and meditation.

The teacher whose conduct and actions are pure becomes the omniscient god.
Hail (to the one who has) pleasure, bliss, mental bliss, innate bliss, and supreme bliss.
Praise and homage to the Tīrthaṅkara who himself is pure as evidenced by his meditation.
Hail to the delighting lord, delighting in happiness, in whose lotus(-heart) is pure meditation.
Hail god who shines on your own, lord delighting in shining liberation.
Hail to you, Jina-god, savior, lord, who (experiences) infinite bliss from meditation.
Happiness, delight, pleasure arise. Hail to the god who gives liberation.
I will do homage to the excellent Jinas Rṣabha and Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) and concisely to the others in succession, and then I will speak the path of faith.
After venerating the supreme lords who are omniscient, all-seeing, undeluded, and have conquered all passions, the faithful souls in the three worlds venerate the Arhats.
The stage on the path of the Jinas, who are unbound and have conquered passions, is that of those whose conduct is pure due to its faith and knowledge, and are unshaken by their own or others’ teachings.
In the context of human births he has five-senses, and in the context of the spiritual ladder he is on the fourteenth rung.
When he is conjoined with all these virtues, and is absorbed in the virtues, called an Arhat.
Homage homage to that god who has abandoned external matter by whom karma has been worn away, and who has realized his own soul that consists of knowledge.
The form of the Jina consists of knowledge, is pure due to equanimity, and has thoroughly conquered passions.
He gives pure initiation and instruction because he has eliminated all karma.
The path to liberation, to salvation from rebirth, consists of shedding the karma of rebirth, knowledge and discrimination of the essence of the triple world, and a yearning for the purity of one’s innate nature.
The layman proclaims the virtues, vows, asceticism, equanimity, the stages, gifting, filtering water, (avoiding) pointless actions, faith, knowledge, conduct, and the fifty-three rites.

The ritual then concludes with the performance of āratt, or offering of a flame in honor of the scriptures. Those who wave the platters holding the candles don a white cap. In some temples this is performed only by men, and in other temples by both men and women. There are two parts to the āratt, one that praises god, teacher, and scripture (dev, guru, and śāstra), and the other known as the Tāran
Svāmī Ārati that praises Tāraṇ Svāmī himself. This latter hymn is in more or less standard modern Hindi, and so must be a fairly recent composition; the reference to Sūkhā also points to it being recent.63

The lamp of Tāraṇ Svāmī,
that does victory victory of the Jina’s speech. (refrain)

Hold the garland of right faith around the throat,
and knowledge of the difference (between soul and body) in the heart.
Fortunate is he who is on the path to liberation,
who is going to that glorious auspiciousness.

At Nisaī, Sūkhā and Semarkherī
blow the sweet horn of god.
Listen today o Lord to my petition
that I bow to the Lordly Guru.

These karmas surround me
so remove my faults.
Lord, now don’t load me like a porter,
listen to the petition of your creature.

The lamp of the fourteen scriptures,
that does victory victory victory of the liberated ones.
Prince, shout “victory” of the saints,
I bow to the one on the banks of the Betwa.

I do your lamp, o Lord,
that my soul become successful.
The lamp of the five supreme lords,
that does victory victory victory of the Jina’s speech.

Experience the essence of your own soul,
the essence of victory in a human birth, o prince.
Here I hold fast to the auspicious path,
I bow to the feet of the Lordly Guru.

The basic elements of these rituals – ritual purity, maṅgalācaraṇa, hymns, sermons, ārati, circumambulation, sandalwood forehead marks – are common to most of the indigenous ritual cultures of South Asia. What distinguishes them from other Jain temple rituals is that the objects of worship are scriptures, and in particular the texts authored by Tāraṇ Svāmī, rather than Jina images. While some of the hymns are shared with the broader Digambar society, most of the hymns sung are specific to the Tāraṇ Svāmī community, and would be unknown to other Jains.

There is one other ritual that is unique to the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth, and that is the marriage rite. According to most sources, this rite was devised by Tāraṇ Svāmī himself for the marriage of a devotee’s daughter. Jaysāgar (1990: 45) said that this
tradition, “of performing the ideal marriage rite,” began in the household of a particular leading family of the community in Sāgar, and so it may be that the tradition was revived in the 1940s on the basis of a textual reconstruction of the rite, perhaps by Jayśāgār himself. I was given a detailed description of the rite by a recently married couple, and there are several written descriptions of it. All of these show some variation, so it is evident that the rite differs according to regional and family custom. My description here is based on what I was told by the informants.

The rite is held in a hall, not in the main shrine room of a temple. One or more lamps are established on a table, on which copies of Tāraṇ Svāmī texts are also ceremoniously displayed. The couple, dressed as a prince and princess, take darśan of the texts, and then sit facing each other. Everyone present reads the Tatva Pātha. Then a pandit recites the entirety of the thirty-two-verse Mālārohaṇa, the text Tāraṇ Svāmī is said to have composed for his devotee’s daughter’s wedding. After each verse those present shout “jay namostu” and throw yellow rice on the couple as a blessing, while a gong or drum is beaten. After the recitation, the couple marks each others’ hands with turmeric paste. The pandit then reads the first of three blessings (āśṭrvāda). The bride stands and applies a turmeric mark on the forehead of the seated groom. The pandit reads the second blessing. The groom stands and applies a turmeric mark on the forehead of the seated bride. After the pandit reads the third blessing the groom puts a flower garland around the bride’s neck to signify the completion of the rite, which takes about thirty minutes in total.

The three blessings are also verses by Tāraṇ Svāmī. While they are not found in any of the fourteen texts, they overlap extensively many of the verses in the Mamala Pāhuda.

Om once it has arisen, enjoy that shining one made of faith.
Enjoy that beneficial sun, it is the efficacious word.
It arises both endlessly enjoyable and pure, it is firm.
God’s speech has arisen, so hail hail to it, hail to the arising of liberation.

The two are separate. In an instant the unequalled rays lift it up. Hail to the good teaching.
For just a mere moment, for one hour, and then two hours, three hours and then four hours the rays shine, the essence of the Jina for a year.
The dirt of time is dispatched for a year, for a life. Hail to the Jina shining in liberation.

Don’t desire either of the two; make the mind firm in kāyotsarga.
See the Enlightened One’s truth in the world, and see the harm done to five-sensed beings.
The Jina’s righteous path shines and saves. Let the lord save and give excellent liberation.
God’s speech from the beginning of the era arises and saves. Let it save the blessed congregation. Hail.
Rajneesh

Let me end this overview of Tāraṇ Svāmī and the contemporary path with a brief discussion of someone who is probably the most famous person ever born in the Tāraṇ Panth, the Indian and later international holy man known in his early career as Rajneesh (Rajnīś), and later as Osho (1931–1990). Most studies of him ignore his early years, or at best make a passing mention of his having been born a Jain. With the exception of one book on his talks, he intentionally refrained from discussing his early years (Devageet, in Rajneesh 1985b: n.p.). The “official biography” written by Vasant Joshi (1982: 9) made just a single reference that his family was Digambar Jain, and only in an endnote do we find a paragraph discussing that his family in fact belonged to the Tāraṇ Panth. There the author wrote,

Taran Swami opposed the idol worship widely prevalent among Digambar Jains and preached the worship of the formless. He criticized the emphasis the Digambar Jains placed on materialism and exhorted them to turn toward the spirituality taught by Mahāvīra. Taran Swami was put to a lot of trouble and harrassment by the society for his views. (Ibid.: 189–190, n. 1)

Rajneesh was raised and schooled in the small town of Gadarwara (Gāḍarvārā) in Narsimhapur district in Bundelkhand. He went to Jabalpur for college, studying for two years at Hitkarini College before having to transfer to D. N. Jain College, from which he received his B.A. in philosophy. He then went to Sāgar, where he received an M.A. in philosophy in 1957 from Saugar University (now Dr Harisingh Gaur University). His first teaching position was at the Sanskrit College in Raipur, and from 1960 until he resigned in 1966 he was professor of philosophy at Jabalpur University.

His intellectual interests took him far afield from Jainism at a young age, but in his early years as a professional holy man he still retained a tenuous connection to the tradition. He led his first meditation camp June 4–8, 1964, at the remote Śvetāmbar Jain pilgrimage shrine of Muchālā Mahāvīr near Ghanerao (Ghānerāv) in southern Rajasthan. But how far he had already moved from traditional Jainism is seen in that at this camp he taught Buddhist Vipassana meditation, Hindu Nadabrahma meditation, and Muslim Sufi Dervish whirling, and in the published version of his discourses at this camp he is as likely to cite Chuang Tzu and Meister Eckhart as Mahāvīra (Rajneesh 1966). In September 1969 at a camp in Kashmir he delivered a series of sermons on Jainism, which were then edited into a volume by Dayānand Bhārgava, the distinguished scholar of Jainism, with the title Mahāvīra: Mere Drṣṭi Memī (“My Vision of Mahāvīra”). The book was published by the respected Indological publishing house of Motilal
Banarsidass. Here again we see how far Rajneesh had come from traditional Jainism, as Bhārgava in his editor’s introduction wrote,

[Among the] three central points in Rajneesh’s teachings...is that his teachings are not moral (naitik), but are trans-moral (atina'itik). This is the essential teaching of the Jain scriptures, in which bad (pāp) and good (punya) are understood to be merely chains of iron and gold.

(Rajnīś 1971: 9)

While it is standard Jain teaching that both punya and pāpa, good karma and bad karma, must be overcome to attain liberation, it is not the case that the distinction between the two is to be ignored by all Jains. Jainism is not antinomian. A key difference between the laity and mendicants lies precisely in the fact that the latter strive to overcome all forms of karmic bondage, while lay ethics are built upon the careful discrimination between the two kinds of karma.

To the best of my knowledge, the last time Rajneesh operated within a traditional Jain orbit was in 1973, when from August 25 through September 11 he delivered a series of lectures in Bombay on the occasion of Paryuṣāṇa. These were published in 1976 as Volume 3 of Mahāvīra Vānī (the earlier two volumes were also based on Paryuṣāṇ lectures in Bombay). By then he was using Jainism as a prop for his own eclectic teachings, much of which went against fundamental Jain spiritual and ethical principles. Sometime thereafter he broke more completely with his Jain roots, so that by 1985 he wrote of a childhood encounter with a Digambar monk whom he termed an “imbecile” and “just a dirty puddle, not an ocean of bliss or peace” (1985b: 94, 102). Later in this same collection he characterized Jainism as “very stupid” and Jains as “idiots” (ibid.: 610, 611).

He began one collection of his lectures on Mahāvīra by stating explicitly, “I am not a follower (anuvāyi) of Mahāvīra, I am a supporter (premi) of him, just as I am of Christ, Krishna, Buddha, and Lao Tzu; and in my opinion, a follower never develops the understanding that an imitator does” (Rajnīś 1974: 1). The editor of this same volume stated boldly concerning Rajneesh’s unique interpretation of Mahāvīra,

This is the first time in world history that he has presented the full weight of the meaning of Mahāvīra’s message that was Mahāvīra’s own intention. By his yogic power and the merit earned by asceticism and spiritual practice in birth after birth Bhagvān Śrī Rajnīś has been able to visit Mahāvīra himself, to reveal his meaning, and having become just like Mahāvīra to publicize the preachings of Mahāvīra.

(Svāmī Ānand Viṭrāg [Dr Rāmcandra Prasād] at Rajnīś 1974: i)

This claim was confirmed by one Jain who heard Rajneesh preach on Mahāvīra in late 1960s. He told me that he had asked Rajneesh the basis for the novel ideas he
was attributing to Mahāvīra, ideas not found in any Jain text. Rajneesh told him that he met Mahāvīra in his meditations, and heard these teachings directly from him.

In the mid-1950s, when he was studying for his M.A. at Saugar University, Rajneesh had fairly extensive contacts with the Tārān Panth in Sāgar. Two small Hindi pamphlets by Rajneesh on Tārān Svāmī were published, one by a Tārān Panth woman of Sāgar (Rajniś n.d.), the other by the Tārān Panth itself (Rajniś 1956). In them we can see very clearly the beginnings of Rajneesh’s own eclectic spiritual teachings. The teachings in these essays are very much those of Rajneesh, and very little those of Tārān Svāmī (although one can probably say that about all interpretations of the oftentimes obscure and cryptic writings of this medieval mystic).

Joshi (1982: 190, n. 1) wrote of Rajneesh’s Tārān Panth background, “It is said that Bhagwan [Rajneesh] read his works as a child and may have been inspired by his teachings.” A cursory reading of the mystical emphasis of Tārān Svāmī on the realization of the innate purity of one’s own soul in comparison to Rajneesh’s iconoclastic and eclectic spirituality might at first seem to lend credence to such a suggestion, but I think that it is an interpretation that does not hold up under closer scrutiny. Certainly Rajneesh makes no mention of Tārān Svāmī in any of his discourses on Jainism that I have seen, even in his 1985 volume of reminiscences of his childhood. His only extended discussions of Tārān Svāmī are in the two small pamphlets published in Sāgar early in his spiritual career.

Rajneesh wrote of Tārān Svāmī that he taught an inner spirituality. Tārān Svāmī taught “the rule of god is within you” and “the real worship of god is the worship of the soul” (ibid.: 8). He wrote that Tārān Svāmī was opposed to external rituals, and instead taught that true religion is the realization of the soul within. Rajneesh wrote that there were three phrases that were central to Tārān Svāmī’s teachings: ātmā-jñān (knowledge of the soul), ātmā-jñān, and ātmā-jñān (ibid.: 10).

Rajneesh placed Tārān Svāmī squarely within the Sant tradition of medieval Indian religion, equating him explicitly with the Sants and the Bauls of Bengal (ibid.: 4), and specific medieval figures including Kabīr, Raidās, Senānāi, Rāmdās, Pipājī, Ramādās, Dhannā, Nānak, Dādū, and Amardās (ibid.: 2). In a catholicism typical of Rajneesh, he added to this catalogue of saints the Sufis of Iran (ibid.: 4) and Šekh Farīd (ibid.: 2). He further described Tārān Svāmī as a “revolutionary,” who strove to wake up the contemporary sleeping society to the spiritual truth (ibid.: 2). In this interpretation Rajneesh was following in the footsteps of other interpreters, as we saw above. But in Rajneesh’s case this was part of a larger agenda of advocating a “perennial philosophy” approach to religion, for he also compared Tārān Svāmī to Jesus Christ (ibid.: 8, quoting Jesus, “The kingdom of God is within you”), Saint Augustine (ibid.: 8, quoting him as saying, “Wander throughout the world, but if you want to find the truth, then you have to return to yourself”), and Socrates (1956: 11, quoting him as saying as he drank the hemlock, “I will live on in all of you”). He stated this explicitly when he wrote

[Tārān Svāmī] was asked time and again, “What is religion (dharm)? Where is it? What is the essence of religion? What is God, and what is

295
the path to attain him?” In his answer he repeated those words that the saints have always repeated in age after age and place after place. One is amazed to see that the message of the saints is the same. It is obvious that the realization of religion is independent of time or place. It is clear that if there is religion, it is one and eternal. Its expression may differ according to language, but whoever meditates on this will see at once that the meaning is the same. Sant Tāran Tāra explained the essence of religion that is expressed in the doctrines at the root of all religions. He said, “Religion is the attainment of your innate self.”

(Ibid.: 6)

Just before this passage, Rajneesh (ibid.: 6) explained that as part of this focus on inner spiritual realization, Tāran Svāmī rejected all traditional forms of religion, and even said that religion (dharm) and tradition (sampradāy) do not provide any valid guidance. The message of Tāran Svāmī was intended to liberate religion from tradition. When one sees the later teachings of Rajneesh, one can see why he wanted to interpret Tāran Svāmī in this way. But it is not in my opinion a defensible interpretation of Tāran Svāmī. A reading of his texts, especially the Jñāna Samuccaya Sāra, Tribhaṅgi Sāra, Upadeśa Śuddha Sāra, and Śrāvakācāra – the texts that together constitute Tāran Svāmī’s “essential teachings” (sāra mata) and his “teachings on conduct” (açāra mata) – shows that Tāran Svāmī remained very much within the mainstream of Digambar doctrine. He downplayed certain ritual forms, especially the cult of temples and images, but in this he is not significantly different from many other orthodox Digambar authors. To claim that he tried to free the Digambar community from its tradition cannot be supported by these texts.

It is not clear that Rajneesh actually read much of Tāran Svāmī’s texts. The only ones to which he referred in his two early pamphlets are Pandita Pūjā and Kamala Battiṣṭi. But he did not engage in any detailed exposition of these texts, and his references were all rather unspecific ones to “Tāran Svāmī’s teachings.” He seems to have started with the person of Tāran Svāmī and his reputation as a mystic who eschewed exterior image-directed rituals in favor of inner spiritual realization, and then, as Rajneesh was later to do with texts and figures from nearly all the world’s religious traditions, interpreted Tāran Svāmī as supporting his own unique and syncretic new religion.

This is confirmed by his brief reference to Tāran Svāmī’s Sunna Svabhāva and Siddha Svabhāva in discourses at his ashram in Kacch in the early 1970s. Of the former he said, “It is just a few pages, but of tremendous significance. Each sentence contains scriptures, but very difficult to understand” (Rajneesh 1985a: 206). He went on to explain that he understood the text due to his upbringing in a Tāran Panth family, as a result of which he understood Tāran Svāmī “not intellectually but existentially” (ibid.: 207). The Sunna Svabhāva, he said, had just a single message: “Awake!” (ibid.: 209). The message of the Siddha Svabhāva, he averred, is equally simple: “Be empty!” (ibid.). These two texts, Rajneesh concluded, contain
the whole message of Tāraṇ Svāmī: “One shows you who you are – pure emptiness; the second, how you can reach it: by becoming aware” (ibid.).

We can see in his two very early pamphlets, as well as his later comments in public talks, the distinctive traits that would later help make Rajneesh one of the most famous religious figures of the late twentieth century. But we do not find in them much if anything that is helpful in understanding either Tāraṇ Svāmī or the community that has followed him for five centuries.

**The study of Jains in history and society**

At the outset of this essay I said that one of the most important aspects of the recent renaissance in Jain studies has been the close attention paid to historical, social and geographical differences among Jain communities. This is part of a broader shift in emphasis from the study of “Jainism” as a decontextualized and timeless doctrine, to the study of the Jains – people who have lived concrete lives in dialogue with their inherited cumulative traditions, dialogues informed deeply by the specifics of place, time and people.73

A focus on “Jainism” tends to emphasize the doctrinal continuities across time and place, and views differences – usually characterized as “schisms” – as problematic eruptions into the otherwise pacific flow of Jain history. A focus on “Jains” reveals that the Jains have expressed themselves religiously (as well as in other fields) in countless ways. It reveals “Jainism” to be a historically rich and variegated family of traditions that have been engaged in internal and external dialogues for over two millennia.

This essay on Tāraṇ Svāmī and the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth serves as an introduction – and it is only that, an introduction – to a distinctive voice and a distinctive social expression within the broader Jain tradition. We see in Tāraṇ Svāmī himself a unique mystic and charismatic teacher, who synthesized the Digambar traditions available to him in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Bundelkhand, and presented them in a way that earned him an extensive following. His followers included both Jains and non-Jains, and shows us how porous boundaries of religious identity were in medieval India. His followers included members of merchant castes, the traditional followers of Jainism in medieval times, but also members of other castes, alerting us to the need to see those instances when the teachings and practice of Jainism have drawn into the Jain fold people from the full array of social backgrounds. In the life and community of Tāraṇ Svāmī we see much that is familiar from other studies of the Jains; but we also find Muslims, boatmen, and jugglers. Many of his teachings enunciate themes found in all Jain writings; but these are then socially and ritually expressed in distinctive ways. The Jain presence almost everywhere has been physically marked by numerous temples; only in the Tāraṇ Svāmī Panth do we find Jain temples devoid of images, and instead having scriptures as the focus of worship on the altars.

This essay has raised as many questions about the life of Tāraṇ Svāmī, and the history and practices of his Panth, as it has answered. We are in need of more
thorough studies of the texts attributed to Tāraṇ Svāmī. Documentation of both the extant manuscript collections and the architectural history of the Tāraṇ Panth caityālāyās would tell us much that we do not know about the history and practices of the Panth (and in this we are hampered by the broader absence of historical and anthropological studies of the Jains of central India). This essay, therefore, serves as both an introduction to Tāraṇ Svāmī and his followers, and an invitation to much needed further scholarship. It is also presented as a model of the sort of studies of Jains that are needed to advance our understanding of the Jains – and therefore of “Jainism” – as people located in specific times and places.

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this paper was delivered as the Third Annual Jain Lecture at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, on March 14, 2002. I thank Peter Flügel for inviting me to deliver the lecture. Research in Bundelkhand was conducted under the auspices of a Senior Short-Term Fellowship from the American Institute of Indian Studies. I thank Seth Dalchandji Jain for his generous hospitality in Sagar. In addition to Dalchandji, the following were all most helpful in aiding my understanding of Tāraṇ Svāmī and the Tāraṇ Panth: Kapoorchand Samaiya “Bhayji,” Dinesh K. Jain, Sudhir Jain “Sahayogi,” Singhai Jnanchand Jain, Brahmaccharini Usha Jain, and Sushil Jain. Any faults in interpretation are mine, of course. I thank Paul Dundas, and the audience of the 2002 SOAS talk, for their comments and questions; Manish Modi for obtaining for me a copy of his grandfather Nāthūrām Premī’s 1912–1913 article; and Peter Flügel for obtaining copies of several books in the collection of the India Office Library.

Notes

* I usually give the Hindi transliteration of Indic terms, unless the word is directly from the Sanskrit, as this more accurately conveys the vernacular Hindi nature of Tāraṇ Svāmī and the Tāraṇ Panth. I give full transliterations of towns and villages in Bundelkhand, but give standard English spellings for districts, states, and rivers. All translations from Sanskrit, Prakrit, Hindi, Gujarati, and Tāraṇ Svāmī’s idiosyncratic language are mine, unless otherwise noted.
1 This same point was made forcefully in a 1978 paper by the late Kendall W. Folkert, “The Gaccha and Jain History” (Folkert 1993: 153–166).
2 A beginning is found in Cort (2001b). Also needed is a clearer understanding of the cultural, social, and ritual differences among the Digambars within each of these regions.
4 I have also discussed Tāraṇ Svāmī and the Panth in Cort (2001a) and (2001c).
5 svāyatā pandraha sau bahattara varṣa jetha vadi chaṭṭhakā rātri sātā śanivāra dina jina tāraṇa tarana śarira chūṭo. Chadmāsthā Vāṇī 10.18. I have used the reading by
Phülcandra (1985b: 397) in preference to that of Jaysāgar, *Chadmastha Vānt*, p. 36. Some authors are of the opinion that this reference to his death means that the *Chadmastha Vānt* is not by Tāran Svāmī; see Āyurvedācārya (1978: 5), S. Jain (1984: 101–102). K. Samaiyā (1977: 25–26) reports that this was also the opinion of Śītalprasād and Kāṃji Svāmī.

6 The correspondence between the two dates for his death works out if the calendar in use in Bundelkhand at that time used the pūrṇimānta system, in which the months start and end with the full moon. The dates for his birth do not quite correspond, as Agahan bright seventh was Tuesday, December 3, 1448, whereas Phülcandra says his birth occurred on Thursday. For these equivalences I have used Michio Yano's on-line panchanga site, which uses the Śūryasiddhānta calendrical system: http://www.kyoto-su.ac.jp/~yanom. I thank Gary Tubb for referring me to this site.

7 Premī (1912–1913: 293) gives his father’s name as Gudhā Sāhū.


Phülcandra (1985b: 398) gives a variant reading of the last two sayings, joined into one: utpanna meṣa uvāsagga sahanā varṣa chaha māṣa paṇca dāsa pandraha sau bahattara gata tilaka.


10 Some sources say that Śrūtakīrti was his teacher; see S. Jain (1984: 29).

11 The importance of this third obstacle that he overcame becomes clear when one considers the many oral tales mentioned further, from both inside and outside the Tāran Panth, of Tāran Svāmī gaining most of his converts through a variety of magical acts.

12 There are also female lay celibates (brahmacārinī); I do not know how old this institution is.

13 Premī spelled his name “Tāran,” as did Śītalprāśād in his early editions of texts; all other sources have spelled it “Tāran.”

14 There have also been more imaginative reconstructions of Tāran Svāmī’s life. Jaysāgar (1990: 6–7) wrote that since about 300 mandalas or circles of followers are mentioned in Tāran Svāmī’s Nāma Mālā, of which 121 were large mandalas, Tāran Svāmī must have been a mandālācārya. This title was used for bhaṭṭārakas, and so it is highly unlikely that it was used for Tāran Svāmī. Jaysāgar also wrote that he had 1,100,000 direct followers, and that a further 4,200,000 had accepted his teachings.

The contemporary Tāran Panth renouncer Brahmācārī Jñānānānd has been working on a biography of Tāran Svāmī entitled *Tāran Jīvan Jyoti* (“Light on the Life of Tāran”). There was a public dispute concerning Jñānānānd’s narrative, which his critics said came largely from his own imagination, and so was not in accord with tradition (or, in the words of one critic, it was “99% wrong”). Due to this public pressure, the publication of the book was stopped as of 1999. Jñānānānd has also been criticized for using the title “Śvāmī” for himself in his publications, since this is seen as denoting the status of a monk, whereas he is still technically a householder according to orthodox Digambar understanding.

Brahmacārī Basant, who is a collaborator of Jñānānānd, wrote that Tāran Svāmī was a mandālācārya who controlled 151 mandalas. In addition, under Tāran Svāmī there were 7 sādhus (Hemanandi, Candragupta, Samantabhadra, Citragupta, Samādhi Gupta, Jayakirti, and Bhuvananda), 35 āryikās, 231 brahmācārīnīs, 60 brahmācārīs, and hundreds of thousands of laity, for a total of 4,345,331 followers (Basant 1999b: 5–6).
Another mid-twentieth century biography, published in 1941 by Kālūrām Jain of Semarkheṛi, is based on Premī’s article, contemporary oral tradition, and an anonymous hand-written manuscript. (It is unclear if this is the same manuscript which Premī used.) Kālūrām is refreshing for his frank recognition of the lack of adequate prior research, and he concludes his brief biography with an extended discussion of those aspects of Tārān Svāmī’ś life and the subsequent development of the Panth that were (and sixty years later still are) in need of further research.

15 Dundas (2002: 107–110), Johnson (2000: 30–45). Scholars have estimated the dates of Kundakunda to have been as early as the second century CE and as late as the eight century (Dundas 2002: 107).


17 On Varā, see R. Jain (1999: 50–82), as well as his own very engaging 1949 autobiography.


19 Jaysāgār (1901–1992) was one of the most important Tārān Panth authors and activists of the twentieth century. He was born as Kisanlāl, son of Jhanaklāl, in 1901 in Seoni (Sīnvī). He studied in Sāgar, where leaders of the Tārān Svāmāj honored him with the title (titāk) of pandit at the age of fifteen. He married at age twenty-one. He became active in the community from 1931 as Paṇṇīt Jaykumār, starting magazines and propagating the observance of Tārān Jayaṁā. In 1938, at the annual fair at Nisaṭījī, he initiated himself as a kṣullak with the name of Jayse. Three or four years later he became Brahmacārī Jaysāgār. In 1940 and 1941 he was at the center of a dispute concerning the appropriateness of image-worship, in which he debated both with local members of the Terā Panth in Gañj Bāsaudā, and in print with Paṇṇīt Lāl Bahādur Sāstrī of the Ambālā-­based Sāstrārth Sangh; he claimed he was totally victorious in this dispute. He wrote many books and pamphlets, and was responsible for organizing the present form of the regular Tārān Panth temple ritual. He died in Sāgar in 1992. Information on him comes from R. Samaiyā (1989: 19), Jaysāgār (1990: 42–46), Jaysāgār (1991: 5–9), and Jaysāgār (2000: 13).

20 My only reference for this volume is B. Jain (1985: 92).

21 Information on Phulcānda is from N. Jain (1985).

22 I have seen only volume 3 of the series, published in 1989.

23 Amrītāl is not unique in invoking Martin Luther as a predecessor for social reform – although he obviously knew few details about Luther, since he described him as living in England. Various Śhānakavāśī authors have also invoked Luther as an iconoclastic reformer against a corrupt and ritualistic religious hierarchy, much as Mahatma Gandhi credited Luther with Germany’ś freedom (Wolpert 2001: 68).

24 For example, the scholar Vidyādhar Joharāpurkar (1964a) wrote a short essay in which he critiqued image worship as contravening the teachings of Mahāvīra on ahimsā. A local Jaipur organization called the Jain Culture Protection Committee (Jain Samskṛti Samrakṣak Samiti) in the 1980s published several pamphlets (one of them by the Tārān Svāmī poet Amrītāl “Cañcal”) that strongly criticized most of the cult of images, with titles such as “The Distortions that Pervade Jain Image Worship” (Sethī 1981) and “Distortions in the Six Essential Duties and the Making of Images” (Polyākā 1982). These are by no means unique within contemporary Terā Panth discourse on images.

25 There is another possible explanation for the de-emphasis of image-worship in the Panth, although the evidence here is also slender. We know from the sparse sources on Tārān Svāmī’ś life that he attracted many followers from lower non-Jain castes. Nāthūrām Premī has hypothesized that the Tārān Panth castes were considered as vaiṣya or merchant castes when they became followers of Tārān Svāmī and therefore
Jain, on the cultural logic that all Jains in north and central India are automatically vaiśya. But, he notes, the Tārān Panth castes are in many ways ranked socially lower than the Parvārās, the dominant Digambar caste of Bundelkhand. Up until the mid-twentieth century many lower Digambar castes, termed dassā (“ten”) in distinction to the higher bīsā (“twenty”) castes, were denied full access to Digambar temples (Mukhtār 1963, Nyāytirtha 1935, Sangave 1980: 325). The lack of images in Tārān Panth temples may simply be a result of a lower caste status. I should hasten to add, however, that I have not heard this argument advanced by any Jains, either of the Tārān Panth or other sects.

26 A version related by Premī (1912–1913: 201–203), on the basis of a Tārān Panth book, says that the culprits were Tārān Svāmī’s own father and a local semi-renouncer (kṣullak). Kālūrām Jain (1941: 8–9) combines versions, and attributes blame for the attempted drowning and later attempted poisoning to a cabal of Tārān Svāmī’s father, his maternal uncle, and a semi-renouncer (yati).

27 Singh (1998: 879) reports that one caste among Tārān Svāmī’s followers practiced cross-cousin marriage until 1930. Since Tārān Svāmī had taken a vow of celibacy, it is possible that the story of the antagonism on the part of his mother’s brother – the man whose daughter he could be expected to marry under a cross-cousin marriage system – reflects a social tension over the marriage system.

28 It is also related by Premī 1912–1913: 96.

29 Delamaine then goes on to say that Tārān Svāmī evidently derived his critique of images from Islam.

30 This story bears obvious comparison with that of the death of Kabīr; see Vaudeville (1993: 39–65). Premī (1912–1913: 296–297) also tells this story.

31 Vyantr deva are unliberated Jain deities who are usually connected with specific locations of which they are guardians.

32 A variant of this narrative is also found at Basant (1999c: 153). According to the account given by Premī (1912–1913: 205), Tārān Svāmī’s chief disciples, including the Muslim Rūyā Ramān, will be reborn as Padmanābha’s chief disciples (ganadhara).

33 See Dundas (2002: 269–270) for a discussion of the traditional hagiography of Kundakunda, according to which he gained his knowledge by attending the preaching assembly of the contemporary Jina Simandhara, who resides on the continent of Mahāvideha. Dundas also discusses the use of Kundakunda by the controversial twentieth-century neo-Digambar Kānjī Svāmī. We thus see that Kundakunda becomes a complex symbol employed in various ways in Digambar contexts to assert a near-omniscient orthodoxy.

34 On Digambar śrāvakācāra teachings, see Hirālāl (1976–1979) and Williams (1963).


36 Other discussions of the language of Tārān Svāmī’s texts are Śītalprasād (1992: 11), and S. Jain (1984: 210–237). The latter author gives a lengthy discussion of Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhramsa, and vernacular (deśī) words, cases and verb forms found in his writings.

37 Premī, writing in the early twentieth century, was even harsher in his estimation of the Tārān Panth intellectual tradition. He said,

There is very little learning (vidyā) among the followers of the Tārān Panth. You won’t find even a single Tārān Panthī who knows logic, grammar, or dharma-sāstra! There is not a single pāṇḍit among them. There are some who can say what the essence of their teachings (mat) is and what is written in their texts. The same condition of religious learning is found in their secular learning. It is lacking. You won’t find a single B.A. or M.A. in this Panth. Thus one can see that learning has been banished from the Tārān Panth.

(Premī 1912–1913: 303)
This is obviously one of the points in his essay to which members of the Panth strenuously objected, and from my experience is no longer an accurate assessment.

39 “Tāran Taran was born. He had five male disciples. Praiseworthy Ruiyā Jin; three female disciples.” utpannapada tāranatarana. tasya utpanna suva pāṇca. anmoya ruiyājina suvanī tīna. Nāma Mālā, pp. 6–7. In his Hindi expansion on these three sayings, Jaysāgar lists Ruiyā Jin – whose name is found in the third saying – as one of the five disciples referred to in the second saying.
41 Most scholarship on the intersection between Jainism and caste has looked at the various baniyā and vāniyā castes of Rajasthan and Gujarat that claim their origins in present-day Rajasthan. There has been almost no research on the merchant castes of central India.
42 On the Samaiyā see Russell and Hira Lal 1916:1: 142–143, 158; and Singh 1998: 3116–3117. One informant, who is himself a learned student of Kundakunda, had a novel etymology for the name of this caste: people in it were fond of reading Kundakunda’s texts, especially his Samayasāra, and so were known for their constant talking of samaya (“doctrine”), as a result of which others applied the name “Samaiyā” to them.

On the Dosakhe, see Singh (1998: 878–879). The name indicates that traditionally marriage alliances were avoided with only two branches (sakhā), those of the father and mother’s brother. Other groups within the Parvār caste avoided either four (Causakhe) or eight (Athasakhe) branches. This would seem to indicate a hierarchical ranking in terms of purity of marriage practice, with the Dosakhe being at the bottom of the hierarchy. Singh (1998: 879) also says that until 1930 the caste practiced cross-cousin marriage, a form common in southern India but considered impure in the north.

43 On the Gulālāre see Singh (1998: 1041–1043). This caste is also known as the Golapūrab, Golapūrva, Golahre, and Gollālāre; see Singh (1998: 1030–1031, 1041–1043). The majority of the caste is Terā Panth Digambar.
44 On the Asethi (also spelled Asahāthi, Asāthi, Asāthī) see Russell and Hira Lal (1916:1: 142) and Singh (1998: 131–132). Singh (1998: 131) writes that this caste was originally from a village near Ayodhya, and later shifted to the area around Tikamgarh, from which it subsequently migrated throughout Bundelkhand. Some members of this caste have been followers of Tāran Svāmī since at least the early seventeenth century. Sitalprasadā in his introduction to his edition of the Mamala Pāhuda (p. 9) said that one of the manuscripts he used was copied in 1624 in an Asahatī temple.
45 On the Ayodhyāvāsī (also spelled Ajudhiabāsī, Audhiā) caste, see Russell and Hira Lal (1916:1: 140–142).
46 On the Cārnagars, see Russell and Hira Lal (1916:1: 142–143) and Singh (1998: 646–647). According to Singh (1998: 646), members of the caste derive its name from cāritra (“conduct”) plus nagar (“ahead”). It also seems to have been in a hierarchically inferior position in relation to the Parvār caste, as Russell and Hira Lal (1916:1: 143, 158) say that the Parvārs accepted daughters from the Cārnagars, but the reverse did not hold true. Russell and Hira Lal write that the Cārnagars also were originally Parvārs. Phūlcandra (1985a: 355, 1992: 72) is also of this opinion, based on the fact that the gotras (clans) of the two castes are identical. Jaysāgar (1991: 34), on the other hand, writes that this caste was converted from the Vaiṣnava Gahoī caste. On the latter, see Russell and Hira Lal (1916:1: 145–146).
47 Information on these sites comes from Jaysāgar (1990: 19–22) and (1991: 13–14), and R. Samaiyā (1989: 10–13).
48 The word nisiṣṭ is found only in Jain contexts. According to A. N. Upadhye (1982: 393) it comes from the Prakrit nisiṣṭhiyā or nisiṣṭhiyā, from which a false Sanskritization of nisiṣṭhiyā or nisiṣṭhiyā was derived. It originally referred to a place outside a city where a monk practiced austerities. The term then was extended to refer to other platforms in such a place, and finally to a memorial shrine at the site of the death of a monk where carved stone footprints (padukā) were consecrated. It is related to the word nasiṣṭā, which also refers to a memorial shrine for a monk. See also Hirālāl Sāstrī (1967) and Polyākā (1990).

49 See also Hālsāgar (1990: 20–22).

50 K. Jain (1941: 9) wrote that the tallest of the three platforms held an old memorial structure (smārak cabāṭrā), which is often renovated. I did not get close enough to any of the platforms to see if there is still such a structure.

51 K. Jain (1941: 8–9) follows Premī, but adds that the other merchant was Tāraṇ Śvāmi’s mother’s brother.

52 See Williams (1963: 185) on the six karmas.

53 avratam śrāvakam yena śaṭakarmam pratipālæ
śaṭakarmam dāvidhaścāiva śuddha aśuddha paśyate.
śuddha śaṭkarma jānte bhavyajīva rato saddā
aśuddham śaṭakarmam rata abhavya jīva na saṃśayah.
aśuddham aśucim proktam aśuddham aśāśvatam kṛtām
śuddham muktimārgasya aśuddham durgati bhājanaṃ.
aśuddham proktāścāiva devālī devaṃ jānate
kṣetra ananta hiṃdante adevaṃ deva ucyate.
mīṭhāyā māyā mūdhahṛṣṭi ca adevaṃ deva mānate
praprāṇaṃ yena kṛtāṃ sārddham māṇyate mīṭhāḥrṣṭiṃ.
Śrāvakācāra 307–311

54 Yogīndu, Yogasāra 44, as translated by Hardy (1995: 534). Dates for Yogīndu range from the sixth to the ninth centuries CE (Johnson 2000: 38 n. 28).

55 S. Jain (1984: 186), citing Hālsāgar (1980); I have not seen this latter source.

56 The original text, as given in Jaysen (1939a: 15–17) and Sītalprāśād’s edition of the Māmala Pāhūḍa, reads as follows. Other printings of the three verses are K. Samaiyā (1998: 8), Ārādhnā (1995: 10), and Basant (1999a: 11); I have not indicated variant readings from these.

Jaysen:

tatvam ca nanda ānanda maï ceyānanda sahāva
parama tātva pada vindamaya nāmyo siddhā sahāvā.  
guru uvaesiu gupta rui gupata nyāna sahakāra
tāraṇa tarana samartha muni bhava saṃsāra nivāra.  
dharma ju oto jinavaraha artha ti artha saṃjoya
bhaya vināsa bhaya ju muṇahu mamala nyāna paraloya.

Sītalprāśād:

tatvam nanda ānanda maï ceyānanda sahāū
parama tattva pada vinda pātī nāmyo siddhā sahāū.  
guru uvaesiu gupata rui gupata jānā na sahakāra
tāraṇa tarana samartha muni bhava saṃsāra nivāra.  
dhamma ju utto jina varaha arthāi athaha jaya
bhaya vināsa bhava jī munahu mamala jānāna paraloya.
JOHN E. CORT

57 Sitalprasad translates this line as “The dharma which the Jina enunciates after seeing the aims in their actual form through the absolute perspective” (jinendra bhagyānne niścay se yathārth rūp mem padārthom ko dekkhar jo dharm kahā hai), while Jayesen translates it as “The three conjoined ends – right faith, knowledge and conduct – enunciated by the Jina after he has seen them” (jo jinendra dev ke dvārā prayojan bhūt samyakdarśan, jñān, cārita, in tīn arth samyukt kahā gayā hai).

58 Premi (1912–1913: 302) refers to this as Avalavānī. In its present form it appears to have been drawn from Tāraṇ Svāmī’s writings by Jayesāgar.

59 Walther Schubring (1957) has adjudged these texts to have been composed by a later author.

60 According to Baṇḍūdhār Śāstri (1977), this is also by a later author.

61 Text from Jayesen (1939a: 1–11), with alternate readings from Campālāl (1951: 56) indicated in parentheses. Campālāl gives only the first five verses, so it is quite possible that the recitation of the final eight verses was an innovation by Jayesāgar. Other printings are K. Samaiyā (1998: 16–17) and Arūdhnā (1995: 64–65).

jaya abalabali uvana kamala vayana jina dhuva (C: dhrūva) tere annoyā sūddham raṅja ramaṇa ceta re maṇa mere.

jaya tara taraṇa samaya tāraṇa nyāna dhyāna vivande āyavana caraṇa sūddham sarvanya deva guru pāye.

(C: jaya taraṇa taraṇa samaya jñāna dhyāna bhi vande āyavana jñāṇācarana sūddham sarvanya deva guru pāye.)

jaya nandā ānanda ceyānanda sahaja paramānande paramāṇa (C: pramāṇa) dhyāna svayaṃ vimala tīrthaṅkara nāma vande.

jaya kalana kamala uvana ramaṇa raṅja ramaṇa rāye jaya deva dipati svayaṃ dipati mukati ramaṇi rāye.

(C: jaya deva dipti svayaṃ dipti mukti ramaṇa pāye.)

jaya (C: guru) tohi dhyāvata sukha ananta svāmī tāraṇa jinadevā utpanna raṅja ramaṇa nanda jaya mukati (C: mukti) dāyaka devā. kāṭaṇa nāmukkaraṇi jīnavarvasahassa vaddhamāṇassa damsānamaggam vocchāmi jahākamaṇ samāsena. (Dārśana Pāhuḍa 1)

savvāṇhī savvādamsī nimmohā viyāryā parameṭṭhī vandittu tijagavanādā arahantā bhavvājīvehiṃ.

(Cārita Pāhuḍa 1)

sapaṇā jaṅgamadehā damaṃṣanānena suddhacaranaṇāṃ nīggāṇtha viyāryā jinamage ersā pādiṃ. (Bodha Pāhuḍa 10)

manuyabhāve paṅcinditya jīvetiḥānāsau hoi caudasse ede gunaganajuto gunamūrdho havaha araha. (Bodha Pāhuḍa 36)

nāmāmayam appāṇam uvaladdham jena jhadiyakammena caiuṇa ya paradavvam namo namo tassa devassa. (Mokṣa Pāhuḍa 1)

jinavimbaṃ nāmāmayam saṅjamasuddham suviyārayam ca jam dei dikkhasikkhā kammakkhayakārānesuddhā. (Bodha Pāhuḍa 16)
samsagga kamma khipanam sāraṃ tiloya nyāna vinyānaṃ 
ruçiyam mamalasahāvam samsāre tarana muttigamaṇaṃ ca. 
(Mamala Pāhuḍa 31)

guna vaya tava sama padīma dānām jalaṅgalanam anatthamiyaṃ 
dāṃsana nāna carittam kiriyā tevaṇṇa sāvayā bhanīyaṃ. 
(Raṇysasāra 149)

62 In every performance of āratī I observed candles were used, rather than the wicks in 
clarified butter one usually finds in Jain and Hindu temples.
63 I give only the Tāraṇ Svāmī Āratī here. Text in Samaiyā (1998: 19–20), and Ārādhnā 

āratī tāraṇ svāmī kī kī jay jay jinvaṃ kī (refrain).
gale mem samakit kī mālā hṛday mem bhed-jñān pāla 
dhanya vah moks-panth vāla kī mahimāmay śivgāmi kī.
nisāi sākhā semarkherī bajiāvem dev madhur bherī 
suno prabhu vinay āj merī kī śī gurudev namāmi kī.

mujhe in karmo ne gherā asātā dūr karo merā 
lagānā ab na prabhu berā vinay sun apne prāṇī kī.
āratī caudah granthom kī kī jay jay jay nirgranthom kī 
kuṅivar jay bolo santom kī betvā tīr namāmi kī.

āratī karhum nāth tumhārtī atmā saphal hov hamarī 
āratī paṅc paramesṭhi kī kī jay jay jinvaṃ kī.

sār nī ātām anubhav kā sār jay kuṅivar so narbhaṅ kā 
vaḥ partī dharum subh rīt caraṇ guru dev namāmi kī.

64 On the other hand, Premī’s (1912–1913: 302) description of the wedding rite, which he 
said he had not actually seen, but was on the basis of what members of the Tāraṇ Panth 
told him, is very similar to what I was told. This would indicate that the rite predates 
Jaysāgar. Premī said that in place of the seven circumambulations of a fire as performed 
by Parvārs in Bundelkhand, the groom places a garland around the bride’s 
throat while the Mālārohāna is recited.
66 My informant said that as part of the royal costume, there are cardamom pods on each 
spike of the crowns. Two of the written sources describe the couple exchanging car-
damoms at a later part of the rite. The significance of cardamoms eludes me.
67 Several sources, both interviewees and pamphlets, say that the couple exchange garlands.
Jaysen (1939b) and Campālāl (1951: 104–106). While the translation of any of Tāraṇ 
 Svāmī’s writings is frought with difficulty, my translation of these three verses is even 
more tentative.

om  uvana  uva su  ramaṇam  diptaṃ  ca  drṣṭi  mayaṃ 
hiyāyāraṃ  tam  arka  vinda  ramaṇaṃ  sabdaṃ  ca  prāyojitaṃ 
sahayāraṃ  sahi  nanta  ramaṇa  mamālaṃ  uvavanna  sākham dhruvaṃ 
suvaṃ  deva  uvavanna  jaya  jayama  ca  jayanama  uvavannaṃ  muke  jayam.

jugayam  khaṇḍa  sudhāra  rayana  anuvam  nimisām  su  samayaṃ  jayam 
ghatayaṃ  tuja  muhūrta  pahara  paharām  dutiya  paharām  triya  paharām 
catru  paharāṃ  dipta  rayati  varṣa  svabhāva  jīnaṃ.
varṣa khipati su āyu kāla kalano jina dipte mukte jayam.

ve do chaṇḍa virakta citta didhiyo kāyotsargāmino
kevalino nṛta loya loya pekha pikhanaṃ dalayam ca pañcendriṇo
dharmo mārga prakāśino jina tāraṇa tara muktaivaram svāmino
suṣayam deva ādi tāraṇa tara uavavannam śrī saṅgha jayam.

The written sources all follow these three verses with the following standard Jain blessing, although none of my sources indicate that it is recited in the wedding rite:

sarvamanāgalamāṅgalyam sarvakalyāṇakārakam
pradhānaṃ sarvadharmāṇāṁ jainaṃ jayatu śāsanam.

It is the holiness of all holies, the cause of all welfare, the foremost of all religions: may Jainism be victorious.

Bibliography

Primary sources


**A Fifteenth-Century Digambar Jain Mystic**


**Secondary sources**


The study of Jainism as a living religion is still hampered by a lack of reliable sociological and demographic information both on the Jain laity and Jain mendicants. Most empirical studies to date have been thematically oriented or were of an exploratory nature. They were based on the methods advanced by the classical anthropological village studies or on small surveys of a non-representative nature. In both cases, the units of investigation were defined in terms of observer categories which were often created ad hoc in the field due to the advantages of snowball sampling under conditions of limited resources. In a paper read at the American Oriental Society Meeting in 1978, at a time when comprehensive field studies had yet to be conducted, the late Kendall Folkert (1993: 156) suggested avoiding the inevitable abstractions of ‘general accounts of the Jains’ by concentrating on ‘the smaller divisions within the tradition’ which ‘have actually been the basic units of the tradition’. What Folkert had in mind was to study the individual ‘schools, sects or orders’ (gaccha) of the Jain mendicant tradition, rather than ‘Jain religious culture’ in general. Certainly, not all Jains coalesce around monastic groups, but the majority does so in one way or another.

The investigation of categories which are recognised by the Jains themselves promises indeed to yield testable results of greater accuracy and relevance for the Jain community itself. However, the research programme envisaged by Folkert has yet to be implemented. Despite the pioneering studies of Vilas Sangave (1959/1980) on the social divisions of the Jain lay community and of Muni Uttam Kamal Jain (1975) on the pre-modern history of the religious divisions of the Jain mendicants, most students of Jainism, and indeed most Jains, have still no way of knowing how many independent mendicant orders exist today and how they are organised. The aim of this chapter is to fill this gap and to provide a brief overview of the present schools, orders and sects within both the Śvetāmbara- and the Digambara-denomination and to bring together the available demographic data on the current Jain monastic traditions.
A comprehensive description of the Jain lay movements is beyond the scope of this chapter.

**Jain laity**

Although no studies of the demographic trends in Jain monasticism are currently available, general surveys of the Jain lay community have been produced on the basis of the available census data by Sangave (1959/1980), Sharma (1976) and M. K. Jain (1986). The inclusion of the category ‘Jain’ into the questionnaire for the Census of India 1881 is widely regarded as one of the defining moments for the modern construction of Jainism as an independent ‘religion’. It was introduced by the colonial government after Jacobi (1879) proved the historical independence of Jainism from Buddhism, and a number of high court judgements in favour of westernised Jains such as Padma Padmarāja (1886), J. L. Jaini (1916) and C. R. Jain (1926) who were interested in securing a privileged legal status for their community. However, notwithstanding the desire of the educated Jain elite to establish a clear-cut boundary between ‘Jainism’ and ‘Hinduism’, in the census itself many Jains continued to return themselves as ‘Hindu’.

A number of explanations have been put forward for this. Amongst them ‘enumerators’ error’ figures most prominently, since local volunteers frequently filled in the census forms themselves on the basis of their own local knowledge. Another interpretation suggests that many respondents were either unable or unwilling to make a distinction between the categories. They may have followed the example of their ancestors who often, in the fear of persecution, maintained an outward conformity with Hinduism (cf. Williams 1983: xix). In other words, they were not so much confronted with the question of ‘who they were’ (Cohn 1992: 248), but rather how they preferred to be perceived.

Reform orientated Jain intellectuals were highly conscious of the problem of communal self-objectification already by the 1870s, and in response to the low turnout of Jains in 1881 actively embraced the census as a medium of communal self-representation. At the turn of the twentieth century, the leaders of the newly founded Jain Conferences even designed petitions which actively encouraged community members to return themselves as ‘Jain’ and not as ‘Hindu’. They also volunteered to carry out the census in their own communities in an attempt to boost the numbers and hence the importance of the Jain community in the eyes of the colonial government.

Demographic growth was generally depicted as a sign of communal progress and used as an argument in contexts of ‘democratic’ politics of representation. This sentiment is still echoed today in the work of Vilas Sangave (1980) and other Jain intellectuals who lament the fact that, even after a century of communal revival, many Jains keep on regarding themselves and are regarded as Hindus, which ‘necessarily vitiates the census figures and obscures the increase or decrease of the Jaina population from census to census’ (ibid.: 3).
The debate on whether Jains are culturally ‘Hindus’ or a ‘minority community’ wages unabated within the community. Thus far, Jain communalists have failed to establish the Jains ‘as a separate social group’ (ibid.: 411) against the opposition of many Śvetāmbara ācāryas. The majority of the Jain laity retains an ambiguous social identity midway between the Jain mendicant communities and the wider ‘Hindu’ society. It is therefore not surprising that still no reliable demographic data is available for the Jain laity. Certainly, the Jain community is very small. The official figure generated by the Census of India 1991 was 3,352,706, that is, 0.4 per cent of the Indian population (Vijayanunni 1991: x–xi). The Census of 2001 produced the figure of 4,225,053, also 0.4 per cent of the Indian population (www.censusindia.net). In addition, about 150,000 Jains live outside India, but no mendicants. No data is available on the number of lay followers of particular Jain schools and sects, although some of these may be estimated on the basis of caste directories, in cases where caste and sect membership widely overlap.

**Jain mendicants**

The rhetoric of numbers, adopted by the Jain lay Conferences, also had a significant influence on the monastic orders, which were put under pressure to compete with each other not only in terms of behavioural purity and education, but also in terms of sheer numbers – in the name of democracy and modernisation.19 The rhetoric of numbers is not necessarily new, but no documents containing information on the actual number of Jain monks and nuns are known before the early-modern period.

There are two exceptions. The Jinacaritra in the so-called Paryuṣaṇa Kalpa Sūtra, which was traditionally attributed to Bhadrabāhu I who is said to have lived c.170 or 162 years after Mahāvīra although the Jinacaritra is certainly much younger, tells us that Mahāvīra’s four-fold community comprised of

- fourteen thousand Śramaṇas with Indrabhūti at their head; thirty-six thousand nuns with Candanā at their head; one hundred and fifty-nine thousand lay votaries with Saṅkaśātaka at their head; three hundred and eighteen thousand female lay votaries with Sulasā and Revatī at their head.

(Jinacaritra 136f., in Jacobi 1884: 267f.)

The Sthavirāvali, or List of the Elders, which is generally attributed to Devarddhi Gaṇi, the fifth century CE redactor of the Śvetāmbara canon, mentions not 14,000, but merely 4,411 monks and gives no total figures for nuns and laity (Sthavirāvali 1, in Jacobi 1884: 286f.). Both of these accounts, collected in the same compilation, are somewhat mythical, but they clearly depict relatively small communities.20 The first
text pictures a very high proportion of mendicants (1–9.54 laity) and an overwhelm-
ing numerical dominance of female ascetics and lay supporters. The prevalence of
nuns is all the more remarkable, because, until very recently, neither Buddhist nor
Hindu monastic orders had significant, if any, numbers of female ascetics. Even
today, Theravāda Buddhist orders in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma and Laos do not
have fully initiated bhikkunis. The second account contains a list of the succession
after Mahāvīra, which is corroborated by epigraphical evidence. It mentions only
the names of 7 nuns amongst a total of 19 disciples of Nandanabhadra, the seventh
elder (thera) after Mahāvīra. The corresponding inscription of the first or second
century CE, mentions 9 nuns, which Bühler (1890: 321) accepted as ‘clear proof that
in the first century of our own era the order of female ascetics was well established’.

At the beginning of the twentieth century most lay communities began to
publish sporadic demographic information on the numbers of their monks and
nuns in community newsletters. However, these newsletters had only a limited
circulation. Readily available information on individual monastic communities
remained largely inaccessible until the last two decades of the twentieth century,
which saw a significant improvement. The person responsible for this is the
Śthānakavāsi layman Bābūlāl ‘Ujjavala’ Jain of Mumbaī. Once an active member
of the Akhil Bhāratīya Jain Mahāmāṇḍal, the principal ecumenical forum of the
Jain communalists founded in 1899 under the name Jain Young Men’s
Association but renamed in 1929, he began to compile and publish charts of the
cāturmāsa residences of all the mendicants of the reformist Śthānakavāsi Śramaṇa Saṅgha from 1979 onwards. The rational was to generate a sense of
unity and coordination amongst the followers of the Śramaṇa Saṅgha, which,
although nominally governed by only one ācārya, is internally subdivided into
many local mendicant traditions. The documentation proved to be useful in
keeping track of the movements of the almost 1,000 mendicants, which from the
time of the foundation of the Śramaṇa Saṅgha in 1952 began to extend their
vihāras from their traditional strongholds in western and northern India to the
entire territory of the new independent state of India.

In 1984, B. U. Jain produced an extended version of the cāturmāsa list, now
covering not only the Śramaṇa Saṅgha, but all Śthānakavāsi ascetic and lay
communities. In this he was supported by the Śramaṇa Saṅgha muni Kanhaiyālāl,
the Mūrtipūjaka paṇṇyās Harāṣ Sāgar, and the Akhil Bhāratīyā Samagra Jain
Cāturmās Sūcī Prakāśan Pariṣad Bambāl. Finally, in 1986, the first annual
Samagra Jain Cāturmāsi Sūcī was published with the intention of providing
information on the cāturmāsa residencies of all Jain mendicants. This project was
officially endorsed by the great assembly of the Śramaṇa Saṅgha ascetics in
Pune in 1987 (AISJC 1987: 19f., B. U. Jain 1987: 71). From this time onwards, the
available demographic data of all Jain mendicant communities were published
annually, first by the Cāturmās Sūcī Prakāśan Pariṣad 1986–1992, then by the Jain
Ekta Mahāmāṇḍal, and last by B. U. Jain himself (SJCS 1987: 67f.).

The following overview of the current divisions of the Jain mendicants, their
numbers and main demographic shifts between 1987 and 2002 is to a significant
extent based on the data compiled in B. U. Jain’s Cāturmās Śucī publications of 1987, 1990, 1996, 1999 and 2002. For want of reliable information, I was not always able to shed light on earlier demographic developments. To my knowledge, only the Śvetāmbara Tere Panth has published complete demographic and biodata going back to the time of its foundation in 1760 (Navratnamal 1981ff.). I was able to locate some useful material on the numbers of Sthānākavāsī mendicants in the early twentieth century, but little on the Mūrtipūjakas and Digambara ascetics. In these instances I had to rely on sporadic information scattered in the secondary literature.

I have rearranged B. U. Jain’s data on the Śvetāmbara mendicant orders into a number of tables summarising figures from 1987, 1990, and 1996, with additional information from 1999 and 2002 provided either in the text or in supplementary tables or footnotes. Initially, the figures published by B. U. Jain were not reliable for non-Sthānākavāsī orders, but this has changed with regard to the Śvetāmbara orders. An important lacuna in B. U. Jain’s publications is the lack of reliable information on the Digambara ascetics, on which no sound data existed until recently. I have nevertheless cited some of B. U. Jain’s fragmentary and inconsistent figures on the Digambaras between 1986 and 2000, because they contribute significantly to our generally meagre knowledge on the Digambara mendicants, whose organisational history is reviewed in greater detail in this chapter. From the year 2000 onwards, reliable information on the Digambara mendicants and cāturmāsa places is published annually by A. Jain (2000a, 2000b, 2001) of Indore in form of a brochure which together with D. Śastrī’s (1985) Digambara Jain Sādhu Paricay is the main source on the demography of the Digambara ascetics.

The figures in the available Jain publications rely on credible self-reporting by the different Jain orders. The quality of this data, especially from the Mūrtipūjakas traditions, varies from year to year. In order to compensate for this, B. U. Jain included personal estimates in his summary tables to account for those ascetics for whom no detailed information was supplied to him (B. U. Jain 1996: 37, 27ff., n. 1–2, 1999: 382, n. 1–7). By contrast, I only counted those ascetics which were listed individually and not B. U. Jain’s considerably higher estimates, which may nevertheless represent a more accurate picture. Another difference concerns the classification of mendicant orders into broader categories. From 1990, B. U. Jain re-classified certain reformist movements, such as Amar Muni’s Virāyatan, Muni Suśil Kumār’s Arhat Saṅgha and the Nava Tere Panth, under the new category ‘independently roaming progressive thinkers who use vehicles’ (pragatīśīl vicārāk vāhan vihāṛt svatantra vicaraṇ karne vāle). But I continued listing them together with their traditions of origin. A major deficit of the publications of B. U. Jain and A. Jain is the lack of statistical data on the social background of the ascetics, especially on caste, class and region, their initiation age and level of formal education. They also offer no overview of the history and organisation of the mendicant groups. As far as possible, I have supplemented this information from other sources.
In the following tables, the ácāryas are also included in the total numbers of sādhus. A hyphen indicates that no information is available or means zero. The data is neither complete nor entirely consistent. But, in general, it is reliable and provides the most accurate available information to date.

**Mūrtipūjaka**

The Mūrtipūjaka mendicants are currently divided into six independent traditions, which emerged between the eleventh and the sixteenth century CE from the caityavāsin, or temple-dwelling, Śvetāmbara tradition: 26 (1) the Kharatara Gaccha (1023), (2) the A(ñ)cala Gaccha or Vidhi Pakṣa (1156), (3) the Āgamika- or Tristuti Gaccha (1193) and (4) the Tapā Gaccha (1228), from which (5) the Vimala Gaccha (1495), and (6) the Pārśvacandra Gaccha (1515) separated. 27 The two main reasons for these so-called gaccha-reforms were (a) the laxity of the caityavāsin, and (b) minor doctrinal differences. Similar reforms within the gacchas in the seventeenth century led to the division between yatīs and samvegī sādhus. The term samvegī, upright, was introduced by Upādhyāya Yaśo Vijay (1624–1688) for his own reformist mendicant group, whose tradition was revived in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, at a time when most of the previously dominant white-clad yatīs were replaced by yellow-clad samvegī sādhus. Today, almost all Mūrtipūjaka mendicant groups are samvegī orders. With the exception of the Vallabhasūri Śamudāya of the Tapā Gaccha, all reverted to wearing white dresses. The orders are independently organised and form the institutional core of distinct sects and schools. At present, no detailed sociological or demographic information is available for most of these monastic traditions, especially for the period before the twentieth century. Two notable exceptions are the studies of the recent history and organisation of the Tapā Gaccha by Cort (1989: 93–112) and of the A(ñ)cala Gaccha by Balbir (2003), both of which are supplemented by the studies of the pattaṇvalīs of both traditions by Śivprāśād (2000, 2001). Of the Kharatara Gaccha only the pattaṇvalī of its monastic order and contemporary religious practices of the laity have been studied (Laidlaw 1995, Babb 1996).

The Kharatara Gaccha and the A(ñ)cala Gaccha are the only Mūrtipūjaka traditions which still have a dual system of succession (paramparā) of yatīs and samvegī sādhus; 28 although there is only one yatī left in the A(ñ)cala Gaccha (see Figures 12.1 and 12.2). 29 The sādhus and sādhvīs of the A(ñ)cala Gaccha are nowadays centrally organised under the supervision of only one ácārya (gacchādhipati) and still 30 constitute one of the largest mendicant orders of the Mūrtipūjaka tradition. 31 By far the largest of the six Mūrtipūjaka gacchas is the Tapā Gaccha. According to Darśanavijaya (1933: 67, fn.), it had only 428 members at the end of the fifteenth century. By 2002 this figure had risen to 6,696. 32 Today, the Tapā Gaccha is divided into two branches (sākhā), the Vijaya Sākhā and the Sāgara Sākhā. The sākhas are further subdivided into a number of lineages which
are currently divided in twenty separate groups, or samudāyas, which are named after prominent ācāryas of their root lineage, with the sādhvīs defined through the male members of the traditions (Cort 1991: 661f.). The origins of the Sāgara Śākhā are opaque. Kañcansāgarsūri et al. (1977: 311–76) attribute its beginnings to Hīra Vijaya Sūri (1527–1569), though Śāh (1987: 14, 65, 168) points to the year 1630 in which Ācārya Rāj Sūri (formerly Muni Mukti Sāgar) seceded from the main line of the Tapā Gaccha with the help of the first nagarṣeth

Figure 12.1 Yati Moṭi Sāgar of the A(ñ)cala Gaccha in Mumbai. Photograph by the author, December 2004.
of Ahmedabad, Śāntidās Jhaverī (1585/1590–1659); who in 1660 also sponsored the Ānandjī Kalyānjī Trust. According to Dundas (1996: 101, n. 108), this tradition was disrupted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was revived in the mid-nineteenth century by Mayā Sāgar with the help of Hemābhāī, another nagarśeth of Ahmedabad, and of Seth Hathīsinha Keśarībhāī (died 1845). After Mayā Sāgar, the tradition split into two samudāyas, the two most famous ācāryas of which were Buddhi Sāgar Sūri (1874–1925) and the Āgamoddhāraka’ Sāgar Ānand Sūri (1875–1950) respectively. The Vijaya Śākhā emerged apparently in 1657, a date which roughly corresponds to Śāh’s (1987) version of the origin of the Sāgar Śākhā, following a succession dispute after the death of Vijay Deva Sūri (1577–1656). In 1999, it was internally subdivided into twenty samudāyas.

Cort (1989) observed momentous changes within the Vijaya Śākhā over the last one and a half centuries, as narrated in the histories of the Tapā Gaccha orders by Ratna Prabha Vijay (1948) and others. First of all, the yatis, that is, sedentary ascetics who fulfil ritual and administrative tasks and who do not pledge themselves fully to the observance of the mahāvrata, became almost extinct in the twentieth century and were replaced by the reformed sāṅvēgī.
sādhus, of which apparently only two dozen or so existed in the early nineteenth century.\(^39\)

In the mid-19th century, several activist sādhus reinvigorated the institution of the samvegī sādhu. Over two-thirds of the over 1,000 sādhus in the Tapā Gacch today trace their lineage back to Pañnyās Maṇi Vijay Gaṇī (1796–1879), known as Dādā (Grandfather). One of his disciples was the former Sthānakvāśī sādhu Muni Buddhī Vijay (1807–1882), known by his Sthānakvāśī name of Buṭerāȳjī. He was very active in the Panjab among both mendicants and laity, convincing Sthānakvāśīs of the correctness of the Mūrtipūjak teachings. Among his disciples was the charismatic Ātmārāmjī (1837–1896), who in 1876 in Ahmedabad took a second dīkṣā (initiation) as the Mūrtipūjak samvegī sādhu Ānand Vijay, along with eighteen other Sthānakvāśī sādhus, under the leadership of Ātmārāmjī and other similar minded sādhus, and later under the umbrella of the Śvetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Conference, a wide-ranging campaign was waged to reform both mendicant and lay practices. As the result of this reform the institution of the yati has virtually disappeared from the Mūrtipūjak society.

(Cort 1989: 99f.)

Cort showed that after the disintegration of the gaddī-centred yati-orders, new decentred patterns emerged, based on demographics, geography and charisma rather than on organisational power and property. It is worthwhile quoting him again at length:

As the Tapā Gacch has grown, it has subdivided in new ways which shed light on earlier processes of subdivision and gacch formation. The former subdivisions, which were based primarily on affiliation with the gādis (seats, thrones) of specific śrīpājyas, have disappeared, with the exception of the Vijay-Sāgar sākhā distinction, and been replaced by about 15 samudāys (literally ‘co-arising’, i.e. descendants of the same sādhu; here synonymous with sampradāy). In general, three interrelated principles accounted for the development of the various samudāys: geography, demographics, and charisma. As the number of sādhus increased, it became increasingly difficult for one ācārya to oversee the large number of sādhus under him. Smaller groups of sādhus were placed under the direction of other senior sādhus, and the sharp increase in the number of the ācāryas within the Tapā Gacch in the past several years is directly related to this need for additional supervisory personnel. As the sādhus increasingly interacted solely with the lesser ācārya rather than the seniormost ācārya, a new samudāy might evolve.

(Cort 1989: 103f.)
According to Jacobi (in Glasenapp 1925: 342, 352–354), the Tapā Gaccha was in 1913–1914 still ruled by ‘a number’ of šrīpūyas and, as a whole, comprised 1,200 sādhus and sādhvīs. Guérinot (1926: 56) reported the existence of ‘30 subdivisions’ of the Tapā Gaccha at the beginning of the twentieth century, without mentioning any figures, while B. U. Jain (1986) and Cort (1989: 100–105) found only two sākhhās and altogether 15–17 autonomous groups (samudāya). Table 12.1 shows that by 1999 this figure had grown to twenty due to further splits in the dominant Vijaya Śākhā tradition of Prem Sūri, the latest being the separation of Kamal Ratna Sūri from the Rāmacandraśāri Samudāya in 1998. Prem Sūri was one of the chief disciples of Buddhī Vijay, the reformer of the saṁvegt sādhus, together with Ātmā Rām, Dharma Vijay (1868–1922) and Niti Sūri (whose lineage further split into the Bhaktisūri- and the Siddhīsūri Samudāya) (Ratna Prabha Vijay 5, 2 1948: 218). At present, four samudāyas trace themselves back to Prem Sūri: the Rāmacandraśāri Samudāya, the Kamalaratnasūri Samudāya, the Bhuvanabhaņusūri Samudāya and the Amṛtasūri Samudāya. Four samudāyas descend directly from Ātmā Rām (Vijay Ānand), the most famous disciple of Buddhī Vijay: the Vallabhasūri Samudāya, the Mohanālāḷa Samudāya, the Dharmasūri Samudāya and the Śānticandraśāri Samudāya. The Rāmacandraśāri Samudāya is the only group which advocates the be tīthi interpretation of the religious calendar, and has therefore been excluded from many Tapā Gaccha upāśrayas. Table 12.1 does not include detailed figures for 1986 (cf. Cort 1989: 491ff.), 1999 and 2002, which are appended in the endnotes. But it reflects the group structure of 1999 and shows that at the time the Mūrtipūjaka tradition was divided into some twenty-seven independent monastic groups.

In 1999, the Mūrtipūjaka gacchas comprised altogether 6,843 mendicants, 1,489 sādhus and 5,354 sādhvīs. Amongst them, the Tapā Gaccha was the largest tradition, with 6,027 mendicants, 1,349 sādhus and 4,678 sādhvīs. The table shows a massive increase in numbers particularly of female ascetics within little more than a decade. It also illustrates the fact, emphasised by Cort (1989: 494, 1991: 661), that occasionally significant population shifts occur within and between samudāyas, which – in the absence of centralised gaddi-structures – seem to divide and unite like segmentary lineages, under the influence of circumstantial factors. Similar changes cannot be observed at the level of the gaccha categories. Commensality between ascetics of different gacchas is, for instance, prohibited. Schubring (2000: § 139, p. 252) already noted that gacchas are not necessarily actual groups. Mūrtipūjaka gacchas are in the first place doctrinal schools and at the same time social categories which may or may not be congruent with organised monastic groups, such as the samudāyas. However, doctrinal disputes are also significant for processes of group-formation at the samudāya level. A good example is the ek tīthi/be tīthi dispute between Rām Candra Sūri and Bhuvan Bhānu Sūri, which split the Premsūri Samudāya into two main sections in 1986 (Cort 1999: 50ff.).

Another important factor influencing processes of fission and fusion are the ways in which gacchas and samudāyas are organised. Shāntā (1985: 329–331) and
Table 12.1 Mürtipujaka sādhus and sādhvīs 1987, 1990 and 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gaccha</th>
<th>Gacchādhipati</th>
<th>Ācārya</th>
<th>Cāturmāsa-places</th>
<th>Sādhu</th>
<th>Sādhvī</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rāmcandrāsūri</td>
<td>27 17 28</td>
<td>144 124 131</td>
<td>423 238 265</td>
<td>443 463 520</td>
<td>866 701 785</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamalratnasūri</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bluwanbhānumūri</td>
<td>— 12 9</td>
<td>— 78 80</td>
<td>— 225 232</td>
<td>— 225 210</td>
<td>— 450 442</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amṛtsūri</td>
<td>4 4 3</td>
<td>94 82 70</td>
<td>61 42 40</td>
<td>312 329 385</td>
<td>373 371 425</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nītisūri</td>
<td>7 7 6</td>
<td>55 44 36</td>
<td>65 59 48</td>
<td>193 163 195</td>
<td>258 222 243</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaktisūri</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Samīvala)</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siddhisūri (Bāpjī)</td>
<td>2 4 3</td>
<td>13 54 13</td>
<td>24 28 26</td>
<td>80 373 99</td>
<td>104 401 125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhadrankarsūri</td>
<td>6 6 6</td>
<td>58 62 67</td>
<td>35 33 29</td>
<td>196 214 220</td>
<td>231 247 249</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharmanvijay</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dehlāvālē)</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nemiśūri</td>
<td>19 18 27</td>
<td>102 93 112</td>
<td>180 189 195</td>
<td>340 362 396</td>
<td>520 551 591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallaḥsūri</td>
<td>2 2 6</td>
<td>69 57 57</td>
<td>57 60 52</td>
<td>195 210 205</td>
<td>252 270 257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labdhisūri</td>
<td>13 12 9</td>
<td>36 39 35</td>
<td>57 56 52</td>
<td>163 177 181</td>
<td>220 233 233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Navinsūri)</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohanālāsūri</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>20 19 17</td>
<td>13 17 19</td>
<td>46 34 23</td>
<td>59 51 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharmanvīra</td>
<td>3 4 7</td>
<td>62 50 65</td>
<td>36 34 30</td>
<td>189 200 186</td>
<td>225 234 216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Tapā Gaccha
A. Vijaya Sākhā

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gaccha</th>
<th>Gacchādhipatī</th>
<th>Ācārā</th>
<th>Cāturmāsa-places</th>
<th>Sādhu</th>
<th>Sādhvī</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 17 28</td>
<td>144 124 131</td>
<td>423 238 265</td>
<td>443 463 520</td>
<td>866 701 785</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— 12 9</td>
<td>— 78 80</td>
<td>— 225 232</td>
<td>— 225 210</td>
<td>— 450 442</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 4 3</td>
<td>94 82 70</td>
<td>61 42 40</td>
<td>312 329 385</td>
<td>373 371 425</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 7 6</td>
<td>55 44 36</td>
<td>65 59 48</td>
<td>193 163 195</td>
<td>258 222 243</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 4 3</td>
<td>13 54 13</td>
<td>24 28 26</td>
<td>80 373 99</td>
<td>104 401 125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 6 6</td>
<td>58 62 67</td>
<td>35 33 29</td>
<td>196 214 220</td>
<td>231 247 249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 18 27</td>
<td>102 93 112</td>
<td>180 189 195</td>
<td>340 362 396</td>
<td>520 551 591</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 2 6</td>
<td>69 57 57</td>
<td>57 60 52</td>
<td>195 210 205</td>
<td>252 270 257</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 12 9</td>
<td>36 39 35</td>
<td>57 56 52</td>
<td>163 177 181</td>
<td>220 233 233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>20 19 17</td>
<td>13 17 19</td>
<td>46 34 23</td>
<td>59 51 42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 4 7</td>
<td>62 50 65</td>
<td>36 34 30</td>
<td>189 200 186</td>
<td>225 234 216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keśarṣūri</td>
<td>Hemprabhasūri</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanaksūri</td>
<td>Kalāpuruṣānā</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vāgadvala)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himacalṣūri</td>
<td>Panvās Rātmākara</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śaṅticandraṣūri</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāg 1</td>
<td>Bhuvaneksarṣūri</td>
<td>2-6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāg 2</td>
<td>Jincandraṣūri</td>
<td>2-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Sāgara Śākhā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ānandasgarṣūri</td>
<td>Suryodayasgarṣūri</td>
<td>3-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhagarṣūri</td>
<td>Subodhagarṣūri</td>
<td>6-6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapā Gaccha altogether</td>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Vimala Gaccha</td>
<td>Cidānandṣūri</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Āñcala Gaccha</td>
<td>Gunodaysarṣūri</td>
<td>2-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Kharatara Gaccha</td>
<td>Jin Mahodaysarṣūri</td>
<td>2-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Tristuti Gaccha</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāg 1</td>
<td>Jayantsenasūri</td>
<td>2-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāg 2</td>
<td>Hemdrasūri</td>
<td>2-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāg 3</td>
<td>Up. Praśāncandra</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Pārśvacandra</td>
<td>Muni Bhuvacandra</td>
<td>2-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaccha 7</td>
<td>Ānanddharsūri etc.</td>
<td>4-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cort (1991) explain population shifts and processes of group segmentation amongst the Tapā Gaccha samudāyas mainly with reference to charismatic leadership. Cort emphasises, for instance, the effect of the unusually high numbers of ācāryas on the processes of segmentation and the size of Tapā Gaccha samudāyas. He explains this effect both with ‘internal organisational pressures for the growth of the number of Tapā Gacch ācāryas – a growth which has been criticised by many sādhus and laity’ and with ‘the desire of influential laity to have the sādhu of whom they are a personal devotee be an ācārya’ (ibid.: 668, n. 16). But he also notes that a distinction between ‘charismatic’ sānvēgī sādhus and ‘domesticated’ yatis is not exactly applicable, since even the sānevgt sādhus have a succession of leaders and thus are not ‘purely charismatic figures in the Weberian sense’ (ibid.: 669, n. 22). Weber (1978) himself categorised Jain monastic orders not as charismatic movements but primarily as ‘hierocratic organisations’.76

Although some samudāyas share the same customary law (maryādā),77 Tapā Gaccha samudāyas are generally organised independently, and compete with one another, even within their ṣākhās. As a rule, members of one samudāya do not share food with those of another (personal invitations notwithstanding).78 Each samudāya is governed by a gacchādhipati or pramukhā ācārya, head teacher, who is generally determined according to monastic age (dīkṣā paryāya) or by consensus, except in the Rāmacandrasūri Samudāya, where the gacchādhipati ideally selects his own successor.79 The gacchādhipati presides over a varying number of monastic functionaries, including subordinate ācāryas with or without administrative duties, who received their title solely because of their academic achievements.80

I suspect that the maximum size of Jain monastic groups is primarily a function of their rules and regulations, which mediate between the categories of descent and the imperatives of group integration (Flügel 2003b: 191ff.). Circumstantial factors such as the socio-economic resources of a particular religio-geographic field (kṣetra) or charismatic leadership are important in specific cases, particularly on the level of gatherings. But generally, the degree of organisation determines its chances of reproduction over time, the maximum group size and thus the potential geographic influence of a particular monastic order. To put it simply, the better the organisation of a group, the greater its potential size and the greater its size, the greater its potential influence. The three principal dimensions of Śvetāmbara monastic orders are descent, succession and seniority. They can be combined in various ways to produce different types of organisation.

In theory, it should be possible to develop a formula for calculating the ability of different types of organisation to compensate for demographic pressure. Practically, there is an upper limit for the size of groups without formal organisation based solely on the principle of recurrent personal interaction. As a first approximation, the breaking point leading to group fission within the orders of the Vijaya Ṣākhā can be estimated through simple averages. In 1996, the average group size of the smallest organised units of the Tapā Gaccha samudāyas, the
itinerant groups or saṅghadās, gatherings, was 5.24 at cāturnāsa. This figure is not unusual for Śvetāmbara orders. It reflects both religious rules on minimal group sizes as well as socio-economic factors, such as the number and wealth of lay-supporters. Evidently, a large group of alms-collecting ascetics can only stay together at one particular place if provisions are available and if their procurement is carefully organised (with the help of the laity).

Within the Mūrtipūjaka tradition, as a rule, the saṅghadās have a fluctuating membership. They comprise the members of one or more categories of ascetics who belong to the lineage of one particular ācārya. These are called parivāras, or families, and are composed of both śādhus and śādhvīs. The parivāras are co-ordinated by one pramukha ācārya, who is the leader of a gaccha or a samudāya. The majority of the ācāryas have no administrative duties, although this varies from group to group, but they possess the qualification for the transformation of their parivāras into independent groups. In 1996, the actual average size of a Tapā Gaccha samudāya was 278.4 ascetics, distributed, on average, among 53.13 itinerant groups. However, the number of Tapā Gaccha ascetics divided among the total number of ācāryas is 41.24, which represented theoretically the lowest average limit of potential group fission between Tapā Gaccha ācāryas in 1996. The difference between average actual group sizes and potentially lowest average group size demonstrates the importance of other organisational factors determining group size. But in order to understand, for instance, how the 447 ascetics under the sole leadership of Ācārya Kalāpūrṇa Sūri of the Kanakasūri Samudāya operate as an integral monastic order, further historical and ethnographic research is required. Segmentary lineages can temporarily form very large groups. Nevertheless, it seems that samudāyas of such a size are not merely segmentary lineages, but internally highly organised, and divided into subgroups whose membership is not based on descent alone. That the Tapā Gaccha samudāyas form distinct monastic orders, whose members share specific rules and regulations (maryādā), is evident for instance in the explicit prohibition of sharing meals with members of other samudāyas. In fact, most Jain mendicant groups operate on the basis of an internal administrative hierarchy and a rudimentary division of labour. However, further statistical investigation of the correlation of group size and group structure becomes only meaningful if more information on organisational structures and other important variables is available. Complete data and careful theoretical modelling might, in future, lead to reliable predictions of expected group sizes under specified conditions.

Sthānakavāsi

The Sthānakavāsi mendicants are presently divided into twenty six monastic orders. These can be classified according to regional affiliation, doctrinal schools and the lineages descending from one of the five founders of the contemporary traditions, the so-called pañcāmuni. Three of these founders separated themselves from the now virtually extinct Loṅkā Gaccha yati traditions to set up reformed ascetic orders within the aniconic, or non-image worshipping, Jain tradition which originated
between 1473 and 1476 after the ‘protestant’ reforms of the Jain layman Loǐkā (c.1415–1489) in Gujarāt:85 (1) Jīv Rāj (seceded 1551, 1609 or 1629), who apparently canonised the thirty two Śvetāmbara scriptures that are acceptable to the Sthānakavāsīs, established the permanent use of a mouthmask (muhapattī), and other principal features shared by all modern-day Sthānakavāsī traditions; (2) Dharma Śiṅha (seceded 1628, 1635 or 1644) and (3) Lava (seceded 1637, 1648, 1653–1655 or 1657). Dharma Śiṅha was the founder of the Āṭh Koṭi (eighth grade) traditions,86 and Lava the founder of the Dhūṇḍiyā traditions, which are also known under the name Rṣi Sampradāya. (4) The founder of the Bāis Tolā traditions, Dharma Dāsa (seceded 1659, 1560, 1564 or 1665), was originally a member of the lay order of the Ekala Pāṭriyā Panth and maybe a follower of Jīv Rāj shortly before Jīv Rāj’s death; and (5) Hara (seceded 1668 or 1728), the ancestor of the Sādhū Mārgī traditions, divorced himself either from the Lahaūrī Loǐkā Gaccha or from the Rṣi Sampradāya.

Doctrinally, Dharma Śiṅha’s Āṭh Koṭi tradition differs significantly from the other four schools, which disagree only on minor points of interpretation. It is today represented by the Dariyāpūrī tradition in Gujarāt and by the two Āṭh Koṭi traditions in Kacch, one of which – the Nānā Pakṣ – is very orthodox. The other Sthānakavāsī traditions are divided along regional lines between the Gujarātī and the non-Gujarātī (North Indian) traditions. The non-Gujarātī traditions are further subdivided into those who joined the reformist Śramaṇa Saṅgha, which was founded in 1952 in a merely partially successful attempt to unite all Sthānakavāsī groups, and those who remained outside or left the Śramaṇa Saṅgha. Both the centralised Śramaṇa Saṅgha and the independent traditions include ascetics from four of the five main Sthānakavāsī traditions which were split into thirty three different organised groups at the beginning of the twentieth century (excluding only the Āṭh Koṭi traditions).

I have written elsewhere on the history and organisation of the aniconic Loǐkā, Sthānakavāsī- and Terā Panth Śvetāmbara traditions.87 Therefore, I confine myself here to the description of their principal demographic features. Like the Jain Śvetāmbara conference of the Mūrtipūjaka laity, the second All India Sthānakavāsī Jain Conference in Ajmer in 1909 resolved to increase the educational standard and the total number of Sthānakavāsī ācāryas in order to raise the competitiveness of the Sthānakavāsīs vis-à-vis other Jain traditions (AISJC 1988 II: 8–32). In 1933 in Ajmer, the first assembly of representatives of all the Sthānakavāsī monastic orders decided to unify all traditions under the leadership of one ācārya. Finally, the Śramaṇa Saṅgha was created by 22 out of the 30 traditions present at the assembly in 1952 in Sādārī in Rājāstān. Table 12.2 shows the regional distribution and the number of ascetics of the Śramaṇa Saṅgha, which is now the largest organised group amongst the Sthānakavāsī mendicants, from 1987–1996.

Although they are nominally under the command of one single ācārya (at present: Dr Śīv Muni), the remaining founding traditions continue to operate within the Śramaṇa Saṅgha more or less independently. The official statistics therefore do not tell the whole story. Some mendicant orders never joined the Śramaṇa Saṅgha: for instance, the Jñāna Gaccha. And because of perpetual discord
Table 12.2 Regional distribution of the Śramaṇa Saṅgha sādhus and sādhvīs 1987, 1990 and 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States (prānta)</th>
<th>Ācārya 1996</th>
<th>Caturmāsā-places</th>
<th>Sadhu</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Rājasthān</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>40 22 51</td>
<td>21 42 48</td>
<td>140 164 173</td>
<td>161 206 221</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Dillī</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24 22 33</td>
<td>21 12 25</td>
<td>93 105 170</td>
<td>114 117 195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mahāraṣṭra</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>70 55 37</td>
<td>111 42 34</td>
<td>202 184 115</td>
<td>313 22 149</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Hariyānā</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11 16 25</td>
<td>4 19 12</td>
<td>52 56 107</td>
<td>56 75 119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Madhya Pradeś</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>17 32 28</td>
<td>7 21 24</td>
<td>76 63 77</td>
<td>83 84 101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Paṅjāb</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>26 18 14</td>
<td>38 23 26</td>
<td>49 38 22</td>
<td>87 61 48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Uttar Pradeś</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 6 8</td>
<td>2 7 13</td>
<td>18 17 30</td>
<td>20 24 43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Karnātak</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 7 10</td>
<td>— 7 2</td>
<td>7 11 37</td>
<td>7 18 39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Andrah Pradeś</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 3 4</td>
<td>2 8 2</td>
<td>4 8 15</td>
<td>6 16 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5 11 4</td>
<td>— 20 2</td>
<td>21 29 14</td>
<td>21 49 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Paścim Baṅgāl</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 — 1</td>
<td>2 — 10</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>2 — 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Himācāl Pradeś</td>
<td>— — 1 2 — 4 — 5 5 — 5 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Gujarāt</td>
<td>— — 3 — 2 — — 6 — — 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Caṇḍigarh</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 2 1</td>
<td>2 3 3</td>
<td>— 4 —</td>
<td>2 7 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Bihār</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 2 1</td>
<td>7 3 1</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>7 3 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Uṛṣā</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 — 1</td>
<td>3 — —</td>
<td>— — —</td>
<td>3 — —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>— — 16 — — 11 — — 6 — — 17 —</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>207 224 222</td>
<td>221 220 208</td>
<td>662 690 771</td>
<td>883 910 979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note
a The table is based on the group-by-group accounts listed in B. U. Jain 1996. B. U. Jain did not have accurate information on ‘other’ Śramaṇa Saṅgha mendicants in 1996, but cited the total figure of 1,017 mendicants and 230 caturmāsā places. For 1996, he quotes the figure of 208 munīs (identical figure) and the much higher figure of 809 sādhvīs, based on estimates (see ibid.: 37f.).
### Table 12.3 Sādhus and sādhvīs of the Independent Sthānakavāśī-Traditions outside Gujarāt 1987, 1990 and 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampradāya</th>
<th>Ācārya/ Gacchādhikar</th>
<th>Cāturmāsā-places</th>
<th>Sādhu</th>
<th>Sādhvī</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dharmadās</td>
<td>Mānmuni</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhāṅgacch I</td>
<td>Campālāl</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaymālgacch</td>
<td>Ācārya Śubhcand</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raṭanaṃś</td>
<td>Ācārya Hirācand</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vardhamān V.</td>
<td>Śītalāj</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amarmuni I</td>
<td>Ācārya Śādhvī Candānā</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amarmuni II</td>
<td>Ācārya Vimalmuni</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māyārām I</td>
<td>Sudarśanāl</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māyārām II</td>
<td>Rāmkṛṣṇa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śādhumārgī</td>
<td>Ācārya Nānālāl</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāntikrānti</td>
<td>Sāntimuni</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nānakgacch</td>
<td>Ācārya Sohanāl</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagāmīlāl</td>
<td>Ācārya Abhaykumār</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arhat Saṅgh I</td>
<td>Saubhāgyamuni</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arhat Saṅgh II</td>
<td>Śādhvī Dr Śādhānā</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes
- Today: Vīryātan.
- The group had only two ascetics in 1999 (B. U. Jain 1999: 365).
- The information for 1996 is incomplete.
- The Arhat Saṅgha was founded by Muni Suśil Kumār. In 1999 it was lead by Yuvācārya Amarandra.
- There is no information for the year 1990.
- This category also comprises mendicants who ‘walk alone’ (ekala vihārī).
Table 12.4 Sādhus and sādhvīs of the Gujarāṭī Sthānakavāṣṭ-Traditions 1987, 1990 and 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampradāya</th>
<th>Ācārya/ Gacchādhipati</th>
<th>Cāturmāsa-places</th>
<th>Sādhu</th>
<th>Sādhvī</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Dariyāpurī Āṭh Koṭī</td>
<td>Ācārya Śāntilāl</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Kacch Āṭh Koṭī</td>
<td>Gāḍipati Prāṇalāl</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Kacch Āṭh Koṭī Nānā</td>
<td>Ācārya Rāghva</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Khambhāt</td>
<td>Ācārya Kantīrṣi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Līmbḍī Cha Koṭī Moṭā</td>
<td>Gāḍipati Narsiṅha</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Līmbḍī Cha Koṭī Nānā</td>
<td>Tapasvī Rāmṛmuni</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Goṇḍal Moṭā Pakṣ</td>
<td>Tapasvī Ratilāl</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Goṇḍal Saṅghāṇī</td>
<td>Narendramuni</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Barvāḍa</td>
<td>Sardārvmuni</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Bोṭād</td>
<td>Navīnmuni</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sāyalā</td>
<td>Balbhadramuni</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Hāḷārī</td>
<td>Kesāmuni</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Vardhamān</td>
<td>Nirmālvmuni</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12.5 Sthānakavāṣī sādhus and sādhvīs 1987, 1990, 1996 and 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampradāya</th>
<th>Ācārya</th>
<th>Cānurmāsa-places</th>
<th>Sādhu</th>
<th>Sādhvī</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Śramaṇaśaṅgh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarāti</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
between the founding traditions, many disappointed ascetics, such as Upācārya Gaṇeśīlāl (1890–1963) of the Sādhu Mārgī or Upādhyāya Amar Muni (1901–1992) of the Manoharadāsa Dharmaḍāsa tradition, subsequently left the Śramaṇa Saṅgha and re-established their own independent groups. Moreover, in May 2003 the Śramaṇa Saṅgha split into two groups, one of which is nominally presided over by the orthodox Pravartaka Umeś Muni, who has however not officially accepted the ācārya title in order to avoid further conflict. Table 12.3 shows the independent Sthānakavāśī groups outside Gujarāt (for details see Flügel 2003b).

The majority of the Sthānakavāśī traditions in Gujarāt, listed in Table 12.4, descend from Dharma Dāsa and separated themselves in the years after 1788 from the Limbāḷi Dharmaḍāsa Sampradāya (Chah Koṭi Moṭā Pakṣa). The only surviving Rṣi Sampradāya in Gujarāt, the Khambhāt Sampradāya, and the Āṭh Koṭi traditions restrict their activities to Gujarāt and Mumbai. None of these Gujarāṭī groups joined the Śramaṇa Saṅgha, which is a Hindi-speaking order or association. They are usually not lead by a selected head, like the independent traditions outside Gujarāt, but by the monk with the highest monastic age, or dīkṣā paryāya, who may or may not be called ācārya.

The overall number of Sthānakavāśī mendicants is much higher than generally assumed. At the time of the first All India Sthānakavāśī Śramaṇa Sammelan in Ajmer, the total number of mendicants of the then 30 Sthānakavāśī traditions was 1,595, 463 sādhus and 1,132 sādhvīs (Maṇīlāl 1934: 263). This figure had more than doubled by 1999 to altogether 3,223 mendicants, 533 sādhus and 2,690 sādhvīs, and by the year 2002 had increased further to altogether 3,331 mendicants, 559 sādhus and 2,772 sādhvīs. In the sixty-six years between 1933 and 1999 the total number of Sthānakavāśī ascetics grew by 102.07%. However, the number of sādhus increased merely by 15.19%, while the number of sādhvīs expanded by a staggering 137.63%, increasing their share by 12.48% from 70.97% to 83.46%. Table 12.5 shows that the total number of Sthānakavāśī mendicants grew from 1987–1999 by 20.40%. All this growth was generated by an accelerated increase in the number of Sthānakavāśī sādhvīs during the last 12 years. At the same time, the absolute number of sādhus slightly declined.

The overall growth rate in 1987–1999 was almost twice as high in the Śramaṇa Saṅgha and the independent orders than in Gujarāt (Śramaṇa Saṅgha 24.12%, Independent 25.26%, Gujarāṭī 13.5%). This can partly be explained by the fact that in 1987 the percentage of sādhvīs was already particularly high in Gujarāt (1999: Gujarāt 89.39%, Śramaṇa Saṅgha 79.29%, Independent 81.08%). While the overall share of the sādhvīs increased by 3.63%, their growth was higher outside Gujarāt (Śramaṇa Saṅgha 4.32%, Independent 5.17%, Gujarāṭī 2.4%). It is difficult to say why Gujarāṭī traditions have a larger percentage of sādhvīs in the absence of detailed historical studies. It is not inconceivable that initiations were artificially increased in Gujarāt; since already in 1933, at the Ajmer sammelan, an inconclusive debate was held amongst leading monks of the Sthānakavāśīs about a proposal to deliberately increase the number of disciples (Devendramuni 2000: 20).
B. U. Jain does not supply any information on the biodata and on the social background of the mendicants. According to Bordiyā (in Shāntā 1985: 336f.), 30% of the Śṭhānakavāṣī sādhvīs were widows in 1975, 16% married and 53% unmarried. The average age of initiation was 10–20 years. Most of the Śṭhānakavāṣī ascetics stem from the Osvāl and Śrimālī castes in Gujarāt, Rājasthān, Madhya Pradeś, Mahārāṣṭra and Pañjāb, but also from southern India (Shāntā 1985: 333). In contrast to many other Śṭhānakavāṣī traditions, the Śramaṇa Saṅgha comprises a large number of mendicants recruited from non-Jain castes such as Rājputs, Brāhmaṇas, or Jats particularly in the Pañjāb, while the lay following is almost entirely composed of members of the Osvāl castes, who are almost all Jain by religion. However, by convention, only an Osvāl can become ācārya. Like most orders, the Śramaṇa Saṅgha has banned the initiation of children below the age of 8 (bāla dikṣā) and of old people (vrddhā) (AISJC 1987: 52). However, the Jñāna Gaccha and the Dariyāpurī Sampradāy set a minimum age of 15 years.

The two largest schools amongst the five principal Śṭhānakavāṣī traditions are at the moment the Bāīś Tolā (Dharmadāsa) and the Lavjīrṣi tradition. Manilāl (1934: 211, 233) mentions that before its internal division in 1788, the Mūlakandra Dharmadāsa tradition in Gujarāt comprised about 300 mendicants. In 1933 it had not much more than 334 mendicants. If the figure for 1788 is correct, then little growth occurred in the 150 years between 1788 and 1933.

Groups of more than 100 mendicants are rarely reported before the twentieth century. This may be due to the fact that no reliable figures are available before the nineteenth century, which had generally lower numbers of Jain ascetics than the twentieth century. In 1933, the six largest organised mendicant orders (saṅghārā or saṅghādā) were the Amarasiṅha Lavjīrṣi Sampradāya in the Pañjāb (133 mendicants: 73 sādhus and 60 sādhvīs), the Amolakarṣi Lavjīrṣi Sampradāya in Mālvā (105 mendicants: 24 sādhus and 81 sādhvīs), the orthodox Rāmaratna Dharmadāsa Jñāna Gaccha in Rājasthān (118 mendicants: 13 sādhus and 105 sādhvīs), the Jayamala Gaccha of the Bāīś Tolā tradition in Rājasthān (103 mendicants: 13 sādhus and 99 sādhvīs), the Āṃbdi Moṭā Pakṣa of the Bāīś Tolā tradition in Gujarāt (94 mendicants: 28 sādhus and 66 sādhvīs), and the Goṇḍal Moṭā Pakṣa of the Bāīś Tolā tradition in Gujarāt (86 mendicants: 20 sādhus and 66 sādhvīs) (Manilāl 1934: 211–262).

A closer look at the gender composition of the mendicant groups in 1933 shows that, with the remarkable exception of the Amarasiṅha tradition and certain subgroups within the Śramaṇa Saṅgha, all traditions with more than ten mendicants tended to have many more sādhvīs than sādhus (generally at the rate of 3:1). It also becomes clear that small groups, such as the Manoharadāsa tradition (7 sādhus) or the Botād and Sāyāḷā traditions (6 sādhus each), were and often are homogeneous male groups.

The principal factor for the emergence of exclusively male groups is schisms. Generally, divisions are only instigated by sādhus who initially form small single sex groups which, after a while, may or may not accrete an entourage of sādhvīs.
The severance of the Terā Panth from the Ragunātha Sampradāya in 1760 is one example. In some cases breakaway groups are formed by both sādhus and sādhvīs. But even then, sādhus are generally the majority.

Larger groups of up to 100 mendicants seem to have emerged more frequently at the end of the nineteenth century with the general revival of Jainism. In response, some groups, such as the influential Amarasinha Lavjīrṣi tradition, re-introduced rudimentary hierocratic structures to prevent the breakup of their communities. Organisation is necessary for the integration of nuns and for the reproduction of a monastic order over time. The need for organisation arises in times of expansion, when the mendicant orders grow and attempt to exert their influence on society as a whole. Organisation is also a major factor determining group size, as indicated earlier. It is symptomatic for an increase in power, not necessarily purity, because it counteracts the segmentary pressures that are systematically generated by the observation of the canonical rules for mendicant-lay interaction. These rules prescribe the itinerary of the ascetics and unmediated face-to-face interaction between guru and disciple, thus impeding the permanent aggregation of large assemblies of ascetics in small towns and villages. Even sizable and well-organised groups are split into smaller itinerant groups of 2–15 and, rarely, up to 70 mendicants, called saṅghāda or parivāra among the Sthanakavāsīs, to make the observation of the canonical rules of non-violent conduct easier.

Another approach to the processes of group segmentation amongst Jain mendicants follows from network theory. I have outlined this approach in an earlier, yet to be published, paper (Flügel 1991) and restrict myself here to general remarks. As mentioned earlier, the size of sustainable groups depends partly on the number of followers in a given region. Studies in network size have shown that informal personal networks rarely exceed thirty individuals in a modern urban environment: ‘In general it appears that there is probably a limit to the number of people with whom an individual might be in direct and regular contact, but as yet there does not seem to be enough empirical evidence available to provide an estimate of what it might be’ (Mitchell 1969: 19f.).

By observing the canonical codes of conduct for their itinerary, or vihāra, and the collection of alms, or gocarī, Jain mendicants are both forced and able to sustain much larger networks of personal, if formal, contacts. In practice, this often requires the keeping of lists of addresses and various other organisational techniques which cannot be detailed here. In other words, while the monastic code of conduct limits the size of mendicant groups, it simultaneously contributes to the widening of the circle of lay contacts. However, even if one accepts that the formalisation of mendicant-lay interactions through the Jain monastic code results in a larger personal network, there seems to be an upper limit of sustainable contacts (a figure which awaits to be calculated). Beyond this limit, both the mendicant order and the mendicant-lay network can only be enlarged with the help of hierocratic organisation. The permutations of this general postulate still await thorough sociological analysis. However, given that schisms privilege male ascetics, it seems that the sustenance of large numbers of female mendicants is
predicated on the existence of large and formally organised monastic groups with the capacity of weaving partial individual or parivāra networks into aggregate group networks. Historically, the emergence of organised monastic orders amongst the Śvetāmbaras seems to be related to the problem of integrating the principally bilateral structure of descent of nuns and the unilateral structure of descent of monks within a single tradition.\textsuperscript{100}

**Śvetāmbara Terā Panth**

Systematic research in the history of the Terā Panth began in 1946 under the supervision of Ācārya Tulsī, who commissioned Muni Navratnamal (1921–2004) to collect the biographies of all Terā Panth mendicants and asked his lay followers to submit all family records and personal notes on the movements of the mendicants, since little reliable data can be found in the writings of the early Terā Panth monks. It is due to Muni Navratnamal’s meticulous study of these sources, spanning more than five decades, that the Terā Panth offers now almost complete published demographic data on the monastic order and on the individual life-histories of its ascetics from its inception in 1760. During the last four decades an annual census was conducted and published under the title Terāpanth Digdarśan. The demographic statistics extracted from these materials differentiate between region of origin (deś), caste (jāti), age (vay), marital status before initiation: unmarried (avivāhit), married (patnī/patī ko chorkar), or widowed (patnī/patī-viyog ke bād), age at the time of initiation (navalig/bālig), initiation with or without spouse (sapatnī/patī sahit), initiation of one spouse after the other (prāg dīkṣit patnī/patī), death (svargavās), departure (gaṇ bāhar), and the name of the initiating ācārya. Most of the available data was compiled by Muni Navratnamal (1981 ff.) and published in 26 volumes under the title Šāsana Samudra. Slightly different figures are quoted by Muni Budhmal (1995) and in other Terā Panth publications. The statistics of different Terā Panth publications do not always match, but are reliable enough to support general conclusions.

The Terā Panth is governed autocratically by a single ācārya who is invested with the constitutional power to select his successor, to initiate all mendicants, to annually rotate the personnel of the itinerant groups, and to determine the number and size of the groups. This administrative technique is unique amongst Jain orders, although the ācārya of the Sthānakavāsī Jāna Gaccha – always the monk with the highest monastic age – also rotates the personnel of the itinerant groups, while most other Sthānakavāsī orders similarly operate with only one ācārya. It was devised deliberately to counteract segmentary pressures resulting from the fact that traditionally the members of a sanghādā stayed together for life and automatically developed a distinct group identity and clientele. The centralised system of administration was introduced by Ācārya Bhikṣu (1726–1803) and refined by Ācārya Jītmal (1803–1881). It allowed the Terā Panth to grow both numerically and geographically well beyond the size of an average samudāya in the twentieth century. In 1955 the Terā Panth comprised of
Table 12.6  Terā Panth sādhus and sādhvīs 1987, 1990, 1996 and 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampradāya</th>
<th>Ācārya 1996</th>
<th>Cāturmāsa-places</th>
<th>Sādhu</th>
<th>Sādhu</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terā Panth</td>
<td>Ācārya Tulsī</td>
<td>135 128 123 121</td>
<td>148 149 142 145</td>
<td>559 553 538 543</td>
<td>707 702 681 688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nava Terā Panth 1</td>
<td>Muni Candannal</td>
<td>— — 4 4 — — 3 3</td>
<td>— — — — 7 7 — —</td>
<td>10 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nava Terā Panth 2</td>
<td>Muni Rūpcandra</td>
<td>6 3 2 8 2 2 9 7 7 17 9 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagrāj</td>
<td>Muni Dr Nagrāj</td>
<td>17 1 22 4 32 —</td>
<td>54 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>135 134 147 128 148 157 169 157 559 562 584 557 707 719 754 711</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note

a The Nava Terā Panth was already split in two sections in 1990, but B. U. Jain 1990: 106 did not have any figures. Therefore, numbers for both groups are listed under Rūp Candra’s section for 1990.
Table 12.7 Initiations, deaths, departures and total numbers of Terā Panth sādhus and sādhvīs 1764–1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acārya (period of reign)</th>
<th>Entry</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Exit</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sādhu</td>
<td>Sādhvī</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Sādhu</td>
<td>Sādhvī</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Sādhu</td>
<td>Sādhvī</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Sādhu</td>
<td>Sādhvī</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Bhikṣu (1760–1803)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Bhārimal (1803–1821)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Rāycand (1821–1851)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jītmal (1851–1881)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Maghrāj (1881–1892)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mānaklāl (1892–1897)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Dālcand (1897–1909)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>299</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Kālūrām (1909–1936)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>472</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Tulśi (1936–1997)</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>685</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>1616</td>
<td>2385</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1361</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>2597</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note

a These figures stem from Budhmal 1995: 237, 292, 328, 532 and Navratnamal (personal correspondance 30 April 2000). They refer to the day of death of the acāryas.
altogether 660 mendicants (180 sādhus and 480 sādhvīṣ), in 1975 of 657 mendicants (151 sādhus and 506 sādhvīṣ) and in 1981 of 695 mendicants (164 sādhus and 531 sādhvīṣ). The 1981 figures would have been higher had they not been compiled shortly after the secession of the groups of the Muni Nag Rāj and the Nava Terā Panth, lead by Muni Candan Māl and Muni Rup Candra. The main reason for the constitution of breakaway groups was the controversial introduction of a new intermediary category of novices, called samaṇa śreni, by Ācārya Tulsī in 1981.

Initially, the samaṇa śreni proved to be extremely popular, at least among young females, who were interested in religious education and travel. But the expansion has periodically slowed down. In 1992 the order comprised of 4 samaṇas and 51 samaṇīs, in 1996 of 4 samaṇas and 81 samaṇīs, and in 1999 of 4 samaṇas and 80 samaṇīs. However, in the meantime the recruitment has been accelerated. Altogether 89 samaṇīs existed by 2001, and more than 100 in 2003. The periodical reduction in numbers is a result of the progression of many samaṇīs into the order of the sādhvīṣ.

In 1992 the main branch of the Terā Panth had altogether 827 ascetics and novices and apparently more than 300,000 lay followers. At that time, it was one of the largest corporate Jain mendicant groups. If ascetics and novices are taken together, the Terā Panth had also the highest rate of growth of all Śvetāmbara Jain orders between 1987–1999. However, if only the numbers of fully initiated ascetics are taken into account, the growth rate seems to be stagnating. Table 12.6 shows that the main group had 688 members in 1999, 145 sādhus and 543 sādhvīṣ, that is, much more than in 1955, particularly if the 23 ascetics of the splinter groups of Muni Dr Nag Rāj and the Nava Terā Panth are taken into account. But the figures confirm the stagnation of the number of fully initiated ascetics between 1987 and 1999. This general trend is underlined by the low recruitment of male novices (samaṇa), whose growth has stagnated.

The main expansion of the Terā Panth occurred under Ācārya Kālū Rām (1877–1936) and Ācārya Tulsī (1914–1997) in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, during the Indian struggle for independence and the first decade after independence. Table 12.7 shows that under Kālū Rām’s reign both the absolute number of initiations of mendicants and the ratio of female mendicants increased dramatically. Simultaneously, caste exclusivity also increased. Terā Panth mendicants were increasingly recruited only from the Osvāl jātīs. By contrast, many of the ascetics that were initiated by the first four Terā Panth ācāryas between 1760 and 1881 were Agraśīlas (sometimes Sarāvagīs) and Porvālas, and Maheśvarīs, though Bhikṣu himself was also a Bīṣa Osvāl. The recruitment
patterns also reflect regional changes. Initially, most of the Terā Panth mendicants came from Māva and Meva. However, after a series of cāturmāsa sojourns by Ācārya Jīṭmal in Lādnūm and Bīdāsar between 1872 and 1877, the focus of activities shifted towards the Thalī region. From Ācārya Kāḷū Rām onwards the great majority of Terā Panth ascetics were recruited from the area of the old principal-ity of Bīkāner.\textsuperscript{105} Table 12.7 shows the pattern of growth of the Terā Panth, whose ācāryas initiated altogether 2597 mendicants between 1760 and 1997.\textsuperscript{106}

The table shows that one of the factors contributing to the low number of sādhus are secessions or excommunications, which occur much more frequently amongst sādhus than amongst sādhvīs (cf. Navratnamal 1981 II: 311, 322, III: 273, 291, X: 309, 325). This confirms Balbir’s (1983: 42) observation that the disposition to rebel against the autocratic regime of the Terā Panth ācāryas is greater amongst male ascetics. The figures show that the number of exclusions was much higher under the regimes of the reformist disciplinarians Jīṭmal, Kāḷūrām and Tūlsī.

Goonasekere’s (1986: 87ff.) analysis of the recruitment patterns between 1760–1944 shows that, with the exception of the first years after the foundation of the Terā Panth during which the sādhus were in the majority, at all times significantly more sādhvīs were initiated than sādhus (on average 65.97% sādhvīs and 34.03% sādhus), and that the percentage of female ascetics continually increased. His investigations of the marital status at the time of initiation give further insights into the historical changes taking place within the monastic community. He shows that until 1944 the two dominant categories were ‘unmarried men’ and ‘widows’: 49.83% of all sādhus were unmarried between 1760–1944, 37.28% widowed, 12.89% married, and altogether 67.77% of the sādhvīs – 44.77% of all Terā Panth mendicants – were widows (ibid.: 100f.). Goonasekere explains the different ratio of widows and widowers by the fact that, in contrast to women, men were always permitted to remarry (due to Ācārya Tūlsī’s reforms widow remarriage is today officially accepted by the Terā Panthīs though it is still despised by the Osvāls). From this he infers the prevailing motives for renunciation: widowhood for women, and impossibility or fear of marriage for men. But he also mentions other socially induced reasons for renunciation, such as infertility, bankruptcy, unhappy marriage, and death of a family member (ibid.: 114f.) – in my experience a very, if not the most, significant external factor, particularly for women, apart from the influence of the monks and nuns, and the alternative to marriage that is offered to women by a well-organised monastic order.\textsuperscript{107}

Cort’s (1991: 660) re-analysis of Goonasekere’s data reveals important changes in the marital status of the Terā Panth ascetics. Under Ācārya Bhikṣu (1760–1803) less than 10% of all mendicants were unmarried. However, between 1909 and 1944 all mendicants under Ācārya Kāḷū Rām and Ācārya Tūlsī were unmarried (women: 72.7%, men: 56 %). Similar increases in the share of unmarried women amongst the sādhvīs had already been observed by Shāntā (1985: 320, 336f., following Bordiyā 1975) for the Stānakavāsīs and the Kharatara Gaccha, and by Cort (1989b) amongst the Tapā Gaccha samudāyas. Cort (1991: 660)
rightly concludes that ‘P. S. Jaini’s (1979: 247, n. 8) statement that most Jain sādhvīs are widows needs to be qualified’.

The average age at the time of the initiation has also increased. It is today 18–19 years, compared to 15–16 years some sixty years ago. The significant increase of the age of initiation can be explained by Ācārya Tulsī’s reversal of Ācārya Kālū Rām’s preference for child initiations (bāla dīkṣā). Kālū Rām favoured child initiations in order to reduce the prevalence of widows in the order and to boost the overall number of mendicants. Tulsī, by contrast, was primarily interested in increasing the standard of education. The rising age of initiation is mainly a consequence of his decision to initiate only educated female candidates, given the overall trend towards the initiation of young unmarried women, who seem to prefer the relative independence of monastic life to marriage. One of the reasons for the creation of the samāṇa category was to give young women the opportunity to study and thus to qualify themselves for full mendicancy, which nowadays can only be entered by young females after some years as a novice. Usually, girls are not initiated before the age of 20. But there is no such arrangement for boys, who are generally less inclined to join mendicancy. They are trained after initiation.

Initiations of children from the age of 8 and initiations of 45–60 year olds are exceptions today, although they still take place.

Digambara

With the exception of very small traditions, such as the Tāraṇa Svāmī Panth, the Gūmāna Panth and the Totā Panth, the overwhelming majority of the Digambaras follow either the Terā Panth, the ‘path of thirteen’, or the Bīṣa Panth, the ‘path of twenty’ or both traditions in a non-discriminate manner. In contrast to the aniconic Śvetāmbara Terā Panth, the image-worshipping Digambara Terā Panth – both are also called Terā Panth – was originally not a tradition led by mendicants but a lay movement. It emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in North India in protest against the lax and ostentatious conduct of contemporary orange-clad ‘Bīṣa Panthī’ ascetics, the so-called bhāṭṭārakas, whose ‘modern’ monastic lineages evolved from those of the naked munis and increasingly replaced them from the thirteenth century onwards.

The precise significance of the distinction between Terā Panthīs and Bīṣa Panthīs is not known anymore. Nor do we know much about the history and organisation of the contemporary Digambara ascetics. Most writers associate the beginning of the Terā Panth movement either with Pāṇḍit Todaṃral (1719–1766), an influential Digambara layman of Jaypur, or with Banārṣidās (1586–1643), a merchant and co-founder (ādīgur) of the Adhyāṭma circle in Āgrā which drew on the mystical philosophy of Ācārya Kunda Kunda to inspire its own version of a non-ascetic lay religiosity that is oriented towards self-realisation through the direct meditative experience of the soul. Yet, the fundamental ideas of both the Adhyāṭma circle and the Terā Panth movement clearly antedated both Banārṣidās and Todaṃral. Lath (1981: xxxvi–vii), for instance, points to the influence of the revenue minister of
King Akbar, Rājā Ṭoḍarmal (died 1589) in Vārānasī and to his younger associate Bāṣū Śāh, who introduced Banārsidās to Digambara mysticism. Cort (2002: 63f.) emphasised the fact that ‘we cannot conclude that an interest in Digambar mysticism equates automatically with the Terah Panth emphasis on reforming the Digambar ritual culture’ (p. 66). It appears rather that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the trans-sectarian Adhyātmacirca in Āgrā and the more ritualistically oriented and more radically anti-bhaṭṭaraka Digambara Terah Panth movement around Jaypur constituted distinct though related lay movements, which became indistinguishable only with the waning of the influence of the Adhyātmacirca movement in the eighteenth century and the institutional consolidation of the Terah Panth through the construction of numerous temples in North India.

According to M. U. K. Jain (1975: 137f.), the radical anti-bhaṭṭaraka movement was started either in 1528 or in the early seventeenth century by Amar Cand, a resident of Sāṅganer near modern Jaypur. The movement first called itself Vidhi Mārga, though its opponents mocked it ‘Terah Panth’, the path of (only) thirteen. The second account is corroborated by Lath (1981: xxxix), who points to Amar Śīṅgh as the founder of the ‘Terah Panth’ movement in 1626. The most detailed investigation of the origin of the Terah Panth/Bīsa Panth distinction was undertaken by Nāthūrām Premī (1912, 1957), one of the main sources for M. U. K. Jain and Lath, who identified the oldest confirmed record of the word Terah Panth and of the year 1626 as its date of origin in Paṇḍit Bakhat Rām’s eighteenth century work Buddhivilās v. 631. He concluded, therefore, that the origin of the Terah Panth must be located in the early seventeenth century. In Premī’s (1912/n.d.: 22f.) assessment, the passage refers to the ritualistic Terah Panth and not to the Adhyātmacirca movement, as Cort (2002: 67) argues. Premī (1957) later recorded three versions of the origin of the Terah Panth in the literature of its opponents. All of these point to the pivotal role of the family of Amrā Bhaumāsū Godīkā of Sāṅganer: One version can be found in Bakhat Rām’s work Mithyātva Khaṇḍan Nāṭak of 1764, which describes how Amrā Bhaumāsū Godīkā was expelled from the congregation of the brahmacārī Amar Cand [sic!] because of his ostentatious display of wealth. In turn, he founded his own group which initially had only thirteen (terah) members and was therefore mocked as the ‘Terah Panth’. The group built a temple apparently with the help of a minister of the king of Amer. A second version is given in a poem called Kavitt Teraphankau by Cand Kavi. The poem describes how Jodhrāj Godīkā, the son of Amrā Bhaumāsū Godīkā, in 1618 – a date which Premī regards as fifty years too early – repeatedly interrupted the sermon of the visiting bhaṭṭaraka Narendrakirti of the Balātkāra Gaṇa Dilli-Jaypur Śākhā of Amer. He was then expelled and founded his own group on the basis of thirteen unreported principles. The third and oldest version goes back to Jodhrāj Godīkā himself who, in his 1667/1669 Hindī translation of Kunda Kunda’s Pravacanasūra, exploited the homonym of terah and terā by interpreting terah panth, ‘path of thirteen’, as terā panth, ‘your path’, that is, as another term for the ‘Jina’s path’ or the ‘right path’.

Hence, the Śvetāmbara Terā Panthī ascetics must have borrowed their own identical explanation of the
three possible meanings of their name from existing Digambara Terā Panth sources;\(^{120}\) though M. U. K. Jain (1975: 138) reports that N. Premī elsewhere expressed the view that the name terā panth only became current amongst the Digambaras after the founding of the Śvetāmbara ‘Terā Panth’ in 1760 – a view which may merely reflect the fact that Bakhat Rām’s works Mithyāṭva Khaṇḍan Nāṭak and Buddhivilās were composed in the year 1764 and 1770. None of the sources cited by Premī give a clear answer to the question of the significance of the numbers thirteen and twenty in terah panth and bīsa panth, which may indeed just reflect a superficial claim of superiority by the self-declared ‘Bīsa Panthīs’ ‘since the number 20 exceeds 13 by 7’ (Nathmal 1968: 7). The influential twentieth century Terā Panth paṇḍīt Phūlcand Śāstrī (1985b: 538), a born Parvār, could therefore take the liberty to identify the Terā Panth with the ‘orthodox Mūla Saṅgha of Kunda Kunda’ and the Bīsa Panth with the ‘heterodox Kāṣṭhā Saṅgha’;\(^{121}\) and also to associate the ‘pure line’ (suddhāmnāya) of the Parvār caste with the tradition of Kunda Kunda (ibid.: 536).\(^{122}\) Śāstrī could, of course, only identify the entire bhaṭṭāraka tradition with the Kāṣṭhā Saṅgha by disregarding the known history of the muni and bhaṭṭāraka traditions. However, many Terā Panthīs nowadays claim descent from the ‘orthodox’ Mūla Saṅgha and interpret the words terā panth as a designation of the ‘right path’ shown by the Jinas and Kunda Kunda.\(^{123}\) The words bīsa panth, ‘path of twenty’, is in turn polemically depicted as a corruption of viṣam panth, ‘irregular-’ or ‘poisonous path’ (Śāstrī 1985b: 538),\(^{124}\) or as a corruption of viśva panth, ‘universal path’ (Glasenapp 1925: 357 for both versions).

### Digambara Terā Panth

The Digambara Terā Panthīs are today guided by paṇḍīts, or lay intellectuals, who are associated with predominantly local religious trusts and temples. There is no unifying organisational framework. About 500–600 Terā Panth paṇḍīts exist in North India today with strongholds in Jaypur, Āgrā and Vārānasī. Most of them teach Jainism only part-time. Although they do respect ‘true’ Jain mendicants,\(^{125}\) the Terā Panthīs represent largely a temple-centred form of lay asceticism, whose main doctrinal inspirations derive more from the mystical writings of Ācārya Padmanandin, known as Kunda Kunda (Pkt. Koṇḍa Kunda), than from Bhūtabāli and Puspadanta for instance. Their following has recently split between those who accept Kāṇjī Svāmī’s (1889–1980) deterministic interpretation of Kunda Kunda’s teachings and those who do not.\(^{126}\) Two-thirds of today’s Digamaras\(^{127}\) are said to be Terā Panthīs,\(^{128}\) who are the predominant Digambara tradition in Rājāstān, Madhya Pradeś and Uttar Pradeś, while the Bīsa Panthīs dominate in Mahārāṣṭra, Karnātaka and Keralā, as well as in Tamil Nādu and Gujārāt where only few Digamaras are left\(^{129}\) apart from the followers of Kāṇjī Svāmī. The reasons for the differential distribution of Terā Panthīs and Bīsa Panthīs have not yet been studied, but there seems to be a clear correlation between caste membership and sectarian affiliation in North India, where, today, most Agravāls and Parvārs are Terā Panthīs and most Khaṇḍelvāls.
However, the majority of the Digambara laity does not consciously differentiate between Terā Panthīs and Bīsa Panthīs qua sectarian membership or following, and merely practises local Jain rituals and caste customs. The absence of deep-seated sectarian awareness amongst the Digambara laity in North India can be attributed to a number of factors: the extinction of the last North Indian bhattāraka seats in the early twentieth century, the revival of the doctrinally amorphous muni traditions, and the lack of organisation not only of the Terā Panthī, but of the Digambaras in general whose dearth of inspirational religious leaders in the nineteenth century resulted in the dominance of caste (jāti) identities amongst the local Digambara communities (samāj) in both North- and South India.

Another factor may have been the long-standing cultural influence of Terā Panthī practices on the Bīsa Panthīs in North India, whose rituals are less elaborate than those of the Bīsa Panthīs in the South.

**Bīsa Panthī**

In contrast to the Terā Panthīs, who practise a dry pūjā and reject the bhattārakas, the Bīsa Panthīs practise pūjā with flowers and fruits and support the bhattārakas, who continued the ascetic tradition after the decline of the muni in the late medieval period. The reconstruction of the organisational history of the Digambara ascetics is a difficult and not yet fully accomplished task. Carrithers (1990: 154) suspects that the current use of specific designations for monastic lineages or groups is largely fictitious since from the medieval period onwards no independently organised muni saṅghas existed besides the bhattārakas. One of the problems is the unclear contextual meaning of the lineage and group categories used by the Digambaras. Muni U. K. Jain (1975: 132) writes that ‘Units like Āmnāya, Anvaya, Bali, Samudāya, Saṅgha and Varṣa appear to be peculiar to the Digambara section’; though he does not fail to mention the common use of the terms gaṇa, gaccha, kula and śākhā in both the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara traditions. The difficulty in connecting the influence of the classical Digambara teachings of Umāsvāmi, Guṇadhara, Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabalī, on the one hand, and the mystical tradition of Kunda Kunda, on the other, with specific lines of succession is, at least in part, connected to the problem of clearly identifying enduring organisational units within the relatively unorganised Digambara ascetic lineages. It has only sporadically been observed that the doctrine of Kunda Kunda, who in old inscriptions is generally associated with the Nandi Saṅgha, was more prominent in the Māthura Gaccha and in certain factions of the Sena Gaṇa.

The nineteenth century paṭṭāvalīs of the Sarasvatī Gaccha (Balātkāra Gaṇa Uttara Śākhā), which were translated by Hoernle (1891, 1892), trace the origin of the lineages of the contemporary Digambara bhattārakas to a disciple of Ācārya Bhadrabāhu II, Guptigupta, who is also known under the names of Ardhabalī and Viśākhācārya. Ardhabalī is presented as the last pontiff who was able to keep the
monks (*muni*) of the originally undivided Mūla Saṅgha, or root community, together. When he was succeeded, apparently in the year 21 BCE, each of his four chief disciples – Māghanandin, Vṛṣabha called Jinasena, Śiṅha and Deva – took over one of the four sub-groups which subsequently developed into independent traditions: the Nandi, the Vṛṣabha- (Sena-), the Śiṅha- and the Deva Saṅgha. The oldest sources for this narrative are two inscriptions in Śravanabelagolō dated 1398 and 1432. The later inscription dates the group formation within the Mūla Saṅgha to the latter half of the eighth century. Schubring (2000: § 30, p. 63) pointed out the discrepancy between this account and references to a Mūla Saṅgha of a different internal composition of the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, and Dundas (2002: 122) concludes ‘that the Mūla Saṅgha gradually became little more than a prestigious but artificial designation, redolent of a long unattainable orthodoxy’.

For the early medieval periods four ‘heterodox’ Digambara traditions are attested to by Deva Sena’s tenth century polemical work Daṃsanasāra (Darśanasāra). The Drāviḍa-, Kaśthā-, Māthura- and the Yāpaniya- or Gopya Saṅgha. The four traditions are described as ‘heterodox’, because they differed on specific points of doctrine and practice from the ‘orthodox’ Mūla Saṅgha, which is not mentioned in the text because it was represented by Deva Sena himself (Schubring 2000: § 30, p. 63). The reported dates of origin of these traditions vary in the surviving manuscripts of the Darśanasāra. Hence, the Drāviḍa Saṅgha may have been founded either in 479 CE, 486 CE, or in 583 CE by Pūjya Pāda’s disciple Vajra Nandin in Madurā (Madurai) in South India. The reported reason was a disagreement within the Mūla Saṅgha over the eating of particular plants, bathing in cold water, practising agriculture and trade. The origins of the Kāśṭhā Saṅgha seem to go back to the seventh or eighth century CE. By the tenth century it was divided into four divisions: the Māthura Gaccha, Lāḍa Bāgaḍa/Lāṭa Vargaṭa Gaccha, Bāgada Gaccha and Nandi Taṭa Gaccha. The Yāpaniya Saṅgha – the only one of the four ‘heterodox’ traditions which is depicted as a non-Digambara tradition in the academic literature – originated apparently in 648 CE, in 59 CE, or in 148 CE.

In North India the most influential traditions were the Sena Gaṇa and the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa (Sarasvatī Gaccha) with its ten sub-divisions which were internally further sub-divided: Kaṭaṇḍa Śākha, Lāṭuṭa Śākha, Uttra Śākha, Īḍara Śākha, Bhāṇāpura Śākha, Surat Śākha, Jerahata Śākha, Dilli-Jaypur Śākha, Nāgaśūra Śākha and Aṭera Śākha. Both the Sena Gaṇa and the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa presented themselves as branches of the ‘orthodox’ Mūla Saṅgha in a direct line from Kunda Kunda (Padmanandin). However, the link appears to be a later construction. The currently available sources point to Ācārya Śrī Candra (r. 1013–1030) as the founder of the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa.

After the demise of the Yāpaniya- and the Drāviḍa Saṅgha in the late medieval period, merely a few branches of the Kāśṭhā Saṅgha – especially the Māthura Gaccha – and of the Sena Gaṇa, the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa and the Deśiya Gaṇa of the Mūla Saṅgha remained, and only some sections of the Sena Gaṇa and the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa survived until today. In the late medieval period the members of
most sub-branches of these traditions transformed themselves from naked munis to orange-clad bhattārakas with a relaxed code of conduct. These domesticated bhattārakas had only very few disciples, amongst them occasionally nuns (āryā), which may be the reason why the term yati is rarely used in the Digambara tradition. There is no reliable demographic information available on the bhattāraka traditions, but one can safely assume that the absolute number of both Digambara munis and yatis was very small during this period. In the first of his planned two volumes on the early bhattāraka traditions, Joharāpurkara (1958: 23) identified the names of only 400 bhattārakas and 165 disciples who were associated with 31 jātis and 200 place names in North India between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Bhattāraka traditions

The honorific title bhattāraka, ‘great lord’ or ‘learned man’, was given to prominent ācāryas and munis in the early medieval period (Premī 1912/n.d.: 3ff.). From the late medieval period onwards, the term came to designate the celibate heads of monasteries (maṭha) who observe a relaxed set of ascetic vows, which entitles them to wear clothes, to administer monastic property in the name of the saṅgha (private property is not permitted), to live permanently in one or more monastery, to use vehicles, to act as heads of the Jain communities and later of Jain castes, etc. To distinguish the two types of bhattārakas, the term paṭācārya is also used for the latter. Domesticated bhattārakas are not fully initiated mendicants, but occupy an intermediary status between the naked munis and the common laity. Technically, they are defined as ksullakas and classified together with the ordinary ksullakas and ailakas as ‘superior laymen’ (utkṛṣṭa śrāvaka) who accept to observe the eleventh śrāvaka pratimā, to different degrees, in contrast to the ‘basic’ (jaghanya) and the ‘intermediate’ (madhyam) laity, who must only observe the pratimās 1–6 and 1–9 respectively. In practice, jaghanya śrāvakas observe at best the first or dāršana pratimā, that is the stage of ‘right views’ combined with vegetarianism. The barah vratas or ‘twelve vows’ of the second or vrata pratimā are rarely formally accepted (in toto) by lay Jains, who are reluctant to impose lifelong (ājitvāna) vows upon themselves, except sometimes in old age. Similarly, the intermediate status is regarded as almost synonymous with the seventh or brahmacārya pratimā, the vow of sexual continence which is outwardly marked by wearing a white dress. The eleventh or uddiṣṭa tyāga pratimā, which should be practiced by bhattārakas, demands world-renunciation and the observance of a monastic lifestyle, including the begging of food. The uddiṣṭa tyāga pratimā is today sub-divided in the stages of the ksullaka and the ailaka. The ksullaka (f. ksullikā) or ‘junior’ (monk) gives up all but two (or three) pieces of cloth of orange colour, while the ailaka keeps only a loincloth (kaupīna). Both the ksullakas and ailakas are consecrated by a personal guru. At their dīkṣā they are both given the three possessions of a Digambara ascetic: peacock feather broom (piṅčī), scripture (sāstra) and water pot (kamaṇḍalu). In contrast to the ksullakas, who may reside with householders, the ailakas always stay with the munis, and should eat their food, like
the *munis*, with ‘one hand’, that is the two hands folded into one, but in a seated position. They also have to practice *kṣaṇa luṅcana*, or the ritual plucking of hair and beard, and silence at night, and are not permitted to use vehicles.\(^{186}\) For this reason *ailakas* are considered to be superior to *bhaṭṭārakas* although this is disputed some *bhaṭṭārakas* who as the descendants of the original *muni* tradition claim predominance even over the modern *munis* and perform a modified *muni* dikṣā.

The procedures of selection and the inauguration or *paṭṭābhiseka* ceremony of a *bhaṭṭāraka* are different from an ordinary *kṣullaka* dikṣā which usually precedes it. Nowadays, a *bhaṭṭāraka* is often not chosen by his predecessor, but by a *paṇcāyat* or by prominent members of the community, who judge the available candidates according to their attitude, conduct and knowledge. If no suitable successor, a *laghu-nandana* or ‘small son’ such as a *brahmaśīry* or *yati* under training\(^{187}\) with a good horoscope, is available, the *ācāryas* of the *muni* *saṅghas* are approached to recommend one of their *kṣullakas* or *ailakas* who could be persuaded to fill the position.\(^{188}\)

If a candidate is accepted by consensus, the *paṭṭābhiseka* is organised, in which a Digambara *muni* plays the role of the dikṣā-ḍātā or giver of initiation. The candidate first renounces his old clothes and his personal name\(^{189}\) in public and is then given a single orange dress and the traditional title of the occupier of the seat. After taking his vows (at least a lifelong *brahmaśīrya vrata*), he is blessed with *mantras* and by sprinkled water on his head and then presented with the principal insignia of a *bhaṭṭāraka* – a *piṇcīth* with a handle made out of silver or gold, an insignia ring, and a metal *kamandalu*. A *bhaṭṭāraka* also commands ceremonial elephants, litters (*meṇā*), and other symbols of worldly status. Generally, he does not keep money on his own nowadays, but leaves the financial assets of the *maṭha* in the hands of the lay trustees, who will cover all his expenses.\(^{190}\)

The tradition of domesticated *bhaṭṭārakas* evolved at the beginning of the thirteenth century under Muslim rule from the existing traditions of the naked *munis* who they replaced almost entirely until the revival of the *muni* tradition in the twentieth century. There are three accounts of its origin, all of which emphasise the pioneering role of the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa: The first account attributes the introduction of the custom of wearing clothes – symbolic of possessions in general – to Ācārya Vasant Kīrti (1174–1207) of the Uttara Śākhā of the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa, who died only one year after his accession to the seat in Ajmer. According to Śrūta Sāgar Śuri, he took the decision to cover himself with a sheet of cotton (*tattī-sādarā*) when going for alms in the village of Maṇḍapadurga (Māṇḍalagarh) in Rājasthān in reaction to the Muslim rulers’ criticism of the custom of walking naked in public.\(^{191}\) Other accounts locate the beginning of the practice in the time of Phīroz Śāh (1350–1387), the sultan of Delhi, who desired to meet the guru of the Digambaras.\(^{192}\) A *paṭṭāvālt* names the seventh *ācārya* of the Uttara Śākhā of the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa, the miracle working Padma Nandin (born 1318, r. 1328–1393),\(^{193}\) as the first *bhaṭṭāraka* who put on a loin cloth. It is said that the title of a *bhaṭṭāraka* was conferred on him by a Gujarāṭī *śrāvaka* who wanted him to consecrate a statue and in this way to transmit to it his miraculous powers (Hoernle 1891: 354). According to an oral tradition, the reason for putting on clothes was Padma Nandin’s acceptance of the request by
King Muhammad Ghôrî to present himself in a decent manner to his wife who desired to meet him (ibid.: 361).194

Under the impact of the Terā Panth reform movement in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most of the bhattachāraṇa seats in North India collapsed. The two last remaining seats in Rājasthān, Mahāvīrī and Prātarpur, were discontinued in the first and second half of the twentieth century respectively, due to the increasing influence of the ‘modern’ lay reform movements which criticised the bhattachāraṇa with arguments similar to those of the ‘protestant’195 Digambara reform movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.196 Only the southern bhattachāraṇa traditions of the ‘Mūla Saṅgha’ in Mahārāṣṭra (Sena Gaṇa: Kolhāpura, Nāndaṇī), Karṇāṭaka (Balātkārā Gaṇa: Hūmachā; Deśiya Gaṇa: Kambadahalli/ Nagamangala, Kanakagiri/Maleyur, Kārkala, Mūḍabidrī, Śravaṇabelagolā; Sena Gaṇa: Narasīhinharājapura) and Tamil Nādu (Sena Gaṇa: Melasittamāra (Arahatasugiri); Deśiya Gaṇa: Tiruvannamalai) survived. The institutional pillars of the present-day Bīsa Panth traditions, the twelve197 surviving bhattachāraṇa seats in Hūmachā,198 Kambadahalli, Kanakagiri, Kārkala,199 Kolhāpura,200 Melasittamāra,201 Mūḍabidrī,202 Nāndaṇī,203 Narasīhinharājapura,204 Śravaṇabelagolā,205 Sondā/Svādī and Tiruvannamalai are all located in the south, and closely connected with individual local castes.206 The cultivation of exclusive links with the members of specific Jain castes in South India was facilitated by the fact that many of them were founded by bhattachāraṇa,207 who protected and dominated them for centuries as their religious rulers, or rājāgurus, who exercised penitential powers. The bhattachāraṇa still initiate and excommunicate their followers and in some cases select their own successor, who is then installed by the members of the respective caste and cannot be removed during his lifetime.208 In the past, the bhattachāraṇa accumulated large assets in land and artwork and maintained an exclusive monopoly over the surviving manuscripts of the principal sacred scriptures of the Digambaras, the Kasāyapāhūda of Gunadharacārya and the Śatkhanda-gama of Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali, until copies were produced and smuggled out of the maṭha of Muḍabidrī in the early twentieth century.

The exclusivist orientation of the bhattachāraṇa towards the castes which they dominated and to the property of their saṅgha proved to be a major obstacle to the ambitions of Jain communalists to unify the Jain community on a national platform during the years of the freedom struggle in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Saṅgha reforms were imposed on the bhattachāraṇa by the laity, who also increasingly took control of the monastic property from the latter half of the nineteenth century onwards. Much of the landed property was recovered by the state governments through Land Reform Acts.209 As a consequence, the legal powers which the bhattachāraṇa once held over their followers have now completely disappeared. With the re-establishment of separately organised saṅghas of itinerant naked munis in the 1920s,210 who were predominantly recruited from the relatively impoverished agricultural Digambara castes of the Bogāras, Caturthas, Pañcamas and Saitavālas in northern Karṇāṭaka and southern Mahārāṣṭra, even the southern bhattachāraṇa lost much of their worldly and religious influence. They
have no disciples amongst the newly established lineages of 
munis and āryikās, who are independent and considered to be of a higher religious status. However, they are still consulted as arbiters for conflict resolution, and supervise the conduct of the upādhyāyas who conduct the temple rituals in southern India. It is due to the continuing influence of the bhaṭṭārakas on the social life of South Indian Jains that their castes tend to be homogenously ‘Jain’ and that the feeling of ‘Jain’ social identity, is more prevalent than in mixed Jain-Hindu castes.

The lack of credible mendicant leaders with a national reputation may explain why the desire for social and religious reform was at the time particularly strongly expressed by the Digambara laity in North India. Another factor was the aspiration of some community leaders to bridge the caste divisions, and the economic divide between the poor Digambara agriculturists in the South and the wealthy Digambara (and Śvetāmbara) merchants in the North. The revival of the munis came therefore just in time. The munis were promoted by the laity as symbols of Digambara unity on a national platform. Particularly the leading members of the Akhil Bhāratvarṣiya Digambara Jain Mahāsabhā and the Khaṇḍelvāla Mahāsabhā associated themselves closely with the new muni saṅgha. The reformist Akhil Bhāratvarṣiya Digambara Jain Pariṣad also supported the revival of the munis and the unity of all Digambaras, but advocated for social reforms in addition to the religious reforms which were promoted by the munis. The association was founded on the 22 January 1923 in Delhi by Champat Rāy Jain (1867–1942), Brahmacārī Sītal Prasad Jain (1879–1942) and other reformers from North India who had left the conservative Bhāratvarṣiya Digambara Jain Mahāsabhā, which was established in 1892 in Mathurā under Rāja Lākṣmāndās and supported by traditional bhaṭṭārakas and pandits, who resisted both the publication of the scriptures, and socio-religious reform movements amongst the Digambaras, such as the Dasa Pūjādhikāra Andolan, the Dasa’s Right to Worship Movement. Reportedly, some members of the Mahāsabhā even opposed the independence of the munis from the bhaṭṭārakas.

**History of the modern muni saṅgha**

The Digambara muni tradition never entirely disappeared, though for the nineteenth century the names of only a handful of munis are reported whose precise relationship, if any, with the bhaṭṭārakas is still not entirely clear. A Muni Nara Siṇha is reported to have visited the town of Dhāka with his disciple Muni Vinay Sāgar in 1870, and another muni is reported to have visited Jaypur. In South India, several munis lived away from larger settlements on hillsides and in caves, though reliable information on them is difficult to obtain. Amongst them was ‘Tapasvī’ Muni Candra Kirti, who was probably born in Guramanḍayā, but no detailed information on him is available. At the time, the only muni in North India was Candra Sāgar, who was born into the Padmasī family of the Hūmaḍ caste in Phalaṭan (Satārā). He took the ksullaka vow in 1912 in Jinappāsvāmī (Śolapur) and a few months later the mahāvrata in Jhālārāpāṭan and started to wander as a naked muni as far as Āgrā. Muni Anant Kirti was born in 1883 in Nellīkār (Kārakal) and died
untimely on 16 February 1918 in Gvāliyar where, in his memory, an eternal light (akhāṇḍa jyoti) is still maintained by his followers.\textsuperscript{222} In South India, three additional munis existed: Candra Sāgar ‘Manihali’, Sana Kumār, and Siddha Sāgar ‘Tervāl’ (1828–1903),\textsuperscript{223} who reportedly self-initiated himself in front of a statue at Sammet Śikhar. In 1921, one Muni Ānand Sāgar lived in Udaypur. It has been reported that he often visited the nearby shrine of Ṛṣabhdeva Keśāriyā.\textsuperscript{224}

Although the Digambara mendicants are not organised, most, but not all present-day munis trace their lines of descent to ‘Cārita Cakravarti’ Śānti Sāgar ‘Dakṣiṇ’ (1872–1955) – not to be confused with his namesake from North India: Muni Śānti Sāgar ‘Chāṇṭi’ (1888–1944) – who is regarded as having revived the institution of munis single-handedly from nearly complete eclipse’ (Carrithers 1989: 232). Śānti Sāgar was born on the 26 July 1872 (1929 Āśād Ṛṣṇa 6) in the village Aināpur-Bhoj in the Belgām District of Kānṭāṭaka. His original name was Gauḍā Pāṭil, and he belonged to a family of farmers of the Caturtha caste. When he was nine years old, he was married to a five year old bride, who died only seven months after the wedding. In 1890, he took the brahmacarya vow ‘in the presence of a muni’\textsuperscript{225} on 25 June 1915 (1972 Jyeṣṭḥ Śuklā 13), the kṣullaka vow from the Digambara ‘muni’ Devendra Kirt,\textsuperscript{226} in Utтарāgram, and in 1916 the ailaka vow from Muni Akalīk Svāmī (? = Ādi Sāgar ‘Akalīkār’), who lived on the Bāhubalī hill near Kumbhōj. He was finally initiated as a muni from another ‘nirgrantha muni’ on 4 March 1920 in Yarnāl (Yeranāl) in Kānṭāṭaka\textsuperscript{227} and recognised as an ācārya after the initiation of his first disciple, Muni Vīr Sāgar, on 9 October 1924 (1981 Āśvin Śuklā 11) in Sāṅglī. He initiated altogether 18 munis, kṣullakas, āryikas and kṣullikās, most of whom accompanied him on his barefoot journeys throughout India.

At the time, roaming naked in the streets of large cities was prohibited (berok-tok) by the Colonial Government (K. P. Jain 1938: 161f.). In British India and in the Indian princely states (riyāsat) wandering naked was an arrestable offence. The munis were therefore more numerous in southern India. In 1926, the Commissioner of Kāṭhiyāvāḍ gave permission for Muni Munidra Sāgar to move lawfully, if he was surrounded by a circle of his devotees, though this restriction was opposed by the Akhil Bhāratiya Jaina Samāj, and a committee was formed to repel it with the argument that according to both British and a Indian law, neither the government nor any other ruler or sampradāya should interfere in the religious affairs of a particular tradition.\textsuperscript{228} When Ācārya Śānti Sāgar entered Bombay in 1927, the case was still pending. He therefore had to transgress the rule of wandering naked (nagna muni vihāra) and to cover his body during his visit to the city (Kāsalīvāl 1992: 35). On the request of the local Seth Ghāśīrām Pūnamcand Jauharī, he then lead a communal pilgrimage to the sacred sites of the Digambaras throughout India, to re-establish for the Digambara munis the right to roam naked and uninhibited by provincial boundaries, and to revive the ‘true’ Digambara religion.\textsuperscript{229} On his tour, he was welcomed by the provincial kings of Mahārāṣṭra. In the year 1927–1928, he led the pilgrimage from Bhopāl to the mahā sammelan of Digambara munis at Mount Śikhar in Bihār;\textsuperscript{230} and on to Jabalpur, Lakhnāū, Kānpur, Jhāmī, Āgrā, Dhaulapur, Mathurā,
Phirozabād, Ẹtā, Hātharas, Aligarh, Hāstimapur, Muzapharnagar, etc. to Delhi, where he spent cāturmāsa. He was famously stopped by the police in Delhi for breaking the law by walking naked, but was pardoned because he refused to move from the spot where he was stopped, asking: ‘how can I walk back?’ After cāturmāsa, he went on to Alavar for a sammelan of all existing sādhu gaṇas, that is, the groups of ascetics which performed mainly jñāna-dhāyaṇa and tapas rather than the rituals promoted by the bhaṭṭārakas, though rituals were not rejected per se. The following six Digambara mendicant groups (saṅgha) were present (K. P. Jain 1932: 161f):

1. Ācārya Śānti Sāgara ‘Dakṣin’, with the muni Candra Sāgara, Śrut Sāgara, Vīr Sāgara, Nami Sāgara and Jñān Sāgara (6 muni altogether).

2. Muni [Ācārya] Śānti Sāgara ‘Chāṇi’, with Muni Malli Sāgara, Brahmacārī Phataḥ Sāgara, and Brahmacārī Lakṣmī Cand (2 muni altogether). Śānti Sāgara ‘Chāṇi’ was born as Kevaldas Jain into a family of the Dasa Humaḍ caste in the village Chāṇi, some 15 km from Rśabhdev Keśariyā in the state of Udyapur. He took the brahmacāraya vrata on 1 January 1919 at Sammet Sīkhara, and a few months later, with permission of the lay community of Gaṛhi in Ṛjaṇasthān, initiated himself as kṣullaka under the name Śānti Sāgara in front of the image of ‘Bhagavān Jīnendradeva’ (due to the absence of muni in North India). On 5 September 1922 (anant caturdāṣṭ) in the Ādīnāth temple of Sāgavāra he started ‘to wear the dress of a Digambara muni’ (Digambara veṣa dhāraṇa). In 1926, he was installed as an ācārya by the Digambara community of Giridīha. He converted Ṭhākur Kūrasiṅha of Bhukhiyā (Bāṁsavārā) to Jainism, but had fewer disciples than his counterpart in the south.231

3. Muni Sūrya Sāgara (9 November 1883 to 14 September 1952), with Ajit Sāgara, Dharma Sāgara and Brahmacārī Bhagavān Dās (3 muni altogether). Sūrya Sāgara’s birthname was Hajārimal and he belonged to the Porvā caste of Jhāḷārāpātan. In 1916 his wife died. He was initiated by Śānti Sāgara ‘Chāṇi’ first as a kṣullaka on the 19 October 1924 in Indore and a few weeks later as a muni on the 22 December 1924. In 1928 he was given the ācārya title from the samāy. He initiated at least four male ascetics: Ācārya Vijay Sāgara, Muni Ānand Sāgara, Muni Padma Sāgara, and Kṣullaka Cidānanda.232

4. ‘Muni’[Ācārya] Ādi Sāgara, (13 September 1866 to 21 October 1944) with Muni Malli Sāgara and Kṣullaka Sūri Śīnha. ‘Mahātaptav’ Ādi Sāgara ‘Ankalikar’ was born in the village Ankalī in southern Mahārāṣṭra. He belonged to the Caturtha caste and was named Śīv Gaurā by his parents. In 1909 he took the kṣullaka vow, and in 1913 initiated himself in front of the Jīnendra image at Kunthalgiri. He died in 1944 in the village Ud (Kāsālīvāl 1992: 35, Suśilā Bāi, in Brahmacārīni Mainābāi Jain 1996: iv–x). In the year 1926, his group stayed at Udgāṁv (3 muni altogether).

5. Muni Munāḍra Sāgara, with the muni Devendra Sāgara and Vijay Sāgara. Munāḍra Sāgara was born in Lalitpur into the Parvār caste. He was very young in 1927 and spent his previous cāturmāsa in Māṁdvi (Surat) (3 muni altogether).

6. Muni Pāy Sāgara, who restricted his movements to South India (1 muni).
In addition, Muni Jñān Sāgar of Khairābād and Muni Ānand Sāgar (and possibly others for which no record is available at the moment) belonged to the Digambara sādhu gana. These 21 mendicants were the only naked munis who performed vihāra at the time.

It seems, though this is a question for further research, that of these six groups only the lineages of Śānti Sāgar ‘Dakṣin’, Śānti Sāgar ‘Chāṇi’, and of Muni Ādi Sāgar ‘Ānkalikar’ survived. In accordance with the general tendency amongst modern Jains to present a homogenous image of the Jaina community to the outside world, it is often said that doctrinal disagreements are not significant within the tradition of the modern munis, only minor differences in lineage and succession. There is, indeed, no clear doctrinal division between the acārya saṅghas with regard to the Terā Panth/Bīsa Panth distinction concerning the latter’s use of green vegetables, fruit, worship with lamps (dṭpā pūjā) or incense (dhupa), etc. Effectively, each ascetic follows his own interpretation. However, Ācārya Śānti Sāgar ‘Chāṇi’ was known for his rejection of the pañca abhiṣeka ritual because it is conducted with milk. Instead he advocated for the use of ‘pure’ water in abhiṣeka rituals. He spent one cāturmāsa together with Śānti Sāgar ‘Dakṣin’ in Byāvar, where differences of opinion emerged, since Śānti Sāgar ‘Dakṣin’ insisted on the Bīsa Panthi view. Śānti Sāgar ‘Chāṇi’s main line of succession is represented by the acāryas Sūrya Sāgar (1883–1952), Vijay Sāgar, Vimal Sāgar (Bhinḍa) (1891–1973), Sumati Sāgar (1917–1994), and Upāḍhyāya Jñān Sāgar (b. 1957). However, a number of splits occurred due to succession disputes, and several guru-śisya paramparās exist today.

Doctrinal disagreements were also instrumental for the schisms between the successors of Śānti Sāgar ‘Dakṣin’, who after his death on the 20 August 1955 (2012 Bhāḍrapad Śukla 2) in Kunthalgiri split into five independent lineages. Four lines were started by Śānti Sāgar’s disciples Ācārya Nami Sāgar (1888–1956), Ācārya Pāy Sāgar (1890–1956), Ācārya Sudharma Sāgar (1885–1938) and Ācārya Kunthu Sāgar (1894–1945). However, the dominant line of his successors (paṭṭadhāra or paṭṭādhiśā) is represented by the acāryas Vīr Sāgar (born 7 June 1876, kṣullaka 13 March 1924, muni 9 October 1924, acārya 9 September 1955, died 23 September 1957), Śiv Sāgar (born 1901, dīkṣā 7 July 1949, acārya 3 November 1957, died 18 March 1969), Dharma Sāgar (born 11 January 1914, dīkṣā 13 December 1951, acārya 24 June 1969, died 22 April 1987), Ajit Sāgar (died 1988), and the present acārya Vardhamān Sāgar (dīkṣā 24 February 1969), who was chosen by Ajit Sāgar, though the older and much more popular monk Abhinandan Sāgar (dīkṣā 29 October 1968) was favoured by the majority of the lay followers. After Ajit Sāgar’s death, Abhinandan Sāgar and his teacher Śreyāṁś Sāgar therefore separated themselves from Vardhamān Sāgar and founded their own group which is now headed by Ācārya Abhinandan Sāgar.

A third influential line was started by Ācārya Vīr Sāgar’s disciple Muni Jñān Sāgar (c.1891–1 June 1973), a Khaṇḍelvāla (Chābṛā) Jain from Sikar, previously known as the Terā Panth Paṇḍit Bhūrāmal Śāstrī and from 1955 as Kṣullaka Jñānabhūṣaṇ (dīkṣā dātā: Ācārya Vīr Sāgar). He was initiated as a muni
in 1959 in Jaypur by Ācārya Śiv Śāgār but seceded on doctrinal grounds from Śiv Śāgār and his dedicated successor Dharma Śāgār, in 1961 and – though not being recognised as an ācārya – initiated Vidyā Śāgār (dtīṣṭā 30 June 1968) in the same Samvat year in Ajmer. In turn, he was installed as an ācārya by his disciple with the consent of his lay followers on the 7 February 1969 in Nasīrābād and immediately afterwards initiated Muni Vivek Śāgār (dtīṣṭā 7 February 1969 or 8 March 1969). Vidyā Śāgār was born on the 10 October 1946 into a middle-class Aṣṭāge family of the Caturtha caste in the village Cikkođi-Sadalğa in Belgārīv.238 He took the brahmacārya vow from Ācārya Deś Bhūṣaṇ in 1967, and muni dtīṣṭā from Ācārya Jñān Śāgār, who appointed him as the new ācārya on the 22 November 1972 in Nasīrābād, and immediately afterwards resigned and asked Vidyā Śāgār to bestow upon him the sallekhanā vow (M. Jain 2001: 23–26, 494, K. R. Jain 2003: 23–52). After Jñān Śāgār’s death in 1973, Vivek Śāgār parted company from Vidyā Śāgār, apparently because the charismatic Vidyā Śāgār was junior to him in physical age, although slightly older in monastic age. But the main reason may have been doctrinal differences. In the group of Vidyā Śāgār, āryikās cannot initiate ailakas, on behalf of the ācārya, on the grounds that the ailakas wear only one piece of cloth and therefore deserve a higher status than the āryikās, who cover their entire body.239 This reversal of the traditional hierarchy – muni, āryikā, ailaka, kṣūlaka, kṣullikā – was a main point of contention between Jñān Śāgār and Ācārya Śiv Śāgār.240 Other disputes concerned the consumption of ‘green’ vegetables such as tomatoes, and Jñān Śāgār’s refusal to condemn the use of the sacred thread, which is common among the Digambara laity in South India but not practiced north of Karṇātaka, which prevented him to become installed as an ācārya by Śiv Śāgār. Vidyā Śāgār additionally resolved that āryikās should not wear the piṇḍht, the principal status symbol of a Digambara ascetic, during their menses, and that only ‘born Jainas’ should be able to become munis. The highest status for renouncers from non-Jain families amongst his followers is thus the position of an ailaka in his group.241

A fourth line was started by Ādi Śāgār ‘Ānikalikan’, who was a contemporary of Śānti Śāgār ‘Dakṣin’, and is often presented as his disciple, despite the fact that he was not initiated by him.242 He was succeeded by Mahāvīr Kīrti (born 1 June 1910, dtīṣṭā 1937, died 6 February 1972) and Vimal Śāgār (born 30 October 1915, dtīṣṭā 19 July 1950, ācārya 24 December 1961), who apparently gained the ācārya title not through succession but by acclamation of the lay community, especially by the pāṇḍīts Lālā Rām Śāstrī and Māṇik Candra Śāstrī.243 Both Mahāvīr Kīrti and Vimal Śāgār were succeeded by a great number of ācāryas who created numerous small groups.245 Vimal Śāgār’s successors were Ācārya Sanmati Śāgār (born 26 January 1939, dtīṣṭā 9 November 1962, ācārya 5 March 1972), and the current ācāryas Bharat Śāgār (born 7 April 1949, dtīṣṭā 23 November 1972) (who was Vimal Śāgār’s upādhyāya).247 Puṣpadanta Śāgār (born 1 July 1952, dtīṣṭā 31 January 1980) (who shifted from Vidyā Śāgār to Vimal Śāgār and teaches an idiosyncratic mixture of Terā Panth and Bīṣa Panth views), Nirmal Śāgār (born 10 December 1946, dtīṣṭā 12 July 1967), Sanmati Śāgār

351
‘Tapasvi Samrati’, Vasu Pujya Sagar, Virag Sagar, as well as Muni Niranjan Sagar, Ganiini Vijay Mati, the kṣullakas Dhaval Sagar, Ratna Kirti, and the kṣullika Siddhanta Mati (A. Jain 2001: 1–34). Amongst Mahavir Kirti’s successors were the present acarya Sambhav Sagar and the present ‘gaṇadharacarya’ Kunthu Sagar, who initiated many disciples under new names ending in the suffix -nandī.

Some of his disciples parted from him in order to establish themselves as acaryas, acaryakalpas, upadhyayas and munis in their own right – to name only the present acaryas Deva Nandi, Gunadhara Nandi, Gunu Nandi, Gupti Nandi, Kanak Nandi, Karma Vijay Nandi (‘= self-initiated), Karunā Sāgar, and Kumud Nandi, Kuśagra Nandi, Padma Nandi, Śanti Sāgar ‘Korasar Vāle’, the acaryakalpas Karunā Nandi and Śruta Nandi, the aīlacarya Niścay Sāgar, and the upādhyāyas Kāma Kumār Nandi Śruta Sāgar. Ācarya Deś Bhūṣan (1908–1987), the politically most influential Digambara muni after Śantī Sāgar, was a disciple of Ācarya Jay Kirti, who may have been associated with Mahāvīr Kirti, though the link is not clear.248 He is succeeded by the presently influential acarya Vidyānand ‘Rāṣtrasat’ (born 22 April 1925), who also comes from Belgānīv but has few disciples and resides predominantly in New Delhi, by Ācarya Bāhubali Sāgar, who separated himself from Vidyānand and by Ācarya Subāhu Sāgar, Ācarya Subal Sāgar, Muni Guṇ Bhūṣan, Ṛṣikā Vṛṣabha Sena, and Kṣullika Anant Mati (ibid.).

In 1981, 151 mendicants and representatives of the national Digambara lay associations gathered in Śravānabelagolā in order to witness the mahāmasta-kābhīṣekā ceremony and to overcome the differences between the growing number of Digambara ascetics and lineages by establishing a common institutional framework for the mendicants – the Digambara Jain Muni Pariṣad. Several rules were drafted with the intention of preventing the practice of wandering alone (ekala vihāra) and a decline in the standards of conduct (sīṭhīlācāra). But these resolutions were not implemented and had no effect (Kāsalivīl 1992: 24).

Though there are no clear-cut divisions among the munis with regard to political-ideological and doctrinal orientations, conservative Bisa Panthi munis tend to support the Mahāsabhā, while modern monks such as Ācārya Vidyānand and Ācārya Vidyā Sāgar associate themselves with the Mahāsamiti whose wealthy leadership has a wider support base in North India and tends to support Terā Panth views. The main catalyst for the recent trend towards a conscious doctrinal self-demarcation of Bisa Panthi and Terā Panthi mendicant groups was the debate on Kāṇṭi Svāmī’s idiosyncratic ‘Terā Panth’ interpretation of Kunda Kunda’s philosophy from the early 1960s onwards, which split the Digambaras into two clearly distinguished factions.249 Beyond the specific context of this dispute, the picture is less clear. There is no exclusive link between Kunda Kunda and the Terā Panth tradition. In the late twentieth century, the Terā Panth pandit Phulcand Sāstrī (1985b: 244, 1992: 146) came to the conclusion that the Terā Panth is identical with the sūddhāṃmya, the ‘pure tradition’ of the Mūla Saṅgha Kundakundāṃnaya Balātkāra Gaṇa Sarasvati Gaccha,250 which propagates the mokṣa mārga and not – like the Bisa Panthī bhāṭṭārakas (‘= Kaṭhā Saṅgha’) – the ways of living a religious life in the world (samsāra). The same claim had already been made at the beginning of the
century by the Bīṣa Panthī ācārya Śānti Sāgar ‘Dakṣīṅ’ who, somewhat imagi-
natively, attributed himself to the line of the ‘Mūla Saṅgha’ Kundakundāṁmayā
Nandi Saṅgha Balāṭkārā Gaṇa Sarasvatī Gaccha (Jñān Maṭī 1980: 249) – which
may have inspired Phūcand Śāstri’s view. Although few details about his life are
known, Ācārya Kunda Kunda (c.1–8 CE) is currently regarded by all contempo-
rary Digambara munis as their ancestor.253 According to Anupam Jain,254 all munis
derive their descent from the lineage of Kunda Kunda and Ācārya Śānti Sāgar.255
However, although the majority belongs to the lineage of Śānti Sāgar ‘Dakṣīṅ’ and
propagates southern, that is Bīṣa Panthī, practices, a minority descends from Śānti
Sāgar ‘Chāṇi’, who rejected the Bīṣa Panthī paṇca abhiṣeka and devī pūjā rituals,
and from Ādi Sāgar ‘Āṅkalikar’.

After the recent death of the influential Ācārya Vimal Sāgar (born 1915), the most
prominent ācāryas of today are Vidyānand (born 1925), who took the twelve year
long sallekhana vow in 1999, and the charismatic Vidyā Sāgar. Vidyā Sāgar is
renowned and respected for his strict observance of the rules of the Digambara
Āgamas, and for his emphasis on Jain philosophy rather than on rituals and imposed
vows; especially for his single-handed revival of the study of the Śāṭkhaṇḍāgama.
He explicitly favours the Terā Panth view on rituals and speaks out both against
the bhattārakas (first on 8 November 1998),256 and against the followers of the
Kāṇṭi Panth. Like his guru, Jñān Sāgar, who did not express any objections to the
bhattārakas, he also favours the mystical teachings of Kunda Kunda. In contrast to
his late rival, the ritualistically oriented Ācārya Vimal Sāgar, who was from a
Khaṇḍelvāl business class background and supported the Mahāsabhā, Vidyā Sāgar
comes from a South Indian merchant family of modest income and favours the ‘lib-
eral’ Digambara Mahāsāmātī and the Digambara Pariśad which promote both ritual
and social reforms.257 He explicitly propagates the recognition of the Jains as a
‘minority’ community, which is now supported by most Digambaras, particularly in
the South, where they form homogeneous Jain castes. The North Indian Śvētāmbaras
and Digambaras, especially those from Gujarāt and Rājāsthān, are traditionally self-
employed merchants and wealthier than the southern Digambara agriculturalists
and petty traders whose preferred route of social advancement tends to be govern-
ment service. They form predominately mixed Jain–Hindu castes and tend to oppose
the minority status for Jains.258 Vidyā Sāgar is also a strong supporter of the cow pro-
tection movement and inspired the formation of a lay organisation called Ahimsā
Army which is based in Delhi and works for a total ban on the slaughter of cows in
India.259 It is possible that the North Indian cultural environment has influenced
Vidyā Sāgar’s change of attitude towards the bhattārakas and the Bīṣa Panthī trad-
ition in general. He was born in Kamāṭaka, but recruited most of his disciples in the
North, particularly in Madhya Pradeś, where he spends most of his time.

With the notable exception of the strictly anti-monastic Kāṇṭi Panth, the revived
muni traditions are today respected both by the Terā Panthī pāṇḍits260 and by the Bīṣa
Panthī bhattārakas, though the contact of the munis with either of them is irregular.261
In fact, the majority of the present-day mendicants attach themselves neither to the
Bīṣa Panthī nor the Terā Panthī Digambara tradition, but act independently and are

353
free to articulate their individual doctrinal interpretations. The widely held view that Digambara ascetics always preferred to impress people ‘more by their behaviour than by their church organisation’ and ‘seemed to favour solitary life’ (Deo 1956: 360f.) indirectly supports the claims of the modern muni that they are the revivers of the authentic form of Jain monasticism that was introduced by Mahāvīra himself. However, although the Digambaras did not, like the Śvetāmbaras, create elaborate monastic codes of conduct, their ācāryas and later their bhāṭṭārakas presided over mathas, or monasteries, which were highly organised manifestations of monastic landlordism. It was monastic property rather than a code of conduct which stabilised the tradition. The long-standing organisational and numerical weakness of the Digambara mendicants from the beginning of Muslim rule may thus be related to the relative success of the bhāṭṭārakas as well as the educated laity, whose influence within the Digambara community is reflected in the extensive post-canonical Digambara Śrāvakācāra literature, which is partly written by lay intellectuals: ‘Digambars seem to have felt more keenly than the Śvetāmbaras the need to concretize and systematize the lay doctrine’ (Williams 1983: xviii). The strength of the Digambara laity over the last 500 years also explains the leading role of Digambara intellectuals within the twentieth century Jain reform movement. Yet, the increasing influence of the scholars amongst the modern muni seems to displace the communal role of the lay intellectual for the time being.

Organisation of the muni saṅgha

Since the demise of the Drāviḍa Saṅgha and other regional traditions, and with the ascendancy of the bhāṭṭārakas who profess to continue some of these traditions even today, Digambara mendicants are not split into distinct schools and sects anymore. Amongst modern muni the popular suffix -nandī or -sāgar does not indicate sectarian affiliation, only lineage affiliation. Not much is known about the doctrinal and organisational differences between the lineages. Maybe by using these suffixes some modern muni attempt to recapture the symbolic identities (and properties) of old bhāṭṭāraka lineages which are now extinct. But our empirical knowledge of Digambara history and sociology is presently not sufficient to answer this question. The lack of a reliable demographic survey of the contemporary Digambara ascetics was lamented by Carrithers (1989), who encountered great difficulties in his attempt to piece together a reasonably accurate ethnographic picture of the Digambara mendicants: ‘The muni as I met them are significantly different from their predecessors, especially those in the nineteenth century. Muni are few. They have no central organisation and it is difficult to gather even the most elementary census data concerning them. Jaini (1979: 247, n. 8) estimated that there were only sixty-five muni when he was writing, and another sixty novices. An unattributable Hindi newspaper cutting shown to me by the muni Vidyānandaji Mahārāj in 1984 estimated the number of muni at 100. These numbers have to be understood in relation to the number of Digambara laity. The 1981 Census of India returned about three and a quarter million Jains of
whom Jaini estimates a third to be Digambar. On that estimate there is one *muni* for every 11 or 12 thousand Digambars’ (ibid.: 221).

According to the information on individual ascetics made available by B. U. Jain, the Digambara mendicants were 1987–1996 split into some 175 independent groups, including ascetics who wander alone. But B. U. Jain’s figures on the Digambara ascetics are, in his own judgement, unreliable and inconsistent, due to insufficient self-reporting by the Digambara monks. Often, for instance, only the leader of an itinerant group is mentioned and not the total number of group members, which was simply estimated by B. U. Jain (1999: 382, n. 1–7) in his summary figures. However, his lists give some idea of the structure of the Digambara mendicant groups in the decade before the turn of the millennium and a rough estimate of the overall number of ascetics.

A more precise annual *cāturmāśa* list, the Digambara Jain Sādhu-Sādhvīyom ke Varṣayoga kī Śucī, was compiled for the first time for the year 2000 by A. Jain of the Tirthāṅkara Rṣabhadēva Jaina Vīdvanta Mahāśaṅgha in order to provide information for the laity ‘who want to contact different *saṅghas*’ (Letter 25 September 2002). The categories he used to compile complete alphabetical lists of groups (*saṅgha*), names (śādhu/sādhvī, etc.), initiating monks (*ātikṣā guru*), and addresses of the monsoon retreats (*cāturmāśa sthāl evaṁ sampark śūtra*) of the Digambara mendicants in the years 2000 and 2001, confirm that the Digambaras effectively treat both nuns (*āryikā*) and novices who observe the eleventh *śrāvaka pratimā* – *aṅkālas*, *kṣullakas*, and *kṣullikās* – as members of the ascetic community. The change of status is indicated by the changes of the name at the *kṣullaka/kṣullikā dīkṣā* and the *muni dīkṣā*. *Brahmacārī* and *brahmacāriṇī* are not listed in the almanacs of A. Jain and B. U. Jain, because

### Table 12.8 Digambara ascetics in 2000 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Number of groups</th>
<th>Male members</th>
<th>Female members</th>
<th>All members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ācārya</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ācāryakalpa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ailācārya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bālācārya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upādhyāya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muni</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganiṅ Āryikā</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āryikā</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ailaka</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kṣullaka</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kṣullikā</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

they are considered to be lay ascetics, although they sometimes accompany the wandering ascetics like novices. According to B. U. Jain (2002: 312), there are more than 100 brahmācārīs and 300 brahmācārīnīs today amongst the disciples of Vidyā Sāgar alone, and some, though very few, are still under the command of the bhatārakas.

Table 12.8 summarises the data published by A. Jain in 2000–2001. The ranking of the monastic positions (pada) adopted by A. Jain indicates that the status of āryikās is generally considered to be higher than the status of ailakas and ksullakas. The status categories ācāryakalpa, ailācārya and bālācārya designate the most disciplined and learned munis and the chosen successor of an ācārya, whom he will consult in all important matters regarding the saṅgha. With or without the official permission of an ācārya, members of all categories can form their own groups (saṅgha), which may comprise members from all lower status categories.

There is only one ācārya in every saṅgha. A Digambara ācārya acts independently. He either wanders alone or forms his own ascetic group (saṅgha), which usually includes munis, āryikās, ksullakas, ksullikās and sometimes one or two ailakas. In 2001, of altogether 51 ācāryas, 14 ācāryas wandered alone and 37 lead small groups of 2–25 ascetics. Of the 37 group leaders, 5 wandered with only one other muni, 2 with one āryikā, 18 led small groups of up to 9 male and/or female ascetics, and only 12 formed groups with 10 or more members (A. Jain 2001: 1–11).

For practical reasons, larger groups are usually sub-divided into smaller units of itinerant ascetics. Even if they belong to the saṅgha of one and the same ācārya, most munis roam alone or in small bands of 2–5 male mendicants who spend their cāturmāsa together in one place. Āryikās, however, should never wander alone and travel always in company of laity. Sometimes they can be found in pairs, or they form larger groups of 4–20 nuns who wander together independently of the monks. However, in most saṅghas the members of the central group surrounding the ācārya are of mixed gender, and the male and female sub-groups travel and assemble together in public. They also stay at the same location for cāturmāsa, but reside in different buildings. In the year 2001, for instance, only 13 of the 37 groups that were led by ācāryas were composed entirely of men – notably the groups of the popular ācāryas Kunthu Sāgar and Vidyā Sāgar (A. Jain 2001: 1–11).

The large and centrally organised group of Ācārya Vidyā Sāgar is exceptional amongst the contemporary Digambara saṅghas because of its size and influence. In the year 2001, 20.8% of all Digambara mendicants were under the control of Vidyā Sāgar. Uniquely, the structure and demographic composition of Vidyā Sāgar’s group in the years 2000–2002 can be precisely reconstructed from the accounts of A. Jain (2000b, 2001) and of B. U. Jain (2002: 309–12), who received comprehensive information for this particular Digambara saṅgha in the year 2002. Despite its exceptional status, the Vidyāsāgara Saṅgha can serve as a paradigmatic example for the organisation of contemporary Digambara mendicant groups in general. From the year 1999 onwards, B. U. Jain’s demographic figures for this saṅgha are said to be reliable (B. U. Jain 1996: 323, 1999: 372, n. 2). They show that in 1999 Vidyā Sāgar had 190 disciples and more than 50
and 150 brahmacārints (commonly called didts: elder sisters) under his personal command, although the figures do not exactly correspond to the self-reported number of 195 members in 1999 (62 munis, 10 ailakas, 114 āryikās, 9 kṣullakas) (Tönyá 1999: 8). For 2001, the figure of 188 members (63 munis, 10 ailakas, 113 āryikās and 2 kṣullakas) is reported by A. Jain (2001: 9–34). Because of the rapidly increasing membership of this group, the mendicants were distributed into 26 different sub-groups in 1996, 34 in 1999, and 44 in 2001, as reflected in the number of cāturmāsa residencies.

In the year 2002, the group had 183 members which were divided into 42 groups: 64 munis, 109 āryikās, 8 ailakas and 2 kṣullakas (there are presently no kṣullikās in Vidyā Sāgar’s saṅgha). The munis were divided in seventeen units. The majority (37) stayed together with Ācārya Vidyā Sāgar, 9 munis formed groups of three, 10 munis groups of two and 7 wandered alone. The 3 kṣullakas and 6 of the 8 ailakas – which are considered to be superior to the āryikās in Vidyā Sāgar’s order – wandered alone. The āryikās were divided into 16 groups of 2–17 members, who roamed independently from the male mendicants. Male and female mendicants never wander together or spend cāturmāsa at the same location in order to maintain the reputation of this saṅgha for strict standards of conduct (B. U. Jain 2002: 312).

Due to the large number of sub-units, the saṅgha commanded a vast geographical sphere of influence, covering Madhya Pradeś (20 sub-divisions), Mahārāṣṭra (5), Rājasthān (4), Hariyānā (2), Uttar Pradeś (1) and Kānṭātaka (1). At the same time, almost half of all munis and half of all āryikās spent cāturmāsa together in one single location in Madhya Pradeś and Mahārāṣṭra respectively. These states are the two main recruitment areas for the Vidyā Sāgar Saṅgha. With few exceptions, all disciples of Ācārya Vidyā Sāgar come from Mahārāṣṭra, Madhya Pradeś and Uttar Pradeś, although he himself was born in Kānṭātaka. Similar patterns of a nationwide mission starting from a regional base can be observed amongst the Śvetāmbara Terā Panthīs and amongst other contemporary Jain orders.

As a rule, all Digambara ascetics associated with the muni saṅgha are initiated by an ācārya or with his permission. Indeed, all members of the Vidyāsāgara Saṅgha today have been initiated by Vidyā Sāgar himself. Āryikās are also by rule always initiated by an ācārya and should never constitute entirely autonomous orders, although they do not always move around with the munis. Within a saṅgha led by an ācārya the munis and āryikās remain under the control of the ācārya who initiated them. However, though a gaṇint has a lower status than a muni, under certain circumstances an ācārya will appoint a qualified nun as the leader of all the āryikās in his saṅgha, while the munis remain always under the direct control of the ācārya. As amongst most Śvetāmbara orders, in the absence of an ācārya, the head of the āryikā gaṇa, the gaṇint, will act like an ācārya for the āryikās.

Sometimes, gaṇint or āryikās are given permission by the ācārya to initiate their own female disciples. The lists of A. Jain for the year 2001 show that 4 gaṇintas had initiated altogether 16 āryikās and 4 kṣullikās, and 4 āryikās initiated altogether 8 āryikās. There are evidently also male ascetics who performed
The monastic names of the āryikās always have the double suffix -matī màtā at the end. The ganinitis are called ganiniti āryikā īrī [name] mati màtā jī. The ganinit pramukha Āryikā Jñān Matî and her namesake Āryikā Jñān Matî (Gujarāt), have each one kṣullaka amongst their disciples. However, the kṣullakas were not initiated by the āryikās themselves but by Ācārya Vimal Sāgar and by Ācārya Ajit Sāgar respectively. According to Shāntā (1985: 514f.) and Balbir (1990: 182f.), the prominent Āryikā Jñān Matî (born 19 October 1933) was initiated by the late Ācārya Deś Bhūṣan. However, D. Sāstrī (1985: 150) points out that only her kṣullika dīkṣā was performed by Deś Bhūṣan in 1953, but her āryikā dīkṣā by Ācārya Vīr Sāgar in 1956. After his death, Jñān Matî was associated with the late Ācārya Sumatī Sāgar. She now commands her own separate group, which is largely composed of family members but includes also celibate male lay followers (brahmačārī) who were personally initiated by her in 1987 – the first event of its kind. Due to health reasons, she stays more or less permanently in her abode in Hastināpura, where her followers have built a giant cosmographic model of the continent Jambudvīpa in concrete. She is closely associated with the Mahāsabhā and with the opponents of the cosmological interpretations of the Kāṇṭī Panth.

Even the largest Digambara saṅghas have a flat administrative structure, which confirms that formal organisation does not play a prominent role in Digambara monasticism. The guru-śīśya link alone constitutes the institutional core of the Digambara mendicant traditions. This is reflected in publications such as D. Sāstrī’s (1985) Digambara Jain Sādhu Paricay, which lists only the immediate disciples of a muni, but does not depict any lineages. Of the 37 groups led by ācāryas, only 5 comprise another office-holder apart from the ācārya himself. The majority of these 5 groups are not even particularly large, which suggests that the titles (2x upādhyāya, 2x aīlācārya, 1x ganiniti) designate honorary rather than administrative roles. The dedicated successors of an ācārya, the ācāryakalpas, aīlācāryas and upādhyāyas, bālācāryas and upādhyāyas, are usually permitted to form their own groups and to initiate their own disciples, while continuing to respect the moral authority of their dīkṣā guru. Because of his limited powers, an ācārya cannot prevent his disciples leaving, if they are supported by members of the lay communities. Although, in principle, only an ācārya can convey the titles of ācāryakalpa, aīlācārya, bālācārya, or upādhyāya or ganiniti on highly respected monks or nuns, there are several recognised methods for becoming an ācārya: either by the choice of the acting ācārya, or – if the ācārya dies without having determined a successor – by the choice of the muni saṅgha and/or the samāj, or by the acclamation of a self-selected successor (e.g. the oldest disciple). In practice, the laity always interfere in the decision making process. Often, individual monks sever themselves from their ācāryas and simply declare themselves to be ācāryas in their own right. However, most ācāryas, even those
who command their own disciples, remain nominally part of the lineage of their teacher, although ‘there is no formal recognition of a line of pupillary succession’ (Carrithers 1990: 153). In the absence of clear organisational and disciplinary rules (maryāḍā) – there are no established criteria for initiation and excommunication (which is never practised) – the group structure and the personnel of the peripatetic groups of a Digambara muni saṅgha is in perpetual flux. Changes occur not only through temporary visits in other groups for purposes of study, but also through the inflow and outflow of new mendicants from one saṅgha to another, and through the deliberate division of a large group into smaller groups for convenience by the ācāryas. It is therefore doubtful whether descent constructs are of practical importance beyond the purpose of legitimisation qua tradition. However, the doctrinal differences between the group of Vidyā Sāgar, who promotes idiosyncratic Terā Panth teachings, and the majority of the other Digambara ācāryas, sometimes causes the rejection of the munis of one lineage by another.

**Demographic trends**

According to the data collected by A. Jain, the total number of Digambara ascetics increased between 2000 to 2001 by 10.3% or 84 mendicants, within a single year. The category with the greatest increase is the one of the munis, who are responsible for the higher growth rate of male rather than female ascetics. In the year 2000, the 450 male ascetics represented 55% of all Digambara ascetics, the 368 female ascetics 45%, and in the year 2001 the 508 male ascetics represented 56.42% and the 394 female ascetics 43.7%. In 2001, the totally 902 ascetics were distributed over 341 groups. The average group size was only 2.65 (āryikā: 2.9). However, the average size of the groups (saṅgha) of the ācāryas was 6.9, which reflects their importance for the organisation of the Digambara ascetics. The fissiparous tendencies of the Digambara ascetics are illustrated by the fact that the groups led by ācāryas lost 18 members altogether within one year, whereas the groups led my munis and āryikās gained 51 and 32 members respectively.

The data published by B. U. Jain (1999: 382) show that the Digambara as a whole have by far the highest growth rate of all Jain mendicant traditions, even if we take into account that the nominal statistical growth largely reflects underreporting in earlier years. Within 12 years, the reported numbers have almost tripled from a total of 363 in 1987 to a total of 960 in 1999. The overall trend has been confirmed by the reliable information of A. Jain for the years 2000–2001. This growth is all the more astonishing considering the fact that one of the first modern munis, Ādi Sāgar, who died in 1943, initiated himself as late as 1913. The accelerated increase in numbers started even later, after Śānti Sāgar’s death in 1955, when the Digambara laity began to actively encourage the initiation of munis (Kāsalīvāl 1992: 35). Two explanations for the revival of the muni saṅgha are generally offered by the Digambaras: The abolition of the limitations imposed by both the colonial government and local kings on the free movement of the naked ascetics after Indian Independence, and the lack of any examination of the
qualifications of the candidates because of the absence of organisational rules. Critics noted that the artificial increase of numbers due to the unchecked intake resulted in diminishing standards of conduct amongst the munis, many of whom joined the mendicant life ‘mainly to gain influence and to enrich themselves’ and to leave again as they please. This argument is rejected by others, who point out that, if this would be true, then even more initiations would take place. Instead, the inspirational role of family members who became munis is highlighted, and the effects of the renaissance of Jain religious education in the last 100 years. Economic factors are generally discredited with reference to the fact that the main recruiting grounds for munis in northern Karnāṭaka and southern Mahārāṣtra, and elsewhere, have experienced considerable economic growth over the last decades.

The most interesting result of this preliminary demographic analysis of the Digambara mendicants is that the Digambaras are the only contemporary Jain tradition which has more monks than nuns (monks 1986: 86.89%, 1990: 63.38%, 1995: 54.13%, 1998: 54.25% and 1999: 63.54%). Part of the explanation for this must be sought in the Digambara doctrine of the spiritual inferiority of women, which is naturally unappealing for unmarried girls who may perceive monastic life as an alternative to marriage (Jaini 1991: 26). Yet, for all practical purposes, Digambara aryikas have more personal freedom than Murtipūjakas sādhvīs, and their numbers are currently increasing. Another factor may be the lack of institutional structures, which offer protection to nuns.

Jaina mendicants 1987–1999

The total number of Jain mendicants for the period between 1987 and 1999, and the relative size of the four principal mendicant traditions are summarised in Table 12.9 and Table 12.10. According to the figures published by B. U. Jain, 11,737 Jain sādhus, ailakas, ksullakas, sādhvīs and aryikās have been counted in 1999. This total is based on confirmed figures only, excluding the personal estimates by B. U. Jain. The real number of mendicants was certainly higher, maybe between 100–300, disregarding yatis, bhattārakas, brahmacārīs and brahmacārīṇīs.

The figures illustrate the continuing numerical dominance of the Mūrtipūjaka ascetics and particularly of the Tapā Gaccha mendicants, who retained more than 50% of the overall share. A look at the summary figures for 1999 and a comparison with those of 1987 shows that the ratios of the main sectarian schools remain relatively stable, considering the significant underreporting of the number of Digambara ascetics before 1996. In 1987, 59.37% of all mendicants were Mūrtipūjakas and 52.28% belonged to the Tapā Gaccha, and in 1999, 58.30% were Mūrtipūjakas and 51.51% belonged to the Tapā Gaccha. The percentages of the Sthānakavāśīs and the Terā Panthīs – whose rapidly increasing number of samāṇīs was not taken into account in the statistics – fell slightly; in the case of the Sthānakavāśīs, from 29.03% in 1987 to 27.46% in 1999, and in the case of the Terā Panthīs, from 7.66% in 1987 to 6.06% in 1999. By contrast, the share of the
Table 12.9 Total number of Jaina sädhus and sädhvīs 1987, 1990 and 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampradāya</th>
<th>Ācārya</th>
<th>Cāturmūsa-places</th>
<th>Sādhuv/Muni</th>
<th>Sādhvī/Āryikā</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mūrtipujaka</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>1220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sthānakavāst</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terā Panth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śvetāmbara</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digambara</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
Digambaras rose sharply from 3.94% in 1987 to 8.18% in 1999 for the reasons given earlier.

A comparison of the data from 1987 and 1999 shows that the total number of Jain mendicants has increased from 9,222 in 1987 to 11,737 in 1999. The overall growth rate for the twelve year period 1987–1999 was an astonishing 26.75%: Murtipujaka 24.99%, Sthānakavāsī 20.40%, Terā Panth 0.57% (1987–1996: 6.65%) and Digambara 164.46%. The growth rate would have been even higher if the sharply rising number of novices and lay ascetics had been taken into account.299

The accelerated increase in the number of Jain ascetics in recent years contrasts with the slow growth of the Jain population as a whole, which rose between 1981 and 1991 by 4.98%, from 3.193 million to 3.352 million. Apart from the Zoroastrians, the Jains had by far the lowest relative growth rate of all Indian religions (4.42% between 1981 and 1991, 26% between 1991 and 2001), which reduces their share of the total population from 0.48% in 1981 to 0.40% both in 1991 and 2001 (cf. M. K. Jain 1986: 33f., Vijayanunni 1991: x–xi, www.censusindia.net). The divergent growth rates of the mendicants and the lay population indicate an increasing popularity of monastic life for the period under investigation.300 This is a puzzling fact, especially if one assumes that secularisation and religious decline are two sides of the same coin. Cort (1989: 100, n. 16) remarked that the continuing rise of the numbers of Jain mendicants is a ‘quite striking phenomenon… given the economic and social status and the degree of Westernisation of Jain society’. If the data is correct, our pre-conceptions need to be revised. Apparently, westernisation and modernisation have not contributed to a decline, but to an increase in the popularity of renunciation amongst Jains.

**Reasons for renunciation**

How can we explain this? There is no easy answer. One explanation would be to argue that renunciation became more popular as a consequence of the monastic reforms at the beginning of the twentieth century, which improved the standards

---

*Table 12.10 Total number of Jaina sādhus and sādhvīs 1999*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampradāya</th>
<th>Ācārya</th>
<th>Cāturmāsãa-places</th>
<th>Sādhu/Muni</th>
<th>Sādhvī/Āryikā</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mūrtipūjaka</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1485</td>
<td>1489</td>
<td>5354</td>
<td>6843</td>
<td>58.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sthānakavāsī</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>2690</td>
<td>3223</td>
<td>27.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terā Panth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>6.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digambara</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>214</strong></td>
<td><strong>2571</strong></td>
<td><strong>2786</strong></td>
<td><strong>8951</strong></td>
<td><strong>11737</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note

a These figures do not include the three recent splinter groups of the Terā Panth, nor the Sthānakavāsī traditions of Vīrāyatan and the Arhat Saṅgha.
and therefore the appeal of monastic life. A social psychological perspective, on
the other hand, would focus on the function of the institution of renunciation as a
socio-cultural defense-mechanism which compensates for the disruptive effects
of modernisation and socio-economic change.\textsuperscript{301} We can, for instance, observe a
strong rise in the number of male mendicants during the struggle for national
independence and in the first years after Indian independence, when Gándhí’s
influence reached its zenith. During these years, male mendicants in particular
were attracted both by the political utility of the cultural symbolism of renunciation
for the purpose of social integration and by the social activism of reform-orientated
Jain ācāryas. But this interpretation does not account for the unprecedented pop-
ularity of renunciation in the last two decades.

Another argument points to the recent economic success of the Jain commu-
nity, which enables it to lose some male workforce and to sustain larger
mendicant communities. This point is sometimes raised within the Śvetāmbara
Jain community. The absolute number of Jain mendicants is very small, compared
to Buddhism which has at least 300,000 fully initiated bhikkhus worldwide\textsuperscript{302} or
Christianity which still has more than 1,000,000 monks and nuns.\textsuperscript{303} However, the
proportion of mendicants relative to the Jain population as a whole is higher than
amongst Buddhists or Christians, and probably always was. In 1990 the ratio was
1 mendicant for every 336 laity (9,974 mendicants: 3,352,706 laity). This
extraordinary high ratio of mendicants may indeed be explained in terms of the
wealth of the Jain population, which can easily afford to feed such a big
mendicant community.

Another explanation is given by Goonasekere (1986: 118f.), who interprets Jain
renunciation as an institutionalised protest movement against specific social con-
straints within the status-conscious baniyā castes in Western India. Yet, this variant
of the deprivation theory which explains the higher proportion of mendicants from
families with a relatively lower income from a rural or small town background\textsuperscript{304}
with reference to economic difficulties and the resulting psychological tensions\textsuperscript{305}
does not account for the motivation of the monks in his own sample, who cited
charismatic attraction to a monk or nun as the main factor. As we have seen, the
recent accelerated increase of Digambara munis is sometimes explained by mem-
bers of the Digambara community itself by the lack of disciplinary procedures
within the Digambara mendicant orders and by the opportunity for young men
from the relatively poor Digambara agricultural castes in South India to increase
their status and power by joining one of the saṅghas. However, if these were the
only reasons, then even more young men would renounce.\textsuperscript{306}

The main reason for the rapidly growing popularity of monastic life must be
sought amongst the population of male Digambara and female Śvetāmbara
renouncers. One of the most interesting findings is the continuing predominance
of the male ascetics amongst the Digambara, which reflects the different status of
nuns in this tradition. Amongst the Śvetāmbaras, only the Tapā Gaccha
Bhuvanabhānustūri Samudāya has – for the said reasons – also more sādhus than
sādhvīs. Śvetāmbara Jainism is unique, because of the institutionalised option of
full ordination for women, which is neither offered by Hinduism nor Theravāda Buddhism. Why is the percentage of female Jain mendicants presently rising? A comparison of the percentages of the sādhvīs between 1987 and 1999 shows a significant (>3%) increase in the number of female ascetics amongst the Mūrtipūjakas and Sthānakavāsīs, while the ratios of the Terā Panthīs and the Digambaras remained stable for the reasons cited earlier (Table 12.11). Sthānakavāsīs have the highest percentage of female mendicants, most certainly because they allow the greatest degree of freedom for sādhvīs, who are permitted to read all scriptures, to preach, and to roam separately. However, the overall ratios between sādhus and sādhvīs remained not only relatively stable between 75% and 77%, they also roughly corresponded to the percentage of 72% sādhvīs quoted in the Kalpa Sūtra.

Social reasons, such as widowhood, unmarritability, high dowry claims amongst higher castes, and other experiences of institutionalised social constraints have been cited already by Bühler and others, in order to account for the consistent popularity of renunciation amongst Jain women. But this does not explain either the absence of female renunciation in similar social groups or recent developments. Reynell (1985: 269) pointed to the rising age of marriage in the Jain communities. Following on from Goonasekera (1986), Cort (1991) diagnosed ‘drastic changes in the demographics of Śvetāmbar mendicancy’ (ibid.: 659), from ‘a situation not unlike the traditional Brāhmaṇical prescription for the vanaprastha and saṁyāsa āśramas, the stages of gradual withdrawal and renunciation after the householder (grhaṣṭha) stage of life’, to a pattern in which ‘the vast majority of contemporary ascetics are unmarried and take dīkṣā before the age of thirty’ (ibid.: 660). He sees the improvements in the social world of women as the reason for the declining number of widow mendicants during the twentieth century. He argues that because nowadays most widows are likely to have had children – due to the rise in the age of marriage and rising health standards – they are less inclined to renounce than child widows in the nineteenth century: ‘Having to raise the children means that becoming a sādhvī is less of a realistic option for a widow. Changing social attitudes towards widows also make it less likely that a Jain widow feels that she has little choice but to become a sādhvī’ (Cort 1989: 111f.). Therefore, ‘becoming a sādhvī is now seen as an alternative vocation to that of a housewife’ (ibid.).

This theory certainly explains the declining number of widows within the mendicant orders, but not the increasing number of unmarried women. Why should

---

Table 12.11 Percentage of sādhvīs 1987–1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mūrtipūjaka</th>
<th>Sthānakavāṣī</th>
<th>Terā Panth</th>
<th>Digambara</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>74.88</td>
<td>79.83</td>
<td>79.07</td>
<td>37.46</td>
<td>75.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>77.72</td>
<td>80.57</td>
<td>78.16</td>
<td>36.61</td>
<td>77.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>77.25</td>
<td>82.80</td>
<td>77.45</td>
<td>39.52</td>
<td>76.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>78.24</td>
<td>83.55</td>
<td>78.92</td>
<td>36.46</td>
<td>76.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
more and more young Jain women become disillusioned with family life under conditions of increasing prosperity and personal freedom? An important factor, which has not been considered thus far, is the significant change in the standard of education of Jain women. One hundred years ago, most Jain women were illiterate. Yet, the last Census of India in 2001 recorded a female literacy rate of 90.6 per cent amongst the Jains – the second highest after the Parsis – while in India as a whole it was only 47 per cent. Contemporary Śvetāmbara women are often born into privileged social groups and increasingly able to enjoy higher education, to choose their husbands within given limits but rarely to give up housework for an independent professional career, unimpaired by customary constraints. Formal education and the experience of an extended period of pre-marital independence often raise expectations which make it difficult for young educated women to re-adjust to the lifestyle of a traditional Jain housewife.

The experience of small freedoms generally increases the desire for more. Yet, monastic life does not offer more individual freedom, but an even more disciplined and restrained way of life. Socio-economic reasons for renunciation are recognised as a matter of fact but not condoned by the Jain scriptures (Ṭhānā 712a, 335a, Schubring 2000, § 137) and can only offer a partial explanation to a difficult question. A more complete answer must take into account multiple factors, in particular the motivating role of the Śvetāmbara doctrine of salvation and the opportunity of an alternative lifestyle offered by the existing sādhvī traditions themselves, as well as the elevated individual status of a nun in the Jain community. I think the most likely candidate for further exploration is the romantic image of freely roaming female ascetics, who enjoy enhanced conditions of living in reformed and materially well supported mendicant orders which offer opportunities for education and self-development that are still unavailable in traditional family life, which currently catches the imagination of young Jain women,\(^{311}\) in the same way as men were attracted by the political symbolism of renunciation during the independence struggle.\(^{312}\)

**Concluding remarks**

The most interesting result of this study, however preliminary it may be, is the emerging, nearly complete, pattern of the group structure of the current Jain mendicant traditions. The Digambara munī tradition is currently divided into some 341 itinerant groups and individuals, who belong to three lineages and maybe a dozen sub-lineages which have a flat administrative structure. However, more than half of all Digambara mendicants were initiated and are supervised by only a handful of ācāryas.\(^{313}\) Although the Digambara tradition has currently no monastic orders, nor clearly identifiable schools and sects, it shows significant organisational and doctrinal faultlines which deserve further investigation. In total, the Śvetāmbara tradition is composed of some 57 independently organised groups: 27 Mūrtipūjaka, 26 Sthānakavāsī and 4 Terā Panth. These independently organised ‘orders’, together with their lay followers can be designated as
sociological ‘sects’, in contrast to doctrinal ‘schools’, although some overlap and fluid transitions between the three categories occur. There are, of course, fewer doctrinal schools than orders and sects. The principal schools of the Mūrtipūjakas are the six gacchas. The situation amongst the Sthānakavāsīs is more diffuse, since not all of the 5 founding fathers had major doctrinal differences. However, there are at least two broad schools within the Sthānakavāsī movement. On the one hand, those who follow the teachings of Dharma Sīnha, who may have had a significant, though never acknowledged, influence on the Terā Panth acārya Bhikṣu and his idiosyncratic teachings, and, on the other hand, those who follow the teachings of Lava and Dharma Dāsa, who had only minor disagreements. The few globalising mendicant groups on the fringe of the Sthānakavāsī movement, which allow their ascetics to use modern means of transport and travel abroad, represent a new development, and share many attributes with Jain lay movements with the yati traditions, and with the disdained mendicants ‘who wander alone’ (Pkt. egalla vihārt), who can always be found on the fringes of the organised Jain ascetic traditions. The use of modern means of transport might in future significantly modify the relationship between group size and size of lay following. However, the use of modern means of communication which, in contrast to the modern means of transport, are now endorsed by most, but not all, mendicant groups, has presently no significant influence on the pattern of recruitment of devotees, which continues to be predicated on regular personal contact between guru and devotee.

Acknowledgement

I am very grateful to Professor Padmanabh S. Jaini for his comments on an earlier version of this study.

Notes

1 Throughout the text, the colloquial ‘Jain’ rather than ‘Jaina’ is used, and with the exception of the Sanskrit names of sects and schools and technical Jain terms, proper names are not sanskritised.
2 See the volume Village India edited by McKim Marriott in 1955. Survey techniques were first used in Jain Studies by Sangave 1959/1980, whose literature review on the social divisions of the Jains is still the standard reference source. The first book length field studies were the monographs by Mahias 1985 and Shāntā 1985. Regional, subaltern, media, etc. studies have yet to be applied on a larger scale in the emerging field of Jain Studies.
4 Following Schubring 2000: §139, 252, Folkert 1993: 153, 163 translates the ambivalent terms gaccha and its Digambara equivalent saṅgha variably as ‘school’, ‘sect’ and ‘order’. He defines schools as ‘doctrinally’ demarcated units, sects as ‘modern’, and monastic orders as primarily concerned with issues of ‘praxis’. Balbir 2003: 48 focuses only on ‘orders’ or ‘lineages’ – the terms are used as synonyms – and dismisses the doctrinal dimension as insignificant with regard to gacchas. However,
many orders are doctrinally demarcated, as Balbir’s study of doctrinal controversies concerning proper praxis shows; and even in the pre-modern period sects existed with and without core monastic orders. For alternative definitions of the terms school, order and sect see Flügel 2000: 77f. and note 8.

6 See also Cort in this volume, p. 261.
7 Sangave’s 1959/1980 attempt at conducting a representative survey did not meet sufficient response from the Jain community.
8 It is neither possible nor methodologically desirable to find for every Jain (Indian) term an equivalent analytical term and vice versa. I would propose to define Jain schools, orders and sects in the following way (cf. Flügel 2000: 42, n. 9). Doctrinal ‘schools’ may inform both individuals or (un-) organised religious ‘movements’ of various types; organised monastic ‘orders’ contrast with unorganised ascetic groups and ascetics who ‘wander alone’ (ekalavihārī); ‘sects’ are exclusive groups which either (a) encompass both ascetics and laity, that is the classical four-fold community (caturvidha saṅgha) and variations created by added intermediary categories such as the pañcavidha saṅgha etc. or by the deliberate exclusion or factual absence of one or more of the four categories, or (b) represent self-conscious lay movements. Corresponding to the distinction between orders and sects is the distinction between the casual ‘supporter’ of the ascetics, the initiated (through the vow of allegiance) or simply dedicated lay ‘follower’, and the born and/or paying ‘member’ of a sect-specific Jain caste- or community organisation. See Flügel 1994: 404; and Dundas’ 2003: 129 for the differentiation between ‘affiliation’ and ‘conversion’. For the distinction between Indian monastic ‘orders’ and ‘sects’ which encompass both ascetics and laity see Vallée-Poussin 1918: 716. The peculiar dual organisation of the majority of the contemporary Jain (and other Indian) ‘sects’, with monastic orders as a core supported by amorphous lay communities under the spiritual command of the monks, was also highlighted by Max Weber 1920/1978: 207. See Dumont’s 1980: 284 distinction between the doctrinal exclusivity of an Indian ‘sect’ and its social inclusivity. Generally, social categories, organised groups and gatherings need to be distinguished.
9 It seems advisable to distinguish the level of more or less exclusive ‘schools’, organised ‘sects’ and ‘movements’ from the level of the two principal religious ‘denominations’ in Jainism which Leumann 1934: 1 called ‘Confessionen’.
10 The use of the word ‘Jaina’ as a self-designation for both the monastic community and the lay community is a relatively recent one (Böhtlingk and Roth 1861: 132, Flügel 2005: 3f.). In the ancient texts, the words nīggaṇṭha and nīggaṇṭhi referred only to Jain monks and nuns, but not to their followers, or upāsakas (Jacobi 1879: 5), who were classified as part of the four-fold saṅgha only from the late-canonical period onwards by both the Śvetāmbaras (Viyāhapannati 792b, Thāna 281b) and by the early Digambaras (Mūlācāra, Chappāhuda, etc.) (Schüring 2000, § 30, § 137).
11 Between 1871 and 1891, the Census of India gradually substituted the initial classification of the Indian population in terms of religion with a dual religion/caste classification: 1871: ‘Hindu’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Other’, 1881: ‘religion (caste)’, 1891: ‘religion (sect)’, ‘caste (sub-caste)’ (Baines 1893: 186f.). ‘The…change was made in order to get rid of the notion that caste, or social distinction, was not required for Musalmans, Sikhs, Jains, and so on, or was held to be subordinate in any way to sect or religion’ (ibid.: 187).
13 ‘Many Jains have…undoubtedly given their religion as Hindoo, and in some cases, though these are not many, I am inclined to think the enumerators have returned as Hindoos persons who really stated their religion to be Jain. As the followers of the

14 The main reason for the ambiguous self-identification of many Jains is the equivocal nature of the concept ‘Hindu’ itself.

15 For example, Keshroy 1924, Manilal 1934: 270ff., Natarajan 1971 I: 39. The preface of Singh’s 1894: 1 report on the census of 1891 in Marwar states that in addition to the questionnaire of the census supervisors and inspectors ‘a good many facts were investigated through personal enquiries from trustworthy representatives of various communities’.

16 There is no evidence for the inflated estimates that are frequently quoted in popular Jain publications. Kalidas Nag wrote in his speech to a Jain audience, ‘Jainism – A World Religion’, in the Jaina Gazette 57, 2–3 (1951): ‘You should prepare a census of your own, regardless of the government census, to arrive at a correct conclusion’ (ibid.: 35). Earlier attempts to produce community censuses, such as the Jain Śvetāmbara Directory (Gujarātī) written in Gujarātī (Jain Śvetāmbara Conference 1909, 1915, 1916), were lacking an integral ‘Jain’ communal or communitarian perspective. The first Jain Śvetāmbara Directory was produced between 1906 and 1907 in accordance with resolution No. 8 of the Jain Śvetāmbara Conference in 1904 which called for the collection of information on the followers of the different Mūrtipīṭaka and ‘Loṅkāgaccha’ Śvetāmbara gacchas and samudāyas in all districts (jillā), sub-districts (ṭūluka) and villages (gāma) in India. The book was intended in particular as a travel guide, for instance for pilgrimages (yātārā). With the help of local volunteers a questionnaire was distributed by the main coordinators Śobhacand Mohanlāl Śāh and Dāhīyācand Trībhovan Gāndhī, who listed the following categories: the number of family houses (kula ghara), women (strī), men (purīṣa), caste (jñāti), sect (gaccha), literacy; and the local temples (jīna-mandira), images (jīna-pratīmā), monasteries (upāśraya), libraries (jīna-bhandāra), schools (pāṭḥsālā), old books (pūrvācarya pranīta granthā), Jain societies (sabhā) and associations (mandala). The interesting resulting statistics suffer from imprecise lists of jñātis and gacchas and problems of inaccurate self-reporting and counting, as the compilers of the first report emphasise (Jain Śvetāmbara Conference 1909: ii–iii). It was probably in response to the Śvetāmbara efforts that the eleventh meeting of the Digambara Jain Mahāsābhā inspired Māṅikcand Hirācand Jauharī of Bombay to produce between 1907 and 1914 the Shri Bharatvarshiya Digambara Jain Directory (Jhaveri 1914) ‘for the good of all Digambara Jain brothers’. The ensuing publication contains lists of towns, leading community members, caste, professions, etc. Cf. Sangave 1980: 119–121, 124–130. I am grateful to Yashvant Malaiya, who has pointed this source out to me. Nowadays, excellent self-produced national statistics are available for certain castes, such as the Khandelvālas, which have a high proportion of Jain members.

17 A Digambara Jain layman told me that the results of the Census of India of 1981 and 1991 in North Indian states were manipulated by ‘Hindutva’ inspired enumerators who wrote ‘Hindu (Jain)’ into the forms, even if the answer given was ‘Jain’. During the Census of 2001, Jain community leaders started awareness rising campaigns to prevent a recurrence of these practices.

18 The introduction of a question on religious affiliation into the UK-census of 2001 stirred similar sentiments amongst leading members of the Jain community in Britain. For a Hindutva inspired variation of demographic anger regarding the outgrowth of the Hindus by the Muslims in India see A. P. Joshi et al. 2003.

19 B. U. Jain 1999, for instance, lists the Mūrtipīṭaka samudāyas according to their size. See Appadurai 1993: 117 on the role of numbers for the colonial ‘illusion of
bureaucratic control’. The role of numbers (regarding fasts etc.) is even greater in traditional Jainism.


23 Sthāvīravālī 5, in Jacobi 1884: 289.

24 Sangave now seems to prefer the less charged term ‘communitarianism’ (personal communication, 2 January 2005).

25 Cort 1989: 491–94 summarised B. U. Jain’s demographic data of the Mūrtipūjaka sādhus and sādhvis in 1986 in an appendix, but noted their incompleteness, which was partly rectified by B. U. Jain’s subsequent publications.

26 These are the conventional dates. Except in the case of the ‘panths’, I have represented the names of monastic orders in their sanskritised form, but proper names in their spoken form.

27 The primary source of information on the origins of these groups is the Pravacanaparīkṣā of the sixteenth century Tapā Gaccha upādhyāya Dharma Sāgara. For an overview of their history, doctrines and practices see M. U. K. Jain 1975.

28 The paṭṭāvalis of the Kharatara Gaccha and of the A(ñ)cala Gaccha were published in many Sanskrit and vernacular editions. They were studied by Klatt 1894 and by Sivprasad 2001. See also Pārśva 1968: 9–21.

29 The Gacchadhipati of the A(ñ)cala Gaccha is presently Śrīpāpa Moti Sāgara Sūri (born 1944). See Photographs. The Śvetāmbara Loṅkagaccha still has one yāti but no sādhus. A notable feature of the yāti traditions is that they do not have any female members.

30 The surprisingly high figure of more than 3,517 ascetics and a higher proportion of monks than nuns is reported in the A(ñ)cala Gaccha Pāṭṭāvalī for the A(ñ)cala Gaccha in the year 1180. It is said that Ācārya Āryaṅgaśita Sūri (1080–1180) initiated ‘2100 sādhus and 1130 sādhvis, the ācārya-padam to 12 sādhus, the upādhyāya-padam to 20, the paṇḍita-padam to 70, the mahattarā-padam to 103 sādhvis (Samayaśrī and others), the pravartini-padam to 82 sādhvis, the total number of sādhus and sādhvis being 3517’ (Klatt 1894: 175). If the figures are true, then a huge number of Jain mendicants must have existed during the heydays of Jainism in the medieval period.

31 The equally centralised Rāmacandraśāri Samudāya of the Tapā Gaccha is the largest order. Balbir 2003: 48f. provides much information on the doctrinal foundation of the A(ñ)cala Gaccha, but not on initiation procedures.

32 According to Ācārya Jay Sundar Sūri of the Bhuvanabhānu Samudāya, the last sanghācārya of the Vijaya Śākhā was Ācārya Vijay Prabhā, who commanded, c.200–300 ascetics. After him the number of samvegti sādhus decreased to 20–25 under Buterāy in the early nineteenth century (plus 10–15 in the Śāgara Śākhā, and 40–50 in the Vimala Gaccha), while the Tapā Gaccha yāti orders had more than 1,500 members. Personal communication, Mumbai 23 October, 2005.


34 Deśāri 1983 I: 106ff., M. Sāh 1987. The precise origins of the trust are not known, but Śāntidās Jhaveri was instrumental in institutionalising this influential organisation.

35 Probably only the samvegti sādhu tradition was interrupted.

36 Kaņcansāgarśāri et al. 1977.

37 See Paul Dundas’ forthcoming book.

38 Only the Kharatara Gaccha and the A(ñ)cala Gaccha still have some yātis.

39 ‘In his biography of Nemisūri, one of the great reformist ācāryas of the early twentieth century, Śilcandravijay 1973: 6 has estimated the number of samvegti sādhus
in the period 1845–1865 to be no more than 25 to 30. While it is not clear if he means only within the Tapā Gaccha, or in all the Mūrtipūjak gacchas, the number is still very small. He further comments on the low level of scholarly knowledge among these sādhus. Thus, the position of the Śvetāmbar samveg sādhhu in the early nineteenth century was not all that different from the position of the full-fledged muni, or nirvān svāmī, among the South Indian Digambaras (see Carrithers…)’ (Cort 1989: 99, n. 14). Unfortunately, the only information we have on the numbers of yatis in the nineteenth century are a number of kṣetrādeśapattakas and sporadic evidence in the reports of British colonial officials. A cāturmāsā list of 1867 issued by the successor of Ācārya Vijay Devendra Śūri, Ācārya Vijay Dharaṇendra Śūri, for instance, lists 212 monks (figures for nuns are not given) organised into 74 groups of 2 and 14 groups of 4 (Sandesara 1974: 229–233). For the year 1891, Singh 1894: 82 cites the number of 834 ‘yatis’ in Marwar (Jodhpura) alone, but gives no figures for the samvegs, who ‘owe their origin to one Anand Bimal Śūri’ (ibid.: 95). The Jain mendicants in Mārvār were classified as ‘devotees’ of the ‘priests’ (yatis, brāhmans, etc.) and all counted under the label ‘Samegi, Dhundia etc.’ (ibid.: 85). Their total figure of 2,314 comprises 725 male and 1,589 female mendicants.

40 The Jain Śvetāmbara Directory published in 1916 by the reformist Jain Association of India lists some 228 monks, divided into 79 groups, and 203 nuns, divided into 40 groups, apparently belonging to reformed groups of the Tapā Gaccha, including the groups of the ācāryas Vijay Kamal Śūri, Vijay Nemi Śūri and Buddhī Sāgar Śūri which were mainly active in Kacch and Mārvār (Jain Śvetāmbara Conference 1916: 18–22).

41 See Cort 1999.
42 In 2002, the total number had increased to 7,541 mendicants, 1,585 munis and 5,947 sādhvis. The Tapā Gaccha had 6,696 mendicants, 1,445 sādhus and 5,242 sādhvis (cf. ibid.: 70, 305).
43 Jaini 1991: 26 explains the attractiveness of the Tapā Gaccha for women with the ‘spiritual equality’ offered to Śvetāmbara sādhvis. However, Mūrtipūjaka sādhvis are still not allowed to read certain āgama-texts nor to deliver public sermons, a fact which Shāntā 1985: 315, 321f., n. 5, 456 explains by pointing at the high number of ācāryas, which limits speaking opportunities.
44 ‘The samudāy is not as formal a grouping as the gacch. Mendicants in one samudāy will, for a variety of reasons, sometimes travel with mendicants of another samudāy. But mendicants do not travel with mendicants of another gacch, as that would involve changing some of the details of their daily practices’ (Cort 1991: 663). In his later publications, Cort 1999: 44, 2001: 46 supplies enough material for the conjecture that many samudāyas have a distinct doctrinal and organisational identity with separate pañcāṅgas, rituals and lay support.
45 Shāntā 1985: 329.
46 The use of the sign ‘-’ in the columns indicates cases of separation (cf. Tristuti Gaccha).
47 The names of all ācāryas of the Vijaya Śākhā are preceded by the title ‘Vijaya’. Some gacchādhhipatis are not ācāryas (śūri).
48 After his death, Prem Śūri’s line split into two samudāyas, led by Rām Candra Śūri and Bhuvan Bhānu Śūri respectively. Following Rām Candra Śūri’s (1896–1991) death, this samudāya was named after him by his successor Mahoday Śūri (died 2002), who was in turn succeeded by Ācārya Hem Bhūṣan Śūri (B. U. Jain 1996: 165–177). Rām Candra Śūri was one of the most influential and orthodox ācāryas of the Vijaya Śākhā. He nearly became the leader (śāsanasmrātu or adhipati) of the entire Tapā Gaccha. Cort 1989: 103, n. 18 quotes demographic data which show that the Dān-Prem Samudāya has grown from 36 sādhus in 1944 to 219 sādhus in 1975.
(Cort had no information on the numbers of sādhvīs). By 1999, this tradition had split into four sections, including Sānti Candra Sūri’s group, and vibuddha Prabhā Sūri’s group. However, after 1996 the Amrtaśūri Samuddāya, lead by Jinendra Sūri, was re-integrated into the Rāmacandrāsūri Samuddāya, which had in all 905 members in 1999, 290 sādhus and 615 sādhvīs, and 1,138 members in 2002, 310 munīs and 828 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 197, 2002: 169). Important particularities, in addition to the be tīthi doctrine, are the performance of guru pījā in the manner of the aṣṭapākārī pījā to the body of the ācārya Rām Candra Sūri and his statues, and the permission for lay followers to mount Satruṇāya Hill even during cāturūṣa (personal communication). This group separated in 1998 from the Rāmacandrāsūri Samuddāya. It operates mainly in Rājasthān. In 1999 it had 45 mendicants, 23 sādhus and 22 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 325f.). This samuddāya also derives from Prem Sūri, but was renamed after Bhuvan Bhānu Sūri (1911–1993) who broke with Rām Candra Sūri in 1986 after a dispute on calendrical issues (ek tīthi-be tīthi). See Cort 1999, B. U. Jain 1996: 179–87. Originally, the group was active in Hālār, but its main sphere of activity is now Gujarāt and Mahārāṣṭra. In 1999 it had 560 members, 285 sādhus and 275 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 230), in 2002 712 members, 361 sādhus and 351 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 186). It is one of the few contemporary Jain orders which has more monks than nuns, because Ācārya Prem Sūri objected to the initiation of sādhvīs, since their presence would inevitably cause the development of relationships between monks and nuns. One of Prem Sūri’s disciples, Ācārya Jāsodev Sūri, successfully criticised this rule, by pointing to the unnecessary problems it creates when entire families want to renounce. Prem Sūri allowed him to start an order of nuns within his tradition, on the condition that he and his successors would be responsible for the supervision of the nuns, of which the main line of gacchādhīpati should remain aloof. After the death of Jāsodev Sūri, his successor Rajendra Sūri is now responsible for the sādhvi section. This group separated itself in 1995 under Prem Sūri from the tradition of Rām Candra Sūri (whose guru was Prem Sūri). In 1999, it was nominally reincorporated into the Rāmacandrāsūri Sampradāya, but still maintains a separate existence. It is mainly active in Hālār, near Jāmmagar. In 2002 it had 26 mendicants, 4 sādhus and 22 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 170, cf. 273). Nīti Sūri was a pupil of Buddhī Vijay and the teacher of Bhakti Sūri and Siddhi Sūri (Ratna Prabhā Vijay 5, 2 1948–1950: 217f.). In 1999, this group had 465 mendicants, 50 sādhus and 415 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 254), in 2002, 426 mendicants, 40 sādhus and 386 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 211). In 1999, this group had 245 mendicants, 49 sādhus and 196 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 295), the figures for 2002 – 128 mendicants, 46 sādhus and 82 sādhvīs – are incomplete (B. U. Jain 2002: 250). Figures for the period between 1987 and 1996 are incomplete. In 1999, this group had 384 mendicants, 27 sādhus and 357 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 271), in 2002, 311 mendicants, 31 sādhus and 280 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 227). Today, Ācārya Vijay Aṅhant Sūri is the head of the order. Apparently, 150 sādhvīs joined the Rāmacandrāsūri Sampradāya (ibid.: 231). Siddhi Sūri (1895–1959) was succeeded by Megh Śrī. One of his pupils was Bhuvan Vijay, the father and dikṣā guru of the influential scholar Muni Jambū Vijay. In 1999, it had 250 mendicants, 30 sādhus and 220 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 289), in 2002, 260 mendicants, 29 sādhus and 231 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 240). The present gacchādhīpati Rām Sūri has been selected, because he is the ācārya with the highest monastic age (ibid.: 246). Dev Sūri’s (1911–2002) predecessor was Merū Prabhā Sūri. The present head of the order is Ācārya Suśil Sūri. In 1999 this group had 543 mendicants, 138 sādhus and
57 Vijay Vallabh Sūrī (1870–1954) was one of the most influential reformers of the Tapā Gaccha in the twentieth century and an important promotor of modern education and social reform. He was initiated in 1886 by Vijay Ānand Sūrī (Ātmā Ṛām). The ascetics of this tradition wear yellow garments, originally to distinguish themselves from the yatis who were clad in white. They permit nuns to give public lectures, and use microphones and in big cities flush toilets (in other samudāyas the excretions of the mendicants are collected and then flushed away by the laity). They share food with the mendicants of the Keśarasūri and Dharmasūri Samudāyas, who descend from the same lineage. In 1999, this group had 274 mendicants, 54 sādhvīs and 220 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 277), and in 2002, 295 mendicants, 60 sādhvīs and 235 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 232). After the death of Vijay Indradinn Sūrī (1923–2002), who originated from a tribal group in Gujarāt, Ācārya Vijay Ratnākar Sūrī became the head of the order.


59 Mohan Lāl was a pupil of Khānti Viyay, who was a disciple of Buddhi Viyay. He was particularly active in Bombay. In 1999, this group had 44 mendicants, 22 sādhvīs and 22 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 323), in 2002, 57 mendicants, 26 sādhvīs and 31 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 272).

60 Vijay Dharma Sūrī (1868–1922) was an influential moderniser. He was initiated in 1887 by Vṛddhi Candra Viyay (died 1893), a pupil of Buddhi Viyay, and was succeeded by Vijay Indra Sūrī (born 1881). In 1999, this group had 236 mendicants, 33 sādhvīs and 203 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 302), in 2002, 229 mendicants, 33 sādhvīs and 196 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 251).


62 Kanak Sūrī was the teacher of Catur Viyay, the teacher of Punya Viyay (1895–1971), who inspired the creation of the L. D. Institute in Ahmedabad in 1957. In 1999, this group had 451 mendicants, 29 sādhvīs and 422 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 262), in 2002, 533 mendicants, 35 sādhvīs and 498 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 217). After the death of Kalāpūrṇī Sūrī in 2002, Ācārya Viyay Kalā Prabhā Sūrī became head of the order (gacchādhīpāti), which is also called Kaccha-Bāgara Samudāya, because of the regional base of Kanaka Sūrī (ibid.: 226).

63 Ratnākar’s predecessor was Lakṣmī Sūrī. This samudāya is predominantly active in Mevār. In 1999, this group had 148 mendicants, 20 sādhvīs and 128 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 313), in 2002, 153 mendicants, 22 sādhvīs and 131 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 261).

64 Sānti Candra Sūrī was a pupil of Vijay Ānand Sūrī (Ātmā Ṛām). In 1999, this group had approximately 75 mendicants, 25 sādhvīs and 50 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 322), and in 2002, 165 mendicants, 19 sādhvīs and 146 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 270). In 2002, Bhuvan Sekhar Sūrī died and was succeeded by Ācārya Rājendra Sūrī (ibid.: 271).

65 Both the present ācārya Som Sundar Sūrī and Jīn Candra Sūrī were initiated by Bhuvan Sekhar Sūrī. In 1999, this group reported the figure of 80 mendicants, 8 sādhvīs and 72 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 320), in 2002, 151 mendicants, 19 sādhvīs and 132 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 268), but the figures are incomplete.
This group was started by Ānand Sāgar Sūri, a bitter opponent of Rām Candra Sūri, the leading monk of the Vijaya Sākhā in the twentieth century (cf. Cort 1999: 43): ‘Rāmendra Sūri (1895–1991) has argued that the scriptures should not be published at all, a view which found many partisans, while the other party followed the view that of Sāgarānanda Sūri (1875–1950), celebrated as the “uplifter of the scriptural tradition” (āgamoddhāraka), who advocated the publication of the scriptures but along with the old niṟyukti and vṛtti commentaries’ (Dundas 1996: 90, cf. Banks 1992: 110). The group experienced frequent changes of leadership in the 1980s. In 1986, the leader was Devendra Sāgar, 1987 Cidānand Sāgar, 1990 Dāsān Sāgar, who was succeeded by Sūryoday Sāgar, and Āsok Sāgar in 2004–2005. The former sādhu Citra Bhānu (Candra Prabhā Sāgar), who continues to inspire diaspora Jains in the US and the UK, was a member of this lineage from 1942 to 1970. In 1999, this group had 740 members, 150 sādhus and 590 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 215), in 2002, 956 members, 136 sādhus and 820 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 171). Its main agenda is currently the defence of the scientific accuracy of the canonical Jaina cosmography.

Buddhi Sāgar Sūri (1874–1925), a disciple of Ravi Sāgar and one of only four samvēgī sādhu ācāryas in 1913 (Cort 1997: 125), popularised the worship of the protector god Ghaṇṭākara amongst Gūjarāt Jains, particularly in Mahudi near Vijāpur (Cort 1989: 406–407, 428–433, 2001: 91, 164–168). He was succeeded by Monogam Sāgar (?), Rudhi Sāgar, and Subodh Sāgar Sūri, who inspired the construction of the tirthas Vijāpur and Mahēśānā, where the tirthankara Śimandhara Svāmi is venerated. Ācārya Padma Sāgar Sūri (born 1934), who inspired the construction of the Jain centre at Kōbā near Ahmedabad, also belongs to this order. In 1999, this samudāya had 135 mendicants, 45 sādhus and 90 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 316); for 2002 the figures are incomplete: 115 mendicants, 45 sādhus and 70 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 264).

Cidānand Sūri’s predecessor was Ravi Vimal Sūri. He is now succeeded by Pradyumna Vimal Sūri. Figures are based on estimates. In 1999, it had about 51 mendicants, 6 sādhus and 45 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 360), in 2002 approximately 49 mendicants, 4 sādhus and 45 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 304).

This sampradāya, which is also called Vidhi Pakṣa, is mainly active in Kacch, Hālār and Mumbai (Jain 1996: 274). In 1999, it had 250 members, 29 sādhus and 221 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 327), in 2002 249 members, 29 sādhus and 220 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 274). For its history see Śiyprāsād 2001, Balbir 2003.


Figures are incomplete. In 1999, this group had 118 mendicants, 28 sādhus and 90 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 1999: 340), in 2002, 127 mendicants, 27 sādhus and 100 sādhvīs (B. U. Jain 2002: 293). The ācārya position is the only administrative post of this group (B. U. Jain 1999: 252, n.4). In the year 2000, a group of three sādhus led by Muni Jay Ānand split off and founded a fourth Tristūti tradition (B. U. Jain 2002: 293). The most famous monk of the Tristūti Gaccha was Rājendra Sūri (1827–1906), who is renown as the composer of the Abhidhānarakarājendra Kośa.


Because of a dispute on proper ascetic conduct, this order split from the Tapā Gaccha in 1515 under Sādhu Ratna Sūri (Ratna Prabha Vijay 5, 2 1948–1950: 134). Although this group is sometimes considered to be part of the Tapā Gaccha, its sādhus do not use
‘vijaya’ or ‘sāgara’ as a suffix or prefix. The group does not have administrative posts and is the only order that is led by two monks: Muni Bhuvan Candra is currently responsible for the region of Kacch and Saurāstra, and Muni Vijay Candra for the region of Mumbai. Bhuvan Candra’s predecessor was Muni Raṃ Candra. In 1999, this group had 74 mendicants, 9 sādhus and 64 sādhvis, though numbers are incomplete (B. U. Jain 1999: 356), in 2002, 68 mendicants, 9 sādhus and 59 sādhvis (B. U. Jain 2002: 301).


Cort’s observations are inversely mirrored by R. K. Jain’s 1999: 32 distinction between the charismatic ‘individualistic, prophet-derived and sect-like character of the Digambara religious field as contrasted with the group-bound, “priest”-derived and church-like ambience of the Shvetambara religious field’; a distinction which deliberately ignores the institutions of the bhaṭṭarakas traditions.

Cort 2001: 46 observed that subtle liturgical differences do not exist ‘between samudāyas’. However, according to Muni Mukti Vallab Vijay of the Bhuvanabhānu Samudāya, four different lists of maryādas exist within the Tapā Gaccha. A leading monk of the Ramacandrāsrī Samudāya mentioned the figure of 64 differences in the rules and regulations of the samudāyas. A number of monks and nuns of other samudāyas confirmed these statements (personal communications, December 2004–January 2005). But more research is necessary to map out the details.

Only if their samudāyas derive from the same lineage food is sometimes shared; for instance between the members of the Vallabhasūri, the Keśarasūri and the Dharmasūri Samudāyas.

Personal communication of monks and nuns of the Vallabhasūri Samudāya and of the Ramacandrāsrī Samudāya in January 2005. In his will, Ram Candra Sūri determined Mahadaya Sūri as his successor. But according to A. Luithle (personal communication, July 2005) the present gacchādhipati Hem Bhūṣan Sūri was elected in an assembly of acāryas in 2003 after one year of dispute.

As evidence, the cases of the centralised orders of the Añcalan Gaccha, the Ramacandrāsrī Samudāya, and the Śvetāmbara Terā Panth may be cited, all of which have a large number of members.

The contrast between the principles of pupillary descent and group organisation in Jain monastic traditions has been analysed in Flügel 2003b: 182–193.

The term sthānakavāśī in its present meaning became only current in the context of the early twentieth century unification movement of the traditions of the pañcmuni.

The dates given in the available sources are not matching up. See Flügel 2000: 46–48, in press.


This is seen as a potential cause of conflict. Personal communication, Ratan Jain, Delhi 16 October 2004.

This is in accordance with the scriptures. See Thāna 164b, Vav 10.15–17 and the Nīśha Bhāsa. On the issue of child initiation see also Balbir 2001.

374
The following figures were given by Manilal (1934) for selected smaller traditions in 1933: Khabhāt Sampradāya (15 mendicants: 6 sādhus and 9 sādhvīs), Cauthamala (Raghunātha Dharmadāsa) Sampradāya (18 mendicants: 3 sādhus and 15 sādhvīs), Rānnavamsā (Dharmadāsa Sampradāya) (47 mendicants: 9 sādhus and 38 sādhvīs), Nānā Prthvirāja (Mevāra Dharmadāsa Sampradāya) (43 mendicants: 8 sādhus and 35 sādhvīs), Kaccha Āṭh Kotic Mota Pakṣa (53 mendicants: 22 sādhus and 31 sādhvīs), Kaccha Ath Koṭi Nānā Pakṣa (39 mendicants: 14 sādhus and 25 sādhvīs), Līmbaḍī Gopāla Sampradāya (26 mendicants: 7 sādhus and 19 sādhvīs), Gondalā Nānā Pakṣa (no sādhus and 'some' sādhvīs), Barvāḍī Sampradāya (24 mendicants: 4 sādhus and 20 sādhvīs).

The latest findings have been summarised by Degenne and Forssé (1999: 21): 'Acquaintances form the largest, a virtual network that includes everyone the respondent has ever met. The average for this outermost circle is about 5,000 people. The circle of immediate contacts is far smaller. The average respondent has only 100–200 people he can contact to link himself up to a target stranger. She has regular talks with fewer than twenty people per week, subject to variation with age, sex, education and other sociodemographic criteria. Again, real confidants average only three'.

It is regarded as a sign of the laxity though if Jain mendicants deliberately maintain contacts, because this contradicts their vow to renounce the world.


This argument is outlined in Flügel 2003b: 183.


See Flügel 2003a.


The change affected the sādhvīs first. Under Ācārya Rāy Cand (1821–1851) and Ācārya Jītmal (1851–1881) only 58.44% and 57.1% of all newly initiated sādhus were Osval, but already 73.8% and 89.3% of all new sādhvīs. Under Kālū Rām, 89.7% of newly initiated sādhus and 95.3% of sādhvīs were Osval (Navrata Namal 1981 II: 311, 322, III: 273, 291, X: 309, 325). This pattern still prevails. In 1985, 96.98% of the Tera Panth sādhus and 94.46% of the sādhvīs were Osval (Navrata Namal XII 1985: 522f.).

A percentage of 56.8 of Ācārya Jītmal's ascetics came from Mārvār and Mevār and only 24.9% from the Thalī region. By contrast, only 29.7% of Ācārya Kālū Rām's ascetics were recruited in Mārvār and Mevār, but 60.97% in Thalī. This pattern was perpetuated under Ācārya Tulsī. In 1985, 23.5% of his mendicants came from Mārvār and Mevār and 63.3% from Thalī (sādhus: 58.62%, sādhvīs: 65.35%).

See Flügel forthcoming.

The resolution was taken on the 5–6 December 1932. See Jauharī 1946: 197.

Another source informs us that, at the time of Loṅkā's death, the Loṅkā Gaccha had 400 disciples and 800,000 lay followers (Prakāścandra 1998: 32).

Manohar Dās was a disciple of Dharma Dās. The two Amarmuni traditions continue his line today.

This argument is outlined in Flügel 2003b: 183.

See Flügel forthcoming.
The average number of initiated ascetics is one of the determinants of the status of an ācārya. On average, Bhikṣu initiated 1.13 sādhus and 1.3 sādhvīs per year, Kālū Rām 5.63 sādhus and 9.44 sādhvīs, and Tulsī 4.84 sādhus and 11.13 sādhvīs between 1936 and 1981.

For a statistical analysis of the demographic structure of the Terā Panth order and the motives of renunciation in the year 2001 see Flügel forthcoming.

While his predecessors initiated on average c.20% of minors, Kālū Rām initiated 45.8% under age sādhus and 41.5% under age sādhvīs (Navratnamal 1981: 309, 325). The Terā Panth has not yet followed the example of the Sthānakāvāsī Śramaṇa Saṅgha, which has officially raised the minimum age for initiation for both girls and boys from eight to fourteen.


On the Tārāṇa Svāmī Panth see Cort (in this volume). The Totā Panth and the Gumāna Panth, an eighteenth century splinter group of the Terā Panth, have not yet been studied systematically. For an overview see Sangave 1980: 51–54.

The following historical reconstruction is therefore necessary.

P. Sāstrī 1985b: 537.

No source is given.

'Itiht gach mein nikasau, nūtan terahpanth / solah sai terāsie, so sab jab jānanti /[631]/' (Bakhtrām, in Premī 1912/n.d.: 22).


No original sources of the tradition itself on its origins have been found so far. I follow John Cort’s 2002: 52f., 67–69 summary here.

Narendra Kirti of Amer was bhattāraka between 1634 and 1665 (Premī, cited by Cort 2002: 52).

P. Sāstrī 1985b: 536, cf. p. 538 found the expression ‘terā – bhagavan āp kā panth’ not only in Joghṛām (Joghṛāj) Godīkā’s work, but also in Jān Cand’s work Śrāvakācāra and in the Jaypur Pāṇḍīt Pannālāl’s Terā Panth Kaṇḍan, where also thirteen practices are listed which the tradition rejected – opposing the use of fruits in pījā, the worship of Pāḍmāvatī and other gods and goddesses, etc. (ibid.: 539). For more references see P. Sāstrī 1992: 146–149.

Like the Śvetāmbara Terā Panthīs, the Digambara Terā Panth panḍits exploit the ambiguity of the word terā panth. The two words terā and terah are homonyms: terā means ‘your’ and terah means ‘thirteen’. However, it seems the Śvetāmbara Terā Panthīs prefer to interpret ‘your’ (terā) more in the sense of ‘the people’ rather than ‘God’. Cf. Budhmal 1995: 69–76, Flügel 1994–1995: 123, n. 12, cf. p. 122, n. 9. It is likely that this wordplay is a religio-poetic topos that can be found in other traditions as well.

He refers to a newly found inscription from 950 CE which identifies the Balātkāra Gaṇa with the Sarasvatī Gaccha and the Mūla Saṅgha: ‘vi. sāṃvat 1007 māsottamamāse phālgunamāse suklapakse tīthau catūrthām budhāvāre śrīmūlaśaṅgha sarasvatīgaccha balāṭkāragaṇa thākurasti dās pratīsthān’ (in P. Sāstrī 1985b: 535), and – because the word sūddāmnāya is used in different contexts both for the Terā Panth and the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa – concludes elsewhere that they are one: ‘terāpanth sūddhāmnāya tathā mūlaśaṅgha kundakudāmnāya balāṭkāragaṇa sarasvatīgaccha ye dono ek hain’ (P. Sāstrī 1992: 146).

On the presumed special relationship with the Parvār caste see particularly P. Šāstrī 1992: 114–149.
124 ‘bisapānth arhitā vīsampanth – terhūpanth jīmat mein mānya nahiin’ (Jaina Nibandha Rattāvalī, in P. Śastrī 1985b: 538). The word was apparently coined by Jinendra in his Jñānānand śrāvakācāra which is cited by P. Śastrī with approval (ibid.: 244).
125 Like the Terā Panthīs, the Tārāṇa Panthīs also venerate ‘true’ ascetics. See Tārāṇa Tāraṇa Svāmī 1933, P. Śastrī 1985c, and J. E. Cort (in this volume).
127 Jhaveri’s 1914: 1418–1424 community census counted altogether 450, 584 Digambaras in 1914. For detailed numerical data on Jain castes from this census and the Śvetāmbara Directory of 1909 as well as the Colonial Indian Census see Sangave 1980: 119–121, 124–130.
128 Sangave 1980: 52. This estimate may be too high. According to P. S. Jainī (personal communication), the distinction was totally unknown in South India and is even now rejected by most.
130 Cf. Cort 2002: 62. Earlier, the now extinct ‘heterodox’ Kāśṭhā Śaṅgha was associated with the Agravāls in Rājasthān (K. C. Jain 1963: 72), and the Mūla Śaṅgha, which was dominant in Western India between the fourteenth and the nineteenth century, primarily with the Khaṇḍelvālas (and Parvārs) (ibid.: 73, 103). Both in South India and in North India, close relationships developed between Digambara gacchas and certain jātis or gotras. An important factor for the success of the Terā Panth amongst specific Digambara caste communities seems to have been the long term absence of the institution of the bhāttāraka as a caste guru. Sangave 1980: 318 notes that in the 1950s ‘the Hummāda Mevāḍā, Narasingapurā, Khaṇḍelvāla, Saitavāla, Chaturtha, Pañčāma, Bogāra, Upādkhāya, Vaiśya and Khatriya castes have their separate Bhāttārakas while the Kathanerā, Būdhelā, Agravāla, Gōlapūrva, Jaisavāla, Nevi and Hummāda (from Mahārāṣṭra) castes have no Bhāttāraka system at all. Besides in some castes like Parāvāra, Bannore, Dāhikāda and Bagheravāla the Bhāttāraka system was prevalent formerly but now it is extinct’.
131 Glasenapp 1925: 357 reported that the contrast was so big that the followers of one ‘sect’ do not visit the temples of the other. However, through an unrepresentative survey amongst the Jain laity Sangave 1980: 299 found that ‘among the persons who do not know about their divisions the Digambaras form a larger proportion than the Śvetāmbaras. Besides, it has been stated that there are no such divisions among the Digambaras at present’.
132 ‘The Bīṣapānth-Terāpanth division is not found in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu or southern Maharāshtra’ (Cort 2002: 70, n. 3).
134 Cort 2002: 65 contrasts the lack of organisation of the Adhyāṭma movement with the ‘organisational foundation’ of the Terā Panth which is still influential. However, the organisational capacity of the local temple- and library trusts of the Terā Panthīs is insignificant compared to the old institutions of the bhāttāraka traditions and in particular the (trans-) regionally organised Śvetāmbara sects.
137 See Deo 1956: 360ff. for a beginning.
We have seen that the Sthānakavāṣī also use the terms *samudāya, saṅgha* and *vamśa*. According to Hoernle 1891: 342 āmnāya – ‘succession’ – is a synonym of *kula*, as is the term *santāna. Anvaya* – ‘line’ – can also be used as a synonym. Sangave 1980: 299 presents a less convincing picture of the organisational levels of the Digambara bhāṭṭāraka traditions (*saṅgha, gana, gaccha, sākhā*) than Joharāpurakāra 1958, whose book is still the most detailed study to date.

Joharāpurakāra 1958: 19 noted that the writings of Kunda Kunda were ‘certainly some cause of unease’ among some of the late medieval *bhāṭṭārakas* of the Sena Gaṇa. Allegedly, the 52 *pattṭha* Bhāṭṭāraka Vīr Sena (died 1938) had a great belief in Kunda Kunda’s Samayāsāra (ibid.: 35, n. 20). Many *pattṭāvalīs* of the *bhāṭṭāraka* traditions present Kunda Kunda conventionally as their ancestor, for instance the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa (ibid.: 44, 71, n. 24).


The third leader of the Nandi Saṅgha was apparently Kunda Kunda (Padma Nandin), who is cited as the ancestor of today’s Sarasvatī Gaṇcha of the Nandi line (*anvaya*) which identifies itself with the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa of the Mūla Saṅgha and calls itself Kundakundāṇvaya (Hoernle 1891: 342, 350f.). The early dates for Kunda Kunda have been questioned by Dhaky 1991: 190, and the artificial link to Kunda Kunda by Dundas 2002: 122.


Schubring 2000: § 30, p. 63 cites in this respect also Indra Nandin’s sixteenth century work Nitisāra and the nineteenth century *pattṭāvalīs* translated by Hoernle 1891, 1892.

See M. U. K. Jain 1975: 126–128 for the complex (putative) internal divisions of the Mūla Saṅgha, whose history in South India has not been analysed.


Rāja Śekhara writes in his Saddarśanasamuccaya 21–25 (c.1350): ‘In the Kāśṭhāsaṅgha, the broom is ordained to be made of the yak’s tail. In the Mūlasaṅgha, the brush is made of peacock feathers. The broom has never been an issue in the Islam. The rest greet with “dharma ṽṛddhi”. The Gopyas declare release for women. The three Saṅghas other than the Gopya declare that women cannot attain it. Neither the other three nor the Gopyas hold that an omniscient takes food; There is no release for one wearing a monk’s garb, though he keep the vow well’ (tr. by Folkert 1993: 363). Schubring 1964: 224 mentions that both the Yāpāṇiya and the Kāṭṭhā Saṅgha taught that women can reach salvation.

The view that the North Indian Kāśṭhā Saṅgha is ‘heterodox’ and the Mūla Saṅgha ‘orthodox’ is nowadays – after the disappearance of the Kāśṭhā Saṅgha – expressed by Bīṣa Panthīs and Tērā Panthīs alike, which both claim descent from the Mūla Saṅgha. See P. Śāstrī 1985b.


Glasenapp 1925: 355.


The tradition was first mentioned in Deva Sena’s Darśanasāra. There are two versions of its origins. According to the prevalent version it was founded in the year 753 CE (? Vikram Saṃvat: 696 CE) in the village Nāṇed (Nandiya) in the region of modern Bombay by Ācārya Kumār Sena I of the Pañcaśūpā Saṅgha (Kumārasena II lived around 955). Kumār Sena was a reformer who insisted on the observation of the ‘sixth
amuvrata’, that is, no consumption of food and drink after dark, and on the performance of aonements in accordance with the Digambara Agamas. A later and less popular (and convincing) version relates that Acārya Loha I from the Nandi Saṅgha Balātkāra Gaṇa founded this tradition some 515 years after Mahāvīra. He converted 125,000 members of the Agravāla caste in Agrohā near Hisār, and used wooden (kāṣṭhā) images for the pājā ritual (this story contradicts other legends narrating the origins of this caste). The use of wooden images was strongly opposed by the older Digambara traditions, because it begins to rot after being bathed with milk and water during the traditional paṇca kalyāṇaka pājās. The tradition was also known under the name Gopuccha Saṅgha, because the munis used whisks made of the hair of cow tails rather than peacock feathers (Glasenapp 1925: 356, Varnī 1998 I: 320ff.). According to Joharāpurkara (1958: 211), the name Kāṣṭhā Saṅgha derives from the name of a village near Dillī. From the fourteenth century internal divisions are reported, and at the end of the seventeenth century four distinct branches, such as the older Māthuṛa Gaccha, were established, with important seats in Ārā (Bihār), Hisār (Hariyānā), Surat (Gujārāt), Gvāliyar (Madhya Pradeś) and Kāraṇjā (Mahārāṣṭrā) (ibid.: 6f., 210–212). The acāryas and bhattārakas of this tradition produced important literary works (cf. ibid.: 238–247). The Kāṣṭhā Saṅgha seems to have continued at least till the early nineteenth century and maybe into the twentieth century (cf. Glasenapp 1925: 356, Dundas 2002: 124 citing Col. Tod).

This is again mentioned in Surendra Kirtī’s work Dānāvītra Maṇḍikandra of 1690. See M. U. K. Jain’s (1975: 112–126) extensive description of the sub-divisions of this tradition.

According to both the Darśanasāra (Glasenapp 1925: 356), and the Subhāṣīta Ratnasamdoha of Acārya Amitagati II (993–1026 CE), the founder of the Māthuṛa Gaccha was Muni Rām Sena, who became acārya in 896 CE; but he is not mentioned in the patta vali of the tradition (Varnī 1998: 321f.). He originally belonged to the Kāṣṭhā Saṅgha and rejected both the use of peacock feather and cow hair whisks (pičhi or piñchī). His tradition was therefore called Niśpaccha Saṅgha. He demanded from his disciples the explicit rejection of other gurus, and argued that salvation can only be reached through meditation on the true self (ātmā dhyāna) following the teaching of Kunda Kunda rather that Bhūtabalī and Puspadantā’s Saṭkhandāgama (Darśanapāhuda and Darśanasāra, ibid., Schubring 2000: § 30, p. 62). Until its demise sometime in the nineteenth or twentieth century, the main seats of this gaccha were in Hisār (Rājasthān), Gvāliyar, and Senāgiri (Madhya Pradeś) (Joharāpurkara 1958: 6f., 238–247). Its followers belonged mainly to the North Indian Agravāla caste (ibid.: 13).

Bāgaḍa is a region near Chittor (M. U. K. Jain 1975: 118). Certain branches of the tradition may have predated the formation of the Kāṣṭhā Saṅgha (cf. ibid.: 118–120). It was also called Punnāta Gaccha, with reference to its place of origin in Karnātaka, or Lāḍābāgaḍa Gaccha, with reference to its centre in Gujarāt. It is mentioned in inscriptions between the seventh century and fifteenth century and maintained important seats in Masār (East India) and Kāraṇjā (Mahārāṣṭrā) (Joharāpurkara 1958: 6f., 257–262). Its followers belonged mainly to the Baghērvāl caste (ibid.: 13).

This tradition is mentioned only in two sources of the tenth and fifteenth century (Joharāpurkara 1958: 6f., 263). It apparently re-joined the Lāḍa-Bāgaḍa Gaccha (M. U. K. Jain 1975: 120).

This tradition (also: Vidīyā Gaṇa and Rāmasena-Anvaya) was founded in the fifteenth century in the village Nandīṭaṭ – the modern Nānḍed/Mumbaī. It came to an end in the early nineteenth century. One of its main seats was Sojjīrā in Gujarāt (Joharāpurkara 1958: 6f., 293–299). Its followers belonged mainly to the Hūmaḍa caste (ibid.: 13). The founder of this tradition appears to have been Ratna Kirtī (M. U. K. Jain 1975: 125).

379
The tradition is first mentioned in the prāṣasti of the Uttarapurāṇa of Guṇa Bhadra’s disciple Loka Sena (898 ce) and in inscriptions of the ninth century and of the sixteenth century. It started with Candra Sena, Ārya Nandin and the famous scholastic Vīra Sena (816 ce), the author of the Dhavalā Tīkā of the Satkhandāgama, and is famous for the many important Digambara philosophers such as Samanta Bhadra and Siddha Sena Divākara in its ranks. It had/has seats in Kāraṇī (Akola, Berara) and Kolhāpura (still existing) in Mahārāṣṭra. The tradition was occasionally called Śūrāsthaṅgaṇa and may have been popular in Saurāṣṭra during a certain period. The last bhattāraka of this tradition was apparently Vīra Sena, a great believer in Kunda Kunda’s Samayaśāra, who died sometime between 1850 and 1938 (Joharāpurkara 1958: 6f., 26–38, cf. Upadhye 1948, M. U. K. Jain 1975: 84–88).

The tradition is first mentioned in inscriptions of the tenth century, most of them in Kārnāṭaka. Its branches had seats in Ajmer, Bhānpur, Cittāur, Jaypur, Jehrahaṭ, Nāgaur (Rājaṣṭhān), Åt, Gvāliyav, Senāgiri (Mālvā), Īdār, Surat (Gujārāt), Bhānapur, Jheraḥaṭ, Malakahed and its sub-branches Kāraṇī and Lāṭāur (Mahārāṣṭra). See Joharāpurkara 1958: 6f., 44–47, and the lineage diagram p. 209. The seats had special links to particular local castes, such as the Hūmād caste in Surat, the Lamecū caste in Aṭ, the Parvār caste in Jehrahaṭ and the Khandelvāla caste in Dillī and Jaypur (ibid.: 12). From the tenth (Sāstrī 1985b: 535) or the fourteenth century (Joharāpurkara 1958: 44) the tradition was known under the names Sarasvatī Gaccha, Vāgēśvārī Gaccha, Bhāratī Gaccha, Sāradā Gaccha. The original name seems to have been Balagāra Gaṇa (ibid.: 44. cf. M. U. K. Jain 1975: 88ff.) and Nandi Saṅgha (Hoernle 1891: 350, 1892: 73). In Kananda Balagāra (balegāra) means bangle-maker (a caste name) which was transformed into Śkt. balatkāra or ‘force’ according to A. N. Upadhye. I am grateful to P. S. Jaini for this information.

Joharāpurkara 1958: 71–78. The tradition was established in the late fourteenth/early fifteenth century. The nineteenth and last patīṭa of this branch was Devendra Kirtī, who died in 1916 (ibid.: 76f., n. 29). The Lāṭāur Śākhā split off this line in 1675 (ibid.: 77). Two samādhis have been built for bhattārakas of this tradition (M. U. K. Jain 1975: 90, n. 80).

Joharāpurkara 1958: 86–90. See the picture of Bhavātāraka Viśāl Kirtī (died 1891) and of his successor who was also called Viśāl Kirtī and enthroned in 1914 (ibid.: 89f.). The seat in Lāṭāur is revered by the Saitavāḷa Jains (M. U. K. Jain 1975: 94, n. 92). According to Tuschen (1995: 23), it became defunct only recently.

This tradition started the bhattāraka tradition by introducing the custom of wearing clothes in public. The main seats of this now defunct line, which was first closely connected with the Baghervāla caste and later with the ‘Hūmād’ and Brāhman castes were Surat etc. in Gujārāt, Ajmer, Dillī and Jaypur. After the death of Padma Nandin in 1493, the Uttarā Śākhā branched out into the Īdar, Surat and Dillī-Jaypur Śākhās (Joharāpurkara 1958: 93–96, cf. M. U. K. Jain 1975: 94–96).


In 1477 the Bhānapura Śākhā split off the Īdarā Śākhā. The last bhattāraka was apparently Devacandra (1730–1748). See Joharāpurkara 1958: 166–168. According to M. U. K. Jain 1975: 105 a splinter group of the tradition still prevailed in South India in 1975 (?).

This branch, which became defunct early in the seventeenth century, was closely associated with the Parvār caste (Joharāpurkara 1958: 202–209, cf. Varni 1998 I: 320f.)

After 1514 the tradition split into three branches, two of which are the Nāgaura- and the Atera Sākhā. The last bhāṭṭāraka of the Dillī-Jaypur line was apparently Candra Kirti who either died or was installed in 1918 (Joharāpurkara 1958: 109–113). Cort (2002: 62) writes that the last bhāṭṭāraka, a Candra Kirti, died in 1969 and was deliberately not replaced. The Dillī-Jaypur Sākhā was closely related to the Khandelvāla caste and established special links to the Kachhavāhā kings of Amer, where the bhāṭṭāraka seat was shifted in the sixteenth century (ibid.: 51, cf. Clément-Ojha, forthcoming).

In 1524, Ratna Kirti was appointed as the first head. The last bhāṭṭāraka was apparently Devendra Kirti in the mid-twentieth century (Joharāpurkara 1958: 121–125). Many bhāṭṭārakas belonged to the Chābaḍā and Sethī sub-castes (M. U. K. Jain 1975: 98–101).

This branch split off the Uttara Sākhā in 1493 and was closely associated with the Lamecū caste (Joharāpurkara 1958: 132–135, cf. M. U. K. Jain 1975: 101f.).

The inscriptions artificially incorporate the names of all famous Digambara ācāryas of the past in one lineage.

Joharāpurkara 1958: 44.

Shāntā 1985: 137f.

Until the nineteenth century, the term bhāṭṭāraka was used both by Bīṣa Panthī Digambaras and Mūrtipājikā Śvetāmbaras yatis. Today, it is only used by Bīṣa Panthī Digambaras.

Personal communication of Bhaṭṭārak Lakṣmi Sena, Kolhāpura 4 January 2005.


The Śvetāmbaras list the abhrama-varjana pratimā already on the sixth position, before the sacittā-tyāga pratimā, and call the eleventh stage śramaṇa-bhūta pratimā (Williams 1963: 173).

Williams 1963: 172 notes that the pratimās were originally conceived as a progressive sequence rather than as alternative options. Jaini 1979: 185 suggests that originally each pratimā may have been practiced only of a limited period of time.

Williams 1963: 179 found the first mentioning of this distinction in the eleventh century text Śrīvakadhamadahaka by an unknown Digambara author.

Hiralal Jain’s view that the word ailaika derives from Skt. acella, ‘unclothed’ or ‘partially clothed’, was rejected by Williams 1963: 179, n. 5 who pointed out that the ailaika is characterised explicitly as cela-khanda-dhara in the twelfth century Vasunandi-Śrāvakacārā edited by H. Jain.

If the sources of Williams 1963/1983: 180 are still of influence, then full access to the ‘mysteries’ of the scriptures is not granted to lay ascetics. The initiation rituals of the (Vimala Saṅgha) Digambara munis are detailed in Syādvādmati 2000: 442–452. Their key ritual elements apart from the acceptance of the respective vows (vratāropana) are: the shaving and pulling out of some of the hair (keśa-lūṅcana), change of dress/nakedness (nāgnya-pradāna), change of name (nāma-karana), ritual giving of the peacock feather broom (piccha-pradāna), of the scriptures (śāstra-pradāna), and of the water pot (kamandalu-pradāna) (ibid.: 442). The muni receive a large broom (picchī), and all other (lay) ascetics only a small broom (pičchika). For a commented compilation of other textual sources for the Digambara muni dikṣā see Kanakanand 1994: 214–226. On the basis of incomplete information, Carrithers 1990: 153 suspects that there is little evidence for the existence of a saṅgha in the Digambara dikṣā rituals: ‘there is not even an explicit vow to live in obedience to a guru’ and ‘no formal recognition of a line of pupillary succession’, nor the passing on of a mantra.
(ibid.: 155). He argues that the orientation towards the ‘aesthetic standard of self-restraint’ is the main element in the transmission of tradition (ibid.: 157). Although his general observation is shared by all modern scholars, mantras of a general nature, oriented toward the veneration of the guru, are prescribed in the dikṣā vidhi texts. For instance: ‘ṇamo arhamāṇam… atha gurvāvalim pathitvā, amukasya amukanāṁma tvam śisyā iti kathayitvā samyamādyupakaraṇāṇi dadyāt’ (Syādvādmatī 2000: 447). One of the mantras used for the inauguration of an ācārya is: ‘oṁ hariṃ śriṁ arham saḥ ācāryāya namah. ācāryamantra’ (p. 482).


187 Bhaṭṭārakas do not have many śisyas and often ask dedicated followers to send their young sons to take boarding and lodging in their mathas to receive religious training in addition to their secular school education.

188 This happened in the case of Jina Sena of the Nāndaṁī matha.

189 Since the generic name is apparently associated with the bhaṭṭāraka lineage there are at least three Lākṣmī Senas, of the mathas in Kolhāpura, Jīnākāṭci and Sīhanagadde (Penagonda in Andhra Pradesh), amongst the contemporary bhaṭṭārakas.

190 According to Premī 1912, n.d.: 27, the bhaṭṭāraka dikṣā is – in principle – similar to a muni dikṣā. The bhaṭṭāraka can therefore not be categorised as a layman. The ritual, he writes, is prescribed in an ancient book in the Bhaṭḍār of Īdar. There it is stated that a layman can only be installed as a bhaṭṭāraka when the search for a worthy muni has failed. The initiation requires the nakedness of the candidate and the ritual plucking of the hair (keśa luṇcana). After receiving the sūri mantra, the candidate is attributed with the qualities of an ācārya, and continues to practise nakedness when he eats his meals and during certain ceremonies: ‘is se sāph mālīṁ hotā hai ki, bhaṭṭārak vāstav men grhastha naṁṁm hai, muni tathā ācārya haim’ (ibid.: 28). Johārāpurkār, interviewed by Shāntā 1985: 186, n. 99, emphasised that even today’s bhaṭṭārakas continue to accept five ‘mahāvratas’ (effectively anuvratas), not only four as often mentioned in the literature, for instance in Flügel 2003a: 8. According to Carrithers 1990: 151, ‘the method of succession was derived not from any Jain prescriptions but from the usages of local polity’. This impression is echoed by the views of the bhaṭṭārakas Jina Sena and Lākṣmī Sena (personal communication 2–4 January 2004).


193 Dates according to M. U. K. Jain 1975: 95f.

194 According to Bhaṭṭāraka Lākṣmī Sena of Kolhāpura, the name of the first bhaṭṭāraka of the Sena Gaṇa was Vidyā Sāgar and the first mathas were established in Dilli, Kolhāpura, Jīnākāṭci (Tamil Nādu) and Penagonda (Andhra Pradesh) – the mathas of his associates. Personal communication, Kolhāpura 4 January 2005. V. Śāstrī 1932: 5–7 gives the line of succession of Vidyā Sāgar, whose samādhī is in Akīvāt/Zīlā Cikoḍī. It comprises some mūnis, but ends with Bhaṭṭāraka Vidyā Mān (r. 1904 ff.), whose conduct is unfavourably contrasted with Muni Śānti Sāgar’s.

196 See Sangave 2001: 136. In 1875–1876, Bühler 1878: 28 visited a bhāṭṭāraka in Delhi, who was accompanied by ‘ascetics (who are called pāṇḍīts)’. Bühler described the bhāṭṭārakas he had met during his travels as ‘very ignorant’. This statement was still echoed by Sangave 1980: 321f. 100 years later. See Cort (in this volume p. 299 n.9) on the Canderī seat of Bhattāraka Devendrakīrti.

197 Personal communication by the Jain Bhavan in Bangalore 31 December 2005 and by Bhattāraka Jina Sena, Nāndāni 2 February 2005, who seems to be the only bhāṭṭāraka who currently has a disciple, Brahmacārī Vṛṣabhū Sena. According to Tuschen 1997: 23, the seats of Bhaṭṭāraka Viśālakīrti in Lāṭūr in Mahārāṣṭra (traditionally associated with the Saitavāla caste) and Bhaṭṭāraka Yaśākīrti in Pratāpgarh in Rājāsthān (traditionally associated with the Narasiṅhapaṇa caste), which are mentioned by Sangave 2001: 135, are now defunct. This would leave only nine bhāṭṭārakas. For the names of more than thirty-six old bhāṭṭāraka seats see Joharāpurkara 1958: 6f., M. U. K. Jain 1975: 131, Sangave 2001: 134. In addition to the seats that can be linked to specific traditions, Joharāpurkara 1958: 6f. mentions a number of other, now equally defunct, seats in Eastern India (Ārā), Gujarāt (Navasārī, Bhadaurī, Khambhāt, Jāmbūsar, Ghoghāhī, Mālāvā (Devgārī, Dharārī Nagārī, Lalitpur, Mahūvā, Dūṅgarpūr, Indaur, Sāgavādā, Ater) and Mahārāṣṭra (branches in Riddhipur, Bālpur, Rāmātak, Nāndēd, Devgīrī, Paiṭhān, Sirād, Vaṇṭ, Vairātt, Vāphād, Malakhyed, Kāryarāṇjapark, etc.). There is currently no information on the old seats in the Paṇṭjā, only on various seats in Dillī. Apart from Merāṭh and Hastināpura, there are no bhāṭṭāraka seats reported from Uttar Pradeś. Sangave 2001: 134 mentions the additional seats of Jērehāt, Keśārīyājī, Mahāvīrījī (Rājāsthān), Sonāgīrī (Mālāvā), Bhanpur, Sojitrā, Kalol (Gujārāt), Nāgpūr, Nāndāni (Mahārāṣṭra), Narasiṅhājapura (Karnātaka), Svādī in Sondā (Karnātaka) and Melasittamā, that is Jinakāṇcī (Tamīl Nādu).

198 The seat was established in the eighth century and belongs to the Mūla Saṅgha Kundakundānīvāya Nandi Saṅgha Sarasvatī Gaccha Balākārī Gana (Tuschen 1997: 28). It is associated with the Bogāra caste (Sangave 1980: 318, 2001: 137) and governed by Bhaṭṭāraka Devendrakīrti.

199 Associated with the Kṣatiṛiya caste (ibid.), and governed by Bhaṭṭāraka Lalitkīrti.

200 Associated with the Paṇcama caste (ibid.), and governed by Bhaṭṭāraka Laksṃī Sena I (I add Roman numbers to distinguish bhāṭṭārakas with the same title). The seat has two other mathas under its administration, in Hosūr-Bīgārvīr and Rāyībāg, and is associated with the Sena Gaṇa mathas in Dillī, Jinakāṇcī and Penagōṇḍa (Saṅhanagaddī in Narasiṅhājapura). For Laksṃī Sena’s works see for instance Sangave 2003.

201 Also called Jinakāṇcī. Associated with the Kṣatiṛiya and Vaiśyā castes and governed by Bhaṭṭāraka Laksṃī Sena III of the Sena Gaṇa (Sangave 2001: 137).

202 Traditionally associated with the Upāḍhīyāya caste (ibid.). According to P. S. Jaini (personal communication), the last two, including the current Bhaṭṭāraka Cārūkīrti II, who is a non-Shetty (Śreṣṭhī) Jain, were not of that caste. There is a Trust comprising members of all three local castes (Shetty, non-Shetty, Upāḍhīyāya) who selected the current bhāṭṭāraka (on suggestion of Bhaṭṭāraka Cārūkīrti of Śrāvanabeḷagola). The seat is associated with the Caturtha caste (ibid.), ‘the only caste among the Janias which follows agriculture as the main occupation’ (Sangave 1980: 96), and is governed by Bhaṭṭāraka Jina Sena. The seat has three other mathas under its administration, in Kolhāpura, Tesdāl and Belgārvīr – and in the past also in Dillī.

203 Associated with the Bogāra (and Kṣatiṛiya and Vaiśyā) caste and governed by Bhaṭṭāraka Laksṃī Sena II of the Sena Gaṇa (Sangave 2001: 137).

204 The current seat was established in the tenth century and derives its descent from the Mūla Saṅgha Deśīya Gaṇa Pustaka Gaccha. It is associated with the Vaiśyā caste (ibid.) and occupied by Bhaṭṭāraka Cārūkīrti I.

205 A summary table of the relationship between specific castes and their principal bhāṭṭāraka seats can be found in Sangave 1980: 318. There were only nine bhāṭṭāraka
Many castes of the Jains were founded by ācāryas and/or bhāttārakas. The most important Śvetāmbara castes are the Ośvāls and the Śrīmāls. Of the Digambara Kāṣṭhā Saṅgha, the Ndīttat Gacch leader Rām Sena founded the Narasinhapura caste, his pupil Nemi Sena the Bhāṭṭāpurā caste, and the Ratnākār caste was apparently founded by Devendra Kirti I. Of some Digambara castes the exogamous subgroups (gotra) or/and their dasa and bisa sub-categories are associated with different branches of the main bhāttāraka traditions. The Bhaghrvāla caste was partly founded by the Mūla Saṅgha ācārya Rām Sena (25 gotras) and partly by the Kāṣṭhā Saṅgha ācārya Loha (27 gotras). The Nāgaur branch of the Balāṭkāra Gaṇa commanded the following of several gotras of the Khandelvāla caste etc. (Joharāpurkara 1958: 13).

The bhāttārakas of the Humaḍa, Narasinhapura and Khaṇḍelvāla castes until recently selected their own successor (?) Kālōl, Narasinhapura), while the bhāttāraka of the Saitavāla, Caturthā, Paṅcama, Upādhiyāya, Bōgāra, Vaśyā and Kṣatriya castes were chosen by the representatives (paṇcika) of these castes (Sangave 1980: 319f.). The only exception is the influential seat of Srvanabelagol, whose bhāttāraka is since 1931 chosen by a committee of lay followers which is selected by the Government of Karnāṭaka (ibid., Tuschen 1997: 33). Sangave 1980: 319–321 found that only the bhāttārakas of the Humaḍa caste could be removed by their followers in the past. Although they preside over a particular caste, the bhāttārakas do not need to be member of the caste and ideally represent all Jains. Laksṇmi Sena of Kolhāpura, for instance, was born in Tamil Nādu into the Saitavāla caste, but presides over the Paṅcama caste.

In 1945, the Land Sealing Act of Karnāṭaka led to the acquisition of most landholdings of the bhāttārakas by the government in exchange for monetary compensation, whose ownership is in many cases still disputed in the courts between the Digambara laity and the bhāttārakas.

According to Shāntā 1985: 134f., the munis apparently entirely disappeared in the seventeenth century.

Shāntā 1985: 134f. A modest revival of the institution of the bhāttāraka was triggered recently because of the desire to spread Jainism across the borders of India and because of a renewed interest in community education. In response to modern demands, the bhāttārakas made themselves accessible to members of other castes than their own and created – without much success – a common institutional platform in 1969 and arranged the first bhāttāraka sammelan (Sangave 2001: 143), which was followed by several others.

Carrithers 1989: 150. In 1926–7, Rāvijī Sakhārām Doṣī, in G. P. Jauharī, in V. Śāstrī 1932: 7f., and G. P. Jauhari of the Akhīl Bhrāṭavrāṣṭha Digambara Jain Mahāsabha (ibid.: 56f.,) emphasised the need to re-introduce the munis to North India to propagate true religion (‘jain dhharma ki yathārthha tathā utkṛṣṭa prabhāvanā’), and unity amongst all Digambara societies in India (ibid.: 84–86).

Most Khaṇḍelvālas live in North India, where no bhāttāraka seats exist anymore.

Some of the first disciples of Śānti Sāgara, such as Vir Sāgar and Candra Sāgar, were Khandelvāla. See D. Śāstrī 1985.

S. C. Jain 1940: 3f. In the twentieth century, after an earlier failure of transregional sect-caste associations, a number of Digambara Jain caste associations were established with the intention of reforming the Digambara community and creating
transregional solidarities amongst geographically dispersed North Indian castes with a dominant Digambara Jain membership. The Jain Khaṇḍelvāḷa Mahāsābhā, for instance, which was founded in 1920, is today organised into 15 prāṇtas, or regions. Other examples are the Baghervāḷ Jain Mahāsābhā and the Jain Padmāvatī Porvāḷ Mahāsābhā. Similar organisations which strive to establish independent sect-castes are relatively rare among Śvetāmbara Jains, whose transregional organisations are usually founded exclusively on religious criteria (Kāsalvāḷ 1992: 14f.). Cf. R. K. Jain 1999: 67.

216 The anti-printing movement called itself Śastra-Mudraṇa Virodhi Āndolana: ‘Murder threads were made against those involved in printing, and printing shops were blown up’ (Sangave 1981/2001: 62).

217 At the time, Jain castes were generally divided in at least two ranked sections: the lower dasa and the higher bīsa sub-castes. The following social reforms were advocated by the Pariśād: 1. child widow remarriage (bāla-vidhīvā vivāha); 2. marriage across caste boundaries; 3. allowing members of dasa families to participate in the pūjā pāṭha, etc., within a society where mixed dasa-bīsa marriages were practised; 4. abolition of death feasts (marāṇa bhojana); 5. abolition of excessive feasts and gift-giving at pratiṣṭhā ceremonies (new pratiṣṭhā pāṭha: as a rule only old images should be consecrated); 6. raising the status of women through the foundation of women’s institutions (S. C. Jain 1940: 3f.).

218 Kāsalvāḷ 1992: 11f. In 1902, the influential Bhāratavāṣya Digambara Jain Tīrtha Kṣetra Kameṭi (BDJTKK) was founded by Manikcand Hīrācand Jauhari (1851–1913) in Bombay as a sub-committee of the Mahāsābhā. It became independent on 24 November 1930 and still has its office in the Hīrābaig Dharmasālā compound in Mumbāi, owned by the Jauhari family trust. For administrative reasons, it divided India into six zones. Another national association, the Digambara Jain Mahāsāmītī, was set up in 1974 by Sāhū Sānti Prasād in New Delhi for the promotion of Digambara unity during the year celebrating Mahāvīra’s 2500th death day. In contrast to the Mahāsābhā, which is composed of individuals, it is organised in the form of a ‘Jain samsad’, or parliament, that is, on the basis of regional representatives (Kāsalvāḷ 1992: 12f.). However, after the death of its founder, the organisation failed to deliver and is now defunct. In 1983, the Kundakunda-Kaṅkā Tīrtha Rakṣā Trust was founded in order to promote the worship of Kāṇjī Svāmī (who declared himself to be a Digambara Tera Panthi) in his putative reincarnation as the tīrthānkarā Sūrya Kīrtī. This was in 1985 vigorously opposed both by the Mahāsābhā, whose patron saints were Muni Dharma Śāgara and Āryikā Jñān Mātā in Hastinapura, and by the Mahāśāmītī, whose patron saint was Muni Vidyānand in 1985. However, the main representatives of the Mahāśāmītī, the Sāhū Jain family (Times of India) and Premečand Jain (Jayna Watch Co.) in Delhi, had once supported Kāṇjī Svāmī and failed to join the united front against the Kanjī Panth supporters at Sonagādh (R. K. Jain 1999: 114–117). The Meerut Court decided on the 6 December 2000 that Kāṇjī Panthīs are not Digambara Jains (case no. 9/91, quoted by N. K. Jain, jain friends@yahoogroups.com, 21 June 2001). Both the Mahāsābhā and the Mahāśāmītī are dominated by Khaṇḍelvāḷs. A rival organisation to the Tīrtha Kṣetra Kamaṭī, the Jaina Samrakṣan Māṭī, was recently set up in Jaypur, in order to protect old temples from partial demolition and reconstruction under instructions of modern munīs.

219 V. Śastrī 1932: 5 lists a number of ‘nigranṭha bhaftārakas’ for the beginning of the nineteenth century. See Carrithers 1990: 148f. and Cort 2002: 71, n. 8 for further references on the so-called nirvāṇ svāmīs, who did not travel much and seemed to have dressed themselves in public.


221 Ibid., citing Digambara Jain 9, 1: 18–23, ed. Mūlcaṃd Kiṃḍaṃdā Kaḍapaṭīyā, Surat.
Eternal lights in the form of oil-lamps can be found at a variety of samāḍhi mandiras for Digambara munis; for instance at the Vimal Sāgar Samāḍhi Mandira in Madhuban.

Ibid.: 159, citing Digambara Jain, Special Issue, 1916.

Carrières 1990: 155.


Ibid. His name was Vardhamān Sāgar according to D. Sāstrī 1985: 54.

K. P. Jain 1932: 159. His name was Devappā Svāmī according to D. Sāstrī 1985: 55. Carrières 1990: 155 identifies Devendra Kārttī as a bhaṭṭāraka.


Cf. C. R. Jain 1931, Ghoshal 1932.

The original announcement of G. P. Jauhari was published in 1926 in the journal Jaina Bodhaka. It was reprinted by V. Sāstrī 1932: 46–48, whose book gives a detailed account of this momentous pilgrimage.

One should assume that the visit to Mount Śikhar would have helped the pending court cases between Digambara, Śvetāmbaras, and the Government concerning the control of the site.


Ibid.

Ibid.: 3–5, Kāsālivāl 2001: 26–29. Sūrya Sāgar’s main disciples were Vijay Sāgar, Ānand Sāgar, Padma Sāgar and Ksullaka Cidānand. Vimal Sāgar’s main disciples were Nirmal Sāgar, Sumati Sāgar, Kunthu Sāgar and Ksullaka Dharma Sāgar.

For one view of the resulting structure, see Kāsālivāl 1998: n.p.

D. Sāstrī 1985, Rājkul Jain 2003: 213–221. Dates were converted with the computer program of M. Yano and M. Fushimi: http://ccnic15.kyoto-su.ac.jp/yanom/pancanga


Āryikās never receive foods in their hands nor in a standing posture, and apparently do not perform keśa luṭėcana.

The ailaikas, kṣullakas and kṣullikās are also called tyā吉ś. See R. K. Jain 1999: 80.

Similar debates on the status of women are known from early on (Jaini 1991). According to some early medieval Digambara scriptures, at least some medieval Digambara or Yāpaniya traditions also formed a four-fold saṅgha, with nuns being recognised as mendicants rather than as laypeople (Schubring 2000: § 30, p. 61).

Personal communications by different Digambara śrāvakas.

This is emphasised in a proclamation by Ācārya Vimal Sāgar 23 October 1993, reprinted in Brahmācārīnī Mainābāi Jain 1996: xv, which requests the laity to mediate the ‘foolish’ disputes between the two lineages with reference to the common Āgamas: ‘samāj kā kartavya hai ki kisi kā vivād na karke donon ācārya paramparā ko āgam sammat mānakar vātsalya se dharma prabhāvanā kareim.’ The writings of Ādī Śāgar were published by B. M. Jain 1996.


His death memorial is in Madhuban at Sammet Śikhara.
The desire to become an ācārya and the abolishment of the once prevalent practice that an ācārya can be enthroned only after the death of his predecessor have contributed to the creation of many splits and independently roaming ācāryas (personal communication by Niraj Jain, 12 June 2003).

According to Kāsaliṅgā 2001: 35 he was a disciple of Mahāvīr Kūrti.


According to D. Sāstri 1985: 411–413. According to Ācārya Puspadanta, he was a disciple of Śānti Sāgar ‘Dakṣin’ (personal communication, Mumbai 24 October 2003). He was born in Kothalpur in Belgaum in Karnātaka and died on the 22 May 1987.

Vir Sāgar ‘Solapur’ is said to have been close to Kānji Svāmī’s views, though his interpretation of the texts was slightly different.

This line is also claimed by the bhaṭṭāraka of Hūmāchā today.

Copaṭe 1936.


According to Dhaky (1991), this is because of ‘the profound reverence and a very false notion as regards the antiquity of Kundakunda-ācārya’ (ibid.: 203, n. 30).


Personal communication of Niraj Jain, 16.6.2003.

Including, occasionally, demolishing old temples in order to replace them with new ones.

The Agravāla Digambaras, who are dominant in the Pañjāb and in U.P., belong also to mixed Hindu-Jain caste.

Critics ask: ‘Why only cows?’

‘vitarāg sādhu kā ko partpanh naḥṁ hotā’ (P. Šāstri 1985b: 540).


Saletore 1940: 124.

For information on the contemporary Digambara ascetics I wish to thank in particular Dr A. Jain, Dr N. L. Jain, Niraj Jain and Manish Modi.


In 2002, only Ācārya Vidyā Sāgar provided complete data to B. U. Jain 2002: 324.

For 1996, B. U. Jain 1996: 326 gives the following sums, which differ from the detailed information on individual ascetic groups in his own text: 36 ācāryas, 143 cāturmāśa places, 352 munis, 305 āryikās and a total of 657 mendicants. For want of additional information, I was unable to check the extent of the inaccuracy of the figures. I met Muni Ānand Sāgar, who is now an upādhyaśya, in 1981. He was then alone and apparently still is. In 1992, I observed that the group of Kunthu Sāgar had in all 34 ascetics, 18 munis, 3 kṣullakas, 2 ailakas and 11 āryikās, a figure which seems to corroborate B. U. Jain’s numbers for 1987. The subsequent decrease in numbers can be explained by Ācārya Kanak Nandī’s separation from Kunthu Sāgar in the early 1990s. My third example shows that the true number of ascetics must be much higher. Ācārya Rayan Sāgar who is not included in the table, is listed by B. U. Jain as a single individual
without mentioning the number of ascetics accompanying him. In 1999, his group had 8 members: 1 ācārya, 1 upādhyāya, 4 mūnis, 1 ailaka and 1 ksullaka.

Roman alphabet.

The word saṅgha is used for groups of two and more ascetics.

On the definition of these categories as ‘novices’ see Carrithers 1990: 153, Flügel 2001: 76f.

There is no equivalent female category because ailakas (elaka) can wear only one loin cloth, which is not considered to be proper for women.

The ailacārya corresponds to the upādhyāya amongst the Śvetāmbaras. The Digambara word elacārya is an ancient designation for ‘a pontiff of the highest learning and for a qualified teacher of Jain doctrines, a position more or less equivalent of vācaka, vācanacārya, or ksamāśramana or mahattara in the ancient Northern Nirgrantha of which the Śvetāmbara Church is the off-shoot. Once a pontiff received the ecclesiastical title of elacārya his original monastic appellation apparently went into the background’ (Dhaky 1991: 191).

The chosen successor, who is called yuvācārya among the Śvetāmbaras.

The titles have been given to only nine monks by the ācāryas Sanmati Sāgar (ācāryakalpa and bālācārya), Kunthu Sāgar (ācāryakalpa 2x, and ailacārya), Ajit Sāgar (ācāryakalpa), and Sumati Sāgar (ailacārya) (A. Jain 2001: 11).

For their names, see B. U. Jain’s and A. Jain’s publications.

This is evident in the mixed composition of the ācāryas’ groups documented by A. Jain 2001: 1–11. See also Zydenbos 1999: 296f.; who cites questionable estimates that no more than 10–15 Digambara saṅghas, headed by an ācārya, exist.

The other bigger saṅghas are those of Ācārya Dharma Sāgar’s successors Abhinandan Sāgar and Vardhaman Sāgar, Deś Bhūṣān’s successors Bāhubali Sāgar and Subal Sāgar, and Vimal Sāgar’s successor Virāg Sāgar. Cf. A. Jain 2001: 1–11.

The accuracy of the data is confirmed by the identical names in A. Jain’s lists. Through the comparison with the names listed by B. U. Jain (2002) the independently roaming groups of munis and āryikās under the command of Vidyā Sāgar can be clearly identified. In 2001 the saṅgha had 188 members: 63 munis, 10 ailakas, 113 āryikās and 2 ksullakas. The changes between 2001 and 2002 are minimal: in 2002 the group had 3 more divisions of altogether 2 more independently roaming munis, but 2 members less in the ācārya’s group, 4 āryikās less, and 2 ksullakas less (A. Jain 2001). The munis were divided into 17 divisions: the ācārya’s group, with 39 members (38 munis including the ācārya and 1 ailaka), and 16 other groups of altogether 25 munis. In addition, 1 unit of 2 ailakas roaming together, and 7 ailakas and 2 ksullakas wandering alone. The 113 āryikās were divided in 17 divisions, which altogether represented 23.6% of all 72 divisions of Digambara nuns.

The word ‘group’ is not really applicable.

R. K. Jain 1999: 80 describes these ‘yāgīs’, or renouncers, as regionally oriented ‘priests’ which can be compared to the bhaṭṭārakas, a hypothesis which still needs to be tested.

According to B. U. Jain 1999: 372f., Vidyā Sāgar’s order is the only mendicant group where the āryikās do not spend cāturmāsā at the same location as the munis.

Six groups of altogether forty seven āryikās spent cāturmāsā Kāraṇjā in Mahārāṣtra (B. U. Jain 2002: 310).


Zydenbos 1999: 295. Svarna Matī (1), Viśuddha Matī (1), and Ananta Matī (1) are listed by D. Sāstrī 1985: 555, 567.

It happens that individuals, though initiated by other munis, are counted under the name of their new ‘dikṣā guru’ after changing to a new saṅgha. Personal communication by Nīrāj Jain, June 2003.
This is one of the biggest differences between Digambara ācāryas and bhaṭṭārakas as well as Śvetāmbara ācāryas.

See also Zydenbos 1999: 297.

This is the oldest method amongst the modern munī sāṅghas according to Ācārya Puspadanta (personal communication Mumbai 24 October 2003).


An estimated figure of 10% was cited to me, which may be exaggerated.

The data are too unreliable to attach much significance to specific changes, such as the diminishing percentage of male mendicants.

See Fohr’s article in this volume.


These percentages do not reflect a similar share of the Jain laity, for which no reliable data are available. Many Digambaras are affiliated to reformist lay traditions without separate ascetic orders. The regional, caste and class background of the ascetics also varies. Most of the ascetics of the Śrāmaṇa Sāṅgha and the independent Sthānakavāśī traditions stem from the Osval and Śrīmālī castes in Rājaśṭhān, Madhya Pradeś, Mahārāṣṭra and the Pañjāb, but also from southern India (Śhāntā 1985: 333). The Gujārāt Sthānakavāśī traditions and the Tāpā Gaccha groups recruit their ascetics almost exclusively in Gujārāt and amongst the Gujārātī population in Mumbāi, the Kharatara Gaccha and the Śvetāmbara Terā Panthı in Rājaśṭhān, and the Digambara groups mainly in Karnāṭaka and Madhya Pradeś, to name only the most important mendicant traditions. The average size of the itinerant groups in 1999 was 4–5 in all four traditions (Mürtipūjaka 4.6, Sthānakavāśī 4.2, Terā Panthı 5.69, Digambara 5.05).

The comparison is only meaningful because of the ‘improvement in reporting of religion’ in the censuses after 1971 (M. K. Jain 1986: 35). The doubling of the absolute number of Jains recorded in the censuses of 1951–1971 (which is not matched by the mendicant population) is generally interpreted as an effect of under-reporting during the colonial period. If this is true, then it must be concluded that – relative to the total population of India – the number of Jains is continually declining.

A variant of this approach is M. Spiro’s theory of renunciation as a psychological defense-mechanism, which has been applied to the Jain case by Goonasekere 1986: 179f.

This figure more than doubles, if nuns and novices are included. See Bechert 1973: 580f.

The 2000 edition of the Vatican’s Annuario Pontificio, gives for 1998 the figure of 57,813 monks and 814,779 nuns (ratio 1: 14). The monastic population as a whole represented 0.086% of all Roman Catholics. Overall numbers are declining, especially the population of nuns, which was 990,768 in 1978: http://www.sspxasia.com/Countires/World/News/Archive.htm

For data confirming this for the Terāpanthıs see Flügel forthcoming.

‘Socioeconomically troubled families, especially those of the middle classes, often seek relief from their frustrations and insecurities by becoming religious’ (Goonasekere 1986: 123).

Vallely 2002: 197 tried to solve the problem through re-definition: ‘Within the order, desire to belong to the group, or attraction to a charismatic leader, is not treated as a
“social” motivation, stemming from worldliness. Instead, it too is seen as evidence of a spiritual purity.’


308 ‘field investigations have revealed that this is more an accusation and a speculation than reality’ (Goonasekere 1986: 179f.).

309 E.g. Bordiyā 1975: 265–80. Reasons which are rarely cited in the literature are (a) recruitment drives to satisfy the formal requirement of Mūrtipūjaka monks to have disciples in order to be able to advance in the monastic hierarchy, (b) family pressure informed by material considerations.

310 ‘In the decades since Independence, with the rise in health standards, this [widows becoming śādhis, P.F.] has changed. Most Jain women are now married when they are in their early or mid 20s, and so even if they become widows they most likely have had children. Having to raise the children means that becoming a śādhī is less of a realistic option for a widow. Changing social attitudes toward widows also makes it less likely that a Jain widow feels that she has little choice but to become a śādhī. . . . Today the vast majority of śādhīs have never been married; becoming a śādhī is now seen as an alternative vocation to that of a housewife’ (Cort 1989: 111f.).

311 Most but not all śādhīs come from Jain families, while an increasing number of śādhus are recruited from non-Jain tribal communities who seek material improvements through the association with the Jains. An unresolved difficulty for this interpretation is that, for reasons of tradition, educational opportunities are limited for Mūrtipūjaka śādhīs.

312 In a personal conversation, the Tapā Gaccha ācārya Jay Sundar Sūri stated that men believe in ‘heroism’, while women are ‘more impressionable, more spiritual’ (Mumbai 23 October 2003). An investigation of the self-reported motives of Terā Panth mendicants showed, however, that ‘religious’ reasons were more prevalent amongst śādhus rather than śādhīs (Flügel, forthcoming). Jay Sundar Sūri’s disciples Prem Sundar Vijay and Harṣad Vijay explained the increasing number of (male) mendicants with the increasing wealth of the Jain community, which now can afford to lose valuable workforce and to feed a growing community of materially dependent mendicants. Apparently, nowadays families of renouncers are more supportive than in the past (Mumbai 1 November 2003).

313 By 1982, nine ācāryas alone had initiated some 300 ascetics (munis, ailakas, ksullakas, āryikās, ksullikās): Sāntī Sāgar (20), Vīr Sāgar (23), Śiv Sāgar (28), Dharma Sāgar (61), Vidyā Sāgar (18), Deś Bhūṣān (33), Mahāvīr Kṛttī (24), Sammati Sāgar (26), Vimal Sāgar (65) (D. Sāstrī 1985).

314 At the moment, the increased mobility of the laity compensates only for the migration from rural to urban locations and abroad.

Bibliography


——. ‘A Fifteenth Century Digambara Mystic and his Contemporaries Followers: Târaṇ Taran Svâmī and the Târaṇ Svâmī Panth’. (in this volume).


——. ‘Three Further pattavalis of the Digambaras’. Indian Antiquary 21 (1892) 57–84.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN JAINA MONASTICISM

——. 393


Klatt, Johannes. ‘The Samachari-Satakam of Samayasundara and Pattavalis of the Anchala-Gachcha and other Gachchas (Revised with Additions by Ernst Leumann)’. Indian Antiquary 23 (1894) 169–183.


——. ‘Āhāra dāna, the Gift of Food to Digambara Ascetics (muni)’. Purushartha (forthcoming).


Part V

PROPERTY, LAW AND ETHICS
ARCHITECTURAL, SCULPTURAL
AND RELIGIOUS CHANGE

A new interpretation of the
Jaina temples at Khajuraho

Julia A. B. Hegewald

Introduction: the continuity of religious sites

It is a common feature of sacred architecture throughout the world that at times of political conflict, of changes in population or of religious belief in an area, sites sanctified by one religious sect have frequently been appropriated by the followers of other faiths. Well-known examples of this are the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem¹ and the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul. In some cases changes in the denomination of religious buildings have happened peacefully, by the adoption of deserted and decaying religious buildings and their conversion to the requirements of a new faith. Sometimes, however, the destruction and forceful re-appropriation of active places of worship have also been used as potent symbols of victory and proof of superiority by different peoples asserting their power. Ancient sacred sites are, however, not only potent places in political but also in religious geography. The latter derives its significance from the fact that holy sites are generally regarded to be qualitatively different from ordinary space. They are places where a break between the different hierarchical levels and spheres of the religious cosmos enables contact and communication with the divine.²

In South Asia, there are ample examples of the forcible expropriation of religious sites during the period of Muslim invasion and domination. Well-known examples are the Quwwat al-Islām Mosque (1197 CE) in Delhi (Dillī) and the Arhāī-din-kā-jhonprā Mosque (1199 CE) in Ajmer (Ajmīr). In Delhi, a large number of Hindu and Jaina temples and at Ajmer, a Jaina theological college (erected in 1153 CE), were destroyed and completely dismantled. The old building material was reused to build new edifices of the Islamic faith on the sacred sites. Although the mosques were constructed from the ruins of Hindu and Jaina edifices, and therefore display decorative elements associated with those religions, in layout and design the mosques do not resemble the former religious edifices.
Robert Hillenbrand argues that such a ‘naked assertion of power’ is typical of the early period of the Islamic conquest and is followed by a more subtle and persuasive approach. There are, however, also examples from later periods in the history of Islam in India where religious sites were forcibly islamicized: for instance, the Bina-Niv-ki-Masjid at Anantpeth in Ujjain (Ujjasī), constructed out of the remains of a Jaina temple in about 1400 CE, and the Bīja Maṇḍal Mosque at Vīdisha (Vīdīśā), originally a Hindu temple from the eleventh or twelfth century, destroyed and converted by Aurangzeb (Ālamgīr) in the seventeenth century.

The Muslims were, however, not the first to annex and convert ancient local places of worship, and there is a long tradition of the continuity of religious sites in South Asia. Sacred locations which were used for Vedic sacrifices were appropriated and converted by later forms of Brahmanism, Buddhist sites were reconfigured for Hindu worship and there was much mutual appropriation between Hindu and Jaina religious buildings. In these cases, the temples were usually not completely dismantled. The main religious images were replaced and the edifices were altered to a certain extent to adapt them to the distinct ritual of the new religion. Examples where Jaina temples were adopted and converted into Śaivite temples are the Śvetāmbara Jaina temple at Bijolia (Bijauliyā) in Rajasthan, now called the Undeśvara Temple, and the Digambara Jaina temple in the village of Hallur near Bagalkot (Bāgalkoth) in northern Karnataka. In both cases, prominent Jaina figures still adorn the temple exterior although their shrines (garbha-grha) now house Śiva liṅgas.

Because of the powerful position of Hinduism in India today, it is much rarer to find examples where Hindu temples have been adapted to Jaina worship. I would like to propose in this chapter that two examples illustrating this point, which show how Hindu temples were appropriated and altered by the Jaina community, are the Pārvatī and Ādinātha Temples at Khajuraho (Khajurāho) in Madhya Pradesh. The discussion of these two temples, with particular attention to the larger and more elaborate Pārvatī Temple, will form the focus of this chapter.

The Jaina temples at Khajuraho

The temples at Khajuraho were constructed between the late ninth and the early twelfth centuries. The city was one of the capitals of the Chandellas who ruled the area of Jekābhukti, known today as Bundelkhand. Whilst the Hindu temples of the so-called Western Group have been well researched and documented in detail, the temple structures to the east of the village, today comprising mainly Jaina edifices, have received much less scholarly attention. The Eastern Group consists of four large Digambara Jaina temples: the ruined Ghaṇṭī Temple, the Pārvatī Temple (Figure 13.1), the Ādinātha Temple (Figure 13.2) and the Śāntinātha Temple. It also includes several smaller Jaina shrines, many of them constructed either on the foundations of earlier structures, or out of the reused building material of previous temples. A large number of Jaina images, the earliest bearing
inscriptions from the beginning of the eleventh century, were uncovered in the area and are now housed in the small Government Museum next to the complex of Jaina temples. It is noteworthy that although several art historians have drawn attention to the prominent Hindu imagery on the walls of the Pārśvanātha and the Ādinātha Jaina Temples, few have even begun to question the belief that these edifices were originally built as Jaina shrines. It appears that so far no research has analysed the structure of the buildings in sufficient detail to suggest that they were initially designed for Hindu worship.

The present chapter will examine the architectural design and certain aspects of the sculptural format of the Pārśvanātha and the smaller Ādinātha Temples,
and argue that the two religious edifices were originally constructed as Hindu temples. The original shrines seem to have been deserted during the Islamic destructions of Khajuraho between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries, and then taken over by the local Jaina community during the thirteenth century. As will be shown here, the buildings continued to change over the centuries and as some parts were closed, new elements were added to distinguish them from their Hindu neighbours and to suit the ritual requirements of the Jaina faith. Both temples seem to have changed their name and main sacred image, once again within the Jaina religious framework. The fact that the conversion process from Hindu to Jaina worship has largely remained unnoticed shows how well and with how

Figure 13.2 The Ādinātha Temple adorned with Hindu sculptures.
The Jaina temples and shrines of the Eastern Group are located in a walled enclosure, typical of Jaina temple complexes not only in this region, but all over India. Only the remains of the dilapidated Ghatat Temple are located outside this walled temple area, about a quarter of a mile (c.500 metres) to the north-west. Today, the Säntinätha Temple is the largest edifice within the temple compound and represents the principal place for Jaina worship at Khajuraho. It is a multi-shrined construction, consisting of several smaller temples (devakulikā), dating from the early eleventh and later centuries, which were linked and arranged around a central courtyard. Although the main sanctuary houses a large standing image of Säntinätha, dated to VS 1085, or 1028 CE, the temple as a whole is largely a modern architectural arrangement. Amongst the older temples on the site, the Pärsvanätha Temple is the largest and most elaborate. It is the best preserved of the religious edifices in this group, and one of the finest at Khajuraho.

The Pärsvanätha Temple was constructed of fine-grained buff sandstone and is raised on a large but relatively low platform (jagat), providing the temple with an open ambulatory for the performance of the rite of circumambulation (pradaksinā). The temple measures about eighteen metres in length and nine metres in width (about 60 by 30 feet). It was planned along an east – west axis with the entrance facing east. It consists of a small, beautifully decorated porch (mukha-mandapa) with a profusely ornamented doorframe, a closed hall (gudha-mandapa) with a four pillared nave (śālā) in its centre, leading to a vestibule (antarāla). The latter leads to the sanctum enshrining a modern black marble sculpture of Pärsvanätha from Rajasthan. The image is placed on a sandstone pedestal which bears the bull lañchana of Rśabhanätha or Ādinätha, and indicates that even during the time of the Jaina occupation of this temple, its dedication has changed. Alternatively, the pedestal could have come from a damaged Jaina temple nearby, but since the statue of Pärsvanätha is dated and appears to have been installed as late as 1860 CE, there must have been an earlier image in its place. The garbha-grha is surrounded by an internal ambulation path, a pradaksinā-patha (sândhāra-prāsāda) with small latticed windows on the north and south sides admitting a limited amount of light and air. At the west end of the temple, a small additional shrine, with access from the outside, has been constructed and attached to the rear of the Pärsvanätha Temple (Figure 13.1). This...
subsidiary structure houses a figure of Ādinātha and might possibly represent the image originally housed in the main sanctum of the temple. Beautifully carved statues adorn both the inside and outside of this large religious building. Numerous rows of mouldings, and three diminishing bands of sculptures run around the temple exterior as well as the outside of the inner sanctum inside the pradaksinā-patha. The well-preserved large temple tower (śikhara) above the sanctum goes over into the roof of the closed mandapa. In front are two smaller roof structures which are clearly later reconstructions.

Although scholars such as Alexander Cunningham, Krishna Deva and George Michell drew attention to the prominent Hindu imagery adorning the walls of the Pārśvanātha Temple, and Eliy Zannas pointed to the striking absence of figures of Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras (Zannas 1960: 151), specialists in Indian art history have not attempted to explain these unusual features. One reason for this neglect could have been the presence of the inscription identifying the temple as a place of Jaina worship. In this respect it is, however, important to bear in mind that the text was re-engraved about three centuries after the event which it is recording, and that there is no proof that the epigraphic record was originally associated with the present temple. A further justification for the lack of inquiries into this matter might have been the well-documented fact that the craftsmen who worked for the followers of one faith at a sacred site were frequently also employed to build temples for other religious groups. Such cross-fertilization is especially common in a Jaina context, where many Hindu motifs and divinities were integrated and re-interpreted to fit the Jaina creed. Later, Islamic decorative features also entered the Jaina vocabulary of architecture. It is worthy to note that James Fergusson was troubled by the layout of the Jaina temples at Khajuraho which appeared so untypical to him (Fergusson 1967: 49). Only rarely, however, have art historians suggested explanations for the presence of such an unusually large number of Hindu images on the walls of these Jaina structures.

Klaus Bruhn, in his detailed analysis of the sculptures adorning the Pārśvanātha Temple, argued that the images are not Hindu as such but strongly Brahmanized in style. He questioned, however, why not at least a few strong markers of correct Jaina iconography, such as Jaina yakṣas or yakṣinīs, were placed in prominent positions on the temple wall. Based on his iconographic study of the temple, Bruhn thought it unlikely that the temple might have changed over from Hindu to Jaina ownership, but he is one of the few to mention this possibility at all and to aim at finding an explanation for the unusual phenomenon (Bruhn 1956: 31–34). Shobita Punja proposed that long after its construction as a Hindu shrine, the Pārśvanātha Temple might have been presented as a gift to the local Jaina community (Punja 1992: 146), but there are no inscriptions recording this event. It is worth mentioning that Fergusson, as early as 1876, believed that the neighbouring but smaller Ādinātha Temple was built as a Vaiṣṇava temple and only later appropriated by the Jainas.

There are a number of strong indications in the actual fabric of the Pārśvanātha and the Ādinātha Temples which show that they were originally constructed as Hindu temples and later adopted by the Jaina community. A careful examination
of the external walls of the Pārśvanātha Temple reveals that it used to have two lateral transepts with fenestrations (vātāyana). Such decorated balconies are typical of the Hindu temples at Khajuraho, creating the ubiquitous Latin cross with two principal arms on the temple ground plans. In the Pārśvanātha Temple these large projecting windows were later enclosed. On the outside, the openings were carefully filled with sculptures taken from dilapidated temples in the surrounding area. Today, only two small projections on both the north and the south sides of the temple indicate their former existence and create pronounced bhadra projections in the centre of the sanctum and the mandapa walls. The presence of plastered brick sections in these protuberances, which are made to look like sandstone, further support the fact that changes were undertaken to the original fabric of the building. The central portion of the temple wall (jaṅgā) is enlivened by further shallow protrusions (ratha) and recesses (salilāntara). Nevertheless, the effect of a play of light and shade is much less pronounced than in the developed Hindu temples at Khajuraho, which are furnished with large protruding open balconies creating clear interruptions and voids in the temple facades. At the Pārśvanātha Temple small fenestrations are present below the śikhara, but these are too small to create pronounced breaks in the long and continuous sculptural bands. Consequently, the whole appearance of the structure is somewhat more solid. On the inside, the enclosed balconies are even more obvious, because only on the north side has the infill been covered with sculptural decorations.

Several reasons might explain why the Jaina community decided to fill in the balconied openings when restoring and converting the temple. First, by enclosing the large windows, wall space was gained inside the building to accommodate further religious images for the Jaina ritual of venerating a large number of statues. Today only one large and two middle sized freestanding Tirthankara sculptures are housed in the temple hall, in addition to the two Jinas located in the shrines. Deva’s detailed description of the temple interior from the early 1970s, however, still mentions ten statues of the venerated fordmakers, placed on elaborate pedestals along the walls of the closed hall (Deva 1975a: 259). Another motive for enclosing the large open windows might have been to prevent people from looking into the sacred space of the temple interior. Cunningham, on his second visit to Khajuraho in 1864–1865, was not allowed to enter the religious edifice and could only glance into the inside from the small porch. It is a common feature of Jaina temple architecture in general to create secluded internal spaces which are frequently protected by rings of high walls. A third reason for the infill of the typical Khajuraho balconies, which is not derived from ritual requirements, might have been the wish to differentiate themselves visually from the Hindu shrines in the Western Group.

Further structural changes were undertaken on the doorframes of the original temple. The entrance to the gūḍha-mandapa is framed by a double doorway of posts and beams (sākhā). Its lintel is adorned with representations of the nine planetary deities, the navagrahas, with a central image of the ten armed yakṣī
Cakreśvarī seated on Garuḍa, the whole flanked by two figures of four armed seated Sarasvatīs. It is worthy to note that there are wide cement grooves between the two sets of doorframes and also where the outer frame was connected to the temple wall. From this, it appears that the lintels and beams were not originally carved for this edifice, as they are too small to fill the available space. In tenth-century India, buildings were constructed of interlocking stones and even during the thirteenth century when the temple appears to have been converted to Jaina worship for the first time, cement was not used for masonry construction. Consequently, the alterations carried out on the doorframes must have been conducted at a later stage, possibly in the mid-nineteenth century, when the main image of the temple was changed to Pārśvanātha and the Jaina character of the edifice was consciously emphasised. It is worth noting that although most of the Hindu temples at Khajuraho were damaged and extensively reconstructed, none of them have such cement grooves. The explanation here seems to be that in those cases the original temple constituents found within the collapsed buildings, were re-inserted into their initial location and thus fitted exactly. The beams and lintels of the Pārśvanātha Temple must be reused parts from destroyed Jaina temples on the site, such as the dilapidated Ghaṇṭai Temple nearby. The re-use of old temple material for the repair of damaged edifices and the construction of new Jaina shrines was still continuing when Cunningham stayed at the site in February 1865 (A. S. I. II: 435). The entrance to the garbha-grha is surrounded by a further double doorframe. As in the example discussed earlier, it was cemented in at a later stage and does not appear to be the original frame belonging to the temple (Figure 13.3). As such, the presence of Jinas on the door lintels of the temple cannot, as many scholars have argued, be taken as lasting proof of the original dedication of the shrine. The doorway leading to the garbha-grha has two superimposed lintels. Whilst the lower example again exhibits depictions of the navagrahas, a seated Jina, and two flanking images of standing Tīrthaṅkaras, the upper architrave is adorned with alternate images of five seated and six standing Jaina figures. The availability of additional doorframes at the site is supported by the fact that additional parts of such frames have been positioned on the north wall inside the closed maṇḍapa. They frame a seated and two standing Tīrthaṅkara figures and cover the blind wall where the former open balcony has been filled in. According to R. Nath a similar frame was also loosely positioned against the inside wall on the south side of the gūḍha-maṇḍapa (Nath 1980: 41). The fact that the high threshold leading to the inner sanctum of the Pārśvanātha Temple depicts a small liṅga in its centre points to the original dedication of the temple as Saivite. This is further supported by Shobita Punja’s interpretation of the imagery on the outside walls of the temple as a depiction of the story of Śiva’s wedding on Mahā-Śivarātri as narrated in the Śiva Purāṇa (Punja 1992: 145–146).

The small additional shrine constructed at the rear of the Pārśvanātha Temple, facing west, represents another alteration to the original temple building. It was constructed after Cunningham’s visit in 1884, probably during the later part of the nineteenth or early in the twentieth century. Whilst some of the local Hindu
temples have further shrines and *mandapas*, these are all freestanding edifices, located either in front or in the four corners surrounding the main temple (*pañcāyatana*). Nowhere else at Khajuraho have subsidiary shrines either been connected to a main temple building or placed at its rear. Whilst J. C. Harle argued that this kind of additional shrine ‘...is not repeated elsewhere, and it cannot be said that it is a function of the temple’s being Jain’,\textsuperscript{30} additional interconnected shrines and small temples located behind a central religious edifice are very common in a Jaina context. The small shrine attached to the rear of the Pārśvanātha Temple provides space for an additional image and is adapted to the

\textit{Figure 13.3} Wide cement grooves are visible between the two doorframes leading to the shrine.
Jaina ritual of venerating multiple Jinas. From an aesthetic point of view, the external shrine also helps to balance the large temple structure. It creates a second axial projection and seems to counterbalance or mirror the front porch projecting from the opposite shorter side.

Changes were, however, not only done to the architectural structure of the temple but also to the sculptural configuration. The main sacred image in the sanctum of the original Hindu temple was probably destroyed during the Muslim assaults on Khajuraho. When Cunningham returned to the site in 1852, the main sanctum of the temple, which he calls the Jinanātha Temple, was empty and deserted although he reported that the shrine had been repaired by a Jaina banker five years earlier (A. S. I. II: 432). In 1865 he was no longer permitted to enter the building which at that time had been restored, internally painted and become an active place of Jaina worship. The first Jaina image to be enshrined in the sanctum seems to have been a statue of Ādinātha. This was replaced by a figure of Pārśvanātha, bearing a date of 1860 CE, which seems to indicate the date of the latest change. A statue of Ādinātha was placed in the additional shrine attached to the rear of the temple.

Sculptural changes were also undertaken on the temple exterior. It is striking that there are fewer erotic scenes and depictions of mithuna couples on the Pārśvanātha Temple than on most other temples at Khajuraho. Because most of the surviving erotic sculptures are found high up on the temple wall, where they can hardly be seen, one might question if others were not consciously removed and carefully replaced by different kinds of representations during the temple conversion. This is not to say that mithuna couples or erotic scenes are not to be found on Jaina temples. The Pārśvanātha Temple at Ranakpur (Rānakpur) in Rajasthan, for example, has small erotic scenes carved onto its external walls. At Khajuraho, however, the removal of large erotic scenes might have served to differentiate the Jaina temples from the Hindu structures nearby.

Whilst a small number of Jina images adorn the outer walls of the Pārśvanātha Temple, there are none at all on the Ādinātha Temple. It is striking that the few sculptures of Jaina Tirthankaras are either placed close to the porch of the Pārśvanātha Temple on the eastern side, which was entirely rebuilt during the reconstruction process, or they are located on the walls of the western shrine, which is a later addition. Most other figures adorning the jaṅghâ of the temple, are either clearly identifiable Hindu gods, such as the dikpālas, Śiva and Kṛṣṇa, or they are lesser known goddesses, which could either be derived from the Hindu or the Jaina pantheon. There are also representations of various composite mythical animals, the vyālas or sārdūlas. Through the positioning of clear Jaina imagery at the entrances to the two shrines of the Pārśvanātha Temple, the Jaina character of the edifice was reinforced, and the otherwise Hindu-looking shrine could not be mistaken for a Brahmanical place of worship.

The most interesting changes to the sculptural repertoire were undertaken on the inside of this complex religious edifice. The outer walls of the sanctum, inside the pradaksinā-patha, are adorned with standing sculptures of playable female figures such as apsaras, nymphs and dryads (vrkṣikā). These images show a very
high standard of workmanship and are amongst the most beautiful at Khajuraho. The exquisitely carved female statues of devāṅganās are interspersed with representations of sitting Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras. These Jinas are clearly replacements of earlier Hindu sculptures which were carefully chiselled out of their niches and replaced with religious icons from the Jaina faith. These changes were carried out with such sensitivity that they are not at all obvious at first glance. Clear evidence for these alterations is, however, to be found in the positioning of the parasols on top of the Jinas. The umbrellas are not placed exactly above the heads of the straight sitting and centrally located Jaina images. Whenever they are found in association with figures of the Tīrthaṅkaras, the parasols are positioned further to the side within the niches, indicating that they either belonged to images in a bent position, such as ābhaṅga or tribhaṅga, commonly associated with Hindu imagery of this period, or that they originally framed representations of divine Hindu couples, such as Śiva and Pārvati (Figure 13.4). It is interesting to observe, that such replacements of Hindu with Jaina images are much more common on the inside than on the outside of the temple. On the exterior, Hindu sculptures seem even to have been inserted into the wall spaces to enclose the balconied openings. Those statues, however, are largely images of goddesses, female figures or of divine couples where the religious denomination is generally more difficult to determine. Perhaps not enough scattered Jaina figures were available from destroyed temples at the site to be used for such major structural changes. We assume that the majority of temples at Khajuraho were Hindu and that only a much smaller number was constructed by the Jaina community. The increase in the number of figures on the temple, the reuse of sculptures from other buildings, as well as the combination of Hindu and Jaina imagery, might also explain why it is so difficult to define a clear iconographic pattern for the location of individual figures on the structure (Bruhn 1956: 32). The emphasis on the temple interior shows that the inner ambulation around the garbhagṛha was given more importance than that on the outside of the temple, and that the ritual life of the shrine was concentrated on the interior. It is typical of Jaina architecture throughout India to have a comparatively plain exterior, often with high protective walls, but a very ornate interior sheltered from outside gaze and intrusion.

The Ādinātha Temple, slightly to the north of the Pārśvanātha Temple, is a much smaller structure. When Cunningham documented the temple in the mid nineteenth century, it consisted only of the prāsāda, raised on a jagatt and crowned by a tall sikhara (A. S. I. II: 432). The porch, made of plastered brick, was added later, either at the end of the nineteenth or early in the twentieth century. A noteworthy feature which further supports the argument that the two major Jaina temples at Khajuraho were initially constructed as Hindu religious edifices, is the presence of an image of Garuda, carved onto the pedestal in the garbhagṛha (Fergusson 1967: 51). During Cunningham's first visit to the temple, in 1852 CE, the seat carried an image of Pārśvanātha (A. S. I. II: 432), whilst these days a sculpture of Ādinātha is found in its place. Consequently, this temple also changed its dedication once again within the period of Jaina ritual use. The outside of the
Ádinātha Temple is also adorned with Hindu images. This, together with the presence of Viṣṇu’s vāhana Garuḍa, led Fergusson to argue that the temple was built as a Vaiṣṇava shrine and later appropriated by the Jainas of Khajuraho (Fergusson 1967: 51).

**Conclusion: from Hindu to Jaina worship**

The earlier discussion has shown that the Pārśvanātha and the Ádinātha Jaina Temples at Khajuraho are highly complex structures with a long history of
architectural, sculptural and religious change. Without new discoveries of local textual sources or inscriptions, precisely recording and dating events in the history of these temples, it will be difficult to ascertain at what stage which alterations were carried out. A detailed examination of the edifices, however, indicates very strongly that they were not designed as Jaina temples from the outset, as has generally been believed. The two shrines are profusely adorned with Hindu imagery and Jaina figures are only to be found on those parts of the buildings which were added at a later stage, or to the temple interior, where it is obvious from their positioning that the Jaina sculptures were inserted into already available niches.

The presence of a large number of dated Jaina figures from as early as the beginning of the eleventh century, which were excavated at Khajuraho, shows that there were Jaina temples at the site during the Chandella period. The Ghanṭai Temple, which survives only in a very reduced form, seems to be one of them. A large concentration of Tīrthaṅkara images with dated inscriptions from the reign of Madanavarmā, who ruled the area from the early to the mid-twelfth century, points to a pronounced Jaina presence during that period. From the available architectural material, it does, however, seem questionable that the Pārśvanātha and the Ādinātha Temples were initially conceived as Jaina structures. The inscription on the left doorjamb of the Pārśvanātha Temple, dating it to 954 CE, is a re-engraving carved in the thirteenth century, and there is no proof that the epigraphic record was originally associated with this edifice. Either the entire doorjamb or the text for the inscription might well have come from another destroyed local Jaina shrine. During the restoration process, the Jaina community clearly aimed at making the temples more Jaina by adding Tīrthaṅkara images and doorframes removed from ruined Jaina structures in the area. There is no reason why in the course of the complete reconstruction of the porch, they should not, in order to add substance to their claim to the temple, also have engraved the copy of a local Jaina inscription on the doorjamb.

Based on the epigraphic and architectural evidence available to us at present, and on the reports by Cunningham and Fergusson who paid several visits to the site during the course of the nineteenth century, a possible historical sequence for the evolution of the Pārśvanātha Temple may have been that it was constructed as a Hindu temple under King Dhāṅga in the mid or late tenth century. The edifice was probably destroyed and desecrated during the Muslim attacks on Khajuraho in 1022 and 1182 CE. Because the Jaina inscription was re-engraved during the thirteenth century it seems that the shrine must have been appropriated and rebuilt by local Jainas during this period. The caturvīmāśati-patṭa of Ādinātha might also have been placed inside the sanctum at this stage. The temple must then have been damaged again during the Islamic invasion of 1202/3 CE, because the shrine room was empty when Cunningham surveyed the structure in 1852. He found the dated inscription in place in the porch but no shrine had yet been added to the rear of the main temple. On the basis of the inscription of the Pārśvanātha image, nowadays housed inside the main shrine, this statue was inaugurated in 1860, around the time of Cunningham’s second survey of the site. The sequence of
events as described earlier is supported by Fergusson’s view that the temple was reoccupied by the Jainas in 1860 but that it had been restored and altered at a much earlier date (Fergusson 1967: 50). In 1865, when Cunningham returned to Khajuraho, the Pārśvanātha Temple was completely restored and had become an active place of Jaina worship.

Although certain details in the history of the Jaina temples at Khajuraho might never come to light, the present paper proposes a new interpretation for the Ādinātha and Pārśvanātha Temples, which for several decades have troubled art historians working at the site. Another perspective on the new theory proposed earlier is given by the fact that at the end of my research stay in Khajuraho, I came to hear about a fierce and longstanding argument between the local Hindus and Jainas. Their dispute is over the rightful ownership of these two sacred Jaina edifices which the local Śaivite community claims are Hindu in origin.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank University College Oxford, the Society for South Asian Studies, the Wingate Foundation and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft without whose generous financial support this research could not have been undertaken.

All photographs are by the author.

Notes

1 The Dome of the Rock (Quabbat al-Šakhara) was constructed on the site of a pagan temple which was first reclaimed as a place of worship by the Jews and then converted by the Muslims into a mosque.
2 Mircea Eliade has written about this phenomenon at great length, see for example his The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, originally published in 1957 and reprinted in 1987.
4 Hindu temples belonging to the Eastern Group are the Brahmā Temple (early tenth century), the Vāmana Temple (eleventh century), and the Javārī Temple (late eleventh century). These Hindu edifices are located outside the compound wall of the Jaina temple complex, close to the Ghaṇṭai Temple.
5 A detailed iconographical study of the sculptures adorning the Pārśvanātha Temple has been conducted by Klaus Bruhn (1956).
6 The first attack on the temples at Khajuraho was carried out under Mahmud of Ghazni in 1022 CE. In the twelfth century, the last official Chandella Rājā, Paramardi Deva, also known as Parmāl (c.1165–1202), was defeated by Prithūrāj (III) Chauhān in 1182 CE, and in 1202–1203 CE, Qutubu-d dīn Aibak invaded the area again and took Kalinjar (Kālanjara). See Alexander Cunningham’s reports in Archaeological Survey of India (A. S. I.) II: 412 and XXI: 59, Smith 1981: 203 and Mehta 1979 I: 70.
7 Although most art historians have described the Jaina temples at Khajuraho as lacking a surrounding wall, such an enclosing structure is present today, and is already marked on the plan drawn by Cunningham for his report of the years 1864–1865 (A. S. I. II: plate XCV).
8 On his first visit to the site, in January 1852, Cunningham recorded an inscription dating the image to VS 1085, 1028 CE, which was later covered with plaster and whitewash (A. S. I. II: 434 and XXI: 61).
9 A further example of the re-engraving of an ancient record at Khajuraho is King Dhanga’s stone inscription from 1059 CE which was renewed by Jayavarmadeva in 1173 CE. In this case, both dates are engraved on the same stone (Kielhorn 1892: 137–147).
10 See for example Deva 1997: 59, or his long discussion of the issue in 1998: 61, 68–70. The Pārśvanātha Temple seems to have been constructed during the early part of the reign of King Yaśovarmadeva’s son, King Dhanga (c.950–1002).
11 The platform is just over one metre (about 4 feet) high and its original mouldings are now lost. The sandstone for the construction of the temple is believed to have come from the quarries of Panna (Pannā) on the Ken River.
12 The porch has a highly decorated ceiling (vitāna) with an unusually elaborate pendant consisting of an intertwined pair of figures, probably vidyādhāras, carved in the round.
13 The construction of the mukha-mandapa is of one catuṣkī (mukha-catuṣkī).
14 From this it can be derived that the pedestal supported a caturvimśati-patta with Ádinātha as the main image (Deva 1975a: 259; Deva 1975b: 287; Deva 1998: 71).
15 Deva suggested that the shrine at the rear might once have been larger and more elaborate (Deva 1975a: 259; Deva 1975b: 287). According to Nath (1980: 42), the additional shrine on the west side houses another image of Pārśvanātha and not of Ádinātha. It is worthy of note that an image of Garuḍa is carved on the front of the pedestal supporting the image in the rear shrine.
16 See for example Cunningham (A. S. I. II: 432) and Michell (1990: 170). Although the sculptures adorning the outer walls of the temple are predominantly Vaiṣṇava, including some rare images of Paraśurāma, Balarāma with Rēvatī and others (Deva 1997: 59; Deva 1998: 69), Shobita Punja argues that the external decorations depict the congregation of the gods at Śiva’s wedding (Punja 1992: 146) and that consequently the temple must have been Śaivite.
17 Kielhorn translated the first lines of the inscription as ‘He who bears the auspicious name Pāhilā, . . . is pleased by good people [and] held in honour by king Dhanga, he bows down here to the lord of the Jinas’ (1892: 136).
18 Because of the absence of projecting window openings, the Pārśvanātha Temple also has no stone seats (āsana-pattikā) or backrests (kakṣāśāna), typically found within the ornate balconies of the Hindu temples of the Western Group.
19 Out of the originally eighty or so temples at Khajuraho, only about twenty five survive today, and sculptures and debris from the ruined temples are still being unearthed.
20 It is noteworthy that the bhadras adorning the mandapa walls are not centrally aligned. On the north side, the projection is much closer to the porch. This is also the area where the repair works in brick and plaster are most obvious. Also the additional shrine at the rear of the temple has pronounced bhadra protrusions.
21 This is not a feature of the Hindu architecture at the site.
22 It is slightly confusing that later on in his article he states that almost half of the pedestals are empty. It is not quite clear if there were still ten images and another ten empty pedestals in the hall, or if a total of ten pedestals carried five sculptures when he visited the site (Deva 1975a: 260). The figures described by Deva were mostly Jinas, a four-armed standing Yakṣī with a lion, and a representation of the parents of the Jina, probably the one now housed in the complex of the Sāṁinātha Temple.
23 During this period, cement seems only to have been used to cover and seal roof spaces.
24 Fergusson drew attention to the reuse of old building materials in the restoration of temples and for the construction of other edifices (Fergusson 1967: 49).
25 The Ghaṭai Temple is named after the chain-and-bell motifs (ghaṭa) adorning its pillars. Only the ardha-mandapa and the gūḍha-mandapa of this structure survive, which is believed to have been similar in design but larger than the Pārśvanātha Temple (some believe it was almost twice as large; see e.g. Deva 1975b: 280). On the basis of its plan and design as well as the presence of pilgrims’ records carved onto its walls, the Ghaṭai Temple appears to be very close in date to the Pārśvanātha Temple. It probably dates from the late tenth century CE (Deva 1975a: 261; Deva 1998: 72). Cunningham argued initially that the temple was a sixth to seventh century CE Buddhist structure and suggested that it might have been converted to Jaina use during the eleventh century (A. S. I. II: 431). After extensive excavations at the site, the discovery of a large number of Digambara Jaina figures inside and around the temple, and the re-examination of the door lintels, Cunningham revised his interpretation and concluded that the temple must have been Jaina from the outset (A. S. I. X: 16). Nowadays, this identification has been accepted unanimously.


27 A further example of a Jaina door lintel excavated at the site is exhibited in the Jaina museum at Khajuraho. This lintel, too, shows representations of the Navagrahas and Cakreśvari, as well as images of Ambikā and Padmāvatī.

28 Other scholars have interpreted the relief carvings on the threshold as a depiction of the churning of the cosmic ocean (A. S. I. II: 433).

29 Whilst Zannas considers the western projection to be a later addition, Deva believed that it was part of the initial layout. A closer examination of the stonework, the grooves and the sculptural representations, however, shows that the projecting shrine on the rear must have been added at a later stage. Cunningham, in his minute descriptions of the temple on his visits to Khajuraho in 1852, 1865 and 1884, never mentioned the existence of the western shrine, which further supports the fact that it must have been constructed after his last reported visit to the site.

30 Harle 1986: 234 and footnote no. 51 (p. 513).

31 For a discussion of the veneration of large numbers of images, and issues of multiplication in Jaina architecture, see my ‘Multi-shrined Complexes: The Ordering of Space in Jaina Temple Architecture’ (2001).

32 A small number of mithuna sculptures also survive in the friezes of the gūḍha-mandapa and the plinth of the entrance portico.

33 For an iconographic analysis of the sculptures adorning the Pārśvanātha Temple and a map exactly marking the location of the few Jina images on the temple structure, see the detailed study by Klaus Bruhn (1956).

34 There is some controversy about the origin and validity of the term ‘tribhaṅga’. I am using it here in the art historical sense summarised by Gösta Liebert (1986: 301).

35 Images in abhaṅga or tribhaṅga are also associated with representations of Jaina patrons and donors, and with Hindu divinities which were integrated into the Jaina religion during the middle ages, but not with the sculptures of Tīrthaṅkaras.

36 Punja (1992: 222) suggests that a Jaina community must have settled in the area of Khajuraho after the invasions of the Islamic rulers of Delhi.

Bibliography


Cunningham, Alexander. 1871. ‘Four Reports Made During the Year 1862–63–64–65’. *Archaeological Survey of India II*.


—— 1885. ‘Reports of a Tour in Bundelkhand and Rewa in 1883–84; A Tour in Rewa, Bundelkhand, Malwa, and Gwalior, in 1884–85’. *Archaeological Survey of India XXI*.


Against a background of comparative jurisprudential analysis, this chapter demonstrates that despite its formal amalgamation into Hindu law in India during 1955–1956, Jaina law continues to manifest itself in various unofficial and semi-official forms. Thus, it is not productive to dispute whether Jaina law existed or exists. The need is rather to research what culture-specific manifestations Jaina law has been taking, and what role it continues to play in maintaining a separate Jaina identity.

The chapter suggests that two major factors have affected the visibility of Jaina law. While the official legal recognition of local customs under Hindu law could potentially act as a protective umbrella for Jaina law, strict evidence requirements have restricted the scope for official legal recognition and inclusion of Jaina religio-cultural elements. Further, strengthening this process of keeping Jaina law within the unofficial realm appears to be a deliberate traditional strategy, by Jainas as individuals and as a community, to keep a cautious distance from the processes of official law and the law courts. Much of Jaina law is therefore found in unreported cases from lower courts, and in unrecorded private agreements within the context of ‘family arrangements’.

The problem of understanding law

On a global level, legal debates now acknowledge more widely that the dominant approach of Western legal positivism or ‘model jurisprudence’ (Chiba 1986), which simplistically assumes that all law comes from the state and appears in more or less codified form, remains deeply problematic, academically incoherent and socially unrealistic. A conceptual analysis of traditional and modern non-Western legal systems inevitably shows that this eurocentric methodology and perspective of certain legal models fails to record many culture-specific forms of law (Menski 2000). Since, somehow, comparative jurisprudence still stops at the Bosphorus (Örücü 1999: 31), it is no surprise that Jaina law has been treated as an exotic specialist subject with little practical relevance. As a result, there is hardly any writing on Jaina law.

Within this wider context, the question whether there is something worth studying which we might call Jaina law turns out to be quite complex. Common
sense would suggest that if Jainas and Jainism exist, there must also be something like Jaina law. However, such a theoretical acceptance of the existence of Jaina law relies on common sense and on a broad, non-technical definition of ‘law’ as a culture-specific human phenomenon, rather than the technical, positivist view of ‘law’ as a body of rules made by some ruler or a state. An interdisciplinary analysis of this problem requires explicit recognition of the fact that lawyers as practising professionals and as academics operate without a universally agreed definition of ‘law’ (Menski 2000). Still, many lawyers and social scientists follow only the dominant Western legal methodology of positivism and try to define away non-state law by labelling it ‘custom’, ‘convention’ or ‘culture’. Such forms of law then become more or less unofficial. It is important to be aware that Indian jurisprudence has been deeply influenced by such dominant theories of positivism.

Thus it would appear that modern India has abolished Jaina law and that, at any rate since the introduction of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 and other Hindu law legislation of 1956, Jaina law no longer exists as a separate personal law.¹ For ‘black letter lawyers’, that would be the end of the story – Jaina law has now ceased to exist, and there is nothing to study. However, from a variety of perspectives Jaina law continues to exist, albeit now at an unofficial level.²

In view of the multiple challenge of conflicting perspectives, relating to law and – no less relevant – concerning the identity of Jainas themselves as a religious community, it becomes difficult to ascertain to what extent Jaina law exists. Even if we find that many people (including numerous Jainas themselves) perceive Jainas as Hindus, or as part of Hinduism in some form, the problems of identifying distinct Jaina social and legal identities remain. There will be specific situations in which Jaina families and individuals will want to follow particular rules as an expression of their very own Jaina identity and way of life. In the present article, rather than focusing on the distinction between Jainas and Hindus, I shall argue, from a socio-legal perspective, that wherever there are Jainas, there will also be some manifestation of Jaina law, if not official, then unofficial.

The diasporic and transnational dimension

Before turning to the law, it may be useful to consider Jainas briefly as forming a transnational community with its own complex identity.³ If, in India itself, Jainas have been rendered more or less officially invisible, nothing stops the globally dispersed Jainas in diaspora, if they wish to do so, from reconstructing and re-asserting their separate identity and ethnicity, including elements of their own personal law.⁴ Jainas have been making notable public statements about their presence in diaspora and about the contributions that Jainism can make to the well-being of mankind and all creations. In Britain, one may think of the impressive Jain Centre (or Jaina Mandir) in Leicester and its aims, community facilities like the Oshwal Centre in rural Hertfordshire, or the Jaina Studies Programmes at De Montfort University and now at SOAS. There are many more manifestations of the private and public face of Jaina life all over the world.
Jainas tend to be gentle, soft people, not aggressive lobbyists and violent demonstrators for their cause. Such relatively quiet and unobtrusive modes of asserting Jaina identity may not be sufficiently loud to remind lawyers, and others who claim to make or influence law, that there is indeed something like Jaina law. Perhaps, therefore, a task of the future is to assert Jaina legal identity more effectively than has been done so far, not through violence, but in a targeted, strategically planned fashion which overcomes the current purposeful silence. Even in Britain, it is not too late: The legal reconstruction process of multi-ethnic Britain is only just beginning to move into a more public arena, as evidenced by a recent Runnymede Report (Parekh 2000). Relevant academic writing is beginning to cover general legal issues (Jones and Welhengama 2000), and one finds more specifically anthropological assessments which are relevant also to Jainas (generally Ballard 1994: 1–34, specifically Banks 1994), and evidence of specific strategies of Jainas in planning law (Gale and Naylor 2002). However, as we shall see, there are several factors impeding Jaina activism in giving a higher profile to aspects and manifestations of Jaina law.

The legal evidence

As soon as one opens one of the leading law books from India which many practitioners use, doubts about the existence of Jaina law resurface. The 17th edition of Mulla’s *Hindu Law* (Desai 1998: 825–826), states under the heading ‘Law applicable to Jains’:

> It is too late in the day to contend that Jains are not included in the term ‘Hindus’. The Jains are governed by all the incidents related to the Hindu Joint Family, as was held by the Supreme Court. The ordinary Hindu law is to be applied to Jains, in the absence of proof of special customs and usage varying that law. Those customs and usage must be proved by evidence, as other special customs and usage varying the general law should be proved, and in the absence of proof the ordinary law must prevail.

So the technically correct view appears to be at first sight that today, there is officially no Jaina law in India, since it was subsumed under Hindu law for the purposes of unification and codification of India’s modern Hindu law. Perhaps there was Jaina law in the past, but it no longer exists. Yet a careful re-reading of the above quote shows that the abolition of Jaina law is not total and complete, since special Jaina customs and usages, if they can be proved, may still be legally recognised.

Since Mulla’s *Hindu Law* and some other legal texts state so bluntly that Jainas have been governed by Hindu law at least since the 1950s, two further questions arise. First, when, how and why did this take-over by Hindu law happen? In other words, in what form did Jaina law exist before 1955–1956 and why was it
abolished by the stroke of a pen? Second, given the official position that Jaina law has been taken over by Hindu law, what is the scope for arguing today that Jaina law still exists? Desai (1998: 826) provides some further hints about possible answers to the second question, indicating the scope for pleading specific customs:

There is, however, nothing to limit the scope of the enquiry to the particular locality in which the persons setting up the custom reside. Judicial decisions recognising the existence of a disputed custom among the Jains of one place are relevant as evidence of the existence of the same custom amongst the Jains of another place, unless it is shown that the customs are different; and oral evidence of the same kind are [sic] equally admissible. Where, however, a custom is negatived by a judicial decision in one place, like Madras, the fact that among Jains in the other states such a custom has been upheld by courts does not warrant a general presumption of the prevalence of the custom in the Madras State.

This clearly indicates, again, that Jaina law may exist today, but only as a matter of local customary law, or as a second-tier type of law which cannot claim immediate legal recognition and remains subject to specific rules and constructions of evidence. So we need to ask a few more questions about Jaina customary law and proof of Jaina customs. Based on the earlier two quotes and on socio-legal analysis, my basic hypothesis therefore remains that Jaina law must be in existence, primarily because Jaina people exist. However, it appears that Jaina law has today become officially invisible in India, as have the Jainas themselves, to some extent. So there is maybe a need to remind the world – and even Jainas themselves – that Jainas and Jaina law exist?

The historical backdrop of Jainism

While this is not the main subject of this chapter, it is relevant as a contextualising element. I studied Jainism at Kiel University in Germany under the guidance of Professor Jagdish Chandra Jain, whose Festschrift contains several illuminating articles as well as an earlier exploration of Jaina law (Menski 1994). Here, a few brief points, relying to some extent on Jain (1926), are made as background to the subsequent legal discussion. It is a well-recognised fact that disputes between Jainas and Hindus go back to the earliest texts and the most basic concepts.

It is undisputed that Jainism is an ancient religion, arising and flourishing well before the start of Christianity. Quite how old its traditions are and how they relate to Hinduism continues to be debated. Jainism rejected the Vedic pantheon of gods and emphasised the importance of the Tirthankaras, the last of whom was Mahāvīra. The Tirthankaras were originally not seen as lawgivers in an Austinian or Napoleonic sense, more as outstanding role models in society, excellent
personalities that achieved due spiritual reward. Later, it seems, positivist interpretations of legal aspects became more prominent.

Jainism as a philosophy and religion rejected the supremacy of the Vedas and, so we seem to assume, all that comes with it in terms of understanding the cosmic Order (ṛta) and the classical Hindu key concept of dharma. However, Jainism then developed its own concept of dharma, which is perhaps only marginally different from the understandings of this concept by the ‘Hindus’. It has been difficult to draw boundaries since the ideals of Jainism do not really diverge greatly from those of Hinduism, unless one puts up a particular sectarian picture of Hinduism that is not representative of the whole. It appears that this is often done to illustrate the conceptual contrasts between Hinduism and Jainism, but this remains questionable academic methodology.

Hence, if we ask specifically what the ideas and ideals of Jainism are, as compared to those of Hinduism, much depends on what kind of Hinduism one looks at to compare and contrast with Jainism. The internal plurality of Hinduism clearly allows for an immense variety of perspectives and does not dogmatically determine anything that strictly binds all Hindus (see now Flood 2003). This radical pluralism is not recognised by many writers, and is often overlooked by lawyers. Refuting the argument that Jainas are merely Hindu dissenters, a leading writer on Jaina law (Jain 1926: 16–17) thus typically overplays and exaggerates the contrast by stereotyping Hindus and Hinduism in a particular way:

The Jainas regard the world as eternal; the Hindus hold it to have been made by a creator. In Jainism worship is not offered to an eternal and eternally pure God, but to those Great Ones who have realised their high ideal and attained to Godhood themselves; in Hinduism worship is performed of one Lord who is the creator and the ruler of the world. The significance of worship in Hinduism is also not the same as in Jainism. In Jainism it is a kind of idealatory that is practised; there is no offering of food and the like; nor is a prayer made to the Deity for boons. In Hinduism the attainment of the object is by the will of certain divine beings who are to be propitiated. In respect of their scriptures, too, there are great differences between Hinduism and Jainism. Not one of the Books of the Hindu is accepted by the Jainas nor do the Hindus accept a single sāstra (Scripture) of the latter. The contents, too, of the Scriptures of the two religions differ. Not one part of the four Vedas and the 18 Puranas recognised in Hinduism is included in the Jaina scriptures. Nor is any part of the Sacred Books of the Jainas included clearly or expressly in the Hindu Books. The matters in respect of which there seems to be an agreement between the Jainas and the Hindus are merely social; their significance wherever they have a religious bearing is divergent.

Many aspects of Jaina philosophy, especially ahimsā, have also become an element of Hinduism and are, at any rate, not unknown to other people, especially
communities residing together with Jainas. Conversely, it seems that Jainas have also retained or taken certain elements from various local Hindu forms of belief and practice. In this way, it becomes extremely difficult to say what is Hindu and what is Jaina.

Consequently, there are many similarities between Hindus and Jainas. For Hindus and Jainas, action (*karma*) and reaction seem to be at the core of the respective rule systems as a dynamising element. Hence it is difficult to identify elements exclusively specific to Jainas, given that *dharma* is also a key element of Jaina concepts. So where, if at all, does one draw lines between Jaina *dharma* and Hindu *dharma*? Should one assume that Jainas are merely a Hindu sect, or does one recognise them as a separate ‘faith community’, as we seem to be doing in multicultural Britain today? In terms of law, too, there are many unanswered questions, as shown in the following lines.

If accumulation of merit (which itself is questioned and even rejected as a dominant concern) for Jainas is, according to some authors (Jain 1991: 38), acquired through a combination of right conduct and right knowledge, and not merely by austerities and penances, it becomes at once doubly difficult to be a good Jaina. But is being a good Jaina the same as following Jaina law?

These few basic points and related questions indicate that we can forever argue about fine differences between Hinduism and Jainism; at the end of the day, many principles in both traditions actually appear to be shared elements. Far from wishing to throttle the debate about whether Jainas and Jaina law exist as a separate entity, I would therefore simply reiterate and assert here that Jainas and their ideas have influenced Hinduism itself so much that drawing any dividing line becomes almost impossible. And yet, in ‘ethnic’ terms, many Jainas continue to distinguish themselves from the Hindus around them, and are also perceived by many others as a separate group.5

**Legal definitions**

In law, too, the dividing lines between Hindu and Jaina elements are not well defined. Understandings of what Jaina law actually is show significant parallels with what Hindus are saying about their own traditional law. If, for Hindu law, Professor Kane claimed during colonial rule in his monumental *History of Dharmaśāstra* that the Hindus have long had law that can match Western ideas and ideals, the same has been done for Jaina law. The most prominent book on the subject of Jaina law remains the study by Champat Rai Jain (1926). It argues vigorously for the separate recognition of Jaina law at a time when court decisions were further restricting the scope for the application of traditional Jaina law, well before the important 1955–1956 reforms which submerged Jaina law into Hindu law.

It is interesting to see how Champat Rai Jain argued his case for the retention of Jaina law, showing parallels with how Hindus perceive their traditional law, namely as the result of some ancient lawgiving process. Such images are quite obviously modelled on the dominant Western ideas of legal positivism, so that
‘proper’ law is perceived as codified, an authoritative source, invariably related back to a male lawgiver. For Hindus and Jainas, the critical question is whether this could have been one personalised god, or rather a more diffuse power. It seems to me that the ambitious image of ancient lawgivers is deeply flawed by the inability to determine historical dates and definite personalities. Still, this has not prevented prominent Hindu law experts from fantasising about the revealed nature of Hindu law. Thus, we read in one such leading textbook (Diwan and Diwan 1993: 27–28):

Hindu law is considered to be divine law, a revealed law. The theory is that some of the Hindu sages had attained great spiritual heights, so much so that they could be in direct communion with God. At some such time the sacred law was revealed to them by God Himself. This revelation is contained in *Sruti* or *Vedas*.

Such distortions of Hindu legal history, modelled on Judaeo-Christian elements, freely mixing images of the interaction of great men and God with South Asian concepts of texts as sources of law, create a confusing mess of concepts and impede analysis of legal reality. Even Diwan and Diwan concede, almost immediately (at p. 28), that the *sruti* is only considered to be the fundamental source of Hindu law in theory, while in practice ‘its importance as a source of positive law is doubtful’ (ibid.). At any rate, reliance on divine revelation as a defence against being reformed worked neither for Hindu law nor Jaina law.

Examining how C. R. Jain saw this matter in 1926, we find an instructive illustration of how legal writers tend to distort South Asian laws for an unsuspecting wider readership that is not familiar with internal debates about the nature of law among lawyers. Jain (1926: 3) opens his case immediately with the grand assertion that Jaina law is a separate entity and must be recognised as such. It is pure religious politics when he writes that ‘[t]he Jaina Law is an independent department of the science of Jurisprudence. Its original author, the first legislator, was Bharata Chakravarti, who was the eldest son of the first Tirthankara, Sri Rishabha Devaji’.

As a specialist on South Asian jurisprudence, I cannot help admiring such amazingly bold assertions. Jain claims here, logically correct in view of the Jaina refusal to recognise the authority of the Vedas, that Jaina law has a human author, an ancient legislator even, who laid down a legislated law in Napoleonic style, in other words a law code that positivists would recognise as law proper. What Jain thereby really claims, as P. V. Kane asserted a little later for Hindu law, is that Jainas are not inferior to other people and have developed something that Western observers should recognise as law. In other words, Jainas are not just an earth-bound chthonic group living in close conjunction with nature (on chthonic laws, see Glenn 2000), but have a sophisticated, formally structured and separate law.

Quite significantly, the claim for Jaina law is not that it comes from a religious source or authority, as appears to be the case for Hindu law through the image of
None of that works for Jaina law, which cannot fall back on monotheistic models and therefore looks decidedly secular (as ‘proper’ positivist law should do), in that the lawgiver was, according to Jain (1926: 3) as cited earlier, the son of a Tīrthankara, neither a prominent holy man nor a god or God. Jain (ibid.) carries on this assertive image of Jaina law in the next paragraph:

The whole of the Jaina Law was composed at one time, and is, therefore, wanting in those marks which characterise the Judge-made Law, though it is not improbable that owing to the necessities of the community and the human intercourse slight changes, not affecting its basic principles, have been made in it from time to time.

These assertions carry on the theme and image of a complete, ancient codified law, which is therefore in danger of becoming somewhat outdated and inflexible because it is so old. Jain compares this to the familiar English concept of case-law, which has been able to build some modifications into its framework of rules through judicial intervention and simply asserts that because of the needs of the community, some changes must have been made ‘not affecting its basic principles’. The next paragraph (ibid.) carries on this theme and provides some more detail about his vision of the original nature of Jaina law: ‘The Jaina Law was originally a part of what is known as the Upāsakādhyāyāna Anga which is now lost. Its existing sources mainly are the books which are mentioned below.’ This is another huge assertion, in principle familiar from Hindu law as well, namely that the original Jaina law could be identified as part of a larger body of text, all of which has been lost. Hence, without following any of the Hindu terminology, the assertion here is to the effect that the ancient Jaina law was founded on a textual basis that has not survived, but which much earlier generations of scholars still knew of. One may suspect that the author is trying to avoid the Hindu terms for ‘revealed truth’ (śruti) and ‘remembered truth’ (smrti). He is certainly using those concepts without telling us so. One may deduce this from the way in which he discusses the ‘existing sources’, namely a number of ‘law books’.

This shows that Jaina law probably faced the same problems as Hindu law in proving the links between the ancient ‘heard’ or ‘revealed’ material and what was later ‘remembered’. In his brief description of what he perceives as the six major ‘law books’ of the Jainas, Jain (1926: 3–5) provides ample evidence that all of this material actually comes from a more recent era. It therefore constitutes at best what we should imagine as reconstructed ‘bricks’ of a much earlier tradition, originating more likely than not in a floating oral reservoir of rules which eventually coagulated into the named texts that we know today. The following six ‘Jaina law books’ are listed by Jain (1926: 3–5) with some comments which are abbreviated here:

1 Bhadrabāhu Samhītā: Related to Bhadrabāhu (about 2300 years ago) but actually a much later work, composed between AD 1601 and 1609. Based on the ancient Code, composed by an unknown author.
2. *Arhan Ntti*: A Śvetāmbara work which is not very old. Its author declares that he remembered what he had heard and wrote it down. This is therefore clearly a *smṛti* work, whose title indicates the purpose of guidance.

3. *Vardhamāna Ntti*: Composed about AD 1011 by Śrī Amitagati Ācārya. This has verses identical to *Bhadrabāhu Samhitā*, which Jain (1926: 4) takes as evidence that both texts must be based on an earlier book. But what if they are both simply based on a mass of floating oral text, which is equally likely?

4. *Indranandi Jina Samhitā*: Composed by Vasunandi Indranandi, apparently also based on the Upāsakādhyayana Āṅga, so that Jain (1926: 5) argues that this text consists of ‘stray fragments’ of the older text.

5. *Traivarnikācāra*: Composed in AD 1611 by Bhāṭṭāraka Somasena.


There are of course many more Jaina texts, and Jain (1926: 6) admits that the ones he mentions are therefore only stray parts of the ancient law, not a complete code of Jaina law. In effect, he simply asserts (ibid.) that this is a problem that has to be tolerated, and that what exists is good enough to reconstruct Jaina law.

These are chiefly the Law Books which are traceable now, but none of them contains the entire Law. Still I think that whatever portion has survived of it is quite sufficient for our jural purposes, though difficulties may have to be faced in the interpretation of it in the beginning.

Clearly, the debate over the legal status of those books remains undeveloped. It seems to be taken for granted that textual fragments can be used as evidence in a court of law, in other words, that textual rules and regulations may be treated as general legal rules, a mistake that was common under British rule. Grave reservations about such techniques of reconstructing law and the underlying assumptions are certainly in order. We know from the history of Hindu law, and particularly of Anglo-Hindu law, where the same problems arose, that one could therefore basically prove anything from any of the old texts, provided one could find the right textual statement to substantiate one’s point. And if in doubt, a vague reference to ‘the śāstra’ might suffice. It could hardly be assumed that the above-listed six texts would, if taken together, constitute a coherent and consistent rule system, a code that could be used in legal practice.

**Jaina law under British rule**

Jain’s study tells us virtually nothing about what happened to the application of such supposedly legal texts between the seventeenth century and the end of British rule. From the parallel history of Hindu law, it is known that the early British administrators tried in vain to make sense of what they assumed to be the Hindu law texts, which were in reality merely guidebooks on dharma and would...
not claim to lay down rules for uniform application in the way the British expected (Menski 2003). Given such fundamental problems of communication over basics, even those texts which the British had specifically commissioned only increased everyone’s confusion, to the despair of many well-meaning administrators (Menski 2000: 179–181) and with far-reaching implications for the reconstruction of Hindu law (Menski 2003, chapter 4). Jain (1926: 6) highlights such problems of communication in the British Indian period, demonstrating that access to those texts, on account of ritual concerns, was sought to be restricted by the Jainas:

When the British came, the Jains concealed their śāstras [sic] and objected to their production in courts. To a certain extent their action was justified, because in the courts the Scriptures of no religion are respected. The presiding officer at times and the court officials generally employ the saliva of their mouth for turning over the leaves of the books, which must cause pain to a devout heart. But the remedy for this is not the withholding of books altogether.

These observations are highly significant. It is not surprising that the British should have reacted to such uncooperative behaviour by concluding that the Jainas had no proper law books. Surely, if they were important for litigation, they would have been relied on and would have been brought into court? Thus, by giving more importance to ritual purity and protective isolation than public demonstration of their separate legal status, the Jainas soon lost the battle for recognition of a separate Jaina law. Jain (1926: 7) is quite clear on this:

The result of the non-production of their Scriptures by the Jains has been that the courts have now held that they (the Jains) have no Law Books of their own . . . And this is notwithstanding the fact that as early as 1837 A.D. the names of certain Jaina Law books were mentioned in court . . . and even earlier than this in 1833 A.D. there was an allusion to Jaina works on Law.

This process of formal legal rejection by the British should probably be seen in the wider context of British dissatisfaction with the way in which all of Anglo-Indian law was developing at that time. Having employed pandits and maulvis to help them make sense of Hindu law and Muslim law, the British would have required the services of some learned Jainas to unravel the contents of some of the Jaina works. But the Digambara Jaina Mahāsabha repeatedly passed resolutions against printing any of the Jaina works (Jain 1926: 8) and pollution-conscious mendicants would not as readily engage with the polluting environment of the British courts as Hindu pandits. Hence there are several meaningful reasons for the lack of proper communication between the British authorities and the Jainas. Occasionally, though, Jaina pandits must have been consulted and
Jain (1926: 8) refers to one such case in 1869, even after the system of consulting such experts had been officially abandoned. So the British did try to assist, but the Jainas themselves were not cooperative enough in this venture.

A more complex problem, which the Hindu also pandits faced, concerns the interpretation of any texts deemed to be legal sources. The presumably correct strategy of tracing Hindu or Jaina law from the old texts inevitably had to run into enormous difficulties, since these texts did not speak with one voice and, more crucially, were not concerned with law, but with dharma. While such mismatches frustrated the British enormously when it came to Hindu law (Derrett 1968, chapters 8 and 9) and eventually led to the sacking of the pandits and reliance on judicial precedent as a major source of Anglo-Hindu law, we do not appear to know much about the communication problems between the British and the Jainas. Jain (1926: 7–8) exonerates the Anglo-Indian courts for the resulting marginalisation of Jaina legal texts:

But the courts are not to be blamed for this; on the contrary they tried on each occasion to ascertain the Jaina Law or at least the Jaina customs, so that the disputes of the Jainas may be decided according to their own rules. Sir E. Montague Smith in the course of the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Sheo Singh Rai v. Musammat Dakho (I.L.R., 1 Allahabad page 688) observed; – ‘It would certainly have been remarkable if the courts had denied to the large and wealthy communities existing among the Jains, the privilege of being governed by their own peculiar laws and customs, when these laws and customs were, by sufficient evidence capable of being ascertained and defined; and were not open to objection on grounds of public policy or otherwise.’

It seems therefore that the reluctance among the Jainas to use their own texts as legal documents in public legal proceedings controlled by outsiders, manifesting itself both in private distancing and in obfuscation by the Jaina Mahāsāhabha, contributed much to the rapid waning of British interest in questions of Jaina law and the resulting formal de-recognition of Jaina law as well as its separate status as a personal law.

By the early 1920s, when some Hindu writing appeared that treated Jainas as Hindu dissenters in the context of law reforms, and thus sought to include them in the uniformising project of a Hindu Code, the Jainas became alarmed and started to protest, establishing a Jaina Law Committee (1921). This was composed of English-qualified lawyers as well as some pandits and other learned men, but it achieved nothing. It appears that the Committee took the anekāntavāda philosophy too far and became a mere talking shop. Jain (1926: 10) is vaguely apologetic about why this Committee failed to accomplish its objectives. On the other hand, Jain (1926: 10–12) complained vigorously about the fact that in many cases Jain litigants had Hindu law rules applied to them. He set out his own
programme, indicating that his compilation ‘is prepared in the hope that the Jaina Law may once again raise its head independently, and the Jainas be enabled to observe the rules of their Dharma properly in obedience to their own Laws’ (Jain 1926: 12). He also refused to question that it would necessarily be harmful for Jainas to have Hindu law applied to them, but provides an interesting example about gender relations in a footnote (ibid.):

A single instance should suffice to illustrate the nature of the harm that will accrue to the Jaina community if not allowed to be governed by their own laws. The son in a Jaina household is placed in a subordinate position, and postponed before the wife, who takes the paternal property as absolute owner. She is at liberty to give it away to any one she likes and cannot be stopped by any one except as regards the maintenance of small children. The effect of this healthy rule is that the son has got to be well behaved, obedient and a model of virtue to win the favour of the mother. To invest the son with absolute ownership is to silence the mother’s controlling voice effectively. The insignificant percentage of criminals among the Jainas – the lowest as compared with other communities – is a glowing tribute to the wisdom of the Jaina Legislator. If the Jainas are subjected to a system of Law in which the mother’s controlling voice is silenced or deadened, the same excellence of moral goodness may not be expected of them.

I am not so sure about giving credit to the imagined ‘Jaina legislator’, but this particular rule about maternal control certainly makes a lot of social sense. There are, however, indications that this particular legal rule is not shared by all Jainas, so it may well be a matter of custom in certain Jaina communities rather than a binding rule of Jaina law as a whole. Anthropologists, in particular, might find it relevant to investigate to what extent matrilineal and patrilineal principles are intertwined here, because Jaina law applied also in many parts of South India and its customs will not have remained immune to local norms that might suggest a more equitable gender balance than is often found in North India.

Jaina customary law thus became a kind of unofficial legal system that developed many situation-specific methods of deciding contested matters outside the courts. The major problem in legal practice became therefore that whatever customs Jaina families and communities from all over India may have developed as sensible social norms within their local socio-legal contexts, these might not be recognised as law once a matter went to court. Serious problems arose in gauging the place of Jaina custom and Jain (1926: 13–14) discusses this in some detail, emphasising particularly the practical problems of evidence:

And, it will not do to say that the Jaina Law can be enforced in the shape of special customs, so that matters may be allowed to continue as they have done hitherto. For every lawyer knows how difficult it is to prove
a custom. Hundreds of witnesses have to be examined and instances to be established which are beyond the means of ordinary litigants and outside the scope of small cases. The chance of miscarriage of Justice is also very great, as is known to have happened more than once. The community, too, lives in a condition of insecurity, since nobody knows what will be the decision of the Court of Justice on a question of custom to be proved by oral evidence. This sense of insecurity is liable to become aggravated by wrong adjudication, since that means a pronouncement of law contrary to the actual prevailing practice. In ordinary cases miscarriage of justice, although reprehensible, may not matter much, as only the parties are affected by it. But in regard to general customs, the whole community is affected by such judgments.

These statements replicate evidence about the difficult role of custom which troubled Hindu lawyers, who could not help noticing that the official formal Anglo-Indian law diverged more and more from informal, unofficial local practices. Thus, while custom was in theory an important source of law, which could even override the text of the written law (Menski 1997: 42), in practical reality proof of custom was most difficult to achieve. The result, more so for Jainas than for other communities, perhaps, if we think of their moral value system and the major principle of *ahiṃsā*, might have been that less and less Jaina cases would actually come to the courts. This kind of avoidance reaction is not surprising, since it fits the historical evidence of Jainas hiding their legal sources from the British on account of fears about pollution as well as a desire to practise non-violent means of dispute settlement – among which one can certainly not count the Anglo-Indian judicial system. In addition, there must have been many local mechanisms for settling small disputes through *pañcāyats* and other informal bodies, so the actual Jaina law would become more and more invisible. In other words, for a variety of reasons, under colonial rule Jaina law turned more clearly into an unofficial legal system, a system of rules that exists in social reality but is not brought to the notice of the state and is not formally recognised by it. Despite the formal recognition of Jaina customary laws in principle, informal processes of dispute management strengthened the trend towards making and keeping Jaina law officially invisible.

**Jaina law under the umbrella of modern Hindu law**

From there, it was only a small step to the early 1950s, when modernist reforms of Hindu law were being debated and the Jaina question inevitably came up again. In the end, the decision was made to agglomerate Buddhists, Jainas and Sikhs with Hindus for the purpose of codification and unification of modern Hindu law, irrespective of what these religious minorities thought about it (Derrett 1968: 44). Maybe the relative invisibility of Jaina and Buddhist law was one of the main reasons why modern Indian law makers decided with such apparent ease to
amalgamate Hindu law with the personal laws of the Jainas, Buddhists and Sikhs to form the codified modern Hindu personal law of India. That process was completed in four major enactments in 1955–1956, instead of one comprehensive Code, which had been planned but was sabotaged by Hindu opposition to the perceived de-Hinduisation of the official law. The four statutes passed at that time all have a statement to similar effect, bringing Jainas formally under Hindu law. Thus, section 2 of the *Hindu Marriage Act*, 1955 provides:

2. Application of the Act.–
(1) This Act applies –
(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj,
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and
(c) to any other person domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed.

Explanation: –
The following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion, as the case may be:
(a) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose parents are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion;
(b) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion and who is brought up as a member of the tribe, community, group or family to which such parent belongs or belonged; and
(c) any person who is a convert or re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh religion.

This, however, was by no means the end of Jaina law. It only signifies its formal demise as a separate personal law and thus relegates it still more clearly to an informal and unofficial status, hidden below the assumed formal uniformity of the new state-made Hindu law. Under this vast and wide umbrella of the modern codified Hindu law, however, there is in theory as well as practice plenty of scope for asserting individual claims that a particular matter should be governed by Jaina law.\(^8\) However, as in the colonial period, the methods for achieving legal recognition of Jaina customs are dictated by the formal modern law, which regulates the processes of ascertaining and applying Jaina law through pleading Jaina custom.\(^9\)

It is known that custom was extremely difficult to prove under Anglo-Indian law, which granted it a large role in theory, but restricted it in practice well beyond
what Hindus and Jainas themselves saw as appropriate. One must wonder to what extent the situation may have changed under the modern enactments. No detailed research appears to have been done on this issue. My tentative view, which is primarily based on an analysis of the scope for the recognition of Hindu customary marriage laws, is that post-colonial Hindu law, conscious of the fact that it governs such a widely divergent population, has actually facilitated the use of customs, but they will have to be pleaded and proved in the courts when disputes arise. To what extent such disputes will arise before any formal forum, in the first place, remains therefore a critical issue on which far too little is known with specific reference to Jainas.

Compared to the colonial period, however, the strictness of the test of custom has since been significantly relaxed. In the realm of the lower courts and their unreported cases, particularly in Gujarat and Karnataka, it should therefore be possible to locate much local evidence of the judicial recognition of Jaina customary law. Certainly in theory, if not in practice, the new Hindu law offers a chance for Jaina litigants to assert themselves and their personal law, particularly at the lower court level. It appears, however, that as in the nineteenth century, today’s Jainas may be rather hesitant when it comes to using this legal facility in open court. In practice, many Jainas will either stay out of the state courts altogether, or they may be happy to see Hindu law applied to them officially to avoid undue complications. A viable balance may have to be found between spending extra legal fees on pleading specific Jaina customs in courts for the sake of asserting a religious identity and pursuing such claims in private informal negotiations and settlements.

Nobody appears to have studied these issues in any depth, nor have I conducted any systematic research on case law for the purpose of this particular chapter. It remains a challenging task to ascertain the extent of evidence that Jainas in India today are able to use customary laws to assert any claims to being governed by their own personal law. As indicated, the formal mechanisms for this exist within the Hindu statutory law itself, since the modern Hindu law is not as uniform as is widely believed, and as may appear at first sight. For example, section 3(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides:

3. Definitions.–
In this Act unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) the expressions ‘custom’ and ‘usage’ signify any rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family:
Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy; and provided further that in the case of a rule applicable only to a family it has not been discontinued by the family;
This innocuous section is extremely powerful, and far too few Indian and foreign observers seem to realise this. The old Anglo-Indian test of custom, as a rule or norm that was ‘ancient’ and applied ‘from time immemorial’ has clearly not been adopted by the modern Hindu law. Custom now has to be shown to be observed merely ‘for a long time’, hence opening up vast opportunities for enterprising plaintiffs and their lawyers to plead Jaina customs without going back for centuries. It appears that this happens a lot in practice, especially at lower court level, but we do not hear about such cases, which remain unreported. There are strong indications, however, even at Supreme Court level, that the superior Indian courts remain perfectly capable of handling such complex questions of customary law.11

The scope for unofficial Jaina law

Hence, it may be possible to argue that Jaina law has not totally lost its potential in terms of legal and social reconstruction. As in the nineteenth century, the community itself will actively need to use the existing mechanisms of the formal legal system to assert the separate status of Jaina law, now as Jaina custom under the wide umbrella of Hindu law. This scenario confirms that Jaina law may have officially disappeared, but has the potential to flourish as a largely unofficial law, in the sense of a system of rules that is not officially recognised by the state (Chiba 1986). This is the case in India as well as in Britain, where the scope for asserting the special qualities of Jaina law and life also exists, but is probably not utilised to the same extent by the community.

I have first-hand knowledge of a British case involving Jainas, in which some such arguments could have been used as a matter of ‘cultural practice’, as we would call it in Britain today. In A. v. J. [1989] 1 FLR 110, the basic facts were that a young Jaina couple had fallen out over a misunderstanding of proper behaviour for spouses who are legally married in England through a registered marriage, but have not yet undergone the religious rituals of marriage. We know that normally such couples are expected to defer cohabitation despite being legally married. In the present case, it appears that the young woman expected her husband to display at least some affection towards her and to behave more akin to a married man, while the clearly inexperienced husband thought it proper to keep a decent distance until after the ‘real’ marriage. For example, he sent his wife a Valentine’s card, but she felt this lacked romance and feeling, given that he was her husband.

An application for nullity of the marriage was made by the wife, and this was granted after much argument, but there is not a word in the reported judgment to indicate that the spouses were Jainas. Of course, why should an English case report be interested in such cultural facts? But by keeping such a low cultural profile, Jainas do not help the cause of Jaina law, if indeed they see any such cause. So, I fear, we are still in the same scenario that C. R. Jain observed in the early twentieth century – unless Jainas assert their distinct cultural and religious identity, they will not even be noticed as a separate category of people.
This seems to be different in India, where a good number of reported cases concerning Jainas make rather a lot of this fact, and where interesting controversies have been reported. Derrett (1968: 460) refers to a case in the Bombay High Court during the late 1950s, *Chhotalal Lallubhai v. Charity Commissioner, Bombay* (1957) 59 BomLR 349, in which the claims of a Jaina charitable trust established for the welfare of animals were refused in what Derrett (ibid.) called an ‘extremely negative attitude’:

> We do not think that the other bequests can be regarded as religious. A bequest to Panjrapole, i.e. a home meant for maimed, aged and deformed animals, can by no stretch of imagination be regarded as a religious bequest. Similarly, a bequest for practising kindness to all forms of life cannot, in our judgement, be regarded as a religious bequest; and a bequest for providing food to pilgrims visiting temples or providing clothes to Jain male and female Sadhus and Sadhvis cannot also be regarded as a bequest for religious purposes.

Obviously, something went wrong here in the judge’s understanding of religion itself, rather than of Jainism and its tenets, but this was such an obvious mistake that the Supreme Court, albeit only in 1965, rectified this matter (see *Shah Chhotalal Lallubhai v. The Charity Commissioner, Bombay* (1965) 67 BomLR 432 (SC)).

The indications from Jain’s study of 1926, as well as some specialist law books on Hindu law which contain stray references to Jainas, are that there are quite a few cases in which Jainas as litigants have felt that injustice was done to them through overlooking or disregarding even basic principles of Jaina law. This, too, will have contributed to attempts to keep disputes out of formal courts as much as possible. Only detailed research could tell us to what extent this is still an issue today and what the consequences have been. Manifestly, however, Jaina law continues to exist today, now under the formal cloak of Hindu law, and at an informal and almost invisible level. It is a classic case of an unofficial law within a formal legal environment, benefiting from the fact that no state legal system can totally control the socio-cultural field of all citizens. Unofficial Jaina law is therefore protected not only by reticence on the part of Jainas about their own laws, but also by the inherent limits of formal legal regulation.

The particular theoretical perspective taken here demonstrates, of course, that a purely legalistic, positivist approach would have yielded very different results, which would in all likelihood neither please the Jainas (because it would deny the existence of Jaina law altogether), nor accord with the social reality of unofficial laws as a universal phenomenon. The socio-legal methodology applied here inevitably yields the conclusion that Jaina law in India (and elsewhere) is today largely an unofficial legal system and will remain in that position. What effects this will have on assertions of Jaina identity and Jaina ‘ethnicity’ remains to be investigated in more detail.
Notes

1 There can be no doubt that Jaina law existed as a personal law before that and was applied by courts as such. Historical research on old cases would unearth a lot of material. For some details see Desai (1998: 825–830).

2 Notably, another method of considering ‘Jain law’ is based on the assumption that the texts and the men who know and use them, embody the law. This is a conceptual approach akin to the one in Hindu law that equates the Manu-smriti to a kind of Napoleonic Code. In the present chapter this aspect is neither critiqued nor elaborated, but this is a topic for future discussion.

3 On the fashionable concept of transnational communities, which is now itself beginning to be challenged by terms like ‘translocal’, see the special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (Vol. 27 Number 4, October 2001), edited by Steven Vertovec, one of the foremost writers on this theme.

4 In this regard, the general observations found in Ballard (1994: 1–34) about the reconstruction of Asian ways of life in the UK ‘on their own terms’ clearly also apply to Jainas.

5 I take the concept of ‘ethnicity’ here as a key element of identity formation and assertion of differences between groups of people who may otherwise, in certain respects, be rather similar. The main legal definitions of ethnicity were developed in English law through a case involving ‘racial’ discrimination against a Sikh schoolboy that went up to the House of Lords. For details of the historical and cultural criteria see Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] 1 All England Reports 1062. To my knowledge, no attempt has been made so far to argue that Jainas could also be defined as a ‘racial group’ under the Race Relations Act, 1976. The legal debates over Jaina identity and ‘ethnicity’ in India have probably taken quite a different route and seem to me, at least at this stage, undeveloped.

6 This method or process is most clearly argued in the case of Muslims, where the direct link of Allah and the Holy Prophet forms the core for all Muslim belief.

7 Peter Flügel rightly suggests that much more could be said about this particular selection, a view shared by Christoph Emmrich at the South Asia Institute in Heidelberg. I must leave this topic to better qualified people, at least for the moment.

8 For example, the Jaina customs of marriage would appear to be comprehensively preserved by section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, which has the effect that a Jaina couple may marry in accordance with the customary rites and rituals of the respective family or community. The modern Indian state has made no attempt whatsoever to impose a uniform secular system on every couple that wishes to marry. While formal registration of the marriage remains optional, a customary religious wedding in the midst of family and friends, thus prima facie a socio-cultural process, creates legal validity per se. For details see Menski (2001: 9–46).

9 It appears therefore that Derrett’s observation (1968: 178) to the effect that Jainas became some kind of Hindu caste, is still an appropriate way of looking at this issue.

10 Derrett (1970: 123–124) only considers the much-contested question whether adoption among the Jainas is religious or secular.

11 A most instructive recent example is found in M. Govindaraju v. K. Munisami Gounder, AIR 1997 SC 10, where the Supreme Court of India recognised the legal effects of customary divorces in low caste communities in order to protect an individual’s property rights.

Bibliography

AHIṂŚĀ AND COMPASSION IN JAINISM

Kristi L. Wiley

Ahiṃsā is one of the core ethical values in Jainism, as expressed in the oft-quoted phrase “ahiṃsā paramo dharmaḥ (nonviolence is the supreme form of religious conduct).” Padmanabha S. Jaini has observed that within Jainism there is a “preoccupation with ahiṃsā,” for no other religious tradition “has carried it [ahiṃsā] to the extreme of the Jainas. For them it is not simply the first among virtues but the virtue.”

Although in most religious traditions non-harming relates to other living beings, Jaini has noted that “for Jainas, however, it [ahiṃsā] refers primarily to injuring oneself – to behavior which inhibits the soul’s ability to attain mokṣa.” The reasoning here is that a tendency to intentionally harm other living beings that is motivated by strong passions (kaśāya) causes the binding of harmful varieties (pāpa prakṛti) of karmic matter to one’s own soul. These karmas cause rebirth in undesirable states of existence as hell-beings (nāraki) and animals (tiryāṇca) that are characterized by a preponderance of suffering and that are not conducive to spiritual progress, thereby prolonging the soul’s journey in saṃsāra.

Ahiṃsā and nonpossession (aparigraha), along with the doctrine of manifold aspects (anekāntavāda), are frequently viewed as cornerstones of a Jain worldview. The concept of compassion is mentioned less frequently in most survey texts on Jainism. For example, in The Jains by Paul Dundas there is no entry for the word compassion in the index, and in The Jaina Path of Purification by P. S. Jaini, it is discussed briefly. However, Jains sometimes associate ahiṃsā with compassion in their writings. For instance, in an essay entitled “Environmental wisdom in Ancient India,” L. M. Singhvi states:

Compassion and reverence for life are the sheet-anchor of the Jain quest for Peace, Harmony, and Rectitude, based on spiritual and physical symbiosis and a sense of responsibility and restraint arising out of the principle of cause and effect. Although the term ahiṃsā is stated in the negative (a = non, hīṃsā = violence), it is rooted in a host of positive aims and actions which have great relevance to contemporary environmental concerns. Ahiṃsā is an aspect of dayā (compassion,
empathy and charity). ... Jiva-dayā means caring for and sharing with all living beings, tending, protecting and serving them. It entails universal friendliness (maitrī), universal forgiveness (kṣamā) and universal fearlessness (abhaya). ... It is the same sense of compassion and non-violence which is the basis of the ancient Jain scriptural aphorism Parasparopagraho Jīvānām (all life is bound together by the mutual support of interdependence).6

On a website for Jain pilgrimage sites, Jainism is described as being “synonymous with ahimsā. Ahimsā (non-violence) occupies the supreme place in Jainism. ... Compassion (dayā) is the guiding force of non-violence. It is the positive way of life. It has been assigned an equally high place in Jainism – ‘Dayā dharma kā mool’ (Compassion is the basis of religion).”7

Given the fact that compassion is mentioned along with ahimsā in contemporary writings such as these, it would be useful to investigate the textual basis for these statements in earlier Jain sources. In what contexts is compassion discussed in the Tattvārtha-sūtra, which is accepted by both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras? Are views about compassion in the Tattvārtha-sūtra and its commentaries reflected in writings on lay and mendicant conduct and in texts on karma theory? Is there evidence of sectarian differences in views on compassion? How do the commentators define the various Sanskrit words such as anukampā, dayā, and kārunyā that are translated into English as “compassion”?

Views on compassion in the Tattvārtha-sūtra and commentaries

Compassion is mentioned twice in the Tattvārtha-sūtra (= TS) itself, at TS 6.12 where anukampā is listed as one of the causes of binding sātā-vedanāya karma and at TS 7.6 (= SS 7.11) where kārunyā is listed as one of the contemplations (bhāvanā) that strengthen the five lay vows (anuvrata) and the five mendicant vows (mahāvrata).8 Compassion is mentioned in the commentaries on TS 1.2 where a proper view of reality (samyak-darśana) is defined as belief in existents (tattva) ascertained as they really are.9 Two Śvetāmbara and three Digambara commentators on the Tattvārtha-sūtra are examined here. The Śvetāmbara commentaries include the bhāṣya by Umāsvāti, which Śvetāmbaras believe is an autocommentary, and the vṛtti by Siddhasenagāni (c. seventh century), which is the most extensive Śvetāmbara commentary on both the sūtra and the bhāṣya. The three Digambara commentaries include the Sarvarthasiddhi of Pujjapāda (sixth century), the Tattvārthavārtika (Rājavārtika) of Akalanāka (eighth century), and the Tattvārthaśilokavārtika of Vidyānanda (ninth century).10 At the first occurrence of each Sanskrit word used by the commentators that may be translated into English as “compassion,” the definitions from the Sanskrit–English dictionaries of Monier-Williams and Apte are included in the notes.
Compassion and samyak-darśana

In his commentary on TS 1.2, Umāsvāti lists four indicative signs of samyak-darśana: praśama (calmness), saṃvega (fear of worldly existence), anukampā (compassion), and āstikya (belief in the existents such as the soul, non-soul, and so forth), but he does not define any of these indicative signs. Siddhasenagani defines anukampā as “ghṛṇā or kārunya towards living beings. For example, those who are desirous of happiness for all living beings and who are desirous of the cessation of suffering, having decided, ‘I will not cause them any affliction, not even a little,’ they strive for this with a tender heart.”¹¹

In Digambara commentaries on this sūtra, compassion (anukampā) is not defined by Pūjyaṭā. However, Akalaṅka defines this term as “maṁtī (friendliness, kindness) towards all beings”¹² and Vidyānanda defines it as “dayā towards all mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthāvara) beings.”¹³ The Digambara commentators state that there are two types of samyak-darśana: sarāga samyak-darśana (right belief with attachments) and viṭṭarāga samyak-darśana (right belief without attachments). The indicative signs of samyak-darśana, namely praśama, saṃvega, anukampā, and āstikya, are associated with sarāga samyaktva. Viṭṭarāga samyaktva is characterized only by the purity of the soul itself (ātma-विसuddhi मत्रा).

There are slight variations in the wording of various Digambara commentaries. Pūjyaṭā states that samyaktva is of two types “on account of a difference in the object (sarāga-वित्तरागा-विषया-भेदत्).”¹⁴ It is not entirely clear to me what Pūjyaṭā is saying here. One way to interpret his statement is that when the object of perception is sarāga, in other words, when the object is a living being who has not overcome attachments and aversions, there would be compassion towards that person by someone who has attained samyaktva. There would be no compassion when the object is viṭṭarāga. This would include a person who has overcome all attachments and aversions, and contemplation of the inner soul itself, which is characterized by innate purity and thus not affected by karma that causes attachment or aversion. Akalaṅka does not use word “object” (viṣaya). Instead, he mentions that samyaktva is of two types “on account of the distinction between sarāga and viṭṭarāga (sarāga-वित्तरागा-विकाल्पत्).” Commenting on the phrase “ātma-विसuddhi मत्रा,” Akalaṅka states: “When the seven varieties of karma have entirely disappeared, there is only the purity of the soul. This is viṭṭarāga samyaktva.”¹⁵ This phrase is somewhat ambiguous because there are no souls that are devoid of seven of the eight main varieties (mūla-prakṛti) of karmic matter. Apparently Akalaṅka is associating viṭṭarāga samyaktva with a kevalin, who has destroyed all varieties of destructive (ghāṭiyā) karmas previously bound with the soul and for whom the binding of seven of the eight main varieties of karmic matter has disappeared (all karmas except for sātā-vedantya karma).¹⁶ The kevalin has thereby attained direct omniscient knowledge of all existents, including the soul itself, and has eliminated forever all attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveṣa). In his commentary on TS 1.2, Vidyānanda also associates anukampā with sarāga samyaktva. In the Hindi commentary on this verse, Panḍit
Māṇikcand explains that prāśama, samvega, anukampā, and āstikya are good or auspicious attachments (śubha-rāga). Vidyānanda clarifies another point by explicitly stating that the qualities of samvega and anukampā are not possible for those who have a false view of reality (mithyādṛṣṭi) and are thereby in the first gunāsthāna.

Thus, according to Digambara commentators, compassion is associated with the samyaktva of those who are still subject to the binding of the eight main varieties of karmic matter, in other words, by those who are affected by conduct-deluding (cāritra-mohanṭya) karma, which causes attraction (rāga) and aversion (dveṣa) in the form of the four passions (kaśāya), namely anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā), and greed (lobha) in the three lesser degrees of intensity. This would include those who have not taken any vows and are thereby in the fourth gunāsthāna, laypeople who have taken the lay vows thereby attaining the fifth gunāsthāna, and mendicants who have taken the mendicant vows thereby attaining the sixth gunāsthāna. However, these indicative signs of samyaktva, compassion and so forth, would not be associated with the samyaktva of a sayoga kevalin in the thirteenth gunāsthāna.

**Compassion and sātā-vedaniya karma**

Given the fact that compassion is associated with samyaktva, which is characterized by activities that minimize harm to other living beings and that lead to the binding of beneficial varieties of karmic matter (punya prakṛti) associated with well-being in this life and a good rebirth in the next life, it is not surprising that at TS 6.13 (= SS 6.12) compassion (anukampā) is listed as one of the causes of the influx of sātā-vedaniya karma (the karma that causes pleasant feelings). In discussing the phrase “bhūta-vrati-anukampā” in the sūtra, Umāsvāti states that one should have compassion “especially for those who have taken the vows,” and Siddhasenagāṇi explains that compassion for those who have taken the vows is preeminent. He glosses anukampā with dayā and ghrṇā and states: “When one gives food, water, clothing, utensils, shelter, and so forth to the afflicted, the poor, and beggars, who have not renounced the household life, and to mendicants as well, there are fruits in the form of disassociation of various types of karmic matter. This brings about knowledge, faith, and conduct. Or, giving is showing compassion. It is viewing the suffering of others as if it were one’s own. Dāna is giving away with the intent or wish of showing kindness or giving assistance to others.” The Digambara commentators agree that compassion towards mendicants is preeminent in this context, stating that this is the reason that those who have taken vows (vrat) are mentioned separately here. Pujyāpāda defines a compassionate person as “one whose heart is full of warmth and kindness (anugraha) and who views the afflictions of others as if they were one’s own.”

In his translation of the Tattvārtha-sūtra, Nathmal Tatia has commented that in the Tattvārtha-sūtra the description of compassion has been expanded “to include positive acts of charity and also adds further factors, self-restraint, etc. as
causes of the inflow of pleasure-producing karma.” He notes that in the Bhagavat Viyāhappannatti-sutta “the inflow of pleasure-producing karma is attributed solely to compassion for living things by desisting from inflicting pain.” Tatia is referring here to Bhagavat-sutta 7.6.358, which states that sātā-vedantya karma is bound by compassion (anukampā) for all living beings (prāṇa, bhūta, jīva, and sattva), by causing them no suffering (aduhkha), no grief (asoka), no emaciation of the body (ajīrna), no bitter weeping (ati-atepanatā), no affliction (apīdana), and no bodily or mental distress (aparitāpana). What constitutes compassion here is not clear from the sūtra itself and unfortunately, in his commentary on this passage, Abhayadevasūri (eleventh century) is silent regarding compassion. Compassion could be interpreted as encompassing all of the following restraints, that compassion means causing all living beings no suffering, no grief, and so forth. However, one could also interpret this passage as a series of individual items, “by showing compassion for all living beings, and by causing them no suffering, and by causing them no grief,” and so forth. This is how Deleu has interpreted this passage in his study of the Bhagavat-sutta: “by compassion (anukampā) on all living beings and by not afflicting them (adukkha), souls produce karmā that will be experienced in a pleasant way.” While charitable acts are not mentioned in the context of binding of sātā-vedantya karma here, in commenting on Bhagavat-sutta 8.8.412, which discusses three opponents (padintya) of various items including compassion (anukampā), Abhayadevasūri states that a compassionate person is “one who supports with food, water, and so forth those who have renounced the household life and are practicing asceticism, those who have recently renounced, and those who are not capable of renouncing on account of illness or disease.” It is possible that compassionate acts associated specifically with the binding of sātā-vedantya karma may have been expanded by Umāsvāti in the Tattvārtha-sūtra. However, according to Abhayadevasūri, charitable acts are an aspect of compassion elsewhere in the Bhagavat-sutta.

Compassion is associated with the binding of sātā-vedantya karma in other texts on karma theory such as the Digambara Gommatasāra Karma-kāṇḍa of Nemicandra (ninth century) and the Śvetāmbara Karmagrantha of Devendrasūri (thirteenth century). However, the commentators do not elaborate on compassion here. At Gommatasāra Karma-kāṇḍa 801, bhūta-anukampā is defined as “a feeling of compassion (dayā) for all living beings,” and at Karmagrantha 1.54, Devendrasūri defines karunā as “one whose mind is filled with compassion (dayā).” As in the Tattvārtha-sūtra, there are additional causes for the influx of sātā-vedantya karma.

**Compassion and the bhāvanās**

Since compassion is associated with samyakta and therefore would be an element in proper lay and mendicant conduct, kārunya is listed among the contemplations (bhāvanā) that strengthen all five lay and mendicant vows at TS 7.6
Views on compassion in the Dhavalā commentary of Virasena

The commentators on the Tattvārtha-sūtra do not discuss why compassion is associated with those who have attained samyak-darśana or why it is not manifested in those who have a false view of reality (mithyāvṛta). Like the commentators on the Tattvārtha-sūtra, the Digambara commentator Virasena (eighth century) lists anukampā as one of the four indicative signs of samyaktva in his commentary on the Saṃkhya-śāstra entitled Dhavalā. Virasena clarifies his position by raising the following questions. “There is a cause for compassion. Why is it said that there is no karunā karma? (Answer): Because karunā is a modification that is associated with the inherent nature (svabhāva) of the soul, one cannot say that it is caused by karmic matter. (Question): There is a cause for lack of compassion (akarunā). Why is it correct to say that there is no specific karma that is the cause of a lack of compassion? (Answer): This is correct because akarunā is caused by the fruition of the karmas that destroy restraint (samyama-ghāṭi karma).”

What Virasena is saying here is that although compassion is often thought of as a feeling or emotion, it is not caused by the rise (udaya) of any of the twenty-five sub-varieties (uttara-prakṛti) of conduct-deluding (cārita-mohanīya) karma. It is not caused by the sixteen sub-varieties of mohanīya karmas that generate the four “feelings” or passions (kaśāya) of anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā), or greed (lobha) in any of the four degrees of intensity. Nor is it generated by the rise of the nine varieties of mohanīya karmas that cause the non-passions (no-kaśāya), or “emotions” or “feelings,” namely laughter (hāsa), prejudicial liking (rati), prejudicial disliking (arati), sorrow (śoka), fear (bhaya), disgust (jugupsā), and sexual cravings of the male (pumveda), female (strīveda), and hermaphrodite (napuṃsaka-veda). Like the four passions, as long as these nine emotions exist, it is impossible to attain the highest stages of spiritual perfection characterized by omniscience (kevala-jñāna) and perfect conduct (samyak-cārita).
Therefore, according to Vīrasena, compassion is not a state of the soul (bhāva) that is caused by the rise of karmas (audayika bhāva). Compassion is a state of the soul that is manifested when the karmas that cause the strongest degree of passions (anantāmubandhī-cārita-mohanīya karma) associated with wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭī) and wrong conduct (i.e., the first guṇaṣṭhāṇa) have been suppressed or destroyed. Compassion is a characteristic of samyaktva in its preliminary stage (ķṣāyopāsānika-samyakta), and in its perfected forms, whether they are temporary due to the suppression of all darśana-mohanīya karma (auṣpāṣānika-samyakta) or permanent due to the destruction of all darśana-mohanīya karma (ķṣāyika-samyakta).30 Those who have a proper view of reality have compassion for others. This includes humans, heavenly beings, and five-sensed rational animals.31

Conversely, a lack of compassion is caused by karmas, namely those that destroy restraint (samyama-ghāṭī krama). Here, Vīrasena apparently is referring to those in the first guṇaṣṭhāṇa in which the conduct-deluding (cārita-mohanīya) karmas that generate passions in the strongest degree (anantāmubandhī-kaśāya) are manifested. These karmas always operate with darśana-mohanīya karma, and together they cause improper conduct and delusion regarding the proper view of reality.

Views on compassion in texts on lay and mendicant conduct

As in the commentaries on the Tattvārtha-sūtra and the Satkhandāgama, the authors of the Śvetāmbara and Digambara śrāvakācāra texts, which discuss appropriate conduct for laypeople, list anukampā as one of the indicative qualities (guna or liṅga) of samyaktva.32 Compassion also is listed in some texts as one of the qualities of an observant layperson (śrāvaka-guṇa). Compassion (dayālu) is mentioned in the earliest literary source for the twenty-one śrāvaka-guṇas, the Śvetāmbara Dharma-ratna-prakaraṇa of Śāntisūri (d. 1040) and also in the Digambara Sāgara-dharmāmṛta of Āśādhara (thirteenth century).33 In the Śvetāmbara Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra (1089–1172) sa-dayā is listed as one of thirty-five qualities of a layman. In his commentary on Yogaśāstra 2.15, which lists the indicative signs of samyaktva, Hemacandra defines compassion as “the desire to eliminate suffering: in this compassion for those in misery, no partiality may be shown, for even a tiger will manifest affection for its own offspring. In its material aspects this virtue takes the form of practical steps to remedy suffering where one has the power and in its non-material aspects it expresses itself in tenderness of the heart.”34

Compassion also can be expressed in observing a variety of restraints. For example, in the Digambara Ratna-karanḍa-śrāvakācāra, Samantabhadra (c. fifth century) defines rātri-bhojana as abandoning food at night out of compassion for living beings (jīva-dayā).35 Vāmadeva (Digambara, c. fifteenth century) in the Bhāva-saṃgraha, equates compassion for living beings (jīva-dayā) with abstention from eating various foods, from adultery, theft, gambling, and from eating after dark (rātri-bhojana).36
As mentioned previously in the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, compassion is one of the contemplations (*bhāvanā*) that strengthen all five lay and mendicant vows. These four contemplations, including compassion (*karuṇā*), are described as prerequisites for analytic meditation (*dharma-dhyāna*) by Śubhacandra (Digambara, late ninth or early tenth century) in his *Jñānārṇava* and as sustainers of *dharma-dhyāna* by Hemacandra in his *Yogaśāstra*.37 Here, Hemacandra defines compassion (*anukampā*) as the desire to eliminate suffering. It may be expressed in tenderness of heart or in practical steps to remedy suffering where one has the power to do so.38

Compassion is also mentioned in Śvetāmbara and Digambara texts in association with mendicant conduct. For instance, Āyāranga-sutta 1.6.5.2 states: “A saint, with right intuition (*samyak-darśana*) who cherishes compassion (*dayā*) for the world, in the east, west, south, and north, should preach, spread, and praise (the faith), knowing the sacred lore.”39 *Uttarajjhaya-sutta* 21.13 says: “A monk should have compassion (*dayānukampā*) on all beings, should be of a forbearing character, should be restrained and chaste, and abstaining from everything sinful; he should live with his senses under control.”40 In discussing religious virtues in the *Praśamaratiprakaraṇa*, Umāsvāti states: “Compassion (*dayā*) is the root of sacred doctrine (*dharma*). A person who is devoid of patience or forgiveness (*akṣamāvān*) does not show compassion (*dayā*). Therefore, one who is devoted to patience attains the highest *dharma*.”41 Unlimited compassion (*karuṇāpara*) is listed among the fruits of practicing severe austerities in the Digambara *Ātmānusāsana* of Guṇabhadra (ninth century).42 In verse 107, the renunciant is urged to follow the path of compassion (*dayā*), self-control, renunciation, and equanimity.43 Guṇabhadra observes: “When the shore of the ocean of the cycle of existence is close by, the fortunate man has aversion to sense-gratifications, has renounced all possessions, subjugates the passions, has tranquility, vows, self-control, practice of self-contemplation, pursuit of austerities, duly ordained mental activity, devotion to the conquerors, and compassion (*dayālutā*).”44

**Views of Ācārya Bhikṣu on compassion**

A disagreement over the issue of compassionate help was one of the reasons that Ācārya Bhikṣu (1726–1803) split with Ācārya Raghunātha (1710–1790) of the Svetāmbara Sthānakavāsī tradition in 1760 and subsequently founded the Śvetāmbara Terāpanthī tradition.45 Ācārya Bhikṣu maintained that compassion represents two feelings: worldly compassion (*laukika dayā*) and spiritual or religious compassion (*lokottara or dharma dayā*).46

In explaining Ācārya Bhikṣu’s views on compassion, Ācārya Mahāprajña, the current leader of the Terāpanthīs, has written:

When a strong person is moved at the suffering of the weak, this is sympathy of the strong towards the weak. The word compassion (*dayā*) is an expression of this feeling. When a person is moved at the suffering
of the strong or the weak, this is the realization of the equality of one soul with all other souls. The word compassion is an expression of this feeling. Thus, the word compassion represents two feelings. After being so moved, there are two courses of action: to not cause suffering and to remove suffering. Everyone agrees that one should not cause suffering, but there is some question with respect to removing the suffering of the afflicted. Therefore, Ācārya Bhikṣu has said, “The dharma of compassion is proper, but salvation is attained only by those who have recognized it as it really is and have observed it properly.” He warns, “Do not be deceived in the name of compassion. Penetrate it in depth and investigate it.”

Ācārya Mahāprajāṇa asks: “Why should one remove suffering? Whose suffering should be removed? How should one remove it?” He concludes that there is not a single answer to these questions. From the perspective of societal (laukika) dharma, suffering should be removed in order to make beings happy (sukha), by some means or another. The suffering of human beings should be removed and that of other beings as well if this presents no problems with respect to the welfare of humans. However, from the perspective of ātma dharma (or lokottara dharma), suffering should be removed only in order to make the soul pure and only by virtuous means. This should be done for everyone. In the case of laukika dayā, the idea of restraint (samyama) or non-restraint (asamyama) is not predominant, only the feeling of compassion (karunā). However, where there is compassion that is informed by restraint, this is lokottara dayā. Therefore, worldly kindness (laukika upakāra) is to rescue someone who is being burned in a fire or to save someone who has fallen into a well. Spiritual kindness (lokottara upakāra) is to save someone who is without restraint and who is being burned in the fire of birth and death from falling into the well of evil (pāpa) by giving religious instruction. To give money and goods to someone who is poor is worldly kindness. To give peace (śanti) to someone who is burning in the fire of desire by giving religious instruction is spiritual kindness.

Thus, according to Ācārya Bhikṣu, from the spiritual perspective, compassion is shown through acts of kindness that are expressed in giving religious instruction, thereby encouraging restraint in others, which leads to the lessening of suffering in the cycle of samsāra. It is also shown through one’s own restraint by not causing suffering in others through acts of violence or through causing fear to arise in them. Ācārya Bhikṣu has said that nonviolence is restraint towards living beings. Compassion is the feeling of friendliness towards living beings and a trembling in the heart that comes in association with their being afflicted. Without compassion, ahiṃsā is not possible, and without ahiṃsā, compassion is not possible. In these two, there is an inseparable connection. The first mahāvrata is to abstain from killing all living beings. In this, the totality of compassion is absorbed. To not cause distress from fear is giving freedom from fear. This is another name for compassion and ahiṃsā. Not killing, not causing another to kill,
and not approving of the killing, this is giving freedom from fear, and this is compassion.\textsuperscript{54} 

In her ethnography on the Śvetāmbara Terāpanthī community at Ladnun, Anne Vallely explains: “Terāpanthī Jains sharply demarcate between social and spiritual action in a way that makes them distinct among the other Jain orders. Only religious guidance that leads to a ‘positive change of heart’ is truly spiritual and earns good \textit{karma}. They argue that while acts of charity (feeding, clothing, healing, etc.) are social duties, they cannot be considered religious or spiritual acts.”\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, the building of hospitals or animal shelters is a social activity, not a religious activity.\textsuperscript{56} She states: “Jain compassion is not directed so much at the suffering in social life, but at the suffering of social life.”\textsuperscript{57} She was told, however, that householders should perform social duties such as these even though they do not cause the binding of good \textit{karma}. She observes that it is hard to know whether the lay community believes that such actions do not cause the accumulation of merit. “When I spoke with members of the Terāpanthī Mahila Mandal (a women’s organization) the majority believed – through a creative interpretation of their doctrine – that their efforts would benefit them karmically. As one woman explained, ‘Perhaps the acts themselves are not \textit{dharma}, but the compassion that drives them is, and this surely leads to \textit{punya}.’ And I knew of at least one \textit{saman} who interpreted philanthropic acts in the same way.”\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{Conclusions}

Although there several different Sanskrit words used for the concept of “compassion” such as \textit{anukampā}, \textit{dayā}, and \textit{kāruṇya}, in the commentaries consulted here, these terms are not differentiated from each other. Instead, the commentators gloss one word for compassion with another, for example, \textit{anukampā} is glossed with \textit{dayā}. Therefore, all of these terms can be translated into English as “compassion.”

The association of compassion with \textit{ahimśā} expressed in contemporary writings by Jains is supported in classical Jain texts and commentaries, where compassion is associated with a proper view of reality (\textit{samyak-darśana}, or the fourth \textit{gunasthāna}) but not with a false view of reality (\textit{mithyātva}, or the first \textit{gunasthāna}). This association of compassion with \textit{samyak-darśana} is also found in texts on lay and mendicant conduct. As P. S. Jaini has explained, compassion (\textit{anukampā}) that is associated with a proper view of reality (\textit{samyaktva}) is free from pity or attachment to its object. “It develops purely from wisdom, from seeing the substance (\textit{dravya}) that underlies visible modes, and it fills the individual with an unselfish desire to help other souls toward \textit{mokṣa}. If this urge to bring all tormented beings out of \textit{samsāra} is particularly strong and cultivated, it may generate those auspicious \textit{karmas} that later confer the status of Tīrthaṅkara upon certain omniscients. When present to a more moderate degree, \textit{anukampā} brings an end to exploitative and destructive behavior, for even the lowest animal is now seen as intrinsically worthwhile and thus inviolable.”\textsuperscript{59}
The opinion of Jain authors, that true compassion is always accompanied by a proper view of reality (samyaktva) and that compassion is lacking in those with a false view of reality (mithyātva), might be associated with views of compassion held by other religious traditions. By definition, those who follow other religious traditions could not have samyak-darśana because one of its indicative signs is āstikya, or the acceptance of the Jain doctrine as the true creed. Phyllis Granoff has observed that medieval Jains were especially concerned with the Buddhist concepts of compassion and self-sacrifice. “[T]he Jains might be said to have defined themselves as the religion of compassion par excellence in medieval India, and to support their claim they needed to show that all possible rival claimants practiced a false compassion.” They believed that “the Buddhist exemplified a wrong ideal of compassion that was in itself inherently violent.” Jains equated acts of self-sacrifice that were considered to be expressions of compassion by Buddhists, for example, of a Bodhisattva offering his body to save a living being or offering his body as food in times of famine, as misguided acts entailing violence that is tantamount to murder. As argued in texts devoted to lay conduct, acts of compassion do not entail killing under any circumstances whatsoever, even when it is perceived to alleviate the suffering of other living beings or to prevent them from killing others in the future. Jains also argued against the views of a group called the samsāramocakas, who believed that it was meritorious to kill sinful or suffering creatures, and against the Mīmāṃsakas, who believed that the prohibition against killing animals did not apply in the context of the sacrifice.

There is no disagreement over compassion when it is understood as restraint, by not causing suffering in others by refraining from acts of violence (ahiṃsā) or by refraining from acts that would cause fear to arise in others. However, the Śvetāmbara Terāpanthī Ācārya Bhikṣu disagrees with Digambara commentators and with the other Śvetāmbara commentators examined here, who believe that compassionate acts that are aimed at alleviating the physical suffering of those who are afflicted is karmically beneficial to oneself and is conducive to spiritual progress. He would disagree with the views expressed by Siddhasenaṇa in his commentary on Tattvārtha-sūtra 6.13 and by Abhayadevaśāri in his commentary on Bhagavaṇ-sutta 8.8.412 that material forms of giving by laypeople to those who are afflicted and have not renounced the household life are compassionate acts that have positive karmic effects. Ācārya Bhikṣu believes that the only compassionate acts of giving that are beneficial from a spiritual perspective are giving freedom from fear and giving religious instruction. Giving material support to those who give religious instruction, namely, giving to support the mendicant community is also considered spiritually beneficial by Śvetāmbara Terāpanthis.

Digambara commentators on the Tattvārtha-sūtra, but not Śvetāmbara commentators, differentiate between two types of samyak-darśana: with attachment (sarāga) and without attachment (vītarāga). Digambara commentators associate compassion with sarāga samyaktva but not with vītarāga samyaktva.
This raises the question of how one might understand compassion in the context of the Tīrthaṅkara, who by definition must have vītarāga samyaktva. How could the soul of a Tīrthaṅkara, who has destroyed all destructive (ghātīyā) karmas, be devoid of compassion in the same way that the soul of a non-omniscient person (chadmaṣṭha) is devoid of compassion after it has fallen from a state of samyaktva to mithyātva due to the rise of mithyātva-darśana mohanīya karma? The apparent absence of compassion in the Tīrthaṅkara could not be associated with the rise of karmas that affect proper belief and proper conduct since these karmas have been eliminated from the soul. There is one definition of compassion that might be relevant here. In explaining the term dayānukampā in his commentary on Uttarajjhaya-sutta 21.13, Lakṣmīvallabhagaṇi states: “A mendicant should have compassion for all beings. This means that the mendicant should be intent on observing compassion in the form of salutary instruction.”

As discussed earlier, this is the view of compassion that Ācārya Bhikṣu understands as spiritual kindness (lokottara upakāra), which encompasses giving religious instruction and giving freedom from fear. Both of these are precisely what the Tīrthaṅkara does after attaining kevala-jñāṇa by preaching to those who have gathered in the assembly hall (samavasaraṇa) including his gaṇadharas, who interpret the utterances of the Tīrthaṅkara and compose the sacred scriptures on the basis of his teachings. The notion of giving for the benefit of others is expressed by Pūjyapāda when he states that on account of the destruction of dānāntarāya karma (the karma that prevents giving to others), the Tīrthaṅkara has the ability to give protection or fearlessness (abhaya) against the sorrows of samsāra to other beings through his preaching. Śvetāmbaras believe that through the destruction of all of the ghātiyā karmas collectively the Tīrthaṅkara acquires the ability to influence for the better his immediate surroundings, giving freedom from fear and comfort to others. Perhaps in the case of the omniscient sayoga kevalin (kevalins and Tīrthaṅkaras in the thirteenth guṇaṣṭhāna), the quality that is expressed by the word compassion in the context of a non-omniscient being in the state of bondage (chadmaṣṭha) could be understood as an expression of perfect knowledge (kevala-jñāṇa). This is how some Digambara commentators have understood the soul’s quality of infinite bliss (ananta-sukha). For example, on Tattvārtha-sūtra 10.4, which lists the four qualities that remain in the unembodied, emancipated soul (siddha) as kevala-samyaktva, kevala-jñāṇa, kevala-darśana, and siddhatva, Pūjyapāda states that other qualities of the soul are not excluded because there is an invariable concomitance between ananta-jñāṇa/darśana and ananta-virya (infinite energy) and so forth. [Infinite] sukha always accompanies [infinite] knowledge. Thus, one could understand that the perfect knowledge of Tīrthaṅkaras, which is conveyed through their preachings, encompasses the concept of compassion, and that this compassion still exists in the world through their teachings and through the sight (darśana) of their images in temples, which are representative of the samavasaraṇa.
Notes

1 Jaini 1979: 167.
3 Kasāyas are caused by conduct-deluding (cārita-mohanīya) karma. See Note 19. The karmas that cause birth as a five-sensed rational animal, human, and heavenly being are considered beneficial varieties (punya prakṛti). For a complete listing of the pāpa and punya prakṛtis, see Tatia 1994: 204–206. For a general discussion of the binding and the operation of karma, see Jaini 1979, chapter 4.
4 A number of works have been written on the doctrine of manifold aspects or a non-one-sided view of reality (anekāntabhāda) and the associated doctrine of qualified assertion (syādvāda) and its sevenfold predication (saptabhāgī-nayā). For example, see Mookerjee 1944. Non-harming (ahīṃsa) and nonpossession (aparigraha), which is interpreted for householders as placing limits on one’s possessions, are two of the five minor vows (anuvrata) of a layperson and two of the five major vows (mahāvrata) of a mendicant.
5 Jaini 1979: 66, 150, and 163.
6 Singhvi 1998: 40–42.
8 Numbering of the sūtras in the TS follows the Śvetāmbara version. A difference in the Digambara version is indicated by (= SS).
9 The tattvas as listed at TS 1.4 are the soul (jīva); the non-soul (ajīva); the influx (āsrava), bondage (bandha), stoppage (samvara), and disassociation (nirjarā) of karmic matter; and liberation (mokṣa). Here, merit (punya) and demerit (pāpa) are not listed but are implied in influx and bondage. Samyaktvā is the state of having samyak-darsāna. A person who has attained samyak-darsāna is called a samyak-dṛṣṭi. This is also a designation given to the fourth gunasthāna, or stage of spiritual development. For a listing of the fourteen gunasthānas, see Jaini 1979: 272–273. Following Jaini 1979, I have used the spelling “samyak” in all terms, rather than the sandhi form with the phonological change, “samyag-darsana.”
10 According to Ohira (1982: 146) dating of the TS ranges from 150 BCE (Datta) to 500 CE (Woods). In between these dates are 100 CE (Phućandra Siddhāntaśāstri), 135–219 CE (J. L. Jaini), third to fourth century CE (Nāthūrām Premi), and third to fifth century CE (Sukhēl Saṅghvī). Ohira believes it was written in the middle of the fifth century. Dating of Digambara commentators follows Dundas (2002: 87). Digambaras believe that Umāsvāmin was the author of the sūtra and therefore do not understand the bhāṣya by Umāsvāti to be an autocommentary. No date is given in the colophon of Siddhasenagani’s commentary, but on the basis of the works and authors mentioned, it could not have been written prior to the seventh century. In his introduction to his commentary on the TS, Sukhēl Saṅghvī states that the commentary was written between the last quarter of the seventh century and the middle of the eighth century (Saṅghvī 1974: 58–60). See also H. R. Kāpadī’s introduction to his edited edition of the TS (Kāpadī 1926: 48–53 and 63–64). He believes that Siddhasenagani’s commentary is posterior to the Sarvārthasiddhi (= SS) and coexisting with, or anterior to, the Tattvārtharājavārtika (= RV) and the Tattvārthaslokavārtika (= SV), both of which he assigns to the ninth century.
11 Siddhasenagani’s commentary on TS 1.2. Anukampā is defined as “sympathy or compassion” by Monier-Williams and “compassion, commiseration, or pity” by Apte. Ghrṇā is defined as “a warm feeling towards others, compassion, tenderness” by Monier-Williams and “compassion, pity, or tenderness” by Apte. Kārūnya is defined as “compassion or kindness” by Monier-Williams and “compassion, kindness, or pity” by Apte.
AHIMŚĀ AND COMPASSION IN JAINISM

12 RV 1.2.30.
13 SV 1.2.12 (vol. 2, p. 34). Dayā is defined as “sympathy, compassion, or pity” by Monier-Williams and “pity, tenderness, compassion, mercy, or sympathy” by Apte.
14 SS 12.
15 RV 1.2.31.
16 In the absence of passions (kaśāya), activity (yoga) is the sole cause for the influx of karma. In this case, there is instantaneous inflow and bondage (īryāpattra) of only one variety of karma, sātā-vedaniya karma. However, the soul of the sayoga kevalin still has all four varieties of non-destructive (āghāṭiyā) karmas (nāma, āyu, gotra, and vedānti) bound with it, which are rising and producing their effects. For details on the aghāṭiṣṭa karmas, see Wiley 2000.
17 SV 1.2.12 (vol. 2, p. 30).
18 SV 1.2.12 (vol. 2, p. 36).
19 There are two main varieties of deluding (mohanīya) karma: those that cause delusion regarding the nature of reality (darśana-mohanīya karma) and those that cause delusion regarding conduct (cāritra-mohanīya karma). When darśana-mohanīya karma is operative, the soul is in the first guṇasthāna, or lowest stage of spiritual development. There are twenty-five sub-varieties (uttara-prakṛti) of conduct-deluding karmas. Sixteen sub-varieties generate the four passions (kaśāya) of anger (krodha), pride (māna) deceitfulness (māyā), and greed (lobha). These karmas operate, or produce their effects, in four degrees of intensity. The strongest degree of intensity is anantānubandhit (pursuers from beginningless time). It operates with darśana-mohanīya karma, causing the soul to remain in the first guṇasthāna. The three lesser degrees of intensity are apratīyākhyānāvarāna (obstructors of partial renunciation), which prevent one from taking the lay vows (auvṛata), pratīyākhyānāvarāna (obstructors of complete renunciation), which prevent one from taking the mendicant vows (mahāvṛata), and samjivalana (smoldering), which prevent one from attaining complete right conduct (yathākhyātā). There are nine sub-varieties of mohanīya karma that cause the non-passions (no-kaśāya) of laughter (hāsya), prejudicial liking (rāti), prejudicial disliking (arati), sorrow (śoka), fear (bhaya), disgust (jugupsā), sexual feelings of a male for a female (pumveda), sexual feelings of a female for a male (strīveda), and sexual feelings of a hermaphrodite (napuṣnakaveda). The first six no-kaśāyas are not operative after the eighth guṇasthāna and the three vedas are not operative after the ninth guṇasthāna. The samjivalana degree of krodha, māna, and māyā are not operative after the ninth guṇasthāna and lobha is not operative after the tenth guṇasthāna. For varieties of karma, see Glaserapp 1942, chapter 2, and for the guṇasthānas, see Glaserapp 1942, chapter 8.
20 Other causes for the influx of sātā-vedaniya karma listed here are giving (dāna), asceticism with attachment (sarāga-samyama), concentration (yoga), equanimity (ksānti), and purity or freedom from greed (śauca).
21 Siddhasenagani’s commentary on TS 6.13.
22 SS 632.
24 Deleu 1970: 137 (emphasis on “and” is mine).
26 Kṛpā is defined as “pity, tenderness, or compassion” by both Monier-Williams and Apte. Neither Umasvāmi nor Siddhasenagāni state how one should render assistance to the afflicted here.
27 SS 683. Pūjāyāda does not state how one should render assistance to the afflicted here.
28 Dhavalā commentary on Saṭkhandāgama 2.1.2 (vol. 7, p. 7). The Digambara Saṭkhandāgama was written by Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali (c. second century CE).
According to Hirālāl Jain and A. N. Upadhye, its date is 683 years after Mahāvīra’s death (c.156 CE) (Satkhāndāgama, vol. 1, p. 9 of the editorial section). This is the earliest extant Digambara text and it discusses the bondage of the soul by karma.

29 On mohānīya karmas, see note 19.

30 Three types of samyak-dārśana are possible in the fourth gunasthāna. Apsaṃamika-samaṃkṣaṭṭa is due to the temporary suppression of all dārśana-mohānīya karma. It lasts only for a short time (less than forty-eight minutes, or an antarmuhārtta). Kṣaṭyaṣaṃaṃkṣaṭṭa is brought about by subsistence-cum-disassociation of dārśana-mohānīya karma. It may be lost if the strongest degree of passions (kaśāya) re-emerge, causing the soul to fall to the first gunasthāna. Kṣaṭyika-samaṃkṣaṭṭa is the state that is attained when all dārśana-mohānīya karma has been destroyed. It is always associated with the destruction of the conduct-deluding karmas that cause the strongest degree of passions (anantāmabhandhi-cārita-mohānīya karma). This type of samyak-dārśana can never be lost. The technical details regarding the processes of energy (karma) associated with the attainment of the three types of samaṃkṣaṭṭa is beyond the scope of this paper. See Tatia 1951: 268–275.

31 On rare occasions, this can include hell-beings as well. Normally, a soul that has attained samaṃkṣaṭṭa is not born as a hell-being because such a soul (i.e., one in the fourth gunasthāna or above) does not bind the sub-variety (uttara-prakṛiti) of āyu karma that causes such a rebirth. However, it is possible for a human or animal to have bound nāraka āyu karma previously while in a state of mithyātva and to subsequently attain a proper view of reality that arises with the destruction of all dārśana-mohānīya karma (kṣaṭyika-samaṃkṣaṭṭa). Once āyu karma has been bound, it is impossible to change its sub-variety (uttara-prakṛiti) and thereby attain rebirth in another state of existence. However, since all dārśana-mohānīya karma has been destroyed, it is impossible to fall back into mithyātva, even after rebirth as a hell-being. King Śrenika is an example of such a rebirth. See Wiley 2003.

32 See Williams 1963: 41.

33 Williams 1963: 259. For dates, see Williams 1963: 9 and 28.

34 As translated by Williams (1963: 42).

35 Ratna-karaṇa-śrāvakācāra v. 21, as cited in Williams 1963:108.

36 Williams 1963: 54. He dates this work sometime after 1350 CE, probably in the fifteenth century.

37 Tatia 1951: 285 and 290.

38 Yogaśāstara ii.15, as cited in Williams 1963: 42.

39 Āyāranga-sūtra 11.6.5.2, as translated by Jacobi 1884: 60.


41 Prāsamaratiprakarana 168. Cf. Sāgāra-dharmāmṛta i.4, a śrāvakācāra text written by the Digambara Āśādhara (thirteenth century): “compassion is the root of the whole sacred doctrine,” as cited in Williams 1963: 42.

42 Ātmānusānana 68. Guṇabhadra, who was a pupil of Jinasena, was also the author of the Uttarapurāṇa and the last five chapters of the Ādipurāṇa.

43 Ātmānusānana 107.

44 Ātmānusānana 224 as translated by J. L. Jaini.


46 His views are expressed in Anukampā ri Caupā, written in 1787 in the local Marwāri language. Not having access to this text, I have relied on passages discussed by Muni Nathmal (now, Ācārya Mahāprajñā) in Bhikṣu Vicāra Darśana (Nathmal 1964). Although this work has been translated into English (Acharyā Bhikṣu: The Man and His Philosophy, Adarsh Sahitya Sangh Publications, Churu, Rajasthan, 1968), I have translated from the Hindi text, which includes verses from the Anukampā ri Caupā in the notes.
49 Nathmal 1964: 86.
50 Nathmal 1964: 87, quoting Anukampā 8.2–8.3.
58 Vallely 2002: 68.
59 Jaini 1979: 150.
60 Granoff 1992: 2.
61 Granoff 1992: 36–37. On samsāramocakas, see Halbfass 1991: 98–129 and Granoff 1992: 3–4 and 41, note 13. According to Granoff, these arguments were most often advanced in the śrāvakācāra texts devoted to proper lay conduct. In this article, Granoff has translated portions of the Śrāvakaprajñāpati attributed to Umāsvāti and its commentary attributed to Haribhadra. This is the earliest Śvetāmbara śrāvakācāra text. Williams (1963: 2–4) believes the Umāsvāti who wrote this text was not the author of the Tattvārtha-sūtra. He dates this text to sometime prior to the end of the fifth century and the commentary in the eighth century.
62 Laksmivallabhagāni’s commentary on Uttarajjhaya-sutta 21.13. According to the introduction to vol. 2 (pp. 7–8), he was the pupil of Lakṣṇikīrtiga of the Kharatara Gaccha and he lived in the late seventeenth century. According to Digambaras, giving protection also is associated with the rise of Tīrthankara nāma karma.
63 SS 261 on TS 2.4.
64 SS 927 on TS 10.4.

Bibliography

Primary sources


Dhavalā, of Vīrāse. See Saṭkhandāgama.


Sarvārthasiddhi, of Pūjyapāda (The Commentary on Ācārya Grdhapiccha’s Tattvārtha-sūtra). Sanskrit text with Hindi translation by Siddhāntācārya Phūlcandra Śāstrī. Jñānapītha


Secondary sources


454
AHI
Ø
SA
AND COMP ASSION IN JAINISM

455


INDEX

Abalabal (The power of the weak) 289
abhaya (one who is incapable of attaining mokṣa) 49, 51, 97 n.5, 112, 303 n.53
Abhayadeva Sūri 39, 41, 76 n.1, 442, 448
abhidyārayāmo 16
abhiseka (anointing): of images 176 n.26, 350, 379 n.152, mahāmastiakābhiseka 352; pañca abhiseka 350, 353;
parībhiseka 345
Ācārānga Sūtra (Āyārānga Sutta) 43, 51, 212
ācārya 6, 7, 98 n.19, 158, 166, 242, 315, 317, 320, 324–326, 331, 332, 334, 344, 349, 351, 356–359; A(f)calacaccha 317; Digambara 260 n.16, 356, 359, 381 n.75, 389 n.291; Sthānakavāsī 314; Tapāgcaccha 45, 46, 52, 53, 263, 317–319, 321, 324, 325, 360; Terāpanth 242, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338; Tristutigaccha 370 n.46; see also gacchādhipati; paṭṭacārya action: 33, 38, 51, 286; and compassion 438, 442, 443; evil 51; Hindu and Jain concepts 422; and intention 213; Jamāli on the nature of 35, 38, 41; and kāṣṭha 247; pointless 290; ritual 199; speech as 94, 122, 124, 162, 208; and volition 38; see also asceticism; calemāne calitam; compassion; conduct; karman
Adda: nikṣepa of 4
addatij’ ajjhayanam 4
Addaya 4
adharma 90, 92, 93, 95
adhyātma (supreme self) 267
Adhyātma circle 339, 340
Adhyātma Parva Patrika 270
Ādinātha (Rṣabha) 402, 403, 405, 406, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415 nn.13, 15
Ādinātha Temple 402, 403, 406, 410, 411, 412, 413
Ādipurāṇa (Jinasena) 181, 193, 343, 427
Ādisūgarā ‘Anikālikar’, Ācārya 351, 357 āgama (canonical scripture) 92, 93; Digambara 353, 379 n.152; Śvetāmbara 61, 113; texts 370 n.43 Āgamikagaccha see Tristutigaccha āganta 18
Agarvāla/Aagravāla caste 379 n.154; and bhāṭṭārakas 379 n.152; and Digambara Terāpanth 339–341; and Kāṣṭhāsaṅgha 343, 377 n.130, 378 n.146, 379 nn. 152, 154; Māthuragaccha 342, 343, 379 nn.152, 154; mixed Hindu-Jain 387 n.258; and Śvetāmbara Terāpanth 337 āghāta karman. (Pkt. āhāya kammaṇa) (the act of killing) 12
ahimsā 12, 248, 423, 431, 438; association with compassion 436–437, 445
Ahimsā Army 353
ailācārya (Pkt. elācārya) 352, 356, 358, 388 n.271
ailaka (male celibate) 168, 265, 344, 345, 348, 351, 355, 356–358; see also monk Ājīvika order 9, 34, 48, 51; see also Gosāla ājīviyā 9
Akalanāka 91, 98, 110, 439–440
Akhil Bhāratīya Jain Mahāmāndal 315
Akhil Bhāratīya Jain Samāj 348
Akhil Bhāratvarṣīya Digambara Jain Mahāsābhā 347, 353, 358, 368 n.16, 384 n.212, 428
Akhil Bhāratvarṣīya Digambara Jain Pariṣad 347, 353, 385 n.217

457
INDEX

āyā 213; see also ātman
āyadandā (one who harms his own soul) 24, 26
āyambila fast 221
āyavam āvum 21
Ayodhyāvāśī caste 281

Babb, Lawrence 175 n.8, 224, 234, 232 n.3, 234 n.37, 246, 253, 256, 260 n.14, 261 nn.34–35, 40
bahujanā 9
Bahuraya 44; see also Jamāli
Bāistolā tradition 326, 332; see also Dharmaḍāsa; Sthānakavāśī
Bajpai, K. D. 283
baladeva: role model for layman 191, 205 n.36
Balatkāra Gaṇa 340, 343, 345, 352, 353, 376 n.121; term 380 n.164
Balbir, Nalini 33, 46, 63, 71, 166, 317, 338, 358, 366 n.4, 369 n.31, 373 nn.69, 91, 375 n.101
Banārsīdās 270, 273, 339–340
Banks, Marcus 220, 234 n.31, 245, 258, 260 n.5, 421
Berlinerblau, Jacques 53
Bhadrabāhu 276; and Pātaliputra council 62
Bhadrabāhu Samhitā 426 n.1, 427 n.8
Bhadresvarā Sūri 72
Bhagavati Sūtra (Viśāhapiṃnati Sūtra) 43, 44, 45; description of compassion 441; four-fold saṅgha in 367 n.10; Jamāli’s portrayal 35, Jamāli’s rebirths 40, 44, 46–47, 50–52; Ohira’s study 68; structure of 39–42
Bhaktāmara Stotra 199
bhakti: congregational 199, 249; devotion 35, 188, 242, 255, 256, 257, 285, 445; guru 241, 255–256; Kṛṣṇa 244; mendicant 200; misguided 255; personal trust 96; sentiment 255; Śrīmad Rājacandra 241–261; texts 185–186; see also ārati; vandana
Bhakti Bhāvanā 199
Bharahesara ni Saajjhāy 182, 188–190; mahāpurusā list 194–196
Bharata Cakravarti 425
Bharateśvara Bāhubali Vṛtti (Śūlaśāhīlagani) 188–190
Bhārgava, Dayānand 293–294
Bhārill, Hukamcand 269
bhaṭṭāraka 265, 337, 340, 341–347, 352, 360, 427; anti-bhaṭṭāraka movement 270, 340; and caste 384 n.207; not layman 382 n.190; and munis 347, 349; origin 345; seats 299 n.9, 342, 345; term 345, 381 n.178; traditions 344–347, 374 n.76, 374 nn.138–139; see also Bīsapanth; mahaḍācārya; succession; Terāpanth
Bhaṭṭa school 92
bhāvanā (contemplation): and compassion 439, 443–444, 445
Bhāvananditā, Sādhuvi 165
bhavya (one who is capable of attaining mokuśa) 51, 99 n.5, 114, 301 n.53, 303 n.56; and omniscience 113
bhikkham 14
Bhikṣu, Ācārya 334, 338, 366; on compassion 445–449
biographical frame 267
Bhīṣma (mythological character) 36
Bhūtadīnna, Ācārya 71
bhūyābhisānkā 17
Bīsapanth 164, 262, 339, 341, 342–344, 350, 352–353; see also Digambara Terāpanth/ Terāpanth
Bogāraste caste 346
Bollée, Willem 4, 10, 12, 22, 24, 37, 47, 61
brahmacārya 162, 176 n.18, 202 n.8; vow 268, 344–345, 348; see also brahmacāri/brahmacarini; celibacy; chastity
Brāhmaṇa: Brāhmaṇical philosophers’ passion 134–136; critique of 5–6, 8, 10; killing of 96; learned in the three Vedas 137–138; see also Rṣabhadatta; Skandaka Kātyāyana
Brāhmaṇism 402
Brāhmaṇ Candanbālikā 180–182, 185, 186; as māṇipalika 199, 200
Brhatkālpaḥsāya 44
Bronkhorst, Johannes 38, 39
Bruhn, Klaus 182, 194, 406, 410
Buddha (Gautama) 114–115; characterizing by contrast 34; omniscience 90, 109, 133; and women 167
Buddhisāgara Sūri 319
INDEX

Buddhism: parallels with Jainism 8, 12, 34, 76, 90, 109, 133, 167
Buddhist: abuse of 16; debate on omniscience 91, 109, 133; disputes with 6, 15, 21, 109, 113, 119, 160; wrong ideal of compassion 448; monastic orders 315, 363; moral status 133–134; passion of 132–134
Buddhivijaya, Muni 320, 321
Budhmala, Muni 334
Bühler, Georg 72, 315, 364
Busby, Cecilia 210–212
Buṭerāya, Muni 320

Caillat, Colette 17
caitvālaya 286
Ceiyavandanaakulaka (Jinakusala Sūri) 43
caityavāsin 317
calemāne caliam (Skt. calemāne calitam) 38, 42–43
Campālā, Paṇḍit 268
Caṅcal, Kavi Amṛtāl 268, 271
Candanabālā 184–185, 196, 314; see also sattā narratives
Candanabālā upavāsa 229
Candanamālā, Muni 337
canon, Pāli 90, 109–110; Buddha in 199; heretical doctrines in 19
canon, Śvetāmbara 8, 90, 212, 367 n.10; cosmography 373 n.62; familiarity with 233 n.17; gānipidagam 45; Jamāli in 35–44; language 14; Mahāvīra in 43; manuscripts 61; non-canonical: Heyopadeya 48, Śravakācācaras 354; redaction 63–76; rules 333; ‘Seniors’ 14; Sthavirāvalī 314; texts 55–56; transmission of 47–48, 50, 61–62; see also council, canonical canonisation: of Śthānākavāsī scriptures 326; of Śvetāmbara canon 61–76.
Cārnāgara caste 281
Carrithers, Michael 342, 348, 354, 359, 381 n.185, 382 n.190, 385 n.219, 387 n.268
caste (jāti): abusive use of caste marks (Sīlānāka) 16, 93; of bhāṭṭārakas 344, 346; category in the Census of India 367 n.11; dominant Digambara social category 342; of followers of Tārān Śvāmī 264, 269, 281–282, 297; Hūmād 347; and identity 210;
in Jaipur 210, 216–217, 222; Jain 224; and karma 213; manifestation of Vedic dharma 93; mendicants from non-Jain castes 332; mixed Hindu-Jain 281, 353; organisation 367 n.8; Osvāl 216–217, 332; and personhood 231; and sect 314, 341–342; of Śrīmad Rājācandra 244; Śrīmālī 216–217, 244, 332; status and renunciation 363–364; of Śthānākavāsī mendicants 332; of Tārān Śvāmī 267; of Terāpanth mendicants 337; trading 224–225, 280
Cāturmāsā Sūcī 315, 316
Cāturmāsā Sūcī Prakāśan Pariṣad 315
Caturtha caste: and Ādisāgara 349; and bhāṭṭārakas 383 n.203, 384 n.208; and Digambara monks 346; and Śāntisāgara ‘Dakṣīṇa’ 348; and Vidyāsāgara 351
cauḍah niyama (fourteen restraints) 231; see also fast; vow
Caudhari, Cidānanda 273–274, 280
Caudhuri, Gulābacandra 271
caur ‘-ant’ 24
Ceiyavandananahābhāsa (Śānti Sūri) 44
celibacy 155, 156; rules for Śvetāmbara nuns 163–166
Census of India 313–314, 354, 362, 365, 367 n.11, 367 n.17, 389
Chadmāsta Vāṇi (Tārān Śvāmī) 264, 265, 277, 279, 281
chanda (verse form) 186
characterising by contrast 34, 42
charisma 374 n.76; of Ātmārāma 320; factor for differentiation of monastic groups 318; motive for renunciation 363, 389 n.305; vs organisation 320, 324; of Śrīmad Rājācandra 250–259; of Tārān Śvāmī 273, 276, 281, 297
charity see dāna
Charpentier, Jarl 8; account of Jaina councils 64–65
chastity (śīla): definition 162, 202 n.8; female 157, 158, 159; and renunciation 173; see also brahmačārī/brahmacariṇī; celibacy; nun
chattrī (canopied memorial platform) 284–286; see also samādhī, smāraka
Chiba, Masaji 419, 434
child initiation see bāla dīkṣā
Christian: heretics 53; monasticism 363
Chuang Tzu 293
Citrbhānu 259
INDEX

Clémentin-Ojha, Catherine 159, 381 n.172
cocount: symbolism 228–229
Cohen, Anthony P. 210, 231
Cohn, Bernard S. 313
community 44, 224, 419; and communalism 313–315, 346–347, 368 n.16; diaspora 258; Digambara 265, 269, 282, 296, 349, 354, 363, 384 n.215; and economy 233 n.20, 234 n.31; education 384 n.211; faith 424; of followers of Tārān Svāmī 264; identity 212, 224–225, 255, 419; image of homogeneity 350; and communalism 419, 430; minority 314, 353; and movement of Śrīmad Rājaacandra 242; pot as symbol of 230; sva-puṣkā 59 n.50; transnational 420; watchfulness 173–174; see also sangha
compassion 133–134, 438–439, 448; Ācārya Bhiksu views on 445–447, 448, 449; Buddhist concepts 448; not caused by karman (Vṛtasena) 443–444; Tattvārtha Śāstra views on 439–443, 449; in texts on lay and mendicant conduct 444–445
conduct: ācāra 161, 163, 283–290, 296, 333, 344–345, 354, 357, 373, 439, 442; ethical 38, 162; lax (sīthiācāra) 270, 272, 352, 360, 382 n.194; lay (śrāvakācāra) 278, 287, 296, 339; misconduct 158, 160, 170; right (cāritra) 162, 213, 278, 302 n.46, 424, 441, 443; samācarati 26; and Vedic dharma 91; see also lay; samyak-cāritra
conversion 12, 41, 138, 177 n.29, 224, 367 n.8; Hindu converts 281
cross-cousin marriage 44, 301; see also marriage
council canonical: dating 74–76; first 61–63, 67; Mathurā council 63, 64, 66, 67, 70–71, 74; scholarly accounts 63–68; Valabhi councils I & II 64–74
Cunningham, Alexander 406, 407, 408, 410, 411, 413–414
custom: of bhāttārakas wearing clothes 345; Bundelkhand 281; caste 342; definition (non-state law) 420; family 292, 365; Jain 255, 421, 431; local 419; monastic customary law (maryāda) 324; pūjā 253; qualities of sattī 84; renunciation in old age (Digambara) 266; of selecting a king 224; see also Jaina law

dakkha 18
Dallapiccola, Anna L. 228
Dansanāśāra (Devasena) 343
dāna (charity) 133–134, 290, 385 n.217, 435, 441–442, 447, 457 n.20
Dariyāpūri Sampradāya 326, 332
Darśānavijaya 317
dayā see compassion
Dayānanda Sarasvati, Svāmī 16, 271
death: experience motive for renunciation 338; fast 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; fast 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 283; memorial for Kesar bhojana 5, 36; feasts (marāṇa bhojana) 385 n.217; and liberation 248; memorial for Himāu Pānde 28
INDEX

dharma (Continued)
Haribhadra views on 93–96; Hindu 423, 427, 429; Jain 384 n.212, 424, 430, 438; Kumārila views on 90–93; laukika and lokottara 446; as an object of perception 95; omniscience 91; see also stīr dhāma

Dharmabhūsana 112
Dharmadāsa, Ācārya 331
Dharmaghoṣa 7
Dharmakīrti 90, 94, 121, 122; anti-Brāhmaṇical stand 136–137; critique of Samantabhadra 109–110, 113; on fallacious examples 141–142; influence on Siddharṣi Gani 129–130; Siddharṣi Gani’s divergence from formulations of 130–132, 138; use of symbols 120–121, 122–123

Dharmaparīkṣā (Yaśovijaya) 50
Dharmasagara: account of Jaina councils 73; on Jamāli’s rebirths 46–50; Pravacanaparīkṣā 369 n.27; Yaśovijaya’s response to 50–52
Dharmasimha, Ācārya 326
Dharmottara 131; acceptance of Dharmakīrti’s typology of fallacious examples 138–139

Dhruvasena, Valabhī 131; acceptance of Dharmakīrti’s typology of fallacious examples 138–139

Dhruvasena, Valabhī King 64, 65, 72, 74

Dhūṇḍiyā tradition 326; see also Lava; Rṣi Sampradāya; Sthānakaśāi

dialogue: between Jains and their cumulative tradition 297; internal and external 297; Kesi and Paesi 115; style 10


Terahpanth; divisions; Kāṇḍī Svāmī Panth; rule; Tāran Svāmī Panth

Digambara Jain Mahāśāmiti 352, 353, 385 n.218
Digambara Jain Muni Parisad 352

Digambara Jain Sadhū-Sādhvīyom ke Vārṣayoga ki Śūcī 355

Digambara Terāpanth/Terahpanth 263, 270, 316, 339–342, 350, 352, 377 nn.132–134; and caste 341, 376 n.130; and Kāṇḍī Svāmī Panth 341–342, 352–353, 358, 377 n.126, 385 n.218; term 377 n.124; see also Bīsapanth; intellectuals

Dignāga 90
dikṣā (initiation): age 364; āryika dikṣā 358; of Ātmārāma (Vijayānanda Śrī) 320; bhaṭṭāraka dikṣā 345, 382 n.190; of children (bāla dikṣā) 332, 339; Digambara 169, 357–359; in Digambara ritual texts 381 n.185, 382 n.190; dikṣā dātā 345; dikṣā guru 344, 355, 358, 388 n.286; kṣuṭalakā and ailaṅka dikṣā 344–345, 355; in satī narratives 196, 202 n.9; ordination 184–185; and self-realisation 251–252, 290; Śrīmad Rājacandra’s 245–247, 252
dikṣā paryāya (monastic rank): and succession 325, 331

Dīparatnasāgara, Muni 41
dispute: Bhuvanbhaṁśuri and Rāmacandraśtri 321, 371 n.46; over biography of Tāran Svāmī 299 n.14; Brāhmins 137–138; Buddhists 117–151; Dasa Pūjādhiśāraṇāndolan 347; devī pūjā 270, 353; Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣi Gani 131; Dharmasagara and Kirtivijaya (Śāgara Śākhā and Vijaya Śākha) 46, 319; Digambara and Kāṇḍī Svāmī Panth 341–342, 352–353, 358, 377 n.126, 385 n.218; doctrinal and group formation 321; ek tithi/be tithi 321, 370 n.44, 371 n.46; fallacious example 119–151; governance of nuns by an ācārya 371 n.46; guru pūjā 261 n.29, 370 n.44; image-worship 264, 266, 269, 271–274, 280, 300 nn.24–25; Jains and heretics 3–26; Jain sectarian 33, 259; Jāyasāgara and Lāl Bahādur Śāstrī 300 n.19; Jñānasāgara
and Śivasāgara 351; Kumārila and Haribhadra 90–96; legal 422, 429, 433; Mahāvīra and Jamāli 43–44; moral status of opponents 46, 52, 131; Mūlasaṅgha and Kāsthāsaṅgha 379 n.152; Muslim followers of Tāran Svāmī 266; non-violent settlement 431, 435; pañca kalyāṇaka abhisekā 353, 379 n.152; Premeśūri and Jāsodevasūri 371 n.46; Samaiyā and Paravāra castes 269; saman category 337; Sāntisāgara and Ādisāgara 353, 386 n.241; status of āryikā 351; style 131; succession 319, 350; Tāran Svāmī 268; Tāran Svāmī and bhattārakas 270; temple-entry 301 n.25; temple ownership 414; Terāpanth and Bisaṃpanth 270; Terāpanth Digambara and Tāran Svāmī Panth 269, 280, 300 n.19; use of ‘green’ vegetables such as tomatoes 351; Vidyāsaṅgara and Viveksāgara 351; word 15; see also heretic/heresy; Jaina law; omniscience dissimilarity see fallacious example dittim 15–16 divisions: Bisaṃpanth/Terāpanth division not demarcated 282, 350; geographical 344, 357; instigated by sādhus 332; religious and political 352; sectarian 201 n.3, 251, 263, 312, 315, 332, 343, 347, 352; social 312, 347; subgroups of mendicant orders 315–316, 332, 343, 347, 352, 357; yatis and samvegī śādhus 317 Diwan, Paras 425 Diwan, Peeyushi 425 Dosakhe caste 281 Douglas, Mary 217 Drāvidasaṅgha 343 dravyārdra 4 Drīdhaprahārīn 51 Dreaming Argument 135–136 drṣṭānta 139 drṣṭāntābhāsa 142 Dube, Leela 217 Dumont, Louis 211, 213, 219, 230, 367 n.8 Dundas, Paul 8, 212, 213, 245, 263, 272, 319, 343, 438; account of Jaina councils 61–62, 66, 67, 76; on Jain attitudes to Sanskrit 97 n.4; Sāgarānanda Śūri’s publication of the Āgamas 372 n.62 Dūrga pūjā 234 n.37 Eckhart, Meister 293 egantayārī 8 Ekala Pātriyā Panth 326 ekala vihārī (Pkt. egalla vihārī) (mendicants who wander alone) 352, 366, 367 n.8 ekāsana fast 221; communal 230 ek tithi/be tithi dispute 321, 370 n.44, 370 n.46 ethics 38, 162, 294, 438; Buddhist 133–134; Jamāli as a flawed ethical type 35; lay and mendicant 294; and salvation 247; transsectarian 249, 259; and volition 38; see also ahiṁsā; compassion experiential knowledge 249; of Adhyātma movement 339; of inner self 31, 209, 247–249, 254–255; Jamāli 38, 48; omniscience 93–96; and perception 122, 136; of sāmāyika 219; of Tāran Svāmī 267, 291; see also self-realisation eyāvāyā 22 fallacious examples (drṣṭāntābhāsa) 119–121 127–132, 134–140, 142 n.21, 143 n.23, 147 n.47; based on dissimilarity (vaiddharmya) 121, 124–126; based on similarity (sādharmya) 120–123; Dharmaṅkīrīn influence on jaina typology 141–142; modified by Siddhāraṅa Gaṅi 130–132, 138 fast: breaking (pārana) 184, 230; counting 369 n.19; death 5–6, 36; of Jamāli 35; kinds 115, 208, 216–217, 221–223, 225; of Mahāvīra 184; and paryuṣana 192, 196; as penance 164; and pratikrama 188; and sātī texts 182–183, 196; see also aksaya nidhi tapa; āyambila; Candaṇābālā upavāsā; caudah niyama; ekāsana; rātri bhojanā tiyāga; sallekhanā; vṛṣṭi tapa female chastity see chastity Fergusson, James 406, 410, 412, 413, 414 Flügel, Peter 175 n.6, 176 n.47, 201 n.16, 231 n.20, 259 n.51, 270 Fohr, Sherry 193, 198 Folkert, Kendall, W.: on gaccha 312, 366 n.4; account of Jaina councils 66, 67, 76 food: alms 70, 164; especially prepared for mendicants (āghāta-karman) 12–14;
food (Continued)
forbidden 194; green vegetables
176 n.26, 351; and identity 220, 224;
and illness 35; offering own body as
(Buddhist) 448; the omniscient and
378 n.146; pūjā 287, 350, 423;
renunciation of 5–7, 226, 276;
sharing 324, 371 n.53; as symbol 229;
transaction 210, 281, 435, 441;
see also fast

gaccha 67, 312, 321–325, 342, 366 n.4
Gacchācāra 47, 50
gacchādhipati 317, 324, 369 n.29,
370 n.43, 371 n.46, 371 n.51, 372 n.54,
372 n.58, 373 n.66, 374 n.79; see also
ācārya
Gale, Richard 421
gana (monastic group) 342
Gandhi, M. K. 300 n.23, 363
Gangeya 39–40, 41
ganinī 357, 358
gantā 20
Gaṇṭai Temple 402, 405, 408, 413
garabāhīma 15
Garuda 412
Gautama (Mahāvīra’s disciple) 40;
challenge to Jamāli 36, 38; Dharma
Śūtra 136–137
Gautama Aksapāda 137
Gautam Svāmī no Rās 199
Geiger, Wilhelm 14, 19, 20, 24
Ghio, Muhammad 345
Glasenapp, Helmuth von 15–16, 66,
245, 271, 341, 377 n.131, 451 n.19
gocari see almsround
god/goddess: Biblical 94; creator 109,
422–423, 425–426; denomination hard
to define 411; Ghanṭākarna 373 n.63;
Hindu 410; invoked in Jain stavanas
187; Jamāli’s rebirth 51–52; Kilbiṣaka
36, 38, 45, 48–49; as law giver 425;
omniscient 90–91, 96, 289–290;
Padmāvati 376 n.119; pot as symbol of
mother and household goddesses 227;
Purusottam 225; rejection of worship
374 n.119; the soul 295; supreme 113;
Tāran Svāmī reborn as 276; and word
Terāpanth 376 n.120; worship of their
images 270, 287–288, 376 n.119
Godikā, Amrā Bhaunīsā 340; see also
Digambara Terāpanth/Terahpanth

Gommaṭasāra Karmakānda
(Nemicandra) 442
Gondal Moṭā Pakṣa 332
Goonasekere, Ratna Sunil Santha
Abhayawardana 338, 363, 375 n.101,
389 n.300, 389 n.304, 389 n.307
Gopucchasangha see Kāṣṭhāsangha
Göpyasangha see Yāpaniyasangha
Gosāla 5, 8, 9, 17, 20; attack on Mahāvīra
21; claim to omniscience 41; endless
rebirth 51
Goṣṭhāmāhila 42
Govardhandās, Brahmačārī 250
Granoff, Phyllis 448
Guérinot, A.-A. 65, 321
Gupta, M. G. 225, 256–258
hanging 5; see also suicide
Hara/Harjī 326; see also Sādhumārgi
Haribhadra 47, 108; account of
Śvetāmbara councils 71, 72; debate on
omniscient being 91–96
Hariśbhadrācārya 198
Harivamśa Purāṇa (Śrutakīrtī) 263
Harlan, Lindsey 181
Hastimal, Ācārya 255
hell (nāraka) 40, 191, 193, 205 n.34,
276; hell being (nāraki) 36, 45, 56 n.37,
276, 438, 452 n.31; see also rebirth
Hemacandra, Ācārya 43, 49, 55 n.23,
56 n.33, 56 n.38; account of Jaina
councils 66, 68, 72; on Candaṇṇabālā
234 n.40; on compassion 444, 445;
dating of first Jaina council 62–63;
depiction of women 233 n.17;
on Jamāli’s rebirths 45, 49, 51, 52,
54 n.15; on omniscience 110; and sāṭṭī
narratives 179, 191
heretic/heresy 15, 18, 19, 20;
pavayana-nihnaga 33, 34; Christian 53;
Jamāli 33, 43; Kapila 49;
pāvaiyā/pavānāyā 15; see also
heterodoxy; Jamāli; Kapila; nihnava
heterodoxy: Digambara 341; Kāṇṭī Svāmī
Panth 259, 269, 341–342, 352–354,
358, 377 n.126, 385 n.218, 387 n.249; Kāsthāsāngha 341, 378 n.146, 378 n.147; Yāpanīyasāngha 343; in Hinduism 29 n.51

_Heyopadeya_ (Siddhārṣi) 45, 48

Hillenbrand, Robert 402

Himavanta 69, 71

Hindu: castes 353, 287 n.258; category 202 n.6, 368 nn.11, 14, 17; dharma 423; encompassing ideology 157, 208, 214, 222, 275, 420; identity 225; vs Jain 136, 183, 225, 313–314, 414, 423; and Jain women 157, 160, 184–186, 195–196, 205 n.37, 208–231, 315, 364; temples 305 n.62, 399, 400–414

Hinduism: expropriation of religious sites 402–403; female renunciation 157–159; vs Jainism 107, 113, 313, 423–424; no interaction with heterodox people 29 n.51


_Hindu Marriage Act, 1955_ 420, 432, 433, 436

Hindutva 368 nn.17–18

_Hitraprāśottarāṇī_ (Hiravijaya Śūrī) 49

Hiravijaya Śūrī 45, 49, 52, 318

Hoernle, Rudolf A. F. 61, 342, 378 n.138

Humāda/Hūmāda caste: and Ācārya Śāntisāgara ‘Chāṇī’ 349; and Balātkāragaṇa 380 n.164; could remove its _bhaṭṭārakas_ 384 n.208; and Muni Candraśāgara 347

Humphrey, Caroline 230

identity: ambiguous 42; competitive demarcation 225; ethnic 424, 435; etymological 22; and fasting 222–223, 231; female Jain 218; food as a marker 220; _gaccha_ 224; Hindu 225; Jain 42, 138, 212, 223, 268, 273, 297, 314, 419, 424; _jāti_ 225; and _karma_ 248; legal 420, 433; mendicant 253; Mūrtipūjakā 224; ontological 119; of opponent 129; purity 220; ritual creation of individual and social 210–230; _samudaya_ 374; _sanghāda_ 334; self vs social 255; see also personhood

image worship (mūrtipūja): Digambara Terāpanth 342; Lonikāgaccha and Sthānakavāṣṭi opposition to 325; rejection under influence of Kundakunda 278; replacement of image 402, 404; in _Srimad Rājacandra_ movement 251, 253, 345–346; Tārān Svāmī indifference to 264, 266, 268–269, 271–273, 280, 286–288, 297, 300 nn.24–25; of wooden images by Kāsthāsāngha 379 n.152; see also pūja

Inden, Ronald 211

individual: and self 210–211

**Indranandi Jina Samhitā** (Vasunandi Indranandi) 427

Indranandi, Vasunandi 427

inference (anumāna) 92, 111, 112, 114, 135, 136, 138–139

intellectual culture 282, 287

intellectuals: Digambara Terāpanth 268, 270, 279, 352; Kānji Svāmī Panth 269; lay Digambara 354; lay Śvetāmbara 42; modern reform oriented lay 313, 354; monastic Śvetāmbara 53; and moral authority 46; and mystics 249, 260 n.17; Tārān Svāmī Panth 267–272, 277–278, 280, 282, 289, 301 n.37, pandits 265; see also lay; pandita

invariable concomitance 121–122, 129, 139–140, 142, 449

**Isibhāṣyāṇī** 4

Jacobi, Hermann 9, 10, 11, 14–26, 61, 63, 313, 314, 321; account of Jaina councils 63–66, 69, 70, 75; on Bhadreśvara’s tales 72

Jagaccandra Sūtra 181

Jainini: elucidation of the _Vedā_ 94

Jain (Skt. Jaina): _dharma_ 98 n.15, 423; intellectual culture 282, 287; Jainness of Tārān Svāmī Panth 268, 273; Jains 297, 312–314; religion 313; religious culture 312; ritual culture 246, 264, 282, 291, 340; word 313, 367 n.10; see also identity

Jain, Anupam 316, 353, 355, 356, 357, 359

Jain, Bābūlāl ‘Ujjavalā’ 315

Jain, Campālā 269


Jain, Hirālāl 271

Jain, Jñāṇacandra 273–274

465
INDEX

Jain, Kālurāma 274, 283
Jain, Kāmṭa Prasād 348–349
Jain, M. K. 313
Jain, Muni Uttam Kamal 312, 340, 341, 342
Jain, P. K. 108
Jaina law 419–420; doubtful existence 421–422; legal definitions 424–427; scope as unofficial law under modern Hindu law 431–435; under British rule 427–431
Jaina Law Committee (Digambara) 429
Jaina Studies 297, 312
Jain Ektā Mahāmmandala 315
Jain epistemology 108
Jainī, Jagmandar Lal 313
Jainism 263, 423; and ahiṃsā 438–439; Ārhatadarśana 99 n.24, 100 n.46; and Hinduism 313, 423; institutional 246; and Jains 297, 312–314, 420; normative scriptural 53; orthodox 38, 42, 46; outside India 258–259, 384 n.211, 420; pre-sectarian 249; revival 333; sectarian 52, 251; standard scholarly accounts of 61, 438; traditional 114 n.9, 293, 369 n.19; true/proper 252, 258, 384 n.212; see also identity; Jain/Jaina
Jain Young Men’s Association see Akhil Bhāratīya Jain Mahāmandal
Jamāli 33, 34–35, 41; kinship relation with Mahāvīra 43–44; negative exemplar 41–42, 44; portrayal in Avaśyaka Cūrṇī 42–43, 44, 45; portrayal in Bhagavati Sūtra 35–39; rebirths 40, 45–46; Drhamasāgara on 46–50; Yaśovijaya on 50–52; renunciation 39
Jamālūṇa 253
Jambūvijaya, Muni 68
Jayamalāgacchā 332
Jayasāgara, Brahmacārī 268, 274, 275, 280, 281, 289, 290–292
Jinabhādra 38
Jinacaritram 314
Jinādaśa 4, 15, 18, 22, 24, 42; account of Jaina councils 70–71
Jinakūśala Sūri 43, 45
Jinamāṇḍana Gaṇī 44
Jinānātha Temple 410
Jinapati Sūri 43, 45
Jīnaprabhamuni 74; account of Jaina councils 72–73
Jina Śāsanānām Śrāmaṇīratna 195–196
Jinasena, Ācārya 427
Jīneśvara Sūri 252
Jitamala (Jayācārya), Ācārya 334, 338
Jīva 210–212; nature of 36, 38
Jīvarāja, Ācārya 326; see also Sthānakavāśī
Jīnānagacchā 326, 332, 334
Jīnānāsāgara, Ācārya 265, 351, 353
Jīnānasamuccayāsāra (Ṭāraṇ Svāmī) 269, 278–279
Jīnānamatī, Āryikā 158, 358
Jīnānavimala Sūri 190
Johrapūrakara, Vidyādhara 265, 300 n.24
Jones, Richard 421
Joshi, Vasant 293, 295
Julian, Emperor 89
Kaduāgacchā 263
Kailāścandra Śāstrī 271, 289
Kakar, Sudhir 214–215
Kālākācārya 74
Kalāpūrṇa Sūri 325
calaśa see pot
Kalāśa Vaiśyaputra 40
Kalpadruma (Lakṣmīvilābbha) 74
Kalpalatā (Samayasundara) 74
Kalpasūtra (Bhadrabhū) 43, 63–70; account of Jaina councils 69–70, 72, 74
Kālurāma, Ācārya 337, 338, 339
Kamala Battiṣī (Ṭāraṇ Svāmī) 278, 296
Kamalāśrī, Āryikā 280
Kamalaratna Sūri 321
Kamkumārāṇa, Muni 169
Kaṇcanāsāgara Sūri 318
Kane, P. V. 424, 425
Kāṇṭi Śvāmī 259, 263, 269, 352
Kāṇṭi Śvāmī Panth 259, 341–342, 353, 358, 377 n.126, 385 n.218
Kapadia, Hirabal Rasikdas: account of Jaina councils 61, 62, 66–67, 75
Kapila 49, 132
karman 12, 22, 28 n.11, 40–41, 55 nn.30–31, 111–112, 125, 213, 234 n.24, 247–248; and compassion 443–446, 449; binding 261 n.38, 438–439, vedāntiya karman 441–443;
INDEX

destruction 108, 221, 279, 290; destruction and vītarāga 131–132, 290, 247–248, 440; effect 183, 193, 260 n.21, 443; in lay and mendicant ethics 294, 447; and omniscience 110–111, 113; punya 222, 226, 229, 232 n.9, 294, 447; reduction 181, 183, 279; via sattī name lists 197–201; and ritual 287; suppression 247, 444; see also action; compassion; Karmagrantha
Karmagrantha (Devendra Sūri) 38, 442
Karna (mythological character) 34
Karnikāvṛtti 45
karunā, karunya (compassion) 439, 445–449; no effect of karman (Vīrasena) 443–444; Siddharśi Gaṇi 133–134; see also compassion Kāsālīvāl, Kāsturcand 348, 352, 359
Kāthāśāsanga 341, 343, 362, 377 n.130, 378 nn.148–149, 379 n.152, 379 nn.154–155, 384 n.207; see also Mūlasanga
Kathākōśa see Śrī Bharateśvara Bāhubali Vṛtti
kāyovagā 14
Keling, Whitney 183, 185, 196, 216, 233 n.17, 233 n.21, 234 n.27
Kēsārībhāti, Seth Haṭhisinī 319
Kesarīdāti 286
Kesi 115
kevalajñāna see omniscience
kevalin 41, 73, 75, 112, 306 n.68, 440–441, 449
Khajuraho Temples 402–405, 412–414
Khandelvāla Mahāsabhā 347
Khandelwal, Meena 160
Kharataragaccha 181, 252, 263, 317–338; caste of laity in Jaipur 216; monks 176 n.27, 389 n.298, 453 n.62; nuns 158, 164, 166, 338; personhood and self amongst lay women 209; pratikramana text 189, 203 n.16, 389 n.299; yattī 317, 370 n.38
Khitāk Vīśesa (Ṭaraṇ Śvāmi) 279
Kilbiṣaka gods 36, 45
kimci loe 17
kinship: and aksaya nidhi tapa 227–228; patrilineal 216; see also marriage
Kinsley, David 225
Kiranāvālī (Dharmasāgara) 75
Kirtivijaya 45–46, 52
knowledge (jñāna): and education 163, 165; experiential self-knowledge (samyak-darśana) 213, 218, 241, 249, 253; adhyātma jñāna 267, ātmājñāna 295; imperfect transmission 62; mokṣa and imperfect 111–113; of men 193; perception imperfect 134–135; right knowledge (samyak-jñāna) 278–279; scriptural 93, 245; secret 9; source of 89–90, 92–95, 97 n.9, 108–109; source of authority 253, 255–256; source of Kundakunda’s 301 n.33; through fasting 227; verbal 144; see also omniscience
Koṭhāri, Jayant 190
kramabaddhaparīyāya 377 n.126
Kṛpā, Śādhvī 172
ksullaka/ksullikā 168–169, 265, 344, 355, 357–358
Kumārīla: advocation of Vedic revelation 95–96; on omniscience 90–91, 98, 107, 108
Kumārapāla, King 196
kumbha see pot
Kundakunda 267, 269, 270, 272, 273, 276, 277, 289, 340, 341, 343, 345, 352, 353; as a symbol of Digamabara orthodoxy 301 n.33
Kunthusāgara, Ācārya 169, 350, 356
kuo bhayenam 20
Kusumāprabhā, Śādhvī 167, 171
La Fontaine, Jean 230
Laidlaw, James 158, 185, 189, 209, 212, 214, 220, 221, 232 n.3, 245, 257
laghu nandanā 345
Lakṣmaṇa Temple 405
Lakṣmīndās, Rājā 347
Lakṣmīvallabha Gaṇi 74, 449
Lālcand, Ambalābhai 245
Lallū, Svāmī 243, 245, 250, 251, 252
Lalwani, Kastur Chand 39
Lamb, Sarah 212
Lath, Mukund 339, 340
Lava (Lavijīrī) 326, 366
lavālavā 18
Lāvanya, Pravartinī 163, 165
lay: Adhyātma circle 333; aim of accumulation of good karman 213, 294; ascetic categories 168, 265, 282, 344, 355, 382 n.190, 386 n.240; bhakti 253–256; categories of virtue 191;
lay (Continued)

conducted 12–13; demographic data 313–315, 362; diaspora and
transnational dimension 420–421; Digambara Terāpanth 339; Ekala
Pātriya Panth 326; gender separation 176 n.31; guru 241–243, 249, 255–257,
265, 288, 339, 346; intellectuals 341, 346, 354; interaction with mendicants
165, 172, 224, 256–257, 333, 358, 366; lineage 249–253; Lonkā 326; men and
women 161–166, 168–169, 174; merchant conduct 23; organisation:
Ahiṁsā Army 353; Conferences 314; pratikramaṇa 177 n.31, 188–189, 198–200, 203 n.17; pandits 341;
protection of nuns 172; Śrīmad Rājacandra 241; religious rules for
287, 353, 439, 441–442, 444, 447–448, 453 n.61; religious role models for men
196, 205 n.36; social divisions 312; Tārān Svāmī Panth 163; virtues
expressed through names of virtuous people 190; see also
brahmacārī/brahmacārini; caste; community; identity; movement;
personhood; ritual reform; śrāvakā/ śrāvikā; śrāvaka pratimā;
vor; wealth
laywoman 196; and chastity 162;
emotional and social vulnerability after marriage 217–218; fasting 208,
221–223; life cycle and increasing authority 220–221, see also chastity;
religious beliefs and practices; strī dharma
Leumann, Ernst 16, 33, 34, 367 n.9
liberation see mokṣa
Limbā Moṭa Paśa 332
lineage: monastic 62, 69, 190, 196, 249, 354, anvaya 277, 342, 378 n.138,
378.n.141; Balāṭkāragaṇa 380 n.164; concept 40, 324, 366 n.4; Digambara
muni 342–359, 365, 381 n.175,
386 n.242; food sharing 371 n.53,
374 n.78; gaccha 46–47, 181; lay guru
242, 246, 249–253; preceptorial 40;
segmentary lineage vs group
organisation 320–325; Senagana
382 n.189; Tapāgaccha 317–325;
Tārān Svāmī family (mūra) 264;
see also denomination; ekala vihārī;
initial; movement; order, monastic;
pandita; school; sect; succession
Lonkā 272, 326
Lonkāgaccha 263, 272, 325–326
Lukes, Steven 210, 231
Luther, Martin 271, 300 n.23
McGee, Mary 222
magic (jātṛgāri) 266, 274
Mahāpṛajñā, Ācārya 39, 259, 341,
445–446
mahāpuruṣa (great man) 194, 196; name
lists 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194,
197–198, 201; see also satt
mahāśrāvaka (great layman) 194, 195
Mahāvīra 6, 8, 9, 35, 40, 69, 293;
biographies 43; disapproval of violent
deaths 5; disciples 19; Gosāla’s attack
21; Jamāli kinship relation 43–44;
Jamāli’s confrontation 36; omniscience
41; Rajniś’s interpretation 294–295;
Śrīmad Rājacandra’s connection 250
Mahāvīrakārtī, Ācārya 351, 352,
390 n.313
Mahias, Marie-Claude 233 n.19,
366 n.2
Mālārohana (Tārān Svāmī) 278, 292
Malayagiri 47, 66, 68, 72
Mallavādin 68
Mallūṣāva, Tārācand 286
Mamalapūrīka (Tārān Svāmī)
278, 279
mándala (circle) 299 n.14
māndalācārya: title used for bhaṭṭārakas
299 n.14
māṅgalācarama (blessing): Tārān Svāmī
texts 288–291
māṅgalik texts 182, 199–200
Māṇikcand, Paṇḍit 440–441
Māṇilāl, Muni 332
Māṇivijaya Gāṇi, Paṇḍyāsa 320
Manohara, Sādhvī 166
mantra: bhaṭṭāraka 270, paṭṭābhiseka
345, 382 n.190, sūrmantra 382 n.190;
muni dikṣā 381 n.185; Nāmakāra
Mantra 184; satt lists as 182, 197, 199;
source of powers 274; Vedic 95
Manu 135, 136
Maṛćci 49; see also Mahāvīra
marriage: in a caste of Tārān Svāmī ‘s
followers 301 n.27; and chastity 159,
162; cross-cousin marriage of Jamāli

468
INDEX

44; intermarriage with other Digambaras 282; Jain and Hindu 420, 432; and kinship amongst Rajasthan Jains 216–217, 220, 227–228, 230; mother marriage of Persians 94; negotiation 215, 222; and saitis 185; Tāraṇ Śvāṃi Panth ritual 291–292; vs renunciation 159, 208, 338–339, 361–365; wedding and fasting clothes 228, 231; widow remarriage 173, 338, 384; see also Hindu Marriage Act Marriott, McKim 211, 212, 230, 231

mathematical logic 120 Mathurā council 63, 64, 66, 67, 70–71, 74 Māthuragaccha 342, 343 Mayāṣāgara 319 meditation: ātmā dhyāna (Rāmasena) 379 n.154; dharma dhyāna 445; dhyāna 93, 249, 267, 271, 273, 276, 279; Tāraṇ Śvāṃi 286–290; Rajñīs 293–295; sāmāyika 219, 273; vipassanā 294 Mehta, Lakṣmīnandana see Rājacandra, Śrimad mehuna 23–24 mendicant 312; classification and segmentation 180, 316; compassion towards 441; demographic data 314; Digambara 339–361; and laity 182, 256–257; Mūrtipūjaka 317–325; Mūrtipūjaka preponderance 362; Śrimad Rājacandra’s critique 246; and Śrimad Rājacandra movement 251–252; Śhānakavāṣṭi 325–334; Terāpanth 334–339; see also monk; nun; monastic organisation; order; monastic
Menški, Werner 419, 420, 422, 428, 431 merchant: characteristics of 23; killing of living beings 23 merit (punya) 229; accumulation 294, 424, 447; family’s 187, 228; Jain critique of non-Jain views 448; transfer of 202 n.7 Michell, George 406 Mīmāṃśā 90; on omniscience 92–93, 107 Mines, Mattison 208, 210, 211 minority rights 314, 353 miracle 267, 273–276 Miśra, Durtleka 137 Mitchell, Clyde 333 mokṣa (spiritual liberation) 22, 54 n.10, 93, 96, 99 n.25, 111–113, 169, 205 n.33, 213, 214, 219, 222, 248, 438, 447; capability 193, 261 n.34; female 178 n.154, 205 n.33, 214, 222, 378 n.146, 386 n.239; Jamāli 39; Kilbiṣaka gods 36; laity 246; Neminath 201 n.4; niścaya path of Tāraṇ Śvāṃi 267; in the present age 177 n.41; of Śrīmad Rājacandra 241, 253–254; Rathnemī and Rājīmatī 157; self-enlightened being 40; and well-being 197, 227, 234 n.24, 294 monasticism: demographic trends in 312; see also mendicant, monastic organisation monastic organisation 321–354, 358; absence in early Jainism 12; answer to the problem of integrating nuns 334; counteracting segmentary pressures 333, 354–359; descent, succession and seniority 324; Digambara and Śvētāmbara compared 158, 164–166, 168, 333; Digambara hierarchy 168–169, 265, 354–359; Gosāla’s critique of Mahāvīra’s 9, 12; influence on group size 324; property vs code of conduct 354; and security 170; see also gaccha; initiation; lineage; maryādā; order, monastic; ritual; succession
Monier-Williams, Monier 439 monk: Buddhist 160; Digambara 158, 168–169, 339–361; Mūrtipūjaka 317–325; Śhānakavāṣṭi 325–334; Śvētāmbara 158, 317–339; Śvētāmbara code of conduct (Adda) 12–14; Terāpanth 334–339; see also mendicant; nun movement 9, 34; Adhyātma 340, 377 n.134; anti-printing 384 n.215; cow protection 353; definition 242, 260 n.20, 367 n.8; Digambara Terāpanth 339–340; lay 241, 313, 346–347, 354, 366; vs hierocratic organisation 324; monastic 316; Mūrtipūjaka reform 160; protest 363; Rajñīs 306 n.69; Rāmakṛṣṇa 159; vs sect 260 n.20; Śrīmad Rājacandra 241, 249–251; Śhānakavāṣṭi 315, 366, 374 n.84; temple-entry 301 n.25; Dasa Pūjādhikārān Andolān 347;
INDEX

movement (Continued)
see also denomination; dispute; ekala
vihārī; lineage; order, monastic; reform;
school; sect
Mūlacakāra Dhammadāsa tradition 332
Mūlasaṅgaha: vs Kāsthāsaṅgha 341, 342,
346, 352–353, 378 n.147;
see also Kāsthāsaṅgha
muni 168–171, 265, 339–361; protection
171; revival 347; see also Digambara;
monk
Munidacandra 47
Mundirasāgara, Muni 348
Mūrtipājaka: mendicant 317–325;
recitation of sati names 200; reform
movement 160–161
Muslim: attacks on Khajuraho 410, 413;
expropriation of religious sites
401–402; followers of Tārāṇ Śvāmī
264, 266, 275, 280, 283, 297; Hindu
fear of demographic outgrowth 369;
and Hindu Marriage Act 432;
influence on Rajniś 293; influence
on Tārāṇ Śvāmī 271, 272,
301 n.29; Islamic and Christian
fundamentalism 89; Islamic decorative
features in Jain architecture 406;
Law 428; rule in India and emergence
of bhaṭṭāraka institution 345, 354;
thinkers 90
mysticism 267–270; and rejection of
image worship 272–273; see also
Kundakunda; Tārāṇ Śvāmī
Nagarāja, Muni 337
Nāgārjuna 63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 75
na kime 16
Nalinbhā Kothārī (Rāja Saubhāga Āśram
Sāyāl) 243, 251–257
Nāma Mālā (Tārāṇ Śvāmī) 277, 279,
280, 281
Namaskāra Mantra 182, 197, 205 n.41
Namisāgara, Ācārya 350
Nandī Cunī (Jinādāsa): account of Jaina
councils 70–71
Nandī Śūtra (Nandī Sutta) 45, 47; account
of Jaina councils 68–69
Nandiyāśa, Śadhvī 172–173
Nath, R. 406
Nathmal, Muni see Mahāprajña, Ācārya
na uvei 19
navaṁ 22
Nava Terāpanth 337
Navratnamala, Muni 316, 334
nāya-puṭte 22
Naylor, Simon 421
n 19
n'egant 25
neha (na iha) 24–25
Nidhī, Śadhvī 172
nihava (concealment) (Pkt. nihava) 33,
47; see also heretics/heresy
Niranjana, Śadhvī 164–165
Nīrvāṇa Hundi 264
nīrvāṇa svāmī 385 n.219
nīryutki (Pkt. nijuttī) 6, 39, 79 n.29,
372 n.62
nisāt 303 n.48
Nisājī 275, 282, 283–286
niścaya naya (absolute point of view):
Jamāli 54 n.15; Kānji Śvāmī 269;
Kundakunda 267; Tārāṇ Śvāmī
267–268, 269, 304 n.57; see also Kānji
Śvāmī; Kundakunda; Tārāṇ Śvāmī;
vyaavahāra naya
nissiyā 24
Nizami, A. H. 280
no ‘kāma’ 20
non-violence see ahiṁsā
Norman, Kenneth R. 10, 14, 19, 20, 24, 25
novice 175 n.7, 177 n.34, 337, 354–355,
375 n.103, 387 n.268; see also aila ka
ksullaka/ksullikā; samāna śrenī
nudity 169–170; of bhaṭṭārakas 382 n.190
nu:n: Buddhist 160, 177 n.34; definition
174, 202, 223, 355, 367; Digambara
158, 344, 355–358, 386; Digambara
hierarchy 168–169, 265, 355–356;
Mūrtipājaka 317–325; ordination 364;
Prem Śūrī’s rejection of integration of
371 n.46; preponderance 157–162,
166–167, 174, 315; problem of
integration into a mendicant order 334;
protection 170–173, 361; and sattas
182; status 365; Śthānakaśaśi 195,
325–334; Śvetāmbara 158, 317–339;
Śvetāmbara and Digambar rules
compared 166–170; terms 195;
Vijayavallabha Śūrī’s liberal rules
371 n.53; see also āryikā; Candanabālā;
celibacy; chastity; ksullaka/ksullikā;
mendicant; monk; Priyadārśanā
Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrtī) 119, 120,
122–126
INDEX

Rajput: conversion 12
Rakeshbhai Jhaveri 242, 246–247, 254
Ramakrishna movement 159
Ramaratna Dharmadasa Jahaagaccha 332
Rathanemi 157, 174
Ratnakiri 91
ratmatraya (three jewels) 213
rātrī bhojana tyāga (giving up taking food at night) 379 n.152, 444
reason vs revelation 89–90;
Jain-Mimamsā debate 91–96
rebirth 40–41; of those hostile to their teachers 36–37, 38–39; see also hell; Jamāli
reform: Akhil Bhāratvarṣiya Digambara Jain Parisad 347, 353, 384, n.217
Buddhist 375 n.103; Dasa Puḍādhikāran Anderson 301 n.25, 347; Digambara Jain caste associations 384 n.215;
Digambara Terāpanth 340, 346, 353; Jain Association of India 370 n.40; Jain Parisad 347, 353, 384 n.217;
Kumārasena I 379 n.152; law reform 346, 424–425, 429, 431; lay intellectuals 313, 346–347, 354; Loṅkā 326;
Śthānākavāṣī 315–316, 325–326; Śvetāmbara Terāpanth 337–338; Tārān Śvāmī 270–273, 277; Vījayavallabha Sūri 177 n.36, 371 n.53; see also movement
relic: Jamāli’s hair 37
religion: Buddhist 177 n.34; compassion as basis of 439; Digambara Jain 170, 348; judge’s misunderstanding of 435; modern construction of Jainism as a 313, 367 nn.11–14; personal nature of 161; and philosophy 423; Rajmī on true religion of self-realisation 295; Tārān Śvāmī on Jainism as the foremost 306 n.68; Wilfred Cantwell Smith on cumulative tradition 306 n.73; see also dharma; Jainism; self-realisation
religious belief and practice 208; combination with female kinship roles 232; and demarcation of space and time apart from the household 219–220; and female personhood 208–209, 231–232; and maturation of self in context of marriage 218–219; personal and family identity 220; soteriological purpose of 254
religious site: forcible expropriation 401–402; of Rājacandra movement 242–243; Samme/Śikhara 348–349;
Tārān Śvāmī Panth 282–286; Tirtha Vandana list 189
Renou, Louis 67
renunciation 6, 35, 37, 41, 173–174, 223;
Hindu and Jain compared 158–166; ideal 162; Jamāli 35, 37, 39; lay 265, 365; of Megha 37; motives 338, 362–365; political symbolism 363, 365; psychological 257; of Ṛṣabhadatta 41; and sacrifice 183–185; of Skandaka Kātyāyana 41; story of daicots 6
revelation see reason vs revelation
Reynell, Josephine 176 n.19, 208, 364
ritual: creating personal and social identity 230, 263, 374 n.74; culture 246, 264, 282, 291, 340; Digambara 287, 342; Digambara Terāpanth 440; gender separation 177 n.31, 230; ideology 287; lay 287; life-cycle 232 n.11; monastic 345; mundana 283; for protection of family 183, 186; purity 428; roles 196, 202 n.7, 265, 270, 282, 319, 346; satī lists 181; vs spirituality 253, 267, 270–273, 288, 295–296, 349, 353; symbols 227–231, 231; Tārān Śvāmī Panth 288–292; temple 213, 219, 242, 287, 296, 346, 350, 353, 402, 405, 407, 410–411; texts and instructions 182, 282, 289; veneration of ascetics 246, 257; see also aksaya nidhi tapa; ārāti; dikṣā; fasting; māṅgalkā; marriage; pratikramana;
reform; rule; sallekhanā; sāmāyika; satī
Roth, Gustav 10, 22
Ṛṣabhadatta 40, 41; Jamāli’s homage 35
Ṛṣimandalarakarana (Padmamandiragiri) 64, 75
Ṛṣi Sampradāya 326; see also Dhuṇḍīyā tradition; Lava; Śthānākavāṣī
Ruiyā Jin (Ruiyā Raman) 275, 280, 283
rules see monastic organisation
Rupcand, Muni 337
rūvēṇa 16

473
INDEX

sabha-gao 9
Sadgunadben 244
sādhana-dharmāsiddha 120
sādhana-vikala 133–134
Sādhānāvyatirekin 134
sāḍharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa see fallacious example
Sādhumārgī 326, 331; see also Hara/Harji; Śhānakavāṣī
sādhya-sādhānāvyatirekin 121, 124, 127
sādhya-sādhana-vikala 136
sādhya-vikala 120,133, 135
sāḍhvyatirekin 120, 128, 134
sāḍhvyāvṛtta 120
Sagarānanda Śūripā Ṭāgamodāhrāraka’ 319, 372 n.62
Śāh, Kāntībhārī B. 190
Śāh, Maltī 318, 319
Śāh, Sulpa ‘Teli’ 280
Śahiśānanda, Muni 252
śāhive 25
Saitavāla caste: and Digambara munis 346
Sajjan Saṃmitra Yane Ėkādaś Mahānīdhi 199, 200
saṭṭhāya (verse form) 188, 190, 198
sa-kāma-kiccena 20
sākā (branch) 317, 342
Saletore, R. N. 228
sallekhanā (Skt. sañīkhanā) 5, 36, 246, 351, 353; Jamāli’s 36
Śāmucārśataka (Saṃyasundara): account of Jaina councils 73–74
Saṃmādi (funerary memorial):
   bhāttārakas: Lāṭūra Sākā 380 n.165; Vidyādharā 386 n.237; Vidyāsāgara
   Senagana 382 n.194; munis: 303 n.48, 385 n.222, Vimalasāgara 386 n.243,
   Tārān Śvāmī Panth 282; Himāi Pāndē 281, 283; Tārān Śvāmī 275–276,
   283–286; see also nīsāi; śmāraka
Saṃgra Jāin Cāturmāsa Sācit 315
Saṃmāyā, Kapūrcand 270–271, 273, 274, 278
Saṃmāyā, Mathurā Prasād 268
Saṃmāyā, Rādhelāl 282, 287
Saṃmāyā caste 269, 281
saṃnā saṃraṇi 337; see also novice
Saṃmāṭabhadra 107–108; Kumārila’s attack on 91, 98 nn.13–14, 108; mokṣa
111–112; on omniscience 108–110, 112; on rātri bhovana 444; and Tāraṇ Śvāmī 279
Saṃṭyārantā 26
Samayasundara: account of Jaina councils 73–74
sāmāyikas 219–220, 226, 231, 273, 374
n.86; text 200
Sāmāyika (Hariśbhadrācārya) 200
samādhyā 9–10
samāy 20
sampradāya (tradition) 296, 320, 348;
   see also gaccha; gāna
samśākara 214–215
samudāya 321, 324–325
samyak-cārītra (right conduct) 213, 278
samyak-dārśana (right view) 203, 213;
   and compassion 440–441, 448–449;
   and self-realisation 239 passim
samyak-jñāna (right knowledge) 213
samyama (restraint) 169
Samyamaratīnā, Śadhvī 167, 171
Saṇdehaṇīvyāsadhī (Jinaprabhamuni): account of Jaina councils 64, 72–74
sandḥigṛda-sādhana-dharma 120, 122
sandḥigṛda-sādhana-vyatirekha 121, 124, 134–136
sandḥigṛda-sādhya-dharma 120, 122, 127
sandḥigṛda-sādhya-sādhana-dharma 120, 122
sandḥigṛda-sādhya-sādhana-vyatirekha 121, 125, 127, 131–133
sandḥigṛda-sādhya-vyatirekha 121, 124, 127, 128, 130–131
Sangave, Vilas A. 271–272, 312, 313
saṇgha (community): concept 366 n.4; Digambara munis 342; five-fold
   367 n.8; four-fold 167, 314, 367 n.10;
   four-fold Digambara 386 n.240;
   six-fold (Jñānāsāgara) 265
saṇghāda (sub-group of itinerant mendicants): Śhānakavāṣī 332–334;
   Tapāgaccha 325
Saṇghāśṭaka (Jñānāsāgara) 265
Saṅkara 16
Saṅkarasvāmī 119–120
Saṅtārakṣita 91
Saṅtinātha Temple 402, 405
Saṅtisāgara ‘Chāṇi, Ācārya 348–349, 350, 353
Saṅtisāgara ‘Dakṣiṇa’, Ācārya 348, 350–353; successors 350
saṇṭ tradition: and Tāraṇ Śvāmī 273
Saṅtyācārya Vādīvetāla: account of Jaina councils 71–72
Śarada Maṭha 160

474
Sarasvatīgaccha see Balākāragaṇa; Mulasangha
Sravadarśanasamgraha (Mādhava) 96
savarajña see omniscient
Sravajñāsatakā (Dharmasāgara) 46–47
Sravajñasiddhi (Haribhadra) 91, 92
Śāsanamudra (Navaratnamala) 334
Śāstravrāttāsamucaya (Haribhadra) 91–95
Śāstrī, Dharmacandra 358
Śāstrī, Kailāscandra see Kailāscandra Śāstrī
Śāstrī, Phulendra “Siddhānta” see Phulendra “Siddhānta” Śāstrī
satā narratives 157, 159, 170, 181–193
Satā Sattī ni Sajjhāy 182, 186, 190–191, 199–200
sātāvedāntiya karman: and compassion 441–442
sattī (virtuous woman) 181; discourse 182, 183–185; Hindu context 183–184; self-immolation 205 n.34
sattī name lists 181–183, 201; efficacy 197–200; fluidity within 191–193; gender and categories of virtue 193–195; inclusivity 195–197; as māṅgalīk 199–200; reduction of karma 197–199; use in annual calendar of rituals 182
Śākthandāgama (Puspadanta & Bhūtabalī) 346, 379 n.154, 380 n.163, 443–444
Śāt Lakh Śātra 189
saubhāgya 222
savva-pāyānakampī 26
school: doctrinal 312, 365; definition 366 n.4, 367 n.8; see also denomination; ekala vihārī; gaccha; lineage; movement; order, monastic
Schubring, Walther 15, 19, 22–24, 28 n.19, 212, 365; account of Jaina councils 62, 65, 66; on gacchas 321, 366 n.4; on jīva and āyā 212–213; on Mulasangha 343
scripture: Buddhist 90; Digambara 346; and indirect knowledge 108; Jain 19, 42, 44–53, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 90, 93, 294; knowledge of and authority 260 n.21, 278; lack of scriptural tradition of Tārān Śvāmī Panth 280; and logic 109–110; and omniscience 95, 109; possession of mendicants 344; publication of 347, 372 n.62, 381 n.185, 383 n.215, 428; revelatory 89; and scholars 168; source of wellbeing 188, 197, 291; of Śrīmad Rājacandra 246; Śhānakavāsi 326; study 249, 257, 266, 364; of Tārān Śvāmī 296; Veda 93, 95; worship 176 n.26, 288, 290, 297, 428; see also āgama
sect 312, 317, 365; category (Census of India) 368 n.11, 368 n.17; vs church 374 n.76; definition 366 n.4, 367 n.8; Jains “Hindu” 424; organisation 377 n.134, 384 n.285; religious sites of 401; sub-sect 45, 175 n.4; see also denomination; ekala vihārī; gaccha; lineage; movement; order, monastic; religion; school
sectarianism: absent between Digambara mūnis 354; anti-sectarian 241, 245, 251, 259, 267; awareness 342; and caste 341; controversies 33, 46, 52, 132, 134, 142; divisions 42, 263; non-sectarian 440; pre-sectarian 250; and regional style 286; vs self-realisation 250; trans-sectarian 267; views on compassion 439; see also dispute
self: as an aspect of personhood 210; development within female person 216–217; gender, personhood and 214–215; and individual 210–211
self-realisation 260 n.2; Adhyātma movement 339; ātma jñāna (knowledge of the soul) 96, 295; and guru bhakti 253; Kundakunda 258 n.16; and mokṣa 251; samyak-darsana 241, 441; Tārān Śvāmī 279, 290; of women 232
Senagana 434
se uade 25
Shāntā, N. 170, 199, 200, 321–322, 324, 332, 338, 358
Sharma, Jagdish P. 313
Siddharsi Gani 45, 48, 52; divergence from Dharmakīrti’s formulations 130–132, 138; on fallacious examples 140–142; influence of Dharmakīrti 129–130
Siddhasena Gani 448
Siddhasena Mahāmāti 140, 141
Śiddha Subhāva (Tārān Śvāmī) 279, 296
sikkhiya 19
Śīlāṅka 3–4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 38, 47, 50, 51; account of Jaina councils 71
Śīlavatī 191–192
Śīmandhara Śvāmī, Tirthāṅkara 259
similarity see fallacious example
Sinclair-Brull, Wendy 159
Singh, R. J. 110
Singhhiyā, Mādhorāo, King of Gwalior 286
Singhvi, L. M. 438–439
Śīyahītā (Śaṇṭyācārya Vādīvetāla) 72
Śītalprāśād, Brahmacāryi 267–268, 280,
283, 289, 299 n.5, 300 n.16, 300 n.18,
304 n.57, 347; biographical study of
Tāran Svāmī 266, 267, 268
Śivasāgara, Ācārya 351
Skandaka Kātyāyana 40, 41
Skandila 63–64, 66–67, 69, 70, 72, 74–75
Ślokavārttika (Kumārila) 107
smāraka (memorial) 303 n.50; see also
samādhi
Smith, E. Montague 429
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell 161
Sōl Mahasatto (Dhami) 200
Solomon, E. A. 108
Sōl Satī ni Stuti see Brāhma Čandanaḥīkā
Sōl Satī no Chand (Udayaratna) 182,
186–188, 197–198; as māṅgalik 199, 200
Somani, R. V. 184
Somasaṇa, Bhāṭṭāraka 427
soteriology 254–255
soul see jīva
Śrāddhagunavivarana (Jinamanḍana
Gani) 44
Śrāmaṇasaṅgha 315, 326, 331, 332
śrāvaka/śrāvikā (listener, Jain lay person):
 DAGHANYA, UTKRṣa 344; see also lay
Śrāvakācāra texts: Digambara 278, 444,
352; Tāran Svāmī 267–269, 278,
287–288
śrāvaka pratimā (stages of the lay path)
344; see also vow
Śrenika, King 276; see also Padmanābha,
Tirthāṅka
Śreyams 196
Śrīmad Rājendra Ṛādhyaṭmik Śādhana
Kendra, Kobā 243, 249, 257
Śrīmad Rājendra Āśram, Agās 243
Śrīmad Rājendra Āśram, Dharampūr
242–243, 257
Śrīmad Rājendra movement 242, 249,
250, 252, 253, 254, 257–259, 260 n.4,
261 n.29; guru lineage 249–250; and
liberation 253–254; and mendicancy
251–252; sectarianism 250–253; and
self-realisation 247–255; structure of
242–244; types of guru 255–256
Śrīmāli caste 216, 244; and Śthānakavāśī
candids 332
Śrīpāl, King 196
Śrutasāgara Śūrī 345
Stevenson, Mrs Sinclair (Margaret) 200
Śthānakavāśī 235, 263, 339; and Śrīmad
Rājendra 245
Śthānāṅga Śūtra (Thānāṅga Sutta) 33,
42, 44
Sthāvīravatī (List of the Elders)
68–69, 314
strī dharma (women’s duty): 159, 222–223
Ṣubāhu, Prince 50
Ṣubhāṣīla Gāni (Kathākośa) 192
Subodhikā (Vinayavijaya) 73, 75
succession: after Mahāvīra 290, 315;
A(n)calagaccha 317; bhāṭṭāraka
345–346, 382 n.190, 382 n.194,
384 n.208; Digambara pupillary 342,
350–353, 358–359, 381 n.185, absence
359, āmnāya, anvaya 378 n.138;
dispute after Vijayadeva Śūrī’s death
319; and doctrinal schools 342; vs
pupillary descent 324, 359, 381 n.185;
and religious authority 44, 93 (Vēda);
of sāṃvegt sādhus versus charisma
324; Śvetāmbara Terāpanth 334;
Tapāgaccha 324; see also āmnāya;
authority; order, monastic
Sudarśanā 42
Sudharmaśāgara, Ācārya 350
suffering: removal of 445–446
suicide: religious 5–7, 36, 246, 351, 353;
see also sallekhana
Sulasā 181, 185, 191, 200
Sulpā Sāh Teli 280
sunehi me 8
sunīcita-asambhavad-bādhaka-pramāṇa
112
Sūnna Subhāva (Ṭāraṇ Svāmī) 279, 296
suttē 19
Sūyagada Nījuttī (Sūtrakrtāṅga Niryukti)
44, 47
Śvetāmbara 44, 263, 317 passim; and
Jamāli’s teachings 34, 45, 52–53
Śvetāmbara Terāpanth/Terahpanth 242,
259, 263, 340–341; on charity 447
symbol: in logic 117–118, 142

tahacce 10–11
Tapāgaccha 165, 166, 181, 263, 317–325,
338; conference of monks 1988 in
INDEX

vayanti 24, 25
vayāsī 24

Veda: absolute authority 90, 91, 109;
authorship 94–95; and Jainism 423;
source of dharma 92–94

Viśāraṇākara (Kīrtivijaya) 45–46

Vidhimārga see Digambara

Terāpanth/Terālpanth

Vidhipakṣa see Añcala Gaccha

Vidyānanda 91, 441

Vidyānandāsāgara, Ācārya 353

Vidyānand “Rāstrasant,” Ācārya 352

Vidyāsāgara, Ācārya 351, 352, 353, 356

Vidyāsāgarasāṅgha 356–357

viṃḥ 14

viḥāra (mendicant wandering) 172;
see also ekala viḥāra

Vijayāhira Śūri 318

Vijñānaprāṇa, Samyāsīnī 160

Vilātī, Paramāṇand 280

Vimalā, Sādhvī 172

Vimalasāgara, Ācārya 351, 353

Vinayavijaya 73

violence 41, 56 n.43

vipārita-vyatirekha 121

Vīrācitrā 45

Virāpiyāsā, Sādhvī 173

Virasāgara, Ācārya 350–351

Virasena: on compassion 443–444

virtue: sati lists as totality of 191–197

virtuous man see mahāpūrussa

virtuous woman see saññī

Viśākācārya see Ardhabalin

Viṣeṣāvāsyakabhāṣya (Jinabhadrā) 38

viṇyāgarejī ṃ 20

Viyāhāpannattī 68; see also Bhagavatī

Śītārā

von Simson, Georg 34

Vorā, Lādakandbhāti Mānekand (Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśrām Sāylā) 241

vow (vrata) 14, 257, 381 n.185, 347–348;
aṅkalakā and kṣullakā 344; of allegiance
367 n.8, 359 n.185; aṅjunvṛata and
mahāvṛata 11, 22, 278, 439, 442–443;
brahahṛta 344; bhottāraka 344–345;
brahmacarya 157; and fast 226, 230;
Tāran Svāmī 265; caudaḥ niyama 226;
fast of Mahāvīra 184, 187; and

Vidyābhūtanās 441; lay 6–7, 252, 287,
290; passim 282, 344; Schubring’s
interpretation 28 n.19; Sitalprasad 268;
Śrīmad Rājacandra movement
257–258; ways of breaking 189;
mahāvrata 225, 319, 445; muni
359 n.185; of Śīlavatī 188; of silence
18; śravaka pratimānā 7, 278, 344, 354;
see also dīkṣā; fast; food; lavālavā;
sallekhanā; sāmāyika

Vusimā 17

Vīśākhānapaddhati (Dharmasāgara) 75
vyāpti see invariable concomitance
vyāvahāra naya (conventional point of
view): Jamāli 38; Tāran Svāmī 267,
269; see also Kundakunda;
niṣcaya naya

wealth 37, 185, 234 n.34, 266, 282, 340,
352; differentials between Jains 347,
353; and fasting 223–224; nidhi 227;
and legal privileges 429; and
ostentation 340; and support of
mendicants 232 n.13, 325, 363,
390 n.311

Weber, Albrecht 61, 64, 66

Weber, Max 324, 367 n.8

Weinberger-Thomas, Catherine 183

Welhengama, Gnanapala 421

widow 162; remarriage 338; renunciation
173, 338, 364

Wiles, Royce 61

Williams, Robert 354

Winternitz, Moritz 65–66

Wong, Aline 215

Yāpanīyasāṅgha 343, 378 n.146

Yaśovijaya, Upādhyāya 46, 317;
response to Dharmasāgara on
rebirths 50–52

yati (sedentary ascetic) 317–320, 343;
traditions 325

Yoga 90

Yogāṣṭhā (Hemacandra) 444, 445;
account of Jaina councils 72

Young, Serenity 159

Zannas, Eliky 406

Zydenbos, Robert J. 158, 171
A library at your fingertips!

eBooks are electronic versions of printed books. You can store them on your PC/laptop or browse them online.

They have advantages for anyone needing rapid access to a wide variety of published, copyright information.

eBooks can help your research by enabling you to bookmark chapters, annotate text and use instant searches to find specific words or phrases. Several eBook files would fit on even a small laptop or PDA.

NEW: Save money by eSubscribing: cheap, online access to any eBook for as long as you need it.

Annual subscription packages

We now offer special low-cost bulk subscriptions to packages of eBooks in certain subject areas. These are available to libraries or to individuals.

For more information please contact webmaster.ebooks@tandf.co.uk

We’re continually developing the eBook concept, so keep up to date by visiting the website.

www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk